The five case studies in this volume concern at-risk youth. Disadvantaged youth programs in different states were studied by different authors: (1) Albuquerque, New Mexico (Richard Mendel); (2) Baltimore, Maryland (Edward C. Lorenz); (3) Hartford, Connecticut (Richard Funkhouser and Delsie Gandia-Fabian); (4) Oakland, California (David Snedeker); and (5) Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Richard deLone). All five case studies report the following: (1) a general concern about high dropout rates; (2) a discussion of model programs; (3) a large proportion of youth at risk because they are not progressing in career and life educational activities; (4) grades five through eight proving to be educationally more effective than grades seven through nine; (5) a need to increase career education and career development programs and to provide remedial education to all students; and (6) reevaluation of funding and legislation for urban education at all levels. (NLA)
Five Case Studies for Youth - At - Risk Project

Albuquerque, New Mexico, Richard Mendel for MDC, Inc.

Baltimore, Maryland, Edward C. Lorenz

Hartford, Connecticut, Richard N. Funkhouser and Delsie M. Gandia - Fabian

Oakland, California, David Snedeker for MDC, Inc.


Research Report No. 88-11

May 1988

NCEP
National Commission for Employment Policy
1522 K Street, N.W., Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20005
The case studies in this volume were prepared under contracts with the authors and the National Commission for Employment Policy as part of the Commission's project on youth-at-risk. Views or opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Commission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Albuquerque, New Mexico, Richard Mendel for MDC, Inc.
2. Baltimore, Maryland, Edward C. Lorenz
3. Hartford, Connecticut, Richard N. Funkhouser and Delsie M. Gandia-Fabian
4. Oakland, California, David Snedeker for MDC, Inc.
Albuquerque Case Report
Options For At-Risk Youth --- Age 9-15

Richard Mendel
for
MDC, Inc.
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Education in Albuquerque</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albuquerque and At-Risk Youth</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. The At-Risk Population</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Who's At Risk?&quot;</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Indicators</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Indicators</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Indicators</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Completion: The Cross-Cutting Issue</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Programs for Disadvantaged Youth, Ages 9-15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overview</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS and Disadvantaged Youth</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment and Career Education</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Partnerships for the Future</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Analysis and Conclusions</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview

Albuquerque's efforts to serve disadvantaged youth have reached a critical juncture in 1987. On one hand, Albuquerque has developed over the past two decades a national reputation for innovative programming for at-risk youth. This recognition has emerged largely through a series of model programs that have been either developed or tested in Albuquerque. These have included youth employment programs, alternative schools, and efforts to serve special populations such as teen parents and adjudicated youth.

There is increasing awareness in Albuquerque, however, that the existing network of programs and services is not yet adequate; that a comprehensive approach to dropout prevention -- one that focuses on averting problems through early intervention and provides the necessary level of assistance to all youth in need -- remains an elusive goal in Albuquerque.

Summary of Data

An estimated 11,500 youth aged 9-15 are economically disadvantaged within the Albuquerque area. Of those, approximately 2,691 are white; 7,498 are Hispanic; 529 are Native American; 483 are black; and 299 are Asian. Overall, minorities comprise 46.7 percent of the school age population and 76.6 percent of the poor students.

Students in New Mexico are required to take the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills (CTBS) battery in their third, fifth, and eighth grade years. Albuquerque Public Schools students score higher than both the state and national norms. Ten to fifteen percent of APS students in the third, fifth, and eighth grades score in the bottom quartile of students nationally. The percentage of students scoring in the bottom quartile varies widely from school to school, and it is closely correlated to the percentage of students within the school who live in low-income homes. Overall, CTBS results suggest that 5,000 students aged 9-15 may be in need of remediation. The evidence suggests that most of these at-risk students are poor, minority, or both.

Indicators of the number of 9-15 year olds with attitudinal and behavioral problems is sketchy. Available information reveals:

- 917 crimes were committed on school grounds during the 1983-1984 school year. About 80 percent of these were burglary and larceny, and there were 15 rapes and 106 cases of assault reported.
In 1986, the Albuquerque Police Department made 3,620 juvenile arrests covering 5,746 crimes committed by juveniles. Of these crimes, 2,815 (49 percent) were committed by youth 15 years or younger.

In 1984, 1,020 babies were born to teen mothers in Bernalillo County, including 368 babies to mothers 17 and younger and 24 babies born to mothers below 15 years of age.

According to a recent statewide survey, 71 percent of ninth grade students in New Mexico have experimented with beer or wine; 56 percent have experimented with liquor; and 34 percent have experimented with marijuana.

The dropout rate for APS students in 1986-87 was 8.03 percent, meaning that 1,975 students were counted as dropouts. Of these, 968 were white; 844 were Hispanic; 71 were black; 66 were Native American; and 23 were Asian. Dropout rates were significantly higher for Hispanics, blacks, and Native Americans than for Whites and Asian students.

APS also conducted a major survey in 1986-87 to improve its understanding of the dropout situation -- identifying more than 4,000 students who dropped out of the APS system from 1984-1986 and contacting 251 of these dropouts for personal interviews. The study found that the dropout problem is most severe for ninth grade students. Apparently, the transition from middle school to the much larger, less supportive, more impersonal high schools has driven many students out of the APS system -- a fact that was not recognized in previous data.

Program Inventory

The most comprehensive efforts to serve Albuquerque's at-risk youth are provided by the public schools. They include Chapter One remedial education services offered to over 6,000 students each year, and summer school -- attended by over 5,000 students each year. In addition, APS operates several alternative school programs. The best known of these is New Futures School for adolescent parents.

Employment programs and career education are not widespread for 9-15 year old youth. The JTPA summer employment programs works with 500 14 and 15 year olds each summer, providing limited remedial instruction to complement work experience. Dial-a-Teen, a temporary employment service for youth, provides more limited work opportunities for
approximately 2,500 youth in the summer months. New programs by Mountain Bell and the Hispano Chamber of Commerce are offering some exposure to career and work issues for younger students, but overall there is little career education and counseling available to the 9-15 population.

During the past year, a number of parallel initiatives has emerged in Albuquerque to focus the energy both of the schools and the larger community toward meeting the challenge posed by the at-risk youth population. These efforts are benefitting from a marked increase in interest and involvement from the private sector. The Ford Foundation and the National Alliance of Business are also providing support for new approaches to dropout prevention. These efforts are hindered, however, by the difficult fiscal environment facing the Albuquerque Public Schools. The vast majority of school funds are provided by statute through the State of New Mexico, which supports public education through a severance tax on energy. Revenues from the tax have suffered considerably in recent years due to falling energy prices.

Conclusion

In its quarterly report for June-August 1987, the Albuquerque Business Education Compact wrote: "It is clear that the majority of students dropout or lose interest in school before the high school years -- enough so that the earlier years require at least as much attention as the later years for intervention to occur."

Interviews with school staff for the recent APS dropout prevention study revealed several policy questions that must be resolved before APS can move forward with a more comprehensive approach to dropout prevention.

First, a major question facing APS is how to assist students in the difficult transition from middle school to high school. In response to this problem, APS has recently developed the Community School alternative program; unfortunately the Community School can serve only 30 of 6,000 ninth graders per semester.

The APS study suggests that "early high school curricula should focus on the development of personal responsibility for social behavior and classroom performance." Several high school principals suggested that students not be allowed to enter high school until they have demonstrated a mastery of middle school basic skills. The policy options are numerous, yet there is a growing consensus that an improved system for easing this middle school to high school transition will be an essential component of the overall APS dropout prevention strategy.
A second major issue raised by several staff members concerned the APS alternative education programs. APS has shown a clear preference in the past toward alternative education programs removed from the mainstream school environment. It has placed less emphasis on in-school support. The APS student-to-counselor ratio is approximately 450:1, and several APS officials admit that the level of counseling services -- both for in-school counseling and home-school liaisons -- is limited.

Many APS staff also complain that the system's mandatory attendance policies -- under which students are suspended for non-attendance -- are counterproductive, prohibiting students from attending school rather than providing an incentive for improved attendance. A number of APS officials feel that these priorities are inappropriate to the needs of the current population of potential dropouts.

The third major issue facing Albuquerque is how to make the emerging Business Education Compact most useful to APS and to Albuquerque's youth. Albuquerque's private sector has grown increasingly involved in supporting APS and serving the City's youth. Up until now, however, the impact of this involvement has been limited. A major challenge for the Compact is to increase both the quantity and the depth of these partnerships.

The support of the private sector will become even more critical in the future due to the overall funding constraints facing APS. While the private sector cannot provide significant supplemental funding to offset these constraints, the Albuquerque Business Education Compact might do well to establish a local foundation to support public education -- as several cities have done in recent years. Through incentive programs and active involvement in the schools, private businesses might also help to provide the type of environment that motivates students to remain in school and to succeed.

Albuquerque clearly has a long way to go in addressing the dropout problem and the other problems facing its at-risk youth population. But the city, which has long been recognized for its innovation in youth programming, is beginning to think more broadly, ask the right questions, and generate the support and involvement of the greater community.
I. INTRODUCTION

Sitting beneath the Sandia mountains in the heart of central New Mexico, Albuquerque has been a steadily growing city over the past two decades. Population in the city increased from 245,000 in 1970 to 332,000 in 1980 to 387,000 in 1987. Bernalillo County, which encompasses Albuquerque, has seen its population grow from 420,000 in 1980 to 464,000 in 1985.

Not counting the public schools or state and local government, the largest employers in the Albuquerque area are Sandia National Laboratory, Kirtland Air Force Base, and the University of New Mexico. Other major employers include hospitals and health care providers, electronics and defense contractors, utilities, banks, and food stores. The county unemployment rate increased gradually in the early 1980s from 7.9 percent in 1980 to 8.6 percent in 1983; since that time it has dropped to 6.5 percent.

Though wealthier than most areas in New Mexico, Albuquerque is poorer than the nation as a whole. Per capita personal income in Bernalillo County was $12,305 in 1984, compared with $10,262 for New Mexico and $13,114 for the United States. In 1979, the last year for which data are available, 54,481 Bernalillo residents (13.2 percent) lived in poverty. Of these, 20,820 were under the age of 18.

Albuquerque’s population is split largely between whites and Hispanics. There are also smaller populations of black, Native American, and Asian residents. Albuquerque’s overall racial make-up can be seen in the table below.

RACIAL COMPOSITION OF ALBUQUERQUE POPULATION, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
<th>% of Poor Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat. Amer.</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census.
As the table above shows, poverty is found disproportionately in Albuquerque's minority populations. Hispanics made up 52.3 percent of the Bernalillo County poverty population in 1979, while whites made up only 36.5 percent. The poverty rate for whites was 8.3 percent, less than half the 18.6 percent rate for Hispanics. Poverty rates for blacks, Asians, and Native Americans were all greater than 20 percent.

Public Education in Albuquerque

The Albuquerque Public Schools (APS) comprise the nation's twenty-seventh largest school system, enrolling 79,919 students in 1986-87. An additional 9,143 students attended private schools. Within APS, per pupil expenditures in 1986-87 were $3,133, well below the national average. APS is unusual in that 92.8 percent of its budget is provided by state funds provided through New Mexico's state equalization formula. The remainder of the budget is provided from local funds, the federal government, and cash balances.

The APS system operates 113 schools, including 74 elementary schools, 23 middle schools, 11 high schools, 4 alternative schools, and a "career enrichment center."

For adults, a Technical/Vocational Institute (T-VI) provides technical education and skills training to residents 16 and older. Enrollment at T-VI, which has grown rapidly over the past decade, now stands at approximately 13,000 during the fall and spring sessions and 8,500 in the summer.

Albuquerque and At-Risk Youth

Over the past two decades, Albuquerque has developed a national reputation for innovative programming for at-risk youth. In the late 1970s, Albuquerque was one of 17 cities across the country to participate in the Youth Entitlement Demonstration Project Act of the Carter Administration, which guaranteed jobs to disadvantaged students who remained in school and passed their classes. Also during the 1970s, Albuquerque Public Schools (APS) initiated several alternative schools -- including the New Futures School for pregnant teens and teen mothers (perhaps the most comprehensive program in the country for teen parents), Evening School for students with full-time jobs, School-on-Wheels for dropouts and potential dropouts, and hogares, a residential school program for emotionally disturbed youth.
Albuquerque has also developed several innovative and successful community programs, including a model work/study program for adjudicated youth and a school-business partnership program funded with a major grant from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation. Meanwhile, Youth Development, Inc., a community-based youth agency, has earned national recognition for its comprehensive services to impoverished youth of all ages.

Through this array of innovative programs -- along with more traditional services such as summer school, Chapter One remedial education assistance, and JTPA summer youth employment programs -- Albuquerque has developed a patchwork of programs to serve its disadvantaged youth population.

During the past year, however, APS officials, along with leaders from business, government, and community organizations, have focused increased attention on the need for a comprehensive approach to serving disadvantaged youth and reducing dropout rates. Albuquerque received one of seven grants from the National Alliance of Business to replicate the successful "Boston Compact" -- a business-school partnership effort to increase high school attendance and graduation rates. Albuquerque was also selected to participate in the U.S. Department of Labor's "Youth 2000" program, and a major youth conference is being held in Albuquerque on September 29, 1987. A third major initiative is being conducted through the APS Department of Planning, Research, and Accountability. Using a $25,000 grant from the Ford Foundation, the department has undertaken a project to improve the quality of data available on the dropout phenomenon in Albuquerque and to work with APS and the Albuquerque community to develop a more comprehensive approach to dropout prevention.

These efforts have been spurred by the attention being paid to youth issues in the New Mexico state government. Governor Gary Carruthers has made dropout prevention a priority issue in the state, and the state legislature has passed new legislation requiring schools to provide remedial education services to at-risk students.
II. THE AT-RISK POPULATION

"Who's At Risk?"

There is no standard, agreed-upon definition of "at-risk" youth. Although the term has become increasingly common, we can estimate the at-risk population only through myriad indicators that suggest a given child or adolescent may be heading in dangerous or unproductive directions. These indicators are compiled by local school systems, by city or county government, by states, and by the federal government -- particularly the Bureau of the Census.

The 9-15 age cohort differs from typical age categories used in statistical references. The Census, for instance, provides information on youth from 0-4 and from 5-17. Schools usually make distinctions between elementary, middle, and high school students. In Albuquerque, grades K-5 are elementary school (generally ages 5-10); grades 6-8 are Middle School (generally ages 11-13); and grades 9-12 are high school (generally ages 14-18). As a result, "who's at risk?" is difficult to answer for the 9-15 age group.

Economic Indicators

Perhaps the most important indicator of who's at risk is poverty. The Albuquerque Public School system (APS) is required to document the number of students from "low income" (below poverty) families as part of its application for Chapter One assistance from the federal government. According to the application for the 1987-1988 school year, there are currently 23,348 school-aged youth in poverty within the APS district (which includes parts of neighboring Sandoval County). They represent 26.9 percent of the district's total school-aged population of 86,411. The poverty rate is highest for elementary school students (32.9 percent); slightly lower for middle school students (28.7 percent); and lowest for high school students (15.8 percent).

The vast majority of 9-15 year-old students are enrolled in grades 4-10. The total enrollment in these grades with the Albuquerque public schools is 41,394. Another 3-4000 are enrolled in private schools. Thus, there are approximately 45,000 students in grades 4-10 within the APS district. Applying the district-wide poverty rate of 26.9 percent, the estimated poverty population within the
district for grades 4-10 is approximately 12,100. Recognizing that a number of ninth and tenth grade students are already 16 years or older, a best guess estimate of the economically disadvantaged population 9-15 is 11,500.

Economically disadvantaged students are concentrated within a relatively few schools in the APS district. Among the 74 elementary schools, 21 have poverty rates above 50 percent; these schools enroll 54.5 percent of all low-income students in APS elementary schools. At the same time, there are 30 APS elementary schools with less than 20 percent of students coming from low-income families; these 30 schools enroll just 13.9 percent of students from low-income families. A similar pattern can be seen in the 23 APS middle schools.

The precise ethnic composition of the economically disadvantaged population, age 9-15, cannot be determined. However, Census figures from 1980 break down the ethnicity of poor persons in Bernalillo County by age. Of the 13,809 poor youth ages 5-17 living in Bernalillo County in 1980, 65.2 percent were Hispanic; 23.4 percent were white; 4.6 percent were Native American; 4.2 percent were black; and 2.6 percent were Asian. Using those same percentages, the ethnic composition of the economically disadvantaged population, age 9-15, would be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>% of Total School Population*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>2,691</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>7,498</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat. Amer.</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ethnic breakdown of APS population, K-12, as of March 1987. Soon to be published statistics, Department of Human Services, City of Albuquerque.

Overall, minorities make up 46.7 percent of all APS students but 76.6 percent of all poor students.

This finding is important in Albuquerque, because the minority population seems to be concentrated within certain schools, particularly those in central Albuquerque. Though the ethnic composition of individual schools is not available, data provided by the Department of Human Services...
Services, City of Albuquerque, does divide the APS district into three regions, finding quite different ethnic breakdowns for each. For instance, 75.1 percent of students in the East region are White, while only 18.8 percent are Hispanic. Meanwhile, in the South region, only 36.3 percent of the students are white, while 52.7 percent are Hispanic.

PERCENT OF APS STUDENTS BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA AND RACE,
MARCH 1987

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>East</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Total APS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>75.1%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>46.1%</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat. Amer.</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Albuquerque, Department of Human Services.

Albuquerque's high minority concentration has another important implication for the education of its youth; 20,895 youth ages 5-17 reside in homes where a language other than English is spoken. Of these, 17,421 (83.5 percent) are Hispanic. Overall, 13.4 percent of all youths in Bernalillo County between 5 and 17 do not speak English well or do not speak it at all. This language barrier obviously inhibits successful learning in the schools, although APS does offer bilingual education programs.

Academic Indicators

Students in the APS system are required to take the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills (CTBS) in their 3rd, 5th, and 8th grade years. As a whole, the APS students perform well above the national and state averages.
**CTBS Results by Grade, by Subject**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Math</th>
<th>Total Battery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APS</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Each number represents the overall percentile score against the CTBS national norm.

For the purpose of identifying the at-risk population, perhaps the most useful indicator is the number of students who score below average in one or more of the CTBS test subjects. CTBS defines "below average" as any student scoring in the bottom quartile (lowest 25 percent) of all students taking the test nationally.

During the 1985-1986 school year, 738 (14 percent) of all eighth grade students taking the test in Albuquerque scored below average in reading; 495 (10 percent) scored below average in language; and 753 (15 percent) scored below average in math. Six hundred and nineteen students (12 percent) scored below average for the test as a whole. (All of these figures relate to the 5,162 students who took the test; approximately 600 students did not take the CTBS test in 1986.)

Among fifth grade students taking the CTBS, 658 (13 percent) scored below average in reading, 622 (12 percent) scored below average in language, and 468 (10 percent) scored below average in math. Five hundred and sixty-eight fifth graders scored below average for the overall test battery. Again, these figures refer only to the 5,035 students who took the test in 1986; more than 600 fifth graders did not take the test.

For each grade, approximately six hundred students (10-15 percent) taking the test scored in the lowest quartile in each subject and for the total test battery. (Likewise, 660 third grade students (13 percent) scored in the bottom quartile for the CTBS battery in 1985-86). Test data do not show the total number of students who scored in the bottom quartile in at least one subject area, but this number can be assumed to be higher. In all, though conclusive data is not available and the value of the tests themselves is always a matter of debate, the tests indicate...
that as many as 750 students in each grade are falling behind in at least one subject area. For the seven grades 4-10, that would mean that as many as 5,250 students are in need of remediation. Again recognizing that some ninth and tenth grade students are already 16 or older, a best guess estimate of students, age 9-15, demonstrating a need for remediation on the CTBS is 5,000.

Data is scarce concerning the economic and ethnic characteristics of those students scoring below average on the CTBS. One source of information is a statistical analysis provided by APS demonstrating the correlation between income and achievement of APS students on the CTBS test battery. Specifically, APS has charted the reading, math, and language scores of students from elementary and middle schools against the percentage of students in those schools receiving free lunch (i.e., those from poverty families). The correlations can be seen in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Reading</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Math</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.82*</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Each number represents the correlation coefficient between mean test scores and the percentage of students receiving free lunches. (A perfect correlation would yield a coefficient of 1.0.)

As the table shows, the correlations are quite close. Moreover, they increase with the age of the students, suggesting that the environmental disadvantages of growing up in poverty may affect the student increasingly over time, reducing the future prospects for even those who perform well in the early school years.

Educators frequently argue that standardized tests are of limited value in measuring academic competencies. As APS explains in the opening summary of its report on CTBS test results, "[CTBS] was developed by a major test publisher to reflect nationwide trends in curriculum and instruction during the 1980s. Therefore, the skills and items in this achievement test battery are not perfectly congruent with the curriculum of the Albuquerque Public Schools or the curriculum of any other specific school district..."
Unfortunately, other indicators of academic competencies are sketchy.

Another indicator of academic difficulty is the numbers of students who are failing in school. According to APS statistics, a total of 643 students in grades K-8 were held back from 1985-1986 to 1986-1987. Of these, 487 (75.7 percent) were in grades K-3. Only 166 students in grades 4-8 were retained -- less than one percent of the total student population for these grades. Retention rates for high school students are not tabulated by APS, since technically no high school students are retained. (High school students simply accumulate necessary credits until they graduate.)

While the number of students held back is relatively low (.44 percent for grades 4 and 5 and .72 percent for grades 6-8), the retention rates are higher than in past years. Retention rates are far higher in the earlier grades; more than two percent of students in grades K-3 were retained in 1986-1987, and more than three percent of first grade students were held back.

A more inclusive indicator of the educationally at-risk population within the APS system is the number of students who enroll in summer school for remedial purposes. Total summer school enrollment in 1987 was 5,100 students -- including 719 elementary school students, 660 middle school students, and 3,721 high school students. APS also tabulates those students who are repeating credits versus those enrolled in summer school for enrichment purposes or to get classes "out of the way." Virtually all of the elementary students enrolled in summer school are there for remediation; 549 of the 660 middle school summer students were repeating classes; and 3,070 of the 5,660 credits taken by high school students were repeat credits. (APS staff estimate that approximately 2,000 of the high school students were making up failed classes.)

In terms of the 9-15 population, it can be estimated that approximately 1,600 students in this age group enroll in summer school to repeat failed classes. Of these, perhaps 250 are in fourth and fifth grades, 549 are in grades 6-8, and about 800 are in ninth and tenth grades. Eighty to 90 percent of these students complete summer school and pass their classes. (More information on summer school is offered in Part II of this study, examining services to assist the 9-15 population.)

Social Indicators

Attitude and behavior are also critical factors in the success of disadvantaged youth during the school-to-work transition. Evidence of improper behavior can be seen in
indicators such as crime or delinquency, pregnancy, and drug use. Unfortunately, data on all of these indicators are sketchy:

Records from the 1983-1984 school year show that 917 crimes were reported within APS schools. Eighty percent of these crimes were burglary or robbery. In addition, there were 15 rapes and 106 cases of assault reported, as well as 46 auto thefts. In 1986, the Albuquerque Police Department made 3,620 juvenile arrests, 13.4 percent of all arrests that year. Almost half of these arrests were for burglary or larceny. The total number of juvenile offenses in Albuquerque for 1986 was 5,746. Of these, 2,815 (49 percent) were committed by juveniles 15 or younger.

Of those juveniles arrested, minority youth were not overly represented: 55.4 percent of juveniles arrested were white, compared to the APS population which is 53.3 percent white; meanwhile, only 35.0 percent of juveniles arrested were Hispanic, compared to an APS district population which is 39.2 percent Hispanic.

In 1984, a total of 1,080 babies were born to teen mothers in Bernalillo County -- 13.9 percent of all babies in the county. Three hundred and sixty-eight of these babies were born to mothers seventeen and younger, including 24 babies born to mothers below 15 years of age. In 1985, 1,077 babies were born to teen mothers in Bernalillo County, 13.6 percent of the county total.

Drug and alcohol use among New Mexico youth was recently the subject of a major survey commissioned by the state government. The students surveyed revealed that by the ninth grade, 71 percent of students had experimented with beer or wine; 56 percent had experimented with liquor; and 34 percent had experimented with marijuana.

High School Completion: The Cross-Cutting Issue

High school completion is perhaps the best indicator of future success in the workforce -- requiring academic competencies, and positive attitudes and behaviors (as evidenced by continued attendance and acceptable behavior). The Albuquerque Public Schools maintain data on high school students who drop out of its schools, and APS analyzes the data by school, by sex, by ethnicity, and by grade level. APS also maintains records on the reasons that students drop out.

Unfortunately, the data collected by APS prior to the 1986-1987 school year was of limited value; APS conducted no follow up on students claiming to transfer from one school
to another. As a result, prior year dropout reports have seriously underestimated the extent of the problem.

For the 1986-87 school year, APS dropout data did follow-up to determine whether youth who claimed to be transferring schools actually did so; it found 439 students who had claimed to be transferring from one school to another within the APS system but had actually dropped out. The new dropout report also counts those students who left school stating a desire to pursue a G.E.D.

As a result of this new, more realistic methodology, the reported drop rate for APS high schools was 8.03 percent in 1986-87, meaning that 1,975 youth were counted as dropouts during the past school year. This is significantly higher than the 1,354 dropouts (5.67 percent) counted in 1985-86. As the latter report notes, however, had the old methodology been continued in 1986-87, the annual dropout rate would have shown a decline to 5.2 percent.

In addition to improving the data collection process in 1986-87, APS submitted a grant application to the Ford Foundation to improve the information base as a first step to planning an enhanced dropout prevention effort. APS received a $25,000 grant from Ford in October 1986.

The APS dropout study included statistical analysis of 4,197 students identified as having withdrawn from the APS system between August 1984 and June 1986; interviews with 251 of these former students to determine the reasons for their leaving school, their current attitudes toward education, and their current employment and educational status; interviews were also conducted with a broad range of APS personnel concerning staff perceptions of the dropout situation.

A draft report based on the above research was completed in July 1987. Among its critical findings were the following:

- the greatest number of dropouts comes in the ninth grade. Due to flaws in the data collection process, ninth grade dropout rates have historically been undercounted by APS;
- among students interviewed, 65 percent were one or more years behind in school before dropping out;
- APS had initially intended to interview a far greater number of former dropouts, but 79 percent of those youths that APS attempted to contact could not be accounted for, either due to wrong telephone
The interviews with school-based professionals yielded a clearer picture of the dropout problem than has been previously available. The majority of the 78 officials interviewed -- principals from high schools, middle schools, and elementary schools, assistant high school principals, and high school counselors -- feel that the dropout problem is growing and warrants increased attention. Elementary school and middle school principals agree that future dropouts are identifiable early in their school careers -- with poor attendance records, frequent discipline problems, and unstable family situations. High school principals complain that many students they receive from middle schools are unprepared both academically and behaviorally for the transition to the more impersonal, subject-oriented high school environment. In short, a consensus emerged that ninth grade students are at the greatest risk of dropping out.
III. PROGRAMS FOR DISADVANTAGED YOUTH, AGES 9-15

Overview

Albuquerque's efforts to serve disadvantaged youth have reached a critical juncture in 1987. On one hand, Albuquerque has developed over the past two decades a national reputation for innovative programming for at-risk youth. This recognition has emerged largely through a series of model programs that have been either developed or tested in Albuquerque. These have included youth employment programs, alternative schools, and efforts to serve special populations such as teen parents and adjudicated youth.

There is increasing awareness in Albuquerque, however, that the existing network of programs and services is not yet adequate; that a comprehensive approach to dropout prevention -- one that focuses on averting problems through early intervention and provides the necessary level of assistance to all youth in need -- remains an elusive goal in Albuquerque.

In the face of increasing concern about the needs for dropout prevention and educational excellence, Albuquerque has begun to reassess its approach to disadvantaged youth. During the past year, a number of parallel initiatives has emerged in Albuquerque to focus the energy both of the schools and the larger community toward meeting the challenge posed by the at-risk youth population.

These efforts are benefitting from a marked increase in interest and involvement from the private sector. The Ford Foundation and the National Alliance of Business are also providing support for new approaches to dropout prevention. These efforts are hindered, however, by the difficult fiscal environment facing the Albuquerque Public Schools. The vast majority of school funds are provided by statute through the State of New Mexico, which supports public education through a severance tax on energy. Revenues from the tax have suffered considerably in recent years due to falling energy prices.

What follows is a more detailed inventory of the current network of programs and services for at-risk youth in Albuquerque, along with some discussion of possible options for the future.

APS and Disadvantaged Youth

APS utilizes three primary approaches for serving at-risk youth: Chapter One remedial education assistance; Summer School; and alternative school programs.
Chapter One Remedial Education. During the course of the regular school year, APS' primary means of assisting disadvantaged youth is remedial education funded by the federal government under Chapter One funded of the. During the 1985-86 school year, Chapter One services were provided in 39 of 74 APS elementary schools, 13 of 23 APS middle schools, and 4 of 11 APS high schools. In addition, Chapter One services were provided in 8 private schools for students in grades K-8. The total Chapter One budget for Albuquerque in 1985-86 was $5,839,552.

Chapter One schools are selected based on the percentage of students from low-income families. Students participating in the program within these schools are determined on the basis of demonstrated need, without reference to family income. In other words, Chapter One is offered in poor schools to students in need, whether or not those students come from poor families. It can be assumed, however, that the vast majority of Chapter One students are economically disadvantaged.

Prior to the 1985-86 school year, APS and participating private schools identified a master list of 10,294 students with a demonstrated need for remedial education. More than seven thousand of these were in elementary grades, identified by their teachers as below the norm in reading. For grades 6-9 and 11-12, students were identified based on their performance on the Rotel Word Opposites Test; tenth grade students were identified based on the Gates-MacGinitie Reading Test. Due to funding limitations, not all students on the master list each year are served under Chapter One. Under the program, participating schools are under mandate to serve those students most in need. Judgements as to who is most needy are made by the school staffs.

Chapter One programs in Albuquerque are focused heavily on elementary students, particularly in grades K-3. Of 6,096 students receiving Chapter One assistance in 1985-86, 4,317 were APS elementary school students; 3,428 of these were below the fourth grade. A Cognitive Language Development curriculum was utilized for 1,352 of these students, mostly in kindergarten and first grade. All other students received reading instruction from teachers funded by Chapter One, including 2,611 students in grades 4-10. Within the fourth to tenth grade age range, participation is highest among fourth grade students (589) and decreases to only 132 students in the tenth grade.

Each school participating in the Chapter One program develops its own program plan for providing remedial instruction, and there is substantial variation in the cost per participant and the average hours of instruction.
Program options for the schools are limited, however, by federal regulations that preclude the use of Chapter One funds to teach any students not participating in the program. In the past, a few schools have experimented with "excess cost" strategies to splinter off a group of Chapter One eligible students from several classes into completed separate classes taught by Chapter One instructors. This strategy has been abandoned in recent years based on a perception that it stigmatizes needy students and reduces opportunities for peer learning. Some Chapter One schools continue to utilize before and after school instruction and some tutoring of Chapter One students within regular classrooms, but the dominant practice for delivering Chapter One instruction is to pull students out of regular classes for short periods of time to provide supplemental instruction in Chapter One classrooms.

Despite the disruption caused by this practice, the vast majority of classroom elementary school teachers (96 percent) feel that the gains made by Chapter One students justify the time spent in the program. Program evaluation data for 1985-86 found that participants in the Chapter One program achieved greater than average skill gains for every grade except grade 2.

In addition to Chapter One, Albuquerque's Native American student population is eligible for assistance through three other federal programs: counseling and outreach funded by the Johnson O'Malley Act; Title IV tutorial services; and Title VII bilingual education programs.

The Johnson O'Malley Act funds two outreach work in the Native American community with students and their families. Title IV tutorial services are provided to 500-800 students per year, mostly at the high school level. The most serious concern of the APS staff operating the Native American programs are strict and varied federal regulations requiring Native American students to prove their tribal ancestry; program staff estimate several hundred Native American students cannot provide the required documentation.

Summer School. As was noted in Part II, 5,100 APS students attended summer school in 1987. Of these, approximately 1,600 were students age 9-15 repeating failed classes.

APS summer school staff explain that the majority of summer students, particularly at the elementary level, come from high poverty areas; a majority are Hispanic. Many of
the elementary school summer students face difficulty with reading and language, often the function of growing up in a Spanish-speaking home.

Most APS students attending summer school are required to pay tuition: $60 for two hours per day of elementary school; $84 for two hours of middle school; and $134 for two hours of high school ($67 for one hour). APS allots $30,000 for summer school tuition waivers, which allow 39 percent of elementary school participants, 13 percent of middle school participants, and 3 percent of high school participants to attend summer session free of charge.

In order to qualify for a waiver, students must come from families with income less than $150 per person per month (well below the poverty level). Relatively few waivers are given to middle school and high school students due to the overall limitation on funds.

For high school students, summer school attendance and behavior standards are strict. No more than one absence is tolerated, and any fighting or marijuana smoking results in mandatory dismissal from the program. For middle school students the rules are less severe. Three hundred and thirty-five high school students and 42 middle school students were dismissed from the program in 1987. None of the 719 elementary school students was dismissed. Of those students who did complete the summer program, relatively few (184) received failing grades.

According to APS staff, the summer school program may be in for major changes in the near future. A new state law in New Mexico will soon require school districts to provide free remediation to students who demonstrate the need for such services. This new law will limit sharply the APS budget for summer school, and APS is currently considering a wide range of options for meeting the new requirement.

Alternative School Programs. "About a dozen years ago," says one APS administrator, "the district came to the see that there are children in the system who, no matter what level of counseling you provide, are not going to succeed in the regular school environment." It was this realization, he says, that prompted APS to develop an expanded network of alternative school programs.

These programs, with names like Freedom School, the Porvenir Program, School on Wheels, and New Futures, all serve a limited number of needy students in a setting removed from the normal school environment. The majority are geared to the needs of high school students, particularly those 16 and older. A few, such as School on
Wheels, also include a work component supported by the Private Industry Council under JTPA Title IIA. Among the dozen or so APS alternative school programs, five include 12-15 year-old students within their target groups. They are: (1) New Futures School; (2) the Alternative Middle School; (3) the Community School; (4) Hogares; and (5) Stay-in-School.

1. New Futures. By far the best known of Albuquerque's alternative school programs is the New Futures School for pregnant teens and teen parents. New Futures began in 1970 with two students meeting in the basement of the Y.W.C.A. Since then, nearly 4,000 adolescent mothers have been served in New Futures School. In 1976, APS assumed primary responsibility for New Futures, though a private non-profit organization, New Futures, Inc., has remained in place to provide a variety of outreach and counseling services in the Albuquerque community related to adolescent pregnancy.

Over the years, New Futures has been recognized as perhaps the most comprehensive program in the country for teen parents. Most recently, New Futures was highlighted in the Committee for Economic Development's September 1987 national report, "Children in Need: An Investment Strategy for the Educationally Disadvantaged."

During the 1985-86 school year, New Futures School served 455 students, with an average daily enrollment of 220. Of the 455 students, 298 were enrolled in the perinatal program (for pregnant teens), while 157 participated in the young parents program.

Eighty-five to 90 percent of New Futures students came from within the APS district; the rest came from other parts of New Mexico or from out of state. Approximately 45 percent of the students had previously dropped out of school before enrolling in New Futures, and about one-third of the students were 15 or younger. (The youngest was twelve.) The ethnic composition of the New Futures student body was 54 percent Hispanic; 30 percent white; 8 percent Native American; 7.5 percent black; and 0.5 percent Asian.

New Futures offers a full range of academic classes for both high school and middle school. In addition, students are required to take classes on child development and parenting. A GED preparatory class is offered to students for whom high school graduation seems an inappropriate goal.

Health services at New Futures are provided by four staff nurses, plus weekly clinics held by the University of New Mexico's School of Medicine and by the federal Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) program. Health histories are taken for all students (plus their children) upon
enrollment, and students are referred to prenatal health care providers.

Counseling and social services are provided by trained counselors (Masters degrees) backed up by a psychologist. Each New Futures student is involved in group counseling once per week as part of the regular course curriculum. In addition, weekly counseling sessions are held for those pregnant teens considering giving up their babies for adoption.

New Futures also provides child care to children of its students. The child care facilities are located on the New Futures campus in three separate facilities, each licensed to care for 25 children. These facilities are not adequate to meet the demand from young mothers, and there is a waiting list for the New Futures young parent program.

Based on statistics provided by New Futures staff, the school has earned the national attention it is receiving:

- the repeat pregnancy rate at one year for New Futures students is 6-8 percent, compared to a national rate of 18-25 percent;
- the proportion of low birthweight babies born to New Futures students is 7 percent, compared to national rates of 15 percent for 14 year olds and 11 percent for 15-17 year olds;
- 92 percent of New Futures students complete a secondary education, while fewer than half of teen parents nationally complete high school.

In addition to school activities, New Futures, Inc., offered counseling and outreach services to 1,900 adolescents and over 2,000 adults in 1985-86. New Futures also prepares educational materials -- books, videos and pamphlets -- regarding teen pregnancy and parenting; more than 35,000 copies of these materials have been distributed around the world.

2. Alternative Middle School. APS has operated an alternative middle school program for more than a decade. Last year, the program was expanded from one site to three -- all operated within APS office complexes away from other middle schools. Each school is staffed by a single teacher.

Last year, 135 students attended APS alternative middle schools. For the most part, these students would otherwise have been suspended. "Middle school students should not be
suspended from school into the community," says Orlando Esparza, Assistant Superintendent of APS for Middle Schools. "That's just a license for them to do whatever they want."

The alternative middle schools offer regular course offerings to their students; in addition, they stress behavior modification and benefit from smaller than normal class sizes.

The majority of alternative middle school students are male; most are Hispanic. As many as three fourths are in the eighth grade, with the rest split between grades 6 and 7. Most of the students eventually return to their home middle schools, though a few are dismissed for non-attendance. The maximum length of stay in the program is nine weeks.

According to Esparza, a main weakness in the alternative middle school program is that all three sites are located within APS office complexes. Given the volatility of the youth served in the program, Esparza argues that separate portable classrooms would be a significant improvement -- one that he is requesting in future APS budgets. The ideal situation, Esparza says, would be to have an alternative school class in each of the 23 APS middle schools. The cost of hiring 23 teachers to staff such a program, however, is prohibitive within APS budget constraints.

3. **Community School.** Community School is a relatively new alternative program operated by APS for ninth grade students who have difficulty making the adjustment to high school. The program is designed as a one-semester intervention to allow failing or misbehaving students to continue their school work in a different environment, enabling them to salvage credits they would otherwise lose. After completing a semester at the Community School, students are reassigned to their regular high schools.

The Community School enrolls 30 students per semester. Like the alternative middle school program, students take normal courses, though class sizes are small and behavior modification and self-discipline are stressed.

4. **Hogares.** Hogares is a private non-profit agency providing residential treatment for youth referred by the Department of Human Services, by APS, by the Department of Juvenile Justice, and by the families of the youth. Working in cooperation with APS, Hogares provides an on-site education program including five special education classes.
and two regular classes. APS provides the teachers and the educational materials.

Overall, Hogares operates 11 residential treatment facilities for 90 youth between the ages of 13 and 18. The average stay is 8 to 10 months, and there is a waiting list of three to six months.

Hogares works with a most difficult population: 92 percent have committed delinquent or status offenses; 70 percent are victims of abuse or neglect; 19 have been court committed as emotionally disturbed and in need of residential treatment; and 27 percent are considered addicts or chronic abusers of drugs or alcohol.

The Hogares population is about half male and half female, and 65 percent are ages 15 or younger. The ethnic breakdown is 56 percent white, 36 percent Hispanic, and 8 percent either Native American, black or Asian. Almost half come from families with income less than $10,000 per year.

Hogares' success rate has remained at approximately 70 percent over the past several years. (A youth is considered a success if he or she has no further contact with the law, is living with his or her family or alone, and is either working or in school.) An additional 25 percent are considered partial successes -- meaning minimal contact with the law or working or in school. Five percent are considered failures, having committed hard-core crimes, become institutionalized, or pursued neither school nor work.

In addition to these residential services, Hogares also provides outpatient services for an additional 250-300 youth and their families. Total annual budget for Hogares is $1.85 million, not including the value of services and materials provided by APS.

5. Stay-in-School. During the 1986-87 school year, Youth Development, Inc., (YDI) inaugurated a new dropout prevention program in two APS high schools. The program operates as an alternative program for students identified by the schools as being at-risk of dropping out. It is the only alternative program that operates within the regular APS schools.

Stay-in-School is operated with funds provided to YDI from foundations and from JTPA -- no APS funding is used. YDI notes that the two participating schools have been highly cooperative, though a third school initially approached by YDI to take part in Stay-in-School declined to participate.
During its first year, Stay-in-School enrolled 202 students. Sixty-seven of these students also attended a Stay-in-School summer session. Most of the participants were in the ninth and tenth grades, including some students who had previously been on long-term suspension. Students in Stay-in-School are required to take regular classes, with class size limited to 15. In addition to regular classes, Stay-in-School provides personal and family counseling, job training and placement services, and a mentorship program. A $58,000 JTPA grant was used to provide part-time after school employment for 102 of the students.

**Employment And Career Education**

The only major employment and training program serving 9-15 year-old youth in Albuquerque is the JTPA Summer Youth Employment Program. This summer, the Albuquerque summer program was divided into three smaller programs -- one for out-of-school youth, one for in-school youth 16 and older, and the third for youth ages 14 and 15. This last program was administered by Youth Development Inc.

The 1987 summer program for 14 and 15 year old youth had 500 participants. These youths were required to take four hours per week of computer-assisted remediation in math and reading. This was the only one of the three summer programs that offered remediation. The software used for the program was supplied by Degum Industries of Israel. Work experiences offered to the 14 and 15 year olds was fairly routine -- clerical work, maintenance, etc.

Additional summer job placement was provided to youths through a service called Dial-a-Teen, which is administered by APS. Dial-a-Teen operates as a temporary employment service for youth between the ages of 13 and 21, most of whom are 14-16. More than 6,000 youth registered for Dial-a-Teen in the summer of 1987; of these, 2,000 to 2,500 found work through the program. The average period of employment is approximately two weeks, according to the program director. Periods range from a few hours to the entire summer. Most of the work is in landscaping or in restaurants, and wages range from minimum wage to $10 per hour -- with higher wages going for the briefest jobs.

Dial-a-Teen operates by locating employment opportunities suitable for teens with local residents and business establishments. These opportunities are then referred to youth who call in to the program office. To locate jobs, the Dial-a-Teen staff runs public service announcements and posts flyers. Because it has been in operation for 15 years, many potential hirers are aware of Dial-a-Teen services. However, the program director reports
that a lack of funds has limited job development efforts in recent years, and the program has resorted to private fundraising (bake sales, lotteries) to pay for "job-a-thons," where teens are paid to call on potential employers to pursue job openings for other Dial-a-Teen youth.

Also due to lack of funding, Dial-a-Teen provides no orientation or pre-employment training. This deficiency is particularly important given that an estimated 60 percent of the youth scheduled to perform work via the Dial-a-Teen program never show up at their worksites. Another serious problem pointed out by Dial-a-Teen staff is that approximately half of all applicants to the program have serious difficulty filling out the simple registration form.

In addition to the above employment services, a pair of programs has emerged recently to offer students increased exposure to the world of work. The first, called "Choices," is offered to ninth grade students by Mountain Bell. The program involves one class period on two successive days. During this time, employees of Mountain Bell -- management and blue collar workers alike -- talk about their work and answer students' questions. The program stresses self-awareness -- identifying the many conditions which affect students' lives and then helping students to distinguish between those they can control and those they cannot. Students are encouraged to maximize their options in life -- a key part of which is completing high school and moving toward post-secondary degrees.

Last year was the first time that Choices was offered in Albuquerque. During the year, approximately 60 ninth grade classes took part in the program. More are expected to take part in 1987-88.

The second program is being offered by the Hispano Chamber of Commerce -- which is becoming increasingly involved in the efforts to serve Albuquerque's at-risk youth. In 1987-88 the Hispano Chamber will inaugurate a speakers program to start fifth grade students thinking about a variety of career options.

In its first year the program will be targeted to nine of the 74 APS elementary schools. Plans are to extend the program in subsequent years. The program will bring successful role models from the minority community into fifth grade classrooms. The goal will be to spark interest among students about various professions and demonstrate to students the importance of education in pursuing desirable career paths.

All speakers will be trained by the Hispano Chamber to ensure that the presentations are interesting to students; demonstrations and student interaction will be emphasized.
The Hispano Chamber selected the fifth grade because it is the last year before students move to a multi-teacher environment, and the Chamber feels that improved motivation among students might help in this transition.

New Partnerships for the Future

The above initiatives by Mountain Bell and the Hispano Chamber of Commerce are evidence of growing involvement from the private sector in efforts to serve needy youth in Albuquerque. This involvement has its roots in a survey conducted by the Greater Albuquerque Chamber of Commerce in 1975. Concerned about the quality of new entrants to the labor force, the Greater Albuquerque Chamber surveyed its members about their perceptions of graduates emanating from APS high schools.

