Proceedings of a conference on policy issues pertinent to the design and implementation of teacher incentive plans are presented in this report. Seven papers and reactions to them are presented, which include discussions on the definition and importance of teacher incentives, job redesign and its organizational impacts, constraint and variety perspectives, usefulness of "weak" initiatives, cost of teacher incentive plans, a model of differential incentives, and the teachers' point of view. Key elements of successful incentive programs are summarized, which include reduced professional isolationism, state financial aid, local autonomy, teacher involvement, and public support, based on immediacy, comprehensiveness, flexibility, and a holistic approach. References accompany each paper. (LMI)
PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR ON INCENTIVES THAT ENHANCE THE TEACHING PROFESSION: A DISCUSSION OF THE POLICY ISSUES

Edited by
Carol A. Bartell
The University of Iowa

One in a Series of Reports on Attracting Excellence: The Call for Teacher Incentives

1987
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Proceedings of a
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Preface to Series

How can the best and brightest among college students be encouraged to enter teacher preparation programs? What does it take to recognize, reward, and retain outstanding educators in elementary and secondary schools? Why do some educators invest more of themselves in developing their professional skills? The questions are myriad.

And as frequently as someone poses a question, another recommends an answer: introduce career ladders and mentoring systems; raise standards and salaries for entry into teaching; strengthen graduate and undergraduate programs of professional development; identify the most superior professionals with better tests and performance evaluation systems.

Debated and considered by policy makers, educators, scholars, and taxpayers, such questions and answers have been at the heart of educational reform initiatives nationwide for the past several years. And, in the same period, many innovative programs to provide incentives to educators have been introduced. Numerous states and local districts, including many in the region served by the North Central Regional Educational Laboratory (NCREL), have considered or taken action to implement incentive policies and programs.

In response to considerable interest in the theme of incentives among constituents in the region, NCREL initiated activities to develop information resources and encourage related research early in 1986. The first activity involved reviewing relevant literature and developing a framework to guide future conceptual work and strategies. The framework first was employed to describe significant themes and issues apparent in policies and programs of state governments. Several papers regarding policy issues on incentive programs were presented and discussed at a seminar held in 1986.

In 1987, the focus of Laboratory activities began to shift from initiatives taken by states to programs in local school districts. A survey of districts in all seven states of the region and case studies to create profiles of a small number of district-level programs comprised the next phase of activity.
Many, many people have contributed to NCREL's work on the theme of incentives for teachers and other educators. Participants in the 1986 seminar, and authors and reviewers of various products have provided, sifted, considered, and translated what has become a significant pool of information.

Although all who have joined this effort have made important contributions, special credit is due to Dr. Carol Bartell of the University of Iowa's College of Education. Her interest in identifying difficult issues and promising programs was equalled only by her dedication to sharing what she was learning with educators, policy makers, and other scholars.

Art Dorman, Graduate Research Assistant at the University of Iowa, and Nancy Fulford, Program Associate at the Laboratory, also deserve special credit for contributing to the development of this product series.

NCREL is proud to publish this series of products.

Jane H. Arends
Executive Director

Harriet Doss Willis
Deputy Executive Director

Judson Hixson
Director, R&D Resource Development
Introduction

This report presents the proceedings of an Invitational Conference sponsored by the North Central Regional Educational Laboratory (NCREL) on November 13-15, 1986. The theme of this conference was Incentives that Enhance the Teaching Profession: A Discussion of the Policy Issues.

The purpose of this meeting was to raise and discuss policy issues that must be considered when designing and implementing teacher incentive plans particularly for the seven-state NCREL region. This region includes: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin.

NCREL invited a broad range of educational leaders, with diverse backgrounds and experiences to participate in this conference. Participants contributed their own perspectives to the lively discussion of the issues. The group size was kept small to facilitate meaningful discussion. A list of participants follows this introduction.

Seven papers and seven reaction papers were presented. Reactors provided the leadership for the discussion of the issues by all participants as presented in each paper. The papers themselves constitute the body of this document followed by the formal reaction papers.

The first paper, by Carol Bartell, sets the framework for the discussion. What do we mean by "incentives" and why has this become such an important concern at this particular time? Ann Hart, from her extensive research on the implications of career ladders in Utah, discusses the notion of job redesign and its organizational impacts. Gary Sykes explores the complexities of the incentive issue from two perspectives -- a constraint perspective and a variety perspective. He also introduces the intriguing notion of "weak incentives" in teaching serving as a useful function.

In his discussion of the financial issues involved in incentive planning, Jim Ward raises an important question: can we afford these plans that are being proposed? Judy Christensen, John McDonnell and Jay Price, of the Collegial Research Consortium, suggest that teachers seek different incentives at various stages in their careers and described a model for this idea. Two different teachers' organization representatives,
Damon Moore and Jacqueline Vaughn, address the issues from the teacher's point of view: what do teachers want, and how can they be involved in policymaking on this issue?

Many insightful reactions followed the presentation of the papers. The discussion that arose around these issues was quite intense at times. Carol Bartell moderated the first day's discussion and the second day's discussion was led by Nancy Fulford from NCREL. Moderating was very difficult at times, because participants always seemed to have something else to add. Perhaps we raised more questions than we provided answers. But the questions need to be asked and will provide us with further direction for teacher incentives.

Parents, educators, and policymakers in our region, as well as in the nation, are deeply concerned about recruitment and retention of highly effective teachers for our schools. We want teachers who will continue to grow and learn, exhibiting excitement for learning to be emulated by the children they teach. We want the best education possible for our children. We cannot have effective schools without effective teachers. The enhancement of the teaching profession is a concern that everyone at this conference shared and will continue to address.

The participants at this conference included the following people:

Charles Almán
Jane Arends
Elizabeth Ashburn
Naida Bagenstos
Carol Bartell
Nelvia Brady
Judy Christensen
Albert Crusoe
Carol D'Amico
Art Dorman
Ralph Fessler
Nancy Fulford
Ann Weaver Hart
Robert Hatfield
Fred Hess
Judson Hixson
Barbara Holmes

Chicago Public Schools
North Central Regional Educational Laboratory
OERI (at the time of the Conference with American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education)
Southeastern Regional Council for Educational Improvement
The University of Iowa
Chicago Community Trust
National College of Education
Milwaukee Public Schools
Indiana State Department of Education
The University of Iowa
The Johns Hopkins University
North Central Regional Educational Laboratory
Western Michigan University
University of Utah
Michigan State University
Chicago Panel on Public School Policy and Finance
North Central Regional Educational Laboratory
Education Commission of the States
Ken Howey
Louise Kutz
Esther Letven
Kathryn Lind
Pearl Mack
John McDonnell
Richard Mesenberg
Damon Moore
Larry Murphy
Jay Price
Gary Sykes

Ann Thering
Jacqueline Vaughn
James Ward
JaMille Webster
Harriet Doss Willis
Nancy Zimpher

The Ohio State University
Ohio Education Association
University of Wisconsin-Parkside
Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction
National Education Association
Beloit College
Minnesota Department of Education
Indiana State Teachers Association
Iowa Senate
University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point
Michigan State University (at the time of the conference with Stanford University)
North Central Regional Educational Laboratory
Chicago Federation of Teachers
University of Illinois
Michigan Education Association
North Central Regional Educational Laboratory
The Ohio State University
Abstract  Teacher incentives have been proposed as one way to make a contribution to the reform of education. The argument presented in such calls for reform is based on the belief that in order to improve the quality of education in our nation, it is necessary to make the profession of teaching itself more attractive, respected, and rewarding. A wide variety of incentive plans have been introduced in states and localities that have as their intent the enhancement of teaching as a profession. The design and implementation of such plans has raised a number of policy issues for consideration. Four major themes are developed in this discussion of the policy implications of teacher incentives as a reform issue: (1) establishing the needs for incentives; (2) examining the intent of incentives; (3) determining the responsibility for incentives; and (4) linking incentives to educational reform.

What role will teacher incentives play in the reform of education? The call for incentives has come from a host of national reports and has resulted in the consideration and adoption of a variety of plans across the nation. At the heart of the reports and the reform efforts lies the notion that in order to improve school experiences for children, school experiences for teachers ought to be improved. In order to attract, retain and motivate a quality teaching force, teaching as a profession must be made more attractive, respected, and rewarding.

An incentive is that which induces, motivates, and encourages participation or performance. It implies an external influence that would offer something desired in order to produce a certain behavior or outcome. Incentives for teachers may be identified in terms of those factors which increase the level of satisfaction and provide increased effort toward higher achievement. Incentive planning, therefore, involves consideration of those factors which motivate teachers to enter and remain in the profession while continuing to grow and develop their professional skills and competencies.

Dr. Bartell is an Assistant Professor of Educational Administration at the University of Iowa. She also has extensive teaching and supervisory experience at the K-12 level. Her research interests are in the area of personnel issues and school administration. She is a contributing researcher to NCREL in their efforts in the area of teacher incentives.
A wide variety of incentive plans have been introduced in states and localities that have as their intent the enhancement of teaching as a profession. The design and implementation of such plans has raised a number of policy issues for consideration and deliberation. Why is there a need at this particular time to consider the design of incentive plans? What shall be the intention and direction of incentive planning? Who shall bear the responsibility for addressing both the quality and quantity concerns of the teacher workforce? Finally, how do teacher incentives fit into the widespread call for educational reform?

**Establishing the Need for Incentives**

Many recent reports have predicted an impending crisis in the teaching profession (Darling-Hammond, 1984; Holmes Group, 1986; Schlechty & Vance, 1983; Task Force on Teaching as a Profession, 1986). These reports express concerns about the quantity and quality of candidates seeking to teach and about the morale and performance of the current workforce.

Fewer academically able students are selecting education as their academic majors (Darling-Hammond, 1984) and the most talented among them are the ones most likely to leave the profession (Lyson & Falk, 1984; Pavalko, 1970; Tierney & Bond, 1985), often within the first five years of their careers (Pederson, 1970; Schlechty & Vance, 1983).

Other problems associated with the impending teacher shortage relate to the unprecedented number of teachers who are nearing retirement age. The average age of American teachers is now about 42 and it is predicted that in the next five years, up to 40 percent of the current teaching force will retire or leave the profession (Hanes & Mitchell, 1985; NEA, 1983).

Predictions based on statistics gathered by the National Center for Education Statistics indicate that by 1992, if present trends continue, there will be 283,000 fewer teachers than there are positions available (Plisko, 1984). Some districts already report shortages in certain curricula areas, such as physics, computer science, bilingual education, and special education.
Some would contend that these needs can be partially met with former teachers who will reenter the profession once positions become available. It is difficult to estimate how many former teachers who were unable to find work or who were subject to reductions in force during times of oversupply and declining enrollments will actually return to teach. The majority will not, according to a survey of former teachers (Harris & Associates, 1985).

The old incentives are increasingly ineffective, especially for women and minorities who now have many more career options than they have had in the past (Schlecty & Vance, 1983). In addition, only 70 percent of those who are trained to be teachers actually do teach (Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 1984).

Many teachers report that they would not select teaching as a career again, nor would they encourage others to do so. Almost half of all teachers in an NEA survey claimed that if they had to do it over again, they would not enter the profession (NEA, 1983); this represented a five-fold increase over a 20-year period. A similar percentage would be reluctant to advise their own children (Gallup, 1984) or any other young person (Harris, 1985) to become a teacher.

According to evidence presented by Sykes (1983), public school teaching has lost more occupational prestige in the past 15 to 20 years than any other occupation ranked in the polls. Half of all teachers themselves feel that students, parents, and the society at large no longer respect them (Harris, 1985).

The conditions under which teachers work more often serve as a disincentive rather than an incentive to remain in the classroom. These conditions have been described as follows:

... Teaching is honored and disdained, praised as "dedicated service," lampooned as "easy work" ... Teaching from its inception in America has occupied a special but shadowed social standing ... Real regard shown for those who taught has never matched professed regard. (Boyer, 1983, p. 154)

... The surroundings in which many teachers work, especially in our large urban schools, would turn any other work place into a shambles ... Recruiting for the profession is hampered by the average rate of pay, which is often less than that in other taxing lines of work ... we also fail in this country to give (teachers) the respect ... the worth of their service to the
community deserves ... Add to this all the many administrative, public relations, and quasi-menial duties that take mind and energy away from teaching, it is easy to understand why our educational system is not able to attract many of the ablest young into the teaching profession. (Adler, 1982, pp. 57-58)

... Too many of the conditions now current in schools limit what teachers can do rather than amplifying teachers' abilities. (Green, 1986, p. 22)

... Elementary and secondary school teachers are expected to act like professionals, but they are not treated like professionals. As a general rule, they are not involved in meaningful discussions and decisions on matters that directly affect their classroom work, such as curriculum, textbooks, instruction, and grading. (ASCD Task Force, 1985, p. 12)

... The problems of teacher education mirror society's failure to treat teaching as a profession. If the rewards, career patterns, working conditions, and professional responsibilities of teachers indicate a second-class occupation, then candidates for teaching and teaching education will tend to follow those expectations. (Holmes Group, 1986, p. 61)

Examining the Intent of Incentives

In order to remedy the problems of the teaching profession described above, a number of incentive plans have been suggested to make the profession more attractive and rewarding. When designing such plans, it is important to decide what behavior one wants to promote or the outcome one wishes to produce in response to the offering of the incentive. What is the intent of the plan? The intent of incentive plans as outlined in this paper include:

- the attraction of competent and talented individuals to the teaching profession;
- the retention of superior teachers;
- the improvement of teacher performances; and
- the enhancement of teaching as a profession.

It may be helpful to think of incentives as hierarchically arranged. Attraction is the first step, after which the focus is on retention of the best candidate. The efforts then need to be on continued improvement with the final step being enhancement of the individual's role and contribution to the profession. Different incentives will appeal at different stages. Enhancement of teaching as a profession is the ultimate goal of all incentive plans. If more, talented persons are attracted to teaching, if those persons remain committed to the profession and are given opportunities to grow and expand within their roles as teachers, then indeed, the profession will be enhanced.
Such incentive plans are based upon different conceptions of what it is that motivates teachers and teacher performance. The following is presented as a framework for classification of such differing conceptions:

- monetary compensation;
- career status;
- professional responsibilities;
- awards and recognitions; and
- conditions of the workplace.

A variety of incentive plans focus on monetary concerns. Many localities are attempting to raise all teachers' salaries, with particular emphasis on the beginning salary in the hopes of attracting more new teachers. Others have focused on improving the range and choice of collateral benefits. Incentives have been traditionally built into the single salary schedule itself, by designing salary schedules that reward additional training and experience. Additional incentives are provided in the design of formulas that drive these salary schedules, in advancing teachers more than one step at a time, and in giving full credit for experience outside of the school district on a local salary schedule. There has been some consideration given to the use of market sensitive pay for positions where there is a critical shortage (mathematics, chemistry, science, computer science). Bonuses are given on a one-time basis to attract teachers to a particular teaching area or geographic location. Bonuses have also been used to reward outstanding teacher performance. Grants, sabbaticals, and pay for additional training could also be considered a monetary incentive, although there are other incentives involved here. Another modification in the traditional pay scale is the design of differing salaries based on job factors, similar to a "comparable worth" scheme. The most well-known and highly publicized of the attempts to tamper with the traditional compensation practices has been the plan to introduce performance-based salaries, or, as it is more popularly known, "merit pay."

Incentive plans designed to enhance career status in order to provide options for teachers within the field of teaching are based upon the premise that teachers need to have opportunities for career advancement. Career ladders, or career development plans are designed to offer this opportunity. The concept of career ladders, like merit pay, is based on the idea of rewarding the most competent leaders. In exchange for that reward, however, the teacher's role changes as he or she assumes different or additional responsibilities. While plans vary from state to state and within states, the
basic purposes of career ladders are: to provide advancement opportunities within the teaching profession, to counteract stagnation by varying teachers' responsibilities and activities at each level; and to reward and motivate superior teachers through enhanced prestige, responsibility and increased remuneration (Cresap, McCormick, & Paget, 1984).

Awards and recognition provide evidence of a job well done. While the award itself is an extrinsic reward, it can appeal to a teacher's sense of well-being and confidence that he or she has performed at an outstanding level. Porter and Lawler (1968) suggest that awards and recognition, as extrinsic rewards, serve as motivators and lead to increased satisfaction if (1) the individual perceives that effort will actually yield the desired result; and (2) the individual values the reward.

Awards can be monetary or nonmonetary in nature. A one-time bonus for outstanding performance, recruitment bonuses, scholarships or funds offered for increased training, and grants given to develop special projects provide examples of awards that are monetary in nature and are awarded on a competitive basis. Nonmonetary awards include such things as teacher-of-the-year awards, teacher-appreciation dinners, and publicity about teacher accomplishments.

Challenging and rewarding professional responsibilities can serve as teacher-motivators to certain individuals. These are opportunities presented to teachers to assume a new role or expand their current role within the teaching profession. Such opportunities do not necessarily change a person's career status or even necessarily carry increased remuneration, although they may do so. The focus is instead on the opportunity to develop new professional responsibilities. Mentor teacher or master teacher plans offer this opportunity to teachers.

The conditions under which teachers work can support or detract from their performance. The nature of the teacher's engagement with the work and the conditions under which the teacher performs his or her task play an important role in the determination of job satisfaction. An incentive for the teacher, then, is the establishment of favorable conditions in the workplace.
Attention to workplace conditions involved a wide range of possible improvements that can be made in the teacher's physical as well as professional environment. Improvements in school climate, reductions in class size, providing instructional aides to assist teachers, providing alternative arrangements for discipline problems, and increasing teachers' involvement in planning and decision-making are but some examples of giving attention to workplace conditions.

Incentives, then, should be designed to match the motivator with the intent of the plan. A matrix is presented in Figure 1 which presents a framework for the examination of the interaction of teacher motivators and intent of incentives.

The intent of incentives is based on what concerns need to be addressed. If, for example, a particular school district began to experience a shortage of qualified applicants for teaching positions, attraction would be the immediate phase of concern. If it is believed that monetary compensation is a strong motivator for those entering the teaching profession, and the intent was to recruit outstanding candidates, one would offer the highest beginning salary that was possible, provide a bonus amount for signing an early contract, or pay the first month apartment rent for the new teacher. If one chose to believe that professional responsibilities were the strongest motivator, the emphasis in recruitment would be different.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOTIVATOR</th>
<th>attraction</th>
<th>retention</th>
<th>improvement</th>
<th>enhancement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>monetary compensation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>career status</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>awards and recognition</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>conditions of the workplace</td>
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Figure 1. A conceptual framework for the examination of teacher incentive plans
The recruiter would then focus on the nature of the job itself and the opportunities available for professional advancement or diversity. The most comprehensive approach to recruiting new teachers would be to plan to address all possible motivators that could stimulate teachers to enter, remain, and continue to develop and grow within the profession.

As was stated above, usually more than one motivator is considered in the building of incentive plans. The framework as presented does not mean to suggest that any given plan will address only one cell of the matrix. In fact, it is more realistic to consider that a wide range of motivations will predict and influence teacher behavior. The framework should not be used to fit a specific plan into an individual cell. It can be used to examine instead how each cell is addressed in a proposed incentive plan.

The most comprehensive plans will address as many cells as possible, including various factors that are felt to motivate teachers and serving a wide range of purposes or intentions. Reform will not occur if the plan is narrowly conceived and adopted. Piecemeal approaches to incentives will only provide temporary solutions and will not, in the long run, enhance the profession.

Determining the Responsibility for Incentives

Although each state bears the legal responsibility for the education of children within its boundaries, the delivery of educational services has evolved into a complex system of shared inputs and decision-making at the federal, state, and local levels. Just as there is a shared responsibility for the setting of the educational policy agenda, there is also a shared responsibility for the reform of the teaching profession. Everyone has a stake in the enhancement of the teaching profession because of the importance of that profession to the future of our nation.

On the national level, strong leadership is needed. Articulation of national needs, as evidenced in the many recent reports, generates interest, discussion, and sometimes, action. The funding of research and demonstration projects also presents an opportunity for involvement. Loan programs for prospective teachers and opportunities for recognition of teachers and the importance of teaching at the national level provide
other means to give attention to incentives. Professional groups with representation at
the national level can also have an impact upon direction in this area. Because of the
visibility and opportunity for impact upon their members as well as others in the
educational community, they have a national platform from which to speak.

At the state level, much can be done. A re-examination of how prospective teachers are
recruited and trained is already underway in many teacher-training institutions. States
can examine funding formulas to insure fair and equitable distribution of resources.
Some monies can be targeted into incentive planning and technical assistance. Teachers
also need recognition at the state level. Their voices should be heard on commissions
and panels that have an impact upon the direction of educational decision-making in
the state.

Governors have recently taken a strong leadership role in addressing educational
concerns at the state level. In the recent report issued by the National Governors'
Association (1986) a detailed action agenda was proposed for the states, many
recommendations of which relate to incentives for teachers. This report calls for major
changes in teaching conditions, teacher salaries, and teacher preparation. In exchange,
the governors want more accountability.

While important policy decisions and directions come from the state and federal levels,
it is at the local level that such decisions are carried out. It is the local environment in
which teachers must live and work. Local responsibilities for incentives undoubtedly
will be the crucial factor in the determination of whether or not a teacher is attracted
to a particular job, remains in that position, and continues to exhibit professional
growth.

Important factors that contribute to teacher satisfaction, such as teacher compensation
plans, work environments, professional responsibilities, decision-making opportunities,
treatment by school boards, administrators, supervisors, parents and community
members, are actually determined at the local level. Teachers receive their strongest
rewards from the nature of their work and from successful experience with students
(Rosenholtz, 1986). Therefore, efforts toward incentives initiated at any level will fail
unless steps are taken at the local level to offer organizational inducements to remain
in the classroom and to perform at the highest possible levels.
Governor Thomas H. Keen has asked the crucial question: "Who will teach?" (Task Force on Teaching as a Profession, 1986). Who indeed? Will the most competent individuals be recruited, trained and be encouraged to remain in the classrooms of our nation?

While the cells for reform offer various solutions to the problems besetting education today, most would agree that teachers and teaching are central to reform.

The most effective way to improve the achievement of a given student is to improve the quality of teaching that the student experiences. Not only does the research on student achievement increasingly document the influence of the things teachers do on student achievement, there is an enormous amount of evidence that teachers have a significant impact on efforts to change schools and on the nature of the student's experience, whatever the formal policies and curricula of a school or classroom might be. (Hawley & Rosenholtz, 1984, p. 6)

Beginning with A Nation at Risk (1983) and the call to "improve the preparation of teachers or to make teaching a more rewarding and respected profession" (p. 30), there have been a series of reports that have addressed the problems of attracting, training, and retaining teachers. Most of the reports have called for raising teacher salaries and devising schemes for professional advancement for teachers (Bird, 1985). Some would restructure the profession and the way in which teachers are trained to take their place within that profession (The Holmes Group, 1986; Task Force on Teaching as a Profession, 1986). Others focus on incentives to recruit more talented individuals to the profession (Boyer, 1983). Still others suggest empowering teachers to have more opportunities for input into decision-making (National Teachers Forum, 1986).

Although different approaches have been taken in the dialogue that has been raised regarding the reform of education and the profession that is central to the educational process, there is a vision emerging that offers hope and encouragement for the schools of the future. This vision can be articulated around several themes that recur in the calls for reform.

1. Teachers will be more rigorously trained, or more highly educated with a better knowledge of pedagogy and content areas.

2. Teachers will have a better knowledge and more input into school and educational goals, with an understanding of their own contributions toward achieving them.
3. Status differences between teachers and administrators will be minimized.

4. School will become less bureaucratic, with more decisions made at the local district and even the school site level.

5. Teacher collaboration will become more prevalent, with teachers working together to make decisions that affect them and their work.

6. Schools will move away from perfunctory performance measures and toward meaningful evaluation and renewal for teachers and all other school personnel.

7. Teachers will exercise more control over professional matters and over the profession itself.

8. The nature of teaching work will become more diverse, with different teachers assuming different roles and responsibilities.

9. There will be a strong emphasis on capacity building among educators rather than on control.

10. Teachers will be paid a competitive, professional wage.

Incentives for teachers will play an important role in achieving this vision. The reports indicate that the teaching profession needs to change. As the profession changes, the incentives to become a participating, growing, and appreciated member of that profession will change. Students deserve the best teachers our nation has to offer and teachers deserve the best our nation has to offer to them.
REFERENCES


Kathryn M. Lind

Reaction to

A Reform Agenda:
The Call for Teacher Incentives

This paper provides a synthesis of the current status of teacher incentives in the United States. The discussion is focused around the following policy issues which provided an organized basis for discussion: Why is there a need at this particular time to consider the design of incentives plans? What shall be the intention and direction of incentive planning? Who shall bear the responsibility for addressing both the quality and quantity concerns of the teacher work force? Finally, how do teacher incentives fit into the widespread call for educational reform?

Wisconsin, similar to other states, established a task force to examine issues associated with attracting, preparing, and retaining quality teachers. While Wisconsin's Task Force on Teaching and Teacher Education was appointed before A Nation at Risk was released, it considered many of the same issues. In addressing the improvement of teaching in Wisconsin, the Task Force focused on: 1) Attracting able men and women to the teaching profession; 2) preparing them adequately and appropriately to teach in elementary and secondary schools; and 3) retaining able, competent teachers and facilitating their continuing professional development. The Task Force recommended the creation of a system of incentives which would act to improve the quality and the appeal of the teaching profession at each of these states. A Teaching Incentives Pilot Program (TIPP) was established in January of 1984 to plan, develop and implement a series of pilot projects which modeled different types of incentives for teachers including: (a) incentives and innovations for training new teachers and for staff development, (b) incentives for retaining teachers in their profession through the development of career ladder structures, (c) incentives for retaining teachers through monetary and nonmonetary awards, and (d) combinations which link the three levels of incentives. The Teaching Incentives Pilot Program has been operating for two years, and the basis of my reactions to this paper will be based on my experiences with the Teaching Incentives Program.