The survey reportedly found that employers were largely dissatisfied with the new workforce. The Chamber's report, billed as a "Report Card," gave APS low marks. Instead of circulating the report, however, the Chamber decided to work with the schools. A Career Guidance Institute was formed by the Chamber to work with the schools to improve cooperation between APS and the business community. This cooperative effort was boosted by a major grant from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, funding a number of career education programs through the early 1980s.

Over the past few years, the most ambitious effort of the Career Guidance Institute has been "Join-a-School," a program launched jointly with APS to promote partnerships between schools and individual businesses in the Albuquerque community. Today, each of the 11 APS high schools has a corporate sponsor; 17 of the 23 middle schools have sponsors; and 22 of the 74 elementary schools have sponsors.

The nature of these partnerships varies considerably. Most common is the use of awards and incentives from the sponsoring businesses to induce improved attendance, performance, and behavior by students. At one middle school, for instance, a student recognition program was initiated by a local hospital and then joined by several other businesses. The school cites as a result a 21 percent increase in the number of students on the Honor Roll and a 33 percent decline in the number of students with below a "C" average. Several restaurant chains have developed similar inducement programs. And this year, the Career Guidance Institute will implement a separate "attendance card project" in which students who meet attendance goals will be issued silver or gold cards good for discounts at participating stores and restaurants.
In creating the partnerships, Join-a-School has attempted to capitalize on the specific assets of the sponsoring businesses. For instance, a psychiatric hospital has initiated weekly counseling sessions for teachers at one elementary school to help them in boosting the self-esteem of their students. "We are so lucky to have someone of [this] stature willing to spend so much time sharing his expertise with us," says one teacher.

According to the Join-a-School coordinator, however, the schools are not yet using their sponsors creatively in most instances. Also, she says, the businesses have been hesitant thus far to commit their employees' time to the partnership efforts -- preferring instead to offer discounts or materials. APS itself is beginning to set an example in this area -- establishing a program of one-on-one interaction between central staff members (non-school personnel) and individual students.

The prospects for improved partnerships in Albuquerque increased considerably in 1986 when Albuquerque was named as one of seven cities to participate in a demonstration by the National Alliance of Business to replicate the successful Boston Compact -- an agreement between business and education leaders in Boston to reduce dropout rates and expand opportunities for adolescents.

Thus far in Albuquerque, a management committee has been formed among top business leaders, city and county officials, and school representatives. A smaller planning committee has been formed to recommend programs and policies to the management committee. And two loaned executives began working full time for the compact this summer. One, Pauline Martinez, has been loaned by Mountain Bell. (Ms. Martinez is a member of the APS Board of Education.) The other, Dr. Moises Venegas, has been loaned by APS and the Albuquerque Greater Chamber of Commerce where he previously worked with the "Join-a-School" program. Both loaned executives are operating out of the offices of Albuquerque's Private Industry Council.

In its August 1987 meeting, the management committee of the Albuquerque Business Education Compact voted to merge formally with the APS team assembled to work on a dropout prevention project funded by the Ford Foundation. The dropout study prepared by the APS Department of Planning, Research, And Accountability -- detailed in Part II -- became the principal planning base from which the Compact will set its course.

Over the next several months, the Compact will be continuing its work in developing a needs assessment,
preparing an inventory of existing programs, increasing communication and cooperation between the business community and APS, and developing a long range plan.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

"The data being presented is leading to a change in the Compact's scope of work. It is clear that the majority of students drop out or lose interest in school before the high school years -- enough so that the earlier years require at least as much attention as the later years for intervention to occur."

So wrote the Albuquerque Business Education Compact in its quarterly report for June-August 1987. The challenge, then, is how to structure these interventions to allow at-risk students to maintain their interest in school and improve their academic competencies at a satisfactory rate of progress.

Interviews with school staff for the recent APS dropout prevention study revealed several policy questions that must be resolved before APS can move forward with a more comprehensive approach to dropout prevention.

First, a major question facing APS is how to assist students in the difficult transition from middle school to high school. The APS dropout study explains, "Young adolescents are coping with changing emotions, peer pressure, personal physical structure, and hormones, among many other things, yet high school freshmen are treated as though they can ignore all this and concentrate on Algebra and Grammar." It is for precisely this reason that APS developed the Community School alternative program; unfortunately the Community School can serve only 30 of 6,000 ninth graders per semester.

The APS study goes on to suggest that "early high school curricula should focus on the development of personal responsibility for social behavior and classroom performance." Several high school principals suggested that students not be allowed to enter high school until they have demonstrated a mastery of middle school basic skills. One APS employee, a former student in the system and now a parent, wondered aloud why the system does not go back to making high school grades 10-12 only, allowing adolescents an extra year in the more supportive middle or junior high school environment.

The policy options are numerous, yet there is a growing consensus that an improved system for easing this middle school to high school transition will be an essential component of the overall APS dropout prevention strategy.

A second major issue raised by several staff members concerned the APS alternative education programs. Some suggested that the alternative programs be located on regular school campuses; others even suggested that the
alternative programs be eliminated altogether, based on a feeling that these programs isolate and stigmatize their participants.

APS has shown a clear preference in the past toward alternative education programs removed from the mainstream school environment. It has placed less emphasis on in-school support. The APS student-to-counselor ratio is approximately 450:1, and several APS officials admit that the level of counseling services -- both for in-school counseling and home-school liaisons -- is limited. Many APS staff also complain that the system's mandatory attendance policies -- under which students are suspended for non-attendance -- are counterproductive, prohibiting students from attending school rather than providing an incentive for improved attendance. A number of APS officials feel that these priorities are inappropriate to the needs of the current population of potential dropouts.

The third major issue facing Albuquerque is how to make the emerging Business Education Compact most useful to APS and to Albuquerque's youth. This private sector support will become increasingly critical in the future due to the overall funding constraints facing APS. According to New Mexico state law, APS is funded almost entirely by state funds under a state equalization formula. Albuquerque therefore has little flexibility to raise funds to increase its school budget.

Through the "Join-a-School" program, the Career Guidance Institute of the Albuquerque Greater Chamber of Commerce, the Hispano Chamber of Commerce, and Mountain Bell, Albuquerque's private sector has grown more involved in supporting APS and serving the City's youth. Until now, however, the impact of this involvement has been limited. A major challenge for the Compact is to increase both the quantity and the depth of these partnerships, reaching out to energize the voluntary support of the private sector and then focusing that energy within an overall APS strategy for serving at-risk youth.

Opportunities for enhanced partnerships can be identified in four areas: funding, employment and career education, in-school support, and community outreach.

Funding. Given the size of the APS budget, private sector contributions cannot be expected to ease significantly the overall financial constraints facing APS. Nonetheless, the Albuquerque Business Education Compact might do well to establish a local foundation to support public education -- as several cities have done in recent years. Such a foundation could provide seed money to test new approaches to dropout prevention and to support and reward the innovative efforts of APS teachers and staff. Targeted
Funding of this type could become an important tool in helping APS to install a more comprehensive system of dropout prevention.

**Employment and Career Education.** The Albuquerque Business Education Compact might also replicate the Boston Compact more directly by providing summer jobs as a reward for improved performance by high school students and by their schools. For the 9-15 year old population, the approach would necessarily be different -- focusing more on career education and less on direct employment. Through programs like Mountain Bell's "Choices" and the Hispano Chamber of Commerce's speakers series, the private sector is making a tentative beginning in helping poor and poorly prepared students to establish positive goals for their futures and understand the importance of education in achieving those goals.

Efforts might also be undertaken to increase the exposure of 9-15 year olds to the world of work. Field trips to industrial plants, military bases, research laboratories, and other work settings are one possibility. "Mentorship" programs, where at-risk youngsters are paired one-on-one with successful role models from the community, are another potential avenue for broadening the horizons of culturally deprived youth and for transmitting positive values.

**In-School Support.** The APS dropout study explains: "It was widely agreed that the most important quality of a school contributing to holding power is the provision of a safe and stimulating environment where students feel accepted, involved, and successful." Through incentive programs and active involvement in the schools, private businesses can help provide the type of environment that motivates students to remain in school and to succeed. Through the Join-a-School program and other efforts of the Career Guidance Institute, this type of private sector involvement is becoming more widespread.

**Community Outreach.** The APS dropout study cited counseling and "home/school liaisons" as critical gaps in the current dropout prevention effort. Presently, APS has limited counseling and outreach capacity; meanwhile, community youth groups, most notably Youth Development, Inc., have a substantial presence within many of Albuquerque's low-income minority communities.

There is broad agreement that school performance is inextricably tied to family and social conditions. Improving the coordination between APS and community groups like YDI would be an important first step toward a more holistic community approach to dropout prevention -- one that focuses both on the in-school and out-of-school needs of at-risk youth.
Summary. Albuquerque has a long way to go in addressing the dropout problem and the other problems facing its at-risk youth population. But the city, which has long been recognized for its innovation in youth programming, is beginning to think more broadly, ask the right questions, and generate the support and involvement of the greater community.
Partnerships to Improve the Education of Disadvantaged Youth in the Baltimore Schools

Edward C. Lorenz
Baltimore, Maryland
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acknowledgements</th>
<th>ii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Development of Public Education for the Disadvantaged in Baltimore</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Evolution of Educational Partnerships: 1920-1980</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contemporary Partnerships</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Business Partnerships - Improving the Product or the Process</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The &quot;Partnership&quot;</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Adoption Experience</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering Pipeline</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other GBC Programs</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Business Partnerships</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Partnerships</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundation Sponsored Partnerships</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job Training Partnerships with the Schools</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Partnerships</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Assessment and Needs</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are far too many individuals who have assisted with providing information, insights, and criticism for all to be acknowledged here. Among those who took time from busy schedules to discuss the project were: Jerry Baum of the Fund for Educational Excellence; David Bergholz, Public Education Fund; Irene Dandridge, Baltimore Teachers Union; Betty Downs, Baltimore City College; Mark Ewing, Baltimore Life Insurance Company; Kalman R. Hettleman, University of Maryland; David W. Julian, Greater Baltimore Committee; David Lieberman, C. and P. Telephone Co.; Howard E. Marshall, McCormick Company; James McPartland, Johns Hopkins University; Frank Piff, Monumental Life; Carol Reckling, BUILD; John Snell, Regional Planning Council; Darla Strouse, State Department of Education; William Struever, Private Industry Council; Earl Thomas, Academy for Educational Development; Elaine Urbanski, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company; Judy Werely, Baltimore City Schools; and Carl Wheeler, Office of Manpower Resources. My wife, Marilyn, who has taught in the city, provided valuable perspective, as well as patience and support for the project. Our six children, particularly the four who currently attend the Baltimore City Schools, gave practical understanding of the operations of the system. Staff of the National Commission, particularly Everett Crawford, have provided valuable guidance and assistance. Responsibility for flaws remains with the author. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Commission for Employment Policy or its staff.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study reviews the history and current status of efforts by community institutions, businesses, and employment and training agencies to develop partnerships with the public schools in Baltimore to increase the educational options of at-risk youth nine to fifteen years of age. Baltimore is a good location for a case study for several reasons, including:

1. The city has a large disadvantaged population, with serious problems of youth adjustment to the schools,

2. Baltimore has experienced economic changes typical of many older industrial cities, and

3. The city has a long history and extensive current experience with partnerships linking community institutions and the schools to deal with the problems of at-risk youth.

The study begins with a review of the history of the school system's attempts to assist disadvantaged youth and with the development of partnerships with institutions outside the schools. This history, which extends back to the turn of the century, has several lessons for today:

1. There have been mixed views of the benefits of vocational schooling as a solution to the problems of at-risk youth, with some strong opposition to such training arising from organized labor, citing the class biases implicit in vocationalism. Critics also charge that vocational training favored special interest, since the schools were assuming the job training responsibilities of selected industries.

2. The problems of at-risk youth relate most directly to the social class of the youth, and within the social class, to the family disintegration which often correlates with class status; however, the fact that a disproportionate number of blacks in Baltimore are poor has resulted in race being confused with the class origins of the problems. That is, frequently programs to solve problems arising from poverty have been indiscriminately directed at minorities.

3. The decisions of many poor youth to drop-out are not totally irrational, since the rewards they observe for extra years of schooling are minimal, due to class biases in hiring and other discriminatory practices.

4. Many of the problems of at-risk youth have been present in the city for generations; however, the problems seem worse in recent years because population change has made disadvantaged youth a larger proportion of the school's enrollees.

5. There are a number of long term patterns in the community relative to the development of partnerships, including

   a. As the schools have become more defensive about their performance, they have been less willing to welcome input from partners.
b. The Greater Baltimore Committee (the chamber of commerce) has sought an increasingly prominent role in partnerships while being unwilling to provide on-going operational leadership or support for greater public funding for educational improvements.

c. The public sector, non-educational institutions have had to take a lead role in developing partnerships.

While the history of efforts to improve the education received by disadvantaged children is important in showing that many of the problems and the solutions are long term, not simply contemporary, most attention in the paper focuses upon current partnerships. Those partnerships can be classified by their goals and their institutional support.

There are essentially three goals for partnerships that assist the disadvantaged. They are:

1. Program Enrichment,

2. Student Employability Development, and

3. Problem Intervention.

Enrichment programs seek to improve the quality of schooling so that disadvantaged students are aware of the educational options before them and may overcome some of the educational disadvantages of their background. Such efforts include the Engineering Pipeline, designed to inform minority youth of careers in the sciences. Also included are activities such as the Junior Great Books programs supported by companies such as Baltimore Life and the C. and P. Telephone Company; and the grants to support educational innovation provided by the Fund for Educational Excellence.

Student employability development programs are targeted on making system graduates vocationally skilled and aware of the demands of city employers. The Greater Baltimore Committee's (GBC) stated goal for the "Partnership Program" falls under this heading. However, few employers appear to focus on a simple employability improvement effort in their actual adoptions of schools.

Problem intervention programs focus on the symptoms of the maladjustment of at-risk youth, such as the high dropout rates or pregnancy rates. The Ford Foundation's Collaborative seeking to coordinate existing services to reduce the number of dropouts is such a program, as is the Futures program funded by the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA).

If partnerships are classified by institutional sponsor, it is found that at least five types of institutions are heavily involved in partnerships with the Baltimore city schools:

1. Businesses, both individually and as members of business associations;

2. Universities, as research sponsors, potential employers, and as educators
of motivated disadvantaged graduates of the system;

3. Foundations;

4. Employment and Training agencies, primarily the JTPA funded Office of Manpower Resources; and

5. Community Organizations, such as the church and labor sponsored Baltimoreans United In Leadership Development (BUILD).

The study of current partnerships results in a number of conclusions regarding the factors which must be considered in establishing partnerships. The primary conclusions are the following:

1. The solution to the problems of disadvantaged youth will require a long-term effort, and participants in partnerships must be aware of this fact. Goals and methods of programs have been changed much too frequently. Stability in the educational environment is one of the primary needs of both disadvantaged youth and their often demoralized schools.

2. Probably the most direct cause of the educational problems of disadvantaged youth is the family instability inherent in lower class life. The community should give adequate resources to efforts to improve family life, including the sexual practices and perceptions of disadvantaged youth.

3. The focus of corrective efforts must be more on solving the general social problems of disadvantaged youth rather than on the personal problems which often are symptoms rather than causes of difficulties.

4. A commitment must be made to early intervention in the education of disadvantaged youth. If this is not done, the efforts to improve the quality of public education will only cause more low achieving youth to dropout. Many partners to the schools have difficulty focusing on early intervention, feeling that they have less to offer the schools in expertise in dealing with young children.

5. The focus in some partnerships upon making the graduates more employable, relates to the point above, for many partners of the schools possess valuable experience in job related training of adults. However, there is a real danger in focusing partnerships upon vocational preparation, if that preparation is too directly linked to only a few skills or industries. In a democracy with many highly technical jobs, the schools need to stimulate creativity and free youth from ignorance. They must be careful that demands for improving the employability of disadvantaged youth do not decrease the educational options of the youth by focusing only upon a few job-related, educational basics.

6. There is a need for partnerships to give attention to general issues of school structural reform as well as to one-on-one partnerships with individual schools, or pupils. Often the school's most needed assistance
is in general administrative fields, such as budgeting or human resource management. Another key asset outside partners bring to administrative problems is their independence of the schools, which allows them to place sufficient pressure for reform on key officials to counterbalance bureaucratic resistance to change.

7. An honest commitment to the evaluation of partnership programs is needed on both the local and national level. There is too much concern with getting credit for the success of experimental programs rather than with receiving credit simply for having tried to solve problems. Current evaluation methods are nearly non-existent and, when used, find only success and originality. In fact, soaring dropout rates indicate large scale failure and wasteful duplication of effort are more common.

8. More attention must be given to the general issues of the economic pay-off from education and the anti-intellectualism inherent in the urban culture, particularly lower class culture. The Commonwealth program, which guarantees jobs or college admission to successful students is a start, if only it reaches the proper audience. The current partners of the schools include the major media companies which can obviously exercise considerable influence in this area. The interest among some partners in only the employability of graduates sends the wrong message regarding the intellectual value of schooling. At-risk youth must see that the schools play a valuable part in their acculturation, particularly training for citizenship.

9. Structural changes are needed in the schools to remove the stigma from youth who drop-out and wish to return to school. The scheduling of education must recognize the desire of some adolescents to experiment in the labor market. Youth who leave school before graduation should know they will be welcomed back. The schools for returning dropouts should be free and equal in quality to the schools serving youth who do not elect to interrupt their education. Partnerships should be encouraged with such schools so that returning dropouts experience the same enrichment as other high school students.

10. There must be no confusion of the benefits of educational partnerships with the need for greater regular funding for urban education. All persons concerned with improving the educational options of disadvantaged youth in cities such as Baltimore must realize that urban schools require even more funding per pupil than the best suburban systems, serving a primarily advantaged population. Partnerships are designed to enrich the curriculum or in some other way help an adequately funded system. They are not a substitute for inadequate funding.

There are several specific recommendations for changes in federal law and regulations which might allow partnerships to be more productive including:

1. Changing the distribution of Chapter I funds and the restrictions upon their use to allow funding of general institutional changes in urban systems.
2. Change performance standards in both employment and education programs to measure long-term impact of programs and services to the most disadvantaged.

3. Change regulations which do not recognize higher education as a viable goal for disadvantaged clients of employment and education programs.
INTRODUCTION

This study is part of the National Commission for Employment Policy's Youth-at-Risk Project. Focusing on one location, Baltimore, the study examines the role of employment and training agencies, businesses, and other institutions which help the schools increase the educational options of disadvantaged youth ages nine to fifteen. Partnerships to assist youth sixteen and above have been a more common focus of employment and training attention and research. Leaders of businesses, employment and training agencies, and most other community institutions have readily perceived the expertise they can bring to the schools when helping older students, particularly high school graduates, fit into jobs and adult society. It has been somewhat more difficult to convince them that they possess expertise useful in improving the educational process for younger students, such as youth nine to fifteen years of age.

Since the dawn of the urban, industrial era, it has been obvious to many critics of modern child rearing methods, that all adults and institutions, not simply the school and the family, have a role and responsibility in educating younger children. Beginning in the late Nineteenth Century with the decline of child labor, there has been growing public awareness that disadvantaged children face greater isolation from certain adult institutions, such as the formal work place and the system for preparing for entry into many better jobs, than more advantaged youth. Since that time, partnerships have regularly been formed in Baltimore to join community institutions with the schools to improve the educational experiences of disadvantaged children. In each era, the size and intensity of the partnership efforts have reflected the public perception of the success of the educational process. Since the late 1960's, there has been a renewed interest in Baltimore in increasing the involvement of business, public employment and training agencies, and other community institutions in the education of younger disadvantaged students. Much can be learned from reviewing the origins, goals, structure, and impact of these contemporary partnerships.

There are several reasons why Baltimore is a good location for a case study:

1.) Baltimore's long history of partnerships linking business, community organizations, and other institutions with the schools provides a length of experience that allows for meaningful conclusions to be drawn about the success or failure of efforts,

2.) The city has a large disadvantaged population, and

3.) The city has experienced economic and educational changes typical of older industrial cities.
Furthermore, in size, Baltimore and its public school system are sufficiently large to have had a variety of programs, while having limited local resources typical of most smaller urban areas.

In 1980, Baltimore was the tenth largest city in the country, with a population of 786,000, of whom 54.8 percent were black, and 2.6 percent Hispanic. Baltimore was the fourteenth largest metropolitan area and increasingly has become part of a joint Baltimore-Washington region, which may be classified by the Bureau of the Census as the fifth largest consolidated statistical area in 1990. As many industrial cities, Baltimore's population has declined in recent years. The city was the seventh largest in 1970 and the sixth largest earlier in the century. The city population peaked at 939,000 in 1960. However, Baltimore's population decline has not been nearly so extreme as in other cities with similar metropolitan populations. The population of the City of St. Louis, in the twelfth largest metropolitan area, declined by 27.2 percent from 1970 to 1980, while Pittsburgh, in the thirteenth largest area, lost 18.5 percent. Baltimore's population declined only 13.1 percent. This lower rate of city population loss highlights an important comparative advantage of Baltimore City.3

Among older urban communities, Baltimore physically includes a larger proportion of its metropolitan area's land. Being 63 percent larger than Pittsburgh and 49 percent larger than St. Louis in area has meant that Baltimore's city limits include more communities which in those cities would be suburban. Despite this advantage, Baltimore has experienced other declines, particularly in employment opportunities, which are more severe than most cities. Most importantly, the number of manufacturing jobs in the city has fallen precipitously since 1970, from 99,600 to 52,200 in 1985. Since most other sectors have remained the same or increased slightly, as the service sector, the character of employment opportunities in Baltimore has changed greatly in recent years, with direct implications for schooling.4

Manufacturing jobs often paid relatively good starting wages, while demanding minimal formal education. The jobs that remain seem either to pay low wages or require specialized education. Even the manufacturing jobs that remain are different, symbolized by the change of the region's number one manufacturer, from Bethlehem Steel, with its mills and shipyards, to the high technology of the Westinghouse Defense Center. Another disturbing trend is found in the growing service sector, where Baltimore has gained mostly unskilled service jobs and relatively few technical employment opportunities.5

In 1960, city residents held three quarters of jobs in the city, by 1980 only half. Yet, while losing city jobs to county residents, Baltimoreans have not increased their rate of holding suburban jobs. More dependent upon public transit than their suburban counterparts, Baltimoreans have suffered from the scheduling of public bus service which favors commuting into the city not out to growing industrial parks. Until recently, there was no public transit service to the booming new city of Columbia, southwest of Baltimore. Consequently, city residents hold seven percent of suburban jobs, the same as in 1960, and less than in 1970. Not surprisingly, the labor force participation rate in the city is nearly ten percent less than in the suburbs.6

Demographic changes in Baltimore in recent decades have compounded the economic dislocations. While Baltimore's total population has been falling,
there has been a net increase in the disadvantaged population. Not surprisingly the surrounding counties have experienced great increases in the number of relatively affluent white and minority households. The city has experienced net increases only in its minority poor population. The minority population of the city grew from 330,000 in 1960 to 450,000 in 1985. In 1985, the median income for city households was $16,700, for the surrounding counties it was $31,000. The city leads the counties, and some say the nation, in the rate of teen pregnancies. Of direct relevance to the schools, the city also experiences far more school drop outs than the counties.7

The Baltimore City public schools are a large system, with 111,243 students, in 1986/87, of whom 81 percent are minorities. Proportionally, the city's schools have experienced less of a decline in enrollment than those in St. Louis, which now have less than 70,000 students. The passage of the post-war baby boom has brought a significant decline in enrollment, which had peaked at nearly 200,000 in the late 1969, resulting in a decrease of 50 percent in the ratio of pupils to teachers. However, most other indicators of school success have not changed so positively. In 1986, only 35% of the system's graduates planned to attend college, compared to 49 percent in neighboring Baltimore County. Worse still, the city rate was inflated by the fact that less city students graduated than county residents. While the system has considerably more students than any other in the state, it is only fourth in the number of graduates. Whatever method is used to compute the dropout rate, all methods confirm that the city rate is much higher than any other system in Maryland and, most importantly, all agree the city rate is growing.8

Structurally, the city's public schools are fully dependent on the city government for leadership and support. Unlike some systems, the Baltimore city schools cannot tax and do not have an elected school board. The members of the board are nominated by the city's elected mayor. The board, in turn, selects the superintendent. The system must submit the annual budget to the city government for approval. The schools are treated as one of the divisions of city government, not as a separate institution. The budget is first reviewed by the Board of Estimates, which is controlled by the mayor. The city council then either approves or disapproves the budget submitted by the Board of Estimates. With city revenue declining, the schools have fallen well behind most surrounding counties in per pupil funding, spending $2,975 per pupil in 1984/85, compared to a regional mean of $3,423.9

With fiscal problems compounded by growing economic and social problems, the schools have increasingly become involved in partnerships with business, community groups, employment and training agencies, and other institutions designed to bring additional resources to their disposal. However, the partnerships which have been formed in Baltimore face barriers to success that arise from the city's special economic and social history.

Baltimore shares with many much smaller cities the problem of being primarily a "branch plant" town. The uniqueness of the city among urban areas its size is clear from comparisons with the next two larger and smaller metropolitan areas -- St. Louis, Pittsburgh, the twin cities, and Atlanta. Baltimore is home to the headquarters of only three of the Fortune 500, and none of these is in the top 200. In contrast, each of the other four cities host at least seven of the largest 500 companies and at least two of the top
one hundred. Pittsburgh is home to 15 of the Fortune 500 and five of the Fortune 100. As with the number of major corporate headquarters, the ranking of Baltimore's local foundations are well below those of cities of like size. Similarly, as a result of the decline of the labor movement in the city, labor involvement in school partnerships has been confined to the teachers union. Negatively, these facts mean Baltimore partnerships face serious barriers to efforts to raise money or otherwise win support from major national sources. Positively, for the purposes of this study, they make Baltimore's experiences and, especially its successes, particularly relevant to the many smaller communities that share its lack of local resources.

This study begins with a review of the history of education in Baltimore, focusing particularly on the problems of minorities and of the disadvantaged and of efforts to develop partnerships to support the work of the schools. While these earlier efforts were not always limited to disadvantaged youth age nine to fifteen, they did give attention to the educational problems of such youth. Next the study examines current partnerships to help at-risk youth. Current efforts are divided into four categories, based upon the sponsoring institution:

1.) Business and university partnerships, including the activities of the Greater Baltimore Committee (the chamber of commerce), other business groups, and the John Hopkins University,

2.) Foundation partnerships, primarily involving the Ford Foundation drop-out prevention initiatives and the activities of the Public Education Fund,

3.) Employment and training partnerships, particularly those using Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) funds to create drop-out prevention programs, and

4.) Community partnerships, such as that of a church and labor group, which guarantees jobs to high school graduates.

After reviewing these partnership efforts, recommendations for facilitating and improving such programs are described.
The Baltimore City Public Schools have a record of both success and failure in their efforts to educate the disadvantaged. Examples of both often can be found simultaneously, such as in 1892. Early that year, a study of the schools by an educational reformer found "a deplorable condition of affairs." Yet, in the same year the first public high school for blacks was begun by the segregated system, a school that was to produce the second greatest number of alumni with doctorates of any segregated high school.11

A general review of the system's history reveals several common themes. There has been a persistent search for quality education, at least in a few schools. There has been a need to accommodate significant shifts in enrollment levels and of the type students enrolled. There have been recurring demands for the system to reach an accommodation with the city government to guarantee sufficient financial support, while not surrendering professional control. Interrelated with all of the above have been the various public attitudes regarding the proper role of schools in educating students of different races and classes.

Through the first half of the century, the concern with quality education paid handsome returns for the city. "Baltimoreans were generally proud of their public schools. A succession of capable, even brilliant superintendents . . . developed the system to a high point, the envy of the surrounding counties."12 The schools promptly adopted and occasionally pioneered new educational methods. The vocational guidance program, for example, was directed by a student of Harvard's John Brewer. The city led in the establishment of specialized, quality public high schools, reconciling the often fruitless debates about the utility of liberal or technical education by providing both in exemplary schools. When there seemed to be problems with the system, the administration was prepared to call for advice from nationally recognized educators or leading citizens. It is important to recognize in these early advisory panels an excellent model for public-private education partnerships.

Complicating the search for quality schooling in earlier years were population trends and enrollment patterns, many not unique to Baltimore. In the early years of the century there was an influx of children of immigrants in the schools, and Baltimore still had one of the three largest concentrations of blacks in urban America, both resulting in a significant population living in poverty. Then there was the national trend toward more and more years of schooling. Since many students with learning problems now elected or were forced to stay in school rather than withdraw at an early age, the schools no longer had the luxury of serving only the more academically qualified in the upper grades.13 Exemplary schools became atypical, while, "the rank and file public schools ranged from good, through mediocre to deplorable." It is important to remember that with the highest percentage of native white families of any major city and with many long established black families, the demographics were not entirely negative in the early years of the century. In fact, some critics have noted among both the white and black leadership of the city a tendency toward complacency arising from the city's relative population stability of this era. "The community was largely indifferent to the plight of the ghetto schools."14
Throughout the twentieth Century, the often differing educational goals of affluent and poor, of black and white Baltimoreans have reflected the general social divisions in the city. While leading merchant and professional families proudly supported the elite public schools that prepared their children for the best universities, the poor either fought to end overcrowding and other signs of educational neglect or resisted requirements that their children remain in the system. Then as now, there was a debate over whether the primary purpose of schooling for the disadvantaged was to control them or free them from the bonds of ignorance. Such differing views of the schools crossed racial divisions. While the segregated schools for blacks were forced to function with second-hand or outdated facilities and supplies, the black leadership of the city was able to develop a quality high school, Frederick Douglass, and feeder schools. The faculty at Douglass, before integration, included excellent teachers, with one principal holding a doctorate from the University of Pennsylvania. A select group of graduates went on to the best private schools in the North. Thurgood Marshall is only one of a host of famous graduates of the school. In other ways the black leadership was included in the educational system, such as when the superintendent formed the Citizen Advisory Committee in 1933.

In spite of a few good schools, the overwhelming majority of black youth, as most disadvantaged white students, did not have a positive experience in the Baltimore schools. For many years, it was obvious that the Baltimore schools either did not know how or want to pursue vigorously education of the disadvantaged. Even in the 1960's, critics complained that the schools did not seek all federal aid available to them because they did not care about serving the disadvantaged. Because of class and race prejudice, the children of the poor saw little immediate gain from education. Frequently, they left school as soon as possible to enter the workforce. In turn, the schools' slightly ambivalent attitude about serving the poor was reinforced, resulting in weak links with many community groups and organized labor.

While the schools had a problem dealing with the poor, they had greater difficulty with the city government, upon which the schools have been totally dependent for financial support. As today, the city administration was controlled historically by a strong mayor who could dominate the school budget process and the appointment of school officials. Until 1925, the superintendent of schools was fully a partisan political appointee. Immediately following World War I, the Women's Civic League formed the Public School Improvement Association to fight for a permanent independent school leadership and educational quality. They quickly achieved a partial victory, when the principle of professional school leadership was accepted in 1925. They never gained independent control of the budget.

Without financial independence, the school leadership usually preferred to ignore politics and accept the funding provided by city politicians. They feared succumbing again to political control, if they joined in a partisan budget fight that was lost. Only in extreme situations, such as when the city proposed drastic reductions in school funding during the Depression, did the schools stand their ground. They did so then, however, after carefully building a coalition of supporters in the form of a Citizens Advisory Committee. That committee became a model for later partnerships linking the community and the schools, such as the Metropolitan Education Coalition formed in 1986 to fight for equal funding of city and suburban schools.
THE EVOLUTION OF EDUCATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS: 1920-1980

As the professional educators gained control of the schools in the 1920's, they welcomed an important change in the school's role in the community. More and more students were remaining in school longer and seeking an education that included more than just elementary reading, writing and arithmetic. The schools had done an admirable job since the late nineteenth century in reducing illiteracy. In 1890, 37.3 percent of black Baltimoreans were illiterate, by 1920 12.9 percent and by 1930 seven percent. For native whites the rate had been cut from 7.2 percent in 1890 to .6 percent in 1930. In fact, the school's chief challenge, statistically, was the continuing high illiteracy rate among the foreign born, whose rate had risen from 12.4 percent at the start of the period to 13.4 percent at the end.17

To meet the new demands upon the schools, the educational reformers of the 1920's implemented partnerships with institutions outside the schools. These partnerships had several features in common with contemporary efforts as well as significant differences. The partnerships at the time did not intensively involve business or labor but rather women's civic groups and the remnants of the progressive reform movement, which had been active in the city since the 1890's. As with educational reformers much later, this group lacked real sympathy with the culture of the poor, a fact evident in some of the battles with the political bosses from poor neighborhoods. There clearly was little interest in a partnership with other parts of the city government, which was viewed as threatening the schools, and no involvement with state or federal officials. When the reformers wanted the system to be studied, they turned to professional educators. In particular, unlike in the 1980's, the reformers were prepared to turn to unbiased outside educators from leading universities for studies to guide and justify their efforts. In 1920 they brought in such a team, headed by George Strayer, a Columbia University professor and Johns Hopkins graduate, to prepare a three volume study of Baltimore's educational problems.18

Strayer focused on several issues regarding disadvantaged students. He found far too many students were "overage," a fact of great concern to him, since they were the students most prone to dropping out. Furthermore, disproportionate numbers of overage students were black or foreign born. While praising the schools for reducing the black retardation rate (creating overage students) from 72.2 percent in the pre-war years to 65.2 percent in 1919, he added, "The situation . . . represents a degree of non-adjustment between pupils and the curriculum which demands immediate attention." He recommended that special classes for overage students be reduced in size as soon as possible to 15 pupils, the standard which he found worked in New York and New Jersey. At another point in the study, he criticised the facilities in the black schools and lamented that in planning vocational training for blacks that "not all vocations are at present equally open."19

During the twenties attention was given to correcting some of the problems observed by Strayer. The Urban League noted in a 1935 study of the City, that "With the possible exception of Washington D. C., Baltimore has the most elaborate public school set-up for the Negro population to be found in the United States. . . . Vast improvements have been made in the physical
facilities of the colored schools [in the last fifteen years]."20 Attention was given as well to studying the reasons why students left school for work and to determine the best form of vocational guidance. One such study concluded, "Economic pressure is evidently not nearly so important a cause of pupil elimination as has been generally claimed." Rather, student interest in the curriculum and intelligence test scores correlated most with dropping-out. This finding led to more efforts to provide vocational counseling for students to keep them in school. By 1925, the system had 12 vocational counselors in all junior and senior high schools, including one each at the two black schools.21

The schools did not attempt to overcome the drop-out and vocational adjustment problems alone. The director of guidance, Leona Buchwald, reported in 1929, "One way in which our Baltimore schools are meeting [the need for vocational information] is through close cooperation with the professions and with business and industry..."22 She added, that the schools not only worked with individual businesses and professionals but with civic organizations, including the Personnel Managers Association and the Engineering Society, both of which are involved in partnerships in the 1980's. She also turned to the Professional Women's Club and other service groups, such as Kiwanis and Rotary clubs, for support of the guidance program. In addition, the Johns Hopkins University, especially through its graduate student dissertation studies, was becoming involved in assisting the schools. While in many ways the efforts of this period set patterns for later partnerships, there was a fundamentally different emphasis upon the involvement of professionals from the service sector in partnerships. Only recently, in the work of Peter Szanton, has an emphasis been returned to involving individual professionals in partnerships.

It is important to appreciate the sophistication of guidance efforts in the 1920's. Leona Buchwald emphasized, "Vocational guidance does not mean the placing of boys and girls in industry or the choosing of an occupation at too immature an age. On the contrary, it lays emphasis rather on the value of sufficient education..." Quoting an authority on vocational guidance, she insisted that such guidance "is not something which is to be added to education... but something which is the very center of education."23

Likewise among instructors in schools for the disadvantaged, there appears to have been a competence and an integrity of commitment to the educational purpose of the schools which helped many students adjust. As the former principal of Douglass High School mentioned regarding the staff in the period, "They were trained in content rather than educational method."24 Such a competence allowed the staff to work in partnership with business as equals, not as so often today, as second class members of the effort.

With the 1930's, the schools faced a profound financial crisis, while their graduates faced a radical decline in employment opportunities. Several efforts were launched to create partnerships to support the schools and unemployed youth in the period. These included the Citizens Advisory Committee, to investigate the school funding crisis, and an advisory board for the National Youth Administration activities in the city. The former, was one of the best examples of partnerships between the schools and a cross section of citizens. The latter was much like a contemporary Private Industry Council.
The Citizens Advisory Committee had an interesting mix of members. For example, of the 75 members, ten were black. Of the sixty-five whites, the largest number, twenty-three, were from the professions, that is lawyers, physicians and dentists. Eight members were businessmen. Other members included ten from civic groups; parent-teacher organizations, nineteen; government, four; and labor, one. Among the ten blacks, were a lawyer and a dentist; three representatives of parent-teacher organizations; four from the Cooperative Civic League; and one businessman. The business and professional members of the committee included representatives of McCormick and Company, Williams and Wilkins, and Western Electric, as well as Johns Hopkins Hospital, all later involved in the Adopt-a School Program.

The committee's selection was explained by Superintendent David Weglein, as follows:

Since the economic depression brought about eventually a reduction in the revenue of local governments... it was only natural that the time would arrive when... education should be asked to reduce its expenditures... If the request for reduction... had been based solely on financial grounds, the matter could have been adjusted... but additional criticisms beyond that of mere expenditure of money have been uttered... concerning the whole plan of public education, its scope, the subjects... the various educational services rendered to children, and the professional standards that have been established. All these criticisms have been carefully considered by the professional group engaged in educational work... Public education, however, is a matter not only of professional judgement and thought, but since the support of public education comes from the people, it is only natural that the great body of citizens generally should be consulted... As with so many partnerships, the representation on the committee was seen as more conducive to the purposes of the schools than the political bodies which controlled the budget. Most of the members had links to Marie Bauernschmidt and the Public School Improvement Association, which had been battling city politicians since the end of the War. The committee intimidated city politicians into providing the budget resources the schools needed.

Its reports were not without an important point of disagreement. The lone labor representative, Harry Broening, representing the AFL, filed the only minority report. Broening served on the vocational education subcommittee with Marie Bauernschmidt. His report criticised vocational education for perpetuating "class distinctions" and for transferring to the public sector a task which was the responsibility of industry, "diverting public funds and pupil's time from the main purpose of education in a democracy." Broening thereby raised a fundamental issue of the purpose of partnerships with industry. Should the primary purpose of education for the disadvantaged be to improve employability or should it be to provide quality general education such as that received by the more advantaged students? Broening did not criticise vocational education because, during the Depression, businesses were not providing sufficient jobs for the graduates. Rather, he was asking what was the proper goal of the business partners of the schools? He maintained that the purpose of business or other community
institutions working to improve education was to help the schools better prepare students to be trained by business, not to take on the job training which was the responsibility of industry.

It is interesting that labor, other than the teachers union, has not been involved in subsequent citizen advisory committees. Until recently, labor's only involvement with the schools has been on vocational advisory committees for particular trades, a type activity Broening abhorred. It is noteworthy, as well, that the black members of the committee endorsed the expansion of vocational education in the black schools and did not see the importance of the issues Broening raised.

There were other partnerships in the 1930's linking the schools, business, and the government. For example, the National Youth Administration (NYA) formed a local advisory body, very much comparable to contemporary Private Industry Councils (PIC's). The Baltimore advisory board included David Weglein, the superintendent of schools, several business representatives from the Citizens Advisory Committee, and a member of Marie Bauernschmidt's Women's Civic League. The NYA programs, however, did not apply to any youth under 16 years of age. 27

The continuing high rate of youth unemployment in the 1930's produced new insights into the problems of low income and minority youth in the city. In 1934, the Urban League commissioned a study by Ira Reid of the state of the Baltimore black community, which was quite similar to one in early 1987. Reid gave considerable attention to public education and the acceptance of it by black youth. He noted that the vocational programs for blacks provided training only for lower level jobs. Except for carpentry, there was no training in the building trades and none in radio repair. More significantly, Reid described the serious family problems that were interfering with black achievement. He warned, "Baltimore has a higher ratio of illegitimate births among its Negro population than any other city having a population of 100,000 Negroes or more. . ." He lamented that "Neither the church nor the intelligent elements of the community are actively concerned over the ravages of illegitimacy. Meanwhile, Baltimore has a sequence of social problems as results of Negro illegitimacy." 28

Four years, later the American Youth Commission sponsored a study of Maryland youth by Howard Bell. He found disturbing attitudes toward education among black youth in the state, where 68.4 percent of out of school black youth had eight grades or less schooling. Bell attributed the much higher dropout rate among black youth, to the fact that, "The white youth were more favorable in their appraisals [of the economic value of schooling] than were the Negro youth." While 35.1 percent of white youth felt schooling was of great economic value, only 15.8 percent of black youth agreed. In contrast 29.9 percent of black youth felt schooling was of little value, compared to only 13.5 percent of white youth. 29 Perhaps more significantly than these findings, Bell went beyond these racial correlations and looked at the family backgrounds of the dropouts. He found, "When the father's occupation is held constant, the differences between the grades attained by white and Negro youth are small . . . Clearly it is not primarily sex, race, nor place of residence but rather the occupation of the father that accounts for these differences." Unfortunately, few subsequent observers of Baltimore's disadvantaged youth have added much to the insights of these two scholars in the Depression era.
Recent studies too often have focused on the individual adjustment problems of students with little perception of the vital role played by social factors. With World War II came a return to prosperity and shortages of workers. The primary concern of the schools was first a shortage of teachers and, after 1945, an influx of veterans seeking adult education. It was during the late 1940's and early 1950's that many of the structural barriers between the black and white schools were removed. In 1946, fully integrated staff meetings began and under the Community Study Program over half of the teachers were trained in the cultural (racial) diversity of Baltimore. The Coordinating Council of Parent Teacher Organizations was formed in 1947, merging black and white PTA's. Yet while administrative progress was being made in race relations, the great growth in the post-war black population led to a growing difference in class sizes between the two school systems. Since long after 1954 poor blacks usually attended the formerly segregated schools, the trend toward inner city school overcrowding in Baltimore was begun at this time. In 1946/47, for example, white elementary school class size was 35.6 pupils per teacher, while that for blacks was 35.8. By 1953/54, the sizes were 33.6 for whites, a reduction of two pupils per class, and 37.0 for blacks, an increase of 1.2 per class. In 1952 when the Junior Association of Commerce conducted a survey of what citizens thought of the public schools, the black parents rated new construction of schools as their greatest need, seeing the limitations in the number of black schools as the primary cause of increased class size. White parents rated job training programs as a higher priority than had black parents.

When the Brown decision brought integrated schools to Baltimore, there was little immediate change for most pupils and teachers. The city accepted the changes promptly with few transfers of staff or students. However, a relatively high percentage of the best students in the black schools, particularly at Douglass High School, promptly transferred to formerly white schools. There was a call for special partnerships to be involved in the process. The State Commission on Interracial Problems and Relations actively monitored the process. Included among its members was Otto Kraushaar, the President of Goucher College, who was to play a leading role twenty years later in the Adopt-a-School program. The Interracial Commission sponsored a study by Elinor Pancoast, a Goucher College economist. Pancoast perceptively echoed Howard Bell's observations in the 1930's, noting, "Baltimore teachers found no new problem with mixed classes. They only found in some instances that the old problem of dealing with children of poor socio-economic background was intensified." Until the early 1960's, however, the city's leadership, both political and educational, seemed to have noticed little change in the schools.

Without notice, 1958 and 1959 proved to be the watershed years for the city's schools. In those years, the city schools fell below the state average in two indicators of school quality: the percentage of city high school graduates attending college and spending per pupil. In 1963, the schools fell behind in the number of staff per student. Meanwhile the superintendents office added a "revolving door." In 1959, John Fisher departed for the Presidency of Teachers College. He was the third superintendent since 1925. Between 1959 and 1987, there have been six incumbents, meaning tenure has fallen in half. Not until 1963 did the schools respond to the growing crisis, and then only reluctantly.
In 1963 a second Citizens School Advisory Committee was formed. Over 1500 people participated in the meetings of the committee. Since an underlying concern of the time was racial equality in the schools, the key staff had special links to groups involved in equal opportunity. Primary work fell to 29 individuals. The chairman was the head of the city's Health and Welfare Council, and the two vice chairman were the leaders of the National Council of Christians and Jews and of the Urban League. There were six subcommittee chairs, including a dean from Morgan State University, the president of the League of Women Voters, the president of the PTA, and two business leaders, a representative of the major radio/TV station, and a representative of the Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC). The other twenty members included equal numbers from business, higher education, civic groups, and the professions. In many ways the committee resembled the committee during the 1930's, however, the appearance of the GBC representative was a link with future partnership patterns.

The Greater Baltimore Committee had been formed ten years earlier to promote economic redevelopment in downtown Baltimore. Its members were the "100 leading businesses" in the city, including people such as the nationally known developer James Rouse. It was considered an activist body and some considered its leadership too liberal and too interested in civic affairs. A less active business group was the Chamber of Commerce. In the 1970's the GBC had grown so powerful that it absorbed the Chamber, becoming the preeminent business organization in the metropolitan area with considerable interest in education. Its involvement in the 1963 committee was only indirect, a result of an invitation to a son of a prominent GBC member.

The Citizens School Advisory Committee investigated many problems in the schools. Its report listed over 300 specific recommendations for change in school organization and practices. Many general points made in the report, such as that the budget was "based on minimum needs of the school system" not on the needs that would make the system excellent, were not welcomed by the system's administration. Likewise, most of the specific recommendations were ignored. One month after the Committee filed its report, in November, 1964, the superintendent resigned to take a university administrative position in Washington State. If any precedent were set with the Citizens School Advisory Committee, it was that public advice, while often solicited, would be accepted with major qualifications. A follow-up report prepared in 1969 by one of the committee staff, listed few of the recommendations as fully implemented and found many key administrative recommendations were still under study. Meanwhile the school system continued to deteriorate.

The system made some limited efforts to develop a partnership with federal employment programs in the early 1960's. For example, in the summer of 1963, the city matched funds provided under the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) to employ 24 counselors in the summer to work with the 4800 drop-outs and potential dropouts identified during the previous school year. Slightly more than 3,000 of these youth were contacted and 1431 returned to school in the fall. The campaign was a partnership with the Chamber of Commerce, the mass media, clergyman, the public library, various government agencies, and numerous civic and social agencies. Despite some success, shifting priorities in later years confined MDTA programs to older youth in adult education.
The Superintendent appointed in 1965, Lawrence Paquin, who was to die in office two years later, was hired because of urban experience. He brought a commitment to use the political process to win improvements in the system. However, he largely ignored the recommendations of the Citizens Advisory Committee. He became embroiled in efforts to convert a magnet high school into a regional school, alienating many influential parents, such as those involved in the Advisory Committee. He was apparently moved by a continuing commitment to the concept of comprehensive high schools serving all segments of the community; however, he was oblivious to the ability of the upper segments of that community to desert the schools if special programs were threatened.\textsuperscript{37}

In 1967, the National Education Association (NEA) sent a team of investigators to the city, at the request of the local teachers organization. The NEA report warned, "The city and the school system have a choice to make now: they can supply the money and creativity necessary to make the schools so good that the white children will be retained or attracted back . . ."\textsuperscript{38} No positive decision on the issue was made in the next few years. Educational budget battles were becoming increasingly severe in the city. In 1957, for example, the Board of Estimates had cut the school budget by 4%. After the departure of John Fisher, in 1959 it cut the budget by ten percent or more in all but one of the next ten years. On leaving Baltimore, the director of the NEA study, Richard Kennan, said, "I don't believe I've ever left a city as discouraged as I did after our visit to Baltimore." As so many future education critics in the city, the task force contrasted conditions in the schools to the revival of Baltimore's urban core and urged city officials "to make the correction of 'deplorable' school conditions [the] number one priority for continuing the revitalization of the city."\textsuperscript{39}

The NEA further urged the schools to seek greater community support in the budget process, a recommendation repeated sixteen years later in a GBC study of school financing. It specifically called for a partnership of community organizations to support public education in the city, including the Greater Baltimore Committee and the Voluntary Council for Equal Employment Opportunity. In fact the Voluntary Council had already suggested to school officials and won their cooperation for testing a partnership program in junior high schools to reduce the drop out rate, Project GO - Growing Opportunities.

Project GO is the oldest partnership program in the system, although today it has been greatly altered and renamed. Starting in one inner-city predominantly black junior high in 1966, it grew to include all 24 junior high schools by the early 1970's. At that point over one hundred institutions, including 93 businesses, a number federal, state, and city agencies, and nine non-profit institutions provided assistance to the schools in the program. The goals of Project Go included: increasing student self esteem, improving attendance and motivation to complete high school, helping youth develop an identification with an occupation, and increasing student interest in learning by showing its relevance to life.

The Project had three phases for seventh through ninth grades, for youth generally ages 13 to 15. The first two phases emphasized growing awareness of the world of work. In the seventh grade, the foundation for later parts was laid through a unit in the curriculum on career development. Books and
interviews with people in various occupations were offered to students in the seventh grade. The eighth grade phase included tours of businesses near each of the schools, practice in job finding skills, and involvement of parents as resources for career awareness. The ninth grade, however, was the heart of the program. In each school, a Stay-in School presentation was made by the Western Electric Company, which, at the time, was the largest manufacturer in the city. Westinghouse, the second largest private employer in the area in the 1970's, provided a living witness program in all schools, featuring minority employees who had successful careers with the company. Later in the year, students were offered tours of participating institutions, where the educational qualifications for jobs were emphasized. Other presentations included one by the Recruitment Task Force (RTF), a coalition of all area colleges, and a job clinic, where each student participated in a mock job application and interview process with a personnel officer.

Project GO is especially interesting because its founders regarded the building of partnerships not as a means to achieve a goal but as itself a goal of the program. In addition to the direct impact upon students, they said the program was designed to "develop supportive teamwork between industries, hospitals, colleges, and the Baltimore Educational system." This priority reflected the philosophy of the Voluntary Council on Equal Opportunity, which played a lead role in launching the project.

The Voluntary Council was one of a number of special interest business groups in Baltimore. In Baltimore, there are many such organizations. Often the work of such organizations has been ignored in studies of partnerships. Most attention is given to the work of a city's general business organization or chamber of commerce. The GBC in recent years has been that general organization. In 1968, one comparative study of the Baltimore educational situation observed, "The business community has not displayed an interest in education and remains aloof from issues when they are raised." Yet, this criticism was not fully valid, but applied mostly to the GBC and the Chamber of Commerce.

The Voluntary Council, which included only fifty members, had been formed in the early 1960's to win business support for equal employment opportunity. It became heavily involved in educational partnerships to help the disadvantaged in the late 1960's. The Council not only had relatively few members, but more significantly, in a branch plant town such as Baltimore, it was dominated by large locally controlled companies. For example, of the 41 business members in 1974, only eight were from companies not headquartered in the area. The 41 businessmen were from 29 companies, including the five largest banks; the two utilities; the two largest black businesses; a newspaper; and a select group of the largest manufacturers, including the owner of the Orioles. Also included were key representatives from the non-profit, public, and business organization sectors, including a representative of the Chamber of Commerce, the Personnel Association, Johns Hopkins University (which hosted the meetings), as well as the heads of the city schools, the Urban League and two public colleges. This group was structured to naturally favor initiatives to help the schools. As with many successful partnerships, the Council falls somewhere between being a general business partnership and a more individually based organization.

While the late 1960's brought Project GO and the launching of the current
school industry partnerships in Baltimore, the period did not bring progress to the schools. Following Lawrence Paquin's death, the schools experienced the two most tumultuous modern superintendencies, marked by sharp racial divisions within the community and the school board, and the awkward departure of each incumbent. Within such a context, it was easy for the schools to gain the attention of business and other institutions in the city. The Voluntary Council played a formative role in crystalizing the concerns of those outside the schools with the problems of youth. In 1975, at the time of the firing of the second controversial superintendent, the Council helped organize the First Educators-Employers Conference, which included representatives of several key institutions, including the Greater Baltimore Committee and the Mayor's Office of Manpower Resources -- the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) prime sponsor. To continue the discussions begun at the first conference, an ad hoc committee, called simply the conference group, was formed. When the Voluntary Council's Chairman, Alfred Ramsey died, shortly after the second conference in 1977, the ad hoc committee was renamed the Ramsey Conference Group. It continued to function until 1984.

From these beginnings sprang several partnership projects which have survived. Also, the pattern of leadership among these partnerships is similar to today, including the Mayor's Office of Manpower Resources (OMR) and the GBC. The relationship between the GBC and the Voluntary Council also was established at this time. The Voluntary Council and the Conference Group proposed new programs and the GBC was increasingly expected to take responsibility for the ongoing administration of the programs.

The literature of the GBC implied that the GBC was fully engaged in sponsoring programs, particularly the new Adopt-a-School program developed in 1976. However, other observers saw business involvement as much more limited. Writing in 1981 in a public relations booklet praising recent school improvements, friends of Superintendent John Crew gave only limited credit to business for the early efforts in partnership. The writers called the first Educators Employers Conference "a timid, tentative beginning of what could someday become a school-business partnership. Dr. Crew waited. He did not push the business leaders. Perhaps he knew that pushing would have done more harm than good." Describing the beginnings of the Adopt-a-School Program, Goucher College President Otto Krashaar said, "Because of the lack of a concerted plan, the Baltimore business community continues to rely heavily on initiatives from the public sector." He concluded that the void in leadership was filled by then Mayor William Donald Schaefer and the director of Manpower Resources, Marion Pines, who launched businesses partnerships from the public sector.

The Adopt-a-School Program (ASP), however, was purely a business school partnership. While in many ways it was similar in goals to Project GO, it differed in several important ways. In method there was a crucial difference. GO organized a pool of experts to serve the needs of disadvantaged students in all schools. The Adopt-a-School Program limited the use of a particular company's experts to only the adopted school. Secondly, while GO was primarily a private sector program, it was not exclusively so, welcoming support from a number of public agencies. Such a mixed membership reflected the membership on the Voluntary Council. The Adopt-a-School Program was rigidly composed only of business members of the GBC. According to critics of
the process, the GBC's exclusive role resulted more from the internal politics of the business community than any educational purpose.44

In the development of the GBC role in Adopt-a-School, the history of the GBC proved important. The GBC had begun as an organization which took a broader view of the role of business in the community than the Chamber. Yet, the GBC's activities focused primarily upon redevelopment of the city, while the Chamber was the general business group. By the early 1970's, however, the GBC and Chamber both performed many of the functions of a general business organization. Some leaders in the business community wanted a merger of the two institutions, with the GBC to be the survivor. It was prudent for the GBC to demonstrate it had many involvements beyond downtown redevelopment. The Adopt-a-School program fit into this effort and the Voluntary Council was glad to let the GBC claim sponsorship, since it could provide potentially a host of new adoption sponsors.45

The ASP program was not unique to Baltimore, of course. The leaders in the GBC gave credit to similar efforts in a number of cities for the idea, including Boston, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Dallas. However, they successfully promoted the fact that the concept of school adoption was most fully developed in Baltimore. The local version of the program, and one of the national origins was an adoption of a junior high school by the McCormick (Spice) Company in 1969. Under "the McCormick Plan," the company provided limited financial assistance for special school projects, provided company equipment and personnel to help with educational projects, welcomed student visits to the company, and provided recreational and cultural experiences to students, as both an educational and motivational tool. The general purpose of the program was to assist "students in developing a positive self-image . . . . Continuing reinforcement of self-image allows these students to look at career horizons from a more aspiring vantage point."46

The program was evaluated after the 1969/70 school year. In the summer of 1970 several teachers were employed by McCormick, both to learn of specific and general business practices, and to write a series of learning packages to familiarize students with the world of work and its relationship to their education. McCormick staff emphasized that the teachers were the educational experts. The company was there only as a resource, not to interfere with the education process. The adoption process included a close working relationship between the company and several social studies teachers at the school. Company staff were involved in pupil instruction in two ways. Ten volunteers spent about five hours each instructing all eighth grade pupils in either a learning package or by explaining their job. During the plant visits, which included about fifteen students per visit, other company staff explained their work and oriented the students to the company. The company emphasized general business employment expectations not tasks peculiar to the spice industry.

In 1976, when the GBC decided to promote the adoption idea, the organization quickly secured seventeen additional company sponsors for adoptions of 19 schools, 10 middle schools and nine elementary. One of the key differences between Adopt-a-School and Project GO was the variety of programs under the former. Project GO had the same structure in each school. For better or worse, Adopt-a-School did not. Several of these adoptions proved to be very innovative, while others failed.
The C. and P. Telephone Company, for example, adopted Guilford Elementary School on the fringe of the inner city. C. and P. introduced the school to a mathematics and reading improvement program previously used within the company to upgrade employee skills. The gains in student achievement of the initial participants at the school were so significant that the program was expanded to one third of the student body, with the ultimate goal being expansion to all students. The partnership resulted in the school system assigning one extra teacher and one extra teacher’s aid to the school to run the program. The program was subsequently evaluated by an independent psychologist, who found significant gains over those to be expected from normal growth of student abilities.47

The C. and P. program had several key features of a successful adoption, features often forgotten when the expansion of such programs is planned. First, the program involved a company with educationally related expertise. Secondly, both the company and the school were willing to commit significant time to the effort, including pressuring the school system to provide additional staffing. As Otto Krashaar noted,

There is a complicating factor that must be taken into account in any effort to replicate the C & P-Guilford plan, and that is its cost. . . . The combined contribution of both parties amounts to not less than $50,000. . . . The plan depends heavily upon the individualization of instruction and a wealth of study resources, and neither is to be had to the required degree . . . without an expanded school budget.48

Lastly, the company showed an interest in program evaluation. The hiring of a psychologist to evaluate the program was unique to the Baltimore effort, but a number of other companies showed interest in less sophisticated evaluation of their programs.49

While several exemplary programs were begun in the early Adopt-a-School program, there were a few problems and failures. Two companies pulled out of the program after a year, and two others had to change schools because of lack of acceptance. Only four of the original partnerships have survived to the present, but most of the companies have remained involved. Typically of the more recent focus of the program, several of the companies which changed schools have adopted high schools and dropped their original elementary or middle school. The evolution of the Adopt-a-School sponsor list shows the problem many businesses and schools have with sustaining relationships which do not simply relate to job placement of students.

The success of the adoptions depended, according to Otto Krashaar, "Upon the extent that the Company [was] willing to sustain a substantial amount of two-way traffic between the school and the plant." In fact, both the school and the company had to see the value of the partnership. The four surviving partnerships -- those involving McCormick, Baltimore Life, The Bank of Baltimore, and Coopers and Lybrand -- depend upon the special commitment of key staff at the company and the school. In the judgement of several employer representatives and teachers involved in the program, each partnership has survived despite receiving support only inconsistently from the GBC and the central school administration.

In addition to Adopt-a-School, the Engineering Pipeline Program emerged.
in the 1970's under the sponsorship of the Voluntary Council. It involved some of the same employers that adopted schools and was linked to the Mathematics Engineering Science Achievement (MESA) Program of the Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory. Pipeline and MESA were not directed purely at disadvantaged students but rather were targeted at minority students, particularly those with superior records in mathematics. The goal was to increase their interest in the sciences. Components of the programs included field trips, science fairs, and other interest and motivation building programs. As with Adopt-a-School, pipeline was not directed at students about to enter the job market but rather at junior high youth, usually between 13 and 15 years of age. The pipeline experience was designed to bring company resources to the schools to enrich the educational experiences of minority youth.

The companies sponsoring Adopt-a-School partnerships were not oblivious to other programs which complimented their efforts. Whether their cooperative efforts had any impact upon the serious problems of the schools is a different question. For example, the Hess Shoe Company, which still is involved in a partnership, but at a different school, linked its program in 1976 with the U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) funded STARS Program. STARS, or Services to At-Risk Students, focused on low achieving seventh and eight graders, the very students who continue to receive special attention in contemporary drop-out prevention programs. As the coordinator of the 1976 program noted, "It is highly improbable, at this point, that the STARS kids will go on to high school." Unfortunately, there was no evaluation of the impact of this cooperative effort.

One type of partnership program that evolved in the era and which brought more significant change to the schools was the Ramsey Conference Group's commitment to use the resources of its members, including the Office of Manpower Resources, to study school problems. The studies sponsored by the Group in the late 1970's set a pattern for business partnerships that has often been ignored. The studies were conducted by private and public sector experts who advised the schools on particular administrative or human resource matters about which the business and employment and training partners had expertise. For example, the Ramsey Conference Group called upon business financial experts to conduct a study of the school system's budget process. The budget committee set in motion reforms which are now being implemented. The committee recommended that the schools develop budgets over a long range, not on a year to year basis; that they use comparative data from other school systems; and that they assess the cost benefit ratios of various programs. Likewise, the Group sponsored a comparative study of student, parent, teacher, and employer perceptions of the value and purpose of schooling. Along with business personnel directors, the city's Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) funded Office of Manpower Resources provided advice and data processing support for this study. This study set the pattern for several key projects in the 1980's which have increased school staff understanding of the attitudes and perceptions of disadvantaged youth.

The importance of these studies points out the value of those partnerships that do not bring outsiders into personal contact with disadvantaged students. To ask an accountant to provide several hours of tutoring to one youth may be very inspiring to some youth and certainly to outside observers. To have the accountant hire one disadvantaged graduate of
the system may seem the most direct way a partner can help the schools. Yet, it might be much more productive for the disadvantaged if the accountant gave time to improving the school system's budgeting process. Over the past ten years, business partnerships have begun to address the general administrative problems of the schools, including the teacher personnel issues, which have a direct bearing on the quality of schooling for disadvantaged youth. It is in such research activities, often, that the partnerships can have the most impact. Unfortunately, more of the current thrust in business partnerships is directed at increasing the number of individual adoptions of high schools by companies than at general improvements in all the schools.
CONTEMPORARY PARTNERSHIPS

There are two general impressions which one gains by the briefest observation of the educational options for disadvantaged youth in Baltimore in 1987: there are serious problems in the education of such youth and one solution is to get everyone involved in helping the schools solve the problem. In early July, 1987, with an election campaign for mayor reaching its peak, all city taxpayers received a message from the incumbent endorsing "mobilizing the community on behalf of the students" as well as continued emphasis upon employment and training programs funded under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). This was but one indication of the emphasis upon partnerships linking business, the community, job training programs, and the schools.

During 1986 and 1987 at least four publicly discussed studies examined the problems of the city's schools, while the chamber of commerce -- the Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) -- issued a "clarion call" for business involvement in upgrading the schools.53 The Regional Planning Council (RPC) in the Spring of 1986 had issued its five year General Development Plan, including for the first time a section on education and employment, focusing "its efforts on changes that would help increase the number of students who are employable in the economic system after they leave school." It called for expansion of the GBC's school adoption program to include small businesses particularly in the service sector.55 In November a study sponsored by a local foundation and written by Peter Szanton, former president of the Rand Institute of New York, caused a storm of reaction with its highly pessimistic description of the options before the city. He focused especially on the problems of the schools, predicting that "progress would require deep commitment from the governor and the business community . . ."55 Seeing a need for a black perspective on the issues raised by Szanton, the Urban League commissioned a study which appeared in June, 1987. It cited "some disturbing statistics which call into question the value of education for blacks."56 Earlier the Urban League and the Health and Welfare Council had published the report of its "Black Needs Assessment Project," which called for greater involvement of the "community in the teaching/learning process."57

Obviously Baltimore was a microcosm of America in the rash of attention focused upon the problems of schooling and their solution. It is also clear that there is considerable disagreement as to the problems and much more to the solutions. However, there seems to be nearly universal agreement that the schools are the primary institution for improving the employment and education options of the disadvantaged and that they will need much outside assistance to perform this role. While the dependence upon the schools for this role is not new, the belief that educators need outside help to succeed in the role has intensified in the 1980's. Throughout the beginning of the century, more and more Baltimore students sought to attend and complete high school. Then in recent years a decay set in. Proportionally fewer and fewer entering high school students remain to receive their diploma. If students dropout in massive numbers, it is quite clear the schools cannot perform their remediation role. Today, most observers of the system know only about half of city ninth graders bother to graduate, compared to a state average of 80 percent. They also know that related to the dropout rate is the low city attendance rate, which in 1982 stood at 78.3 percent, while no county system in Maryland state had a rate under 90 percent.58
Before dwelling upon the system's problems, it should be noted that some believe progress is being made. The former superintendent, John Crew, in a booklet he co-authored in 1982, boasted of his success in upgrading student achievement. He was quite willing to share credit for success with the school’s partners. "The most important factor was leadership. The mayor, the school board, the superintendent and the business community formed an unlikely coalition and led the system toward progress." He was certain that the corner had been turned in the battle against educational decay. For obvious reasons that has been the position of key school administrators and city officials.

There is certainly some justification for a positive view of the system's achievements. City student test scores in the state accountability program rose from below the national average for third graders to above average in two of three indicators, language and math, by eighth grade. Perhaps more importantly, the scores of youth in schools just inside the city's borders, are comparable to, and at times above, those for the nearest suburban school, proving that some city teachers and administrators can perform as well as those in the counties. Furthermore, a recent survey of parents found most were moderately satisfied with the education their children received.60

The opposing view is that the schools are continuing to decline, overwhelmed by social problems, if not their own bureaucratic rigidity. In the summer of 1987, Kathy Lally in a series of articles in the Baltimore Sun, on the city's Southern High School, graphically portrayed the problems of drug use, teen pregnancy, and general youth boredom with school. Describing one dropout who was promised a new sports car by his family if he graduated, Lally asked, "If the promise of a Corvette can't keep Charles Jay in school, how can Baltimore ever hope to win its fight against an enormous dropout rate?"61 Many community leaders, teachers union officials, and researchers, such as Peter Szanton, share these pessimistic views.

In addition to the difference in dropout and attendance rates from the suburbs, there are other differences. While a few students living near the county may be learning and while attention to basics has resulted in the average city eighth grader reading at grade level, the average county neighbor is reading at the tenth grade level. Likewise, although per pupil spending in Baltimore has increased since the 1960's, the city has fallen from near equality to being far behind neighboring Baltimore County. Today, the city spends slightly over $3,000 per pupil, the county slightly over $4,000.62

Peter Szanton does not even believe the spending disparities from the counties are a serious problem. He believes there is evidence that smaller classes, higher teachers salaries "and more modern buildings," is a strategy "widely applied with very little result." Unfortunately, for urban schools, he notes, "Experience and a series of massive and careful studies have demonstrated that the factors that most influenced the performance of students are the support and concern shown by their parents, and the environment created by their peers."63 Without fully agreeing with that view, the Regional Planning Council (RPC), a coalition of the local governments, found that within the public there is a fairly widespread perception that the poor have not benefit from improvements in schooling. "There is a fairly widespread public perception that the schools are not doing enough to provide [a well-organized, well-structured, efficient educational] experience
for all students and furthermore that inadequacy of our efforts have had a disproportionately severe and negative impact on the black poor."

The family and peer problems noted by Szanton and Kathy Lally, the Sun correspondent who studied Southern High School, are what distinguish Baltimore's school problems from those of the surrounding counties. In the suburbs the interest has been in improving the quality of education. We repeatedly see references to the impact of education on national competitiveness. The RPC said, "A well-organized, well-structured, efficient education experience undoubtedly has direct and unambiguous benefits for economic development in the region." In the city, however, one has the sense, as Kathy Lally wrote, "You can improve the teaching, tighten up the administration, provide better supplies and smaller classes. And all that will help. But in the end, you have to change the values, you have to teach the students to agree to learn. That's the battle. And no one knows how to win it."66

While Szanton questions the value of simply spending more money on the problem, he was less doubtful that the means to solve the problems of urban youth were known. He questioned the commitment to their solution, observing,

The elements of the strategy are familiar, ... they are widely approved by thoughtful persons inside and outside the school systems and though there are very considerable bureaucratic and political barriers to putting them into effect, they are hardly radical.

Underlying the strategy are two rules fundamental to business and at least partially applied to some public institutions, but widely ignored in the Baltimore public schools. The rules are simply to establish clear standards of performance, and to tie authority to responsibility.67

CURRENT BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS -- IMPROVING THE PRODUCT OR THE PROCESS

It is vital in understanding the course followed by Baltimore partnerships to understand the role of the schools' partners in rectifying the structural problems summarized by Szanton. In forming business partnerships, there has been a recurring temptation to focus efforts on improving the product of the schools -- the students or future employees -- rather than on the process. The Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) often has fallen victim to this temptation in recent years, being more interested in pairing businesses with schools and businessmen and women with students, than in using their talents to seek system wide changes. However, some of the most creative partnerships of the GBC in recent years continued the work of the Ramsey Conference Group in studying the structural barriers to school success.

Under the direction of its former education coordinator, Muriel Berkeley, the GBC tapped its members for experts to conduct three general studies of the educational system. They investigated the organization and management of the schools, the school budget process, and the school's image. As much as the GBC sponsored partnerships with specific schools, such as under the Adopt-a-School program, these system wide efforts could have a significant impact upon
individual disadvantaged pupils. One reason is that these system-wide programs, if successful, help all students. There is some evidence that the individual pairings with schools and students help the more advantaged students, even when the target is the disadvantaged. Furthermore, it is in solving the system-wide problems that businesses often have expertise of critical value to the schools. Few public agencies, particularly in the human service areas, such as schools, have a mastery of human resource development equal to the best efforts in the private sector. As Szanton believes, it is adoption of commonly used business performance and responsibility methods that might allow the schools of Baltimore to have a significant impact upon the at-risk population.

Probably the most significant GBC study was that on "Organization and Management of the Baltimore City Public Schools," completed in 1982. Developed under the direction of Muriel Berkeley, the paper highlighted key areas of change which would have fulfilled Szanton's goals. The committee which wrote the report included the president of a local retailer, the human resource manager for one of the area's largest manufacturers, the corporate secretary of a large office and apartment management company, and other business and public sector administrators. It focused particularly on correcting the basic system problem, that "emphasis on students is diluted for staff in the central administration." It made five recommendations, the first of which being that significant changes were needed in the relationship of administration and training functions in the system "so that administration serves the schools, and so that the most able educators are encouraged to stay in school." Specifically, it called for changes in the salary structure to achieve the latter goal and the implementation of management development programs so that administrators would relate well to the educators.

The second GBC task force reported on its review of the "Education Budget Process," in 1983. Staffed again by Muriel Berkeley and another GBC employee, the committee brought together budget executives from three major businesses and the Johns Hopkins University; partners from two major accounting firms; a management information system director for a large manufacturer; and two other corporate executives to recommend changes in school budgeting. Following-up on the central concept of the organization committee, the guiding principal for the budget process study was the adoption of a financial management and reporting control structure based in the schools. Budget Committee members visited Cincinnati and other cities in search of productive systems. They particularly favored the Cincinnati system which facilitated both local school control of priorities and local accountability. To bring about greater school expertise in its annual budget battles with the city government, the task force recommended the hiring of a chief financial officer with experience comparable to that of a corporate equivalent. The Budget Committee noted the importance of budget competency for educational reform. "Only requests for more money typically spark the interest of decision-makers. To avoid conflict, policy makers routinely stick with the existing status quo . . . "

The budget and organization studies marked a high point of GBC involvement in partnerships in the 1980's. Business was providing what it truly could provide best, advice from its areas of expertise. As with so many partnerships in Baltimore, however, this one was primarily the work of a few dedicated individuals. The initiative was not institutionalized. John
Crew, the Superintendent through 1983, was overly optimistic when he held that "The philosophy of the Greater Baltimore Committee was consciously amended. It would no longer be mere catalyst, but would become directly involved in educational reform." In fact, the organization backed-off when it came to the brink of full involvement in reform. Crew alluded to the problem when he noted that Muriel Berkely learned that the Baltimore business community could not be pushed but only gently led to increase its involvement. She left the GBC staff shortly after completing work on the budget study and now teaches elementary school French at one of city's border schools.71

The GBC, without Muriel Berkely, conducted one final study for the schools in 1984. Not surprisingly, it looked at a more acceptable bureaucratic topic, the image problems of the system. Once again the GBC brought together appropriate experts, including several persons from the media. Certainly such a topic is a valid one for outside advice. In fact, some school partnership experts have seen assistance in public relations as the most valuable form of assistance which business can provide schools.72 They point out that a major reason for the dropout problem is the poor perception of the value of schooling of many youth. That is, a fundamental part of the dropout problem itself is a public relations problem. The GBC School Image Committee did a credible job in advising the schools on methods to improve communications with all school constituents.

There were two problems evident in the GBC's involvement in these studies. First, there was the general reluctance to administer or fund programs. Second, there was not great interest in general educational reform. The emphasis at the GBC has been in expansion of one-on-one relationships of schools and businesses. Peter Szanton defined the problem evident in GBC school policy in his general description of the response of Baltimore leaders to the city's problems:

I have noted the near unanimity of the advisers [to his study] as to Baltimore's key problems and hence to the overriding goals of the city. . . . But it should be acknowledged, too, that the advisers agreed more readily about the nature of those goals than about the importance of acting upon them.73

The GBC was prepared to offer advice. It particularly sought to avoid political conflict which might have arisen from implementation of the educational recommendations of the studies. Eventually, the Ramsey Conference Group, which the GBC had absorbed, was dissolved for this reason, in favor of an informal group that met privately with the superintendent.

The fate of the organization and budget studies has been instructive. The schools, under the current Superintendent, Alice Pinderhughes, are beginning school based budgeting and did hire a financial chief executive. However, the first incumbent, who was greatly respected, quit after a year due to lack of support. The GBC leadership was not prepared to support its recommendations for change. Likewise, the recommendations of the organization committee, while receiving endorsement from key officials, have yet to be implemented. However, these represented the minimal non-radical reforms which many outside observers see as prerequisites for empowering city educators to deal with the devastating problems of at-risk students.

24
THE "PARTNERSHIP"

Reflecting the GBC's greater emphasis upon individual partnerships to make disadvantaged students a more employable product of the schools, the Adopt-a-School Program was changed after an internal review in 1984. There were two changes in the program. First, the GBC committed its members to increase greatly such adoptions. Second, in a shift in program targeting, the GBC pledged to adopt all high schools. A minor change was the renaming of the program, simply the Partnership. In early 1987, the GBC modified the priorities by agreeing to seek adoptions for at least 130 schools, including many elementary and middle schools. GBC Chairman, Henry Rosenberg, Jr., said at a May 21, 1987, GBC meeting:

Simply put, we can no longer tolerate the status quo . . . we must pull together as a community to end the crisis of confidence in our public schools . . . I'm issuing what we're calling a clarion call. It's from trumpets on high.

The great expansion of the Partnership Program was directly related to the employment problems of graduates of the public schools. According to the GBC's Education Committee Chairman, Arnold Kleiner, the expansion was launched when a survey of the membership showed great 'dissatisfaction with the way graduates of Baltimore schools performed on the job.' The GBC published a report explaining the steps in establishing a partnership. The program has four goals, "to develop basic skills in students, relating these basics to the . . . the job; motivate students to attend . . . regularly; expose students to the business world; [and] increase student awareness of career opportunities." The GBC emphasized that partnerships do "not require businesses to provide financial support to their partner schools," and "there are no real limitations to the Partnerships." 74

Some critics of the renewed GBC emphasis on partnerships have expressed concern about the quality of some new school adoptions. They sense that there is no emphasis upon program impact. They cite the partnership booklet, which begins its discussion of program evaluation saying, "There are no set rules for evaluating the collaborative efforts between a business and a school." 75 A number of persons involved in the partnerships expressed resentment that the GBC was counting part of its Partnership program efforts begun by others and even efforts still conducted independently of it.

According to 1987 partnership reports from GBC, there are two primary classifications of partnerships: those that continue the Adopt-a-School concept, where one or more businesses work with one school, and the Engineering Pipeline Program, formerly run by the Voluntary Council. While the GBC says there currently are about 80 partnerships, only 25 have been functioning long enough to be described as operational in its April 1987 report. Many of these are continuations of the old Adopt-a-School Program. Ten of the 1977 employers and nine of the schools are still involved, although only four of the pairings are still in existence. Sixty-two percent -- eight of the thirteen -- of current pairings at the elementary and middle school level are with Chapter I schools, the same percentage as in 1977. Only four elementary or middle schools have been added to the original group. Most of
the program changes have come from the shift in emphasis to the high schools. In addition, one partnership, between the major law firm in the city and the system wide business education program, does not fit the pattern of being a school partnership. The shift toward senior high schools shows the current emphasis at the GBC toward improving job-related skills. Any future expansion of partnerships will have to be at the elementary or middle school levels, since the recent expansion has covered the high schools.76

THE ADOPTION EXPERIENCE

It is essential to separate the GBC's stated goals for the Partnership adoptions from the actual expectations and experiences of adopting companies. Most of the companies minimize the direct relationship of the adoption to student employment. They display real sensitivity to the problems of at-risk students and their teachers. The Baltimore Life partnership with Eutaw-Marshburn Elementary, a Chapter I school, is a good example of this type effort. Company staff have emphasized to the school that they wish to help and not be a burden on teachers. The company supplies samples of company work which teachers believe relates to instruction such as in mathematics, with the goal of making lessons more realistic. The company appreciates the problems of student families, which often understand the world of work little better than the student. Parents are invited to tours of company facilities, along with their children. The company has hired a few parents during the eleven year length of the partnership and offers summer jobs to teachers at the school. In contrast to GBC statements regarding financial contributions, the company has donated money to the school to fund the Junior Great Books Program and a playwright to compose a school drama. Obviously, company staff do not simply emphasize the link between schooling and job seeking skills. The emphasis is more educational than the current goals of the GBC, emphasizing the development of a stable school relationship with students and parents, critical thinking skills, and appreciation of the arts.

Most of the companies with long experience in adoptions appear to pursue goals somewhat differently from the job related aims emphasized by the GBC. They appreciate the need for sound general education for at-risk youth, not simply improvement of basic skills. For example, the telephone company funded the Junior Great Books Program at its current partner. It had previously shown great originality in the 1970's in its educational and mathematics teaching program at Guilford Elementary. One of the benefits of the partnership experience for companies seems to be this appreciation of the value of general academic preparation and a sympathy for the work of educators in an urban setting.

Company concern in partnerships differ from GBC program descriptions in other ways. Perhaps most importantly, businesses place great emphasis on program evaluation. The Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, for example, worked with the school system to develop a data base to correlate dropout rates of program participants and non-participants. It found significant reductions in the dropout rate for participants at Southern High School, its partner. There was agreement from company staff involved in the partnerships that they did not want the effort to become a numbers game, counting every activity as a success. There was considerable fear that current emphasis on the rapid growth of partnerships will result in little additional impact on at-risk students but just such a tabulation of participants.
The contrast between the GBC's emphasis on the employability of students and the interest in participating businesses in improving the educational process is quite evident in the evolution of the Engineering Pipeline program. Pipeline, as the school adoptions, includes many long-term pairings of businesses and schools. In addition it includes an important commitment by the Johns Hopkins University. As the adoption program, Pipeline has been focusing increasingly on the high school years. Refocusing on older youth is just one of a number of recent changes in the program following the GBC's assumption of control two years ago. Formerly run by the Voluntary Council, the program's costs made the Council glad to find another sponsor.

Pipeline simply is a program designed to inform city students, particularly minority and female students, of opportunities in the sciences and mathematics. It does this through the activities of Pipeline (Science) Clubs in the schools. These clubs hold "expos," participate in field trips, work to improve member study skills, as well as provide science career awareness to students. Pipeline is a simple concept, enthusiastically embraced by both the science teachers and company staff involved. However, they share a sense a frustration with the lack of support given the program by the general business community and the school system.

Because of the complexity of many Pipeline activities, those involved believe it needs both school and business staff support. Specifically, teachers feel that one science teacher in each school should be freed of some teaching to provide coordination. In addition, an application is being made for a National Science Foundation Grant for a city-wide coordinator employed by Pipeline. Neither the GBC nor the school system seem concerned with these needs. Pipeline participants see this lack of support as symbolic of the problem of voluntary partnerships. The schools and many proponents of partnerships expect much of programs such as Pipeline without being willing to commit even a minor amount of money to support them. Supporters of Pipeline find that volunteers and teachers are wasting too much time on program administration and spending too little on the educational components of the program.

In addition to highlighting the conflicting goals of the Partnership program, Pipeline demonstrates the tendency of school officials to abuse partnerships designed to broaden the educational options of at-risk students. They seek to use them as substitutes for -- not supplements to -- regular educational resources. At risk students need enrichment programs, over and above education in the basics. Pipeline is such an enrichment program. Yet, the schools and the GBC treat it as a program needing no additional staff or funding support, assuming that it can replace lost basic resources.

OTHER GBC PROGRAMS

While Pipeline and the adoption programs under the Partnership are its major activities, the renewed Partnership efforts of the GBC have several additional thrusts. The GBC intends to develop special programs to reward students who perform well and to offer incentives to current and future teachers, such as the no fee credit cards for teachers offered in some
subdivisions. In another initiative, a major accounting firm in the GBC is
compiling data to allow for more efficient school planning. The GBC also
 intends to make data processing and administrative resources available to
parent groups to facilitate greater parent involvement. Henry Rosenberg
emphasized that, "We have to get the parents involved. The teachers can't do
it all." Finally, the GBC launched a program to compile a list of all the
cooperative efforts between business and the schools.77

Of course the easiest task was to compile a list of what business is
currently doing in the schools. That task was completed in April, 1987. The
other projects will take longer, but the GBC has emphasized that it is
prepared for the long process of upgrading the schools. Key leaders of GBC
regularly meet with the school superintendent. There is the possibility that
many additional educational improvements will come from this dialogue.

Some community leaders and school staff privately have criticized the GBC
for its ambivalent attitude on school funding issues. They point out that the
GBC did not support efforts in the state legislature to devote to education
the windfall from federal tax reform. Rather, the GBC favored returning most
of the money to the taxpayers. Some teachers have been particularly bitter in
their criticism of this breach in the spirit of partnership. Supporters of
more funding had to form the Metropolitan Education Coalition, a partnership
relying on labor, the League of Women Voters, the NAACP, the Urban League, and
suburban school officials, but not the GBC, for budget lobbying.

OTHER BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS

Any review of business sponsored partnerships must be careful to avoid
the myopic view that all programs involve the GBC. In some cases, the GBC's
aversion to directly administering programs causes it to consciously reject
sponsorship of partnerships. For example, it rejected endorsement of a model
career encounter program and a practicum program at the city's magnet school for the
humanities. The career encounter day sends every student to the worksite of a
parent or, if the parent is not employed, another relative, a friend, or
neighbor. The concepts behind the program, in which students participate
twice in their high school years, are that it exposes students to real work
situations and helps them appreciate parent responsibilities. Counseling
staff at the school believe the encounter program could easily be expanded to
all city schools, particularly if the GBC endorsed the effort. They point
out that, despite the lack of such endorsements, no business has refused
student admission to the parent's worksite and most have welcomed the youth
with special explanations of the business. Only the federal Social Security
Administration has barred youth.78

Businesses are also heavily involved in the schools through the
activities of foundations and of the Private Industry Council (PIC) created
under the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). In both cases, the GBC role
has been minimal. There have been special partnerships, as well, sponsored by
other institutions, particularly the Johns Hopkins University. Hopkins is
involved in an independent pipeline program, called MESA (Math, Engineering,
Science, and Achievement), a health careers awareness program focused at one
high school but including outreach to all ninth grades in the city, and
research projects in the schools.79
UNIVERSITY PARTNERSHIPS

The University's Center for Research on Elementary and Middle Schools, one of the national education centers funded by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement of the U. S. Department of Education, has worked on many projects with the schools. Usually the programs involve attempts to understand and change the schools organizational structure, one of the primary concerns of the center. For example, from 1982 to 1985, the Center sponsored an Effective Schools Project in two Chapter I junior high schools, including one of the schools in which MESA functioned.

The Effective Schools Project was an attempt to improve instruction by improving morale at the two extremely demoralized schools. Focusing on the seventh grade, the researchers trained staff in the "Program Development Evaluation" (PDE) method of achieving organizational change. This method involves carefully defining problems with school staff, setting goals, developing measures of goal achievement, and developing from the experience blueprints to correct such problems in the future. The goals at the two schools were "to reduce school disorder, increase attendance, and improve educational motivation." One strategy for achieving these goals, but not a goal itself, was a career exploration unit. It is important to appreciate the subtle difference between seeking career awareness as a goal and seeing such awareness as a base for educational efforts.

Evaluations of program success were a basic part of Hopkins plans; however, they have not been easy to complete. The school system complicated the evaluation process by not allowing Hopkins to administer tests to control groups at other schools. This has been a common problem Hopkins has had in all efforts to conduct evaluations of city education and employment programs. However, comparing the accomplishments of earlier seventh graders at the schools to the experimental group showed marked improvement in student attendance and achievement. In addition, the Project illustrated the sophisticated assistance available to the schools within the community.

The Effective Schools Project ended for reasons typical of so many research partnerships. The old National Institute of Education was changed into the Office of Educational Research and Improvement just as the original grant expired. While Hopkins was interested in continuing the project, the Center had other interests; and, as so often, the school system seemed mostly interested in minimizing the involvement of outsiders. Consequently, Hopkins had to end its role in the Baltimore project, while continuing to work with systems in several other cities. Without outside partners, the system was unable or unwilling alone to continue the effort. Thus, knowledge of this method for improving school planning has faded slowly from memory at the two schools, rather than becoming a real model for bringing change. The system's administration has ignored the findings of the program, despite the apparent need in many schools for clearer planning of educational goals. As with so many other partnerships, this experience demonstrates the need to institutionalize the efforts of the partners or risk their loss when personnel or priorities change.
FOUNDATION SPONSORED PARTNERSHIPS

There are at least two major programs originated by foundations which are directed at improving the educational experiences of at-risk students in Baltimore. Both include significant business and JTPA involvement, the participation of diverse public and non-profit groups, and to some extent, organized labor. Compared to the GBC's activities, each has received comparatively little public attention; yet, each seems to have great potential for affecting the quality of education received by disadvantaged youth. Both of the initiatives, the Fund for Educational Excellence and the Collaborative, a program promoting dropout prevention planning, began with Ford Foundation support.

In addition to these programs, local foundations have been heavily involved in studying educational problems and have provided key financial support for public sector programs with inadequate financial resources. In most cases the Goldseker Foundation has been the lead supporter of such efforts. Its "Baltimore 2000" report, published in late 1986, appears to be a major catalyst for educational change. Previously, local foundations paid for the study of the Adopt-a-School program conducted by Otto Kraushaar in the 1970's.

In 1986, the Ford Foundation granted $25,000 in seed money to the Baltimore Public Schools to plan "school-community projects that will match dropout-prone students with programs addressing their particular problems, whether school- or home-related." The Baltimore grant was one of twenty-one made to school districts in the country, all in the same amount. The grant stipulated that the program's steering committee of 36 persons should include both "insiders and outsiders." The diversity required of the Steering Committee assured that its membership would be reminiscent of that of the advisory committees of the 1930's or 1960's. The Committee included a mix of community organization leaders, private citizens, university staff, politicians, government agency heads, representatives of the teachers union, and six businessmen.

The general expectation for the Collaborative is that it would assemble data on the dropout problem. After data analysis, which might be provided by the Academy for Educational Development in New York, the project will attempt to develop standards for determining precisely which students are likely to dropout. Since it is assumed that there will be a mix of reasons why Baltimore students dropout, the project is expected to develop procedures for coordinating needed solutions for the problems of specific students.

For example, students with acute financial problems might be helped to secure jobs. For those having mainly school-related problems, the programs might provide further academic assistance, specialized counseling, or training for school staff to help them recognize potential dropouts.

The Collaborative launched earlier this year a Community Mobilization Campaign (CMC) "to involve the total community in educating high-risk dropout-prone children." The hope of the CMC is to develop partnerships between churches and community groups and the schools. It is hoped such community
institutions will provide mentoring and tutoring programs in the neighborhood schools and develop before and after school programs to help area students. The Collaborative is supporting the Baltimore Commonwealth program, an effort originated by a community organization that guarantees jobs or college admission to school system graduates meeting minimal academic and attendance standards. It also is promoting coordination of school based social, recreation, and library services, so that all students have access to such services.

Perhaps the most original effort of the Collaborative is the "Success for All" program, which it is developing with staff from Johns Hopkins. Targeted on the kindergarten to third grade students, the purpose is to assure that students reach the third grade at grade level in basic skills. The plan is to provide small classes, family intervention, professional tutoring, and individualized educational plans for all at-risk youth. As with so many current dropout programs, "Success for All" is starting much smaller than its ultimate goal of reaching all city youth under fourth grade. In 1987/88, the program will operate in one school, combining that schools $200,000 in Chapter I funding with $300,000 in Chapter II, exemplary program funds. The program nearly exhausts the city's Chapter II funding. Emphasizing the collaborative nature of the project, the city Department of Social Services is contributing the services of a social worker.

Those involved in "Success for All" speak positively of its expansion. They believe they can secure sufficient state and private sector funding to expand after the pilot program. It is not clear if such plans are realistic. Whatever its ultimate size, the program may provide a test of the ability to prevent students from reaching the higher grades trailing behind in basic achievement. A factor in the programs favor is the Superintendent's commitment to expand the individualized planning concept to all students in the system. The Superintendent, also, is very interested in pre-school and other early intervention programs. How greatly "Success for All" will be directed by the board of the Collaborative, which might assure it of relatively great support, is not yet known.

The general assumption behind the Collaborative, as the name implies, is that dropout prevention cannot be a specialized service, but must involve the total community in a new commitment to education. There are several key unexpressed assumptions behind the project. One is that, with coordination, existing institutional services, particularly existing public sector services, can be made to respond to and solve the personal problems of the dropouts. Another is that non-public community institutions can be mobilized to support more and better public schooling in a socially and politically divided city, such as Baltimore, where cultural and legal barriers are frequently thrown across movements to impose values in public programs. Apparently the Collaborative assumes that the culture does not accept social problems such as broken families as the norm; or, if it does, that such problems no longer will be the barrier to student retention that they have been in previous years.