Dr. Kathryn Lind is Director of the Teaching Incentives Pilot Program for the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction. She was a secondary teacher for 10 years. Most recently, she has been working on induction models and teacher incentive plans.
Establishing the Need for Incentives

How Do We Define the Problem?

Two of the most critical questions to be addressed are: What is the problem to be solved? and, Who is defining the problem?

In Wisconsin, the Task Force on Teaching and Teacher Education defined and answered these questions. The needs established by the Task Force pointed to issues very similar to those examined on a national level. Information gathered by Wisconsin's Teaching and Teacher Education Task Force pointed to several critical considerations which documented the need for an incentives program designed to improve teacher quality. One issue used to document the need for an incentives program was the fact that many of those who choose to go into teacher education programs were, as a group, less academically talented than students who choose most other college majors. Second, the most academically able teachers tended to be the first to leave education and are doing so in increasing numbers. Third, approximately 50 percent of those who take jobs as teachers leave the teaching profession within five years. Finally, research statistics from the National Education Association indicated that the percentage of college freshmen planning to become elementary or secondary teachers has dropped from 19.3 percent in 1970 to 4.7 percent in 1982.

In response to these facts, members of the Wisconsin Task Force came to agree with educator, Gary Sykes (1983), that "public policy must create magnets to draw the talented as well as screens to keep the unqualified out." The task force also recognized the need for public schools to create environments that are conducive to the retention of the most academically able teachers in the public school, who as the research had indicated, tend to be the first to leave the profession. The Teaching Incentives Pilot Program was developed based on these assumptions.

The only problem not addressed by the Task Force, that was discussed in this paper, was the loss of occupational prestige and the need to improve conditions under which teachers work. These concerns, however, did surface as statewide incentive programs began to evolve.
In January of 1984, an Advisory Board was appointed by the State Superintendent to develop the guidelines for a state incentives program. The Advisory Board was composed of the presidents of both the Wisconsin Federation of Teachers and the Wisconsin Education Association Council, the executive secretary of the Wisconsin Association of School Boards, the chair of the Department of Educational Administration at the University of Wisconsin--Madison, two principals, a district administrator, a representative of the business community and a parish priest who is a former president of a private college.

The Advisory Board recommended that two principles should direct the thrust of the pilot programs: 1) cooperation among the different systems of education (universities, school districts, the state education agency) responsible for teacher education, employment and continued professional reinforcement and development; 2) joint planning and action by teachers, administrators, school boards and community members in pilot project activities. The objectives of the Teaching Incentives Pilot Program (TIPP) established by the Advisory Board were:

1. To develop and encourage innovations in teacher education which attract and retain talented teachers, including: improved programs of undergraduate recruitment; clinical teaching and field experience; and assistance/assessment for first-year teachers;

2. To develop and encourage innovative structural incentives for teachers such as three or four stage career ladders and teacher specialist program models;

3. To develop and encourage programs which recognize and reward the accomplishments of teachers including: challenging professional responsibilities and staff development opportunities; progressive remuneration based on a teaching career ladder; and the recognition of excellence in teaching.

Following the development of the TIPP objectives, a series of six regional information meetings were held throughout the state. All school districts in the state of Wisconsin were invited and encouraged to bring a team consisting of district administrators, teachers, university representatives, school board members, and community members. The purpose of these meetings was to encourage districts to apply for a grant to pilot an incentive project in their district.
School districts were informed that funding of the pilot projects would depend upon how much money was appropriated in the 1985-87 biennial budget by Wisconsin's legislature. Funding of the projects by the state might be anywhere from 50 percent to 100 percent. Thus, districts were aware from the beginning that there was no guarantee of state funding.

The orientation meetings primarily focused on a lengthy discussion of the needs for an incentive program as established by the Task Force Report. Participants at these regional meetings were informed that the most academically able were not entering the teaching profession, and that 50 percent of the most academically able teachers were leaving after five years. "We need incentives to attract the best and retain the best." After the first two orientation sessions the staff from the Department of Public Instruction (DPI) could not fully understand the resistance, or lack of enthusiasm, on the part of teachers and some administrators. District administrators contacted DPI voicing their concern over resistance from various teacher groups.

After numerous discussions, the staff at DPI began to recognize that the need for incentives, as identified by the state, was insulting the integrity of experienced teachers. The implication was that they were not and would not do their jobs properly without the use of incentives. Teachers did not perceive the problem presented as establishing the need for an incentive program. The teachers viewed the program as a "top down" initiative from the state department with the support of their local administrator. Teachers did not agree that only the best were leaving or that the best were not attracted to the teaching profession. Further, many district administrators disagreed with the Department's rationale for the need for incentives. Therefore, at the remaining orientation meetings, the DPI staff emphasized that local districts had to establish the need for an incentive program based on input from the teachers, district administrators and school board, and community members. Further, it was recognized not only should these segments of the educational community determine what their needs are, but they all should be in agreement.

DPI staff recognized the fact that the proper definition of the problem had to be a local issue and that who defined the problem was as critical as at what level it was defined. Teachers may see one need, administrators another, and school board a third. For the program to function, however, all parties must agree on the need, or the
definition of the problem to be solved. This approach met with less resistance and allowed districts to develop a program that fit into their local district philosophy.

After two years of piloting, DPI has discovered that the most predominant reasons districts developed incentives programs were based on teachers’ sense of their loss of status in the profession and the need to improve conditions under which teachers work. In Wisconsin, we have discovered that the more academically able are entering the teaching profession, and in fact, enrollments in the school of education have increased. Further, evidence indicates that teachers, at least in Wisconsin, are not leaving the profession in large numbers after five years.

Examining the Intent of Incentives

How to solve the problem? Who solves the problem?

Following the six orientation meetings, districts were informed of the application process. Each district was required to develop a School District Development Council consisting of teachers, community members, school board members, administrators, and university representatives. The intent was to involve, in the planning process, those constituent groups that would be most affected by a pilot program in the district/community. It was crucial that everyone not only agreed on the need/problem, but also what is the intent of the plan or solution to the problem?

The Advisory Board for the Teaching Incentives Pilot Program firmly believed that by creating a planning committee representative of all the segments of the educational community, and requiring a vote by the teachers organization, they would ensure a successful project. During the planning phase of the projects, many failed because they could not agree on how to solve the problem. For example, in one district the problem was defined as "how do you motivate a maturing staff?" The administrators viewed the solution as one of monitoring and "tightening up standards, get them off dead center." The teachers' solution was to provide more input in decision-making, more professional growth activities, and more awards for recognition. The School Board felt the solution
was to establish more control over the administrators who would in turn implement merit pay. Needless to say, a program never was developed to meet these varying perspectives.

In some districts, a well conceived plan was developed by a so-called "representative council" only to be defeated by a faculty vote. The problem: the committee members were not true spokespersons for their constituents. In these instances the committee had been picked without considering the legitimacy of the appointments. It is crucial that the individuals in charge of developing the incentive plan are respected and true spokespersons for their constituency.

Finally, it is critical that the committee that is appointed develops and generates a sense of trust. Trust between administrators, teachers, and school board is essential for a successful incentive program.

Unfortunately, our projects did not have the benefit of the matrix as presented in Bartell's paper. This would have been an extremely useful tool for our early projects. Our projects were focused primarily on training incentives (assistance for first-year teachers) a narrowly defined career ladder (primarily monetary rewards) and an awards for excellence program.

Most districts only investigated monetary rewards without examining how different incentives motivate different people. These particular districts had a very simplistic view of what motivates human behavior. Based on what we knew about incentives at the time, however, they were not at fault.

The most successful programs were those that tried to provide a variety of incentives based on a variety of needs within their staff. Fortunately or unfortunately, these projects discovered the individualized approach as exemplified in the matrix through trial and error. It was only after the entire staff did not apply to be mentors, or did not apply for mini grants, or did not ask for extended contracts, that many projects reexamined their plans.

After a year of struggling, many projects reviewed their needs and asked the critical, but easily dismissed question, "Do the goals of our incentive plan meet our local needs?" Even though this was a requirement in the application process, it wasn't until districts began to experiment with incentives that they recognized this seemingly simplistic relationship.
Therefore, many of our districts have begun to abandon goals or solutions that have no bearing on their district situation. Further, they have begun to examine the career stages of their teachers and how different incentives relate to different career stages. In one series of interviews conducted with teachers in a pilot program, valuable information was obtained to assist a district's program. For example, one district had the majority of their incentives money in mini grants and special project awards. Although this is a valuable program, after interviewing about 50 teachers, it was discovered this was not perceived as an incentive. Most of the teachers were mid-career, raising a family, and did not feel additional work for additional money was an incentive. Most of the teachers interviewed would have preferred release time or a nonmonetary recognition for a job well done. There are numerous other examples; however, the point is that incentives need to address a specific agreed upon district need as well as relate to the individual needs of the staff.

In conclusion, the best incentives programs have developed their incentives program on an individual basis rather than one set of incentives for the entire staff.

Determining the Responsibility for Incentives

There definitely is a specific role for national, state, and local leadership. I agree with Bartell's analysis that there is a responsibility on the national level to provide leadership and financial support. Further, that the states need to provide leadership and financial support. However, reform has to happen at the local level. It has never been more apparent than through the Wisconsin experience that it is at the local level that reform will occur.

Linking Incentives to Educational Reform

Incentives will reform our educational system if we perceive them as mechanisms for change rather than mechanisms for maintaining the status quo through cosmetic reform.
Questions and Concerns on Educational Reform

1. Will the reform movement end with regulation or continue on and implement the rewards of reform? Is the reform movement a series of clubs without any carrots?

2. What are the unintended results of the incentive programs? How have we set the working environment of teachers?

3. Will the incentives be individualized or centralized?

4. How do incentives fit into the reform movement? Are they a change agent or a mechanism to maintain the status quo?
Redesigning Careers
For Current and Future Teachers

Abstract Imbedded in the Carnegie Commission report and the Holmes Group report is the belief that teaching should be carefully examined and reorganized. This redesign requires the examination of all aspects of teaching work, the nature and distribution of work resources, and the power distribution in schools. No fundamental change in teaching can be implemented without affecting the work and status of others, including principals, supervisors, directors, and students.

This paper explores the implications of a research agenda on job redesign teacher career ladders. The effects of the work redesign on school site interactions, district policies, principals' work, teacher career plans, and power distribution within schools are explored. The importance of this data for the assessment of the variety of teacher incentive programs that can be included in a teacher reform package are discussed, both for current teachers and for the future allure of teaching in the minds of young people choosing a career.

Job redesign can provide a resource for the analysis of teacher incentive policies. Providing important conceptual and practical guidance, the literature spans the gamut of social and managerial sciences. This paper applies some of the issues raised by job redesign to current questions in the development and implementation of teacher incentive strategies.

The Carnegie Commission report on the teaching profession (1986) and the Holmes Group Report on teacher preparation (1986) argue that teaching should be carefully analyzed and reorganized. The Holmes Report states:

Improving teaching's attraction and retention powers requires a differentiated professional teaching force able to respond to the opportunities provided by a staged career that would make and reward formal distinction about responsibilities and degrees of autonomy.

Similar arguments focus the Carnegie Commission (1986) recommendations for redefined roles and working relationships in teaching:

Not only do professionals typically have a range of support staff and services available, but they are usually organized so that the most able among them

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influence in many ways the work that others do, from broad policy direction to the development of staff members who might some day take on major responsibilities. This, too, is a matter of simple efficiency, making sure that the experience and still embodied in these valuable people makes itself felt throughout the enterprise....

Highly skilled and experienced teachers are typically used no differently than the novice. The system rarely takes advantage of their expertise in ways that would make it available to less skilled members of the staff.

Both reports emphasize the haphazard use of expertise and the lack of career opportunities that characterize teaching work. The reports' authors see the redesign -- restructuring and redistribution of tasks and compensation -- of teaching work as a visible approach for the amelioration of identified deficiencies.

Framework

Research reports in job redesign were examined for their applicability to teacher career ladder efforts. Four conceptual categories were distilled for use in this paper: (1) job characteristics; (2) the influence of social meaning on work choices and assessments; (3) individual roles; and (4) the administrative link. The implications of this literature for the assessment of teacher career redesign programs as incentives for current and future teachers are discussed.

Job Characteristics

The literature suggests that the motivating potential of job characteristics can be identified and changed. However, situational constraints, task interdependence, and impacts on other jobs influence the potential affect of redesign efforts.

Job Characteristics Model

The job characteristics model of work redesign, developed by Hackman and his colleagues (Hackman & Lawler, 1971), is a framework for assessing the motivating potential of a job. Job characteristics are conceptualized as influences on psychological
states leading to a variety of personal and work outcomes. (For a critical review of this model see Roberts, K.H., & Glick, W. (1981). The job characteristics approach to task design: A critical review. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 66*, 193-217.) Five objective characteristics are viewed as pivotal: skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, and feedback. Additionally, individual differences in skill, knowledge, and growth needs affect the potential of job characteristics for influencing work behavior and attitudes.

The original job characteristics model was constructed as a linear relationship (Hackman & Lawler, 1971). This relationship could be moderated by individual growth needs that shape the relative assessment of the motivating potential of each job (See also Green & Novak, 1982).

Evidence that the task, feedback, and autonomy effect on the motivating potential of a job is a vigorous one, though it may not be linear, has accumulated (Brief, Wallace, & Aldag, 1976). For example, a number of studies demonstrate that task dimensions, autonomy, and feedback, even when they exist in the absence of other job characteristics, can positively affect people's assessment of their work. The separate nature of skill variety, task identity, and task significance is not clear, however, nor is their isolation from perceptions about feedback (which may affect judgments of task significance, etc.) and other job dimensions.

The job characteristics model provides a framework for examining teacher task, autonomy, and feedback structures in schools. The model holds considerable potential, for example, for understanding the relationship of work isolation (Lortie, 1964) to concepts of autonomy held by teachers. The impact of autonomy conceptualization on new structures of teaching requiring interaction, collegial diagnosis, and problem solving will need to be monitored. The model might be used to assess new tasks, autonomous work, supervision, and feedback structures that support the work. A merit pay system requiring the assessment of individual teacher contributions to outcomes might also be evaluated. Since evidence suggests that some interventions meant as incentives can conflict with the nature of the work, becoming disincentives (Malen, Murphy, & Hart, forthcoming), the motivating potential of teacher work manipulation holds promise as an assessment tool.
The diagnosis of needs and design of tasks is the core of job redesign. Bacharach and Conley (1986) summarize the argument:

...[I]n education, we never appropriately design the jobs of teachers, and rarely specify what it is they do in their jobs. Therefore, we spend disproportionate amounts of time... appraising the individual rather than evaluating the task. ... Contemporary management recognizes that workers must have opportunities to develop themselves and must have a sense of career movement.... A genuine career development system, concerned with the development of professionals... would have as its primary concern the expansion of teacher skills, and with promotion would come further opportunities for teachers to expand their skills. (pp. 12-13)

Situational Constraints

The job characteristics model of work redesign is shifting its emphasis toward contextual and situational moderators of objective job characteristics. This shift has led to a continually more complex view of work change efforts (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978; Hackman & Oldham, 1980). For example, Hackman and Oldham (1980) describe the constraining influence of dissatisfaction with work contexts such as pay, job security, supervision, and interpersonal relations as moderators of the effects of jobs on satisfaction, motivation, and performance.

Peters and O’Connor (1980) and Mitchell (1986) identify resources critical to the work place. While Peters and O’Connor emphasize the constraining influence of these resources, and Mitchell views resources as work features to be manipulated, choices about work design or career opportunity structures should take into consideration the unique distribution of these resources in each setting (district or school). The resources are: 1) information; 2) materials, supplies, or clients (students); 3) budget; 4) human support service; 5) training or knowledge; 6) time; 7) physical work environment and space; 8) tools and equipment; and 9) authority.

Resource constraints apply to teaching. Incentives are not manipulated in a vacuum. Without the necessary resources, teacher incentives are unlikely to substantially improve education. Teacher incentive plans will also interact with the effects of other school improvement efforts. For example, Lipsky (1976) argues that teachers will have little or no energy or commitment to devote to rethinking or reorganizing their work if they lack the basic resources to do what they are already expected to do well.
However, as Mitchell points out, the probability is high that current resources could be reorganized and redistributed to provide a more attractive work structure and increase teacher career growth opportunities.

Bacharach and Conley (1986), Bacharach, Conley, and Shedd (1986), and Mitchell (1986), use situational resources to assess teacher career opportunity designs. They emphasize the need to analyze the work of schools free from the biases of past practice. Once a history free examination is complete, educators will be more able to distribute a school's resources to accomplish tasks. The redistribution and restructuring of tasks can then undergird career development opportunities, making career long growth a reality for teachers in a restructured job setting. Job design, Mitchell (1986) argues, requires data collection, diagnosis, and then design, not just the assignment of tasks or jobs to teachers for some additional compensation.

**Task Interdependence**

In addition to task diagnosis and resource allocation, the interdependence and direction of dependence in work affect responses to job redesign. Teachers are dependent on one another and on many other forces in the school and environment -- students' background and motivation, parents, administrators, public policy, cultural mores and values, and the supply of critical resources. The autonomy-equality-civility pattern of norms that dominates teaching (Lortie, 1964; Malen, Murphy, & Hart, forthcoming) -- isolated work, all teachers treated alike, polite nonintervention -- reinforces a belief in independence, although interdependence is a reality.

The intensity and direction (or multi-directionality) of dependence, revealing relationships among task structures, job characteristics, and worker motivation (Kiggundu, 1983), are important. A variety of effects emerge. For example, the increased interdependence of teachers occurring when school-wide responsibilities are included in levels of a career ladder or in a redistribution of the authority resource in schools will affect teacher perceptions of their own responsibility for work outcomes. Other features manipulated in teacher incentive plans, such as collegial work generated
by mentor teachers and school-wide improvement efforts, will also increase interdependence and the visibility of interdependence.

The job redesign literature on task interdependence has several implications for future reforms and research agendas. First, interdependence does not appear to erode autonomy. It can contribute to a sense of efficacy and responsibility in work (Kiggundu, 1983). Teachers who facilitate and support the work of others might benefit not only from a personally expanded scope and criticality of work but from satisfaction in the improvement of others' work. Second, the enhancement of task dependency between teachers does not mean that novices would develop relationships negatively affecting their own job and career attitudes. The result might be, on the other hand, redefinitions of autonomy and collegiality more congruent with their meanings in other professional jobs and the expressed desires of young American workers (Hall, 1976).

**Effect of Job Redesign on Others' Work**

Interdependence in work also assures that job redesign affects everyone in an organization. The impact ranges from the creation of new work roles and new support roles, through intermediate influences on the feedback and supervisory relationships, to the restructuring of authority and power relationships between people.

For example, mentor teachers often assume responsibilities for providing supervision and feedback. Snyder, Williams, and Cashman (1984) investigated the strength of age, tenure, and work perceptions as predictors of responses to feedback provided by superiors. Unlike some other studies suggesting that older employees will resent feedback, they found that the personal relationship with the supervisor is a far more powerful moderator of attitudes than age or tenure. Additionally, the more expertise demonstrated by the supervisor on critical tasks, the more positive the reaction to performance feedback.

Personal relationship and demonstrated expertise should, consequently, influence teacher mentor roles and principals' abilities to supervise the new teacher leaders. While the challenges of establishing new norms of supervision and feedback cannot be
understated (given the strength of the autonomy-equality-civility pattern of norms), they are surmountable, particularly if addressed at the individual level, focusing on relationships and demonstrated expertise.

In addition to new role development, tinkering with one job affects other jobs. Hackman and Oldham (1980) point out that the work of immediate supervisors is profoundly affected by changes in the work patterns and authority structures of those they supervise. Berg, Freedman, and Freeman (1976) go further, reminding "all reformers that increasing one person's satisfaction may not be possible without reducing another's" (p. xii). One important influence appears when unions and management confront job redesign. When the package of roles and rewards has been painstakingly bargained, it is not easily reconstructed (p. xiii).

Job redesign analysts return repeatedly to the challenge redesign poses for the assumptions and processes of evaluation and supervision. Cherns (1976), while acknowledging that the quality of the work performed improves and the quality of employee work experiences and satisfaction is enhanced by job redesign, also cautions that data on output remain mixed. More recent reports concur (Hackman & Oldham, 1980). Job redesign poses a challenge for organizational policies and practices such as training, career development, compensation, and supervision. Small incremental changes, often adjustments meant only to make people more comfortable, can neutralize the effects of job redesign. Hackman and Oldham call this the "vanishing effect." Cherns suggests that the redesign of the supervisor's job is a prerequisite -- making support for subordinates an integral part of supervisors' responsibilities and refocusing the supervisor's attention from the management of subordinates' behaviors to the management of the organizational context.

The impact of teacher job redesign on the work of principals cannot be ignored. If a comprehensive career development program that increases teacher scope and criticalness within the school power and decision-making structure is developed, principals will serve a far different role in schools -- as heads of school leadership teams, as group leaders, or as articulators (Hart, Kauchak, & Stevens, 1986). Some principals, socialized when they were the only authority in a school, find this a threatening proposition. Others find it invigorating. Whatever the response, teacher job redesign will not take place isolated from the work of others.
Social Meaning in Work

Many social and context variables affect people's choices and behavior at work. In job redesign research a variety of factors are identified, among them: participation in the redesign; the social cues sent and received in the workplace; personal characteristics and previous career decisions; and group differences. Ample evidence that job redesign decisions cannot be made free from the social, context abounds.

Participation

One variable affecting attitudes about jobs is participation in the redesign of the work. Much of the literature exploring the impact of social context (isolated from objective job characteristics) argues that the level of participation in the redesign by those who perform the work is an important factor (Strauss, 1977). Participation in the development process has also been identified in recent teacher incentive research as a powerful moderator of attitudes. For example, participation is credited as a major component of early acceptance by teachers of various career ladder designs (Cornett, 1986; Hart, 1985; Utah Department of Education, 1985; Rosenholtz, in press).

Other researchers argue that participation in the redesign will affect attitudes. Jans (1985) states:

People will tend to become involved in their jobs if they can participate in decision-making in the work group and if they are doing work which matches their self-images. This requires managers who are willing and able to share authority with their subordinates. . . . (p. 394)

However, as an isolated variable, participation has not emerged as a uniformly strong influence on long range attitudes about work redesign efforts. Though there may be an initial Hawthorne effect, when the nature of the changes are small or when jobs lack complexity, researchers observe mixed results from attempts to isolate long term main or interaction effects of participation in the design by those who do the work on attitudes about work redesign (Griffith, 1985).
The salience of the redesign to participants may be an important moderator of the participation factor (Jans, 1985). For teachers, the restructuring and redistribution of tasks and rewards could be of critical importance, lying outside their zone of indifference (Hoy & Rees, 1974). Though participation in the design of work should not be ignored, other powerful factors in implementation such as task characteristics, supervisory behavior, or norms and social meaning may be more powerful moderators of long term responses (Hackman & Oldham, 1980; Berman & McLaughlin, 1978).

**Social Cues**

The attitudes of significant others in the work place toward the redesigned work also alter responses. This impact is variously identified as social cues, work place norms, social meaning, and information processing. While most experimental and field studies indicate that task structure and distribution have a greater impact on perceptions, researchers often identify social cues as a major influence on satisfaction and productivity (Griffin, 1982; Vance & Biddle, 1985). Social attitudes can mold perceptions of jobs in isolation of objective features of the work (Adler, Skov, & Salvemini, 1985).

Social information from leaders at the work site is one influence on attitudes. Green and Novak (1982), manipulating feedback from supervisors, the design of jobs, and leader-member exchange, found that leader behaviors accounted for significant variance in attitudes about a redesign effort.

Because of the influence of supervisor input on work attitudes, the response of faculty to a redesign effort might be significantly affected by the behavior and attitudes of the principal, regardless of the career ladder plan itself or the participation of teachers in designing the new structure. Early comparative case study data in schools support this conclusion (Hart, 1986c; Hart & Murphy, 1986). Other teachers also influence attitudes in teacher job redesign efforts. The sanctions applied by peers who accuse teachers in new roles of "exalting themselves above other teachers" or "kissing up to the administration" (Hart, forthcoming, 1986a, 1986b; Malen & Hart, forthcoming), provide clear social cues to those who venture to change.
Meaning is also influenced by the focus of attention. The impact of studying attitudes on attitudes may be a stumbling block to the appropriate evaluation of job redesign efforts for teachers. Asking questions about attitudes affects them. Social cues also confound causality in the measurement of job redesign attitudes (Weiss & Iler, 1981).

Social information processing raises additional questions for job redesign. The teacher incentive effort assumes that rewards valued by teachers and potential teachers can be identified and addressed. However, relationships among intrinsic and extrinsic factors (often manipulated by incentive structures) may be muddied. Skinner (1971), and others, found that people may identify the rewards they receive as the rewards they value. This relationship is independent of fundamental preferences. Teacher reliance on intrinsic, relational rewards (Lortie, 1975) could thus be as much a result of the lack of sufficient extrinsic rewards (or the interaction between insufficient extrinsic rewards and the prevalence of intrinsic rewards) as it is a natural preference for relational/intrinsic reinforcement.

Social interaction research in job redesign adds further support to the suspicion that the rewards valued in work are influenced by social cues and previous experience. Pfeffer and Lawler (1980) investigated the effects of salary, the availability of job alternatives, tenure, and the length of time in the organization on satisfaction and intention to leave in a random sample of 4,058 university faculty. Their data affirm the relationship between commitment to a job (defined as the decision to remain) and the definition of salient rewards congruent with the setting. Social information processing theories (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) suggest that teachers, once committed to remain in the profession, unconsciously rationalize their decision by developing attitudes consonant with their behavior. In its strongest form, this phenomenon is known as the insufficient justification hypothesis. Consequently, changes in opportunity structures may alter values over time and a broad spectrum of rewards for teachers should be considered.

More serious implications of social meaning also arise for those attempting reform. In the early stages of change, attempts to improve can make things worse.
By attempting to improve conditions one is led almost inevitably to a series of activities which focus attention on problems, increasing their salience, and raising expectations for change and improvement. Both increasing problem salience and causing employees to expect change can lessen satisfaction with the present work environment. (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978, p. 242)

The attention teaching is receiving contributes to teacher dissatisfaction.