Of course, the $25,000 seed money from Ford can only start the process. It is hoped that the Community Mobilization Campaign will become a permanent institution, directed by the Advisory Council. If this effort can be sustained, and the board's diversity of membership continued, then certainly it may mark a new beginning of efforts to seriously address the community's
As with the Citizens School Advisory Committee of the 1960's, the schools have shown great reluctance to welcome input from a wide spectrum of the community. The schools initially provided most of the members for the CMC, having restructured an internal school dropout committee to administer the Ford Program. At the start of the Collaborative the schools yielded only under pressure to include a representative sample of community representatives. The school's attitude seems to be if they must accept the advice of a wider coalition from the community, they will make major demands on the partners, not simply addressing the dropout problem. All of these facts should indicate more might be achieved with greater cooperation.

As the Collaborative is an interesting attempt at cooperative efforts to improve educational quality for disadvantaged pupils in Baltimore, the Ford Foundation's support of the Fund for Educational Excellence has created another interesting community education partnership. The Fund is one of a number of Public Education Funds supported by Ford and modeled after the Allegheny Conference Education Fund in Pittsburgh, created by that city's business community. There are several differences between the Baltimore fund and more established funds in other cities.

In contrast to the role of the Pittsburgh business community, the GBC did not think it should sponsor such a fund, feeling the business community was already being asked to do too much. In Baltimore, the Fund for Educational Excellence therefore had to turn to city government for leadership following the pattern noted by Otto Krashaar in the 1970's. Rather than being a program of the GBC, the Fund for Educational Excellence is a creation of the JTPA program and a select group of businesses, several associated with the Private Industry Council (PIC). The local JTPA program provided the director for the fund and turned to the core businesses which have been involved with the city's former mayor in other partnership efforts to provide funds.

Beginning in Baltimore in 1984, the fund was granted $100,000 in seed money from the national Public Education Fund. Each succeeding year the Public Education Fund has reduced its contribution by $25,000 and the local sponsors have increased their fund raising. Starting in 1984 with $35,000 in local funds, in 1986 the $50,000 in national funding was far exceeded by $225,000 raised locally. Much of the money came from business, through thirty-nine corporate donors. Additionally, 10 local foundations and 175 individual's contributed in 1986. While this level of fund raising is impressive, the Baltimore fund is only the twelfth largest of 44 funds. On a per pupil basis, the Baltimore fund is the thirtieth in size.

The fund distributes grants in two broad categories, small grants of under $500, which often go to specific teachers for classroom projects and grants from $500 to $3000 for larger projects, which more often involve a whole school or community. Because of the fund's comparatively small size it has not yet been able to mount a major project, such as the program in Pittsburgh that has provided refresher training to all high school teachers.

The key point of the fund is to encourage creative efforts to improve the quality of education in Baltimore. Its procedures allow teachers to apply for funds directly, without requiring school system review. The goal of this
process is to reward individual creativity, without the bureaucratic review by higher authorities which might interfere with innovation or, at a minimum, diffuses credit for its initiation. The fund also pays for some more general or larger projects, including Science on the Move, which promotes laboratory science in the schools. A community relations program is funded which starts partnerships between schools and churches, neighborhood associations, and local businesses. There is a parent involvement program to encourage greater parent activity in schools, and, most recently, an Academy of Finance.

The Fund's role in establishment of the Academy is a good example of the importance of the fund to the development of new initiatives in urban education. The Academy grew out of a similar institution sponsored in New York City by Shearson Lehman/American Express. The model required matching school and private funds to pay for the $60,000 costs of the program. The Fund for Educational Excellence provided the private matching for public funds. Raising such funds quickly in the absence of the fund might have been impossible.

However the key value of the fund is in restoring creativity and pride in the schools, either sponsored by staff or the community. Some critics hold that the small grants or even the total Fund budget of $275,000 in 1986 are incapable of overcoming a deficiency in public funding of the schools -- a deficiency of many millions of dollars. However, the local executive director finds the grants, "Have a significant impact on the learning environment." The Director of the Pittsburgh fund, David Bergholz, agrees, noting, "I believe if it makes the teacher happy and if it makes the kids in the class happy, it is a grant well spent." Of course, it must be remembered that the Allegheny Conference Education Fund, in Pittsburgh, is many times larger than the Fund for Educational Excellence, and can make large system-wide grants.

The small grants have been used extensively and creatively by teachers. The director estimates that in each of the last two years 50,000 students, or nearly half the students in the system, have had some contact with grant funded activities. Typical grants have included $500 to two Chapter I schools to train teachers in a special reading tutorial process. The process had been used successfully by tutors at a church run tutorial program. There was a grant of $500 to a teacher at a special school for students with behavioral disorders to fund production of a student musical. The goal of the project was to involve students, faculty, parents, and community members in a common project. Other projects included funding a Junior Great Books Program, a creative writing with computers effort, and an alumni as role model program, each at Chapter I middle schools. In all, 75 small grants were funded at 40 schools. Over sixty schools have had grant recipients during the year. A majority of all applications are approved, and the fund is encouraging more applications.

Both the Collaborative and the Fund for Educational Excellence demonstrate the value of resources from outside the community to start partnerships that address the problems of urban youth. They show how relatively small amounts of funding can be leveraged into a large impact. However, persons involved in both are conscious of the key limitations of the efforts. Neither are designed to supplant regular educational funds. The Collaborative seeks to improve coordination of existing public programs and to encourage community involvement with the schools. The Fund for Educational Excellence
Excellence tries to encourage creativity and make the difference between good programs and excellent ones. Both are built on the assumption that many of the at-risk youth and their families see a reason to utilize the programs they help improve. To realize this assumption, both show special concern with building parent and community involvement in the problems of at-risk students.

They differ in several ways. The Fund is not limited to helping at-risk students, while the Collaborative is focusing only on dropouts. However, the office of the Director of the Fund is in the Office of Manpower Resources, and he is still a part-time official of the local JTPA program. His personal commitment certainly is to helping the disadvantaged. Currently the Collaborative is a temporary effort, expected by the Ford Foundation to produce a dropout prevention plan in the Fall, 1987. The Fund is an on-going, growing activity, becoming increasingly free of national foundation support. However, the last difference may be less real than it appears, for the Collaborative is intent upon permanency.

JOB TRAINING PARTNERSHIPS WITH THE SCHOOLS

The role of the local JTPA program in the Fund for Educational Excellence is an indication of the willingness of the program leadership to become directly involved in efforts to improve the educational options of disadvantaged youth not yet in the workforce. The local JTPA program, the Office of Manpower Resources (OMR), has welcomed a view of job training which allows activities for youth not yet of working age. Furthermore, this attitude predates the JTPA legislation which currently funds OMR operations.

Since being created under the Comprehensive Emploment and Training Act (CETA), OMR has been involved with the schools. OMR representatives attended the Educator Employer Conferences in the 1970's and played an important role in some of the committees of the Ramsey Conference Group. However, most of the financial involvement of OMR with programs for youth under 16 years of age only came in the 1984/85 school year with the inauguration of Project SAIL or Student Adventures in Learning. The JTPA portion of SAIL was funded under special provisions of JTPA Title II-A, Section 205, which authorizes "a 'preemployment skills training program' for youth, and individuals aged 14 and 15, with priority being given to those individuals who do not meet the established levels of academic achievement." The Project also received funding from the Fund for Educational Excellence and the Goldseker Foundation, to pay for various costs not allowable under the JTPA restrictions on administrative expenses.

Project SAIL was aimed at economically disadvantaged students, reading two or more grade levels below average, who were completing junior high school. As a pilot program, it was to be limited to students entering one of three high schools "selected because of the high enrollment of educationally deficient and economically disadvantaged youths." SAIL had four goals, "(1) to improve school retention rates, (2) to increase the employability of disadvantaged youths, (3) to deter adolescent parenthood, and (4) to reduce learning decay experienced over the summer months." There were two parts to Project SAIL, a summer component and a year around part. During the summer, students were offered computer assisted
remedial instruction to raise achievement test scores. In addition the students worked part-time. JTPA funds were used to pay for a teacher, worksite supervisors and six high school honors students who served as tutors. The linking of paid summer employment was an attraction for youth who wanted to earn income. The remedial education component combatted summer learning decay, which makes low achieving youth particularly likely to dropout. Program administrators pointed to research which shows significant decline in achievement levels of disadvantaged students during the summer. Achievement on standardized tests improved between .4 and 1.3 years in reading, mathematics, and language arts, while for a control group the scores were falling. During the winter, about 75 percent of summer students participated in optional Academic Clubs, designed to continue remedial instruction after school and to reinforce positive peer contacts.

There were several problems - SAIL, some of which may have been a result of the haste with which the program was launched and some of which, no doubt, reflect the school system's reluctance to fully incorporate outside programs. For example, there was a problem filling all slots in the program, leading to open enrollment as the start-up date approached. Principals were a key source of enrollees and some may have selected students they wished to reward, rather than a random sample of problem youth. These factors make test gains difficult to interpret. While there were many youths who participated in the Academic Clubs, the 75 percent figure includes all who ever attended. Not nearly so many participated regularly because the clubs met after school hours and conflicted with sports and other activities.

SAIL was considered to be a pilot project, with the various evaluations being used to consider whether it should continue. In 1984 only 75 students participated. In 1985, 105 youth were in the program, including one third of the previous year's participants. They continued to receive remedial instruction and support. With about 6,000 dropouts in the Baltimore school system, this number of clients was not to make a significant impact on the dropout rate. Following the positive evaluations, OMR decided to greatly expanded SAIL, under the new name Futures.

Futures expands on SAIL in several ways. First the number of participants is much larger and is drawn from enrollees at six, rather than three, regional high schools. Based upon program eligibility requirements, 750 students were invited to participate in 1987. Of those, 570 saw the program presentation at their middle school, and 530 signed-up. Observers of the program point out that the voluntary nature of the selection process is a fundamental part of the eligibility process, since it might be a good measure of latent motivation.

While generally an expansion of SAIL, Futures includes several new program components. The most innovative may be an Outward Bound experience which gives every youth a chance to participate in a four day outdoor confidence building exercise, either in the Western Maryland mountains or on a sail boat on Chesapeake Bay. The Outward Bound component is designed to increase youth self-confidence and build self-esteem, since one dropout factor seems to be the low self-esteem as much as the low test scores of the dropout. In addition to the Outward Bound component, Futures includes additional emphasis upon recreation. The theory is that many of the youth do not understand sports or recreational activities. As with Outward Bound, the
A general recreational program is expected to build student self-confidence.

For students enrolling in the start of the ninth grade, Futures' services are expected to continue until graduation. As currently planned, after four years of operation, the program would have about 2,000 participants. That is, each summer and throughout the school year the Futures students will receive remedial instruction, summer employment, and support services. With the new Commonwealth Program, guaranteeing jobs and college admissions to graduates with good attendance and academic records, it is expected Futures can successfully lead most participants to graduation. To sustain the changes in student lifestyles sought by the program, there is a significant commitment to changing youth recreation habits, as well as to improve the educational qualifications. City parks and recreation funds and staff are fully involved in the program.

Supporting a program of the size of Futures will require considerable commitment of resources. In 1987, with 530 students, the budget includes approximately one million dollars, from a variety of sources. Perhaps demonstrating the school system's lack of enthusiasm, its contribution was only $100,000. That school contribution was simply from additional per pupil state funds earned by the city as a result of the return of older dropouts to the regular student rolls. The OMR funds have come from a mix of JTPA and other funding. The Private Industry Council (PIC), seeing the potential funding requirements if the program grows, is hoping for waivers which would allow the use of funds from other parts of JTPA, particularly the summer youth employment funds, to administer Futures.

The view from the PIC is that Futures should be the JTPA youth program for Baltimore, both summer and year round. The hope is to expand the program to all city high schools, serving all youth from disadvantaged families who are achieving, at the end of middle school, two or more years below norm. In addition to JTPA Title II-B summer jobs funds, they anticipate use of a new state at-risk education fund to pay for this expansion and, if possible, funds from a greatly enlarged Fund for Educational Excellence. The PIC Chair points out the the Boston public education fund has raised millions of dollars, and sees no reason why Baltimore cannot do so. As for summer jobs, the PIC chair sees no need for publicly funded summer jobs for disadvantaged youth, believing that they can secure enough private sector openings not requiring a JTPA subsidy.

The Office of Manpower Resources has made plans for a continuing evaluation of Futures. They approached Johns Hopkins University about their needs, but rejected Hopkins proposal since it involved maintaining a control group that would be denied service. They turned subsequently to the University of Maryland, which will conduct an on-going measure of program impact. Combining such data with the results of the Dartmouth study of Outward Bound, they believe, will provide information necessary to further refine the program.

The ingeneous use of multiple funding sources, including the Fund for Educational Excellence; the support of the PIC; and the commitment to program evaluation demonstrate the agency's commitment to having a meaningful impact upon the dropout problem. However, the success of Futures depends on continued local political support for the JTPA program and the willingness of
Congress to change JTPA to allow liberal transfer of funds between JTPA titles. In addition, the administrative costs of complex programs such as Futures are a larger portion of program expenses than are allowed under JTPA. Consequently, these limits might need amending if such programs are to grow. Ultimately, of course, Futures success depends upon its ability to influence the target population throughout the four years of high school.

While Futures has an impressive mix of services, it is not clear if they will be of the length and quality needed to seriously impact dropout factors. The Outward Bound experience is only a few days in length. The summer jobs under Project SAIL were often extremely boring, with supervisors who were not skilled at assisting disadvantaged youth learn from their summer experience. Futures alumni may not continue to participate once they become eligible for regular employment at age 16. Then there is the general question of the use of SAIL's success to predict the achievements of Futures. SAIL was a small program, without the bureaucratic barriers to success of most larger efforts. For example, SAIL had extremely motivated teachers; it will be difficult to find a larger number of motivated staff for a larger Futures program. It is not clear that the qualified, one summer gains of SAIL participants have meaning for Futures. It may be much more difficult to sustain changes in student attitudes over the long term, when initial enthusiasm and interest may wane. Nonetheless, the Futures program marks a significant departure in the use of JTPA and other funding to make meaningful changes in the educational and personal experiences of younger disadvantaged students.

COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS

A review of the development of public sector and business sponsored partnerships to address the educational needs of disadvantaged youth indicates that the serious educational problems of the city are being vigorously addressed. However, there has been a different view coming from some community leaders, particularly with links to the inner city churches. They express some alienation from the educational reform process of the early 1980's, although they did not oppose the conclusions of the various studies of the schools conducted by the GBC or the Goldseker Foundation. These sentiments crystallized in the educational agenda of Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development (BUILD), a coalition of churches formed in 1978.

BUILD began when ten Protestant and Catholic churches contracted with the Industrial Area Foundation to train their members in organizing techniques to bring social change. The basic strategy of BUILD was to "empower poor, working class and middle class communities," to "negotiate on behalf of Baltimore's poor and working class communities with corporate and elected political power," and "to rebuild and reorganize through parishes and congregations the centrality of mediating institutions as places where values are formed and families nurtured and protected."

BUILD's activities in the schools began in 1984. Early in the year the group complained about shortages of school supplies and persuaded the Superintendent to correct some shortages. Overcoming some hesitation on the part of the GBC leadership, BUILD's leaders began meeting with school and GBC representatives regarding implementation of a Baltimore version of the Boston
This plan was a key point of the group's October, 1984, convention, attended by 1,000 representatives of 33 churches. On April 24, 1985, the Commonwealth Agreement implementing this plan was signed. Basically, the agreement committed business to employ in jobs with career potential all graduates of the city schools who had 95% attendance in the senior year and an 85 grade point average. In May 1986, local colleges became the fourth partner to the agreement, pledging to give special consideration in admissions and financial aid to the participants.

The agreement specifically committed the schools, GBC, and Build to perform certain steps to assure implementation. For example, the GBC agreed to "enlist 100 companies to commit to providing preferential hiring for qualifying Baltimore City high school graduates." Build committed to developing parent involvement Commonwealth Committees in each high school. The schools promised to "secure [the] active participation of principals, teachers, and staff." Meanwhile Build increased the chance of teacher support for its agenda by welcoming the Baltimore Teachers Union and the administrators association to membership at the end of 1985. While there has been some tension in the Union over issues of teacher accountability, the teachers and administrators continue to support the efforts of Build. The school system agreed to staff the Commonwealth administrative office.

The Commonwealth Agreement is not the primary part of the Build agenda, although it is the one receiving the majority of press coverage. As even those involved in the program admit, any student meeting the Commonwealth criteria has a good chance of going to college or getting a job. The Commonwealth was to achieve two goals other than simply giving jobs to the best students. First by committing businesses to hiring city students, it was assumed the businesses would demand that the schools improve educational quality. As Robert Keller, the Executive Director of the GBC said, "The program is to provide an incentive for city students, the school system and the community to improve students' academic and attendance records." However, the program was also designed to reduce the dropout rate, which often has risen when school quality improves. Supporters of Commonwealth see the guarantee of a job after graduation as the reward which would keep students from dropping out when academic standards rose. The GBC's Education Chairman, James Flick, of Ernst and Whinney, said, "The program is designed to give students a reason to stay in school and to earn good grades. . . . We would hope that students, as well as their parents, see the Commonwealth as a tangible indication that business is prepared to do its part to reward them for success in education."97

Commonwealth also required a change in business and college selection procedures. The procedures counteract the simple vocationalism criticized in the 1930's by Harry Broening, and inherent in many programs linking business and the schools. Under Commonwealth, businesses are committed to hiring graduates who meet regular academic requirements. No reference is made to the schools providing specific vocational training for companies. If students receive any message from Commonwealth, it may be that the regular curriculum of the comprehensive high school is a proper preparation for life. Likewise, the willingness of area colleges to welcome applications from qualified students from any city high school sends an important message to the students of each school. Admissions staff at several selective colleges in the region report the 1987 Commonwealth applications included the first they had ever
received from some high schools.

In order to achieve the Commonwealth's dropout reduction goals BUILD and the schools formed a team to visit all high schools before the end of the 1985 school year and explain the program to students. After the initial explanation to juniors and seniors, the emphasis has shifted to ninth graders entering high school. The Commonwealth committees in each high school include about 15 members, including teachers, administrative staff, parents, and members of community groups, especially churches. The teachers and administrators serve as volunteers, for they are on the committee in a dual capacity: as school staff and as members of their union, which is a build member. The committees perform a number of roles but particularly they work at increasing parent involvement. For, it is the family support for the students that BUILD feels is essential to changing educational experiences of the disadvantaged. Perhaps of equal importance the purpose of the committees is to institutionalize local partnerships to promote education in communities.

With certain qualifications, the data from the first two years are encouraging. The key qualification, which is acknowledge by those promoting Commonwealth, is that the eligibility rules foreordain student success. In 1986, 583 students qualified for Commonwealth, out of a graduating class of 4,951. Other than four percent of the eligibles who did not wish to participate, 26 percent were helped to find jobs pledged by city businesses. Sixty-eight percent went to college, and two percent joined the armed forces. While enrollments were slightly lower in 1987, 670 students qualified, with 75 percent estimated to be entering college. Although half the participants are from the city-wide magnet schools, half are from the regional comprehensive high schools, where, traditionally, few students have tried to enter college. It is in reaching these marginally good students that Commonwealth staff hope to use the partnership to change opportunities for disadvantaged students.

The staff and others involved in the program, much as those involved in Futures, the Fund for Educational Excellence, Pipeline, and several of the school adoptions, show a genuine enthusiasm for their work. They particularly enjoy the freedom from regulation the program has, since it has no funding restrictions. BUILD and others involved in Commonwealth insist that the program is not a "give-away" program such as, they believe, is the Boston Compact. They demand students perform well to participate, and they demand that businesses offer quality jobs and colleges provide real admissions and financial assistance to participants.

BUILD has not stopped with the Commonwealth program in its efforts to improve the schools. In fact, Commonwealth is a relatively minor part of the BUILD agenda. At the June 30, 1987, BUILD public forum, the organization shifted its educational emphasis to demands that Baltimore political officials pledge to reduce class size to no more than 25 students in all grades within four years, at an additional budgetary cost of $30-$35 million. BUILD'S agenda included a pledge by candidates to use projected tax revenue increases to achieve these goals. With qualifications, the candidates pledged to seek the same goals.

The achievements of BUILD have been impressive. The group's commitment to maintain its organizational strength may assure it will have the ability to bring continuous pressure on officials for change. However, as with most
programs, the resources available to BUILD may not be sufficient to deal with the family disintegration which seems to lie at the heart of the dropout problem in Baltimore. As one observer at the 1985 BUILD Convention noted, while the group talks about helping the poor, the leadership is overwhelmingly middle class. The agenda, of guaranteeing jobs for graduates of the schools who have good attendance and grades may encourage some poor students to stay in school and work harder. Mostly it assures jobs to the middle class children of the BUILD leadership. Poor kids do not appreciate the agreement. As Kathy Lally of the Baltimore Sun noted in her series on Southern High School, "It's hard to get more than a handful of students interested. 'I heard about it, but I'm not interested,' says Mary McDonald, a senior from Curtis Bay. 'I want to get a job on my own. If I need help, I'll go to them.'"

That may be one of the best expressions of the problem faced by all the partnerships. So long as basic attitudes or values are not changed the programs created by partnerships are going to have little impact. BUILD's reliance upon the community for its support, upon local churches and unions, may give it a greater chance of success than other programs. The other partnerships have often had the problem of being run by business leaders or other community officials perceived as isolated from the disadvantaged. In order to succeed as a more representative partnership BUILD must keep its focus on using school improvements to lure more low achieving poor youth to a greater interest in schooling. If it loses sight of that goal, it will become another pressure group for middle class parents assuring they will receive the benefits of their commitment to a lifestyle different from that of Baltimore's disadvantaged.
PROGRAM ASSESSMENT AND NEEDS

There are several observations which seem appropriate after a review of efforts in Baltimore to improve the educational options of disadvantaged youth. Most major groups in the city seem to have some involvement in efforts to improve those options. Various government agencies, such as the Office of Manpower Resources (OMR); businesses and the Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC); foundations, both local and national; a number of civic and community groups; the teacher's union and, at least formally, other affiliates of the AFL-CIO; and the public school leadership are committed to educational change. Most directly, they see the problem as the extremely high dropout rate, which they all say is over 50 percent and rising.

There are several common features of the major efforts to deal with the problems of at-risk youth, including the extensive commitments of effort. Most of the programs include some innovative partnerships of diverse groups and demonstrate some sophistication of goals. They often mask this sophistication with simplistic rhetoric, such as when the business leaders talk only of training in job related skills, improving economic competitiveness, or increasing the quality of teachers. Yet, those active in the actual business partnerships, particularly those that have been involved for a number of years, show an appreciation of the difficulties faced by teachers and students. Few business representatives seek to achieve narrow vocational benefits from their efforts. They have an awareness of the need for quality general education if the educational problems of disadvantaged youth are to be overcome.

Those efforts funded by foundations show a like awareness of the complexity of the effort to solve the problems. There is no illusion at the Fund for Educational Excellence that the fund can overcome major disparities in school funding between the city and the suburbs. The Collaborative is motivated by the awareness of the complex factors causing dropouts to leave school and the mix of services needed to deal with those factors. The leadership of the Futures program is fully aware that disadvantaged youth need more than short run job training and placement but rather must be assisted in rebuilding their self esteem and basic educational skills. More importantly, Futures is designed as a four year intervention for each student, not simply the experience of a single summer. The goals of BUILD, likewise show an appreciation of the inevitable complexity involved in improving educational quality while attempting to reduce dropout rates. The teachers union has shown an interest in improved education and a shared agenda with the GBC.

These are all extremely hopeful signs. Yet, there are concerns with the impact of these programs. Such concerns can not be ignored so long as the rate of withdrawal from high school remains high and is increasing. It is especially disheartening to recall the history of the education of at-risk youth in Baltimore. Since J. M. Rice looked at the schools of Baltimore in 1892, there has been a continuing concern that the disadvantaged, especially the minority disadvantaged population of the city, was not benefitting from schooling. Being largely ahistorical in our analysis of problems, many program supporters today believe we have never faced the same problems before and that, if we did, we did not have the sophistication or commitment to solve them. Yet, in fact, our predecessors did understand some of the causes of dropping out and its consequences. They did attempt partnerships and other
programs to solve them. Yet it seems the most serious problems, particularly those complicated by our strange patterns of race relations, have never been solved.

In the 1930's, for example, the impact of family disintegration upon the opportunities of black Baltimoreans was clearly described. It was known, furthermore, that the problem of family collapse did not originate in the race of the youth but in the social class. The demographic changes within the city in the last two generations have only intensified such problems, as out migration from the city of the middle class and relatively higher birth rates among the poor have made the majority of users of the Baltimore public schools economically disadvantaged.

We now know that schools are an integral part of the larger society. They may be an instrument for some change, but only if the users want such a change. There are at least two overwhelming facts among the poor in Baltimore which make it difficult for the schools and programs working with the schools to succeed. As Howard Bell noted in 1938, a majority of poor youth do not see a financial pay-off from the schools. As many writers have documented, there is a profound anti-intellectualism in much of American culture. Combining these two observations would indicate that many poor youth may see neither an intellectual nor a monetary benefit in schooling. That being the case, educators and their partners are in for an extremely difficult and lengthy struggle before they convince today's poor to use the schools they are reforming. And, as so many recent observers have noted, if we improve educational quality without making provisions for the potential dropout to play catch-up, then the dropout rate will rise even higher.

The above observations do not mean that partnership efforts should be abandoned as hopeless. They merely mean that partnerships must be guided by a realistic awareness of the difficulties of the current urban education problem. If partnership participants lack such awareness, they are doomed to frustration, which can make the partners less willing to cooperate in the future, as well as do more harm to already disadvantaged students. Of course, it is difficult to criticise partners engaged in unsuccessful efforts. Who can criticise a volunteer, as partnership participants so often are? However, the Baltimore experience with partnerships give considerable experience on which to base conclusions about problems and solutions to increase the likelihood of success. Sponsors of partnerships owe it to participants to prepare them for the basic problems of affecting the educational options of disadvantaged youth.

First, the intensity of the effort must be sustained over the long term, if success is to be achieved. Partnerships which come and go, especially with significant shifts in goals, will not have an impact. The cultural forces encouraging anti-school feelings among disadvantaged youth are intense. The Futures program correctly focuses on combating the decay of skills in the summer. Yet, is that enough? At one point, there was a community effort to have parents pledge to reduce the exposure of their children to television. We must seriously address the anti-intellectual features of the culture, which, for the disadvantaged, are seldom offset by an intellectually stimulating home environment.

Secondly, attention must be given to the role of the family and sex in
the lives of youth in Baltimore. Most of the partnership efforts make an effort at fostering parent involvement. Yet, the at-risk youth is very often at-risk because of the lack of a regular family structure. The late 1986 report of the Black Needs Assessment Project, a joint Urban League and Baltimore Health and Welfare Council, warned:

There is little doubt that the crises facing the black family in the metropolitan Baltimore area are a microcosm of the national problem. A good number of the basic issues that plague the black family today can be traced to such socioeconomic factors as massive unemployment and low enterprise ownership. However, many concerns can also be attributed to the increased number of families headed by single mothers, the decline in strong family units, and the weakening bond between black males and black females.106

Aware of such problems, which really affect both poor white and black youth in the city, the Ford Foundation has sponsored several programs to reduce teen pregnancy in the city, including a long term study of the impact of such child rearing methods on incomes.107 Because of its special links to communities and its emphasis upon "mediating institutions [such as churches]. . . where values are formed and families nurtured," BUILD may be uniquely qualified to overcome the problems of disadvantaged education with roots in family life.

Those active in partnerships to assist disadvantaged students must understand the difficulty of involving parents in their efforts in a way that will impact the home environment of students. The youth with the greatest need for home support for education, by definition often lack a home structure which can respond when asked. One of the June 1987 graduates at Southern High, Sonia Jefferson, who felt unusual in school for living with two parents said, "I think it's kinda good that I got both. Most of my girlfriends just live with their mothers. Then their mother has a tendency to go out and hang out a lot. Everybody needs some guidance."108 There is some disagreement as to the role of family structure as a cause of the educational problems of disadvantaged youth. Others have described less obvious, yet still defineable family factors affecting school success. Reginald Clark, in his study of family life and school achievement, found:

It is the family members' beliefs, activities, and overall cultural style, not the family units' composition or social status, that produces the requisite mental structures for effective and desirable behavior during classroom lessons. . . .

It [is] apparent that a crucial factor affecting differences in knowledge transmission . . . is the parents' own psychological-emotional state and coping ability. . . . parents' own life experiences have had a profound influence on their current psychological-emotional state and subsequently on the communication styles they use with their children.109

Such factors as the family attitudes about books and the perceived need for schooling, if one is to be a responsible member of the community and is to secure useful employment, seem to be crucial to educational success. As one study noted, "low-income Black families with successful readers do embrace some educational traditions which other investigators have historically categorized as middle class."110
There is a real danger that the participants in efforts to assist the disadvantaged will become too concerned with solving the personal problems of students: the student learning problems, the individual financial or job needs, or needs for self esteem -- without ever applying their efforts at getting to the root of the students' difficulties, arising from the social and, particularly, the family structure. That perception has guided BUILD in demanding jobs for graduates. It is the reasoning behind the Urban League's response to Szanton's recommendations. The League believes that the lingering effects of discriminatory hiring must be removed before students are asked to increase their educational effort. They both see that while we promote education as a major solution to urban employment problems, the employment and financial rewards for schooling have corresponded more to the class status of the student than the educational achievement. One pessimist noted, "Combined with a relatively stratified, fixed social class structure, the nature of the economy does not encourage -- cannot permit -- perfect open competition on the basis of the possession of abilities."111

It cannot be emphasized enough that partnership participants are naive if they think emphasis can be placed solely on individual student adjustment. Kathy Lally, in her last article for the Sun on Southern High School, captured the primacy of social class differences in understanding Baltimore's educational problems. She recalled:

I would return to the newspaper office and my middle class life day after day, reeling from culture shock. The kids I met were living in a world completely isolated from the one I knew. I had never really realized how separate the economic classes in this country have become and how difficult it is to cross those class lines. . . .

Few of the youngsters I talked to were absorbing the values that make the middle class the middle class -- the recognition that an education is important and the understanding of how to get it, for example. Often they confuse life and television. Things just happen on television, and they think life is like that.112

The Urban League noted the failure to understand the class differences of disadvantaged youth is common among black educators:

It is also not farfetched to conclude that black educators, too -- particularly those whose middle-class values and life-status may have removed them from regular contact with the neighborhoods from which their students come -- might be guilty of negative 'expectancy communications.'113

Thus, understanding of class differences is basic not only to the general plans of partnerships but even of the style and attitude of staff communication with pupils and their parents. Over twenty years ago educators noted, for example that you could not simply try to strengthen the PTA at some schools. The parents of the most disadvantaged often will not come to PTA's, whether strong or weak.114

Superintendent Alice Pinderhughes believes the solution is to reach students at the earliest years in life. The task is to reverse a system of values where going to school is not a primary consideration in a child's life,
where children grow up uninterested in reading because there are few books in
their home, where they often learn not from the conversation of their families
but from the drone of the television." The "Success for All" component of
the Collaborative is an effort to address this concern. It is designed to
reach children at pre-school age and change their reading practices before
they reach age ten. Unfortunately, the "Success for All" program has only
just begun and in only one school in 1987/88.

Perhaps as much a requirement for success of partnerships as
considerations of family and social structure is an understanding of the
administrative structure of the schools. It is important that partnerships be
designed with some understanding of that structure. Much of the work that has
been done by Johns Hopkins University's Center for Research on Elementary and
Middle Schools involves a sophisticated understanding of schools as a social
organization. The Effective Schools Project was an attempt to learn how to
direct change in schools to the benefit of at-risk students. While it is
doubtful if most partnerships will analyse the problems of school structure as
carefully as the Effective Schools Project, it is important to appreciate the
importance of classroom and school structure to the solution of the problems
of at-risk youth.

Considerable evidence indicates that at-risk youth are most helped by
general improvements in the intellectual climate of their schools. Too many
of the partnerships in Baltimore are oblivious to this knowledge. They focus
too much on providing remediation to only the youth who have obvious
educational or family income disadvantages. At-risk youth usually attend
schools where many other youth just barely fail to meet the eligibility
criteria for disadvantaged programs. Even if quality individualized services
to the disadvantaged youth are provided, the marginally advantaged may behave
in such a way as to undermine the impact of the services for the at-risk
pupils. There is only a limited amount of time when at-risk youth are in
contact with the most lavishly funded services. It is far more cost-effec-
tive to change the whole school climate, which will affect the student throughout
the school day, than to provide specialized services for only part of that
day. The Commonwealth and Pipeline programs, the Fund for Educational
Excellence and some of the school adoptions, such as those promoting the
Junior Great Books Program, seek to increase the general quality of learning.

There is a vital need for sympathetic understanding of the function of
the school structure, especially the central bureaucracy, if partners are not
to be frustrated in their work. The school bureaucracy emerged in its present
rigid form for a variety of reasons, many of them good. The bureaucracy with
its professional rules, shielded the schools from both political interference
and the parochial demands of various constituencies in a community. It was a
method to give continuity to students and teachers, despite often shifting
budgetary and educational policy priorities. But now most observers believe
the bureaucracy has become too rigid and too centralized. The GBC rightly
devoted much effort to reviewing the school organization, with the goal of
having the "central administration serve the schools." The school system's
desire for isolation, however good earlier in the century, has made it less
than enthusiastic in acceptance of suggestions for administrative reform.

The most appropriate way for future partnerships to bring reforms to the
bureaucratic isolation within the schools may be to continue applied research
on effective educational administration. Many outside organizations have learned much about organizational responsiveness and flexibility in recent years, while the schools seem frozen in an early twentieth century structure. The most effective assistance some organizational experts could offer to increasing the educational options of the disadvantaged would be to lead the schools to a new era of excellent administration. A major contribution of outside partners should be the ability to look beyond current structures. Szanton, for example, as many recent critics, suggests as one option the break-up of the school system and its replacement with individually vouchered students able to attend the school of choice. If current efforts at reform, designed to empower teachers and principals to assume greater professional control over student destinies fail, partnerships could lead the way in developing a more privatized system.

It appears that the studies of school structure have had some impact upon the Baltimore schools. The system has developed some special programs designed to individualize services for at-risk students. At the May 1987 meeting of the Voluntary Council, Superintendent Alice Pinderhughes discussed the systems Focus on Individual Success program. Each student in the system will have an individualized educational plan drawn up by teachers and parents. The effort will "move decision making closer to those who must implement decisions." Whatever the results, the Focus is an attempt to bring good management practices to the schools. Theoretically, every student will be treated as an individual. As the Superintendent said, "We will not mass-produce children. We need humanity, not technology." Also, beginning in the 1987/88 school year, the system will shift to local school budgeting. Both individualized plans and local budgeting were supported by the early GBC studies and their adoption is an encouraging sign of the impact of quality work by partnerships. Critics of the current effort fear the implementation is too hasty, resulting, as so often in Baltimore, from the school system's fear of being overly controlled by outsiders, if it did not act. The critics believe there must be outside monitoring and assistance for this process, such as by the GBC, which neither the system wants nor the GBC wishes to provide. Hopefully, the critics are wrong, and the GBC will actively assist the schools in implementing these initiatives.

While attempting to understand the proper balance in school structure, partnerships must maintain a realistic position on school budget issues. Many staff of the schools and key people involved in the partnerships have grave doubts about the level of resources committed to the schools. There is a constant danger that partnership efforts designed to improve educational options will be converted to maintenance of present effort, with less cost to the taxpayer. BUILD has been careful to specify sources of funds for the changes it demands. It never allowed the Commonwealth effort to become tied to new funding. Those involved in the Fund for Educational Excellence emphasize that their grants are not to replace cuts in the regular school budget but rather to promote excellence over and above routine operations. JTPA and school staff have worked creatively to use existing funds from a variety of sources to run the program, while being alert to the need for legal changes to allow them to tap other sources. The Superintendent believes $150 million in additional funding is needed to reach parity with suburban schools. Labor, the NAACP, the League of Women Voters, and other groups have joined the schools in a partnership, the Metropolitan Educational Coalition, to fight for such funding.
There is much emphasis in local political circles on the lack of correlation between quality schooling and funding levels of education. Frequently, the educational achievements of students from private schools are cited as the proof that funding is not the key ingredient of success. The school staff has been so subversive to local political officials that the former superintendent, John Crew, committed educational heresy by boasting of having improved reading scores while asking for a budget cut. The fundamental flaw of some partnerships in Baltimore has been the reluctance of the non-educators to fight vigorously for equal per pupil funding for city and suburban pupils. As was made clear in 1987 with debates over the distribution of the state windfall from federal tax reform, business and the schools have a fundamental conflict over taxation.

The debate over funding is one measure of the seriousness of concerns about improving educational options for disadvantaged students. Another has been the commitment to measuring the impact of partnerships. Many of the partnerships have made efforts to measure the impact of their program. Most have found positive results. If partnerships are to become a serious part of efforts to help educationally disadvantaged youth, much more care must be taken that programs are evaluated. Considering the seriousness of the problems of at-risk youth, it would seem doubtful that all the programs functioning presently in Baltimore are effective. It is in the interest of all participants to rigorously and continuously review the goals, methods, and achievements of particular partnerships. Most importantly, with a mix of efforts, it is important to know how many youth should receive services, how many are in fact receiving such services, and which youth are receiving multiple services and which are receiving few or none. Futures has shown concern with program impact, as have a few of the companies involved in adopt a school. None have conducted a long term follow-up of participants. Obviously such evaluations are impossible on new programs; yet, few partnerships seem to be planning to create the records which could allow for future assessment of success. Opposition to the use of control groups, such as by Futures, similarly is disturbing.

A number of critics of the current partnership effort, including businessmen who have been active for years in school partnerships, lament the tendency of the current leadership of the city's partnership movement to seek credit for success too quickly. One recent study noted:

[The current educational reform efforts] can sustain an illusion of excellence while allowing students and teachers to bargain away real academic learning. As long as tests are passed, credits are accumulated, and credentials awarded, what occurs in most classrooms is allowed to pass as education. . . . The real value and meaning of the accomplishments, however, will be eroded by the vision's narrowness and limitations.

The concern with receiving credit for program success, also, seems to have blinded many sponsors to the existence of other, similar efforts, with which they might cooperate. Few persons involved in partnerships demonstrate a comprehensive knowledge of all programs in Baltimore that help at-risk students. When informed of other programs, the typical response is that the respondents organization should become the clearinghouse or coordinator of all partnerships. Unfortunately, this response reflects the problem more than the
solution. What is needed, in many cases, is an awareness of the scope and seriousness of the educational problems of disadvantaged youth and of the need for many creative efforts to solve those problems. Then, program sponsors may be able to admit there is a need for many partnerships, and that each may make a unique contribution.

A crude estimate of the numbers served by current partnerships is extremely difficult to develop. While most schools have some involvement in a partnership activity, some partnerships serve only a few students at one school. For example, one tutoring program sponsored by a major business served only thirteen students at one school, five of whom dropped out without completing the year of special instruction. Even such large programs as Futures serve only a portion of all dropouts. At its projected maximum enrollment, Futures would probably served less than half the annual dropouts. That would be a remarkable accomplishment; however, even if all the students it served stayed in school to graduation, Baltimore still would have nearly twice the number of dropouts of any county in the state.

The partnerships to increase the educational options of disadvantaged youth demonstrate great concern, effort, and originality. They need, as well, a commitment to the seriousness of the problem they have agreed to face. They must appreciate the amount and quality of resources needed to impact the problem. One city parent, commenting about the work of the current GBC Education Committee Chair, a local television executive, suggested his biggest contribution to education would be running educational programs or shutting down his station during the afternoon and evening hours. The fact that most who heard that suggestion laughed, probably, reflects the lack of real commitment among some of the partnership leaders, more than the foolishness of the parent.

No doubt the problems of at-risk students will not be reduced or solved without a host of partnerships being established. Baltimore is well on the way to meeting that prerequisite. The danger is that the various partners will expect success to follow the establishment of new means to achieve goals, without attempting the use of those means for sufficient time, with sufficient regular school funding, and sufficient critical evaluation of impact to bring success. The problem of at-risk students in Baltimore has been with the city for many years and has been getting worse, not better. Success will require a seriousness of commitment and a sophistication of strategies that we have not necessarily achieved.
RECOMMENDATIONS

Several specific changes in laws, regulations and funding have been recommended by participants in Baltimore partnerships to improve their effectiveness. Most relate to the Office of Manpower Resources' (OMR) use of JTPA funds and the uses of Chapter I funds. Generally there is a desire for much more flexibility in the laws and regulations, that would allow concentrating funds on comprehensive programs. Of course, if restrictions are relaxed, reasonable records of fund utilization would be needed to assure that funds are achieving results among at-risk students.

The major change in JTPA would be that:

Restrictions on the percentage of funds which can be used in administration of programs need to be relaxed. The administration of a complex program, such as FUTURES, with many components sponsored by several government agencies, necessarily has relatively high administrative costs. Standards which flexibly assess the complexity of programs in determining a cap on administrative funds should be developed.

Changes in Chapter I, include:

1. Targeting of funds on systems, such as Baltimore, with large percentages of disadvantaged students.

2. Flexibility in use of funds at schools with less than 75 percent disadvantaged populations, to allow funding to be used for school wide improvements, not only individualized instructions for the disadvantaged (currently such flexibility is allowed at schools with 75 percent or more disadvantaged).

3. Developing a list of validated effective types of programs for at-risk youth, so that schools take advantage of these. Currently, many schools, fearing legal problems if ineligible students are found in Chapter I programs, use generally ineffective individualized "pull-out" programs as the only Chapter I strategy.

There are several general changes which could be made in federal laws and regulations affecting the education and employment development of youth. Performance standards should assess long-term impact, not short run gains. The problems which programs are attempting to solve are not subject to easy correction. Standards of performance can be no less rigorous, if they are based on long-term gains. Standards which look to permanent changes in behavior should be developed. For example, if the goal of a program for at-risk students were to reduce dropout rates, program success could be measured based on comparison of current annual rates with historic rates in the community for similar populations. Of course, one of the problems with such an effort is that there is considerable disagreement as to what the dropout rate is. However, reasonable standards superior to those currently used should be fairly easy to develop.

In purely educational programs, the emphasis upon improving basic skills.
while understandable, leads inevitably to programs which teach students to take tests. Once again, measures of change in social behavior over the long term should be used to assess program impact. It is essential, also, that any standards consider the seriousness of the deficiencies of program enrollees. Without such consideration, the standards will encourage the selection of the most qualified among the disadvantaged and the exclusion of those most in need.

The standards for JTPA funding need to be separated from the post graduation goals of students. With considerable evidence of the value of higher education both for the individual’s financial well being and to have an informed citizenry, it is unfortunate that exemplary youth program funding is restricted to youth who will be entering employment immediately following graduation. If this standard is to insure that non-disadvantaged students are excluded from services, that goal should be achieved through more direct reforms of eligibility determination procedures. The message should not be that higher education is not an option for improving disadvantaged youth job training and placement.

Generally within much of federal education legislation and partnership initiatives there is a simplistic link of educational change and improvements in youth employability and, even, national economic development. Much of the effort to increase the educational options of disadvantaged youth is based on the assumption that such youth have rather limited capabilities. As critics of the comprehensive high school noted, proponents assume that “most students could not be taken seriously as thinkers.” Yet, traditionally, poor parents whose children achieve in school have taken academic performance seriously. It would be extremely helpful if legislation and regulations always considered quality liberal education as a viable means of increasing the options of disadvantaged youth. Such a position would be realistic, if for no other reason than that most education is more academic than vocational.

Additionally, there was considerable concern among participants about the quality of information and measurements used to evaluate the impact of partnerships. It is time that national efforts to promote partnerships seriously faced questions of the evaluation of the design of partnerships to meet needs. In Baltimore, there have been times when only outside pressure brought about changes needed in programs, as when the Ford Foundation advisors forced the Collaborative to broaden membership. Independent, competent program evaluation is essential if token partnerships are to be avoided. For a problem that is growing worse, there appear to be too many exemplary programs. They may appear good only because of the mediocre quality of their evaluations.

Several issues were raised which more directly impact older youth or adults but which have implications for younger students. Generally, critics believe that rigid concepts of the proper time and place of schooling frustrate creative partnerships. Specifically, several observers suggested making the time of schooling more flexible. Youth who wish to try out real employment might be offered regular schooling in the evening or on weekends. Likewise, they should be allowed to interrupt their schooling totally and re-enroll later without cost or stigma. That is, everyone should be offered the opportunity to secure a regular high school education at no cost, regardless of age. High schools for students over the usual age should have
institutional identities and a mix of services, extra-curricular activities, and partnerships identical to the comprehensive high schools.