**Personal and Career Interactions**

The relationship between values held by current teachers, different groups of teachers, and target recruitment populations further complicates job redesign efforts. Research on the interaction between past job experiences and current personality traits led Broussseau (1978) to argue that individual personality differences themselves result in part from qualitative differences in the work people experience as they move along their career paths.

The relationship between experience and redesigned jobs has other implications for recruitment and retention efforts in teaching. For example, more complex individuals seek to attain more and find more emotional well-being as a result of their attainment. The target population for teacher recruitment, highly qualified and able people, would thus be more likely to seek opportunities not valued by others. Many teachers, after years committed to their profession, have few available avenues for attainment. Schrag (1983) argues that, at 40, a teacher has few options -- limited to administration, exit, or bitterness. The absence of options in the teaching career may be a significant cause of stress. Job redesign, aimed specifically at creating a variety of career options, may thus hold promise as a direction worthy of attention.

Career-based attitudes and involvement have also been studied. McKelvey and Sekaran (1977) worked to develop a career-based theory of job involvement using a sample of scientists and engineers. The positive correlates with job involvement they identified merit attention from education reformers. Positive organizational factors were centralization, opportunities for advancement in authority and responsibility, open communication, autonomy, opportunity to use knowledge and skills, opportunity to
grow and learn new skills, and freedom to carry out their ideas. Positive professional factors were interest in innovation, challenge building a professional reputation, work on difficult and challenging problems, contributions to knowledge, and fun on the job. Negative correlates were local orientation and technical orientation. The growth, expertise, and status emphasis in job involvement for this population is clear. Colloquialism's negative impact is also clear.

**Group Differences**

Groups differ substantially in their responses to features of work. For example, most of the statistically significant factors affecting job involvement in the sample of engineers and scientists studied by McKelvey and Sekaran (1977) were rooted in different subgroups; markedly different factors were important for each subgroup. Consequently, assumptions that teachers make up a homogeneous group that will respond to features of work uniformly may be flawed. One can question the wisdom of adjusting policy decisions about teacher incentive and job redesign solely on the basis of attitudinal surveys of the existing teacher population. A target population for recruitment may differ substantially from current teachers, and subgroups within teaching may also vary in their values. Research on career group differences identifies more within group variance than between group variance (McKelvey & Sekaran, 1977), and long experience may affect personal preferences more than original inherent characteristics (Herman & Hulin, 1972).

These data raise a serious question for career redesign for teaching -- whether the career can be structured so that individuals from the target populations will select and remain in it. While McKelvey and Sekaran (1977) argue that: "Managers should therefore design jobs with the expectation that different types of employees look for different things" (p. 301), it is politically difficult to admit that a policy is designed to encourage some people to leave teaching and discourage others from choosing teaching as a career.

The difficulty is amplified when a redesign effort seeks to directly affect a job's appeal and motivating potential. Differences in individual preference (O'Reilly & Roberts, 1975; Vecchio, 1980) and in previous group membership and socialization (Van Maanen, 1978; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979) shape people's work preferences. McKelvey
and Sekaran point out that people often choose a job because of its characteristics. Those who currently work as teachers chose the job as it is. In a study of student teacher orientations toward work and career structures required for a job redesign career ladder, Hart and Adan's (1986) found that student teachers may initially resist attempts to socialize them into more collegial and autonomous (though not isolated) work patterns. If barely socialized recruits resist new patterns of interacting and organizing work, seasoned veterans pose a much greater challenge.

Evidence suggests that the school system selects people who are able to adjust to it. Fein (1974) describes the mechanism through which this happens. "The combination of the worker's choice to remain and management's decision that the worker is acceptable initially screens out workers who might find the work dissatisfying" (p. 81). This argument suggests that teaching is poorly organized to meet expressed recruitment and retention goals.

Early studies isolating responses of teacher groups to job redesign career ladders affirm findings in other settings. For example, Hart (forthcoming) found that highly experienced high school teachers were substantially more negative toward all features of a job redesign than any other group. Other group differences were apparent; career ladder involvement and career stage affected responses. Career ladder teachers in mid-career, elementary school teachers, and teachers involved directly in career ladder work were most positive in their overall assessment of opportunities, career ladder teacher work, and effects on school-wide performance.

Teacher group differences are identified outside the incentives literature as well. Applying Schein's (1971a) rationale, DeLong (1982) found that teachers differ in their career orientations. Describing the needs of rural educators, DeLong (1983) isolated two career factors. Factor 1 -- managerial competence autonomy, variety, and creativity -- describes the preferences of teachers more interested in supervising, organizing, and creating. DeLong argues that many teachers who find themselves getting bored fall into this category. Autonomy was a central theme for this group, and members said they were more comfortable with the thought of leaving education. Factor 2 -- technical competence and security -- describes teachers who took their greatest career satisfaction in knowing that others saw them as excellent teachers. The dichotomy of
appealing features in education targeted by these two groups is striking and again emphasizes the difficulties faced by those who attempt to define and design jobs for target populations of teachers.

Roles

Work role transitions are an important part of job change. If teacher career redesign is to be a reality in school settings, then the transitions required by individual teachers will be very different from those they now experience. An unfamiliar set of boundaries between roles that must be spanned will be created. Career redesign for teachers will require that managers and researchers address the adjustments necessary for teachers and administrators who must function as boundary spanners (Latack, 1984). The effects of transition on role ambiguity and role overload will need to be examined.

Teachers involved in career development and redesign may be required to invent roles and relationships in the school setting as they go along. Current plans often include detailed role descriptions and reward structures. However, good evidence that organizational change can take place through the role innovative behaviors of new incumbents exists in the job redesign literature (Nicholson, 1984; Schein, 1971b). More interest and attention should be paid to the dynamic of developing teacher career patterns shaped by the early incumbents in new roles. Two issues, identified in role transitions research, can form the basis of early inquiries into teaching redesign: the amount of discretion to develop new roles granted by the school and district; and the novelty of behavior and role expectations (Nicholson, 1984). Emerging evidence that role innovative behavior is taking place in teacher career ladder plans appears in longitudinal case studies (Hart, 1986c).

The roles of teachers are firmly established by tradition. Changes will require considerable effort. Role ambiguity and overload are particular dangers linked with work stress and will occur in any redesign effect (See Toffler, 1981). Ambiguity -- uncertainty about how the job should be done -- and overload -- perceptions that the job is beyond one's resources and capabilities -- cause job stress. Latack (1984) argues that both these role features, in excess, can require such an investment of personal resources in the coping process that the individual finds adjustment difficult.
Job redesign often results in both role ambiguity and role overload. Hart (1986b) found that promoted teachers often wonder what to do even when given elaborate job descriptions, and districts, principals, and faculties often hold unrealistic expectations of them. Additionally, career ladder teachers find themselves in a no man's land between administration and teaching that causes considerable personal discomfort. Promoted teachers report stress as a result. In one study, only half the promoted teachers reappeared for their positions after the first year (Hart, 1986b).

The Administrative Link

Policymakers and managers are critical factors in job redesign efforts. Data from the implementation of teacher career ladders indicate that state political and education leaders, district superintendents, and principals are visible articulators, influencing the shape and vigor of change efforts (Malen & Hart, forthcoming). Managers are critical actors, capable of crippling a job redesign effort by misinterpreting, changing, or quietly opposing its features and assumptions or by leaving before the implementation is well established (Berg, Freedman, & Freeman, 1976).

The leadership link is critical as teachers make sense of an incentive reform's impetus. While people rush headlong into a variety of incentive packages, many teachers and principals ask what the purpose of the reform is (Hart & Murphy, 1986). Increased school performance is difficult to define, and simply acquiring state appropriated funds has become an aim in many settings (Malen & Hart, forthcoming). The presence of strong, articulate leadership, particularly at the district and school level, is a necessary ingredient to combat the propensity to see the implementation of an incentive structure as another way to punish, regulate, and control teachers.

Other administrative pitfalls, isolated during analyses of the early experiments in job redesign in industry, emphasize the administrative link. Walton (1974) suggests that seven things went awry in field experiments he reviewed:
1. Managers failed to follow through on efforts that had heightened the expectations of workers.

2. Managers were simply unwilling to reduce supervision and materially increase workers' influence in critical decisions.

3. Managers failed to reduce turnover to a threshold level (10 percent), leaving the requisite bank of necessary skills too depleted for the redesigned and enlarged work to be effectively executed.

4. Managers accepted new appointments, thereby draining the pool of qualified, trained successors committed to work redesign.

5. Managers lost their consultants to other clients.

6. Managers could not contend with the expansion of work to be performed by the relevant work unit.

7. Managers could not maintain a steady state in the experimental operation when pressures developed for greater predictability and certainty and for less movement of personnel, more specialization among workers, and close supervision.

Perhaps this emphasis on managers misrepresents the complexity of job redesign interaction effects, but it is indicative of the leadership challenges that will be faced in schools where incentive plans are implemented.

The long range staying power of commitment is a critical issue for teachers caught up in the reform movement for the last three years. Hart (1986a, 1986b), Hart, Kauchak, and Stevens (1986), and Hart and Murphy (1986) found considerable skepticism about legislative and societal resolve in career ladder legislation. If teachers perceive the job redesign movement as another enthusiasm destined to disappear with the changing tides rather than as a serious attempt to address the structure of teacher work and careers over time, they will be less likely to invest serious effort into the painful adjustments necessary.

Conclusions

While work redesign literature offers insight into questions for research on teacher incentive structures, it also illuminates pitfalls that lie ahead of any teacher job redesign endeavor.
Efforts to redesign jobs have not produced results that were generally persuasive in validity or consistent in direction, although there are tantalizing bits of evidence..., which suggest the potential value of the approach to both the quality of working life and economic performance. Those who wish to experiment should be prepared to make major job changes, for it is apparent that to do less is likely to be ineffectual. Moreover, evidence also suggests that such experiments are likely to succeed only if (a) workers are psychologically ready for it, which is more likely to be true of young, affluent, and better educated workers, and (b) the production technology lends itself to such change. (Katell, Yankelovich et al. quoted in Berg, Freedman, & Freeman, 1976, p. 184)

Although we want innovative solutions to a perceived crisis in schools, we also want to achieve the reformation (not necessarily revolution) in ways congruent with prevailing norms and values. This goal may be counter-productive, as well as elusive. As Renshaw (1986, p. 259) points out: "It may be America’s curse or its genius that we wish to reform as many things as possible while changing things as little as possible." Malen, Murphy, and Hart (forthcoming) argue that an incentive structure should either be congruent with existing norms or powerful enough to change them. Change is a viable option. However, if rhetoric on teacher incentives blames all failures on teachers or the nature of schools, policy makers may be disinclined to invest resources (Staw & Ross, 1976).

The job redesign literature provides a rich overview of the challenges facing teacher incentives through job redesign over the next several decades. Several issues should be central to policy and research agendas:

1. The tasks, autonomy, and feedback structures of work can be analyzed for their effect on the motivating potential of a job, moderated by individual needs for growth.

2. Any assessment of the quality of work life and the motivating potential of job characteristics is affected by the social cues in the immediate work environment, totally removed from objective characteristics of the work. Consequently, implementation efforts may have only begun when plans move into schools.

3. Meanings -- rewards, control, punishment, criticism -- are attached to teacher incentive programs based on the perceptions and beliefs of the recipients of the policy initiative, not on the intentions of those promoting it.

4. Groups and individuals within teaching can be expected to respond differently to features of teacher incentive plans. Not all features will appeal equally to all groups; features that some groups find attractive will repulse others. This phenomenon of work characteristics is even more complex when
the recruitment of those currently not selecting teaching as a career is a goal. Teachers may be expected to differ on the basis of their experiences, career stage, and personal career needs.

5. Events and interaction patterns at each school, the site of implementation, are critical to the actual assessment of any reform plan. Personal relationships are strong influences. Additionally, supervisors, teachers, and students will, often unwittingly, denigrate features of the reform and promote a vanishing effect by translating work into familiar practice.

6. Any redesign of teaching work will fundamentally alter teacher/principal authority and decision making relationships.

7. Any redesign of teaching work will place serious strains on the supervision and evaluation technology and structure, on employment/promotion decisions and on the supervisory relationship.

8. The effect of job redesign on school-wide effectiveness will be difficult to assess for a long time. Intermediate effects on the career plans of talented young teachers, the appeal of reform features to young people entering the work force, the retention rates of selected groups of teachers, and the accomplishment of school tasks will be easier to assess. Such assessment should begin immediately upon implementation.

9. Stamina, in the form of leadership, articulation, and resolve, is a necessary component of job redesign.

Decades of research and implementation of job redesign reveal the promise of this approach for the improvement of work. Data analyses point to enhanced satisfaction and job involvement; uncover individual and group differences in responses to particular job characteristics; reveal dynamics of social interaction in interpretations of the meaning of redesign; point to the interaction effects of change reverberating throughout an organization; and raise important questions about the resolve necessary to mount such a reform.

Studies elicit cautious optimism toward teacher career redesign. Redesign has potential for increasing the appeal of the teaching career for target populations. However, teaching redesign is a much more complex and interactive effort than current policies suggest. Redesign will take considerably more thoughtful care, leadership, and intervention at all levels, particularly at the local school level, than has yet been acknowledged.
REFERENCES


Dr. Hart provides a significant addition to the current educational literature on teacher incentives and reward systems. By bringing together several key studies from the area of task design she highlights issues and questions having important connotations for the incentives concept. The perspective to which Dr. Hart relates these ideas is the Holmes and Carnegie proposals for differentiating the teaching staff and creating specific career levels.

My reactions to the paper are focused on four areas, (a) highlighting the key points; (b) issues needing further clarification, (c) questions raised by these points; and (d) possible contributions to the design of incentive programs. I will address the potential merits of the concept, as described by Dr. Hart, as opposed to critiquing her interpretation of the concept, in other words supplementing her effort by further interpreting what appears useful.

The purposes for teacher incentives offered by Bartell (1986) -- attraction, retention, improvement and enhancement -- also provide a focus for this discussion. Given Bartell's purposes for teacher incentives we seem to be talking about redesigning the teacher's job in a way which will make it both more attractive and more effective. What we have here then is a set of goals, as stated by Bartell, coupled with a plan for achieving these goals described in the Holmes and Carnegie reports. The notion of career ladders, lead teachers and/or mentors serves as the focus for redesigning the teacher's role with the intent of making it more attractive, increasing retention of the best teachers, and improving and enhancing the position. Job redesign literature can provide data on how to accomplish this change. This literature, however, also needs to be interpreted in the context of current programs, e.g. described by Cornett, 1985; Johnson, 1984; and Rosenholtz and Smylie, 1984.

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Cornett (1985) analyzed career ladder programs and identified a variety of criteria that were used for selection, but also indicated that teachers have not been enthused about accepting the added responsibilities which are part of most systems. Further, experienced teachers were not particularly eager to accept outside assistance from a formally appointed master teacher. Johnson's (1984) analysis of merit pay systems indicates they may result in increased competitiveness, and less cooperation and emphasis on school goals.

According to Rosenholtz and Smylie (1984) the issue of efficacy is of greater importance for teacher motivation than is money. This conclusion would mean better professional preparation, greater professional interaction and collegial activity, with personal rewards being sought through recognition for special contributions. Indications are fairly common that competitive rewards impede collegiality and task improvement.

It appears that added money and changes in responsibility, under the rubric of career ladders and/or mentor teachers, may not be the most viable concept for providing teacher incentives. The value of the concepts might be greater if used in some other form or context than that initially established. Perhaps this is where job redesign literature can make a contribution, to restructure what has been started and provide direction for future development. The implementation of career ladder programs, however, has started to positively impact on beginning teachers and the improvement of professional dialogue. What seems abundantly clear is that teachers are more satisfied and excited about their work if perceiving it to be successful and are more receptive to innovation and professional dialogue when the work environment is supportive and needed resources are provided.

Key Points

Job redesign as presented and interpreted by Dr. Hart offers a conceptual perspective, with a considerable research base, for developing tasks which enhance teacher incentives. This area of study has postulated several important elements integral to the successful design and implementation of job changes. Significant elements from this presentation can be related to job characteristics and implementation factors for new teacher roles.
Job Characteristics

The analysis of job characteristics takes on a fuller meaning when analyzing them for task variety, task identity, and task significance. These factors provide a broad means for analyzing and for developing jobs and reflect significant issues for enhancing teacher incentives. The literature also deals with tasks from a motivational perspective by coupling job tasks with autonomy and feedback.

Although variety is one of the mainstays of career ladder and mentor teacher concepts, the ideas of task identity and significance are not given much thrust. The identity and significance of tasks represents key elements for giving meaning to a change in roles. Without establishing this importance and niche in the organization the tasks can be little more than additional work. The degree of autonomy and feedback as motivational factors gets some attention in current practice, but studies on current incentive plans indicate that the role itself is perceived as motivational and nothing more is needed to clarify the authority one assumes or to enhance the persons satisfaction by giving feedback on the job. Emphasizing motivational factors, particularly of autonomy and feedback, add a significant qualitative dimension to job tasks. These issues represent problem areas for current teachers and teacher leaders. These factors provide a basis for designing a job in a manner which considers both the task and the motivational effects. Studies of job motivation by Herzberg (1976) and Blumberg (1974) reinforce these needs for personal support and feedback.

What sounds to be very productive is to use the variables identified in these studies to actually design a teacher's role. Implicitly, but seldom explicitly described, teachers may themselves have an incomplete perspective on their job. Houle (1980) indicates the importance of this concept for professional workers, to revise and maintain perspective on his/her professional functions and missions, as a significant reason to pursue continuing education activities.
Implementation Factors

Job redesign studies call for careful planning and include elements for personal response, task interdependence, participation, attitudes of significant others, and situational constraints.

Personal and group responses to new roles, as with any new development within a bureaucratic institution, are going to be strong factors influencing change. Not all teachers, either those not selected or those who are selected for new roles, will respond to the roles equally or with the same perceptions. Anticipating and planning for these differences enhance the potential for successful implementation. Most current career ladder and mentor plans are state mandated and generally ignore these ideas.

Task interdependence among teachers, principals, and other staff with related and dependent roles can lead to confusion on the issues of autonomy and collegiality. Teachers have long been branded as working in isolation and only recently has the notion of collegiality become something other than an infrequent term used in the field of supervision. Studies in task design have reported the effects and intended recipient's perceptions and attitudes toward proposed changes and the need for involvement in planning these changes. Here we are addressing an issue which requires a change in role and the development of new relationships among persons normally functioning in other types of relationships. Effectiveness of these new roles is dependent on having the necessary authority, and being able to influence peers to function in different ways. This form of relationship is difficult because it is largely a result of personality and the level of one's expertise. The effects on other personnel, particularly those whose role will be most affected by these changes, is also important. The relationships altered through job redesigns also require organizational support, competence to provide the needed skills inherent in the changes, and clear and supportive communications with supervisors.

A further issue, which has already caused many difficulties in states initiating these new roles, is one of situational constraints; those conditions of a local nature including all the related history, relationships and resources linked to the development of an innovation. Connections are evident between job redesign studies and educational innovation studies regarding issues on budgets, available materials, services to be
provided to the new position, time allocated, and the physical environment. Task design needs to be institutional specific in addressing needs of personnel, individual perceptions and responses to the changes, along with general situational constraints, i.e. supplies, training, and budget distribution of school resources.

Collectively these concepts convey a conceptual perspective which gives added meaning and direction for the improvement of teacher incentive programs whether or not they are in the form of career ladders and mentor teacher programs.

**Issues Needing Further Clarification**

Several issues suggested by this literature need added clarification including teacher specialization, organizational culture, the career development concept, and related professional preparation.

If the teacher's role is to be changed it will undoubtedly be in the direction of specialized tasks not commonly done by all teachers. This smacks somewhat of earlier concepts on differentiated staffing and other attempts to establish alternative assignments for teachers. In fact, the way in which teaching has become specialized is through creating completely different roles which are separated from regular classroom teaching (i.e., counselor, special education teacher, and librarian). In the effort to identify specializations, teachers have generally been removed from teaching regular students with special education teachers and reading teachers doing specialized teaching. But these different assignments have not usually been perceived as career advancement or more professionally valuable than a regular assignment so do not fit the current career incentives concept.

Another major issue is the organizational culture of schools and how formal programs for career differentiation affect this culture. Enhancing teacher incentives within the context of the culture is very apparent from organizational (Fullan et al., 1980) and career development (Dalton et al., 1977) literature and from the job redesign literature itself. In a direct sense personnel evaluation is linked to an organization's culture and
perceptions of the work environment. Yet, this aspect of present teacher incentive programs is in conflict with conditions described under job redesign studies. Evaluations of career ladder and mentor teacher programs lean more heavily in the direction of increased competition, personal goal achievement, and less collegiality and communication. Related to this issue is one of formality, the precision needed in evaluation to identify how incentives will be distributed. Organizational structure resulting from this evaluation and labeling process and the morale associated with differential staffing and sometimes arbitrary evaluation decisions impact on the entire work force and may not be consistent with the needs of a professional worker. This aspect of job redesign is central to the studies reported. Describing the tasks, the necessary resources and power distribution all need careful articulation and compatibility to make job redesign work. Underlying this issue is when performance appraisal plans are not based on goals of the schools and, therefore, do not necessarily lead to school improvement. There is obviously a close link between the issues for implementing changes in tasks and the organizational culture studies, but in job redesign studies the issues seem less visible and comprehensive. These issues are greater than logistics being more attitudinal in nature.

Additional issues addressed in job redesign studies are individual attitudes and perceptions about career advancement. Several of the points indicated provide a framework for analyzing or designing jobs which might enhance the career concept, i.e. autonomy, challenge, learning opportunities, open communication, advancement in responsibility, work on difficult problems, and building a professional reputation. These conditions constitute a basis for a work environment which is both motivational and productive but also a basis for career development.

The advanced preparation necessary for newly developed roles has been limited but very crucial as one reads studies of mentor teachers (Wagner, 1985) and teacher consultants (McDonald, 1980). Newly assigned mentor teachers and teachers who have staff improvement assignments have quickly discovered their need to acquire new knowledge and skills to become successful. Does this mean that the evaluation process for such promotions was inadequate, was misconceived, or that the roles were unclear until the individual was put in the new position? Dr. Hart has indicated the latter point may be commonplace. Anticipating and planning for these needs would be very helpful.
Building job descriptions which provide career development opportunities should be compatible with the type of work conditions indicated and also encourage the concept of career development. However, designing jobs to be motivational and effective doesn't mean they also facilitate a career concept.

Key Questions

Applying job redesign literature to teacher incentive plans could lead to better teaching performance, and as indicated by Hawley (1985), "Almost every study of teacher motivation, job satisfaction, or attrition concludes that the most important thing teachers want from their work is intrinsic satisfaction derived from contributions made to student achievement" (p. 57).

An initial question is where and how to use job redesign concepts in creating teacher incentive plans? When considering the Holmes and Carnegie proposals we find the creation of roles which are in serious conflict with other leadership roles for teachers already in place making part of this question the very concept of whether career ladders and mentor teachers represent new jobs and in what context they are to be represented.

The current status of teacher leaders indicates a large number of teachers serving both formal and informal roles within the schools (over 10 percent of the teaching force) encompassing a wide variety of responsibilities. But, these roles are in need of being reviewed (redesigned) to clarify differences in responsibility as perceived by self, peers, and administrators. In a study of these teachers it was found that when confronted with defining their place in the school organization teacher leaders quickly discovered that they could reform their own role based on job descriptions and assignments (Hatfield et al., 1986). There are now a wide range of incentives provided to teachers with these leadership positions beyond just the position itself.

This issue may have greater potential if approached in the manner described by Dalton et al. (1977), who have actively investigated the career development of professional and technical employees in business organizations and colleges. In these studies it was found that an individual may be promoted within the system to perform a well defined job or may be highly recognized for certain attributes and contributions in a nonformal role.
In the job changes currently being implemented (i.e., career ladders and mentor teachers) a conflict has arisen in communication among individuals responsible for curriculum development and for staff development. This conflict appears to be one of organizational structure and authority as much as personal conflicts but should be an important factor in designing new roles.

Another major question concerns how the various educational constituencies are going to participate and contribute to building new teaching roles. What decisions are needed and which groups will make these decisions? To date additional funding has generally been forthcoming from state governments, but in the process many plans have been reduced because of cutbacks in funding.

**Issues Related to Designing Teacher Incentive Programs**

My specialty is designing and/or modifying educational practice applied to specific settings using a goal-design model and utilizing conceptual and research studies. Needed in this design process are the rationale, goals and procedural elements necessary to carry out the desired practice (Hatfield & Stanard, 1986).

In this context job redesign literature appears to provide a significant basis for developing the procedural elements, but less help in formulating a rationale justifying a career ladder, or mentor teacher program. Bartell provides a set of potential goals for such plans leaving a gap for formulating the rationale. This issue probably needs to be achieved through a dialogue among the various educational constituencies.

In this systematic design process the procedural elements of a particular practice are key factors for both identifying related research studies and constructing the model for practice. The redesign literature and studies do suggest potential elements necessary for this process. These elements might include job characteristics, relationships, personality, and skills.

The goal for teacher incentives is seen as enhancing the position of the teacher and the quality of teaching as one of several factors for improving schools. Other options for school improvement include curriculum improvement and effective school studies. If
these are the goals then we need to consider the broad dimensions of the issue and how to address each for job design and implementation. Dr. Hart's analysis of this body of literature will certainly help in furthering the study and implementation of teacher incentives.
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Teaching Incentives: Constraint And Variety

Abstract Approaches to incentives in teaching adopt one of two perspectives. The first emphasizes central tendencies in the profession, longstanding features of teaching that are difficult to change. The second explores the variety within teaching, noting precedents and exemplars for future practice. This paper reviews the evidence and arguments marshalled within each perspective, takes up the question whether teaching’s weak incentives may serve a number of adaptive functions, and concludes with suggestions for future lines of research or incentives in teaching.

Two perspectives dominate the literature on incentives in teaching. The first seeks truth on average and for the most part, the modal tendencies that characterize teaching, the grand patterns, the systemic features of the occupation. The second perspective identifies discrepancies and anomalies, the variation around the mean, the exemplary, outlying case.

The first perspective raises few hopes that substantial change is possible. The concept of “incentives” suggests variables that can be easily manipulated to produce changes in behavior. “Sticks and carrots” is the familiar phrase. Both policymakers and organizational theorists are used to thinking in terms of altering incentives to produce changes. But considerable research and commentary in teaching suggest that the incentive structure of teaching poses formidable constraints on the prospects for reform. Fundamental aspects of teaching, this perspective holds, are essentially unalterable, and these aspects compose and deeply influence incentives in teaching.

The second perspective provides a more hopeful approach to the possibilities for change. If there are modal tendencies in teaching so too is there variation. Some communities, some districts, some schools, and some teachers stand out and exemplify good practice. The task is to distinguish good from mediocre practice, to abstract principles from the success stories, and to spread good works. Although there may be constraints, this perspective capitalizes on variety for promising leads and the hope of steady, incremental improvement.
To provide a balanced assessment of teaching incentives, acquaintance with both perspectives is necessary. An understanding of the constraints protects against facile solutions and false optimism. By itself, however, this perspective leads into a cul de sac of fatalism. An understanding of the possibilities suggested by variety points to ways out, grounds hope in concrete instances of good practice and of pitfalls to avoid. Constraint and variety, then, form the analytic themes of this essay, the twin speakers through which to drive insights about teaching incentives.

**Preliminary Distinctions**

The terms "reward" and "incentive" often are used interchangeably in common parlance, but within the analytic literature take on more specific meaning. Generally, reward conveys a broad meaning, denoting the pleasure, satisfaction, or fulfillment gained from an activity or experience. Incentive is conceived as a reward offered or exchanged for specific work behavior. An incentive is an anticipated reward that directs the action of a worker. Incentives, then, are often conceived as methods or tools with which social groups or organizations induce specific behaviors.

This distinction does not quite do away with ambiguity. Is incentive a sub-category of reward, or, rather, an attribute of a reward, so that under some circumstances any reward could become an incentive (Mitchell et al., 1982)? The latter conception seems more promising analytically as it avoids the untenable view that some rewards can never serve as behavioral incentives. But so defining this relationship opens up a wealth of complexity. To determine the conditions under which a reward has incentive value requires an understanding of (1) what individuals anticipate will be rewarding; and (2) the mechanisms that control the distribution of those rewards.

The incentive system available to any worker, then, will depend on the motivations he brings to the worksetting, and on organizational mechanisms to control reward distribution.

This observation suggests, following Chester Barnard's (1938) classic formulation, that organizations may improve the incentive value of their reward system by altering the worker's "state of mind," and/or the capacity of the organization to offer rewards.
already perceived as worthwhile. However, work motivation, a "state of mind" construct, is a complex matter. Incentives operate not through some simple connection between action and reward, but on subjective perceptions regarding cost and reward values. Much of the research is experimental and relatively low on ecological validity, and there are multiple theories of human motivation (see, e.g., Weiner, 1972). In real-world action settings, identifying the play of human motives is exceedingly difficult.

Assumptions about human motivation are necessary to explanations of work behavior, but teaching work takes place primarily within organizations and social groups that influence individual behavior through structure and culture. To understand the effects of various incentives on teachers requires knowledge and assumptions about individual psychological processes, about social and organizational arrangements, and about their interaction.

Incentives influence participation and performance in organizations. Katz and Kahn (1978), for example, classify behavior necessary to organizational functioning as (1) joining and staying in the system (recruitment, absenteeism, and turnover); (2) dependable behavior/role performance (meeting or exceeding quantitative and qualitative standards of performance); and (3) innovative and spontaneous behavior/role performance beyond role requirements (creativity, professional growth, problem-solving, cooperation, etc.).

These distinctions suggest the targets at which to direct incentives. From a policy perspective, the equity implications of incentive systems are also important, the effects incentives have on access and opportunity in education. A fundamental principle of equity is that each school should receive its fair share of good teachers, a policy goal far from realization. Combining these distinctions, then, yields the following targets for incentives in teaching:

- the composition of the teacher workforce, as shaped by recruitment and retention;

- the distribution of the teacher workforce across states, districts, and schools. Teachers are the most critical resource for learning in school, and so must be fairly distributed;

- the disposition of the teacher workforce with respect to such process factors as performance and effectiveness, commitment and professional growth, efficacy and expectations, innovative and problem-solving behavior, and others; and
the effects of teachers in terms of student learning and other outcomes of schooling.

In the discussion to follow I will refer in passing to each of these policy goals.

The Constraint Perspective: Some Realities of Teaching

Education's Market Structure

Incentives to attract and motivate teachers, suggests much commentary, are both weak and scarce. Consider first an analysis at the sector level. Education is a public monopoly:

... it is not market oriented; it is widely considered to be socially necessary and therefore deserving of public protection -- is, in fact, the captive servant of a captive clientele; it is open to a good deal of public scrutiny on issues having to do with perceived equity, quality, and goals; it cannot unambiguously define its aims or clearly identify technologies that are dominant in light of aims that might be specified; its contribution to its clientele's life and learning is uncertain and also modest as compared to other societal influences; its governance is highly decentralized, yet subject to a wide variety of influences so that each unit perceives itself as facing a unique configuration of clients and masters. (Pincus, 1974, p. 115)

You might quarrel with one or another of these observations, but education's market situation is self-evident. A healthy dose of capitalist competition, argue Milton Friedman and like-minded economists, is the most obvious, direct, and powerful means to reshape the incentive structure of teaching. Absent choices, the education system's clients -- parents, students, community members -- cannot exert much influence on a large, cumbersome public bureaucracy. How to motivate teachers to adopt promising new practices, to be responsive to students, to have high expectations for learning, and to display similar desirable behavior? Introduce choice via open enrollment plans, vouchers, or tuition tax credits answer market-oriented economists.

This is not the place to debate these schemes. The point is that one powerful source of motivation in many organizations -- the opportunity for clients to switch brands, parties, services -- is largely absent in education. In a monopoly situation, consumers cannot "exist;" their only recourse is to complain, and to seek changes (Hirschman, 1970). Perceptions of decline in educational quality can produce political action of various kinds, but schools have developed capacities to resist change while appearing to
be responsive. Without competing alternatives, argue some analysts, the prospects for improvement are weak because the spur of competition is missing.

Teaching and Transcendent Ideals

Man searches for meaning in his work, for significance that enobles and commits. Private schools attract individuals with deep commitments to particular religious ideals and traditions despite lower salaries and fewer resources than most public schools provide. Teachers in inner city parochial schools express a sense of mission that knits them together into a community of believers (Cusick, 1985).

The same is true for teachers in Christian academies (Peshkin, 1986), and elite New England private schools (Lightfoot, 1983, Chapters V, VI). A community of belief, often set over against prevailing cultural beliefs in the larger society, can supply esprit and commitment to transcendent ideals that are powerfully motivating.

The political ideology of the public schools, however, precludes such particularistic commitments. The strict separation of church and state in our society means that publicly supported schools must be secular in their orientation in order to serve children of diverse creeds and origins. But secular societies fail to supply connection to the transcendent ideals and purposes provided by religious institutions. Parochial schools typically offer lower wages than public schools but attract teachers who wish to live out their religious commitments in communities of like-minded believers.

Canada offers a setting in which to study these motives because in three of the five western provinces public funds are used to support the parochial schools; in the other two, the catholic schools are private. Some research (Erickson & Nault, Note 1) indicates higher levels of affiliation and commitment among teachers and parents the privately funded schools. These schools tend to be at risk financially and to demand sacrifices to keep them alive. Consequently, members of the school community feel specially seeded; they contribute to the survival of the school.
Public bureaucracies are restricted in the dedication they can command from their employees. Public school teachers may live out a service ideal, but the institution they work within tends to be large, impersonal, and secular, features that over time sap commitment. By contrast, private schools are mostly small, personal, and value-laden institutions, whose clients must volunteer to join. Often, they are beleaguered financially and must struggle to attract students and to survive. Their special missions compel intense loyalty from those who choose to affiliate, for they are sacrificing much for their beliefs. Public schools lack the circumstances to command similar levels of dedication from unionized employees working in large bureaucracies.

Incentives and the Occupational Ethos of Teaching

A third set of constraints on the employment of incentives rises out of the ethos of the profession, "... the pattern of orientations and sentiments which is peculiar to teachers and which distinguishes them from members of other occupations" (Lortie, 1975, p. viii). Dan Lortie has provided the most comprehensive recent analysis and his portrait stresses the relative weakness of rewards and incentives in teaching.

Lortie distinguished extrinsic, intrinsic, and ancillary rewards of teaching. The first includes rewards attached to the role that exist independently of role incumbents, including salary and benefits, level of prestige, and power over others. The second refers to sources of satisfaction rising out of the work itself. These are largely subjective and will vary over time and from individual to individual. The third refers to objective characteristics of work that may be perceived as rewarding by some, but not necessarily all, teachers. An example might be a work schedule that permits easy integration of family duties with work responsibilities, a factor likely of greater importance to women. His major observations, largely supported by other accounts of teaching:

- Psychic rewards assume the greatest importance for teachers, particularly rewards derived from interaction with students. Individuals are drawn to teaching out of a desire to work with people and to live out an ideal of service. Teachers feel most rewarded when they "reach" students, have a good day, make a lasting impression on youngsters, and produce learning in their students.
Teachers downplay extrinsic rewards in their self-reports. The ethos of the profession supports altruistic motives and provides little warrant for concern about wealth, status, or power. However, there are indications that many teachers today may be unhappy with these features of the occupation, a point taken up below.

Lortie's data indicate a disjunction between engagement and work satisfaction, especially for young men and older single women. The return on time and effort devoted to teaching does not warrant the investment, producing patterns of disengagement by many career teachers who may turn to other interests, or psychologically withdraw from the work.

The satisfactions of teaching are not easy to come by. Lortie portrays teachers as uncertain and anxious about whether they are having effects on students. The uncertainties are endemic; teachers must work with conscripts in groups and must elicit work from them. Criteria for effectiveness are vague, expectations are multiple, often conflicting, and global. Easy entry to teaching and the unstaged nature of the career fail to provide structural reassurance about competence.

The task imperatives of teaching -- what is necessary to carry out the work -- are ill-supported by teacher status realities. Teachers must manage groups and create an environment for learning, often a delicate accomplishment. Yet they control neither the conditions nor the resources of work. Teachers, Lortie notes (pp. 165-66), are like theater directors and middle managers without comparable control or resources.

The teaching career has few rewards associated with it. Salaries are front-loaded; individuals will reach peak earnings by their late thirties, then plateau thereafter. Few advanced positions exist to fulfill ambitions, provide variety and challenge, or stimulate growth. Furthermore, teaching has been institutionalized as temporary work, with easy entry, exit, and re-entry. Career rewards depreciate collegiality and the emergence of leadership among teachers: few consider teaching suitable work for a lifetime, and veterans possess ambiguous status at best; they are "survivors" in a dubious system.

The organization within which teachers work has few selective incentives to distribute. Schools tend to be "incentive-poor"; there are at best only modest informal means for rewarding teachers -- choice assignments and schedules, inservice experiences, some extra pay for extra duties.

Career and work incentives contribute to the norms of privacy and individualism. Teachers protect autonomy in the classroom at the expense of colleagueship and professional community. Isolation and its debilitating effects is perhaps the most widely noted social features of teaching. Teachers become "entrepreneurs of psychic profits" (Lortie's phrase) striving to secure rewards from their own students while resisting organizational demands that divert them from this quest.
This portrait of a profession seems dispiriting enough; a recent update of Lortie's work etches the lines yet more deeply. In 1984, a research team revisited Dade County, Florida, where Lortie had collected survey data in 1964 for his study. They administered the same survey to a large sample of teachers, then compared their results to Lortie's (Kottkamp et al., 1986). They found a substantial increase in the number of teachers reporting no satisfaction from extrinsic rewards, a decrease in the numbers reporting satisfaction from their status in the community, and an increase in the importance of ancillary rewards, particularly the opportunity to have time away teaching (vacations, summers). The authors concluded that teachers find their work less rewarding today than teachers did 20 years ago. The features of teaching receiving greater emphasis today are the opportunities to get away from the work, not to succeed at it. Reviewing these results, Lortie (1986) posits increased "structural strain" in teaching: "...tension between the qualifications and self-images of teachers in large school districts, their position in the formal system of governance, and their ability to make firm decisions in matters related to their own classroom and students" (p. 571).

An implication of this occupational analysis is that the accommodations made over the decades to teaching's weak rewards have themselves become sturdy features of the occupation that are highly resistant to change. Job security in exchange for better pay and status may be a tolerable bargain for many, a bargain that accountability efforts threaten. Task interdependence and collegiality may be low, but teachers have learned to guard their constrained autonomy behind the classroom door. The absence of career advancement may drive the ambitious out of teaching after a few years, but those who like the opportunity to enter, exit, and re-enter easily may not hunger for advanced responsibilities. So, although surveys routinely turn up evidence of teacher dissatisfaction, many proposals to alter fundamental aspects of teaching such as career ladders, merit pay, peer evaluation, team teaching, and others meet with resistance. Many teachers have adapted to the constraints in place; on balance, the effort necessary to make big changes may not appear worthwhile.

Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services

Public service organizations, argues Michael Lipsky (1980), confront a common set of pressures that shape the orientations and work routines of the "street level bureaucrats"
who must provide services to large numbers of people. His analysis, like Lortie's, locates difficulties in motivating and directing the work of teachers in fundamental aspects of the work situation. A selective review of his generalizations will illustrate this point of view:

- In human services, chronic resource shortages are the rule, not the exception. This may reflect public spending priorities, but the underlying cause is the infinitely elastic nature of demand for services. The schools in our century have become multi-purpose human service agencies, expected to meet a wide and expanding range of needs and problems. Teachers are expected to meet the needs of individual students yet confront them in groups of 25 to 30. "The fundamental service dilemma," notes Lipsky, "is how to provide individual responses or treatment on a mass basis" (p. 44). Even modest reductions in class size strain school budgets as well as society's capacity to produce enough teachers. Sarason (1982) refers to the "myth" of class size reduction in noting that if tomorrow Congress passed a bill appropriating funds to reduce all classes to 20 or fewer students, society could not produce enough teachers to meet the demand. Furthermore, the human demands on teachers are enormous and would continue to be so even if they faced classes of 20 rather than 30. Teachers must husband their resources and ration services yet these necessary responses to the work situation run counter to the ideology of individual needs. This tension between ideals and realities is inherent in the situation and deeply influences teachers' capacity to obtain rewards from the work of teaching.

- Teachers, like other street-level bureaucrats, pursue conflicting and ambiguous goals, many of which cannot be easily measured. Goals such as good health, equal justice, and public education are, "more like receding horizons than fixed targets," and the front-line individuals charged with their pursuit often have little control over all the factors affecting the outcome. The relationship between means and ends is often unclear, provoking a restless search for what works, and the existence of multiple goals often leaves conflicts of purpose which the teacher must resolve (see, for example, Berlak & Berlak, 1981; and Lampert, 1985, for accounts of specific dilemmas and how teachers manage them). Absent a delimited set of goals with corresponding performance indicators and output measures, it is extremely difficult to control the work of teaching through incentives. Efforts to "manage by results" often divert teaching from what is desirable to what is measurable, thereby distorting the broader, deeper, and more humane purposes of the enterprise.

- Working in schools as in other human service agencies involves a basic contradiction: "On the one hand, service is delivered by people to people, invoking a model of human interaction, caring, and responsibility. On the other hand, service is delivered through a bureaucracy, invoking a model of detachment and equal treatment under conditions of resource limitations and constraints, making care and responsibility conditional" (Lipsky, p. 71). Teachers are caught between often conflicting demands to serve as advocates for their students, and to meet responsibilities as subordinate employees in an...
hierarchical organization. The result often is goal displacement -- process students rather than educate them; control behavior rather than impart knowledge, and so on. Yet the psychic costs, the alienation created by this loss of ideals takes a toll on the inner life, corrodes the spirit of the individual who loves children, who came to serve, who seeks to hold onto a positive image of self. Horace's compromise (Sizer, 1984) is but one example of a pervasive pattern in human service work. "The existential problem... is that with any single client [teachers] could interact flexibly and responsively. But if they did this with too many clients their capacity to respond flexibly would disappear" (p. 99). So teachers must trade quality of service for serving more students, a trade no matter how made that must create doubt and anxiety.

Functions of Weak Incentives

Understand this perspective. Teaching's weak rewards and incentives did not develop through accident or inattention. The difficulties in attracting, holding, nourishing, and directing a sizable corps of teachers are deeply rooted in structural constraints -- a public monopoly organized along bureaucratic lines; in historical accommodations to the rapid growth of the educational system; in the occupational ethos of teachers; in the indeterminacy of means and ends in education and the lack of a firm knowledge base; and in the existential realities faced by teachers in their daily work situations.

Weak incentives are so persistent and pervasive a feature of teaching as to raise a question: Do weak incentives serve any functions in teaching? This appears a peculiar question. The usual move is to regard weak incentives as the problem, then search for solutions -- higher pay, career ladders, improved working conditions, and so on. But, this question insinuates, might weak incentives be the solution to certain endemic problems in teaching? If so, this helps explain the persistence of weak incentives for they simultaneously represent the conditions of teaching and adaptations to those conditions.

To understand the potential functions of weak incentives, a closer look into the psychological operation of incentives is necessary. The most familiar image of the impact of rewards on behavior is operant conditioning theory, wherein rewards are conceived as stimuli evoking responses. Within this framework, goals serve to direct behavior: individuals choose a goal then organize their actions to reach it. Humans are prospectively rational this theory proposes. Other theorists, however, posit more complex cognitive mediation between external incentives and responses. Within this
view, people act first, then determine the goals of their actions later. "The rationalizations developed for particular behavior can affect subsequent behavior by their focusing and committing effects" (Pfeffer, 1982, p. 105). People are retrospectively rational according to these theories, and construct beliefs and attitudes out of reflection about their actions (Weick, 1979).

Incentives enter the picture because they have a double significance: "The informational aspect facilitates an internal perceived locus of causality and perceived competence, thus enhancing intrinsic motivation. The controlling aspect facilitates an external perceived locus of causality, thus undermining intrinsic motivation and promoting extrinsic compliance or defiance" (Deci & Ryan, 1985, p. 64). The incentive structure of human action supplies information leading to attributions that influence subsequent behavior and attitudes.

The implications of self-perception or retrospective rationality arguments have been developed in two distinct but conceptually related literatures. One treats the consequences of engaging in some activity for an insufficient reward (Bem, 1972); the other deals with the consequence of overrewarding behavior (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lepper & Greene, 1978). The fundamental generalizations emerging from these two lines of research are the following (Pfeffer, 1982):

... persons who are induced to engage in some behavior for little or no external reward will adjust their attitudes to be more favorable toward the intrinsic aspects of the task they are doing. This attitudinal change results from a process of rationalizing why they are engaged in the action. In the absence of external reward, they rely on internal constructs of positive affect and self-motivation to explain their activity. (p. 107)

And:

... if paying people too little or providing too few external reasons for their behavior increases their task interest and job satisfaction, providing too many rewards or paying them too much undermines task interest and job satisfaction. The argument is that persons confronted with salient extrinsic reasons for their activity will attribute their behavior to these external factors and, therefore, have less reason to justify their actions as being the result of the intrinsic nature of the task or situation itself. (p. 109)
A large body of experimental research has explored both hypotheses, but there has been relatively little work in field settings. Nevertheless the implications for the role of weak incentives in teaching are suggestive. Two speculations occur; the reader might supply others:

- Weak external incentives support the service ideal in teaching, focusing teachers on relations with students as the primary source of gratification. Given the nature of teaching work, with a premium placed on nurturing, caring behavior, this incentive structure is functional. Performance contracting or other forms of pay for results might well dehumanize teaching work by directing teachers to the pursuit of external rewards at the expense of developing caring relations with students.

- Commentators note the tendency for teachers to lower expectations about student achievement, to make "deals," "treaties," and "bargains" with students that exchange behavioral compliance for easy standards and superficial engagement in the hard work of learning (see, for example, Sediak et al., 1986; Powell, Farrer, & Cohen, 1985; and Cusick, 1983). Weak incentives may serve as a psychological resource in this process, helping to rationalize the gradual loss of ideals while holding onto some self-esteem. Coupled to the extreme difficulty of engaging most students most of the time in real learning, weak incentives encourage teachers to adjust perceptions of what they can accomplish to the realities of teaching. Weak incentives convey the message that only so much is expected of teachers. Losing initial ideals from one perspective is adapting to the demands of work from another. Weak incentives help to justify such adaptations. "How can we be expected to accomplish so much if the rewards are so few?" might be the message to self that forms over time, serving as a protective, coping mechanism for teachers.

Other functions of weak incentives rise out of organizational rather than cognitive concerns:

- Weak incentives help promote turnover. Turnover is functional in two respects. First, human service work is so emotionally demanding that few people can sustain it year after year without encountering burn-out or other stress reactions. The absence of strong career rewards means that many individuals will be short-termers, or will leave for a period then re-enter, or will enter late. If teaching featured a strong career line that required sustained experience for upward mobility, the psychic toll would be great. High turnover allows regular infusions of fresh recruits, a necessity in work of this sort. Second, high turnover helps reduce educational expenditures. School systems regularly replace senior with junior teachers, saving increments on the pay scale. If all entering teachers remained a full 40 years, the cost implications would be significant, and a graying workforce would be less responsive to innovation than an age-mixed workforce. Consequently, weak career incentives serve a number of functions.
Weak incentives form part of the recruitment bargain of teaching. As Parsons (1958) noted, incomes of persons working in the public sector are lower but more secure than those earned in the private sector. Individuals attracted to public sector occupations accept the trade-off between the amount of money received and the amount of risk entailed. The occupation is populated with persons who have accepted this bargain. Consequently, incumbents are unlikely to feel enthusiastic about schemes that increase income in exchange for greater risk. In this case, it is not the weak incentive per se that is functional but its correlate, security.

Teaching sanctions diverse interests. Weak incentives allow low commitment which in turn frees teachers to engage in a range of other activities, including second jobs (Greer, 1966). In 1982, for example, an NEA teacher survey (1982) reported that 19.8 percent of teachers were employed outside the school system in the summer, 11.1 percent during the school year. Many individuals in our society may want to blend several lines of work rather than submitting to the demands of a single occupation. Teachers own small businesses, sell real estate, tend bar, run summer camps. These secondary jobs provide income, diversity in work, and connections in the community. Teaching's weak incentives tacitly sanction such combinations. Teaching may attract individuals who wish to avoid narrow, intense work commitments in favor of occupational diversity, or encourage adaptation in this direction among those who decide late to stay on. In either case, such individuals are likely to resist calls for greater commitment to teaching because they have struck a different bargain, one predicated on low commitment. Of course, teaching does not preclude single-minded dedication, and many make this choice; but neither does teaching demand it.

Schools, according to a prevailing popular metaphor, are loosely coupled organizations (Weick, 1976). Control and coordination of work are weak despite the outward trappings of bureaucracy. In organizations featuring poorly understood technology, little evaluation of work, and weak market mechanisms, formal structure and processes are not coupled to work performance, and this is useful: it permits the work to get done according to the localized judgments of those doing the work, while presenting to the outside world the appearance of rational control (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). If teachers are in the best position to interpret and respond to the needs of students, then the fact that teachers are beyond the reach of organizational controls may benefit students because control mechanisms, including those that are incentive-based, reduce and otherwise distort the scope of caring and responsiveness. Teachers, as both Lortie and Lipsky argue, must manage a set of ambiguous, conflicting purposes none of which can be ignored entirely. Strong external controls tend to be reductionist and to oversimplify the complexities of teaching work. Teaching's weak incentive structure leaves teachers unsupported but provides considerable room for creative subversion of bureaucratic rules and regulations at least some of which get in the way of good teaching.
These arguments are highly speculative. They serve to illustrate, not to exhaust, the possibility that teaching's weak incentives may over time have come to serve adaptive functions, perhaps even to have emerged as a common definition of the problems in teaching and has led to a variety of policies designed to improve the rewards of teaching. This concern has overshadowed the possibility that weak incentives serve a series of adaptive functions and are complexly interrelated with other features of teaching. "Adaptive" and "functional" do not equal "desirable," of course. Some of the adaptations are pathological in terms of student well being and the longer term interests of teachers. With others, it is not so clear. However, this perspective argues that changing fundamental features of teaching, even those that appear pathological, may be considerably more difficult than the reform rhetoric would lead one to believe. Furthermore, the uses of weak incentives are but one aspect of the broader theme that fundamental constraints rooted in the nature of teaching work, in the development of the occupation, and in the sentiments of teachers restrict the possibilities for directing teaching work through manipulation of incentives. To understand the possibilities for progress, we must turn to the second broad perspective.

**Variety as Possibility: The Search for Exemplars**

If teaching on average features weak incentives, there is also considerable variation in the educational system. How rewarding teaching is depends on characteristics of teachers, including their gender, race, age, social background and other factors, and on the situations within which they teach. Much current literature identifies school-level characteristics that influence the satisfactions of teaching and more recently interest has also emerged in district-level factors.

A review of evidence from this perspective can be divided according to a widely recognized distinction in response to the question, "What do people want from their jobs?" Responses tend to break into two sets of factors: those related to satisfaction, happiness, and fulfillment, and those related to dissatisfaction and unhappiness. The first have to do with the work itself -- tasks, events indicating success in performance, possibilities for professional growth. The second have to do with the conditions that surround the jobs, including physical working setting, interpersonal relations, salary, job security, policies and regulations, etc. When this second set of factors falls below
acceptable levels, job dissatisfaction ensues. However, the reverse is not true. Optimal external conditions will not by themselves produce positive attitudes. Human need for challenge, self-actualization, and competence stem from the experience of work itself and the intrinsic rewards associated with that work. But the foundation for fulfillment of such needs is associated with surrounding factors such as fair compensation, working conditions, administrative practices, etc. Herzberg et al. (1959) label these factors "hygiene" and "motivation," to distinguish basic health needs from the higher needs for self-realization and growth.