Finally, there is the need to emphasize that partnerships to help the disadvantaged must be supplements to quality educational programs. Policy must not portray partnerships as a solution to funding contractions. The partnerships described in this study are a fundamental means of improving the educational experiences of at-risk students. However, an equally important ingredient is adequate funding. In fact, the most needed partnerships may be those that emulate BUILD and become effective vehicles to demand increased general education funding.

With this fact in mind, the recommendations made here to redistribute Chapter I funding and to lift restrictions on the use of Title II-B JTPA funding are logical and, even, crucial to the success of current efforts to help younger disadvantaged youth. On the state and local level, it is essential that the difficulties faced by urban systems be recognized and their work be rewarded with funding above the level of the suburban systems. Then the partnerships may concentrate upon enriching the educational experiences provided to disadvantaged students by an adequate educational system.
NOTES


6. Regional Planning Council, Commuting in the Baltimore Region: Historical Perspectives and Current Trends (Baltimore: Regional Planning Council, 1987); of course, public transit services are responsive to market forces.


8. Maryland, State of, Department of Education, Fact Book 1986-1987 (Baltimore: Dept. of Education, 1987), pp. 4-13; a common computation of the dropout rate makes it over 50 percent. That rate is based on dividing the number of withdrawals from the system by the number of graduates. Officials in the Maryland Department of Education raise some important statistical reservations about that process. First, the withdrawal figures are not only for students in their senior year. Secondly, a system such as Baltimore's, which experiences significant emigration of parents to suburban districts in any year, which is not offset by immigration, suffers from such a procedure. The state Department of Education preferred method of computing the "dropout rate" would determine the number of different students in grades 7-12 in a given school year and divide that number into the number of withdrawals who did not transfer to another system. The rate for 1985-86, using that method is, 13.8 percent for Baltimore. The state rate is 4.8 percent. See: Memorandum Linda Baker and Mary Crovo to David Hornbeck [State Superintendent of Schools], July 17, 1987.

10. Szanton, pp. 11-12.


13. Sowell, p. 16.


15. Sowell, pp. 16-17.


18. See: George D. Strayer, Report of the Survey of the Public School System of Baltimore Maryland (Baltimore: Baltimore City Public Schools, 1921): in contrast to reception of Strayer, Peter Szanton in 1986 was criticised as an outsider.


24. Sowell, p. 16.


27. U. S. National Youth Administration of Maryland, A Special Report to the
Advisory Committee of Baltimore City (Baltimore: National Youth Administration, 1938).


30. Howard M. Bell, Youth Tell Their Story (Washington: The American Youth Commission, 1938), p. 63; Baltimore Urban League, Actions for an Empowered Community, pp. 58-61, agrees that little progress has been made since 1930's; for another discussion of problems of black youth in era, see: Lester B. Granger, "Problems and Needs of Negro Adolescent Workers," The Journal of Negro Education, IX (July, 1940), 323.


33. Gittell and Hollander, pp. 178-179, said, Fisher and his successors "declined to play a 'political' role in the city to secure support for the school system" and the politicians welcomed the insulation of the schools from the city government because they wished to distance "themselves from school problems, in large part to avoid blame for failure."


Policies and Magnet Alternatives (Berkeley: McCutchan Publ. Corp., 1977), pp. 247-266 for a discussion of the limited value of magnet schools in improving the education of the disadvantaged; the 1966 debate in Baltimore found the NAACP calling for the abolition of magnet schools, while the black student body president of the male humanities school, future Baltimore leader Curt Schmoke, defended the specialized school.


40. Baltimore City Public Schools, Project GO (Baltimore: Balto. City Public Schools, 1974).


44. Kraushaar, p. 78.


47. Kraushaar, pp. 32-33.

48. Ibid., p. 35.

49. Ibid., pp. 30-31.


51. Kraushaar, p. 61.

53. The (Baltimore) Sun, May, 21, 1967, p. 1D.

54. The Regional Planning Council, General Development Plan: Education and Employment (Baltimore: RPC, 1986), pp. 1 and 26 [draft plan text only].

55. Szanton, p. 44


58. Szanton, p. 10.

59. Crew, p. 103.

60. For the recent survey of parents' attitudes see: The (Baltimore) Evening Sun, June 3, 1967, p. 1; for a critique of the accountability concept see Arthur G. Wirth, Productive Work - In Industry and Schools (New York: University Press of America, 1983), pp. 15 and 110; on the test scores for neighboring schools see Maryland, State of, Department of Education, Maryland Accountability Testing Program, Annual Report School Year 1985-1986 (Baltimore: Dept. of Educ., 1986), compare, for example, Hamilton Elementary grade 8, in city to Parkville Middle, grade 8, in county.

61. Kathy Lally, "The Urban Teenager: Back to High School," The Baltimore Sun, July 8, 1987, p. 1A [this is part of a series of articles which appeared between July 5 and July 12, 1987; will be cited as Lally, with date, and page].


63. Szanton, p. 37.

64. General Development Plan, p. 4.13.

65. Ibid., p. 4.2.

66. Lally, July 12, 1967, p. 3E; the success of the city's border schools in providing education equal to that of neighboring county school shows the educational problems of the city largely result from the socio-economic backgrounds of the students and not simply from the structural weaknesses of the schools.

67. Szanton, p. 37; many critics of Szanton believe this conclusion is simplistic.

69. Ibid., pp. 8-14.

70. GBC, Education Budget Process, p. 15.

71. Crew, pp. 41 and 48.


75. Ibid., p. 25.


77. The (Baltimore) Sun, May 21, 1987, p. 3D.

78. The Baltimore Business Leadership Training (BBLT) is another program sponsored by the Voluntary Council at this high school. The BBLT is a good example of a program where services to minorities are confused with services for the disadvantaged. While some of the youth in BBLT may be disadvantaged, all are highly motivated and few need special help to enter the workforce. Yet, the program is promoted in the school system as one more partnership for the disadvantaged.

79. Voluntary Council, Minute of Meeting of April 9, 1987, pp. 2-3 (mimeo).


82. Denise Gottfredson, p. 15.


84. Ibid., p. 7.

86. Baltimore City, Department of Education, Summary of Conference on Collaboratives, May 6, 1987 (mimeo.), implies that "Success for All is a large program, saying that it seeks "to assure that all high risk children reach 3rd grade at grade level." It does not mention it has not even started at one school and will start at only one in 1987-1988.


88. Letter Jerry Baum to Edward Lorenz, October 16, 1987; and Levine, The Private Sector, p. 53.

89. Fund for Educational Excellence, pp. 4-11.

90. Crew, p. 47 and Kraushaar, pp. 66-68 contrast activist role of OMR with the cautious approach of the business community.


93. Futures is very much like the STEP program developed by Public/Private Ventures, although the Baltimore sponsors never refer to STEP; see: Public/Private Ventures, Summer Training and Education Program (STEP); Executive Summary (Philadelphia: Public/Private Ventures, 1987).


95. For an earlier review of the attitudes of community leaders, see: NEA, Baltimore, pp. 66-67.

96. See flyer: "The Story of Build Continues;" Build has followed the course recommended in Andrew Hahn, Jacqueline Danzberger, and Bernard Lefkowitz, Dropouts in America: Enough is Known for Action (Washington: Institute for Educational Leadership, 1987), pp. 38-39, for the Boston Compact.

98. Statement of James A. Flick, Jr., at Commonwealth Agreement Press Conference, October 30, 1985, (mimeo.).


100. Lally, July 12, 1987, p. 3E.


102. Szanton, p. 40, is critical of localized control of schooling; CED, p. 10, favors more community control.


104. Szanton, p. 39, discusses year around schooling in Baltimore.


108. Lally, July 12, 1987, p. 3E.


110. Portia H. Shields, Jessica G. Gordon, and David Dupree, "Influence of Parent practices Upon the Reading Achievement of Good and Poor Readers," The Journal of Negro Education, LII (Fall, 1983), 444; see also pp. 436-437, on recent studies.

111. Michael W. Sedlak, et al., Selling Students Short: Classroom Bargains and...
112. Lally, July 12, 1987, p. 3F.
113. Wickham, pp. 6-7.
115. Lally, July 10, 1987, p. 12A.
117. Voluntary Council, Minutes of Meeting of May 14, 1987, pp. 6-7 (mimeo.).
120. Cuban, p. 67.
121. Sedlak, p. 182.
Evaluation of the Bridge and Club-Coop Educational Assistance Programs in Hartford, Connecticut

Richard N. Funkhouser
Delsie M. Gandia-Fabian
**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Community Background</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Description of Hartford</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Population/demographics</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Economics and institutions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Hartford School System</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Program Information</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Project Bridge</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Motivation and precedents</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Goals, objectives and strategies</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Curriculum and operation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Financing</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Club Co-op</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Background</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Goal and objectives</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Operation</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Financing</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Program Evaluation</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Project Bridge</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Club Co-op</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Summary and Conclusions</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Early identification of &quot;At-risk&quot; Youth</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Vertical Extension of Bridge Programs</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Horizontal Extension of Bridge Programs</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Expansion of Bilingual Bridge and Interstate Cooperation</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End Notes</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgments</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Compared to the State of Connecticut as a whole, the City of Hartford's population is relatively poor, relatively uneducated, and has a relatively high proportion of single parent families. About 90% of the public school students in Hartford are black or Puerto Rican, and over half the students come from economically disadvantaged households.

A general concern about high drop out rates in Hartford has led to the formation of a broad coalition of organizations to address the problem, primarily in the form of Project Bridge, a drop out prevention program aimed at providing academic instructions, employability preparation, study skills and life skills to "at-risk" students in 7th through 10th grade.

The core of Project Bridge is the special attention paid to participants' overall social needs, including their academic deficiencies, and the incentives offered for participation, namely paid internships and early promotion. Though the program is too new to have made an observable impact on drop out rates, there are strong indications of the correctness of the approach and its potential for success.

The second program discussed in this paper is Club Co-op, a six week summer program providing recreational and educational activities for nine to thirteen year olds. Similar to Project Bridge, Club Co-op provides employment education and also uses monetary incentives for participation. The best measure of Club Co-op's success is the fact that two to three more children seek entry to the program than there are places available.

Recommendations discussed in the paper examine several alternatives for extension of the existing Bridge program. The recommendations are based on the conclusion that Project Bridge and Club Co-op are worthy of continued support, and that aspects of each might be incorporated into expanded programs serving "at-risk" youth in Hartford.
EVALUATION OF THE BRIDGE AND CLUB CO-OP EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT

I. INTRODUCTION

Successful participation in the labor force is largely determined by the early acquisition of academic and life skills. Failure to acquire these skills often results in poor academic performance, decreasing attendance and dropping out of high school. Eventually the lack of academic and job skills may lead to poverty and helplessness. When these children become parents they are unable to pass on the skills they never had and the cycle is repeated. Thus, the skills that lead to successful labor force participation are essential for adults to lead useful, responsible lives and to create a stable environment in which their children will, in turn, thrive.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how the 9-15 year old "at-risk" youth population in Hartford is helped to learn those skills that will help them stay in school and eventually succeed in their labor force participation as adults. The focus of the paper is two educational assistance programs: Project Bridge, which targets potential school drop outs from 7th grade to 10th grade, and Club Co-op, which targets inner city children 9 to 13 years old.

Section II describes the economic and demographic environment in Hartford under which these programs operate. Section III describes the programs, their goals and objectives, operation and financing. Section IV evaluates the programs on the basis on a series of interviews conducted by the authors. Sections V presents a summary, conclusions and recommendations.

II. COMMUNITY BACKGROUND

A. Description of Hartford

1. Population/demographics

Like many other cities, Hartford in recent years has been experiencing a continuing decline in population relative to surrounding suburban areas. By 1984 Hartford's population was 135,720, a 0.1% decline from 1980. [1] The 1980 census indicates that half the population of the City of Hartford is white, 34% black, and 16% are from other racial groups (See Table 1). Twenty percent of the total population is of Hispanic origin (mainly Puerto Rican), an ethnic classification which cuts across racial groups. [2]

Drop out rates are influenced by family income, educational attainment of the parents living at home [3]. On each of these counts the City of Hartford appears to be problem prone. Most of the City's population is relatively poor, with an annual median family income of $14,032 compared with $23,149 for the State of Connecticut as a whole. A third of the families living in
Hartford have incomes below the poverty level. Furthermore, 51% of all children living in Hartford live in single parent families. [4]

The level of educational attainment of Hartford's citizens is also below that of the State. Only 51% of the adults over 25 years of age had a high school diploma compared with 70% for the State of Connecticut as a whole.

Educational attainment in the City is also very low compared to the Hartford labor market area, which includes the City of Hartford and 33 surrounding towns. (see Table 2) Only 22% of Hartford residents over 25 have one or more years of college education as opposed to 37% for Greater Hartford. [5]

In 1984-85 there were 23,568 students attending public schools in the City of Hartford, 88% of which were minority students, mainly black or Puerto Rican. The language used at home by 44% of Hartford’s high school students was not English (mainly Spanish) and 52% were from economically disadvantaged households.

2. Economics and institutions

The Hartford labor market area includes 34 towns with a current total population of 803,620. Major industries include wholesale and retail trade, services, government, insurance, finance, and in the manufacturing sector, aircraft engines and space equipment, machinery and electrical equipment.

The labor force in the Hartford labor market area averaged 406,600 in the Hartford labor market area averaged 406,600 in 1985, an increase of 10,400 from 1980 with gains centered in the non manufacturing sector. Manufacturing employment declined by 7,000 from 1980 to an average of approximately 93,000 in 1985.

Unemployment averaged 4.5% in the Hartford labor market area in 1985, with the highest unemployment rate being in the City of Hartford (7.1%) and the lowest in the two suburban towns of Marlborough and Simsbury (both 2.9%). For comparison, the average unemployment rate in Connecticut in 1985 was 4.9% while that national unemployment rate was 7.2%.

Unemployment rates in Connecticut have declined dramatically since 1985. The most recent information available, for the month of May 1987, shows the unemployment rate in the City of Hartford at 5.4%, in the Hartford labor market area at 2.8%, and in the state of Connecticut at 3.1%. [6]

Hartford is a medium size city with a total population of approximately 135,000 whose traditional economic base has been mainly the insurance and the metal fabrication industries, such as firearms. In recent years there has been an expansion of the insurance and banking industries due to their partial deregulation at both the national and state levels. For example, Connecticut
presently participates in a regional banking compact along with Maine, Massachusetts and Rhode Island. This has been responsible for much of the ongoing office construction boom in Greater Hartford. There has also been an important expansion in aerospace technology, communications, advanced electronics, energy and control systems and in the application of micro-electronics to manufacturing.

Manufacturing accounts for 21% of employment in the Hartford labor market area, with transport equipment and machinery (except electrical) being its most important employer (10%, See Table 3). Retail trade (15% of total employment) is the most important sub-sector within the trade category (20%). In the finance, insurance and real estate sector (15% of total employment) the most important sub-sector is the insurance industry (12%). Twenty six percent of employment is provided by the service sector and an additional 7% is provided by federal, state and local government administration. [7]

The single most important employer located in Hartford proper is the State of Connecticut, with 19,800 employees. Four insurance companies and a bank are the next largest employers: Aetna Life & Casualty (14,200 employees); Travelers Insurance Company (11,000 employees); Hartford Insurance Group (8,280 employees); CIGNA Corporation (6,500 employees); and the Connecticut Bank & Trust Company (5,454 employees). Of the eighteen largest employers in the Hartford labor market area located in Hartford proper, two are government, six are insurance companies, three are banks, two are utilities, one is a retail establishment and the last one is a firearms manufacturer.

The Hartford area is in the midst of an economic boom, one result of which has been a reduction in the unemployment rate in the Hartford labor market area to 2.8%. This has important and contradictory implications for the success of the drop out prevention programs we shall be discussing. First, the tightness of the labor market has made dropping out a relatively attractive proposition since entry level wages are very high. Secondly, internship/instruction programs find themselves competing with the private sector for participants. At least some "at-risk" students prefer and are able to take higher paying jobs in the private sector rather than taking the subsidized internship jobs. This provides them with the work experience that the programs sought to provide but not the instruction and guidance that presumably would have steered them towards staying in school and completing their high school education.

This economic boom with its attendant labor shortage has spurred the business community of Hartford to take a strong interest in improving the educational attainment of the Hartford population. It is estimated that by 1990 the local labor shortage will be critical with far more vacancies for unskilled work than there are workers to fill them. Thus the business community has a strong interest in establishing a working partnership with the school system in order to reduce the number of school drop outs and improve the quality of education in the schools.
B. HARTFORD SCHOOL SYSTEM

The City of Hartford is served by twenty K-6, five K-8, two middle schools (7th and 8th grades only) and three high schools (9th through 12th grade). There are three high school districts corresponding to Weaver High School, Bulkeley High School, and Harcford High School.

In the 1986-87 school year, this system served a population of approximately 24,000 students, about 5,800 of whom were in the high schools and 18,200 in the elementary and middle schools. (These numbers do not include approximately 700 students, the vast majority of whom are black and Hispanic, who are bused to schools outside the City of Hartford in a program called Project Concern.)

Providing for the educational needs of these 24,000 students requires about 2,000 full time equivalent professionals, including approximately 1,700 classroom teachers. The classroom teacher: pupil ratio in the Hartford public schools is one per 14.0 pupils, compared to a ratio of one per 14.5 for the entire State of Connecticut.

In terms of racial/ethnic composition, forty-four percent of the students in the Hartford public schools are black, forty-five percent are Hispanic, and ten percent are white.

The Hartford school system annually compiles statistics indicating the number and percentage of students who drop out in a given year. As defined by the Hartford school system, "a drop out consists of any student who discontinues his/her education in a given year and does not enroll in another educational program." Students who transfer to other school systems or alternative education programs, such as the Teenage Parent Program or Adult Education, are not considered drop outs. Students who leave school to take a job or enter the military are considered drop outs.

Annual drop out statistics are available for the school years 1978-79 through 1985-86 for the three high schools in Hartford. The drop out rate over this eight year period has ranged from 8.4% (505 students) in 1978-79 to 15.5% (874 students) in the 1981-82 school year. Since its peak in 1981-82, the drop out rate has declined to 11.5% (613 students) in the 1985-86 school year.

Of the 613 drop outs recorded in the three high schools during 1985-86, 274 students (45%) were black, 288 students (47%) were Hispanic, and 45 students (7%) were white. The importance of these numbers becomes apparent when they are compared to the proportion of each racial/ethnic group in the total high school enrollment. Blacks were 48% of the total; Hispanics were 39%, and whites 10%. The drop out rate for Hispanics was therefore considerably above their representation in the total student body, while the drop out rate for blacks and whites was somewhat lower than their respective proportions of the student body. Compared to blacks and whites, the problem of dropping out appears to be relatively more severe for Hispanics.
The Hartford Board of Education has compiled additional information on dropouts, classifying them by age, grade, and reason for dropping out. High school dropouts in Hartford are most likely to leave school at age seventeen and to leave during their 9th grade year. By far the most common reason for dropping out is simply "non-attendance." Other more specific reasons, such as the need to go to work, illness, family problems, marriage, pregnancy, and moving away, are infrequently cited as reasons for dropping out.
III. PROGRAM INFORMATION

A. Project Bridge

1. Motivation and precedents

A number of local government and community organizations have direct contact with, or a direct interest in, the general problem of school drop outs. Prominent among these organizations is the Hartford Board of Education, which in its responsibility for the City's public schools is the "front line" from which students either advance to graduation or recede into the problem prone world of the drop out.

Another such organization is the Hartford Foundation for Public Giving. This is a so-called community foundation — a broad based local charity with a financial base of about $100 million making annual gifts of about $6 million.

A third relevant organization is the School/Business Collaborative, a body representing various community organizations which was established under the auspices of and is operated by the Hartford Chamber of Commerce. The School/Business Collaborative includes school system administrators, city and state government officials, and representatives of parents organizations, labor unions, and local foundations. The co-chairmen of the Collaborative are the superintendent of the Hartford public schools and a vice chairman of the Connecticut National Bank.

A fourth center of initiative in the area of drop out prevention is the parent body of the School/Business Collaborative, the Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce. In addition to concerns it may have for the general welfare of Hartford's citizens, the Chamber's specific interest in drop out prevention must also be related to labor supply for the area's businesses, especially in view of the low unemployment rates and very tight labor market now prevailing in the Hartford area.

Research conducted at the Chamber of Commerce during 1984 suggested that many recent high school graduates were either unemployed or underemployed (i.e., were willing and able to work more hours). The Chamber thus became involved in a job placement program for non-college bound seniors called School-to-Work (STW), which began in March 1985 as a joint effort between the School/Business Collaborative and the Hartford public schools. STW was financed by a $60,000 grant from the Hartford Foundation for Public Giving. The School-to-Work program provided career assessment, pre-employment training, and referral and placement services to job-seeking seniors in the three Hartford public high schools and achieved a 94% placement rate for the 145 seniors who successfully completed all program requirements in the first year. Through additional funding from the Hartford Foundation for Public Giving, a job internship component was added to the School-to-Work program in 1986, permitting students to acquire work experience prior to graduation. The placement rate for 1986 matched that established the previous year while the number of participants rose to 214.
Through their involvement in the School-to-Work program, the School/Business Collaborative became ever more aware that because STW was aimed at high school seniors, drop outs were virtually unaffected by it. This highlighted the need for a drop out prevention program (rather than only a School-to-Work transition program), if the underlying objective was to reduce the number of drop outs and, consequently, increase the number of students acquiring high school diplomas.

Data collected by the school board showed that drop out rates are highest for students aged 16, 17, and 18 who have been held back and are still in 9th or 10th grade. These students, however, started having problems in school much earlier than that. It was thought that many students effectively "dropped out" between middle school and high school by virtue of their poor attendance rates in middle phenomenon. (At the time, statistics on drop out rates in middle schools were not collected, presumably because middle school youngsters are normally so far under the legal age for dropping out of 16 years). A smooth transition from middle school to high school was therefore considered to be critical in preventing a student from dropping out of school. To be effective, it was thought that a drop out prevention program would need to span the middle school and early high school years in order to carry "at-risk" students from the 7th and 8th grades through the peak drop years of 9th and 10th grade.

As a result of the initiative of one Hartford middle school principal, a small drop out prevention program called Project Save was begun in the Fall of 1985.

During the Spring of 1986, the Chamber of Commerce via the School/Business Collaborative responded to a request for proposals from Public/Private Ventures, Inc. (P/PV) in an attempt to acquire outside funding for Project Save. The proposal was successful, and Project Save officially became Project Bridge, beginning on July 1, 1986. Subsequent grants from the federal government (Department of Health and Human Services; Department of Labor), the Hartford Foundation for Public Giving, and other local organizations permitted expansion of the Bridge program to several more middle schools during 1987.

Another initiative on drop out prevention was undertaken by the Hartford Board of Education in late 1985 with the establishment of the Hartford Dropout Prevention Planning Committee, a collaboration of the Board and various community organizations whose goals were to expand the compilation of statistics on drop outs and develop a drop out prevention plan. With financial assistance from the Ford Foundation, the plan was drawn up and adopted by the Board of Education in February 1987.

2. Goals, objectives and strategies

The Hartford Dropout Prevention Plan notes that of the many programs existing to serve the needs of students, only one — Project Bridge — is specifically designed to serve potential drop outs. The broad goal of the Dropout Prevention Plan is "...to establish a framework for the express purpose of reducing the drop out rate in the City of Hartford and provide services to those students who do, in fact, drop out."
The drop out prevention component of the Plan states as its objective a reduction in the drop out rate by 1% per year for each of five years beginning September 1987. This objective translates into between fifty and sixty fewer drop outs each year.

Steps outlined in the Plan to achieve this objective include the implementation of processes for early identification and screening of potential drop outs, and the referral of those persons to appropriate programs.

The particular strategy of Project Bridge is to offer "at-risk" students two strong incentives to remain in school; namely, early promotion from middle school to high school and placement in a subsidized internship position.

3. Curriculum and operation

There are important differences between Public/Private Ventures' "generic" Bridge program, as described in a series of Bridge program information papers written by them, and the Bridge program now being implemented in Hartford. We will first describe P/PV's program and then discuss modifications of that program in its application in Hartford.

As envisaged by P/PV, the Bridge program consists of one and a half years of instruction and work experience for students considered "at-risk" of dropping out of school. The program starts during the spring term of the 9th grade, through the summer, for the full academic year of the 10th grade, and the summer following the 10th grade. Subsequently, it is anticipated that students will be sufficiently integrated into the mainstream to be included in more advanced School-to-Work initiatives.

Bridge participants are clustered into groups of about 25, receiving their instruction as a group and apart from other students not participating in the program. Staff will include sufficient teachers to produce a maximum teacher/student ratio of 1:15. During the first term, students receive instruction from five to ten class periods per week in basic skills (math, reading, and other communications skills), employability preparation (orientation to job seeking, job keeping, and employers' expectations), study skills and life skills.

During the first summer of the program, students combine part time employment with a minimum of ten hours per week (80 hours minimum per summer) of instruction on the same topics followed in the first term. As an alternative during the first summer, if regular summer school is offered instead of a Bridge special class, then the summer school is to be supplemented with a Bridge employability/life skills workshop for one and one-half hours per week, or some other form of weekly structured contact with Bridge staff. In either case, a special effort is made to incorporate the students' summer work experience into the course.
The 10th grade curriculum continues with the same topics but at a more advanced level, thus building on the 9th grade. In addition, students are prepared for admission to regular School-to-Work programs.

During the second (and final) summer of their participation in the program, the students' activities are similar to the previous summer -- a combination of instruction and summer work -- though emphasis is given at this point to private sector job experiences.

The Hartford Bridge program is very similar to the P/PV model but differs in several important respects. First, Hartford Bridge participants enter the program as second semester 7th graders. They are clustered with a team of two teachers for instruction in five basic subject areas: reading, math, language arts, social studies, and science. Both 7th and 8th grade curricular materials and texts are used for instruction.

At the end of the spring semester, Bridge participants who have met program objectives are promoted to the 9th grade. Those who have fallen short of the objectives are promoted to the 8th grade, where they remain in the drop out prevention cluster and have another opportunity to qualify for early promotion at the end of the first marking period of the fall semester experience no academic disruption at the time of their promotion to high school, teachers in the middle school drop out prevention cluster use 9th grade texts and curricular materials for that nine week period. These teachers in essence follow an instructional track parallel to that of their 9th grade counterparts in the major subject areas.

A second distinctive aspect of the Hartford Bridge program is that students are given paid internships during the school year in addition to the summer work internships. To qualify for an internship, a participant is expected to attend school and program workshops regularly, maintain a level of academic performance consistent with his or her abilities, and demonstrate mastery of basic employability skills. Bridge interns are paid a stipend of $3.50 per hour for a maximum of 15 hours per week at a public or non-profit sector work site. Once students have demonstrated the ability to perform acceptably in a subsidized internship, they can be considered for unsubsidized after school jobs in the private sector. The students' academic performance is closely scrutinized, and if the internship is considered to be interfering with school work it is terminated.

A third difference is the Hartford Bridge program is that in some cases participation in the summer internship/study program is waived. The client population for the Hartford Bridge program is largely composed of Puerto Ricans. Many Puerto Rican families travel to the Island during the summer months and, rather than disqualifying students from participating in the program altogether, the summer internship/study component is waived in these and similar cases. The summer component may also be waived if the student finds a private sector job on his/her own. This is especially relevant in Hartford since the present labor shortage makes it particularly easy (in a relative sense) for at least some "at-risk" students to find private sector summer employment. It is not unknown for students to find jobs paying $6.00 an hour or more compared with the $3.50 per hour paid in the bridge internships.
4. Financing

The Hartford Bridge program has been financed by a series of private and public grants of different durations and available for different purposes within the program. Moreover, the Hartford school system has provided all the regular teachers (of academic subjects) and the physical facilities used in the program.

Chart 1 shows these funding sources. The program formally began in July 1986 with the $62,500 grant from P/PV Inc. which covered the period July 1986 until August 1988. This grant was earmarked to pay the operational expenses of the project in one high school district, including the salary of the Bridge employment specialist. The Federal Health and Human Services Department provided $311,375 for 1987 to pay for the operational expenses of extending the program to a second high school district, including the Bridge employment specialist. The program was extended to the third high school district with a grant from the Hartford Foundation for Public Giving (HFPG) of $108,000 which was given in April 1987 for 18 months. The 1987 summer program was paid for with JTPA funds ($24,000) which covered the costs of all teachers involved, (not just the Bridge employment specialists), instructional materials, and the operational expenses of the summer program. An additional grant of $220,500 was provided by the HFPG during 1987. This last HFPG grant was used to pay for student internships during the 1987 school year and for some of the 1987 summer internships.

In addition to the above funds, which are administered by Bridge, the program used funds and facilities provided by other organizations. The school system provided the facilities used in Bridge and the teachers for the regular school courses. Since the Bridge students are being taught as a separate group, the provision of teachers for the program represents an important commitment from the school. The City of Hartford's Employment Resource Development Agency provided the summer internship money for all JTPA eligible students in the program.

In sum, project Bridge began with a relatively modest $62,500 grant, which through contributions by various other sources grew to approximately $450,000 by the summer of 1987. We have been informed that the scale of the Hartford Bridge program will shortly double in size again by virtue of a further infusion of approximately $500,000 by the Hartford Foundation for Public Giving in the Fall of 1987.

B. Club Co-op [8]

1. Background

Club Co-op was established in 1967 by the City of Hartford's Human Relations Commission and was originally designed as a summer employment program for children aged 9 to 12, providing them an opportunity to earn money while participating in recreation and work projects. At its peak the program served over 700 children each summer, but by 1985 participation
had fallen to 200 and some components of the program, such as educational programming, had been eliminated due to local and federal budget reductions. An attempt to revitalize the program in 1985 led to its administration being transferred to the Hartford Employment Resources Development Agency/Office of Youth Services (ERDA/OYS) and an effort to increase funding levels.

Club Co-op operates for six weeks each summer, dividing approximately 200 participants into teams of 12-14 children who meet (with team leaders) for five hours a day five days a week in city parks near their homes. Daily field visits are arranged to local businesses and to cultural, educational and recreational institutions and facilities. After morning field trips, free lunches are provided by the Hartford Department of Parks and Recreation. The program day ends with each child maintaining a journal of the day's visit, and by listening to visiting speakers address different career opportunities or by playing organized sports. The program day ends at 2 PM.

2. **Goals and Objectives**

As presently composed under the auspices of ERDA/OYS, Club Co-op offers its participants a series of activities which, in addition to recreation, are intended to impart a mixture of academic, social, and career oriented skills. These activities are designed to give the children an understanding of the types of employment opportunities available in the Hartford area, the educational background needed, and the procedures involved in getting a job.

The Hartford ERDA/OYS established the following goal and objectives for the summer 1986 Club Co-op program:

**Goal:** To develop and implement a 6 week summer program that provides 25 hours a week of structured employment, financial planning, educational and recreational experiences to 200 children ages 9 - 13 years old.

**Objective 1.** The program will provide 5 hours a week of employment education to each participant. Activities designed to meet this objective include field trips to local businesses and public agencies, and guest speakers who address topics related to job acquisition.

**Objective 2.** The Program will provide 10 hours a week of educational enrichment to each participant. Activities designed to meet this objective include excursions and sports undertaken with the help of the Department of Parks and Recreation, and a weekly visit to a summer camp operated by a local corporation.

In addition to offering City children educational and recreational opportunities they might not otherwise have, Club Co-op offers its participants a financial incentive. The children are paid stipends of $15 a week -- $2 per week in cash and $13 per week held in escrow for them in an account at a local bank. The accumulated savings are used to purchase clothes and other back-to-school items during a shopping trip at the end of the program. With deductions from the stipend made for absences from the daily activities, the participants are presented with a financial incentive to participate.
3. **Operation**

Club Co-op begins with the recruitment and selection of participants in early June, which is a matter of publicizing the program via the media and registering applicants in person or by telephone. In 1986 approximately 900 children were registered, while only 200 could be chosen. The selection process sorts applications by neighborhood and chooses applicants at random so that each neighborhood in the City is represented. Participants are grouped into teams of 12 to 14 children, and each team is staffed by one team leader and one assistant team leader. Prior to the start of the program, these supervisory staff receive training in safety, positive discipline, and available community resources.

Over a six week period, each team participates in scheduled activities including field trips to 15 institutions, visits from 3 career professionals, 2 social development sessions, 2 Department of Parks and Recreation Excursions, weekly banking day activities, and one day a week at Camp Courant. Transportation is provided by public buses or vans, or by walking.

Participants are paid $15.00 a week; $2.00 in cash and $13.00 in escrow for each perfect week of attendance. Each missed day costs the participant forty cents in cash and $2.60 in savings. Any child who misses 5 days of Club Co-op is dismissed from the program.

Once a week each team goes to the branch of the Connecticut Bank and Trust Company closest to their site to cash vouchers. Banks collect vouchers and bill ERDA/OYS at the end of the program.

The last week of the program is reserved for the "Shopping Spree". Team leaders are given vouchers for each child stating the amount of money they have in escrow. Each child is given a letter to take home requesting that parents specify types of clothing and sizes.

The last day of the program is spent at "Community Day", a picnic and recreational event sponsored by the Center for Youth and Community Resources. This gives the participants an opportunity to meet fellow team members from across the city.

4. **Financing**

In 1986 Club Co-op was funded at $59,846. The bulk of this money was provided by general funds from the City of Hartford ($20,000) and by the Martin Luther King Jr. Youth Fund ($20,000). The Martin Luther King Jr. Youth Fund (MLK) is a private foundation located in Hartford with primarily corporate support for its endeavors. These include, in addition to Club Co-op, the funding of scholarships as well as a summer program for 14-20 year olds in the City. The remainder of 1986 Club Co-op funding came from a carryover of $11,000 unspent from the previous year, and $8,846 provided to Hartford's Economic Resources Development Administration, Office of Youth Services by the State of Connecticut.
Funding for Club Co-op in 1987 increased to $89,793 from the following sources:

- Martin Luther King Youth Fund: $35,000
- City of Hartford: 30,000
- 1985 Carry Over Funds: 10,293
- ERDA/OYS (via State of CT): 10,000
- Special Contributions (CT National Bank and two foundations): 4,500
- TOTAL: 89,793

The approximately $30,000 increase in Club Co-op funding in 1987 permitted an increase in the number of children served in the program from 200 in 1986 to 300 in 1987.

Club Co-op also receives indirect subsidies from many other local private organizations and individuals as well as local and Federal government agencies. For instance, the program would not be able to operate without cooperation from the City’s Department of Parks and Recreation, which supplies all Club Co-op teams. Similarly, banking facilities are supplied at no fee by the Connecticut National Bank, and subsidized passes are provided by the public transportation system. Finally, a large number of private companies and individuals make their time available (e.g., two local department stores, a local television station, a carpenter, an electrician, a lawyer, and four universities).
IV. PROGRAM EVALUATION

A. Project Bridge

There exists no formal evaluation of Project Bridge in Hartford, either in terms of its relative success as a drop out prevention program or in terms of its cost with respect to alternative programs. It is of course a very new program, devised in response to a strongly felt need, scrambling for funding, and making up some of its operating procedures along the way, so that its administrators have had neither time nor inclination to ponder the fine points of evaluation. Nevertheless, the Hartford Board of Education in its drop out prevention plan has at least taken the preliminary step of setting a measurable objective for lowering the annual drop out rate over the next five years; and the original Bridge funding proposal submitted by the Chamber of Commerce to Public/Private Ventures contains provisions for Hartford Bridge research, to be conducted by P/PV researchers, which is aimed at evaluating the impact of the program. Evaluation will in any case be constrained by the fact that Project Bridge is the only program now in existence in the Hartford public schools whose specific objective is drop out prevention.

While formal impact evaluation remains for the future, there is no lack of qualitative impressions of Project Bridge, and these impressions are universally favorable. Teachers and administrators of the program rate it successful on the evidence that relatively few students have left it. It appears that Project Bridge I, which began in July 1986, started with approximately 35 participants, 7 of whom were "special education" students, 18 of whom were passed on from Project Save which operated during the 1985-86 school year, and 10 of whom were identified as "at-risk" during the summer of 1986. The group of 35 Bridge I participants were tutored through the 1986-87 school year, at which point the 7 "special education" students were directed into other special education programs (out of Bridge), and 5 students left the program, leaving 23 students officially attached to Bridge I in the summer of 1987.

In fact, there were only 16 Bridge I students actually in attendance during the summer of 1987 because seven of them temporarily left the program to go to Puerto Rico for the summer with their families. This highlights the interesting point that "staying in the program" is broadly defined. Even though participants may leave for Puerto Rico in summer, or leave to have a child or for whatever reason, they are not automatically dismissed from the program but rather encouraged to return as circumstances permit. The rationale for this flexible approach to absences is that dismissal from the program would merely raise the probability that the individual would drop out of school, thus defeating the point of the program. According to the employment specialist attached to Bridge I, it is precisely this sort of personal attention paid to participants that they most appreciate and respond to and which therefore makes the program successful in deterring drop outs.
The chief executive of one of the program's principal funding sources, the Hartford Foundation for Public Giving, stated that the Foundation favors the Bridge program because the people involved in its administration have proved themselves very capable, and because the program represents the last opportunity to save potential drop outs. He expressed the idea that in a rough cost effectiveness appraisal, it seems evident that people who do drop out represent a much larger long-term cost to society in terms of public expenditures than the cost of preventing them from dropping out in the first place.

We have observed in the course of our investigation several other indicators of the attraction and potential success of Project Bridge. There has been, first, a remarkable rapid coalescence of interested parties around the drop out problem. The Board of Education, the Chamber of Commerce, Public/Private Ventures, The Hartford Foundation for Public Giving, the Ford Foundation, Connecticut State government agencies, Federal government agencies, various community organizations, politicians and private businesses have all been brought together within a two year period to help define and attack the problem. This is a politically appropriate approach to the resolution of what is a general social problem (rather than only a local school board problem), and at the same time attests to the skill and concern of those involved in the task.

On the operational side, Project Bridge was developed quickly because the main parties involved in its implementation already knew each other well and had worked together extensively before the project started. For example, the close cooperation between the Middle School and the High School staff was due in large part to the fact that the principals of both schools had worked together before assuming their present positions. Problems having to do with follow up, communications and "turf" were ironed out without much trouble. The other important party in the operation of the program, the Chamber of Commerce, also has a long history of cooperation with the schools in regard to other programs. The Chamber had a strong commitment to the success of the program, alleviating the drop out problem.

A second indicator of the attraction of Project Bridge is its rapid expansion into other middle and feeder schools in Hartford. From its initial modest enrollment in the summer of 1986, participation has increased to about 70 students in the summer of 1987 and is projected by the Board of Education to increase to about 400 students in another year's time. Expansion of the program is clearly something that the concerned parties want to do: Funding has been acquired; administrative mechanisms have been established via the School/Business Collaborative; and an orderly plan of action has been drawn up by the Board of Education.

A third indicator of the attraction and potential success of Project Bridge relates to program-specific factors. The expansion of the program backward into 7th and 8th grades in order to pick up "at-risk" students before they enter the most perilous years for dropping out in the 9th and 10th grades.
is considered to have been critical to the success of the program. Students get help in sorting out the problems that lead to dropping out long before they become overwhelming. It has also allowed the school to help those students considered to be most in danger of dropping out (those who are 15 or 16 years old and still in middle school). Three other factors considered very important to the success of the Bridge program in Hartford are also adaptations of the "generic" Bridge model. Two of these adaptations deal with the ability of the program to attract students in the program: early promotion into high school and part time work during the year. The job component is important since for the most part these students come from an economically disadvantaged family and the need for an extra source of income is often a factor in their decision to drop out. However, early promotion is considered by some as a more powerful incentive to participate in the program than the part time job component. The third adaptation is a cultural sensitivity to the circumstances of Puerto Rican participants who may be obliged to leave Hartford during the summer (and are not dismissed from the program because of it). This clearly affects the ability of Puerto Rican students to participate in the program and since Puerto Ricans form such an important part of the "at risk" group it increases the effectiveness of the Hartford program.

B. Club Co-op

An objective evaluation of programs like Club Co-op is inherently difficult by virtue of the fact that the results on individual children may not be at all clear until years after the experience. And who is to say that the general behavior of a given child several years after participation in Club Co-op has anything in particular to do with that participation?

We spoke with several individuals who participated some years ago in Club Co-op, and their reactions to the program were highly positive. They mentioned the financial incentive as very important for their parents in purchasing back-to-school clothes. For themselves, the most important aspect was the opportunity to do things (like swimming at summer camp) and visit places (like museums) they would not otherwise have done.

The relatively modest objectives of Club Co-op noted in Section III. B. 2. are expressed in terms of providing a certain number of hours per week of "employment education" and "educational enrichment" to each participant. Objectives like these are certainly appropriate but are at the same time relatively easy to fulfill given that they are stated in such general terms of respect to content. The real question of interest here is whether these "employment education" and "educational enrichment" experiences delivered to 9 to 13 year olds have some positive effect on their behavior — in terms of not dropping out at some future date, serving as inspiration or motivation to a particular profession, or even creating some broader educational aspirations.
The answer to this question is notoriously elusive. It is preferable in the present context to observe that Club Co-op is operated on shoestring budgets by dedicated and energetic people who are attempting to broaden horizons of a few hundred inner-city kids. Given what appears to be a useful program, the question arises as to whether six weeks of such exposure is sufficient to meet the longer-term and unstated objectives mentioned above.

We can only speculate, but our guess is that a serious effort at consciousness-raising for these children would require much more, both in terms of breadth and length of exposure. Demand for Club Co-op places is at least double the available spaces, and virtually no children leave the program once in it. As for length of exposure, it is simply hard to believe that one six-week Club Co-op experience could overcome the persistent negative family-related problems that eventually result in a child leaving high school prior to graduation.
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Summary and Conclusions

The purpose of this paper has been to evaluate and assess the ways in which the 9 to 15 age group of "at-risk" youth is being served in the Hartford School System, in particular through the Project Bridge and Club Co-op educational assistance programs.

Project Bridge is the only program in Hartford having the specific purpose of drop out prevention. It has been in operation for just over one year and therefore cannot yet be evaluated in a formal, objective sense as to the achievement of its goals, which are stated in terms of an annual decrease in the drop out rate over a five year period. However, there are many indicators of the progress made so far which lead one to be hopeful that this innovative program is on the right track. A formidable coalition of interested parties has been assembled to finance, coordinate, and administer the program as well as to gather the appropriate statistics to measure its impact. The program itself has adopted measures and established incentives aimed at increasing its effectiveness, namely: Starting in 7th grade rather than 9th grade; early promotion; paid part-time work during the school year in addition to summer internships; and a culturally sensitive flexibility toward students' "forced" absences, resulting in their not necessarily being dismissed from the program when it is felt that dismissal is inappropriate.

As reported to us by school system administrators, the immediate results of Project Bridge are a vast improvement in students' attitudes toward school and a rapid decline in their rate of absence from school. A corollary result is the fact that relatively few Bridge participants are leaving the program although this must be tempered by the observation that dismissal does not necessarily follow from prolonged absence.

Finally, a large measure of confidence in the program is demonstrated by plans for its rapid expansion throughout the Hartford School System.

Club Co-op is a different sort of program, focusing on recreational and educational activities for 9 to 13 year olds in the summer. Both Bridge and Club Co-op successfully use monetary incentives as an inducement to participation. In the case of Bridge, participation -- that is, not dropping out -- directly achieves the immediate program goal. But in the case of Club co-op, participation can only be vaguely related to a child's future behavior, so that the connection between the monetary incentive and program's "success" is virtually impossible to assess. Presumably that is why Club Co-op's objectives are stated in terms of the amount of exposure to certain kinds of information rather than some activity or behavior resulting from that exposure.
In short, neither Bridge nor Club Co-op has yet proved itself successful in a strictly objective sense. But in the real world the problem of "at-risk" youth cannot be shunted aside while social scientists debate the possibilities for reform and evaluation. It is in this context that Bridge and Club Co-op appear to be such appropriate and promising programs worthy of the faith placed in them by public and private organizations in Hartford. The recommendations in the following sections are based on the conclusion that Bridge and Club Co-op are worthy of even more support, and that aspects of each program might be included in an expansion of support to "at-risk" youth in Hartford.

An expansion of financial support, however, requires that the problem of "at-risk" youth be redefined as a problem of "at-risk" families seen in their broader impact on society. As many of the people interviewed for this study have stated, one can pay now for an amelioration of the problems associated with "at-risk" youth or one can wait until later and pay vastly increased sums for the correction of other social problems whose origin can be traced to the "at-risk" family.

By defining the problem as that of "at-risk" youth, one is open to the criticism that through the expansion of programs serving "at-risk" youth, limited resources within a given school system are being unjustifiably diverted from the education of youth who are not at risk. We believe this criticism is incorrect, because by serving "at-risk" youth, as part of the more general "at-risk" family, then future social welfare expenditures both within and without the individual school system will be correspondingly reduced.

Evidence in favor of this view recently appeared in a New York Times editorial extolling the cost-effectiveness of various social welfare programs aimed at very young children. [9] It cites, for example, the benefits of $1.00 spent on preschool education as a savings of $4.75 in later social costs, and the benefits of $1.00 spent on childhood immunization as a savings of $10.00 in later medical costs.