Establishing the Foundation: Attracting and Retaining Teachers

The simplest, most direct policy variable to manipulate in attracting teachers is salary. Research indicates teacher supply is responsive to salary differentials and a number of generalizations are evident:

- Despite school finance reform efforts in many states there are still substantial inter-district disparities in educational expenditures. Odden (1986) cites a number of studies indicating large differences by district in overall per pupil expenditures, class sizes, teacher-administrator ratios, percentage of teachers with a master's degree, teacher salary, books-and-materials expenditures per pupil, and other measures. To fully interpret such discrepancies requires an accounting of variations in cost across districts, but even after such adjustments inequities are likely. Local capacity and preference to support education will exert a strong influence on a district's ability to attract and retain teaching talent. State equalization measures are in place in many states but inequities are still large.

- Some evidence (Turner et al., 1986) indicates that salary incentive to attract teachers with master's degrees has modest effects on student achievement. However, a district's ability to provide such incentives is a function of (1) median family income, and (2) economies of scale based on district size. Large districts can achieve economies by increasing pupils per teacher, then use the savings for salary incentives. Small rural districts do not have this option.

- Recent reviews of compensation in teaching (Ferris & Winkler, 1986; Stern, forthcoming) indicate that aggregate teacher supply is positively related to salary levels in teaching and negatively related to salary levels in alternative occupations. The most comprehensive study, conducted on a sample of teachers in Britain (Zabalza, 1979) found that a 10 percent increase in relative salary would bring about a 21 percent increase in female entrants and a 36 percent increase in male entrants to teaching.
The amount of income individuals must forego in order to teach varies by field. One study (Levin, 1985) for example, reports that in 1981-82, undergraduates majoring in humanities or the social sciences had to give up $1,100-$1,300 of income in selecting teaching over positions in business and industry. Chemistry and computer science majors, however, had to forego $8,500, and physics majors $10,600. Shortages in fields such as math and science extend back decades and obviously are related to such wage differentials.

Higher salaries also are likely to produce higher SAT scores among recruits. One study (Manski, 1985) found that setting a minimum SAT score (verbal plus math) at 1,000 would require raising teachers’ salaries approximately $90 per week (in 1979 dollars), if the fraction of high school graduates who eventually enter teaching were to be held constant. SAT scores are not a proxy for teacher quality, but academic ability is at least a desideratum in teaching.

Wage differentials affect teacher mobility between districts. Higher wages decrease the probability that teachers will leave (Eberts & Stone, 1984), other factors being equal.

Wage differentials contribute to teachers' decisions to leave teaching. Teachers are influenced by what they are making relative to what they can make in other fields; the wider the perceived difference, the greater the likelihood teachers will exit for other work (Eberts & Stone, 1984).

Racially isolated inner city schools have particular difficulty attracting and holding onto teachers due to a range of nonmonetary factors related to working conditions. Efforts to offset poor working conditions with monetary incentives have been only marginally successful. "Combat pay" tends to attract young, inexperienced teachers from nearby schools, only marginally improves turnover, and does little for instructional quality (Bruno, 1986).

Economists argue that teacher salaries are "hedonic wages" that reflect characteristics of individuals and jobs (Rosen, 1974). That is, teachers respond to a mix of salary, working conditions, and other job characteristics. Teachers may be willing to trade salary for other benefits such as small class sizes, motivated students, and pleasant surroundings. Unfortunately, these factors often seem to cluster. Some districts offer higher wages and better working conditions, others offer neither. There is little firm evidence based on teacher behavior to indicate how teachers make trades among these pecuniary and nonpecuniary factors, but survey and interview data reveal sources of teacher dissatisfaction that vary across districts and schools:

In a recent national survey (Metropolitan Life, 1985) a substantial percentage of teachers reported as less than adequate such resources as: administrative support (18 percent); people responsible for discipline (25 percent); guidance counselors (38 percent); and teacher's aides (43 percent). Not surprisingly, the percentages of teachers reporting unsatisfactory conditions are highly associated with the wealth of the school district within the state.
A survey of California teachers (Koppich, Gerritz, & Guthrie, 1985) finds that: 27 percent of teachers say they have insufficient textbooks and other instructional materials; 10 percent report having too few desks and chairs for students; 20 percent say they do not have access to audio-visual equipment; and class size reductions headed the write-in responses (see also McLaughlin et al., 1986), an understandable complaint in that California has the largest teacher-pupil ratio in the country.

A survey of New Jersey teachers (Eagleton Institute, 1986) produced results somewhat different from those in California. These teachers were most dissatisfied with the amount of paperwork, administrative duties, and time spent on nonteaching responsibilities. They also objected to low salaries and to their lack of voice in school policymaking.

Two other teacher surveys emphasize the large discrepancies that exist between teachers' desired vs. their actual involvement in school decision-making. The 1986 Metropolitan Life Survey of the American Teacher revealed that 97 percent of teachers surveyed agreed that school districts should have a team approach to school management involving teachers, but only 50 percent of teachers reported this as the reality (p. 50). Another recent survey (Bacharach, 1986) found that large numbers of teachers report little involvement in such matters as hiring staff, establishing testing or grading policies, setting expenditure priorities, developing a student discipline code, selecting texts, planning staff development, or evaluating teaching. Teachers vary in their desire to have greater authority over such matters, but in many schools, teachers apparently have little opportunity to exercise control over some central aspects of teaching. (These findings are drawn from a draft report by Samuel Bacharach and associates titled "The Learning Workplace: The Conditions and Resources of Teaching." Washington: National Education Association, April, 1986.)

These salary and working condition factors influence recruitment, retention, mobility, and job satisfaction in teaching, but act only as the foundation on which to build organizations that support teacher growth, competence, and commitment. Subtle factors involving both the hard S's -- strategy, structures, and systems -- and the soft S's -- style, skill, and superordinate goals -- combine to produce work settings that motivate and effectively direct teacher work. (This analysis draws from an unpublished paper by Phil Schlechty titled "Schools for the 21st Century: The Conditions for invention," delivered at a conference at Stanford University, November 4, 1986.) To these factors we turn next.
Motivating and Directing the Work of Teaching

Teachers derive their deepest satisfactions in teaching from their work with students. Consequently, creating conditions in which teachers can be successful provides direct benefits to both teachers and students. If the psychic rewards of teaching are most potent, then it follows that measures to improve psychic rewards should receive top priority. The better teachers are at their work, the more rewarding they find teaching, and the more likely they are to devote effort to teaching and to remain committed to it.

These notions come together in a concept that has begun to receive attention in the research on teaching. Teacher efficacy, the individual's perceived expectancy of obtaining valued outcomes through personal effort, is associated with student achievement (Ashton & Webb, 1986), and is itself influenced by organizational factors (Fuller et al., 1982). Teachers' sense of efficacy varies individual to individual but is systematically related to school-level factors. A recent survey study of a large sample of elementary teachers begins to suggest what factors are involved, and is worth summarizing. (These findings are reported in draft chapters for a book by Susan Rosenholtz, tentatively titled The Organizational Context of Teaching, forthcoming from Longman Press in New York.)

This study collected survey data from over 800 elementary teachers in 78 schools in order to examine how school organizational factors influence teachers' commitment to teaching. The study proposed that in schools where teachers could acquire skills necessary to good teaching, felt effective in helping students learn, and felt rewarded for their efforts, they would also develop high commitment to teaching as evidenced by positive attitudes, low absenteeism, and little desire to leave teaching. Dramatic school-level differences emerged, related strongly to a number of organizational processes. In schools that support teachers and build their sense of efficacy:

- There is an emphasis on goal-setting and on developing consensus on values -- what the school stands for, what "we're trying to achieve."
- Goal consensus is the outcome of frequent talk among faculty and with the principal about instruction. Teachers get together frequently -- before, during, and after school -- to talk. The principal facilitates the process through scheduling, faculty meetings, inservice activities, etc.
- Teachers collaborate frequently. They observe one another, share materials, work on curriculum together, and plan for the future. Crucial to this collaboration is the social meaning of help-giving and help-seeking. In collaborative schools, asking for and providing help is the norm modeled by the principal and experienced by teachers. In isolated schools, help-seeking is construed as a sign of weakness or inadequacy; teachers learn not to ask for fear of being stigmatized as incompetent.

- Teachers' learning opportunities are frequent, valuable, and associated with shared goals, regular feedback and evaluation, and norms of colleagueship.

- Principals are crucial to healthy school cultures. Through their activities and interactions with teachers they foster goal consensus; model openness, collaborative behavior, and reciprocity; buffer teachers from intrusions such as the Ic1dspeaker; establish student discipline procedures so that faculty can concentrate on teaching rather than behavior management; evaluate teachers and arrange for feedback directly and through experienced teachers; encourage the emergence of instructional leadership via delegation to lead teachers; and hire teachers who share a collaborative orientation to teaching.

In such schools, teachers are more likely to develop attitudes conducive to effective teaching:

- Teachers gain in certainty about their ability to produce academic achievement in students. They develop self-esteem that is tied to successful teaching of skills and knowledge.

- Teachers believe that learning to teach takes a long time, that teaching cannot be mastered simply, that they must continue to work on their craft and to improve year by year;

- Teachers emphasize individual learning differences among children and the need to respond to such differences. If children fail to learn, teachers search for new strategies rather than "blame the victims."

- Teachers believe that teaching is a collective not an individual endeavor; they believe in help-giving and seeking, and value ideas from colleagues.

- Teachers identify learning as the acquisition of skills not the unfolding of innate abilities. They believe learners are made, not born.

- Teachers associate excellence in teaching more strongly with producing academic achievement in students rather than with a range of general, diffuse developmental goals.

- Teachers are more willing to "buck the system" in cases where policies conflict with their best professional judgment. Teachers do not feel powerless in the face of bureaucratic constraints.
Rosenholtz' research further reveals that collaborative schools had lower rates of teacher absenteeism and produced higher standardized test scores in reading and math over a three year period. Finally, neither the size nor the socioeconomic status of the school predicted healthy teaching cultures. They were equally prevalent (or equally rare) across the range of communities, a surprising, but heartening finding. No reason, it appears, why all schools might not begin moving in this direction.

Judith Little and her colleagues have built an impressive body of ethnographic research that complements and fills out this portrait of healthy teaching cultures in schools (Little, forthcoming; 1982; 1981; Little et al., 1986; Bird & Little, 1986). This work focuses on school-wide processes that produce shared norms and work orientations. Most critical are the norms of collegiality, an expectation for shared work within a school, and of continuous improvement, an expectation for ongoing analysis, evaluation, and experimentation. Careful observations in more or less successful schools (based on school-wide test scores over several years plus nominations) revealed a number of "critical practices of adaptability" (Little, 1982):

- Teachers engage in frequent, continuous, and increasingly concrete and precise talk about teaching practice. By such talk teachers build up a shared language adequate to the complexity of teaching.

- Teachers are frequently observed and provided with useful (if potentially frightening) critiques of their teaching. Such observation and feedback provide shared referents for the shared language of teaching.

- Teachers plan, design, research, evaluate, and prepare teaching materials together. By joint work on materials, teachers share the considerable burden of development required by long-term improvement, confirm their emerging understanding of their approach, and make rising standards for their work attainable by them and by their students.

- Teachers teach each other the practice of teaching. In the most adaptable schools, most staff, at one time or another, on some topic or task, are permitted and encouraged to play the role of instructor for others. (p. 331)

These practices do not develop by accident. Organizational structures and processes encourage and insist on such behavior. Principals, once again, are critical. They model such behavior themselves, supply resources to teachers, set up routines and expectations, and create organizational arrangements that facilitate collegiality and reduce teacher isolation.
In her recent work, Little has begun exploring how district-level processes contribute to the emergence of teacher leadership (see Little et al., 1986). Teamwork among teachers is quite fragile in many schools and often fails to survive turnover of key actors such as the principal or lead teachers. Consequently, actions at higher levels within the system are necessary to the institutionalization of work norms and patterns that support collaboration. The superintendent's actions are critical. She proposes and champions collaborative arrangements, personally attends critical planning meetings, holds principals to expectations, allocates resources, and models collaborative behavior for management. Specific support factors such as mutual time for planning and training for key personnel are important as are formal roles and staffing patterns to support various forms of teamwork.

The image of a successful school rising out of this work fits well with many of the generalizations from the effective schools literature (see Purkey & Smith, 1982; Rutter, 1983; and Rosenholtz, 1985 for reviews). This literature emphasizes that "good schools" are tightly coupled: there is consensus among faculty on goals; there are procedures to measure and track goal attainment; expectations for achievement are high; and curriculum is well coordinated. To achieve these desirable features require collaboration among teachers, regular feedback and evaluation, and precision in the shared language of teaching. In such schools, teachers' sense of efficacy is high, and consequently they feel rewarded in their work. The ambiguities, uncertainties, and loose coupling that the constraint perspective suggests are widespread seem to be substantially reduced in some schools, making the work of teaching more satisfying, more rewarding, and more effective. But, most commentators agree, there are not enough such schools. They seem to be the exception, not the rule, and so we return to the original insights about teaching and its constraints.
In their now sacred text, Peters and Waterman (1982) cite philosopher Ernest Becker's argument that man is driven by an essential dualism: to be part of something, and to stick out, to be a conforming member of a winning team and to be a star in his own right. Schools, like other work organizations, must meet both these needs if teachers are to be satisfied and productive workers. It is just this simple. And just this difficult.

Future research on incentives in teaching might take up any number of topics, but I want to propose three areas for further inquiry: incentives and school effectiveness; the relationship between accountability and teaching incentives; and the equity implications of incentives.

Incentives and School Effectiveness

The work of Rosenholtz and Little is valuable because it establishes connections between the social psychological processes contributing to teachers' efficacy and the socio-cultural characteristics of schools as teacher worksettings. This review has emphasized that cultural characteristics of schools contribute to schooling outcomes directly and through effects on teaching's intrinsic rewards. Such features of schools are in principle alterable, are widely if not abundantly present, and constitute a prime locus for future research.

Inquiry to date on effective schools, however, has been a mixed blessing. The research has begun to identify alterable features of schools that contribute to student achievement, but in translation for use has led to new orthodoxies rather than flexible guidelines for practice. Future work must begin to differentiate and refine our conceptions of good schools to avoid the "list logic" (Barth, 1986) that dominates current thinking.

First, research must take up differences among elementary, middle, and secondary schools. Elementary schools differ considerably from high schools in their organizational properties. For example, they tend to be smaller, less specialized by subject matter and department, and to possess a more captive student clientele. Women
make up the majority of elementary faculty, while high school faculties are more evenly divided by gender. These and other differences may influence systematically the character of school effectiveness, and the deployment of incentives.

Second, research must view schools in a community context. Communities vary along a variety of dimensions including wealth, socioeconomic status, racial composition, and location (i.e., urban, suburban, rural). Schools must be responsive to their communities, but there are few indications how such responsiveness influences school effectiveness. Conceptions of school effectiveness must begin to take account of the fit between schools and communities rather than viewing schools as context-free, generic institutions.

Third, research might begin to identify differences among similar schools that are effective, in order to illustrate that no single formula or recipe underlies the creation and maintenance of a good school. Portraiture as a social science genre is relatively new, but Lightfoot (1983) among others already has made contributions. Such work might start with a set of common prescriptions or ingredients, then reveal how very differently these are enacted in particular schools.

Finally, future work must portray schools as dynamic organizations undergoing cycles of growth, decay, and regeneration rather than as static entities comprised of properties. "How do good schools become so?", and, "How do they remain so?" must receive the same attention as, "What characterizes effective schools?" We must, in short, begin to produce a film library of good schools, not just albums of snapshots.

**Accountability and Teaching Incentives**

The prevailing thrust of much policy-driven change is to legislate better teaching. This takes the form of more regulation, more tests, more curriculum specifications, more reporting requirements for teachers, in short, more external accountability. Such an approach attempts to improve school effectiveness by prescribing the goals of schooling and translating them into measurable results. Goal clarity and high expectations are certainly desirable as the school effectiveness literature testifies, but a single-minded
emphasize on accountability is not likely to inspire teachers. In fact, our best teachers may find external controls most burdensome and diverting (Darling-Hammond, 1984), and some interesting experimental evidence suggests the costs of heavy-handed accountability.

Edward Deci and his colleagues hypothesized that when teachers are placed in highly controlling environments that reduce their autonomy and emphasize conformity to external rewards and punishments, they will in turn become more controlling with students. They tested this hypothesis by asking 40 people to instruct a group of students in solving puzzles (Deci & Ryan, 1985):

Results... revealed that teachers in the performance-standards condition made twice as many utterances, spent twice as much time talking, and allowed students to work alone much less than did the no-standards teachers. They also gave three times as many directives, made three times as many should-type statements, and asked twice as many controlling questions as did the no-standards teachers. Further, the performance-standard teachers were rated as being more demanding and controlling, as giving students less choice and less time to work alone, and as being less effective in promoting conceptual learning, than the no-standards teachers. Finally, the raters indicated that they would prefer to be taught by the no-standards teachers. (p .1)

Other experimental research supports this study, but the results are more eye-opening than definitive. The description of controlling teachers sound remarkably like the portrayal of classroom life in John Goodlad’s recent study (1984). Deci goes on to point out other sources of controlling behavior in teachers, including rowdy, disruptive students, but the implications are clear. If we genuinely expect teachers to encourage creativity, higher order reasoning, and autonomy in students, then placing them in regulated environments will be a disaster.

There appears two extremes to avoid. One is direction without support, where goals are specified and accountability mechanisms put in place but teachers are treated as low-level bureaucrats expected to carry out orders. This is not what the effective schools literature recommends, yet it is what a lot of educational policy looks like today. The other extreme is support without direction, where teachers are given freedom to experiment but little guidance about goals. This was the drift in the sixties with the cafeteria-style curriculum and the tacit sanctioning of treaties, deals, and bargains between teachers and students. Peters and Waterman conclude their book with a
chapter on the "simultaneous loose-tight properties" of effective companies. This is the elusive mix in organizational cultures of shared values, constant, swift feedback on results, and attention to the client, coupled to considerable autonomy and innovation from the rank and file worker. School environments that get this mix right empower teachers while reducing their anxiety and uncertainty about results.

Little research has been done on how accountability mechanisms affect teachers. Experiments of the sort carried out by Deci are suggestive, but are low on ecological validity. It is important to understand the circumstances in which common accountability mechanisms serve as disincentives for teachers. A useful line of research, then, would explore the effects of accountability and control procedures on teachers' motivation, morale, and effectiveness. Field studies might draw on the hypotheses and concepts derived from the psychological literature on rewards and incentives.

**Equity and Teaching Incentives**

Teaching incentives have equity implications. The distribution of incentives that affect teacher recruitment, retention, and effectiveness is critical to educational equity. The current system is inequitable at every level: between states, between districts within states, and often between schools within districts. Where a student lives predicts the quality of education he receives; where a teacher teaches predicts the quality of teacher worklife. Consequently, research must attend to the distribution and redistribution of incentives.

Research on incentives can attend to equity in several ways. One is to study the equity-related consequences of incentive-based policy. If, for example, states allocate funds for teacher salaries, merit pay, career ladders, or similar programs, follow-up studies should determine whether the state formulas widen, narrow, or hold constant salary disparities across districts. Efforts should be made to ensure that the rich do not get richer while the poor get poorer or stay the same.
A second priority would be to initiate and study interventions that mix pecuniary and nonpecuniary incentives for attracting teachers to hard-to-staff schools. Policy to date has not been especially innovative in this regard. Combat pay and various categorical program monies have not proven effective. Clearly, special measures must be initiated to encourage teaching in inner city and rural isolated schools. Bonus pay may be part of the solution, but only in combination with attention to school resources, structures, and cultures. Research might evaluate various schemes, and attempt to understand how teachers trade off such factors as salary increases, reduced class size, fewer classes and more time for planning, access to better teaching resources and materials, improvements in the physical plant, increased autonomy, and other teaching "valuables."

There is a tendency to think of incentives in simplistic terms as directives with rewards attached to them. Yet the concept of incentives is useful because it encourages policymakers to attend to the people -- teachers mostly -- who must carry out policies. But as this review has attempted to illustrate, the interplay of incentives, motivation, and behavior -- both individual and collective -- is quite complex. There are no simple ways to improve teaching through manipulation of incentives. The incentive structure of teaching is difficult to change on a large scale basis. But there are some promising leads in the research literature and some exemplars to follow. Thinking about incentives can help improve effectiveness, accountability, and equity in teaching.
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Elizabeth A. Ashburn

Reaction to

Teaching Incentives: Constraint And Variety

Gary Sykes has presented an impressive paper. The theory and research have been presented in a way that can both clarify and inform our thinking about policy development and inquiry. It is an honor for me to comment on his work.

The first thing I will talk about is what I found particularly helpful in Gary's paper. I then have three concerns about his perspective, and finally, four questions which developed from my reading of his paper and which I think are important to examine.

The first helpful notion is the organization of the incentives literature by the labels -- "constraints and variation." He used the words in his discussion today -- a "tragic vision of teaching." The first part of his paper presents this tragic vision. I read that first part on the plane coming out here and I thought, "Well, he's covered all the literature on this and maybe I ought to just leave the paper on the plane and go home, give up. There is nothing that can be done through incentives to help the teaching profession." But the second part, the discussion about variation, was very uplifting. This perspective says, "Let's look for the successful examples of incentives that we can use as models." When I got through the end of that, I was not sure exactly what I was supposed to do with that. Still, I think the concepts could be very helpful in developing policy and programs. Our research tradition typically points toward the mean, the average, the probable. What Sykes is telling us to do is look at the exception, the variant, the possible.

Secondly, I think the paper lays out a broad review of what literature suggests are the constraints on incentives, the possibilities for incentives, and the dynamics of incentives. His paper is very impressive in this respect. He has taken a complex subject which could easily be treated in a superficial manner, and he has explained the complexities of it and referred us to the various bodies of knowledge undergirding those complexities.

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A third helpful aspect of the paper is the use of the language and literature of business and management. What do we know about incentives from private sector management practices and the research about these practices? We need to pay more attention to that aspect of research knowledge and to use what is appropriate for school settings. We are naive, I think, in the education profession about some of these things that would be very practical and useful to us.

One caution, however, about this transfer of knowledge: comparing the education system to the private sector can be taken too far. Our bottom line is not profit or even productivity in the usual business sense. Sykes referred to an experiment in industry which linked salary to productivity. The application of this principle to our teachers and children could produce some real difficulties. I would be concerned about unintended consequences of a teacher reward system focused principally on student productivity as defined by gains in scores on standardized achievement tests.

Another helpful idea is that weak incentives serve major functions in the social and organizational structure of education. Gary mentioned to me before his presentation that this was the best idea he had. I agree. It helps us to clarify a complex phenomenon. We need to make sure we understand the problem of incentives in context. That weak incentives probably do serve some important functions -- and Sykes argues cogently that they do -- helps us think about whether the incentives we propose as solutions are really going to provide solutions.

Another helpful aspect of Sykes' paper is to point out the effects of external, top-down controls. Research shows us that when teachers are in very controlling environments, they become very controlling themselves. We need to have more discussion of that in the dynamics of incentives. How incentives are developed and implemented and what role teachers play in that process will have a significant impact on the effects of the incentives.

The final helpful component is the review of research about teacher efficacy. We need to bring to the forefront of our discussions that teachers are the way they are many times because of the situation, that their sense of efficacy can increase based on what organizational variables exist, and that their job satisfaction will increase with their
job confidence. And we need to ask: How does our knowledge about teacher efficacy inform the development of policy and procedures for teacher incentives?

Now I move to the concerns that I have arising from the paper. The first one is the nature of our language about educational reform. We talk about reform as if it were a national event. We use language which I can call "aggregate terminology." One of the "aggregate terminology" phrases in the paper, for example, was "schools are in bad shape." There are many schools which are not in bad shape. When we talk about reform in the aggregate like this, we are not getting our hands on an important reality of reform. Catherine Cornbleth (1986) argues that reform is local, and that the only way we are going to have real reform is to approach it at the local level. What is local? I am not sure. It could be the classroom as the "unit of reform." It could be the teacher. It could be the school as the unit of reform. It could be the district as the unit of reform. I think we need to figure out how to talk about it so that when we say "Let's improve the working conditions for teachers; let's figure out what is the motivation for a teacher," we talk and think about it more on a microlevel. In other words, our language should reflect the context -- specific nature of reform.

I don't mean to suggest that policymaking should be piecemeal. It should be holistic; it should be systematic. Policymaking does need, however, to take into account a fundamental aspect of reform, and that is the local nature of it. To continue to use the global perspective expressed in the aggregate terminology obscures the "localness" of problem definition and problem solution.

The second concern I have has to do with the issue of what we are about in schools. Our discussions often imply an assumption that we know what we are about, and should be about, in schools. I don't think we can talk about what we are about in schools in the aggregate -- schools vary in their purposes from community to community. I also think we cannot make the assumption we are all in agreement on what we are about in schools. To take an easy example -- the emphasis and priorities in my son's school are not totally what I want for my son. In his school in Montgomery County, Maryland, there is an extraordinary emphasis on verbal achievement and mathematical achievement on standardized tests. While his test performance is more...
than adequate, his talents are in the area of creative writing and art and music and he's not getting adequate opportunities for development in that regard. So are we about verbal and mathematical achievement, or are we about helping children become all that each of them, individually, can become?