It is precisely this sort of logic that underlies our recommendations for the expansion of Bridge-like programs. The following sections contain these recommendations.

B. Early Identification of "At-risk" Youth

In the course of this research, we have observed a phenomenon which repeatedly arises in conversation with persons whose work involves them in some aspect of the problem of school drop outs and "at-risk" children. We call this the "pushing back" phenomenon, and we use that terminology to describe the fact that whenever people discuss their particular interest or work with "at-risk" youth, they inevitably suggest that the source of the problem they are addressing in their work, and therefore the ultimate solution to that problem, lies somewhere in the past -- at an earlier stage in the education of the children they are concerned with -- so that no matter what progress or improvements they achieve in their work, it can only be a remedial or partially corrective measure rather than offering a long term solution to the fundamental problem(s) represented by "at-risk" youth.
Let us be specific about the sequence of this "pushing back" phenomenon as it has been revealed to us in this study. The initial link in the chain was the interest of the Hartford Chamber of Commerce in the transition of high school students into the workforce. Efforts to facilitate this transition were embodied in the School-to-Work Transition Program which deals with 12th grade high school students and attempts to ensure that they are aware of the attitudes and behavior expected of them as well as the work opportunities available to them. But for those people administrating STW, it quickly became clear that while STW was a well received and relatively successful program it nevertheless contributed nothing to the alleviation of the drop out problem, for the simple reason that by the 12th grade the drop outs had already left. Therefore, if the problem is defined as ensuring a sufficient number of high school graduates to meet local labor force needs, then the solution is "pushed back" to an earlier phase of the education process.

Our attention was then shifted to the early high school years (9th and 10th grade) when students turn 16 years old and can legally leave school. These grades are the focus of P/PV's "generic" Bridge model (as we have called it), which was the basis of requests for proposals sent out by P/PV during 1985.

Simultaneously and independently from P/PV's initiative, within the Hartford School system one middle school started what was in essence a "Bridge" program called Project Save, aimed at preventing "at-risk" middle school students (in 7th and 8th grade) from dropping out. Therefore, at least in Hartford, one practical response to the drop out problem was to "push back" the solution into middle school rather than leaving its focus on the 9th and 10th grades only.

As we have described in the body of this paper, the P/PV initiative and the Hartford middle school initiative were then joined together under the auspices of the Hartford Chamber of Commerce to form the first Hartford Bridge Program in July 1986. This program, while initially funded by P/PV and based on the P/PV "generic" Bridge model, also contained several local adaptations, notably the "pushing back" of the program into Hartford's middle schools.

It is instructive to observe that various people with whom we have discussed these issues have suggested that in general "at-risk" children can be identified quite early on in the education process, for example at least by the 4th or 5th grade and quite possibly earlier. One implication (which in our discussions has sometimes been stated explicitly and sometimes not) of being able to make a very early identification of potentially "at-risk" students is that Bridge or Bridge-like programs should be "pushed back" from the early high school or middle school years right into the elementary schools. One recommendation of this study is to verify, perhaps by means of a review of relevant research, just how early the reliable identification of "at-risk" youth can be made. Such identification would be a prerequisite for determining how far back into elementary school any new or extended program should reach.
C. Vertical Extension of Bridge Programs

If such an expansion were seen to be reasonable, the question arises as to whether or not a "Bridge" program for elementary school children should be similar to the programs offered in upper levels. We believe a tentative answer to this question is that they should not be similar, for two reasons. First, it might be socially very awkward for a group of, say, third or fourth grade elementary school children who are deemed "at-risk" suddenly to be physically separated from their peers in school; the chances seem high that such children would be ostracized and stigmatized among their peers who are not so separated. (We believe that a similar stigmatization does not occur, or is less important, in upper level Bridge programs because the upper level Bridge participants are much more aware of what they will gain by being in a Bridge program and simply discount any stigmatization that may result). Second, there are suggestions from people we have interviewed that the problems of "at-risk" students are largely family-centered rather than academically-centered. In other words, the academic problems experienced by "at-risk" you in middle and high school are largely a result of family problems rather than intellectual incapability.

We are therefore postulating that elementary school level "Bridge" programs should emphasize family counseling rather than academic remediation, because it is family (i.e., social) problems that are relatively more important at the elementary school level in determining whether a child is "at-risk" or not.

Indirect support for this view is found in the problem of "burnout" among Bridge teachers in middle school level programs in Hartford. What is happening in Hartford is that as the Bridge teachers inevitably become more involved in the students' personal -- as opposed to academic -- lives, they in turn are increasingly exposed to and forced to deal with their students' family and social problems. They become social workers as well as teachers and are simply overwhelmed by the complexities of the situation.

If elementary school level "Bridge" programs are oriented toward family counseling rather than academics, there would be no particular need to physically separate participants from their peers. Instead, such a program might emphasize several special weekly classes in so-called "life skills" plus after school or evening meetings between family counselors (basically, social workers), the participating students, and their parents.

Because so many of the families of "at-risk" students are also involved with other social welfare agencies in respect to housing or other public assistance, it seems sensible that Bridge team members at the elementary school level include people (again, probably social workers) representing those other social service agencies, so that there is a coordination of efforts to people in the school system and people in the social welfare agencies who are assisting people in the same family -- parents and children.
It is most important to be clear about the shift in focus that we are suggesting here. In essence we are proposing that the problem of "at-risk" youth is actually a problem of "at-risk" families when one refers to elementary school-age children. Consequently, any solution aimed at "at-risk" youth of this age must necessarily and primarily deal with the "at-risk" family of which the child is a part.

A further rationale for this sort of approach to lower level Bridge programs is the simple realization that "at-risk" students at upper levels respond in a very positive fashion to the fact that someone (a Bridge team) is paying special attention to and cares particularly about them. Application of this principle at elementary school level implies going back to the family, trying to get the family involved and concerned, and at the least substituting an official and personal concern for children where the family concern may be deficient.

While we have no easy answer to the form that an elementary school level "Bridge" program might take, based on the above discussion it seems that such a program would more closely resemble the Club Co-op program described earlier than the Bridge Program now underway in Hartford’s middle and high schools. The Club Co-op program uses direct monetary incentives (spending money and savings) to induce attendance at summer recreational and educational experiences for its 9 – 13 year old participants. Expansion of the Club Co-op concept into the school year, plus establishment of a direct link between the families of Club Co-op participants and the government agencies operating Club Co-op, would transform that program into something approaching what we imagine an elementary school level "Bridge" program would look like.

Our second recommendation is to make further inquiries into the technical feasibility of a vertical extension of "Bridge" programs into the elementary school level. We have in this section only begun to probe the sorts of issues that might arise in such inquiries, but the force of the "pushing back" phenomenon strongly suggests that the earlier "at-risk" youth are identified and helped, the more effective will be the long-term solution to the problem of drop outs.

D. Horizontal Extension of Bridge Programs

An alternative to the vertical extension of Bridge programs down to the elementary school level is the extension of existing programs in 7th through 10th grade to all students deemed "at-risk" in those grades.

From its modest beginning in July 1986 with a handful of middle school students, the Hartford Bridge program is already expanding within the 7th to 10th grade range and plans have been made to include on the order of 400 "at risk" students in such programs by the end of 1988. Yet even if in fact these plans are fulfilled, it is evident that only about two thirds of the potential drop outs will have been covered (based on the information that 613 students actually dropped out during 1985-86, the last year for which statistics are available).
Horizontal extension of the existing Bridge programs has the unique advantage of being based on a set of operating procedures and administrative structures which have already been tested and found to work well.

The kinds of changes that might be made in a horizontal extension of Bridge are operational. One change might involve a resolution of the Bridge teacher burnout problem whereby some sort of mechanism is devised for rotating regular teachers into and out of Bridge programs. A second change might involve the introduction of a bilingual component to existing Bridge programs, as discussed in the following section E.

The principal disadvantage of extending the coverage of existing Bridge programs within the 7th to 10th grade range relates to the "pushing back" phenomenon mentioned earlier; namely, there appears to be a consensus that any long-term solution to the drop out problem must deal with "at-risk" youth at as early an age as possible. Consequently, the horizontal extension of these programs, confined as it would be to the 7th through 10th grades, would not reach "at-risk" youth at the elementary school level.

Our third recommendation is that the feasibility of a horizontal extension of Bridge programs be examined. It appears that a horizontal extension may be less costly than the vertical extension discussed earlier, first, because the number of students to be covered is probably smaller and, second, because the nature of the program would change very little.

E. Expansion of Bilingual Bridge and Interstate Cooperation

The Puerto Rican population seems to have special problems which translate into lower educational attainment and higher drop out rates for Puerto Ricans compared to other racial or ethnic groups. Especially relevant to the drop out problem is the fact that Puerto Ricans tend to be much more geographically mobile than the rest of the population in Hartford (and probably other places as well). They also tend to travel to Puerto Rico for extended periods, especially in the summer. This mobility makes it more difficult for Puerto Rican school children to adapt to their environment, particularly if the move is made from Puerto Rico and, thus, involves changes in language and culture. This also makes it more difficult for the school system to know whether a student has dropped out or just moved to another school system and to design a program which takes this mobility and its attendant problems into account.

The Hartford Bridge program has attempted to address this problem by not requiring its students to participate in their summer program if the family leaves the Hartford area during the summer. While this is an encouraging first step, it does not go nearly far enough. However, a comprehensive attack on this problem is very likely too large and expensive for Hartford alone and may necessitate coordination at the Federal level. Coordination should occur between the Puerto Rican Department of Education and the departments of education in all U.S. cities with a large Puerto Rican population. It should
also occur in other programs, such as the JTPA programs, in Puerto Rico and the mainland. This coordination is already beginning between Puerto Rico and New York City with its educational "passports," and should be extended to the drop out programs. For instance a Bridge student from Hartford who goes to Puerto Rico for the summer might attend a local summer drop out program and/or participate in the local JTPA program. Ideally this participation should be prearranged before the student leaves for summer vacation, but such prearrangements would require a large amount of interstate cooperation and coordination.

The need to add a bilingual education component to Project Bridge is one thing that was mentioned by many of the people interviewed. Apparently plans are already underway for the addition of a bilingual component in at least one Hartford Middle School, but these plans are being hindered by economic constraints. The school system is using its regular teachers in the Bridge program, and since its bilingual program is already working at full capacity, it is finding it difficult to spare enough bilingual teachers for the Bridge program. Our fourth recommendation is that, in view of the fact that so many Puerto Ricans are in the "at-risk" population in Hartford, the efficacy of expanding the bilingual component of Bridge be examined along with an expansion of interstate cooperation among drop out prevention programs.
END NOTES


5. The Greater Hartford Region is composed of the City of Hartford plus 32 other towns. It is similar in size to the Hartford Labor Market Area.

5. State of Connecticut, Department of Labor, Employment Security Division, personal communication. The State of Connecticut does not publish statistics on minority unemployment rates for the City of Hartford or the Hartford labor market area. In June 1987 the total number of unemployed in the Hartford labor market area was 12,900. Of these, 51.7% (or 6,670) were members of minority groups. 3,790 of these were black and 2,710 were Hispanic.


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Preparation of this paper would have been impossible without the cooperation of the following people, whose assistance we gratefully acknowledge. The views expressed in the paper as well as any error or omissions are solely the responsibility of the authors.

Antres Buford, Hartford Board of Education
David Cleaver, Connecticut State Department of Education
Robert Hurley, Public/Private Ventures, Inc.
Beth Kenworthy, Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce
David Lawrence, Hartford Public Schools
Ann Levie, Hartford Employment Resource Development Agency
Robert Nearine, Hartford Board of Education
James Palma, Connecticut Office of Policy and Management
Ivette Rivera, Hartford Bridge Program
Michael Ruggles, Connecticut State Department of Education
Malcolm Salter, Hartford Foundation for Public Giving
Robin White, Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce
REFERENCES


Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce. "Greater Hartford Fact Pack," (mimeograph, no date).


Public/Private Ventures, Inc., "Bridge Information Papers," various titles (mimeograph, no dates).

Public/Private Ventures, Inc., "Public/Private Ventures' Bridge Project Program Elements," (Mimeograph, no date).


State of Connecticut, Department of Labor, "1986 Annual Planning Information, Hartford Labor Market Area".

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>Overview</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The City of Oakland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Oakland Unified School District</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The PIC and the Private Sector</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>The At-Risk Population</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Summary Estimate</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who is At-Risk?</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How Many Youth Are There?</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How Many Youth Are Economically Disadvantaged?</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How Many Youth Are Educationally At-Risk?</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How Many Youth Are Both Economically and Educationally At-Risk?</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other Indications of the Number of At-Risk Youth</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>Programs for At-Risk Youth Age 9 to 15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The JTPA Programs</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The School District Programs</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Private and Partnership Programs</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>An Overall Assessment</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How Many Are Being Served?</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How Effective Are These Programs?</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the Direction of Change?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...the School District</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...the Partnerships</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>...What's Needed</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An estimated 33,800 youth aged 9-15 live in Oakland, California (1986). Most of these youth are ethnic and racial minorities, and many of them are poor. About 27,400 of these youth attended public schools, with most of the balance in private schools (approximately 15 percent). Most public school students are from minority ethnic groups (90.6 percent in 1986). The majority of students are black (60.7 percent in 1986), while Asian students (14.1 percent in 1986) are the second largest ethnic group in the schools. Over 40 percent of all 9-15 year olds are members of AFDC families.

A large proportion of these youth are "at-risk" in the sense that they are not making normal progress in educational activities that prepare people for a reasonably productive and healthy life, and are from families who do not have the financial resources to attempt private remediation. These youth may also be experiencing conflict with the law or be engaged in seriously self-destructive activities. Using AFDC status and school test performance as criteria, we estimate that one in three of Oakland's youth age 9-15 is educationally at-risk, about four in every ten are economically disadvantaged, and about one in five is both educationally and economically at-risk.

While less than one in four of Oakland's non-poor youth are educationally at-risk, almost half of Oakland's economically disadvantaged youth are educationally at-risk. A study commissioned by the Oakland School Board estimated the cumulative dropout rate for grades 10-12 at 33 percent, suggesting that 11,260 of the 9-15 year old cohort of 33,800 can be expected to drop out of Oakland's schools. These figures indicate that conservatively between 20 and 33 percent of Oakland's 9-15 year olds are "at-risk" and will have difficulty competing in the labor market.

There are a wide variety of programs attempting to stem this tide in Oakland but efforts to coordinate and focus these activities are just beginning. The school system, in the throes of adjusting to a series of State funding reductions, is reorganizing its at-risk effort under the leadership of a change-oriented superintendent. The private sector and other non-school groups are involved in numerous partnerships with the schools. The overall impression is that Oakland is ripe for a concerted attack on the at-risk problem; it just hasn't happened yet.
II. OVERVIEW

The City

Oakland California, with a population of 356,000 people in 1986, is the second largest city in the San Francisco Bay area. Connected to San Francisco by the Bay Bridge and the BART rail system, the city is the major port and transportation center for the middle Pacific coast. The Port of Oakland alone processes approximately 21 million short tons of cargo a year and the shipping industry is said to be responsible for a quarter of Oakland's jobs. But Oakland's historically important trade, manufacturing and shipbuilding industries have declined, and been only partially replaced by the service oriented economy. As a result, Oakland's ethnically diverse population has suffered recent unemployment rates one and a half, to two percentage points higher than the national and regional averages. Ethnic diversity and a flow of new immigrants from Asia and the Americas influence the social and cultural environment of the city, as well as the nature of the problems the local human services systems must address.

Oakland has not shared proportionately in the prosperity of the other Bay Area communities. High tech has passed it by for other Alameda County and Santa Clara County locations. Unemployment rates approaching ten percent, high inner city welfare rates and losses of major blue-collar employers seem somehow incongruous with Oakland's Mediterranean climate. In recent years losses of employers such as Gerber Products and the slow withdrawal of trading firms such as Montgomery Ward have diminished the stock of manufacturing and warehouse jobs in this traditionally unionized and high-wage labor market. The existence of thousands of well paying civil service jobs in the nine major Oakland area military facilities (seen by some observers as economic enclaves) have not compensated for the blue-collar job losses in the private sector.

Despite these problems there are bright aspects in Oakland's economy. Both income and job growth have exceeded the national average over the last five years. The port has continued to prosper and new development has taken place downtown and around the new airport. Oakland has managed to retain its traditional corporate headquarters operations (Kaiser, Clorox, Safeway, American President Lines, etc.), and attract some significant new corporate headquarters (Crown-Zellerbach and the President's Office of the University of California). Kaiser Permanente, the health care provider, is Oakland's largest employer with almost 19,000 jobs. Clorox has 1500 in its headquarters operation, and Kaiser Aluminium employees 700 in the City. National business service firms are increasing their presence in Oakland. For example, most of the "Big Eight" accounting firms have established or renewed their Oakland operations. In short, Oakland is not an "economic basket case" or a "backwater."
Commercial real estate interests are quick to point out the advantages of an Oakland move from the increasingly congested San Francisco central business district. Although office rental rates have recently dropped, and "for lease" signs abound downtown and along the airport connector highway, the number and size of the new commercial buildings and the downtown office highrises provide concrete evidence of the substantial new investment that has recently taken place in Oakland. The outlook is for continued non-residential real estate development. The business press recently estimated that $1 billion in new office and commercial construction is planned for the downtown and the redeveloping Victorian Embarcadero district along the waterfront. Growth in the clerical and service jobs that fill these structures is slowly reshaping the local labor market.

The population and labor force of Oakland is ethnically diverse. The school district notes that some eighty-two different languages and ethnic groups are represented in its student body. About half of Oakland's population is black, about a quarter non-Hispanic white, with the balance predominantly Hispanic and Asian. The availability of relatively low cost housing, the overall physical attractiveness of the city, the promise of access to the blue collar and service jobs of the East Bay area, and the increasingly crowded conditions in San Francisco's traditional immigrant quarters account at least in part for some of Oakland's attractiveness to the new immigrants.

Major changes in the size and ethnic composition of Oakland's population have taken place over the last two decades. In 1980 Oakland's population was 339,337, a decline of 6.1 percent from 1970. By 1984 the population of the city was growing again and had reached 351,898. Most of this growth is attributed to increases in the Asian and Hispanic immigrant population.

The youth of Oakland are growing up in a city undergoing rapid change. The traditional economic base is declining while large and visible new investment is creating a new economy and new jobs. The challenge of preparing Oakland's young people for life in this new economy is substantial.
The Oakland Unified School District

In October 1986 the Oakland Unified School District had an enrollment of 51,586. Historically its students have performed below national norms on standardized tests and approximately a third drop out of school. Oakland's students are predominantly minority, with an increasing proportion from immigrant households, and a large proportion from poor families. Over 90 percent of Oakland's students are ethnic and racial minorities, over 20 percent are bilingual and over 40 percent are members of AFDC families.

In 1982 black youth were 64 percent and white youth were 12.1 percent of the Oakland Unified School District's student population. By 1986 black students had declined to 60.7 percent of the student population and white students had declined to 9.4 percent. Over the same four year period the percentage of Asian students (combined) had grown from 10.7 percent to 14.1 percent, and Hispanic students had grown from 10.8 percent to 11.8 percent of the student population. The 1980 Census reported that 18.4 percent of Oakland's population over five spoke a language other than English in the home. The district reported that 20.1 percent of its K-12 students were bilingual in 1985-86, and in the same year enrolled 8713 in its adult English as a Second Language classes. In the Spring of 1987 the district tested almost 4000 limited English 4th-10th graders. These figures indicate that rapid changes are underway in the demographics of Oakland.

Residential segregation plays some role in the racial make up of the Oakland schools. Two of the district's 58 elementary schools have more than 70 percent white students. Hispanics and Asians respectively are slight majorities in two of the 16 middle and junior high schools, while white students are a slight majority in another. Blacks are a majority of students in all the high schools but Asian students constitute an almost equal proportion in one high school in the Asian district near the center of the city, and white students are 40.3 percent of the student body of another high school along Skyline Boulevard on the eastern foothills edge of the city.

The current superintendent of the Oakland Unified School District is Joseph Coto, a former Oakland City Council member and, some say, a future mayor of Oakland. Coto came to the school system at a particularly crucial time. Budget problems had begun and dissatisfaction with the administration of the last superintendent set the stage for change.

Perhaps unfairly, the last superintendent is compared to his predecessor, Dr. Ruth Love, initiator of the adopt-a-school program and other innovative approaches in the 1970s. Love, an advocate of the "effective schools movement," sought out private sector partnerships, pushed academics and gave leadership to a district still shaken by the assassination of Superintendent Marcus Foster. Coto's predecessor had much to his credit, including the district's ambitious testing program, but his
administration is criticized for a lack of imagination, failure to raise student academic performance, failure to effectively utilize private sector support, the excessive growth of central administration and for a failure to understand and support the classroom teacher.

In his first year Coto faced a large budget deficit and a teacher's strike. A projected $7.8 million deficit in 1985-86 was eliminated by cutting 100 central office white collar and maintenance positions through retirement and attrition, and by instituting a hiring and purchasing freeze. A 19 day teacher's strike in January of 1986 was settled with a 20 percent increase in teacher's pay over three years. Moving beyond the crisis, Coto began to demonstrate his priorities: Another 79 certificated central office staff were reassigned to schools, and extra funds were allocated for new textbook purchases.

The key to understanding the practical magnitude of Coto's efforts is to look at the school district as an employer - the fifth largest public employer in Alameda County. The district's 6,065 jobs and $131 million payroll (1985-86), is a prize worthy of any political mill. Traditionally the Oakland School Board has taken considerable interest in hiring and individual appointments. Consequently, Coto's personnel changes do not take place in a vacuum.

Faced with further reductions in Oakland's allocation of State special urban impact funding, and a very critical report commissioned by the School Board (The Guthrie Report), Coto launched a series of changes that may take years to settle. Coto's program is called "No Excuses." The core of "No Excuses" is a pledge to raise student achievement on standardized tests to national averages by 1990. To accomplish this goal staff and resources are being shifted to the "basics" and to the classroom. Central office administrators, teachers and counselors are being reassigned to the building and classroom level. This summer most faculty were "put on waivers," and this time the uncertainty was real. Coto went on record that central administration would be cut. By mid summer news of actual cuts and future cuts permeated the system. Many special program staff did not know where they would be until the school year started. Staffing shifts and plans for reorganization continue to unfold.

Working with the School Board, Coto's administration has attempted to focus the renewal of the schools on a common mission. The formally adopted mission of the Oakland Public Schools is to assure that students will:

- Master the basic skills
- Think critically and independently
- Compete successfully in a changing job market
- Benefit from a college education
- Desire lifelong learning
- Play a responsible role in our democratic society
Some of the key elements of Coto's rejuvenation efforts include:

. Refocusing existing staff and resources on basic education in the classroom through reassignment of central staff to schools, and upgrading and increasing the amount of instructional material available in the classroom.

. Pulling together scattered special programs and refocusing their activities on clearer objectives. An example is the recent proposal to consolidate the district's various "at-risk" activities under one administration.

. Rejuvenation, recognition and increasing the involvement and support of outside private and public sector groups in the schools. Examples are more active support of the "Adopt A School" program, and conduct of a Citywide "Education Symposium" to garner demonstrable private and political support for the public schools.
The PIC and the Private Sector

Private sector involvement in the at-risk youth area has two axes in Oakland: the local structure of the Job Training Partnership Act, and the more diffuse network of overlapping local partnerships and involvements of private sector firms with the Oakland School District and private non-profit entities.

JTPA in Oakland is operated under an agreement between the incorporated PIC (the Oakland Private Sector Corporation) and the City of Oakland's Employment Development Department which serves as the administrative entity. Although a few PIC members are from large corporations, the majority come from public sector organizations, non-profits and smaller firms. As per the legislation the local JTPA program deals only with the 14-15 portion of the 9-15 year old group. At present the local JTPA programs are serving approximately 500, 14-15 year old youth.

PIC youth policy is in transition and City staff say the PIC is becoming more interested in at-risk youth. An ad hoc advisory/working committee is being used to inform the PIC and the City on these issues. The committee is a remnant of the local "Youth Assembly" which was established during the CETA years. Although the committee lacks official status its membership includes a PIC member, the head of the school district teen parent program, and other local service provider representatives. SDA staff are interested in the deliberations of the committee.

This spring the SDA staff prepared a definition of "high-risk" youth and distilled a set of likely program service models for the PIC. The definition of high-risk youth included dropouts, youth with serious educational deficiencies, absenteeism and truancy problems, and youth experiencing a variety of other conditions including pregnancy, marriage, criminal involvements, lack of basic skills, low self esteem, alienation, school discipline problems, emotional and physical problems. No estimated numbers of youth were attached to these categories, nor was a specific age range set.

Service models identified by the SDA staff included a "school-to-work transition" program tied to the school district vocational education programs, an entrepreneurial youth-run business project, a GED/job search and work experience model, an "earn while you learn" project to be attached to the school district continuation school, an "adopt a business" program, a mentorship model, and a school year youth-tutoring-youth program. SDA and PIC consideration of these models will continue this year.

It is much more difficult to generalize about the diffuse network of overlapping local partnerships and corporate involvements with the Oakland School District and private non-profit entities. It is perhaps better to identify the major focal points of this loose network and to describe some of issues that relate to these involvements.

-7-
One of the focal points is a person: Mr David Goodman of the Clorox Corporation. Goodman and Clorox show up everywhere. Clorox "adopts" a school, is active on the Chamber of Commerce Education Committee, gives money to the community based East Forteenth Street Project, sits on the board of the Marcus Foster Institute, provides volunteers in the schools through the Oakland Alliance, hires summer youth, etc.. Kaiser Permanente also seems to have representation on all the community's boards and contributes in one way or another to everything that is going on.

A second set of corporate community partners includes representatives from most of the major corporations operating in Oakland including IBM, AT&T, Chevron, Kaiser Aluminum, the Oakland Tribune, the Port of Oakland, Zerox, Transamerica, Sutro, Wells Fargo, Coldwell Banker, Pacific Bell, Kaiser Technologies, Peat Marwick, and Deloitte Haskins + Sells.

This loose network of corporate community partners comes together in two arenas that relate to addressing the problems of at-risk youth. The first is through participation on the Chamber of Commerce Education Committee. The Committee seems to perform an informal information exchange function, as well as mount some limited projects supportive of the schools on its own. A donation campaign for the school libraries is the most recent effort of this sort. The Committee also is a focal point for an irregular school district dialog with the business community.

The second arena is the Marcus Foster Institute and its Board of Directors. The Institute was established as a conduit for getting private funds into the schools. Many of the same firms are on both the Education Committee and the Institute Board. The Institute also serves as the fiscal agent for the Oakland Alliance (Oakland's Boston Compact variant), and some of the same firms are involved with the Alliance.

Not all the partnership players in Oakland are private. The CBOs tend to be scattered and numerous in Oakland. CBO involvements with the schools seem to be on a neighborhood level. CBO involvements with the corporations also tend to be individual; individual CBOs get support for activities from firms who develop their own pet projects. In the overall scheme of things the CBOs tend to be referral agents for school district and public social service agencies, as well as fill community advocacy, recreational and cultural roles. Finally, an interesting wrinkle to the partnership scene in Oakland is that the Navy is one of the most important partners of the school district, as will be shown in chapter IV.

The parts of this network are presently stronger than the whole because the individual players do more on their own than in concert. There is some feeling that the corporations need to get more performance from the schools. But a more critical understanding of what is needed from business is also emerging, as will be discussed in the final section of this report.
III. THE AT-RISK POPULATION

The Summary Estimate

Using AFDC status and school reading test performance as criteria, we estimate that one in three of Oakland's youth age 9-15 is educationally at-risk, about four in every ten are economically disadvantaged, and about one in five of this age group is both educationally and economically at-risk. Almost half of Oakland's economically disadvantaged youth are educationally at-risk, while less than one in four of all non-poor youth are educationally at-risk. This section describes the approach used in making these estimates and their limitations.

It was necessary to make four subpopulation estimates to obtain an overall estimate of the 9-15 year old at-risk population of Oakland. First it was necessary to make a population estimate for each of the ages of interest because a recent local estimate was not available. Secondly, an estimate of the number of economically disadvantaged youth was made using AFDC status as a proxy for income. Then an estimate of the educationally at-risk population was made using the percent of all Oakland School District students taking the reading portion of the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills (Form U) who fell below the bottom quartile (lowest 25 percent) of all students taking the test nationally. Finally, an estimate was made of youth who were both economically and educationally at-risk, using test data from schools with very high proportions of students from AFDC families. The resulting estimate is a very conservative construction of the at-risk population. The table below shows the results of these estimates while the sections that immediately follow discuss how they were constructed.

Table. Estimated At-Risk Population 9-15, City of Oakland, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4800</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>2059</td>
<td>659</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>1550</td>
<td>2145</td>
<td>1008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4800</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>746</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4450</td>
<td>1350</td>
<td>1820</td>
<td>910</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>1650</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>961</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2112</td>
<td>1077</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5150</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>2220</td>
<td>1176</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 33,800 | 11,200 | 14,241 | 6537

Who is At-Risk?

Perhaps it should go without saying that there is not a precise definition of "at-risk" youth and that the age cohort of interest, the 9-15 year olds, is not one that is standard to most of the current statistical sources. The working definition used in this report focuses on indicators that youth are not making normal progress in those educational activities that help prepare people for a reasonably productive and healthy life, and are from families who do not have the financial resources to attempt private remediation. These youth may also be experiencing conflict with the law or be engaged in seriously self-destructive activities. Because most of this population is still in school, we have to look to the schools for indicators of the number of children who may be "at-risk." But even here there are problems because the school statistical data is compiled by grade level rather than by age; however, with some reasonable assumptions it is possible to develop of estimates of the size of the at-risk youth population.

The first important assumption is that the 9-15 year old age group corresponds roughly to the 4th through the 10th grade school population. A second necessary assumption is that indicators of poor educational progress are correlated to a wide variety of other socially dysfunctional conditions that also put youth seriously "at-risk." This is an important assumption because reliable statistical data on these other conditions are hard to come by, and these data are not easily cross referenced to the educational data. With these and other assumptions made along the way, this report estimates the size of the 9-15 year old at-risk population of Oakland.

How Many Youth Are There?

Recent locally developed estimates of the number of 9-15 year old youth in Oakland were not found. Inquiry at the Oakland Planning Department produced no figures more recent than the 1980 Census. The California EDD "Annual Planning Information" report estimates the number of 16-21 year old economically disadvantaged youth (12,360 in 1986-87), but makes no estimate of disadvantaged 14-15 year olds. Similarly, the Oakland SDA makes no independent estimates of our study group.

The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) makes population estimates for Oakland between censuses. The last ABAG estimate of the 1985 total Oakland population is 352,000. This is a very conservative estimate considering that the Census provisional estimate for 1984 was 351,898. The next ABAG estimate for Oakland is scheduled for release this fall. ABAG estimates population for broad age groups by county, but not by city. Consequently, the latest detailed population-by-age data is contained in the 1980 Census. The 1980 Census estimate showed 31,942 youngsters in the target age range.
For lack of a local estimate an independent estimate of the current number of youth between the ages of 9 and 15 was made. The 1986 total population was estimated by adding an increment equal to 1/5th of the 1980-1985 growth to the 1985 ABAG estimate. The new total was then prorated among each of the one year age cohorts using the proportions of the age distribution in the 1980 Census. The result of this procedure was an estimated population of 33,800, 9-15 year old youth in 1986. These estimates are shown on the table below.

Table 1. Estimated Population Age 9-15, City of Oakland, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>1980 CENSUS</th>
<th>1986 POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4554</td>
<td>4800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4727</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>4533</td>
<td>4800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>4191</td>
<td>4450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>4423</td>
<td>4700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>4632</td>
<td>4900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>4864</td>
<td>5150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| TOTAL | 31,924 | 33,800 |


The independent estimate was compared with the current enrollment in the public schools as a check on its reasonableness. Public school enrollment for grades 4-10 was 27,386 as of October 1986, or 6414 less than the estimate. Private school enrollments, said to range from 30-40 percent among Hispanic and white youth by local informants, and growing black private school enrollment probably account for 4500-5500 of these youth. (In 1980 the Census reported that 14.9 percent of all elementary students attended private schools.) The 1000-2000 balance is probably composed of late enrollments, street youth, and estimation error. In sum, an estimate of 33,800 youth between the ages of 9 and 15 appears reasonable for Oakland in 1986.

How Many Youth Are Economically Disadvantaged?

As in most cities, Oakland's poor are disproportionately young. The Oakland Employment Development Department current Job Training Plan shows that 16 percent of Oakland's families live below the poverty level. In 1980 the Census also reported 16 percent of Oakland families, and 18.5 percent of all persons as having incomes below the poverty level. In contrast, 28 percent of youth under 18 were poor, 34.4 percent were in families with incomes below 125 percent of poverty, and youth accounted for 36.4 percent of all poor persons.
The school district estimates that in 1985-86 about 42 percent of their total student population "lived in poverty." Another basis for a conservative estimate of the number of youth who are economically disadvantaged is the proportion of youth from AFDC families in the school system. 1986 Oakland Unified School District data indicate that 42.9 percent of elementary, 40.9 percent of junior high, and 43.1 percent of senior high students were from AFDC families. Consequently this report uses a figure of 42 percent, or 14,200 as a reasonable low-end estimate of economically disadvantaged youth 9-15.

Experience in JTPA programs suggests that non-welfare youth from families with low income might conservatively add another 20 percent, for a total of 60-62 percent, or 20,950 economically disadvantaged youth aged 9-15.

Table__. Estimated economically disadvantaged youth age 9-15, City of Oakland, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low End Estimate</th>
<th>14,200</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JTPA Experience Estimate</td>
<td>20,950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We recognize that these figures appear high but we do not think they are out of line with the general situation in Oakland.

How Many Youth Are Educationally At-Risk?

The best estimate of the number of youth who are educationally at-risk in Oakland is based on Unified School District testing data. The district administers the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills (CTBS Form U) each year to most of its students. The district reports test results for reading, language and math for each school in the system. We chose to use the scores for the reading portion of the test as an indicator of educational disadvantage. Scores were available for the last several years for the district and each of its schools by grade level for the 1985-86 school year.

In the spring of 1987 the district gave the CTBS to 8086 students in grades 4-10 that it identified as "educationally disadvantaged youth," and to another 3885 students in the same grades identified as "limited English proficiency" students. Together these 12,000 students constitute a rough control total for our estimate; however, it was not advisable to use these figures as an estimate of the educationally at-risk because only average percentiles were available by group and grade.

For the purposes of this estimate the percent of all Oakland School District students taking the CTBS (Form U) who fell below the first quartile in the reading portion of the test was used as an indicator of educational disadvantage. Reading scores were
selected because in our judgement they seemed less culturally influenced than the language scores. Math scores were not used because they would eliminate most of the limited English students who tend to score significantly better in the math portion of the test and significantly poorer in the reading portion of the test.

The first quartile percentage on the reading test was applied to the population estimate to obtain an estimate of the number of educationally at-risk youth in each age/year cohort. This procedure yielded an estimated 11,200 educationally at-risk youth, or one in three youth in the 9-15 year old population. The table below shows these estimates.

Table 1. Estimated Educationally Disadvantaged Population 9-15, City of Oakland, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>NOMINAL GRADE</th>
<th>% BELOW Q1</th>
<th>1986 TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>1986 EST.ED. DISADV. ESTIMATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>4800</td>
<td>1300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>1550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>4800</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>4450</td>
<td>1350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>1650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>1900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>5150</td>
<td>2200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 33,800 11,200

* This figure is the percent of all Oakland School District students taking the CTBS (Form U) who fall below the first quartile in the reading portion of the test.


How Many Youth Are Both Economically and Educationally At-Risk?

The working definition used in making this estimate defines as at-risk those youth who are not making normal progress in those educational activities that help prepare people for a reasonably productive and healthy life, who may be experiencing conflict with the law, who may be engaged in seriously self-destructive activities, and who are generally from families who do not have the financial resources to attempt private remediation. We assume that the indicators of poor educational progress are correlated with a wide variety of other socially dysfunctional conditions that also put youth seriously "at-risk." With this assumption in mind an estimate was made of youth who
were both economically and educationally disadvantaged; this final estimate is our most conservative construction of the at-risk 9-15 year old population.

The first requirement for the estimate is a breakout of low income youth by grade level. This was accomplished by applying the known AFDC proportions by type of school to the population estimate. The table below shows estimated low income youth by grade level.

Table__. Estimated Low Income Population 9-15, Oakland, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>NOMINAL</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1986</th>
<th>1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GRADF</td>
<td>AFDC</td>
<td>SNEDEKER</td>
<td>EST.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>ECON.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ESTIMATE</td>
<td>DISAD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>4800</td>
<td>2059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>2145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>4800</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>4450</td>
<td>1820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>2112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>5150</td>
<td>2220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL  33,800  14,241


To establish a basis for estimating educational disadvantage among low income youth we identified schools with very high proportions of students from AFDC households. The percentage of students from these high-AFDC schools falling below the first quartile on the CTBS was applied to the estimated low income population estimates to arrive at an estimate of 9-15 year old who were both low income and educationally at-risk. The table below shows the results of that procedure.
### Table 1. Estimated Low Income Educationally At-Risk Population 9-15, Oakland, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>NOMINAL GRADE</th>
<th>% BELOW Q1 ECON.</th>
<th>EST. 1986</th>
<th>ECON. &amp; ED. AT-RISK EST. 1986</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>2059</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>2145</td>
<td>1008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>1820</td>
<td>910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>2112</td>
<td>1077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>2220</td>
<td>1176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14,241</td>
<td>6,537</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Percentages used are from Cox Elem. (74.3% AFDC), Madison Jr. High (80.0%), and Castlemont HS (96.9% AFDC).


This procedure yielded an estimate of 6,537 low income educationally at-risk youth. To sum up these estimates...

- The 9-15 year old population is about 33,800.
- About 42% of this population is poor (AFDC).
- About 33.1% of all 9-15 year old youth are educationally at-risk.
- About 19.3%, or 6,537 of all youth aged 9-15 are both poor and educationally at-risk.
- About 46% of all poor youth are educationally at-risk.

### Other Indications of the Number of At-Risk Youth

Dropout rates, failure rates and measures of behavioral problems are additional indicators of the at-risk youth population. The Oakland dropout rate is said to be about 33 percent. The failure rate data is inconclusive. The suspension rate data is about 22 percent. This section looks at the school data on these indicators.

**Dropout Rates**—Completion of high school generally indicates that a student has gained some basic skill competency and probably has adopted attitudes and habits that will help in the transition from school to work. The Oakland District had data available on
the dropout rate from comprehensive high schools by grade, but did not have comparable information on its continuation and "necessary" high schools. The district reported that 264, or 7.2 percent of 10th graders dropped out in 1985-86. The cumulative dropout rate for grades 10-12 in the comprehensive high schools was 16.3 percent in 1985-86. We found little association between the dropout rate and attendance, or the proportion of AFDC students by comprehensive highschool in the data.

The actual dropout rate in Oakland is probably much higher than these figures indicate. In 1986-87 about 1700 students in grades 7-12 withdrew from school to "attend school in another district." Fully 30 percent (1357) of all withdrawals last year left for "unknown reasons." The Albuquerque experience suggests that some portion of these withdrawals may be hidden dropouts. In a study commissioned by the Oakland School Board, Dr. James Guthrie of the University of California estimated that the cumulative dropout rate for grades 10-12 was 33 percent. He had access to "necessary school" data (many severely at-risk youth are placed in these schools). If Guthrie's estimate holds for the 9-15 year old cohorts we can expect 11,260 of the 33,800 to dropout. Guthrie's estimate suggests that our at-risk estimate (20-33%) is conservative.

Failure Rates— The number of students who have been retained in the same grade for another year is an indication youth at-risk. In 1985-86 a total of 5.3 percent (1580) of K-6th graders were retained. (Sixth graders enrolled in middle schools were not included in these figures.) We found no apparent association between retention rates by school, and attendance or proportion of AFDC students.

Behavioral Problems— Behavior and attitude problems in school are indicators that a youth may also have problems with the transition from school-to-work. The single best available indicator of behavioral problems is the rate of suspension from school. The most recent Oakland data show a suspension rate of 21.7 percent for secondary students in a single year. The elementary school suspension rate was only 2.8 percent. Despite the high secondary school suspension rate, only 34 students were listed as having withdrawn from school because of expulsion.

Although these indicators can not be cross tabulated with the income and educational test data presented earlier, the high dropout rate estimated by Guthrie and the high reported suspension rate support the idea that a large portion of Oakland's youth are at-risk.
IV. PROGRAMS FOR AT-RISK 9-15 YEAR OLD YOUTH

This section summarizes the major programs addressing the needs of 9-15 year old at-risk youth in Oakland. The programs are grouped under three categories: the JTPA programs, the school district programs, and the private and partnership programs.

The JTPA Programs

JTPA Title IIA School Year Program- It is not the policy of the SDA to provide school year programs for 14-15 year olds. However, a few 14-15 year olds are served incidental to the operation of the 16-21 year old program.

JTPA Title IIB Regular Summer Program- This program serves about 400, 14-15 year old youth. The regular program consists of 20 hours of labor market orientation and 180 hours of work experience. Limited classroom training is provided... mostly in ESL. 14-15 year olds are not segregated for special treatment in the regular program.

JTPA Title IIB Special Tutoring Program- A special peer tutoring program, earmarked for 14-15 year olds, serves about 100 youth in a six week program. Eligible participants (youth who tested one to two years below grade level in reading or math) were recruited through the school system. Some of the tutors and tutees happened to be older than 15, although the program was designed for 14-15 year olds.

Youth spend three weeks learning to be tutors. They get 120 hours of instruction in reading and math and 25 hours of career information. Then they spend three weeks tutoring 100 other kids in four classrooms at two different summer school sites. The tutors work with the tutees on a one-on-one basis. The classroom teachers help with lesson plans. The program is directed by a retired educator.

Ninety percent of the youth tutors were retained in the program through the summer. An SDA sponsored evaluation showed significant learning gains. For example, the average score of the 92 tutors tested on the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills went from the 55th to the 74th percentile in reading and from the 53rd to the 63rd percentile in math.

The School District Programs

Consolidated Application Program- Approximately 25,800 Oakland students in 72 schools are involved in programs of compensatory education, including those funded under Chapter 1 (ECIA), the State Economic Impact Aid (EIA) program for educationally disadvantaged youth and bilingual students, and the AB65 School Improvement Program. The programs are usually referred to as the Consolidated Application Program.
Chapter 1 reading and math remediation services are provided to almost 13,000 students, or about 26 percent of the total 11/86 school enrollment. About half of all Chapter 1 students are in grades 4-10. Chapter 1 resources are focused in the elementary and junior high schools. Almost half of all elementary schools and 2/3rds of all junior highs had Chapter 1 funded programs in 1986-87. At the junior high level the program served 42 percent of all students. The district has used a combination of individual tutoring and class group assistance.

State of California funded Economic Impact Aid compensatory education assistance was provided another 9000 students in 1986-87. About a third of these students were in grades 4-10. Impact Aid funded limited English proficiency assistance served almost 10,000 students in 1986-87. Most of this money goes to support special tutoring and efforts to meet the bilingual education requirements. About 40 percent of these students were in grades 4-10. Special federal immigrant and refugee bilingual education funds serve about 2500 students K-12.

The California Impact Aid has traditionally been used to fund special central office directed compensatory programs, in addition to school-based programs. It is the cuts in these funds that have caused the most recent round of reassignments.

School District Work Experience Education Program- This school year program serves about 400 high school students in our target group throughout the district. The students find their own jobs and then apply for credit. Four school district coordinators go to the worksite, grade the students, and issue credit for work experience. The program is co-located with the Youth Employment Service operated by the California EDD.

Necessary and Continuation High School Programs- The school district operates one continuation and four alternative high schools (called "necessary high schools" in Oakland). Students who are disruptive to the regular classrooms of the comprehensive high schools are assigned to the necessary schools. These students may be assigned due to violence, drug or other behavioral problems.

The program of the necessary schools focuses on academic remediation, the provision of individual counseling, and the referral and delivery of social services. Within these schools, the district operates a special at-risk program based at Clawson Necessary School for students needing further special counseling, personal attention and social services. The district's regular work experience programs do not operate within the necessary schools. The continuation High School is for youth returning to finish high school programs.
Table. Necessary and Continuation High Schools, Enrollments 1986-87

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Students No.</th>
<th>Certificated Staff</th>
<th>Classified Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clawson</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudsdale</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Side</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dewey</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Oakland Unified School District.

The necessary schools served approximately 250 14-15 year olds in the 1986-87 school year. No estimate of service to 14-15 year olds is available for the continuation school.

Opportunity Junior High - The school district operates one opportunity school (Dag Hammarskjold) for about 150 troubled 7-9th graders. The opportunity school serves a similar function for the middle and junior highs as the necessary schools do for the high schools. Seventeen certificated opportunity school staff serve about 150 youth with severe behavioral problems, or a need for extensive social services and individual attention. In past years the district has also operated similar opportunity classrooms within regular middle schools ("schools within schools"); however, it is our understanding that the opportunity classrooms have been formally phased out.

Cyesis Centers (Pregnant teens) - The school district provides three special centers for students past the fourth month of their pregnancy. In October of 1986 these centers had 54 youth enrolled in academic and counseling programs. The centers are operated in conjunction with a set of 23 district operated Child Development Centers (day care). Estimates of the number of 9-15 year olds served by the Cyesis Centers have not yet been obtained.

The Private and Partnership Programs

A number of community based organizations such as Asian Multi Service, Consortium of United Indian Nations, Good Samaritan Cathedral, Stepping Stones, Project Joy, etc., offer valuable referral, counseling, recreation, information and social services to limited numbers of 9-15 year olds in the neighborhoods of Oakland. The Math/Science Network of Mills College encourages minority young women to stay in school and enter the sciences. Time and space limitations do not permit full coverage of these organizations. The Hire Oakland First program and the Mayor's Summer Jobs program are also not covered because they only serve youth above age 16.
Allen Temple Baptist Program - This program provides math and science tutoring to 50-60 students during the school year and 60-70 students during the summer. It is targeted on seventh and eighth graders who have been labeled as under-achievers or trouble makers by the schools.

The students are referred and recruited by their parents and the schools. They are tutored by student volunteers from local colleges. During the school year the program runs for two hours a day, three days a week. During the summer it runs three hours a day, four days a week. The students learn science, math, and computer literacy. Limited counseling and social services are available.

The program is funded by the church and corporate sponsors. Xerox has provided money and equipment. Professional educators hired by the church direct the program. The Black Engineers Association helped write the original funding proposal, but the program no longer receives public funds. The church is located in a very disadvantaged area of East Oakland. The temple offers no other educational programs. The objective of the tutoring is to shift youth from the general education track, to the college preparatory track in their schools. It is reported to be successful with 40-50 percent of the students.

Marcus Foster Institute -

This non-profit corporation was specifically established as a legal vehicle for channeling private funds into the Oakland school system. The Institute Board of Directors includes the Superintendent of the Oakland public school system and some community leaders, but its dominant coloration is corporate. Board members include representatives of Clorox, Kaiser Permanente, AT&T, Chevron, Kaiser Aluminium, Sutro, Wells Fargo, Coldwell Banker, Kaiser Technologies, Peat Marwick, Deloitte Haskins + Sells, Oakland Tribune, Port of Oakland, and Transamerica.

The Institute raises and uses funds in a variety of ways to enrich the school programs. Institute programs include a small grants program, scholarship programs, a school to work transition project and a volunteer speakers program. The Institute also serves as the fiscal agent for the Oakland Alliance.

. The Institute's "New Notions" program awards small grants ($25-$2500) to teachers for specific "creative" projects and experimental approaches in the classroom.

. The Institute's School to Work Transition project is funded for $69,000 from California Grantmakers, a consortium of foundations. The project concentrates on dropout prevention, and offers motivational counseling and Saturday tutoring. The project serves over 100 students from four high schools.
The Institute manages scholarship programs for other foundations and corporations. The Institute advertises, screens, interviews, awards and disburses scholarship funds under these arrangements.

One of the most significant of the Institute's activities is the "Role Models" program which places volunteers from the business world into classrooms to assist as speakers and occasionally as tutors. The purpose of the program is to put students in personal contact with a successful person who can share how they overcame obstacles and succeeded in life and on the job. The volunteers generally give presentations based on their occupational experiences and the importance of career preparation. Role Models links volunteers with an individual school coordinator who arranges specific activities. The program presently has about 170 active volunteers.

Superintendent Coto has personally encouraged individual business people to become involved in Role Models. Role Models appears to be a simple and direct way to utilize business people in the schools. The level of effort seems about right for volunteers who may not be sure of what they are getting into, or who may not be ready to take a bigger plunge. The program obtains most of its volunteers from the day-to-day contacts of its staff and consultants. While the program seems to get a positive overall response from the volunteers, one business person noted that the individual schools vary widely in their effective utilization and organization of the volunteer assistance.

Oakland Alliance-

This program is a local, Clark Foundation funded, "Boston Compact" inspired, attempt to address the school-work linkage problem with business investment in the schools. The Oakland Alliance is quick to point out that their "compact" model is adapted to the situation in Oakland and that each of the compact models is unique. Starting promotional efforts in the summer of 1985, the Alliance succeeded in becoming established and mounted programs in the schools. The principal effort of the Alliance has been the "Step Ahead" program.

The Alliance Step Ahead program served 300 high school youth last year with an instructional and job placement program targeted on four high schools (Fremont, McClymonds, Oakland Tech and Castlemont). Four "Career Specialists", who do both tutoring and career awareness counseling, worked with youth after school, weekends and during lunch breaks. An employment specialist recruited from the private sector placed the youth in part-time and full-time jobs.

The program is directed to youth with an attendance average of 80 percent or better and at least a 2.0 GPA. The program has had no difficulty in attracting youth who see it as a way to "get a job". By design, the students are almost exclusively minority youth (85% black, 10% Hispanic, and 5% Asian). Most of the students are juniors and seniors.

1
Private business participation has focused on the use of corporate volunteers in mock employment interviews with Step Ahead participants. Corporate volunteers have been less helpful in providing jobs. Still, the program placed 180 of its 300 participants last school year. The program points to "career awareness" as the chief incentive for youth participation.

The Alliance also operates a modest Corporate Volunteer program. Kaiser Permanente, a large California health care provider, IBM, and in particular, Clorox have been involved in this effort. The volunteer program has placed 13 employees from participating companies into the schools for 1-2 hours per week as tutors, resource people and speakers. Contact people at each school, (teachers, community people or principals) coordinate the volunteer efforts. There is some overlap in the Alliance corporate volunteer program and a similar effort called "Role Models" operated by the Marcus Foster Institute, a non-profit educational agency. Other corporate assistance to the Alliance has included advice and contributions toward advertising the program and donated office space early in the Alliance's existence.

Clark Foundation funding has sustained the Alliance since its inception but is expected to phase out in a year or so. Current year Clark funding of $75,000, some JTPA money from the Oakland PIC, and modest corporate contributions are known resources for the current year. Last year district support for three of the four "Career Specialists" and the director provided the core staffing for the Alliance. This year, due to the financial straights of the district, the career specialists were first removed from the budget and then retained, but reassigned, as regular counselors. The Alliance Director has been assigned to an elementary school principal position, but continues as Director on a part-time basis.

School district inkind support and salaried staff support are uncertain for the current school year. Although discontinuation of the Alliance seems a possibility to this observer, the program is planning to continue its career awareness and tutoring classroom activities on Saturdays and to retain its full time placement specialist with foundation funds. This arrangement would serve 50-75 youth. All of this, like so much else relating to education in the Oakland District at this time is very much "up in the air."
Adopt-A-School Program- This program was started in Oakland by Dr. Ruth Love, superintendent of the Unified School District from 1976-1981. Dr. Love was able to encourage a number of major local businesses to set up partnerships with individual schools. The chief activity of the partnerships was to obtain release time for employees of the participating firms to volunteer in the schools as tutors and resource people. Adoptive firms also donated learning materials, provided field trips and gave publicity to efforts to upgrade the schools and the image of the district.

In later years the Adopt-a-School program was decentralized. The program became an option of each principal and central coordination and direction diminished. The district, through the Oakland Alliance has provided some training to individual school people and participating business people using the National School Volunteer Program guidance. Each participating school now plans its own program. This has helped the schools to tailor the thrust of the volunteer effort to specific needs in each school, but has also brought on some problems. One business community informant related how the lack of central support and recognition had caused some efforts to become frustrated and collapse in the face of individual disinterested building administrators.

At present about a third of Oakland's 98 schools have been "adopted." Some of the adopted schools appear to have significantly benefited from the program. for example, Castlemont High School was adopted by the Clorox Corporation and given equipment to establish a "Computer Academy." Under Superintendent Coto the Adopt-A-School program is receiving encouragement and recognition from the central office again.

The single largest adopter has been the US Navy. The impetus for Navy involvement comes from the top of the command structure. As a part of its "Excellence Program," each area Navy command is charged with developing local community partnerships. The area commands in California are at San Diego, Long Beach and San Francisco. Naval Base San Diego had a successful set of partnerships with local schools, so when Admiral Robert Toney assumed command of Naval Base San Francisco he decided to rejuvenate Navy/community involvements through the adopt-a-school model. Units under Admiral Toney's jurisdiction have adopted 50 schools in the Bay Area.

Eighteen of the 50 adopted schools are in Oakland. The Navy found a good reception to its adopt a school initiative in Oakland. Part of the reason is that the Navy has lots of activity in the East Bay area including the Naval Supply Center and Alameda Naval Air Station. Another reason is that the Navy has taken a flexible approach to gearing the content of its efforts to the needs of the individual schools and included recreational elements in the programs. The fact that Admiral Toney is an Afro-American and may feel some personal commitment to the program is not seen as a major consideration by his public information officer... others disagree.
The Navy Oakland adoptions include three elementary schools, one middle school, one junior and thirteen high schools! The programs begin with a formal adoption ceremony and include a wide variety of supportive activities. For example, at McClymonds HS volunteers from the Naval Supply Center offer tutoring help and a mentor/job shadowing program at the naval facility. At Brookfield Elementary a "Saturday Scholars" program staffed by volunteer teachers from the Navy School of Physical Distribution offers one-on-one tutoring in math and English for four hours each Saturday on a six week cycle. In addition to tutoring, Navy Adopt-A-School activities have included guest cruises, cookouts, school site clean-up and painting days, computer training classes, talks on different job fields and life in the Navy, ball games and joint high school/ship golf tournaments. The Navy program gets its volunteers from uniformed shore personnel, civilian employees and uniformed ship personnel.

The Navy experience offers some lessons to other adopt-a-school efforts as will be discussed in the last chapter of this report.
V. AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT

This section is an overall assessment of the programs addressing the needs of at-risk 9-15 year olds in Oakland. The important questions are... How effectively are Oakland's 9-15 year old at-risk youth being served by the school district, the JTPA and the partnership systems? In what direction are these systems moving? What opportunities exist for improving service to at-risk youth?

At this stage of our understanding of the situation in Oakland we believe that services to 9-15 year old at-risk youth are insufficient. While a precise figure on the coverage and the effectiveness of available services is not possible, the overall pattern and magnitudes support this finding. Programs to enhance basic skills, to inform at-risk youth of their employment options and to help them begin careers exist in Oakland. Unfortunately we did not find an effective focused effort to assemble a coordinated approach across organizational lines to address the problems and service needs of 9-15 year old at-risk youth. However, the direction of change in the delivery of services, and the scattered indications of performance, point in a positive direction. Consequently, if a prediction was required it would be that Oakland is beginning a period during which serious efforts to address the needs of at-risk youth will be made.

How Many Are Being Served?

The estimates made in an earlier section of this report set the number of educationally at-risk youth at 14,241, of which about 6500 were from low income (AFDC) families. The remediation and compensatory services of the Consolidated Application Programs probably touch about 9500 of the educationally at-risk youth in this age group. Perhaps another 1000 get basic remediation through the necessary schools and other school district programs, while probably no more than another 1000 are tutored in the JTPA, private and volunteer partnership efforts. Bilingual, refugee assistance, and limited English programs probably serve about 4000-5000 of the youth in our study group. All of these are generous estimates. We think that when overlaps are accounted for, somewhere between 2000 and 4000 educationally at-risk 9-15 year old youth receive no special remedial assistance.

The real question is what does it mean to be "served" in these programs(?). Undoubtedly it sometimes means effective remediation by an unhassled teacher in an environment conducive to learning, but our informants argue that the weight of existing social conditions, a large influx of limited English speakers and refugees, Proposition 13 limitations on local funding, and recent limitations on State support for local education can be almost overwhelming. In this context, the Consolidated Application funds disappear into the funding of the general program, and the special program becomes the general program.
In addition to tutoring, the partnership programs provide career awareness, motivational and informational services to inform at-risk youth of their employment options. Even with a generous estimate of youth served in these programs, making some mighty assumptions about the effect of volunteer career days and special trips, the number of at-risk youth receiving employment information and guidance would be 2500-3000, or less than a quarter of the educationally at-risk population estimate. The number of these youth receiving specific occupational preparation is somewhere between 800 and 1600, and district and JTPA work experience programs probably serve less than 1000 combined from this age group.

How Effective Are These Programs?

We do not know precisely how effective these programs are. The relatively small JTPA and Allan Babtist tutoring programs report significant learning gains. The partnership volunteer tutoring efforts are probably experiencing similar results. At present allocation levels the JTPA program is assisting 500 at-risk 14-15 year olds with positive reinforcement in the school to work transition. This figure suggests that JTPA is reaching less than 1/20th of the estimated 11,200 economically disadvantaged 9-15 year old youth. Evaluation of this program based on CTBS testing shows significant educational gains. Anecdotal information suggests the volunteer partnership career awareness, motivational and informational efforts make a contribution. However, the largest number of the at-risk population is served by the Oakland School District, and there are indications that district-wide test scores are improving and that at-risk youth are benefiting.

The school district goal is to meet national averages on test scores by 1990... by raising the average percentile score three points per year. While this level of improvement has not been achieved, test scores on the CTBS have generally sustained a dogged uphill climb over the last three years. There is a marked difference between scores on the reading and on the math portions of the CTBS in Oakland. Oakland has generally scored closer to the national average in math than in reading. In the last two years (1986 and 1987) the Oakland average percentile in math has exceeded the national average. While the Oakland average percentiles for the reading tests still lag the national averages, with few exceptions the yearly district averages by grade level are climbing.

The picture is less clear on a school-by-school basis. Test scores are generally lower in schools with high proportions of youth from AFDC families. If the district's focus on basics is working, test scores in these sites will have improved. The data suggest that this is happening in some high AFDC schools but not in others. At the junior high and middle school level percentile gains (and declines) from 1985 to 1986 in CTBS reading test scores are spread fairly evenly between high and low AFDC schools. This suggests that schools with high portions of at-risk
youth are benefiting from the district's overall improvement program. At the high school levels all the schools but one shared in the 1985 to 1986 district-wide CTBS reading percentile gains, including Castlemont with 96.7 percent AFDC and 95.4 percent black students. McClymonds (97.5% AFDC and 94.1% black) experienced a slight decline in reading, but shared in district gains in math scores. The largest gains were at Oakland Technical (41.9% AFDC, 43.3% black and 43.2% Asian) and Skyline (2.2% AFDC, 40.3% white and 41.9% black). Unfortunately we do not have 1987 CTBS data on a school basis and therefore are unable to follow the pattern further. However, the 1985 to 1986 gains data support a finding that the district improvements are taking hold and are benefiting at-risk youth.

Table . Summary of Programs and Service Levels.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th># Served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JTPA School Year Program</td>
<td>WEX</td>
<td>a few</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTPA Regular Summer Prog.</td>
<td>20 hrs LMI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>180 hrs WEX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTPA Special Tutoring Prog.</td>
<td>3wks prep, 3wks tutoring</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Application Prog.</td>
<td>remedial math and reading</td>
<td>9500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited English Assistance</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sch. Dist. WEX Prog.</td>
<td>Sch. credit for jobs</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necessary &amp; Continuation Sch.</td>
<td>Alternative HS + Soc. servs</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity School</td>
<td>Jr HS and social services</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyesis Centers</td>
<td>HS for pregnant teens</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen Temple Babtist</td>
<td>Sch. yr. math &amp; science tutoring</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summer math &amp; science tutoring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopt-A-School</td>
<td>Volunteer Tutoring, speakers, and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a variety of other enhancement experiences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(33 schools)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcus Foster Institute</td>
<td>School to work transition,</td>
<td>100-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role Models, scholarships, and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>small grants to teachers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland Alliance</td>
<td>Tutoring, career awareness, and</td>
<td>75-300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>placement. (Step Ahead)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volunteer speakers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What is the Direction of Change? ...the School District.

The direction of change in the school system is positive. When Oakland School District people talk about change in regards to services for at-risk youth they focus on the current financial situation of the district and the Superintendent's drastic reassignment of central office staff. The reassignment is designed to concentrate staff resources on basic educational needs, thus reducing the need for special programs. It was unclear this summer how most of the current special at-risk programs in the district (alternative schools, work experience, etc.) would be affected. Some of the people we spoke to were waiting reassignment and did not know how their programs would operate in the fall. In short, people were concerned with retaining their special program status, and their current resource levels, rather than with new program designs.

Uncertainty still pervades the situation. Staff have been reassigned to schools and classrooms, but programs have not been eliminated— they have just been left in limbo. Our present impression is that it will be another month or so before the situation is sorted out. But the perspective is encouraging for 9-15 year old at-risk youth.

One of Coto's most exciting new initiatives is the proposal to pull together many of the district's at-risk efforts under one coordinated At-Risk Program. Still very much in the development stage, a presentation on the concept was made to the Board in late September. At-risk activities would be drawn together into a Prevention Unit, a Maintenance Unit, and a Recovery Unit. The Prevention Unit would be responsible for remediation activities, re-entry, stay-in-school efforts, drug abuse prevention, dropout prevention, work experience and youth employment. The Maintenance Unit would be responsible for the special continuation and opportunity schools, attendance, teen pregnancy efforts, and home and hospital education programs. The Recovery Unit would be responsible for agency placement of students and support of youth in the juvenile justice system. If adopted, this initiative holds great promise for at-risk youth.

What is the Direction of Change? ...the Partnerships.

The private and partnership efforts in Oakland lack coordination and have many hurdles to climb, but the seeds of a more significant involvement with the problems of at-risk youth have been sown and change is in the wind. In one sense the parts of this partnership network are presently much stronger than the whole, because the individual players appear to do more on their own than in concert. There is some grumbling that the corporations need to get more performance from the contributions they have made; that the schools take the money but don't perform, and that both the Oakland Alliance and the Marcus Foster
Institute need to get their acts together. The School Board gets little respect in the business community. Informants say that district support for the corporate volunteer efforts is irregular; that good efforts have floundered when the district didn't provide its part of a bargain.

Some recent attempts at coordinated action have been disheartening. A business effort to save the Oakland Skill Center didn't get very far. Superintendent Coto's attempt to use a blue ribbon business advisory committee to evaluate the business management practices of the district failed when the committee balked at the request that the evaluation be completed in eight weeks.

There is also some healthy self criticism coming from the business community. Some see the Chamber as too tied up in "old boy" politics to be effective in the face of the social realities of Oakland; the business community has to make a serious commitment because the future workers to fill the glass towers are in the Oakland schools. Figures on business dollar contributions are hard to come by, but it's clear we are talking about thousands rather than millions. Business has not come up with the money to turn the schools around and business effort in the political arena for school tax support has been half hearted. Racism and a blatant lack of EEO in some firms, and even in some areas of city government, are said to undermine broader cooperative efforts.

Finally we come to the question of the role of JTPA in the future programming for 9-15 year old at-risk youth. JTPA is a small direct service funder in this arena. Most of its current resources are already deployed in programs for adults and older at-risk youth which are focused on employment outcomes. As we have seen, the PIC is funding about 100 summer tutoring slots and 400 summer work experience slots for at-risk 9-15 year olds. The PIC and the City are also reexamining their youth policies. Service providers and OBOs are involved in this reexamination, and will undoubtedly have to look at the relationship of its agenda and that of the School District. We can offer no prediction as to where this will lead.

A related issue is what role the PIC might play as a catalyst in jelling a coordinated approach by the loose network of corporate partnership players, to the at-risk problem in the schools. The PIC has funded the Oakland Alliance for a small project dealing with older youth at a time when the Alliance needs resources. Could this entry portend more links between the network of corporate partners and the PIC? Could these links lead to emergence of the PIC as a focal point for corporate commitments to the schools? Anything could happen but at this stage of our understanding of the situation in Oakland it doesn't look likely that the PIC will lead a corporate charge. It seems more likely that the individual firms will link up in small nodes around effective projects and increase their efforts as the school district becomes more effective and accountable.
Despite the problems there are also ideas in the business community as to what is needed to focus the corporate partners effectively on the at-risk problem, including:

. A commitment to expand and improve some of the partnership programs that are working like the Adopt-A-School and Role Models programs.

. A strong commitment by local firms to hire local kids and to provide training and remediation in-house.

. A concerted effort to learn how to help, but not intrude in the schools; sponsoring training in new skills areas where the schools have no existing programs is one idea.

. A campaign to develop an encompassing post secondary scholarship program (similar to the Cleveland program) that covers all of Oakland's kids.

The Navy experience offers some more specific lessons for improving the adopt-a-school efforts:

. Central school district support and recognition is important and helps move the program forward, but the best way to administer the program is to have the commanding officer of the adopting unit (read company executive) work directly with the individual school principal or coordinator. This helps to better focus the program on the individual needs of the school and the capacities of the adopting unit.

. Volunteers must really be volunteers... participation can't be forced. In the Navy program uniformed personnel get to feel that they belong to the community through participation in the program, and letters of appreciation from the Admiral (read company president) help, but the key is to recruit people who get personal satisfaction from helping kids and who are professional and take pride in their work.

What is the Direction of Change? ... What's Needed.

During the course of our work some of Oakland's present and past educators offered suggestions for increasing the impact of the remedial programs focused on the "most seriously at-risk" of Oakland's 9-15 year olds: Youth with problems in addition to being poor and behind in school. The impact of remedial efforts could be increased for at-risk youth with severe behavioral, social, drug, and abuse problems if some of the following principles and changes were applied:
Special social services for dealing with problems that are interfering with the educational process are essential to any remediation effort targeted to these youth. Social services need to be budgeted for any educational remediation effort.

Regular teacher/student ratios (about 1/32) do not permit the individual attention and extra help that at-risk youth require.

Educational support for heritage and identity development is important, but academic success is the key to success in these and other areas. Academic success requires specific instructional programs, high standards and a commitment to the belief that all children can learn.

Bilingual education requirements put significant burdens on poor districts with a large variety of immigrants and refugees. Either some new limits on service, or extraordinary federal/state funding support is needed to meet this burden.

Although there is wide agreement on the need to focus on at-risk youth, there is less agreement on the idea of separation of the most seriously at-risk youth from the rest of their peers. Separation into special schools and classrooms, some argue, allows the educational process to begin; stigmatization is the least serious problem of these youth. (Oakland "separates" at present.) Few would disagree that special social services for dealing with the problems that are interfering with the educational process (drugs, abuse, pregnancy etc.) are easier to administer (and should be easier to get) in a special school/classroom environment, but others (Dr. Ruth Love for one) feel that isolation is not good, even for the purpose of delivery of social services.

* * * * * * *

Both the educational and the JTPA structures have policy frameworks and programs which encompass our study group. The JTPA framework deals only with 14-15 year olds as per the legislation. The program framework of the Unified School District encompasses the total group. Both systems are aware of and cooperate with the efforts of the other. Both systems are undergoing change. The JTPA system is slowly rethinking its overall approach to youth. The partnership network may be ready for a wider role. The school system is digesting radical changes in State funding by reorganizing and downsizing central office special programs and redeploying staff positions to the classroom. Because the school system is so much larger than the JTPA and the partnership efforts, and the school system is undergoing so much change, it will define how most of the at-risk 9-15 year old youth will be served and how well the contributions of other groups will be utilized.
Education and Employment Services for 9-15 Year Old Youth "At-Risk" in Philadelphia

Richard H. de Lone
for
MDC, Inc.
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
Background

Approximately 140,000 young people, aged 9 to 15, live in Philadelphia (pop 1.7 million). Of these some 97,000 attend the city's public schools, with the remainder in the city's unusually large and well-developed Roman Catholic and other private school systems. Some 76% of public school students are from minority families (6% black, 9% Hispanic), and over 40% come from households receiving public assistance. The public schools are the "default" system of choice for youth at-risk, although approximately 10% of Catholic school students meet Federal tests for educational disadvantage.

The percentage of public school youth "at risk" is large but somewhat problematic to calculate. Depending upon relative weight given to income or to test scores, and depending upon which test scores one believes (the school system's new tests, its old tests, or the state's tests), somewhere between one-third and two-thirds of youth can be called "at risk". If one takes as a reasonable measure the percentage of youth who drop out of school (40-45%) plus the percentage of graduates who are inactive (neither in the labor force, in school nor in the military) a year after graduation (13%), 50% is about the right percentage--i.e., about 50,000 9-to-15-year olds in the public schools will face severe problems in the school-to-work transition if current patterns continue. (Another 8,000 9-to-15 year old parochial school students can be estimated for a grand total of 58,000).

In the 1970's, the public schools of Philadelphia were in crisis, marked by minor corruption, major budget deficits, recurrent teacher strikes and declining enrollment, sped by the flight to independent schools of middle class parents of all races. In the past five years a new superintendent and Board of Education have stabilized the budget, improved labor relations, initiated a number of educational reforms and begun to restore public confidence in the public schools.

In the city itself, the 1970's were a troubled economic period, with substantial job loss, primarily in the manufacturing sector, and high unemployment. There has been a rebound in the 1980's, during which a strong and growing services sector has created a strong local economy and relatively low unemployment rates.

Youth at-risk, however, are concentrated heavily in inner
city communities which have not reaped many benefits from the growing economy. In fact, there is evidence that the neighborhoods in which they live are more devastated, more segregated by race and income, and less capable of sustaining "grassroots" improvement efforts than ever before.

Services

There are significant efforts underway in the city and the School District to address the education and employment needs of older teen-agers, but little special attention has been given to the needs of the 9-to-15 year-old group.

In the schools, some programs for high school students serve 14 and 15 year-olds, but overall, except for the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act's Chapter I remedial education services, very few programs or services are targeted specifically at this group. Rather, insofar as their needs are addressed, they are addressed through general school reform: implementation of a standardized curriculum, tougher promotion standards, summer school for students who fail to be promoted, and movement underway to switch from a predominant K-6-3-3 mode of school organization to a "middle school"-based 4-4-4 system deemed more appropriate to early adolescents, and various efforts at individual school improvement.

Special services and linkages to strengthen the basic academic skills and develop knowledge and attitudes helpful in the subsequent school to work transition are limited for "at risk" 9 to 15 year-olds:

- Chapter I remedial programs have a demonstrated and documented history of failure, with some exceptions noted.

- Other than Title IIb summer jobs programs, which emphasize remedial education for 14 and 15 year-olds, there is no broad scale service of this group by the PIC or JTPA.

- Career education, development and counseling programs are, as a recent joint school/business study concluded, underdeveloped, with no more 25% of students receiving them.

- The PIC and the state employment service have recently become involved in a partnership program with the schools, but it serves primarily older youth.

- Some community-based agencies, settlement houses and voluntary organizations do offer services to this age group, including tutoring, counseling and enrichment activities, but programs are few and far between, with little solid evaluation of effectiveness.

- Most youth advocacy and most special programs for at-risk
youth in Philadelphia are concentrated either on older teens or on special population subsets: e.g., adjudicated youth, abused and neglected children, where the City is experiencing a crisis in both quantity and quality of service.

Recommendations

Despite the relatively paucity of current services to the population of concern, there are some promising developments upon which to build.

For older (14 and 15 year-old) members of the age range, the High School Academies program, a school/business partnership now providing alternative vocational education options for some 1,600 disadvantaged youth, has a documented track record of improving school retention and post-graduate employment of participants.

The early results of another school/business partnership which also involves the PIC and the state employment service, the Education for Employment Initiative of the Committee to Support Philadelphia Public Schools, shows powerful promise for reducing drop-out rates and improving school performance and retention of highly "at risk" youth, including some 14 and 15-year olds.

The School District has preliminary evidence that middle schools (serving grades 5 through 8) are considerably more educationally effective than junior high schools (serving grades 7 through 9), and is planning to expand middle schools while experimenting with the most effective approaches to education for the early adolescents who attend them.

The School District also believes that delivery of Chapter I remedial education services to entire school populations, as an integral component of the basic education program, is producing far better results than "standard" Chapter I services, which involve pulling selected students out of regular classes for remediation. The system is seeking regulatory changes to permit broader application of the more effective approaches, which are now constrained to less than 10% of Chapter I eligible students.

A number of school officials and others also advocate expansion of career education and career development programs. In theory, these are available to all students from kindergarten through 12th grade, but in practice they are offered to only a small percentage.

In addition, there are a number of examples of community-based or voluntary agency programs which have a good reputation and make conceptual sense, although most lack systematic evaluation. Key themes of these programs are providing individualized tutoring, counseling, and family involvement/intervention, as well as experiences which broaden student horizons (trips, interaction with "role models", etc). In some cases, it appears possible to expand such services to youth
after school or in the summer at relatively low additional cost, with overhead supports provided by existing agencies. However, major expansion would require basic investment in new capacity development.

Finally, school officials believe that a concerted effort to link health and social service systems to the schools is desirable to address the many non-educational impediments to learning which large numbers of "at-risk" youth face.

Potentially, Private Industry Councils and their subcontractors could play a role in expanding after school and summer services to 9- to 15-year-old youth, as well as in forging service linkages to the schools. However, it would take both a major revamping of JTPA legislation and a major reorientation of the local PIC to realize this potential. In Philadelphia, it is not clear that in the long run the JTPA-delivery system offers significant advantages for serving this population.

It is estimated that an additional $90 million a year would be required to fund the type of supports for at-risk 9- to 15-year-old youth suggested. It is unclear that Federal dollars could or should pay the whole bill, but a number of areas for Federal initiative are suggested, including:

- Funding demonstration, evaluation and dissemination activities.
- Regulatory reform, especially of Chapter I of E.C.I.A., to provide greater flexibility in local use of these funds (with a quid pro quo of meeting performance requirements.
- Requiring relevant HHS and DOL-funded programs to work closely with the schools.
I. INTRODUCTION

Approximately 140,000 young people, aged 9 to 15, live in Philadelphia (pop 1.7 million). Of these some 97,000 attend the city's public schools, with the remainder in the city's unusually large and well-developed Roman Catholic and other private school systems. Some 76% of public school students are from minority families (64% black, 9% Hispanic), and over 40% come from households receiving public assistance. The public schools are the "default" system of choice for youth at-risk, although approximately 10% of Catholic school students meet Federal tests for educational disadvantage.

The percentage of public school youth "at risk" is large but somewhat problematic to calculate. Depending upon relative weight given to income or to test scores, and depending upon which test scores one believes (the school system's new tests, its old tests, or the state's tests), somewhere between one-third and two-thirds of youth can be called "at risk". If one takes as a reasonable measure the percentage of youth who drop out of school (40-45%) plus the percentage of graduates who are inactive (neither in the labor force, in school nor in the military) a year after graduation (13%), 50% is about the right percentage--i.e., about 50,000 9-to-15-year olds in the public schools will face severe problems in the school-to-work transition if current patterns continue. (Another 8,000 9-to-15 year old parochial school students can be estimated for a grand total of 58,000).

Except for the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act's Chapter I remedial education services, very few programs or services are targeted specifically at this group. Rather, insofar as their needs are addressed, they are addressed through overall school reform: implementation of a standardized curriculum, tougher promotion standards, summer school for students who fail to be promoted, and movement underway to switch from a predominant K6-3-3 mode of school organization to a "middle school"-based 4-4-4 system deemed more appropriate to early adolescents, and various efforts at individual school improvement.

Special services and linkages to strengthen the basic academic skills and develop knowledge and attitudes helpful in the subsequent school to work transition are limited for "at risk" 9 to 15 year-olds:
Chapter 1 remedial programs have a demonstrated and documented history of failure.

Other than Title IIb summer jobs programs, which emphasize remedial education for 14 and 15 year-olds, there is no broad scale service of this group by the PIC or JTPA.

Career education, development and counseling programs are, as a recent joint school/business study concluded, underdeveloped.

The state employment service has recently become involved in a partnership program with the schools, but it primarily serves older youth.

Some community-based agencies, settlement houses and voluntary organizations do offer services to this age group, but programs are few and far between.

Most youth advocacy and most special programs for at-risk youth in Philadelphia are concentrated either on older teens or on special population subsets: e.g., adjudicated youth, abused and neglected children, where the City is experiencing a crisis in both quantity and quality of service.

However, there are several proven and growing partnership programs in Philadelphia focused on education for employment, reform of vocational education and drop-out prevention. While focused primarily on high school youth, these serve some students in grades 7 through 10 and have potential as "models"; the PIC is placing increased emphasis on remedial education and has expanded linkages with the schools in the past two years; and School District officials, while not convinced that special programs are needed for "at-risk" 9-to-15 year-old youth (as distinct from overall school improvement efforts) have some thoughts on regulatory changes which might make Chapter 1 programs more effective and in the past two years have experimented with alternative modes of delivering Chapter 1 remediation which show some early signs of payoff.

II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM

A) Context

1. The City

Like most older eastern cities, Philadelphia experienced significant losses of population and jobs in the 1970's--losses related to the decline of manufacturing which was once the backbone of its economy. But in the 1980's, the service sector has boomed and hi-tech is growing. Unemployment in the metropolitan...
area has dropped below 5%, and the business pages report a labor shortage in some industries and locations in the region. This economic expansion and its benefits have been distributed unevenly, however. Most job growth has been outside the city, where, in an historic shift, most of the population of the metropolitan area and most of the jobs are now located. According to the 1980 census, 38% of Philadelphia's residents are black, 58% white and the rest "other". Hispanic's are estimated to comprise about 5% of the city's population.

In 1986, 420,000 city residents received some form of public assistance (roughly 25% of the population). Unemployment in the city is higher than in the suburbs (7%), and is disproportionately born by black and Hispanic persons, with black unemployment standing at 12% (based on 1985 data) and black youth unemployment at c. 35-40%. By limited educational attainment and by location, low-income youth are poorly positioned to compete for the better paying jobs in the growth sector of the area's economy.

Despite a comparatively robust economy, particularly healthy in the downtown business district, the city's heavy concentration of low-income families leaves it with fragile and severely strained local tax base. Local wage, real estate and other taxes make Philadelphia's citizens and business among the most heavily taxed in the country. Children and youth do not fare well in the competition for local tax dollars. The School District, for example, receives a smaller part of its budget (38%) from local taxes than any other district in Pennsylvania, and health and human services in city government rely heavily on state and Federal funds.

2. The Community Context

As the economy has shifted to service jobs, with the fastest job growth occurring in the suburbs, demographic trends have heightened the dilemma of at-risk youth, especially black and Hispanic youth, in Philadelphia as in other major metropolitan areas. Essentially, both race and class segregation have intensified in the city in recent decades. Research by Ira Goldstein and William Yancy, sociologists at Temple University, has shown that residential segregation of blacks in Philadelphia has actually increased in every decade since 1930. Then, 35 percent of blacks lived in areas of the city where the persons in their immediate neighborhood were predominantly black. By the same "index of dominance", in 1980 82% of blacks lived in predominantly black neighborhoods.

Since 1970, the trend towards racial isolation in the city has been exacerbated by an exodus of middle class blacks from inner city areas. Most census tracts in North Philadelphia, the city's major "ghetto", lost between one-third and one-half of their population between 1970 and 1980. According to Dr. Theodore Hershberg, director of the University of Pennsylvania's Center...
for Philadelphia Studies, "this was not a random loss. Rather, it was working class and middle class blacks, the more stable and powerful members of the community, moving to neighborhoods on the outer ring of the city or to the suburbs".

The effect of these trends has been to leave heavy concentrations of low-income/high pathology families in the inner city, perhaps an "underclass", in neighborhoods rampant with drug abuse, among blocks and blocks of abandoned or deteriorated homes, with relatively few intrinsic leaders left with the energy or skills to organize the community or maintain the strong neighborhood and community-based organizations which, 20 years ago, were widespread in North Philadelphia and other inner city neighborhoods. Those organizations which do remain are predominantly concerned with job training or housing development. Both of these are activities for which various sources of public support are widely available. Such support is not widely available for youth in the 9-to-15 year age group. As a result, there is relatively little grass-roots infrastructure for youth advocacy or programming.

A common theme among youth workers is the extent to which residential segregation is accompanied by experiential deprivation. "Incredible as it may seem," said the director of ASPIRA, an Hispanic organization, "many of the kids we work with, even high school seniors, have never been to center city. Similar observations were voiced by others who emphasized that the geo-social bounds of experience create something akin to terror in many young people at the thought of applying for jobs outside their (job-poor) neighborhoods.

3) The Political Context

Housing, waste disposal, downtown development (the building of a new convention center), taxes, municipal corruption, the performance of the Mayor and his battles with a headstrong and fractious City Council have been the dominant political issues in Philadelphia for the last four years. They remain so in this election year.

Education and social services are among the second tier of concerns, including services to youth. General school improvement and youth employment have been significant parts of this agenda, attracting considerable attention from the business community as well as the press and community-at-large, as discussed below (although the 9-to-15 age group has not been a particular emphasis).

The children and youth advocacy groups which do exist in the city tend to be city-wide advocacy groups, typically with boards dominated by white middle class citizens, or voluntary agencies. These groups, in turn, tend to place primary emphasis on either general educational improvements or improving services to certain high need/high visibility subsets of the youth population: children of the homeless; children in the juvenile justice
system, and abused/neglected children in the child welfare system. Each of these areas has been in severe crisis in the last several years, punctuated by a recent series of deaths of abused and neglected children. These are, not coincidentally, also the areas where most public funding and political attention of city government officials are directed.

In sum, outside of the School District and some limited JTPA funding, relatively few resources, little organizational capacity and little political priority are available to address the developmental needs of 9-to-15 year-olds. Nor is it clear where, with the important exception of the school system, the constituency or funding might emerge to change this situation. The PIC is driven primarily by JTPA regulations and performance criteria and shows no inclination to broaden its role. The parents of this age group are powerless, and their communities are in disarray. The business community might be persuaded to place more emphasis on this group, but it is most likely to do so through working with the schools. And while the business community has considerable influence with the Mayor on economic issues, it has little ability to influence a neo-populist City Council, which (despite a strong mayor/weak council system of government) has managed to become a powerful if somewhat unpredictable--some would say irrational--force in city government.

4. The Public Schools

In the current moment in Philadelphia, it is unquestionably the school system which has the most resources and shows the greatest promise for meeting the needs of 9-to-15 year-old at-risk youth.

The School District of Philadelphia has 198,000 students and a budget of just under $1 billion. Its students are predominantly from low income, minority families; 40% live in AFDC households; test scores are below national norms and it has a high drop-out rate. Of the 24 percent of students who are white, most live and attend school in residentially-segregated sections of the city--most notably the Far Northeast. In addition to racial segregation, there is substantial segregation by class and school achievement: a large proportion of middle class and high-achieving students attend either "magnet" or other schools with academic admission standards. Between 1971 and 1983, the School District experienced 11 teacher strikes, reflecting both poor labor relations and recurring budget crises in the fiscally-dependent district. Middle class parents, black and white, abandoned the public schools in droves, sending their children either to the city's large Roman Catholic school system or to its unusually-well developed network of independent schools. This exodus, combined with declining birth rates, dropped enrollments from over 305,000 to the current level. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, the system was jarred by scandals (e.g., the superintendent accepting gifts from contractors) and professional
staff were demoralized by a system of ethnic patronage which governed promotions: with little effort to disguise the fact, administrative appointments were divvied up among black, Italian, Irish, and Jewish personnel, each of whom had formed an ethnic professional association to lobby for its share of the pie, and each of which possessed an "angel" or two of the same ethnic background on the Board of Education.

School Board members are appointed by the mayor to staggered terms. Between 1979 and 1983, Mayor William Green, a "good government" mayor gained control of the Board of Education. In late 1983, the Board bought out the contract of the then superintendent and named Dr. Constance E. Clayton, one of the few administrators whose reputation had survived the 1970's unsullied, as the superintendent of schools. Dr. Clayton inherited a $100 million budget deficit, faced a new round of teacher contract negotiations in 1985, and oversaw a staff demoralized to be associated with what had become dubbed by a searing series in the city's major newspaper as "the shame of our schools." Educationally, she was confronted by what she called "curricular anarchy": a system with no standards, low student expectations, and curricular offerings which varied from school to school, depending primarily upon what the teachers and principals at each building felt like teaching. On the California Achievement Tests, which were used through 1983, one-third of elementary school students scored below the 16th percentile, and then things got worse. Half of eighth graders scored below the 16th percentile and despite a high dropout rate, fully two-thirds of 12th graders performed below it (roughly an eighth grade reading level equivalent).

Under Dr. Clayton's powerful leadership in the past four years, there has been a marked turnaround. The budget now shows a modest surplus; there have been no strikes; a strict exam system of merit appointments to administrative jobs has been installed, and a program of educational reform is being implemented, based on the superintendent's oft-stated conviction that "all children can learn" and will respond to high expectations. This program is generally consistent with the so-called "excellence" movement nationally, and is reinforced by state education reforms which have stressed tougher graduation requirements. The major building blocks of this program are:

- Adoption of a "standardized curriculum" for grades K-12, consisting of a fairly detailed set of objectives which teachers are expected to cover (and students to learn) in each subject at each grade level.

- Adoption of a curriculum-referenced testing program, keyed to the objectives of the standardized curriculum. (This testing program replaced the CAT's in 1984. Some items in the test are drawn from norm-referenced pools and school officials believe they permit extrapolation from local test scores to national norms. The testing program to date covers only grades 1 through 8).
o Establishment of promotion standards (passing grades in at least 3 of 4 major subjects in each grade) replacing social promotion and establishing tougher requirements for graduation.

o Re-institution of a large summer school program to provide remediation and a second chance for those not promoted in June.

The superintendent's tough management and "get tough" approach to education have won widespread support. The Board of Education typically approves her recommendations unanimously; editorial praise has been constant; and in three years her salary has been raised from $86,000 to $100,000 without so much as a peep of public protest. Further, there have been large gains in scores on the curriculum-referenced tests which seem to indicate the program is working (although, as will be discussed, these gains have not shown up on a different set of state-mandated tests). Finally, there are small but significant signs of a return of the middle class to the public schools, detected as transfers into "magnet" schools at the secondary level and larger than expected enrollment increases in the early grades. The business community has provided strong backing to the superintendent. Through the Committee to Support Philadelphia Public Schools, whose members include chief executives of ten of the city's largest firms, six college presidents and two foundation heads, it has organized programs with a cash budget in excess of $3.5 million a year (plus considerable in-kind support) for teacher training, management assistance and services to youth, including a growing emphasis on education for employment of "at risk" youth, as will be described.

Despite these considerable positive signs, there is a long way to go in raising student achievement and graduation rates, as we shall see. Further, there are two developments of particular significance for "at risk" youth. First, the steady growth of magnet schools and others with admission standards have, in the view of many principals, sapped the comprehensive high schools (and some junior highs) of their most talented students, leaving behind an unleavened mass of low achievers ("at risk youth"). In this respect, school system policies seem to reify the demographic trends which strip inner-city neighborhoods of leadership. Secondly, added academic course requirements—which forced the high schools to lengthen what was traditionally the shortest school day in the country—have tended to squeeze out vocational courses and other career-oriented electives. While some applaud this, arguing that a good academic education is the best preparation for work, others fear it will short-change students who do not go on to post-secondary education (roughly 50% of graduates), especially students "at risk" who lack the
the basic skills to benefit from increased academic offerings. 1

5. The PIC, other Public and Private Resources

In 1981, recently-elected Mayor Wilson Goode abolished the city's Office of Employment and Training, which had been heavy in staff and light on performance, and placed all JTPA management functions in the hands of the non-profit Private Industry Council. With a staff one-third the size of the old city office, a president recruited from industry, and informal oversight by the Greater Philadelphia First Corp., the city's blue-ribbon business civic association (which supplements the salary of the PIC director), the PIC has doubled the number of JTPA placements and meets or exceeds all Federal performance standards. The PIC also operates the city's summer job program, which merges JTPA Title II-B funds with corporate dollars and private sector (unsubsidized) job development. The summer program serves over 3,000 14 and 15-year old youth. Driven by JTPA performance standards, the PIC generally requires an eighth grade reading level or above for admission to its training programs and most of its youth services consist of relatively low cost job readiness training and placement programs. Like some other private industry councils, the PIC initially found it difficult to achieve service of 40% youth in II-A programs, which is among its reasons for having begun to develop closer linkages with the school system (primarily, however, to serve high school youth). More recently, the PIC has been able to achieve the 40% level, but PIC officials are concerned that relatively few minority teen-age males are being reached.

Most community-based organizations providing education or employment services to youth are supported by the PIC or by the privately-funded Foundation Collaborative, which operates year-round subsidized employment programs for low-income students. Outside of the schools and summer jobs, however, relatively few remedial education or employment-oriented services are available for 14 to 15-year olds (and less for 9 to 12 year olds). There are few resources available to support such activities outside the public schools, and by and large the city government and the civic community have given much greater attention to the education and employment needs of older youth and adults.

1 This issue does not effect the system's 4 vocational-technical high schools or the High School Academies program, discussed below, which have a longer school day and manage both a full academic program and vocational offerings.
B) Scope of the "At-Risk" Problem

It is readily apparent that a very large proportion of Philadelphia public school students are "at risk", but variability of definitions and limitations of data make it difficult to develop a precise estimate of what is, after all, a probabilistic classification with inherently fuzzy boundaries.