Howard Gardner at Harvard wrote a paper recently for a conference in Palo Alto, funded by Exxon on what we want in our schools for the future and what kinds of teachers we want for the future. Gardner talks about a choice we must make between a uniform curriculum-centered approach to education or an individual-centered curriculum. He noted that we often compare ourselves with Japan in a kind of education race, but that there is a significant difference. Japan is a homogeneous culture, while the brilliance and strength of our culture is its individual orientation. Using Japan's model for our schools will not fit the values on which this country has been based. He argues cogently, of course, for individual-centered curricula and its feasibility. So I think we need to incorporate in all our discussions the questions and assumptions about the goals in our schools. Cornbleth (1986) uses the words "critical examination of questions of purpose, substance, and value" (p. 13). Those are the questions we need to start with. In the discussion of incentives and what we want to achieve by using incentives, these fundamental and prior questions must be raised; the answers cannot be assumed. What we are about in schools will affect what we do regarding incentives.

The last concern that I have is something that Gary did not argue for, but that I fear others might. It has to do with the perpetuation of the argument that an absence of competition is a powerful constraint on incentives. The notion that incentives lose power without competition suggests that competition should exist within the work setting and that competition must be part of a solution. I think it is a wrong headed, or argument -- that if we don't have competition, we are going to have bad schools and inadequate teachers. It's a dangerously simplistic approach, and it does seem to me that there are other options we can explore. A recent book entitled No Contest (Kohn, 1986) uses research findings from sociology and psychology to argue that the win/lose structure of competition is inherently destructive. He concludes that in many fields, the "assumption that competition promotes excellence has become increasingly doubtful" (p. 54). He makes an important distinction between trying to do
well and trying to beat others. This distinction should be kept in the forefront of our discussions about incentives policies. I encourage you to read this important book as you consider how to develop circumstances which serve as incentives for teachers.

Finally, there are four questions that I think we need to deal with. When Arnold Gallegos talked about trust earlier in this meeting, I looked at my notes for this paper reaction, and there was my language about trust. I had thought do I dare raise the idea of trust at a conference on teacher incentives? So, thank you, Arnold, for opening the door to raise a question about trust. The question is: can we make policies which encourage conditions for the development of trust? The typical policymaking that's going on now does not seem to encourage that. What does research say about developing conditions to encourage the development of trust and cooperation? Policymaking apparently assumes Theory "X", to go back to the management literature; Theory X says that people don't want to work, don't want to improve, don't want to do their jobs well. Policymaking could start with Theory "Z", instead, and assume that teachers do want to do their jobs well, and trust them to do that. The author of the book on Theory Z argues that productivity problems in the business world will not be solved by increased funding for new technology or development of complex economic ideas. The remedy is "coordinating individual efforts in a productive manner and...giving employees the incentives to do so by taking a cooperative, long-range view... Productivity and trust go hand in hand, strange as it may seem." (Ouchi, 1981, p. 5). This seems to me an extraordinary notion about a direction that legislation and policy making can take. And I have never heard anybody talk about legislation which mandates the conditions for developing cooperation and trust.

A second question: To what degree should Cornbleth's notion that "reform is local" be incorporated into policymaking and inquiry about the impact of policies? If reform is local, what we do about policy on incentives raises some questions about how we talk about incentives. Are there some general truths about how incentives work? The line of research discussed earlier indicated that incentives are related to teachers' development. Maybe there is some truth in that. Is it possible to find some general truths about how this is all going to work?
The third question is: How can we make policy and conduct inquiry about incentives so that teachers' perspectives are incorporated? I attended a recent conference in Wisconsin sponsored by the Education Commission of the States, where a teacher said at the end of this day-and-a-half meeting, "You know, I have been teaching for 20 years, and nobody has ever asked me to listen to what's going on about things that affect my life, never mind ask me what I thought about it." I think it is irresponsible not to involve teachers in developments which affect their daily lives.

The last question has to do with what is a framework for policymaking and inquiry. What was presented in the paper is a framework for thinking about the meaning of incentives, the use of incentives, the issues related to incentives. What I would like to see emerging from this is a framework that is usable by policymakers and researchers. What are the specific assumptions, the variables, and the dynamics which we need to attend to? Given constraints, variations, weak but purposeful incentives, I want to know what I am supposed to do next, as a policymaker or a researcher. We need good thinking on that.

The group discussion about Sykes' paper included the following points.

- Minnesota has legislative policy that allows the state legislature to, in fact, initiate a local building level change model with legislative support and the State Department mandates behind it. It does involve teachers, it does involve the other stakeholders -- principals, and the central office staff -- in decision-making for those schools.

- There is a lot of field research -- outside of private industry in the professions and in other social service agencies that are very similar in their philosophy and orientation to education -- that supports the "weak incentives argument" that Gary has made.

- The service that Gary's perspective provides for us is to ask us to evaluate the underlying assumptions on which we act, because we could move very aggressively and with great pride in directions that will have exactly the opposite effect of what we do. We need to constantly re-examine our assumptions.

- There seems to be a borderline here between weak incentives and too weak. It appears to me that the incentives for teachers have always been weak. It's only lately that it seems that we have slipped below a certain level. Lortie's work demonstrated that teachers go into teaching not for the money, but that's the main reason they give for leaving. Where the line is between "weak incentives" and "too weak" is unclear.
The literature that Gary reviews indicates that if we work in an occupation that has a set of incentives attached to it and a set of environmental conditions attached to it, we will come to describe our reasons for being in that profession in terms of the incentives and features attached to it. It's a feedback loop system, it's not a directly causal relationship. Teachers will, when we interview and survey them, describe their work in terms of their work because they have come to grips with and made the decision to remain in teaching. So it's a very complex interaction of motives and incentives and reasons for making those decisions.

One question that we haven't raised is that if we concentrate too narrowly on any given population of teachers to define ways in which it attracts and retains people who are self selecting out, we will choose incentive packages that appeal to those who have chosen to remain, rather than one that appeals to those who choose to leave.

The weak incentives that are promoting the turnover occurred and perhaps were functional at a time when we had women and minorities who filled those positions, when they were limited to teaching and a few other service types of occupations. Now it's going to be much harder for teaching to capture the vast numbers of talented people because women and minorities have many other choices. Certainly with the salaries being as low as they are, we are going to have a real problem with shortages.
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Financial Issues
and Fiscal Responsibilities
for Teacher Incentive Plans

Abstract
Teacher incentives have been seen as a way to attract and retain high quality teachers and to improve the quality of schooling. However, most approaches to teacher incentives are very costly, may not achieve their stated goals, and are not likely to be cost-effective. This paper addresses the fiscal and demographic environments for teacher incentives, with a focus on the Midwestern states. The prospects for implementation of teacher incentive plans will depend upon environmental factors largely outside the control of education policymakers and administrators. This paper concludes that fiscal factors and funding will be the weak links that threaten such programs.

Teacher Incentive Plans: The Context

The current period of reform activity in American public education can be dated from 1983 when three reports of national importance on education were issued. A Nation at Risk, released by the U.S. Department of Education's National Commission on Excellence in Education, the report by the National Task Force on Education for Economic Growth of the Education Commission of the States, and Twentieth Century Funds' Task Force on Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Policy report all emphasized the need to improve teaching and to attract and retain high quality teachers in public schools (Boyd, 1983). This emphasis on teachers is logical since the classroom teacher is the central figure in the technology of classroom instruction which forms the core of public school activity. If our concern is with increasing student achievement, then we must concentrate on the technical level of schooling where basic services are provided and where ultimate goal attainment will or will not occur. It is at this level where public schools will be judged in terms of their level of goal attainment, and hence, their legitimacy (Boyd & Crowson, 1981; Parsons, 1960). From the perspective of school finance and resource allocation, the teacher is also the key element to focus upon because the costs of teacher salaries and benefits are the largest item in the school budget.

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Interest in policies to enhance the teaching profession and to attract and retain highly qualified teachers is not new. Almost 25 years ago, Kershaw and McKean (1962) applied the tools of economic analysis to the problem and explored the structure of teacher salary schedules and their implications for offering incentives and disincentives for teachers. Their interest was in salary structures rather than salary levels and they concluded that salary schedules for teachers should be based on the number of years of teaching experience, the number of graduate courses completed, and the number of courses taken in certain subject areas (Kershaw & McKean, 1962, p. 156). By the late 1970s, it became clearly recognized and accepted that both the quality of entering teachers and the supply of new teachers were in serious decline (Weaver, 1979). The solutions proposed to rectify this situation assumed that both monetary and nonmonetary incentives would play a central role in attracting and retaining high quality teachers and that salary increases and new teaching structures would comprise important elements in any incentive program (Schlechty & Vance, 1983; Ward, 1983). The specific area of incentives for school improvement was addressed by Hanushek (1981), who stated,

Incentive schemes of various sorts might be a fertile area for experimentation. The essential questions involve alternative types of incentive schemes and the behavioral responses of teachers and administrators. For example, would direct performance incentives encourage individual teachers to "hoard" information about successful techniques? Would administration modify their rating behavior if it had real impact? Answer to such questions are currently unavailable. (p. 37)

In fact, school districts have been experimenting with different types of teacher incentives. The results of a survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Education (see Table 1, p. 110) show that almost one fifth of public school districts in the United States were using some type of teacher incentive with financial incentives being the most common type offered (Plisko & Stern, 1985). The evidence is not clear whether these teacher incentives are achieving their purpose and how much they cost. Total costs are important because they would affect resource allocation decisions within school districts and they would have an impact on state and local government fiscal systems. Efficiency concerns would require cost-benefit or cost-effective studies of teacher incentives to be done also. Such information will provide important inputs for evaluation and decision-making (Levin, 1980; Levin, 1983). An understanding of the elements that go into each incentive and the precise role that incentives plays in affecting teacher behavior and student achievement will also be important as a basis for useful cost analysis (Bridge, Judd & Mook, 1979).

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The Policy Process: Toward a Conceptual Framework

Downs (1972) describes the process many policy issues go through as they receive attention. After a pre-problem stage just prior to the time when the public becomes aware of a problem and the period of alarmed discovery when there is widespread recognition of the problem, there comes a step in the process when the costs of making significant progress toward solving the problem are realized. This is often followed by a gradual decline of public interest in the problem, accompanied with discouragement, boredom, and reluctance to deal with the problems. Then the issue moves into prolonged limbo as public interest wanes. With the issue of teacher incentives, the window of opportunity for program design and implementation may be short. If it is discovered that the costs of such programs are too high and the resources are not available for funding, attention and interest may dissipate and the issue of teacher incentives may slide from the policy agenda. One factor which may work against that possibility and extend the window of opportunity is the publication of *Time for Results* by the National Governors Association (1986) and its call for teacher incentive programs. This report may renew interest in the issue as well as place the power of various state governors behind teacher incentives and help make more funding available.

Another danger is posed by Boyd (1986) in his review of the literature on implementation of educational innovations and the politics of school change. The danger Boyd poses is that education reform policy changes will be imposed in a top down, bureaucratic fashion on local school districts, or that the opposite will occur and what he calls a "fragile, bottom-up" strategy will be attempted. He maintains that both approaches are likely to fail. Boyd argues for a course of action in implementing change that provides "leadership that respects educators as professionals but nevertheless motivates substantial change and improvement" (p. 13). This strategy is echoed by Peterson (1981), who argues that successful change can best be achieved through clear goal setting and standard maintenance at a higher level of government with an evolutionary change process in response to these goals and standards at the lower level of government.

The central issue in teacher incentives is the improvement in school quality. Fuller (1986) presents four views of school quality. The first is to focus on the technical production process of schooling, as has been done in the education production function.
studies (Bridge, Judd & Mook, 1979). This has little to do with teacher incentives. The second and third approaches focus on (1) the individual abilities and perceptions of teachers and pupils, such as individual behaviors and perceptions and school climate, and (2) a look at school and classroom organization and pattern interaction. Both approaches allow for teacher incentives to affect school quality, and contribute to a model of schooling that would recognize teacher incentives as a variable in quality schooling. The fourth approach relates to institutional signals and the symbolism of school reform initiatives as expressions of social values. Fuller stresses, with all four approaches to school quality, the need to look beyond the formal structure of schooling and to examine the various interests, needs, and goals of all participants in the schooling process. This is pertinent to the issue of teacher incentives because incentives for teachers are only one part of the larger incentive in schools. Changing only one part of that system may be of limited effectiveness and may, at the same time, be very costly. In their analysis of state policy mechanisms for improving schooling, Mitchell and Encarnation (1984) point out that greater fiscal accountability as a part of state resource allocation policies and new staffing structures and incentive funding plans are important school reform mechanisms. Hanushek (1986) presents theoretical and empirical research which calls into question the likelihood that any of these reforms will substantially improve school quality.

Political economists and collective choice theorists remind us that decision making and change are complex undertakings and planned changes affect and are affected by a complicated set of arrangements and interrelationships. These institutional arrangements are defined by Kiser and Ostrom (1982):

Institutional rules are the arrangements used by individuals for determining who and what are included in decision situations, how information is structured, what actions can be taken and in what sequence, and how individual actions will be aggregated into collective decisions. Institutional arrangements are thus complex composites of rules, all of which exist in a language shared by some community of individuals rather than as a physical part of some external environment. (p. 179)

This approach is based on the proposition that both individuals and organizations pursue their own purposes. Individual purposes may be congruent with one another and with an organization, or they may likely be at odds with one another or the organization. Pursuit of individual purposes is constrained by institutional
The application of such an approach to teacher incentives is made clearer by Boyd (1982):

Using the rational choice paradigm from economics, the approach assumes that rational, self-interested individuals try to maximize their own welfare (or benefits) within the context of the institutional or organizational reward structure they face. Alternative institutional arrangements thus need to be evaluated in terms of how variation in the structure of incentives affects behavior. (p. 113)

Boyd argues that the best way to change the structure of public schools in improving performance is through an incentive system that "encourages, rewards, and helps maintain meritorious performance" (p. 123). This view is compatible with the view of Weiss (1983) who says that public policy results from the interplay of information, ideology, and interests, and that interests are in power, reputation, and financial reward (pp. 220-221). Pursuit of interests is limited by all kinds of institutional arrangements and constraints, including history, social forces, and economic reality. As Sacks (1972) reminds us, all school finance decisions have both fiscal and educational dimensions.

This section of the paper has attempted to develop a framework for consideration of the educational dimension of teacher incentives, including a way of considering teacher incentives which illustrates the complexity of implementing teacher incentive plans. This leads to questions such as will teacher incentive plans work, what will they cost, and will the benefit be worth the cost. Fiscal issues cannot be separated from issues of educational feasibility and political feasibility. All these issues are embedded in contextual factors of the broader economic, political, and social environment and in the interests and ideology involved. This paper focuses on the central question of what teacher incentives will cost.

The next section of the paper will address the fiscal and demographic environment for teacher incentive plans, with a focus on the Midwestern states. Specific analysis of selected economic and fiscal issues will follow, with some synthesis of the political economy of teacher incentive plans.
Fiscal and Demographic Environment

School finance is the central issue in educational policy because financial resources are necessary to effectuate any other policy decision. Rossuiller (1986) has observed that,

It is revealing that despite all of the ado about school reform, only a few states have made significant commitments in support of their school reform efforts. Too much of the school reform movement has been horatory and too few of the reform actions have been accompanied by the additional resources needed to make them effective. It is unlikely that in the next ten years there will be enough additional money to, for example, significantly reduce class size or greatly increase teacher pay. (p. 3)

In fact, it would be difficult to discern those states which have experienced major education reform from those which have not from an examination of school funding levels. Table 2, p. 111, shows expenditure levels per pupil for the seven Midwestern states in 1979-80 and in 1985-86. In 1979-80, Midwestern states that were well above the national average in per pupil spending levels were Minnesota, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Iowa. Ohio and Indiana had spending levels well below the national average of $2230 per pupil, as measured in average daily attendance (ADA). By 1985-86, the effects of a national recession and a major agricultural crisis could be seen on public school spending levels in the region. Both economic events decreased state and local revenue raising capacity and, therefore, served as depressants on school spending.

For the 1985-86 school year, Wisconsin was still well above the national average in per pupil public school spending. Minnesota and Michigan were still above the U.S. average, but their previous superior position had deteriorated significantly. Illinois dropped from a position 11 percent above the national average in 1979-80 to a position below the national average in 1985-86. Over the period, Iowa also dropped below the national norm. Both Illinois and Iowa are states with substantial agricultural activities and the farm crisis has been a factor in the fall in school spending in those states. Ohio improved its position over the period, but was still below the U.S. average in 1985-86. Indiana's spending level for public schools remained the lowest in the region.
As also shown in Table 2, of the seven Midwestern states, the percentage increase in per pupil expenditures between 1979-80 and 1985-86 exceeded the national average increase in only Ohio and Wisconsin. The lowest percentage increase, over the period occurred in Illinois and Michigan.

Another measure of educational spending is average classroom teacher salary levels, as shown in Table 3, p. 112. In 1979-80, both Michigan and Illinois had average teacher salaries at least 10 percent above the national average. Indiana, Ohio, and Iowa were below the national average in this measure and remained below the U.S. average in 1985-86. Between 1979-80 and 1985-86, both Wisconsin and Minnesota increased their position relative to the national average teacher salary, while Illinois and Michigan moved closer to the U.S. average.

While these data reflect past performance, they do not indicate much optimism for increases in public school spending levels over the near future, with a possible exception of Wisconsin. The Midwestern states above the national average seem to be moving closer to that norm in spending level and are not maintaining their previous superior positions. Data on public school demographics are shown in Table 4, p. 113. The demographic statistics indicate public school systems in decline. Between 1979-80 and 1985-86, public school enrollment in the U.S. dropped 5.5 percent, but enrollment declines in all seven Midwestern states exceeded 10 percent. Likewise, the percentage decline in the number of classroom teachers over the period exceeded the national average in all seven states. The greatest percentage declines in the number of teachers were in Michigan, Illinois, and Minnesota. The smallest percentage drops occurred in Ohio and Wisconsin.

An examination of changes in per pupil expenditures, classroom teacher salaries, enrollment, and the number of teachers would indicate that the seven Midwestern states have public school systems that are not fiscally healthy compared to the rest of the nation, although there is considerable variation within the region. The best prospects seem to be in Wisconsin, Ohio, and Minnesota. Indiana and Iowa are in the middle range. The worst prospects are in Illinois and Michigan.
The success of any teacher incentive plan will be predicated on the ability of the state school finance system to provide fiscal support. No matter how sound educationally any plan may be, it is doomed to failure if the funding is not available. The availability of sizeable additional school revenues does not seem likely in the Midwestern region. National economic forecasts would suggest that slow economic growth for the nation and the region is very likely over the next few years (Ward, 1986). It is, therefore, highly unlikely that additional funding will become available for education reform initiatives in any of the Midwestern states over the next five to seven years.

Fiscal Issues in Teacher Incentives

The most complete study on the costs of various education reform proposals was done by Wagner (1984), who estimated that if the various proposals to upgrade teacher quality, to upgrade the curriculum, and to increase the school year were implemented, they would cost $24 to $26 billion nationally, or about 20 percent of current total national expenditures on public elementary and secondary schools (p. 3). Proposals to only upgrade teacher quality would cost $12 to $16 billion nationally. In his paper, Wagner warns that there is no assurance that any of these proposals will achieve their stated purposes.

First, it is just not clear whether the various monetary incentives will encourage adequate numbers of talented individuals to enter or remain in teaching (or of current teachers to upgrade their skills). Even accepting that these proposals would strengthen the quality of the staff, the rigor of the curriculum, and the depth and extent of the learning experience for elementary and secondary students, the effects of the initiatives on what students actually learn remains a hotly debated, controversial question without a compelling answer. (Wagner, 1984, p. 3)

In 1986 we do not seem to be any closer to answering those questions than Wagner was. There is no clear empirical evidence that any of the popularly mentioned reforms would improve educational outcomes to any substantial degree.
The Cost of Increasing Teacher Salaries

There is no consensus on how much teacher salaries would need to be increased to provide a proper incentive to attract and retain high quality teachers. In 1985-86, the national average classroom teacher salary was $25,257 (see Table 3, p. 112). An increase in the average salary to $35,000 per year would certainly make teaching more competitive with other occupations with similar training and responsibilities. This could be achieved by extending the work year of the teachers; by providing equal, across the board raises; by constructing some sliding scale to increase beginning salaries by an amount in excess of $10,000 per year and offering veteran teachers smaller increases; by the inverse of this; or by some combination. The $35,000 figure is arbitrary, but probably is a realistic estimate if an incentive is to achieve its purpose.

As shown in Table 5, p. 114, the cost of raising U.S. average teacher salary level to $35,000 per year would be over $21 billion in the first year alone, using 1985-86 data. This estimate exceeds Wagner's figures because more recent data were used and a higher salary increase was assumed. This would require an increase of 15.7 percent in school expenditures. However, this estimate does not include any corresponding increases in costs of teacher fringe benefits, such as pension costs, which would inevitably rise also.

The cost of such a proposal for the Midwestern states would vary by the number of teachers and by the gap between 1985-86 average salary levels and the $35,000 figure. The highest absolute costs would occur in Ohio ($1 billion), Illinois ($781 million), and Indiana ($553 million). The greatest increase as a percentage of current school expenditure levels would occur in Iowa (25.3 percent), Indiana (20.7 percent), and Ohio (17.5 percent). The total cost for the seven Midwestern states would be $3.9 billion, or 14.2 percent of total current expenditures.

To return to Wagner's admonition, there is no guarantee that such an increase in school costs would make any improvement in school quality. Even if some quality increases were to be assumed, they might take a substantial number of years to appear, while the increased cost base remains.
The Cost of Implementing a Master Teacher Plan

Wagner (1984) estimated that cost of implementing a master teacher plan based on the Tennessee Master Teacher Proposal. Master teacher plans and career ladder plans differ greatly in their structure and incentives. There is no common model that can be costed out to provide a reasonable estimate of the financial impact of such plans. For the purposes of this paper, Wagner's middle level estimates were updated for changes in teacher salary levels since those estimates were made and applied to each state using a national per teacher cost average. These very rough estimates are shown in Table 6, p. 115, and they include both salary and fringe benefit cost increases. The estimates show a total national cost of $10.5 billion, with state increased costs ranging from $187 million in Iowa to $604 million in Illinois. These are cost estimates for the first year of implementation only.

Because of the estimation technique, great caution should be exercised in the use of these estimates. Actual cost could range widely, depending upon the master teacher plan or career ladder plan to be implemented. Fox (1984) feels that Wagner's original estimates to a national cost of $5 to $8 billion are too low (p. 229). Since the estimates in this are based on Wagner's, Fox would most likely make a similar argument about these estimates.

The Cost of Other Teacher Incentives

Other teacher incentives have been proposed such as loan subsidy or forgiveness programs, awards and recognition, improving the quality of the teacher workplace, and altering professional responsibilities. Some of these are impossible to cost out with any degree of accuracy, while others await specific proposals. As a result, no attempt will be made in this paper to provide cost estimates.
Financial Responsibility

It is clear that major teacher incentives can be very costly. It is also clear that most states would assume a very heavy financial burden to fund such incentives. Most local school districts rely almost exclusively on local property tax revenues for local funding and property tax burdens in the United States are already quite burdensome (Aronson & Hilley, 1986). As a rough rule of thumb, many school finance specialists expect that state governments assume at least one-half of the total state and local fiscal responsibility for public schools. Among the Midwestern states, only Indiana (61 percent) and Minnesota (57 percent) have reached that goal. The other states are below that level: Ohio (49 percent), Iowa (43 percent), Illinois (42 percent), Wisconsin (42 percent), and Michigan (38 percent). While attainment of a 50 percent state funding level is not necessary before large funding increases be assumed by the state, the low level of state school funding in the Midwest, makes large revenue increases for teacher incentives even more difficult.

It is clear that the financial responsibility for funding teacher incentive plans rests with the state and not with local school districts. Therefore, the availability of state revenue, the state appropriations process, and fiscal politics at the state level all become very important in consideration of teacher incentive plans.

The Political Economy of Teacher Incentives

Educational systems are open systems with dynamic interaction with their environment and have a normative base in the sense that values play a strong role in the determination of goals for the system. Making major policy shifts in educational systems are difficult without the right combination of factors being present. Political factors cannot be easily separated from educational factors and economic factors, and this is particularly evident in an analysis of teacher incentives.

Education reform and the interest in making major changes in the educational system to improve school quality came to the forefront of the public policy agenda in the early 1980s. Downs' issues attention cycle would suggest that such attention to education may not last. In fact, interest may already be waning in those states where
early reforms took place, as political and economic realities have joined with the complexities of the operation of the public system to create disillusionment and frustration over the efficacy of any real change. These conditions may present sobering prospects for the possibility of implementing a program of teacher incentives.

Teacher incentive plans created at the state level with highly specific components and heavy regulation and imposed on local school districts would seem to invite failure. On the other hand, states can provide leadership, guidance, and technical assistance to local school districts. The state also must provide resources.

Any teacher incentive program must be designed with very clear goals and with well thought out and explicitly articulated processes on how such incentives will improve school quality. At the very least, there will suggest evaluation criteria upon which incentive programs can be assessed and judged. In order to meet these goals and objectives, teacher incentive plans need to be part of structural change in the educational system. Incentives in one part of the system cannot be changed without altering incentives throughout the system.

Structural change can be accomplished through alteration in institutional arrangements. The incentives provided must be real in the sense that they make direct appeal to the self-interest of those in the system. They must not only offer financial incentives, but they must provide the opportunity for promotion, professional growth, and career advancement. Teachers must be empowered with decision-making power about their jobs and how they perform them. We cannot look at the isolated effects of monetary incentives or nonmonetary incentives, but at a package of teacher incentives and their ability to alter the institutional arrangements of a teaching career. However speculative the beneficial effects of such changes may be, political factors may require experimentation with them.

Finally, the fiscal dimension remains dominant. Teacher incentive plans will be costly to implement. Only the state governments have the potential to have access to resources sufficient to fund teacher incentives. There is serious question whether those resources are now available or will be available in sufficient quantity to even consider implementation of teacher incentive plans. This problem is particularly acute in the Midwest. Then there is the issue of opportunity costs involved. If the millions or
billions of dollars needed become available, are teacher incentives the best way to spend those monies? Maybe those resources would be better spent on programs for children at risk of academic failure or on programs to raise school resources in low wealth school districts. This thrusts the question of cost effectiveness to our attention. The question must be addressed of whether the massive new expenditures teacher incentives would require are justified in terms of whether they are the most effective or efficient method of improving school quality. Less costly teacher incentives could be employed, but the likelihood is very slim that they would do anything to improve school quality. For example, it is extremely naive to think that a $500 one-time bonus will make a good teacher teach better or make a poor teacher improve performance. The problem lies elsewhere. Teacher incentive plans must not be considered in isolation from the fiscal environment in which they will operate.