One approach is to define the numbers "at risk" as those eligible to receive Federally-funded Chapter I services. Overall, 69,000 public school students and 8,250 non-public school students (almost all from the 89,000-pupil Catholic school system) received either Chapter I reading or math assistance in 1987. That is, 34.8% of public school students and 9.3% of parochial school students. Roughly half of Chapter I students (39,000) are in grades 4 through 10, which approximate the grade levels of the 9-to-15 year old population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>% Eligible (Reading)</th>
<th>% Eligible (Math)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 5</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 6</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 7</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 8</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 9</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 10</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (4-10)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: Schools with > 40% poor students.
Individual eligibility in grades 4-8 requires below 50th percentile on norm-referenced tests. In grades 9 and 10, below 25th percentile.
To be Chapter I eligible under Federal regulations, a student must attend a school in which at least 40% of the students are from households with incomes below the poverty line (a qualification met by 150 of the 276 public schools in Philadelphia). Under local allocation rules, students in grades 1 through 8 must score below the 50th percentile on the norm-referenced section of the School District's testing program. In grades 9 through 12, the cut-off is sharper: they must score below the 25th percentile. It is notable, however, that under prevailing eligibility definitions, most of the students enrolled in schools eligible for Chapter I are themselves eligible by virtue of test scores below the cut-off, as indicated in Table I. That is, if Chapter I eligibility is viewed as defining "risk", most students are at risk in Philadelphia schools serving substantial concentrations of low-income youth.

Note that in most grades eligibility for reading remediation exceeds eligibility for math remediation. Note further that despite a slight downward trend in percentage of students eligible from grades four through eight, the percentage rises in grades nine and ten despite more stringent eligibility requirements.

However, Chapter I eligibility is an imperfect criterion for determining the number of students at risk. It excludes "at-risk" youth who do not attend schools with a heavy concentration of low-income students and it applies substantially different criteria in the ninth and tenth grades. Test scores offer a more nearly universal—and hence, potentially preferable—measure of risk, assuming one can determine an appropriate cut-off point. Unfortunately, conflicting evidence from various tests muddle the picture. The School District publishes test scores in four nationally norm-referenced percentile ranges. The lowest range comprises students who score below the 16th percentile: i.e., they are one standard deviation below the norm of a presumed national sample. While more stringent a measure than Chapter I eligibility, in terms of test scores, this seems an intuitively reasonable measure of risk. One would, of course, expect 16 percent of students to fall in this range. Under its three-year old (and still evolving) new testing program, Philadelphia publishes test scores for grades one through eight only. In 1986, only 14 percent of students in grades four through eight scored below the 16th percentile, (a low of 12 percent of fifth graders and a high of 17 percent of eighth graders). Another 30 percent score between the 17th and 49th percentile, and 36 percent at the 50th percentile or above. Thus, while scores lag somewhat below the national norm, this measure would lead one to believe that slightly less than the "normal" percentage of youth are at risk, which strains credulity.

Recall that in 1983, 33% of Philadelphia elementary school students scored below the 16th percentile on the California Achievement Tests, a figure that rose to 50% in eighth grade and nearly 66% in 12th grade. In 1984, the first year of the city's
new testing program, 27% of students in grades 4 through 8 scored below the 16th percentile. Either the School District has made mammoth gains in three years, especially among its weakest students, or the latest score gains are in part an artifact of the new testing program. Since the new tests are curriculum-referenced for the most part, and use selected items drawn from the test-makers norm-referenced item banks to project national norm scores, there is clear possibility (though no demonstrated certainty) that the improvement is in some (unknown) measure an artifact of the new testing procedure.

This possibility is reinforced by two other sources of data. First, the percentage of students scoring below the 16th percentile on Philadelphia's tests tracks fairly closely the percentage who fail to meet promotion standards (prior to summer school attendance). This constitutes prima facie (if somewhat weak) evidence that Philadelphia's projected national norm scores are really locally-normed scores.

Secondly, and more significantly, the state of Pennsylvania requires testing of all third, fifth and eighth grade students to determine eligibility for state remediation funds, using a test constructed of items from the Iowa basic skills test. The percentage of students in Philadelphia eligible for remediation (i.e., those who fall below an established cut-off score) has not changed significantly in three years. This year, for example, better than 60% of students tested were rated as requiring remediation in reading, and over 55% were rated as requiring remediation in mathematics. (See Table II).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE II: Philadelphia Students Requiring Remediation on State TELLS Test</th>
<th>(Percentages by grade, subject)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 3</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 5</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade 8</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the state test is not norm-referenced, it is notable that statewide less than 25% of students scored below the cut-off in reading and less than 20% did so in math, indicating that Philadelphia students score far below state norms.
Beyond poverty and test scores, other possible indicators of risk include behavior problems, truancy, mental retardation, learning disabilities, limited English proficiency (which is presumably captured in reading test scores), and abused and neglected children. However, none of these measures is all inclusive, and neither truancy nor behavior problems are widespread among the younger age groups. It is notable, however, that approximately 10,600 Philadelphia students are enrolled full-time in special education programs, with another 13,000 receiving some special education services (exclusive of programs for the gifted). The majority of these are diagnosed as mildly retarded or learning disabled (the latter category defined primarily by low test scores. If one adds to special education students delinquent juveniles under supervision of the courts (approximately 10,000 a year, of whom most are over 15) and court dependents (abused and neglected children at roughly 8,000 a year, including 4,500 in foster care placements), it is clearly that the number of severely "at-risk" youth is vast, although these numbers are "apples and oranges" which cannot be summed in any straightforwards way. Further, both the quantity and quality of services to these ultra high-risk youth is in question. Although not a focus of this case study, overcrowding and uneven programming in juvenile justice facilities, sub-par conditions in group homes, and a general paucity of services to both delinquent youth and abused or neglected children who remain with their families have been major concerns of child advocacy organizations and subject of a long string of press accounts in the past several years.

One other way to assess risk is through historical data, especially drop-out and unemployment data. Such rates cannot, of course, be validly extrapolated to current youth without making the probably flawed assumption that present students will not do any better in school or in the transition to work than past students. On the other hand, given strong and persistent correlations between family income and educational outcomes, historical data have considerable merit as a benchmark. A recent School District study which attempted to account for transfers to other school systems concluded that the class 9.8% of high school students (grades 9 to 12) dropped out ion 1985-- which compounds to a cumulative drop-out rate of roughly 36%. However, 1986-7 School District data suggests slightly higher drop-out rates and independent studies have pegged the drop-out rate in Philadelphia as high as 45%. A 1984 study by ASPIRA found a 55% drop-out rate for Hispanics students. Further, a study of a sample of 1985 graduates showed that one year after graduation, 13% of graduates (i.e., 7% of the pre-dropout cohort) were neither employed, nor attending a post-secondary school nor in the military. If one assumes for sake of argument that all the dropouts and all the youth "inactive" a year after graduation will have continuing difficulty competing in the workforce, one concludes that about 50% of Philadelphia public school students experience serious difficulty in the school to work transition.
While this number is far from an unflawed estimate, it has the rough and ready virtue of being about midway between the various estimates of the population "at risk" according to the widely varying, problematic and not strictly comparable poverty and test score measures reviewed above.

As this discussion should have made clear, there is no easy way to estimate the percentage of students in Philadelphia who are "at risk". It is equally clear, however, that one is dealing with a large number, concentrated primarily in race/income segregated public schools, and that in many inner city schools, the great majority of students, for all intents and purposes, can be classified as "at risk."

Finally, it is important to note that there are elusive, hard-to-quantify but clearly critical qualitative dimensions of the youth at-risk problem. While good overall data are lacking, it is clear that high percentages of youth educationally at-risk also have health problems, lack access to health care, and come from families whose own problems—unemployment, poor-housing, alcoholism, mental health problems, illiteracy, and a whole litany of problems—have severely eroded their ability to support their children's development (Philadelphia Citizens for Children and Youth, 1983). While the superintendent and other school officials want to focus on their core business, education, and avoid the notion that schools can solve all problems, they are keenly aware that unless some of the problems children do bring with them into the classroom are ameliorated, their ability to learn is harshly constrained. Closer linkages with health and social service providers are being sought by the schools to permit a coordinated attack on this issue.
III. REMEDIATION AND CAREER EDUCATION OPTIONS: PROGRAMS AND RESULTS

This section summarizes the major programmatic options for 9-to-15 year-old youth at risk in Philadelphia and reviews the (generally scanty) evidence on their effectiveness. Both remedial education programs and programs of career education or awareness, job readiness training, work experience and other employment-related services are discussed. Programs are grouped under four headings: 1) School District programs; 2) PIC programs; 3) Community-based programs and 4) Partnership programs. The last draw on resources of the private sector, as well as the schools, PIC, employment service, other public agencies and community-based organizations.

1. School District programs

a) Chapter I remedial education

As noted, Chapter I provides remedial services in reading or mathematics to 69,000 public school students and 8,250 parochial school students, of whom roughly 38,000 are enrolled in grades four through 10, at a total cost of $49 million per year. (Some state and local funds are also allotted to remediation, primarily to provide remediation to students not eligible for Chapter I).

Most Chapter I funds have been spent on "pull-out" programs—either small classes of Chapter I students taught by remedial specialist teachers or individual tutoring. According to the director of research and evaluation for the School District, evaluations of these "pull-out" programs have consistently failed to show any significant improvements in student achievement, as measured by standardized tests. They are unpopular with classroom teachers, who find it disruptive to have students removed from regular classes for remedial purposes, and, as one administrator put it, because of their documented failure, they are "high on the superintendent's hit list."

In past year, the School District has begun to experiment with different modes of delivering Chapter I services, within regulatory constraints which limit flexibility. Two alternatives show some promise:

- "Schoolwide projects" for which Chapter I funds can be spent when 75% of students in a school are Chapter I eligible and the School District provides matching funds for the balance.

- Smaller classes, achieved by pairing two standard-sized classes of 30 within which at least one-third of students are Chapter I eligible, and breaking them into three classes of 20, one of which consists of all-
Chapter I-eligible students taught by a teacher paid with Chapter I funds.

Approximately 10% of Chapter I students participated in the "schoolwide projects" option in the 1986-87 school year, and 25% in the smaller classes option. Schoolwide projects vary from school to school, but generally consist of purchasing added staff: either more teachers to lower class size, more teacher aides, or provision of home-school coordinators to attempt to increase parent participation. Neither option entails any major revision in curriculum or the basic school program. Rather, the basic treatment is a lower pupil/adult ratio.

School officials are cautiously enthusiastic about these revisions to Chapter I. In their first year, both are said to have produced large test score gains, although these results have not been made public because of the short-term nature of results and a concern that they may not hold up over time.

b) "Priority One"

Under order of the Pennsylvania State Human Relations Commission, the School District has completed three years of a voluntary desegregation program. A strategy of magnet schools succeeded in desegregating about 30 schools, but with few white students, there are sharp limits to the amount of desegregation possible. Accordingly, part of the desegregation plan has been to place special emphasis on improving racially-isolated inner city elementary, middle and junior high schools—the "Priority One" schools. Private foundation grants and Chapter I funds have been the main source of support for Priority One. Many Priority One schools are using the Chapter One options described above, as well as "mastery learning" and other curriculum and teaching strategies which break the curriculum into very discrete objectives and skills, in combination with workshops which aim to increase teacher expectations of students. The main "treatment" in this somewhat diffuse effort, however, is intensive school-site planning, led by facilitators from the central administration. The planning process is supposed to produce schools which show the characteristics of "effective schools" identified by the late Ron Edmonds and other researchers: i.e., clarity of objectives, shared by principals and teachers; increased student "time on task"; a safe, orderly environment and a supportive climate for teaching and learning.

Although Priority One has suffered from poor (and constantly changing) leadership, school officials report that there are strong test score gains in Priority One schools, but they have not been made public for the same cautionary reasons as Chapter One improvement scores.

c) Conversion to Middle Schools

About 20 per cent of seventh and eighth graders in Philadelphia attend K-8 elementary schools. Another 40% attend K-
4 elementary schools and 5-8 middle schools. Most of the rest attend K-6 elementary schools and 7-9 junior high schools. According to the director of research and evaluation, internal (and not-as-yet-released) studies show that seventh and eighth grade students in K-8 and 5-8 schools have significantly better test scores and significantly lower suspension rates than students in the troubled junior high schools. Although these studies do not control for demographic variables, "eyeball" analysis leads school officials to believe that the K-8 or middle school grade organization is preferable for early adolescents, for reasons generally cited by the avatars of the middle school. (i.e., team teaching, greater flexibility of instruction, closer and more personal attention to students, teachers interested in teaching this age group, unlike junior high teachers who often prefer to teach their subject matter specialty to high school students, etc). Accordingly, within constraints posed by facilities, teacher certifications and enrollment patterns, the School District is evolving (with no fixed timetable for implementation) towards elimination of the junior high and a K8-4 or K4-4-4 grade organization.

4) Career and Vocational Education/Counseling

In theory, the School District curriculum requires a K-12 career education program. Career education is not, however, a separate course and teachers are expected to "integrate" career education topics into other subjects, progressively introducing students to an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the world of work, the range of career options and the prerequisites for entry into various careers. In practice, however, neither the executive director for career and vocational education nor any other ranking administrators believe this happens in most classrooms. The School District funds ten people as career development specialists, who are charged with training teachers to "infuse" career awareness and exploration activities into the curriculum in grades K-8. However, according to the executive director for career and vocational education, they are unable to reach more than 25% of the approximately 8,000 teachers expected to implement this "infusion" approach. As a result, there is neither sufficient training for classroom and subject matter teachers nor enforcement of the career education curriculum. A recent study of career and vocational education by a school/business task force confirmed this impression, finding that except for a modest number of career education projects funded by the Perkins Act, there is at best sporadic attention -- occasional career days and speakers from the business community-- to the subject in junior highs or high schools (Committee to Support Philadelphia Public Schools, Education for Employment Task Force, 1985). Further, under terms of the Perkins Act, career development funds must be spent primarily on disadvantaged ninth-grade students who are enrolling in approved vocational courses, a requirement which sharply limits applicability.

The largest and most coherent career development program affecting at-risk students in the 9-to-15 year-old age range is a
"career development laboratory". Approximately 2,000 junior high school students a year, accompanied by their teachers, participate in a two-day experience at this facility, where they are given aptitude tests and exposed to simulated work settings in several career clusters. Observation by the author suggests that this program is well-run and engages student interest, but the numbers served are small, the program is brief, and there is no outcome evaluation.

With the exceptions noted above, occupational counseling generally receives short shrift. The average school counselor serves a caseload of 300 students. While occupational counseling and course selection are among their putative responsibilities, school officials concede that most have little training, little inclination and less time to engage in career counseling. Rather, these counselors are concerned primarily with discipline, personal problems of students, college counseling, or, to an increasing extent, the extensive paperwork required by individual education plans for special education students.

Work experience programs and vocational education round out the career-related educational offerings of the school district. Work study and cooperative education programs are almost entirely limited to students 16 years of age and older, with roughly 2,600 co-op ed students (including the High School Academies' students discussed below) and another 1,800 receiving general work experience. The system's four vocational high schools enroll approximately 10 percent of high school students, (5,700 of 56,000 pupils), including ninth and tenth graders. These schools have a longer school day to permit both a full academic program and vocational training. They have a fairly good record: their annual drop-out rate is about 6% (compared to 14% for comprehensive high schools); recent qualitative studies suggest that most of their programs have adequate facilities, equipment and instructors (Advisory Committee on Career and Vocational Education, 1984) and that most of their graduates either go to college or obtain jobs related to their training (Office of Research and Evaluation, 1987a, b). However, these schools also have admissions criteria and return failing students to comprehensive high schools. Accordingly, while they serve many students from low-income families, they do not serve many who are academically most "at risk."

By contrast, the vocational courses offered in academic high schools do serve a substantial portion of the "at-risk" population (about one-third of comprehensive high school students enroll in at least one vocational course). But, in contrast to the vo-tech schools, these courses are widely perceived as "dumping grounds" and evaluations bear out the perception: equipment, offerings and instructors are often outdated; programs often do not meet state standards for hours of instruction in a given occupational subject; dropout rates are higher than the system average, and relatively few students gain employment in their field of study (CSPPS, 1985; Advisory Council, 1984; Office of Research, 1987c). The Office of Vocational Education
is currently considering the elimination of most of these courses, with tentative plans to replace them either with "magnet"-type programs or expansion of the High School Academies (see below).

2. Private Industry Council Programs

For the past four summers the Philadelphia Private Industry Council has operated Phil-A-Job, a summer employment program for "at-risk" youth between the ages of 14-21. During the summer of 1986 Phil-A-Job was operated in cooperation with 27 community based organizations city-wide and served close to 25,000 youth. Approximately 5,000 (or 20%) of those youth were 14 and 15 year olds. Programming for 14 year olds consisted entirely of classroom experience including basic academic skills remediation and employment oriented life skills training. Fifteen year olds participated in similar classroom instruction for two hours in addition to holding jobs. The goal of the academic remediation instruction was to help students improve their academic performance and prepare for the coming school year. The purpose of the life skills training was to have students become proficient in eight competencies including: communication, job search, completing an employment application, interviewing skills, punctuality, task completion, resume preparation, and life survival awareness. Based on 1986 Private Industry Council sixty-seven percent of 14 and 15 year-olds attained the prescribed youth competencies.

3. Community-Based Programs

As mentioned earlier in this report there are not many programming options available specifically for the 9-to-15 year old target population. Further, data on effectiveness is hard to come by. None of the programs cited here have been subject to third party evaluation, and their self-reported results appear in most cases to be estimates, not the product of systematic information collection. While the programs mentioned here are not presented as an exhaustive catalogue, they not only represent the range of services, but they have been selected because they represent the larger and seemingly better organized programming elements in what is, in fact, a rather small universe. It is notable that the first response of virtually everyone interviewed in an effort to identify non-school-based programs serving the 9-to-15 year old group was a long silence. It should also be noted that several knowledgeable observers--among them John Ruthrauf, president of the Philadelphia Foundation; Robert Schwartz, director of the Juvenile Law Center; Gerson Green, executive director of the Greater Philadelphia Federation of Settlements, Shelley Yanoff, executive of Philadelphia Citizens for Children and Youth (a major civic "watchdog" group), and Dr. Clayton, the superintendent of schools--concurred with this author's belief that the number of community-based organizations, including church groups, with the capacity to serve young people has steadily declined in the past ten to 15 years, in concert with
the general decline of civic infrastructure in inner city sections discussed earlier in this paper.

Except for the MARC, ASPIRA and Woodrock programs, which are privately supported, all of the community based programs mentioned here receive some funding from the Philadelphia Private Industry Council.

-Math Arts and Language Camps (MARC)—Greater Philadelphia Federation of Settlements

The MARC program provides after-school and summer instruction in mathematics, reading and arts and crafts for some 900 youth, five-to-13 in age. Eight different settlement houses offer the program, which has been in operation for over 20 years. The program enjoys a good reputation with School District officials and civic leaders, but unfortunately there has been no attempt to evaluate its effectiveness and no test scores or other measures of student progress are maintained. Given the rather large caveat that there are no data on effectiveness, the program does present an interesting example of an efficient and extremely low-cost approach to delivering educational supports to "at risk" youth in a community setting.

MARC serves students who are referred to it by local schools. Students are referred because of learning problems (as distinct from behavior problems). Most are from low-income families, and about 70% come from single-parent homes. During the school year, about 450 students receive after school-tutoring and small group instruction in reading and mathematics, combined with a program of arts and crafts, in settlement houses in their neighborhoods. Academic instruction is provided by certified teachers from the School District (who work for the settlement house for $9 an hour). There is one teacher for every 20 to 25 youth. In addition, settlement house staff provide arts, crafts and other activities and assist in the tutoring.

In the summertime, MARC becomes a component of day camps run by the settlements, serving up to 900 young people (including most of those served during the school year), for at least six weeks, six hours a day.

The costs of the facility, settlement house staff, and program management are absorbed by the settlements, which consider them "sunk costs"—i.e., they would have been incurred anyway. Therefore, only direct outlays for the program are for teacher salaries and materials. These average about $50 per child in the school year and $50 in the summer. As the director of the Federation of Settlements puts it: "This has to be the most cost effective education program in the world. For $100 a year, a child gets half the hours of instruction he or she would in school—and after-school care in safe, nurturing environment in the neighborhood."
Of course, there is a limit to the number of organizations with capacity to provide the overhead and supplemental staffing required for programs like MARC without being reimbursed for them. The Federation, for example, believes it could double the size of the program by simply adding more teachers, but further expansion would require support for overhead and added funding for settlement house staff. Nevertheless, the program illustrates the possibilities of providing considerable service to at-risk youth at very reasonable costs by making better use of existing community-based facilities.

- ASPIRA Clubs

The Philadelphia chapter of ASPIRA, a national organization concerned primarily with the educational, economic and political advancement of Puerto Ricans, has run leadership development programs in conjunction with the School District for 15 years. Most have served high school students, but four years ago ASPIRA completed a study of the school drop-out problem for Hispanic youth and concluded that many students exhibit the behavior (poor grades, poor attendance) which predicts school leaving as early as fourth grade. ASPIRA has begun, accordingly, to extend the concept of its program downwards. It now serves approximately 600 junior high school youth and hopes to reach lower. The program is staffed by four counselors who organize ASPIRA clubs in junior high schools. These clubs elect officers and an emphasis is placed on involving students in the planning and implementation of projects (from social events to cultural activities) as a way to develop leadership, provide motivation and teach skills (planning, budgeting) and work habits which should serve them well in school and the workplace. In addition, the counselors make home visits and provide individual counseling and educational services as needed.

ASPIRA claims that 90% of the youth it works with graduate, compared to 55% of all Hispanics. However, data are not yet available on the effectiveness of the program for junior high students. Further, since the program is voluntary, it is possible that selection bias affects results (e.g., more motivated students join clubs).

- CORA (Counseling and Referral Association)

CORA is a group counseling program that works with truant students and their families, helping them find ways to participate in the traditional school environment or assisting in identifying educational alternatives. For the most part the program deals with students who are in grades 8-11 although CORA has worked with students as young as 11 years of age. During the past academic year the program served 104 students. Seventy-six percent of the students who participated in the program decreased their number of days absent or cutting, or made a connection with a positive alternative (such as another program or employment).
- The De La Salle Vocational Program

The De La Salle program is operated under the umbrella of Catholic Social Services of Philadelphia. De La Salle is an alternative school for boys ages 14-18 who are committed to the program by the courts. Every year 175 - 200 boys continue or complete their schooling by taking regular academic work, GED preparation and vocational skills training in a number of areas including building maintenance, food services, graphic arts, auto body repair and auto mechanics. This year 60% of the participants completed their program goals, including obtaining a GED, and 23% of those eligible obtained employment.

- West Philadelphia Improvement Program

The West Philadelphia Improvement Program is a joint initiative between the West Philadelphia Partnership, a local civic organization, and the University of Pennsylvania, which is using the project as the basis of a research project. Students from West Philadelphia junior and senior high schools (ages 14-17) are provided with after school and summer jobs as an incentive to keep them in school. Close to 100 students are participating in the program this year, however, there are no evaluation results available at this time.

4. Partnership Programs

Two large partnership programs in Philadelphia focus on the education and employment needs of "at-risk" youth. While both emphasize high-school students (grades 9 -12), both also provide some service to junior high students. These are the two-year old Education for Employment Initiative of the Committee to Support Philadelphia Public Schools, which incorporates a drop-out prevention program, and the High School Academies program, a vocational education alternative for "at-risk" youth in the comprehensive high schools, which is an 18-year-old partnership of schools, business, labor and the Philadelphia Urban Coalition. The Private Industry Council is involved in both programs, as well as a large number of other governmental and community agencies.

a) Education for Employment/Drop-Out Prevention

This initiative was piloted in one high school and two junior high schools in 1986. It expanded to four high schools in the 1987 school year, and will expand to three additional high schools and three more junior highs in the school year beginning September, 1987.

The Education for Employment initiative is the result of a study conducted by CSPPS in cooperation with the School District. This study concluded that about 8,000 students a year (6,000
dropouts and 2,000 graduates) were leaving school without the basic skills, job readiness skills, work experience, or vocational skills needed to obtain a job. Most of these students were "general track" or vocational students in the comprehensive high schools. The study further concluded that the problem could be addressed with few additional dollars by making better use of existing resources in the school and community.

The program which emerged is a partnership of the School District, CSPPS, the PIC and Office of Employment Security. It has the following basic features:

- An "education for employment" coordinator has been designated in each school to direct an "employment center" and coordinate drop-out prevention programs in the school's "feeder" junior high (or middle) schools.

- The employment center is both a place and a concept: it is a room where students receive career advice and assistance obtaining work experience, and as a concept, it is the locus of coordination for all career-related activities in the school. (In fact, the coordinative role is less developed in some schools than in others).

- The center is staffed by the coordinator and a counselor assigned by the Pennsylvania Office of Employment Security (Job Service), a VISTA volunteer, a part-time secretary and such other staff as principals occasionally assign.

- Programmatically, each center attempts to develop for all students who seek assistance or are referred to it an individual employment profile, updated annually, and arrange a sequence of services required to enable students to meet their employment goals. These include:

  - Remedial education (via existing school or other services).

  - Career exposure activities, including a computerized career guidance system.

  - Job readiness training (provided either by the School District's "Job Search" course, a one-semester elective, or by subcontractors of the PIC assigned by it to work with each school.

  - Work experience, either in part-time jobs in the school year, including both jobs subsidized by the Foundation Collaborative and unsubsidized private sector placements, or in summer jobs provided through the PIC's summer program.

  - Placement assistance in jobs or PIC training programs after graduation.
Each high school employment center also houses a drop-out prevention program, with the following basic elements (although there is some school-to-school variation).

- Students are assigned to this program because they are judged "at-risk" to drop-out by virtue of poor grades (generally three or more failures in their four major subjects) and attendance (typically below 60%).

- Students have a common "advisory period" and are rostered to at least some common teachers (usually English and math) who volunteer to work with "at risk" youth, thus creating a modified "school within a school" for more personal and individualized treatment of students.

- A broad range of services are provided these students through School District, other governmental and community resources. These include all services of the Education for Employment centers, drug and alcohol counseling, close communication with parents, medical exams and treatment, family counseling, tutoring and others.

- In addition to a more intimate environment and a range of support services, the drop-out prevention programs include a highly-structured set of rewards. These include prizes and field trips for good attendance and academic improvement, and a PIC-backed guarantee of a summer job to every student promoted in grade (a guarantee also made to other participants in the Education for Employment centers).

This year, the drop-out prevention program also operated in two junior high schools, with plans to extend it eventually to every junior high feeding the senior high schools with employment centers.

The assumption that few additional resources were required has been born out to date. In addition to the services of PIC subcontractors and the Office of Employment Security staff (who prepare individual employment profiles, certify for TJTC and assist graduating seniors with placement), over 75 community-based and public agencies have been involved in providing services to students in the drop-out prevention program. The only additional funding has gone to support an overall coordinator for the School District, the employment center coordinators at each school, and modest ($5,000 per school) funds for student activities in the drop-out programs. Total marginal cost in 1987 was
$300,000, of which roughly $180,000 was provided by the schools, $100,000 by the Committee to Support Philadelphia Public Schools and $20,000 by the PIC.

The PIC, it should be noted, views participation in this program as one of its major youth activities. Its vice president for youth programs sits on a steering committee which coordinates the program, and its president is a member of the advisory board which oversees it (a board chaired by the CEO of the Rohm & Haas Company). In addition to direct PIC funding, PIC contractors provide job readiness training and the PIC has provided some job development services.

Results

In 1987, their pilot year, the four employment centers developed individual employment profiles for over 1,600 youth; developed part-time school year jobs for nearly 800 youth; placed an estimated 2,000 youth in summer jobs, provided job readiness training through PIC subcontractors to over 400 youth, and provided placement assistance to a substantial (but as yet unknown) number of graduating seniors. The majority of these youth were 16 or over, and the results of these activities are not yet known. The drop-out prevention programs, however, enrolled 500 youth, almost all of them in the tenth-grade or below, with some intuitively impressive results, especially given the "high risk" nature of the population served (Office of Career and Vocational Education, 1987).

- In every school, participants in the drop-out prevention programs achieved substantially higher daily attendance rates than their grade-level peers. Average daily attendance was 76% for participants.

- In every school, participants in the drop-out prevention program on the average doubled the number of major subjects they passed (compared to the prior year).

- Promotion rates of the high-risk drop-out prevention students equalled or surpassed those of their grade-level peers.

- In one high school, the drop-out prevention program enrolled only tenth graders who had been retained in grade the previous year. All were promoted (compared to 63% of all 10th grade students in that school).

- In the only high school with two years experience, the drop-out rate for program participants is half that of the general student body.
The High School Academies program was established in 1969 as a vocationally-oriented alternative educational program for potential drop-outs. Initially serving 160 youth in one high school, with a central focus on the electrical trades, it was conceived as a response to urban unrest and youth unemployment in the 1960's. The program began as a joint venture of the Urban Coalition, the School District and business, in the form of the Philadelphia Electric Company and other members of the electrical industry.

Despite success, the program grew slowly over the next 14 years. By 1983, it had added a second electrical academy, an automotive academy and three business academies, focused on careers in office work (secretarial and bookkeeping). Shortly after she was appointed, Superintendent Clayton asked the chairman of Philadelphia Electric, who also serves as chairman of the Academies program, to expand the program. It has since expanded to 10 academies (each in a different high school), adding two health academies and two more business academies. These enroll a total of 1600 youth in grades 9 to 12. Further expansion over the next several years to approximately 4,000 is being planned.

Nearly three-quarters of the youth who enroll in the Academies scored below the 25th percentile in reading and/or math at the time of their entrance (ninth grade), suggesting that most fit any reasonable definition of "at risk." Since students volunteer for this program, however, they may be more motivated than other "at-risk" youth and Academies staff concede that they do not serve the "hardest core" of youth.

With some modest variations, the Academies format is similar from program to program. Each Academy has an advisory board from its industry and a coor-dinator, drawn either from industry or, in the case of the initial Health Academy, the Health and Hospital Workers union. Businesses pay the salary of these coordinators (who report to the individual academy boards), provide speakers, curriculum consultants and other resources to the Academies and, perhaps most importantly, provide part-time and summer jobs to Academy youth. Many of the city's major companies participate in this effort. The PIC has provided support for two job developers who service the Academies. Each academy is organized as a "school within a school". Teachers are provided by the School District (from volunteers) and teach only Academy students. The basic Academies program consists of:

- A curriculum which combines vocational and academic subjects in a longer school day which permits students to take a full complement of academic subjects.

- An effort to closely relate academic instruction, especially in reading and mathematics, to skills and information required in the occupations being studied.
Progressively responsible work experience, in summer and during the school year, often provided by companies sponsoring the individual Academy.

Results

The Academies have recently been evaluated by Public/Private Ventures as part of a national study of public/private partnerships. This study will be published in the near future, but in an interview its author stated that the Academies program appears to be one of the most successful (perhaps the most successful) school-business partnerships for at-risk youth in the country. In particular, P/PV's preliminary findings are that:

- 77% of Academies' students graduate (compared to 63% of other students in the Academies' home schools).
- Eighteen months after graduation, 81% of Academies students were either employed or attending school (or both), compared to 75% of graduates from their home schools, with Academies students much more likely to be working than comparison students.
- While there were not significant differences in wages or hours worked, Academies students were far more likely to be working in major corporations with better benefits packages and more career advancement opportunities.
- Academies students far outscored all others on a P/PV test of knowledge about job seeking.

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

How effectively are at-risk youth, aged 9-to-15, being served by Philadelphia's schools, employment and training system and other systems? Are new or expanded approaches required? What resources and opportunities exist to provide them?

Neither definitive nor straightforward answers exist to these questions. Uncertainties about the meaning of data which do exist, limitations to that data, and issues of educational philosophy and values which do not yield to easy answers all complicate matters. Further, the 9-to-15 age group is a broad span, and as we have seen there is a richer array of services available to 14 and 15 year-olds (such as the Education for Employment Initiative, the Academies, and the summer jobs program) than there is to 9-to-13 year-olds, so answers vary by age group. What follows, then, is the author's best effort to provide answers, based on analysis of the information presented above, the opinions of persons interviewed in the course of this case study, and his own observations. All should be viewed as tentative, because neither the state of the art nor the state of the data, at least from a Philadelphia perspective, permit
authoritative statements.

1) Effectiveness of Current Services

Despite the marked improvements in local test scores, (a problematic measure, as we have discussed), it is fair to say that few in the school system or the community believe that at-risk nine-to-15 year olds are receiving adequate basic education. Whichever tests one believes and whatever significance one attaches to them as measures of learning or educational quality, it is clear that improved basic education and remediation are critical. There are some signs that middle schools (as opposed to junior high schools) and some Chapter I remedial efforts--those that serve whole schools and are integrated into regular classrooms--help strengthen basic education for "at-risk" youth, but in the absence of published studies and sustained, long-term gains, it is difficult to assess how adequately these revisions to prevailing educational patterns address basic and remedial education needs. Yet, given the failure of other approaches and the signs of superior results which alternative approaches to remediation and the middle schools appear to exhibit, they seem worth trying. In Superintendent Clayton's view, these directions are worth pursuing, but she cautions that "no one really knows the best way to go, although we know that something different has to be done," and she urges considerable experimentation and variation to determine best approaches.

While applying to relatively few youth, both the High School Academies program and the Education for Employment program have served some 14 and 15-year old at-risk youth with targeted interventions whose success is reasonably well validated by data on results (although no experimental studies have been conducted on either).

As one turns to programs other than those run by the schools, the question of effectiveness is pretty much moot, since there are neither enough programs nor sufficient data to draw conclusions. More hypothetically, one can conclude that insofar as supportive services (e.g., health programs, family interventions, career education in the early grades) are needed--and common wisdom suggests that for many young people at-risk, they are--there is a large (if indeterminate) unmet need. A few programs suggest approaches to meeting that need, but there is little definitive evidence on their effectiveness.

Insofar as evidence and opinion of practitioners are credible, there are several themes which seem to characterize successful programs for at-risk youth in Philadelphia:

- Remedial education is most effective when integrated into the basic educational program.
- Smaller, more personalized environments (middle school, schools within a school) produce stronger attachment to
school for at-risk youth, and better achievement.

- Service providers seem to enjoy greater success working collaboratively with "at risk" youth than they do working in isolation (e.g., the Education for Employment and Academies programs).

- Successful programs strive for a delicate balance of challenge and support, firm standards and individualized treatment of at-risk youth.

2) Need for New or Expanded Service

To measure the need for new and expanded service, one should know both what services are needed, what the effective models for delivery of those services are, how many youth need those services, and how many are currently receiving them. As this paper has been at pains to point out, the knowledge base required for such measurement is imperfect, to say the least.

However, a rough and ready outline of an "ideal" set of services can be patched together by combining the available data with the opinions of practitioners interviewed in the course of this case study, and then taking a leap of faith. This outline has the following elements:

First, the basic school program would be structured so that:

- Remedial education programs would be integrated into the regular curriculum, with smaller classes.

- Junior high schools, which now serve children in grades 7 through 9, would be eliminated, in favor of grade 5 to 8 middle schools and 9 to 12 high schools.

- Career education and development programs would be fully implemented, with stress in grades five through eight on career awareness (classroom activities, trips, speakers) and in grades eight, nine and ten on career exploration—such activities as "shadowing", internships and exploratory work experience. Some of these activities could occur in the summer as well as in the school year.

Secondly, broader community resources would be marshalled to provide enrichment and support services beyond the basic education program. Such services might be provided in cooperation with the schools or on a freestanding basis. They would include:

- Educational enrichment and remediation, either through programs similar to the MARC and ASPIRA programs, or through linkages with the summer job program, in the manner of the Ford Foundation-sponsored STEP demonstration (P/PV, 1987).
Experiential enrichment programs—trips to businesses, cultural institutions, "foreign" parts of town, suburbs, contact with so-called "positive role models", etc.—to help broaden the horizons of race- and income-isolated youth, and their ability to "deal" with the broader society. Such broadening of experience should, in theory, contribute at least indirectly, to employability development.

Systematic and sustained provision, on an "as-needed" basis of various support services, of which the most critical and commonly needed, if the testimony of many school people and program operators is to be believed, are health services, family involvement and intervention in families with serious problems (abusive or alcoholic parents, mental health disorders or other less severe forms of familial disorganization).

We previously estimated that there are about 50,000 "at-risk" youth in the Philadelphia public schools, aged 9-to-15, as well as several thousand more in the Catholic schools. Ignoring the latter group, about whom there are even less data available than for public school students, it is clear that the majority are not currently beneficiaries of "best practice" (problematic as that concept is).

Specifically, only 35% of Chapter I eligible schools participated in the more effective "school wide projects" or "smaller class" modes of service delivery; not more than 60% of at-risk students attend middle schools during grades five through eight; not more than 25% receive a full-fledged program of career education; and it can be very crudely estimated that not more than 10% receive any of the additional services itemized outside of school (in a given year). One is reminded of the old joke about the farmer who told the extension agent that he was not interested in any new methods of cultivation because "I ain't doing half of what I already know."

3) Opportunities, New Directions and the Federal Role

It would be false to suggest that there is any clear consensus among school officials, youth program directors, child advocates, the business community, or others in the city of Philadelphia concerning what should be done for "at-risk" 9-to-15 year olds. Most persons interviewed for this study would agree with the proposition that intervention before the age of 16 is sensible. Most agree that it is possible to identify at a fairly tender age young people who will have trouble succeeding in school and/or making a successful transition to work. Most agree that there is something terribly important about the "middle years," but few have actually focused much sustained attention on the needs of the 9-to-15-year-old group. Further, there was not a single person interviewed who suggested that "things would be
okay if only the Federal government would provide funds for ..."

Some, indeed, expressed doubt that there is a significant Federal role. In part, this reflects a belief that the most critical issues are those of basic school improvement, which is viewed as a largely local matter. In part, it reflects a loss of faith in the efficacy of Federal support. For instance, the School District's executive director of career and vocational education, a strong advocate, as one might expect, of expanding career development programs for the age group of concern, is primarily interested in increased local funding. She is skeptical of Federal support because in her experience, programs which live on "soft" money die when soft money disappears. Further, a number of School District officials find the regulations which do surround most Federal dollars to be counterproductive.

In fact, the primary concern of Philadelphia school officials seems to be not for more Federal dollars, but for greater local discretion in the use of those dollars, especially ESEA Chapter I and Perkins Act funds. It is the author's belief that in this city, local school officials would be willing to accept reasonable performance standards (i.e., improved outcomes for disadvantaged students) in return for greater discretion concerning how they use the money. Insofar as increased funding is desired, support for smaller class sizes as a component of a revised Chapter I program would be the most likely candidate.

With regard to ancillary services or programs outside the school system, the most likely area for Federal initiative would be expansion of support for educational enrichment and remediation programs (after school or during the summer), other experiential programs for youth, or coordinated social service strategies. Such programs should be closely evaluated.

It seems unlikely that the Federal government could (and not clear that it should) assume full funding for such activities. But incentive grants, demonstration grants, and evaluation studies (which almost never claim priority over service provision from local and state funds), are all possible strategies.

For example, it could prove useful to try to expand and evaluate programs such as MARC where "surplus" overhead permits cost-effective concentration of new funds on direct costs, and combined with tutoring, counseling and other enrichment activities.

While there is no doubt a limit to how large a program could be mounted without incurring added overhead requirements, it also seems probable that considerable expansion could occur.

Similarly, there is growing consensus in Philadelphia that a coordinated strategy of social services, including child health and family supports (mental health, counseling, etc.) are vital.
The Education for Employment Initiative's drop-out prevention program reflects this belief, and the superintendent and president of the Board of Education have begun to give this idea increasing attention, with emphasis on using the schools as a center for delivery of these services. Linking these services to schools has potential to solve the outreach problem, reduce fragmentation of effort, provide consumers with "one-stop shopping" and build in continuity and follow-up. These are not new concepts, and history does not suggest they are easily fulfilled, but the logic is sturdy. At the core of that logic, in the superintendent's words, is that "in many of our communities, the only viable institutions left are the schools and the police." Such coordination cannot occur without strong support of the mayor and local service providers. But large-scale Federal demonstration funds might help galvanize local action.

The Role of PICs

In Philadelphia, as discussed earlier, one of the limits on providing services outside the schools is the absence of current capacity of community-based and other organizations to provide these services. Some of this lack of capacity may be the irreversible result of the growing disorganization of the ghetto. Some of it may simply reflect lack of funds to support indigenous groups. In either case, a capacity building problem exists. In theory, this problem might be addressed by building on the network of agencies who serve as subcontractors to the Private Industry Council, although it should be noted that the scale of current PIC agencies is small in contrast to the magnitude of the "at-risk" population.

In practice, however, it is less clear that the PIC is, at least in this town, the right organization to play that role. It has defined its mission primarily in terms of meeting JTPA regulations and the needs of its current population. As PIC's Vice President for Youth Program's put it, "Frankly, Harrisburg (the Governor's Job training Council) calls the shots, and my biggest concern is doing a better job with the kids we are trying to reach now--especially black male teen-agers. We've never really given much thought to a younger population."

In other words, it would take both major changes in the JTPA legislation--altering of performance requirements, target population and allowable activities; willingness to invest in long-term programs with long-term outcomes--and a correlative reorientation of the local PIC. It is likely that PIC could deliver career development and related services to at-risk 9-to-15 year olds more cheaply than the schools. But cooperation of the schools would be required, and it is not clear that in the long run PICs could provide the institutional stability or scale of programming required to address so massive a problem.

However, there is a clear opportunity to strengthen summer job programs, especially the education components thereof, for 14 and 15-year olds, and the PIC is eager to do so.
4. Cost Implications

It is beyond the scope of this paper to cost out an "ideal" set of services for "at-risk" middle years youth. However, extrapolating from the experience of existing programs for this age group and older youth, $1,800 per youth per year ($90 million) seems in the ballpark if effective, coordinated use of existing resources can be achieved. (This ballpark figure includes $666 per pupil for class size reduction; $337 for social services, and $300 for after-school and summer education supports, and $500 for overhead and "other").

A limiting factor on the effectiveness of such an effort would no doubt be conditions in home and neighborhood which, as we described above, appear to have deteriorated drastically in the last 20 years, but which raise far larger and more problematic policy issues than can be discussed here.

In the perspective of a $1 billion education system, the dollar amounts are not vast, although if funded from Washington, they would double current Chapter I aid.

Beyond provision of dollars, Federal policy could facilitate the development of better services to this population by:

- Modifying Chapter I regulations as suggested.
- Encouraging (and/or funding) research and demonstration efforts.
- Improving and disseminating knowledge of "what works".
- Encouraging HHS and DOL supported programs to work closely with the schools.
Appendix I

PERSONS INTERVIEWED AND SOURCES

Interviews:

SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA

Dr. Larry Aniloff, Manager, Education for Employment Initiative
Dr. Constance E. Clayton, Superintendent of Schools
Barbara Goldsmith, Coordinator, High School Academies
Dr. Marion Holmes, Executive Director, Career and Vocational Education
Dr. James H. Lytel, Executive Director, Research and Evaluation
Marilyn Rivers, Director, School Age Parents Program
Thomas Rosica, Executive Director, Office of Categorical Programs

PRIVATE INDUSTRY COUNCIL OF PHILADELPHIA

Patricia Irving, Vice President-Youth Programs
Larry Robertson, Director of Youth Programs
Elaine Willingham, Business Development Representative

YOUTH SERVICE PROVIDERS

Gwendolyn Bailey, Assistant Director, IMPACT Services
Diane Barber, Coordinator of Truancy Prevention Programs, CORA Services
Gary Hall, Executive Director, Community Action Agency for Children and Youth
Alden Lanphear, Executive Director, Woodrock, Inc.
Ted Levine, Executive Director, Youth Service, INC.
Emmanuel Ortiz, Executive Director, ASPIRA
Jerry Romeo, Executive Director, Joys Clubs of Philadelphia
ADVOCACY GROUPS, COORDINATING BODIES AND OTHER

Mark Brody, Program Analyst, Youth Services Commission, City of Philadelphia

Richard Cox, Program Officer, William Penn Foundation

Gerson Green, Executive Director, Greater Philadelphia Federation of Settlements

Dr. Theodore Hershberg, Director, Center for Philadelphia Studies, University of Pennsylvania

Lucille Howard, Program Analyst, Youth Services Commission

Ernest Jones, Executive Director, Philadelphia Urban Coalition

Bernard McMullen, Research Officer, Public/Private Ventures

Helen Davis Pitcher, Program Officer, William Penn Foundation

John Ruthrauf, President, Philadelphia Foundation

Robert Schwartz, Executive Director, Juvenile Justice Law Center

Shelley Yanoff, Executive Director, Philadelphia Citizens for Children and Youth

Sources:


---------------------------------------------: An Analysis of Post-Graduate Employment of Automotive Vocational Students, mimeo, 1987c.