However seductive teacher incentive plans may be as a way to make fundamental changes in public schools, some hard questions must be addressed before policy deliberations move too far in this direction. This paper has attempted to raise some of the financial issues and to address the question of fiscal responsibilities. Prospects for teacher incentives will depend upon environmental factors that are largely outside the control of education policy makers. Funding may well be the weak link that threatens such programs. This study would indicate the following:

1. Teacher incentive plans will be very costly to implement.
2. There is little or no evidence that teacher incentives would improve the quality of education.
3. Even if teacher incentive plans were educationally viable, their high costs would prevent their implementation.
4. Even if the funds were available to finance teacher incentives, these additional dollars could be used more effectively and efficiently in other ways in public education.
5. There will probably not be sufficient political support for teacher incentives to overcome all these obstacles.
Table 1. Pupil School Use of Teacher Incentives, 1983-84

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Incentive</th>
<th>Percent of Public School Districts Using Incentive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any incentive</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Different step on salary schedule</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash bonus</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free retraining</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Award/recognition</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended (11/12 mo) contract</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Released time</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave of absence with normal step included</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loan forgiveness</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared program with industry (e.g., summer employment)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other incentive</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Public Elementary and Secondary School Current Expenditures Per Pupil, 1979-80 to 1985-86, Midwestern States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1979-80</th>
<th>1985-86</th>
<th>'79-80 to '85-86</th>
<th>1979-80</th>
<th>1985-86</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>2034</td>
<td>3547</td>
<td>+74.4</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>2973</td>
<td>+52.4</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>2465</td>
<td>3621</td>
<td>+46.9</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>2548</td>
<td>3789</td>
<td>+48.7</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>2451</td>
<td>4168</td>
<td>+70.1</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>2561</td>
<td>3864</td>
<td>+50.9</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>2365</td>
<td>3568</td>
<td>+50.9</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Average</td>
<td>2230</td>
<td>3677</td>
<td>+64.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's computations from National Education Association, Estimates of School Statistics data file.
Table 3. Public Elementary and Secondary School Average Teacher Salary, 1979-80 to 1985-86, Midwestern States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Average Teacher Salary 1979-80</th>
<th>Average Teacher Salary 1985-86</th>
<th>Percent Change '79-80 to '85-86</th>
<th>Percent Salary as Percent of US Average 1979-80</th>
<th>Percent Salary as Percent of US Average 1985-86</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>15,269</td>
<td>24,500</td>
<td>+60.5</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>15,599</td>
<td>24,333</td>
<td>+56.0</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>17,601</td>
<td>27,190</td>
<td>+54.5</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>19,663</td>
<td>30,168</td>
<td>+53.4</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>16,006</td>
<td>26,800</td>
<td>+67.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>15,912</td>
<td>26,970</td>
<td>+69.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>15,203</td>
<td>21,600</td>
<td>+42.7</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Average</td>
<td>15,970</td>
<td>25,257</td>
<td>+58.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's computations from National Education Association, Estimates of School Statistics data file.
Table 4. Fall Enrollment and Numbers of Classroom Teachers, 1979-80 to 1985-86, Midwestern States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1979-80 Enrollment (000)</th>
<th>1985-86 Enrollment (000)</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
<th>No. of Classroom Teachers</th>
<th>1979-80</th>
<th>1985-86</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>2,020</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td>-11.2</td>
<td>101,590</td>
<td>98,230</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>-10.8</td>
<td>53,544</td>
<td>50,001</td>
<td>-6.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>2,039</td>
<td>1,777</td>
<td>-12.8</td>
<td>108,818</td>
<td>100,051</td>
<td>-8.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>-12.5</td>
<td>88,248</td>
<td>78,970</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
<td>48,034</td>
<td>45,700</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>-10.3</td>
<td>44,022</td>
<td>40,530</td>
<td>-7.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>-11.7</td>
<td>32,610</td>
<td>30,897</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>41,778</td>
<td>39,468</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>2,211,365</td>
<td>2,177,851</td>
<td>-1.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's computation from National Education Association, Estimates of School Statistics data file.
Table 5. The Cost of Increasing Teachers Salaries to $35,000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cost to Raise Average Teacher Salary to $35,000</th>
<th>Total Current Expenditures for Public Schools</th>
<th>Percent Increase in Expenditures Required for Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>$1,031.4</td>
<td>5,900.00</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>553.4</td>
<td>2,670.4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>781.4</td>
<td>5,629.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>381.6</td>
<td>5,844.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>374.7</td>
<td>2,929.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>325.5</td>
<td>2,541.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>411.2</td>
<td>1,626.8</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>21,085.6</td>
<td>134,604.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Values in millions of dollars)

Source: Computations by author.
Table 6. Cost Estimates of Implementing a Master Teacher Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total Costs (in millions of dollars)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>10,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Computations by author based on data from Wagner (1984).
REFERENCES


G. Alfred Hess, Jr.  

Reaction to 

Financial Issues and Fiscal Responsibilities for Teacher Incentive Plans

In his paper "Financial Issues and Fiscal Responsibilities for Teacher Incentive Plans," James G. Ward articulates three key questions: "Will teacher incentive plans work? What will they cost? Will the benefit be worth the cost?" Ward does not directly address either the first or the last questions. He does provide detailed and straightforward information on the costs of two incentive plans: higher salaries for teachers and the costs of master teacher plans (on the Tennessee model). He does not address other forms of incentives which relate primarily to teacher control of curricula or redesigning the nature of collegial relationships within school buildings. Howe he does address a very important fourth question which relates to the politic economy of funding any significant additional costs for public education.

In an unpublished paper circulated in 1986, Russell W. Rumberger wrote:

Evaluations of costs involve determining all the resources used in the program, not only so that the full cost of the program can be determined, but so that the program (can be) properly implemented in another setting. (Levin, 1983)

Information on program effects and costs can then be compared in two ways. Cost-benefit studies determine whether a program's benefits exceed its costs; cost-effectiveness studies determine whether one program is more effective for each dollar spent than the other, alternative programs. (Rumberger, 1986)

Ward provides the detailed cost analyses of two types of teacher incentive plans which would allow others to assess whether benefits exceed those costs and whether other programs with comparable costs may be more effective in increasing school improvement.

G. Alfred Hess, Jr. is the Executive Director of the Chicago Panel on Public School Policy and Finance, a nonprofit coalition of 18 civic agencies concerned with improving public education in Chicago. He has directed the Panel's research into the fiscal management of the Chicago Board of Education, the Board's long-term revenue picture, and various programmatic evaluations. Other activities include work on cost analysis of Illinois reform proposals including teacher incentive plans and research on the urban dropout problem.
Randall (1986) classifies costing procedures into the two categories of cost descriptions and cost analyses. He includes cost modeling and cost forecasting as part of cost descriptions. In addition to part to whole comparisons, he distinguishes between cost-benefit, cost-utility, and cost-effectiveness analyses. He characterizes cost-benefit analysis as answering the question, "Does a program make good economic sense?" Cost-utility analysis is more aimed at determining if a program is worthwhile. He emphasizes that cost-utility analysis is important in assessing the results of alternative courses of action according to differing levels of utility, in order to make choices among alternatives. Finally, cost-effectiveness analysis is aimed at discovering whether an option is "obtaining certain measured effects" (1986, p. 3), achieving particular outcomes.

Ward's paper is essentially limited to cost descriptions, to modeling and forecasting. It provides virtually no comparative analysis of either utility or effectiveness, through which differing forms of teacher incentives might be evaluated. In part, this is due to unclarity among teacher incentive advocates about: a) the alternative incentive options which should be evaluated, and b) the objectives to be achieved by incentive programs, for which competing strategies might be proposed. Under the common title of teacher incentives, different advocates appear to be putting forward favored proposals aimed towards different objectives. Under such conditions, comparative analysis is difficult. Therefore, Ward restricts his analysis to Randall's cost-benefit approach, and does so by asking the larger economic question of whether any incentive programs make good economic sense, given the current economic and political situation in the Midwest.

Cost Analysis

Ward has developed some significant data on the financial condition of schools in the Midwest. As is typical, his data are carefully developed and interestingly presented. These data are not easily available elsewhere. He estimates costs of raising average teacher salaries from a national average of $25,257 to $35,000. Nationally, this would cost an additional $21 billion, a 15.7 percent increase. Ward notes that costs of benefits would also increase, but provides no estimate of those costs. On a state level, costs would run from $325 million additional in Minnesota to more than a billion dollars for
Ohio. For Illinois, the state I know best, he puts the additional cost at $781 million. This figure seems right in line with similar calculations I have worked on (Nelson & Hess, 1985). When we computed the costs of raising minimum salaries in Illinois to $20,000, with benefits and corresponding salary increases for administrators (who normally do secure comparable increases), the initial cost was estimated at $861 million.

Similarly, Ward estimates costs of a Tennessee type Master Teacher Plan at $10.5 billion nationally, and costs in Midwestern state which range from $187 million (Iowa) to $604 million (Illinois). We also calculated the costs of a Tennessee type plan for Illinois, though apparently with different assumptions. For a five rung ladder (apprentices, probationers, and three levels of teachers at additional stipends of $1,000 to $3,000 over probationary levels), we calculated a statewide cost of only $227 million, less than half of Ward’s cost for Illinois.

However, Ward’s basic point is that these plans all cost megabucks and he questions whether such funds are available, whatever the benefit. From that perspective, the total new funds allocated to educational reform in Illinois in 1985 were about $330 million, only $100 million of which was for specific reform programs, and only $3.5 million for pilot experiments in career ladders, less than 2 percent of costs calculated in our study. Thus, Ward’s point is well taken.

Ward provides no data on other types of incentive plans, citing a lack of specific proposals in circulation. For our study, we did examine proposals for scholarships, retraining scholarships, and internships. Even figuring internships for 10 percent of new hires in Illinois, the costs only came to about $3 million (for half-year internships). Thus, the costs of some of these other options may be more in the realm of political possibility.

In dismissing class size reductions, Ward only cites Rossmiller (1986) that states are unlikely to have resources to significantly reduce class sizes. Yet in several states, funds were available for this purpose: Indiana cut class size in the primary grades to 18 while Florida reduced student loads, at least for English teachers, by some 20 percent to facilitate additional writing requirements (notice that student-load may be a more important consideration for high school teachers).
However, it does appear some reduction in class size has occurred as a result of declining enrollments. Using Ward's data from Table 4, the student teacher ratio dropped from 18.9:1 to 18.1:1 nationally, and from 18.7:1 to 17.8:1 in Illinois. This change does not necessarily mean a difference in the classroom, depending upon teacher utilization schemes. It results because reductions in force (RIFs) usually lag behind enrollment declines, partly due to unit grouping of students and partly as a function of union job protection efforts.

The Political Economy

Ward emphasizes the significant costs involved in either increasing teacher salaries across the board or in creating merit based teacher categories for additional pay. He then suggests it is unlikely that such funds will be available in the future, particularly in the Midwest. He suggests that local district reliance upon property taxes will be constrained from adopting such costly programs, so the burden must fall upon the states. However, in the Midwest, Ward points out that states generally bear less than 50 percent of the costs of education and may be unwilling to further invest in the schools. He correctly points to the past record of funding increases for education in the Midwestern states, and notes that even with increases associated with reform legislation, growth in education funding in the Midwest has not kept pace with the national average.

My own calculations for Illinois make me even more pessimistic than is Ward. Not only did state education funding in Illinois not keep pace with the national average, it did not keep pace with inflation, a far more important factor for program and salary enrichment or diminishment. As Figure 1, p. 126, shows, education funding in Illinois did not keep pace with inflation from 1977 to 1983, and in 1982 and 1983, education funding was cut from the level of the preceding year. Only in the last three years did funding exceed the inflation rate. When declining enrollments are also taken into account (see Figure 2, p. 127), per pupil state support fell by 29 percent in real terms between 1977 and 1983! Even with the added funds from the reform effort, state per pupil support in 1985-86 was still 14 percent below 1977 levels in real terms. The second year of education reform funding in Illinois saw reductions in a number of the program initiatives and an increase in total education funding only about equal to inflation.
Michael Kirst, in an unpublished address to the American Educational Finance Association in 1984, suggested that the window of opportunity for increased educational funding was very narrow and closely tied to positive results of reform efforts. He suggested proximate measures of improved educational performance were needed. Salary and recruitment incentives for teachers, as Ward points out, promise only long-term improvement but require up-front investments. Further, as Allan Odden (1985, p. 406) points out, enrollment increases during the next five years will require a 5 percent increase in funding just to meet the needs of students at present service levels. All of these factors lead me to support Ward's contention that the very cost of teacher incentives is prohibitive at the current time.

Challenging Assumptions

Some months ago a weekly newspaper headline read, "If Incentives Are The Answer, What Is The Question?" After reading Ward's paper and other materials prepared for this conference, I am also seeking to discover what the question is.

Two different problems are addressed in Ward's paper, but are not carefully distinguished: (1) school improvement by upgrading the quality of those recruited into the teaching profession; and (2) school stability by offsetting an impending teacher shortage. These are quite distinct problems, both of which might be addressed by increasing teacher salaries, but might be more easily addressed by other means.

If the primary concern is to improve schools, doing so by recruiting more capable teachers is a very long term solution. It would take nearly 20 years to replace a majority of the current teaching force, particularly in large urban districts where school improvement is more desperately needed. Further, it is questionable that upgrading new recruits would change things significantly, since these new recruits would be thrown into the existing teacher culture and beaten into the common mold long before they achieved a critical mass for change.
On the other hand, raising salaries across the board is an expensive way to get beginning salaries up to a level to be competitive and attractive. At very small cost, eliminating the lowest rungs on the salary ladder could immediately boost starting salaries over $20,000 in Chicago and most Illinois school districts (less than 7 percent of Chicago teachers are on the first five steps of the salary ladder, while 52 percent are at the top of the scale).

Another option, in a depressed economy such as pervades the Midwest, is simply to set aside the education course requirements and open teaching to that large pool of unemployed or underemployed college graduates. Since education majors dominate the bottom parts of most college graduating classes, such a technique, while repugnant to the education establishment, would be the cheapest way to both recruit new teachers and improve the basic academic capacity of entering teachers. Of course, as is being done in New Jersey, some indoctrination courses could be required as a condition of employment, if that were deemed beneficial rather than contaminating.

Of course, another approach to improving teacher quality is to use the flip side of incentives, i.e., sanctions. This is the approach adopted in Illinois and other states as part of reform legislation. Requiring higher criteria for entering college students who intend to major in education will raise the scores of enrolled education majors, and presumably, education graduates from our teacher preparation colleges. However, it is more likely to also severely restrict the number of people planning to enter teaching. That may have the desired effect of forcing school districts to relax formal certification requirements for first employment. But tougher standards, while leaving entering salaries at an $8,000 competitive disadvantage to other nontechnical majors, is unlikely to provide enough teachers to meet even current replacement needs, let alone meet the expansion due to increasing enrollment and burgeoning retirements expected during the next decade.

Ward suggests that financial incentives are not enough, but incentives must also "... provide the opportunity for promotion, professional growth, and career advancement." Ward is echoing the calls in the popular literature for such enhancements. But I wonder what these possibilities really are. In fact, I find myself questioning the assumption that there should be promotions and career advancement. For the best teachers, such advancement often means that school systems lose their most effective
teachers and gain moderately to minimally effective administrators. I am not sure that a good cost-benefit analysis would justify the current practice in this arena.

But more significantly, I find myself searching for the presumed analogy which is being referenced in such proposals. Why should there be promotions and career advancement in teaching? Teachers often claim "professional" status, but most other professionals have no promotion options: doctors, lawyers, psychologists, etc. Teachers are also unionists, but most union members work in fields where there is virtually no promotion: carpenters, machinists, electricians, hod-carriers don't have advancement plans.

I think the hidden analogy is with management jobs, in which there is a clear sense of climbing the corporate, bureaucratic ladder. While there is a clear bureaucratic ladder to climb in education, it is in the management part of the field, and teachers are not part of educational management. Thus, to get into career advancement, they have to leave teaching. I think we should seriously question the assumption that there should be promotion and career advancement incentives offered to teachers.

Finally, I find educational strategies which are discussed in general, whether it be teacher incentives or dropout reduction plans (an arena in which I've been working lately), do a disservice to educational policy formation. While I understand the political necessities which lead to thinking about a common solution, one best plan, statewide, for instance, I find such approaches usually are unworkable in many settings. Thus, I suggest that we should be disaggregating educational approaches, at least to differentiating between suburban, urban, and exurban districts. I see little need for teacher incentives in most existing suburban areas. On the other hand, how we get the best teachers to work in schools which need the most help is an incentive question which I think is quite important. Thus, I'm interested in evaluations of the Houston approach of additional pay for inner-city assignments. And exurban districts have a whole different set of issues, with lower pay scales to start but the attractiveness of a downscale life style. I'm also concerned about whether incentives are focused towards excellence (a suburban concern, if you will) or towards overcoming the educational collapse of all major urban school systems in this country.
REFERENCES


Abstract This study reports an investigation of the relationship between teaching incentives and a model of teacher career stages. This investigation was part of a larger study examining the characteristics of teachers at various career stages and the personal and organizational influences on these stages. Based on social systems theory, this model of teachers careers predicts that at various stages, different personal and organizational influences will be perceived by teachers as differentially important. Consequently, various teaching incentives also will be perceived differently by teachers at different career stages.

In March of 1985, Secretary of Education Terrell Bell made the following statement:

To attain excellence in education we must attract and hold the best possible talent in teaching. Teaching competes with other important professions for the most able people. In recognizing this, the National Commission on Excellence in Education urged that "salaries for the teaching profession should be increased and should be professionally competitive, market-sensitive, and performance based." The recommendations continue: "School boards, administrators, and teachers should cooperate to develop career ladders for teachers that distinguish among the beginning instructor, the experienced teacher, and the master teacher." (p. 16)

The goal of making teaching a more attractive profession for "the best and brightest" has caused a scramble to find ways of providing a variety of incentives for teachers and changing the structure of the teaching profession. The terms "master teacher" and "career ladder" most often have been associated with efforts to improve conditions in the profession. More recently the term "career lattice" has been introduced to describe horizontal or nonsalary incentives.
In order to plan for incentives and career ladders, it is important to look at teachers' careers and what characteristics are present at various stages. If up to 50 percent of teachers leave the profession after five years, what is happening within to cause them to abandon teaching as a profession? What professional incentives are appropriate at various stages to keep good people in the classroom?

In many reports, ranging from the National Commission (1983) to Ernest Boyer's (1984) and Theodore Sizer's (1984), it is being realized that quality education and constructive reform will only be achieved by taking into account the key factor—the teacher. Attention is being paid to the need to upgrade the profession by paying professional salaries, by attracting the best potential students into the field, by increasing accountability, by restructuring the profession itself. Merit pay, master teacher, nonsalary incentives, and career ladders are now national topics for debate. More than debate is occurring. School boards and state legislatures are beginning to implement some of these concepts. While merit pay and differentiated staffing, functions, and salaries are not new, it seems that the time has come when the teaching cadre will be substantially more professional as a result of the reforms of the '80s.

**Goals for Improving the Professional Nature of Teaching**

Teaching is not yet fully professional; it is an emerging profession. What problems exist which indicate a need for change in the profession? What directions should these changes take? What aspects of the profession need modification? Six areas of concern seem salient.

First, there is a general recognition that both entry levels and top levels of most salary schedules are inadequate for competent teachers. Most of the major reports recognize this problem and recommend significantly raising the compensation of competent teachers. Any proposal for improving the status of the teaching cadre in this country that does not take this issue into account is doomed to failure.
The second problem is attracting a sufficient number of students into education. There is increasing evidence of a current and growing teacher shortage. On a national level math, science, and some categories of special education teachers are in short supply. In some regions, such as the Sunbelt states, there is a shortage of teachers in general. Even in the Northeastern and Middlewest states, where reductions in staff still occur, evidence indicates a shrinking supply which will soon result in stabilization or even shortages. Demographic trends in terms of births indicate that the number of school age students is shifting upward while the number of students entering teaching has shrunk 50 percent since 1972. Further, women who used to find teaching one of the few professions in which they could gain entry and receive equal pay for equal work, are now finding other careers at more attractive salaries. This hidden subsidy of supply is rapidly becoming a thing of the past. Teaching as a career must simply be made more attractive if the profession is to renew itself with competent new teachers.

The third problem that must be addressed is how to retain quality teachers in the profession. A variety of studies demonstrate that the dropout rate is quite high -- on the order of 50 percent in five years. There is some evidence that indicates that the teachers who do drop out are among the more competent. Teacher incentives and appropriate professional development needs should focus on teachers' skills in such a way that they are rewarded based on competence and contribution, so that they are more likely to remain in the profession.

A fourth problem with the career of teaching as it is currently structured is the relative flat and goalless career line. Functions of teaching are basically undifferentiated. The first year novitiate and the 40-year veteran perform essentially the same task. In fact, the novitiate often has the more difficult assignments, larger classes and more extensive extracurricular responsibilities, partially as a way to get a job in a tight market and partially as a result of seniority systems. Salary schedules reflect this fact. They are "front-end loaded," to use Lortie's (1975) term. By the time teachers reach 35 to 40, if they have continued their accumulation of units and degrees, they have topped out on the salary schedule; there is nowhere to go except for cost of living adjustments or a general overall increase in the schedule. The problems of undifferentiated functions and a front-end loaded salary scheme, in addition to the disincentive for professional growth, should be addressed in any proposal to improve the profession regardless of the adequacy of the salary schedule.
A fifth problem facing the profession is its bureaucratic nature. This, when coupled with an undifferentiated structure, results in a unique profession where to go up in money or status one must get out of teaching and leave the classroom. Career lines for those who stay in education vary. Some find considerably more money and some status by becoming an administrator. Others find status and often some increase in salary by going into higher education. Since the late sixties and the growth of collective bargaining, many classroom teachers attain money and status in a new career line of professional organization/teacher union work. The bureaucratization of the school has resulted in teachers having little control in the actual conditions of the work environment. They report to a "boss" who does not have a role in the classroom, as well as to other administrators and educationists who have "escaped" the classroom but seem to have an inordinate amount of control over it. No wonder teachers who do stay report a feeling of alienation from the work place. No wonder they resent the lack of autonomy, the little control, and the absence of leadership which they have in the school. No wonder there has been rapid unionization of the teacher force in the past decades. A restructuring of teacher incentives should strive to restore control, autonomy, and leadership to the teacher.

Finally, most teacher incentive schemes assume an inevitable upward trend in a person's career in which one reaches the peak and stays there until retirement. Current research in adult development, learning, and teacher growth indicates that this assumption may just not be the case. A cyclical model of ebb and flow, of peaks and valleys, may more likely prevail. If teacher incentives are to reflect this, they must provide flexibility based on career stages and alternatives reflecting potential teacher stage cycles as influenced by one's personal and school environment.

Career Stage Theory, Teacher Incentives and Professional Development

To meet individual needs and increase the effectiveness of instruction is an objective that is accepted by virtually every educator. This purpose has changed teacher/student ratio, published materials, government spending patterns, parent involvement, special education programs, and certification laws. A great portion of our education dollar is
spent in trying to meet the individual needs of students. What happens, however, when teachers become students? Are individual needs assessed and met when considering teacher incentives and professional development programs? How do needs change as teachers mature in life experiences and in their careers? How can incentives and professional development programs be tailored to meet these needs? How can professional development provide rewards and incentives to teachers at various levels in their careers?

School districts, private foundations, and the government have allocated substantial sums of money to support professional development for educators. Legislatures and education agencies across the nation are responding to recommendations made in the variety of national and state reports previously mentioned. There is a need to be certain that the funds that are expended for professional development will provide the most benefits possible. One way of assuring this is to understand teachers' needs and provide for their individual differences. Floden and Feiman (1981) believe that there is a need to look at how teachers change throughout their careers.

Teacher educators and educational researchers share a desire to improve elementary and secondary school education. Since teachers made a difference in education, one promising way to improve education is through changes in teachers. The ways in which changes can be effected, however, are poorly understood. Many educators and researchers believe that a better understanding of patterns of teacher change would suggest means for producing or fostering desired changes. (p. 1)

Sykes (1983) states that "career stages and differential rewards encourage workers to defer gratification and to maintain effort. An unstaged career which provides a uniform reward schedule based on seniority cannot command continued commitment" (p. 28).

Existing evidence on teachers' careers suggests that there are identifiable career stages through which teachers progress (Burke, Christensen, & Fessler, 1984; Christensen et al., 1986). Also, inherent in these career stages is the need for differentiated teacher incentives and development programs. The premise that the stages of development are important in planning effective professional incentives and development programs is well accepted in the literature (Bents & Howey, 1981; Burden, 1981, 1982; Hall & Loucks, 1978; Krupp, 1981).
The literature cited above yields many "first attempts" at researching the development of teachers throughout their careers and contains some suggestions, trends, and weaknesses. The studies which have been conducted have limited samples; therefore, their results have limited generalizability. Reports about teachers' stages are based on observations and "feelings," but no research base exists to verify these stages. Although extensive research studies have been conducted in specific areas such as stages of concern about innovations and student teaching, these are not necessarily applicable to stages of teachers' careers. Consequently, the literature reviewed thus far has identified a need to know where teachers are in their career development. Furthermore, the notion that needs are different during various career stages is consistent in all of the literature reviewed. Yet, an evident weakness lies in the area of needs assessment. The literature did not yield a great number of procedures for assessing stages of teachers' careers. There are numerous sources of information on needs assessment and the trend seems to be more toward involving teachers in the identification of their own needs and balancing personal and institutional or organizational needs. Also, there is a trend to plan professional development programs to more adequately meet the individual teacher's personal and professional needs. The need to look at factors such as age, family status, years of experience, student populations, and the role of these characteristics is timely. Teachers need to be provided with meaningful support systems and in a time of limited finance, "hit or miss" efforts must be avoided.

The following section will focus on a model of teachers' careers and the influence from their personal and organizational environment.

Teacher Career Cycle Model

The model presented in Figure 1, p. 131, (Fessler, 1985) is an attempt to describe the dynamics of the teacher career cycle. The model offers a view of the career progression which reflects influences from environmental factors both personal and organizational. The career cycle itself progresses through stages not in a lock-step, linear fashion, but rather in a dynamic manner reflecting responses to the personal and organizational environmental factors. The components of the model are described in the following sections.
Figure 1. Dynamics of the teacher career cycle
The teacher career cycle responds to environmental conditions. A supportive, nurturing, reinforcing environment can assist a teacher in the pursuit of a rewarding, positive career progression.

Environmental interference and pressures, on the other hand, can impact negatively on the career cycle. The environmental factors are often interactive, making it difficult to sort out specific influences that impact upon the cycle. In an attempt to sort out the variables, however, the influences may be separated into the broad categories of personal environment and organizational environment.

**Personal Environment**

The personal environment of the teacher includes a number of interactive yet mutually identifiable "facets." Among the variables from the personal environment that have an impact upon the career cycle are family support structures, positive critical incidents, life crises, individual dispositions, avocational outlets, and the developmental life stages experienced by teachers. These facets may impact singularly or in combination, and during periods of intensive importance to individuals, they may become the driving force in influencing job behavior and the career cycle. Positive nurturing and reinforcing support from the personal environment that does not foster conflict with career-related responsibilities will likely have favorable impacts upon the career cycle. Conversely, a negative crisis-ridden, conflict-oriented personal environment will likely impact negatively upon the teacher's world at work.

**Organizational Environment**

The organizational environment of schools and school systems comprises a second major category of influences upon the career cycle. Among the variables impacting here are school regulations, the management style of administrators and supervisors, the atmosphere of public trust present in a community, the expectations a community places upon its educational system, the activities of professional organizations and associations, and the union atmosphere present in the system. A supportive posture from these organizational components will reinforce, reward, and encourage teachers as
they progress through their career cycles. Alternatively, an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion will likely have a negative impact. It should be noted that the list of facets in the environments is not all inclusive. What is presented here is an outline of some key components that can impact on the career cycle.

Components of Career Cycle

The components of the career cycle are described below.

Preservice The preservice phase is the period of preparation for a specific role. Typically, this would be the period of initial preparation in a college or university. It could also include retraining for a new role or assignment, either within a higher education institution or as part of an inservice process within the work setting.

Induction The induction phase is generally defined as the first few years of employment during which time the teacher is socialized into the system and learns the everyday aspects of the job. It is generally a period when a new teacher strives for acceptance by students, peers, and supervisors and attempts to achieve a comfort and security level in dealing with everyday problems and issues.

Competency Building During this phase of the career cycle, the teacher is striving to improve teaching skills and abilities. The teacher seeks out new materials, methods, and strategies. Teachers at this phase desire to build their skills and are frequently receptive to new ideas, attend workshops and conferences, and enroll in graduate programs.

Enthusiastic and Growing Even after reaching a high level of competence, an enthusiastic and growing teacher seeks to continuously progress as a professional. Teachers at this phase love their jobs, can't wait to get to school everyday, and are constantly seeking new ways to further enrich their teaching. Enthusiasm and high levels of job satisfaction are key ingredients.
Career Frustration  This period is characterized by frustration and disillusionment with teaching. Job satisfaction is not present to a high degree, and the teacher reflects upon why he or she is doing this work. Much of what is described in the recent literature dealing with teacher burnout can be included in this phase. While the frequency of this frustration often occurs during a mid-career period, the increased incidence of similar feelings among teachers in relatively early years of their careers has been observed. There is evidence that this phenomenon is even present among many first year teachers.

Stable and Stagnant  Stable and stagnant teachers have resigned themselves to putting in "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay." These teachers are doing what is expected of them, but little more. They may be doing an acceptable job, but are not committed to the pursuit of excellence and growth. These teachers are often going through the motions to fulfill their terms of contract.

Career Wind-Down  This phase describes the conditions present when a teacher is preparing to leave the profession. For one, it may be a pleasant period, reflecting upon positive experiences and anticipating a career change or retirement. For others, it may reflect a bitter period, one in which a teacher resents forced job termination, or alternatively, cannot wait to get out of an unrewarding job.

Career Exit  This phase represents the period of time after a teacher leaves the job. It may reflect the period of retirement after many years of service, unemployment after voluntary or elective job termination, or a temporary career exit for child rearing or alternative career exploration.

The Reform Movement of the '80s has prompted a search for a new structuring of the teaching profession which will result in a higher level of incentives for the more competent teacher. Both old and new models have been undertaken, often without consideration of the dynamics of career cycles present within the profession.
Merit pay systems have been met with suspicion by teacher associations and others. While the concept has been around for some time, it is estimated that fewer than 5 percent of the nation's teachers work under pay differentials based on merit. The career ladder concept seems to be center stage at this time with several states and some local districts mandating various adaptations. Yet, the approach is not without critics. The assumption of vertical mobility throughout a teacher's career does not correspond to stages in which teachers' careers are seen as cyclical in nature, influenced by personal and organizational factors (Fessler, 1985; Burke, Christensen, & Fessler, 1984). This more dynamic and flexible perspective was considered by McDonnell when he recommended career alternatives as part of a career ladder (McDonnell, 1985). Teacher Specialists and Career Teachers are seen as co-equal in status with the professional teacher. While they would have differentiated functions, time and salary in these positions, they would be considered temporary positions with the professional teacher as the norm position. Movement among these positions would be based on teachers' interests, competence, skills, and their career cycle placement. (See Figure 2, p. 136).

The competitive nature of career ladders and the status consequence of downward mobility might be mitigated by such horizontal alternatives to the more common vertical-only model.

A report sponsored by the California Round Table on Educational Opportunity (1985) also indicates the need for alternative incentives in addition to a career ladder for teachers. Teaching must be seen as more than just a classroom activity. Other school-level responsibilities are necessary to meet the varied needs of students and to ensure the effective functioning of increasingly complex schools. A lattice image emerges when progression is not simply up or out or down but one in which various branches and options are possible.
Specific Competencies

Performance Assessment (of teaching) for persons not previously career teachers

Schedule C-1
CAREER TEACHER
Professional Development
Professional Assessment

Schedule B
PROFESSIONAL TEACHER
Professional Development
Performance Assessment

Schedule C-2
TEACHER SPECIALIST
Professional Development
Specific Competencies

Schedule A
ASSOCIATE TEACHER
Test (including those from out-of-state)
Performance Assessment

FIFTH YEAR INTERN
Includes full semester internship

PRE-SERVICE PREPARATION
Undergraduate degree in the Liberal Arts
Test

Figure 2. Career ladder--career alternatives
Combined with a career ladder, a career lattice allows horizontal as well as vertical movement. Teachers as a group have increasing responsibility for their school. The report lists a variety of examples of horizontally-structured teacher incentives: (p. 7)

- community liaison
- performance reviewer
- media specialist
- inservice trainer
- peer evaluator
- researcher
- professional classroom teacher
- curriculum developer
- master teacher/mentor/coach
- program developer
- grant writer
- program evaluator
- scheduler
- program coordinator
- budget analyst
- experimenter, and
- counselor
- other roles in school-site administration
- program developer
- grant writer
- program evaluator
- scheduler
- program coordinator
- budget analyst
- experimenter, and
- counselor
- other roles in school-site administration

This new mix of classroom, school-level, and professional roles must be appropriately structured. Teachers should not be expected to assume additional roles and also carry a full classroom teaching load. Schools should be given enough resources and enough flexibility to provide these opportunities regularly. Roles also should be flexible so that the strengths and interests of individuals can be used to help schools accomplish their work effectively. A career lattice-incentive program could be a positive model as part of a career ladder alternative.

In addition to alternative roles and responsibilities in a career lattice organization plan, suggestions for monetary and nonmonetary incentives have received considerable attention (Harty & Greiner, 1985; Palaich & Flannelly, 1984; Rosenholtz & Smylie, 1983; Rosenholtz, 1984). The common categories for incentives include compensation plans, career options, varied responsibilities, nonmonetary recognition, and improved working conditions. Figure 3, p. 138 (Cresap, McCormik, & Page, 1984), illustrates how specific examples within each category could serve as incentives to address crucial needs in the profession.

The authors of this paper believe that it is imperative that incentives be viewed in the context of teachers' career stages in order to maximize the effectiveness of a school district's efforts in establishing professional development programs. The following sections will describe the development of instruments to assess teachers' career stages and to examine appropriate and available incentives to meet teachers' needs.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Type of Incentive</th>
<th>Attract High Quality Teachers</th>
<th>Retain Superior Teachers</th>
<th>Motivate Effort and Improvement</th>
<th>Accomplish Other Community Goals</th>
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<td>Compensation Plans</td>
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<td>• Modification in Base Salaries and Benefits</td>
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<td>• Longer Day or Year</td>
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<td>Nonmonetary Recognition</td>
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<td>Improved Working Conditions</td>
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Figure 3. Purposes of teacher incentives
Instrument Development

To identify career stages and incentives, two instruments were developed and used in combination for this study. The first instrument, the Self-Selection of Career Stages (SSCS), consisted of eight descriptive paragraphs corresponding to the eight facets of the career cycle model. These descriptions were composites based on an extensive literature review of the adult development and teacher career literature as well as interviews with teachers (Christensen et al., 1983; Fessler, 1985; Burke, Christensen, & Fessler, 1983). Respondents read each description and selected the one which most closely corresponded to their present career stage. During initial pilot testing, respondents' comments indicated little trouble identifying career stage but many objected to the label identifying certain stages. In subsequent use, labels were deleted from the descriptions and no further problems in use were reported (see Appendix A).

To examine the relationship between career stages and incentives, an instrument based on incentives for growth was developed. This instrument, the Teacher Incentives Inventory (TII), consisted of 46 incentive items drawn from the literature on existing and recommended types of incentives as well as the researchers' experiences. The items covered monetary, nonmonetary, role change, and time categories of incentives. Respondents indicated both the availability of the incentive in their settings and the appropriateness of the incentive for themselves using two five-point scales. Respondents also listed the three incentives that were most and least important to them (see Appendix A).

Psychometric characteristics of the TII were explored in a common factor, factor analysis of the appropriate ratings. This analysis indicated that six factors accounted for approximately 43 percent of the variance in the TII item set. Alpha estimates of the factors' reliabilities fell in the .7 - .8 range. On the Self-Selection of Career Stage instrument, a test-retest reliability estimate in a small sample of 27 teachers was equal to 80 percent over a three and a half week time period.
Sample

From a market survey firm's master list of approximately 1.5 million teachers in the United States, 3,600 teachers were systematically sampled at random. This group was randomly divided into seven groups of teachers, 1,200 of whom received all the instruments while the six remaining groups of 400, each received various sets of four instruments (e.g., the demographic sheet, the SSCS, and two of the remaining instruments used in the larger study). Thus, each instrument was paired with every other instrument and it was possible to assess the effects of instrument length with respect to return rates.

The total number of returns was 778 (21.6 percent) with the highest group rate of 27.8 percent and the lowest at 19.3 percent for the group receiving all instruments. For the data included in this report on incentives, 502 returns (25 percent) were obtained out of 2,000 possible given the sampling plan.

Analysis

What rewards and incentives are most appropriate and available for teachers at each of the various stages?

This question was addressed with the Career Stage categories serving as the independent variable in two separate multivariate analyses of variance. The "appropriate" and "available" ratings from the Teacher Incentives Inventory served as the dependent variables in the separate MANOVAs. Each MANOVA analysis was then followed by a discriminant function analysis to determine the dimensions and similarities among teachers at various stages of their careers. Following each discriminant analysis, the discriminant scores were obtained on each significant function and these scores were analyzed in a univariate ANOVA to determine more precisely where career group differences lay. Finally, discrepancy scores were computed by subtracting the available ratings from the appropriate ratings. These were then submitted to analysis using various descriptive statistics.
Results

Table 1, p. 142, contains the basic demographic information about the respondents in this study while Table 2, page 143, contains the proportions of teachers at the various career levels on the Self-Selection instrument. The profile of these characteristics indicates that the typical teacher in this study is about 41 years of age and has attained about 16 years experience in education with nearly 11 years spent in the present position. The typical teacher is most likely to be a married female employed at the elementary level in a rural or small city location in a district having 2,000-5,000 students. This teacher is as likely to have a bachelor's degree and a master's degree, is affiliated with the NEA, and holds classroom teaching as a teaching goal. The teacher rates her career stage as enthusiastic and growing.

Figure 4, p. 144, contains the averages for the years-in-education and years-in-position variables for each of the six career stage groups. Separate ANOVAs on these two variables followed by pairwise comparisons indicate that groups 1, 2, and 6 differed significantly among themselves and from groups 3, 4, and 5; however, no significant differences were obtained between group pairs for 3, 4, and 5. The omega coefficients for years-in-education and in-position, .23 and .13, respectively, indicate that only a small relationship exists between career stages and these variables suggesting that variables other than the passing of time need to be considered in accounting for the mature career stages.

Part I

What Rewards and Incentives are Most Appropriate for Each of the Various Stages

Table 3, p. 145, contains the results of the step-wise discriminant analysis on the appropriate ratings of the Teacher Incentives Inventory. For this analysis and all subsequent analyses, Preservice teachers were combined with Induction teachers, and Career Exit teachers were combined with Career Wind-Down teachers due to small group sizes.
Table 1. Demographic Characteristics of Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>x</th>
<th>s.d.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years Experience</strong></td>
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<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Years in Position</strong></td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Gender**
- Male = 243 (31.2%)
- Female = 531 (68.3%)

**Marital Status**
- Married = 567 (72.9%)
- Unmarried = 200 (25.7%)
- No Response = eleven (1.5%)

**Teaching Assignment**
- Elementary = 327 (42%)
- Middle-Jr. High = 197 (25.3%)
- High School = 210 (27%)
- Other = 44 (5.6%)

**School Location**
- Urban = 60 (7.7%)
- Suburb = 199 (25.6%)
- Rural = 254 (32.6%)
- City = 242 (31.1%)
- No Response = 23 (3%)

**District Size**
- 0-499 = 83 (10.7%)
- 1000-1999 = 141 (18.1%)
- 5-10,000 = 100 (12.9%)
- 500-999 = 96 (12.3%)
- 2000-4999 = 185 (23.8%)
- Over 10,000 = 125 (16.1%)
- No Response = 48 (6.2%)

**Highest Ed. Level**
- Bachelor = 326 (41.9%)
- Masters = 327 (42.0%)
- Ph.D. = 10 (1.3%)
- Postmasters = 86 (11.1%)
- Other or No Response = 29 (3.7%)

**Organizational Affiliation**
- AFT = 77 (9.9%)
- NEA = 464 (59.6%)
- Nasa = 168 (21.6%)
- No Response = 8 (1.0%)
- Other = 61 (7.8%)

**Career Goal**
- Teacher = 480 (61.7%)
- Team Leader/Chair = 86 (11.1%)
- School Adm. = 62 (8.0%)
- Other = 135 (17.4%)
- No Response = 15 (1.9%)
Table 2. Proportions from Self-Selection of Career Stages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preservice</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Induction</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competency Building</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enthusiastic &amp; Growing</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable &amp; Stagnant</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career Frustration</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career Wind-Down</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career Exit</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>778</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4. Career stages and the relationship to years in education and position.
Table 3. Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients and Group Means for the Teacher Incentives Inventory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Designation as master or lead teacher</td>
<td>-51</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Professional organization recognition or rewards</td>
<td>-19</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Verbal praise from principal/supervisor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Written praise from principal/supervisor</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Praise from students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Promotion to administrative position</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Aide support</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21. Leadership opportunities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. Pleasant physical environment</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23. Mentor/master teacher role</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24. Options for extra work in the summer</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td></td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25. Options for extra work during the year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.30</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27. Early retirement options</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td></td>
<td>.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28. Longer day and/or year options (with additional pay)</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29. Flexible work day (year)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>32. Educational loan forgiveness programs</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33. Paid sabbatical leaves</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>35. Support for research and writing</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36. Release time for professional activity</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38. Opportunities for professional advancement</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40. Attractive insurance benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43. Control instructional decisions</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44. Influence in school decision making</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Univariate p < .10:
Item eleven significant but removed during step analysis
omega* = .45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>% of Variance</th>
<th>% of Variance</th>
<th>Canonical R</th>
<th>R</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>&lt;.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>&lt;.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>&lt;.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Means</th>
<th>F.1</th>
<th>F.2</th>
<th>F.3</th>
<th>F.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Re-Service-Induction</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Competency Building</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>-.1</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Growing &amp; Enthusiastic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Stable &amp; Stagnant</td>
<td>-.6</td>
<td>-.9</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Frustrated</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Career Wind-Down &amp; Exit</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F = Function

Consortium
- 145 -
In this analysis of the appropriate ratings four significant discriminant functions were obtained. The omega coefficient (Tatsuoka, 1970) indicated that 45 percent of the variance in discriminant space was attributable to differences among the career groups' appropriate ratings.

Interpretation of these functions, given the standardized coefficients and group means, indicates that the first function discriminates based on group differences in ratings of teaching incentives. In general, the first three career groups were relatively higher on the items relating to extra work (#24), loan forgiveness (#32), professional advancement (#38), and control of instructional decisions (#43). On the other hand, the latter three groups tend to rate at relatively higher levels the appropriateness of promotion to administration (#13), early retirement options (#27), and released time for professional activities (#37).

On the second function, discrimination among the career groups appears to be based on differences in ratings of concrete incentives. For groups 6, 2, and 3 designation as master teacher (#4), written praise (#9), longer day/year with pay (#28), and leadership opportunities (#21) tend to elicit higher than average ratings. However, for groups 1, 4, and 5 aide support (#18), physical environment (#22), loan forgiveness (#32), and professional advancement opportunities (#38) tend to elicit relatively higher ratings.

The third function appears to discriminate based on praise and support incentives. Groups 5 and 3 tended to have relatively higher levels on organizational recognition (#7), written praise (#9), support for research (#36), and extra work options (#24). On the other hand groups 4, 6, 1, and 2 tended to have relatively higher levels on student praise (#12), administrative promotion (#13), loan forgiveness (#32), and instructional decision making (#24).

On the fourth function, discrimination among groups appears to be based on praise and recognition. For groups 1, 2, and 5 verbal praise (#8), leadership opportunities (#21), and flexible workday (#29) received relatively higher ratings while among groups 3, 4, and 6 promotion to administration (#13), written praise (#9), and praise from students (#12) tended to receive relatively higher ratings.
In general this analysis indicates that incentives among teachers are differentially related to career stage in at least four ways which include teaching incentives, concrete incentives, praise/support incentives, and praise-recognition. What is important about this analysis is that of the 46 items included, only 9 items approached the traditional level of significance in a univariate analysis. The discriminate analysis, however, increased the discriminating power of the item set and increased the number of items contributing to group differences.

In general, it appears that the later three stages rate appropriateness of incentives at lower levels than the initial three stages. However, it is apparent from the group means that this is not a constant phenomenon and that at times the preservice-induction group may appear similar to later stages as on functions 3 and 4.

To determine more precisely where pair-wise differences occurred, individual discriminant scores were calculated and submitted to a univariate analysis of variance. These results are displayed in Table 4, page 148, and in general indicate that the later stages differ very little from the earlier stages in terms of reward preferences. Only on function 1 do the differences clearly distinguish the first three stages from the Stable, Frustrated and Wind-Down stages. Thus, in terms of the Career Cycle Model, these results indicate that only a two or three stage model might be needed to account for differences in rated appropriateness levels of the various incentives.

Part II

Do Differences in the Reported Availability of Incentives Relate to Teachers' Career Stages?

To answer this question the availability ratings from the TII were analyzed first in combination using MANOVA and discriminant function analysis and then singly using ANOVA; both with career stage as the independent variable. The results of the discriminant analysis are contained in Table 5, page 149, and the univariate results are indicated by an asterisk on the items for which significant group differences were obtained.
Table 4. Scheffe Pairwise Comparisons of Group Mean Discriminant Scores on Four Functions

*p < .05

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function I</th>
<th>Incentives in Teaching</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means Group</td>
<td>6 5 4 3 2 1</td>
<td>5/479</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.6  6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.6  5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.6  4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1  3</td>
<td>* * *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2  2</td>
<td>* * *</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.7  1</td>
<td>* * *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function II</th>
<th>Concrete Incentives</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means Group</td>
<td>4 5 2 3 1 6</td>
<td>5/479</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.9  4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.1  5</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.2  6</td>
<td>*</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function III</th>
<th>Praise &amp; Support Incentives</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means Group</td>
<td>6 1 4 2 3 5</td>
<td>5/479</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.8  6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.6  1</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.3  4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.2  2</td>
<td>* *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2  3</td>
<td>* *</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3  5</td>
<td>* *</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function IV</th>
<th>Praise &amp; Recognition</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>prob.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means Group</td>
<td>6 4 2 1 2 5</td>
<td>5/479</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.3  6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.2  4</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-0.2  3</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3  1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4  2</td>
<td>* *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5  5</td>
<td>* *</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Table 5. Standardized Discriminant Function Coefficients and Group Means for Availability Ratings on the Teacher Incentives Inventory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
<th>% of Variance</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>p</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.02</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Means</th>
<th>F 1</th>
<th>F 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Pre-Service-Induction</td>
<td>-.8</td>
<td>.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Competency Building</td>
<td>-.3</td>
<td>-.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Growing &amp; Enthusiastic</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Stable &amp; Stagnant</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>-.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Frustrated</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>-.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Career Wind-Down &amp; Exit</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>-.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Univariate p < .10

\( \Omega^2 = .23 \)
The results of the step-wise analysis indicate that two significant discriminant functions were obtained. The omega coefficient (Tatsuoka, 1970) indicated that 23 percent of the variance in discriminant scores was attributable to differences in availability ratings among the career groups.

The interpretation of these functions given the standardized coefficients and group means indicates that the first function discriminates based on group differences in ratings of job benefit availability. In general, the later stages report at relatively higher levels that job protection and security (#39), sabbatical leaves (#33), released time (#37), and a pleasant environment (#22) are available. In contrast the contributing items for the earlier stages, at relatively higher rating levels are: aide support (#18), opportunities for professional advancement (#38), control over issues and events in the work environment (#46), and control of instructional decisions (#43). On the second function, discrimination among the career groups appears to be based on praise and monetary rewards. For group 3 praise from students (#12), scholarships (#31), control over issues and events (#46), and longer day/year (#28), were rated at relatively higher availability levels. For groups 4 and 5, however, opportunities for advancement (#38), loan forgiveness (#32), and aide support (#18) received relatively higher availability ratings.

In general, this analysis of availability of incentives indicates that availability ratings are related to career stages in at least two ways. These ways include job benefits and praise/rewards. To determine more precisely where pair-wise differences occurred between the groups, individual discriminant scores were calculated and submitted to univariate analysis of variance. These results, displayed in Table 6, page 151, indicate how the later stages differ from the early stages in reports of availability of job benefits. The Stable and Stagnant and Frustrated groups report higher levels of job benefit availability than the earlier Induction and Competency Building stages. On the second function only the Growing and Enthusiastic stage reported significantly higher availability of praise/rewards that the Frustrated and Stable and Stagnant groups.
Table 6. Scheffe Pairwise Comparisons of Group Mean Discriminant Scores on Two Functions—Availability Ratings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function I</th>
<th>Job Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>Group*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function II</th>
<th>Praise/Rewards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Means</td>
<td>Group*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-.1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Groups

1 Preservice Induction
2 Competency Building
3 Growing & Enthusiastic
4 Stable & Stagnant
5 Frustrated
6 Career Wind-Down & Exit
While the proportion of variance explained in the discriminant scores by the career stage variable is relatively low to moderate in size (23 percent), it is interesting to speculate on the meaning of these results on availability. With "appropriate" ratings there seems to be few problems of interpretation since the ratings are straight-forward, self-perception data. With availability reports, however, there is presumably an objectifiable reality that may be examined for the validity of reports on the incentives.

That the reports are valid is suggested by the dimensions of difference found here. It makes sense that the later career stages are secure in their jobs and have certain benefits that are generally unavailable to the newer growth stage individuals. Indeed, on the second function, it also makes sense that the Growing and Enthusiastic people would hear student praise more often than the Stable and Stagnant or Frustrated teachers. Given the sense of these results, that availability is in some part being reported with validity, then it seems appropriate to begin speculation about the impact of the environment on teachers' careers. More specifically, what impact does an environment rich in certain kinds of incentives hold for teachers' careers and their movement through the career cycle?

Part III
Discrepancy Analysis

Table 7, pages 153-54, contains the means, standard deviations, correlations and discrepancy values for each of the 46 "appropriate" and "available" ratings. What is apparent from the discrepancy values is that they are all positive, ranging from a low of 0 to a high of 1.7. This result indicates, with one exception (item #25), that the availability ratings do not match the appropriateness ratings. Also, in no case does the availability exceed the appropriateness rating. The average discrepancy value obtained was .99 with a standard deviation of .41.

Table 7 also contains the values of the correlations between the two ratings. These values were all positive, ranging from a low of .09 to a high of .62 (all values were significant at or beyond the .05 level) indicating that in general there is a low, positive relationship between ratings of availability and appropriateness. The average correlation across the 46 items was .26 with a standard deviation of .10.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Appropriate (x)</th>
<th>Appropriate (S.D.)</th>
<th>Available (x)</th>
<th>Available (S.D.)</th>
<th>Mean Discrepancy (Avg-Av)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Increase in base pay for teaching excellence</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. One-time bonus for teaching excellence</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Across-the-board increase in base pay</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Designation as master or lead teacher</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. School based recognition or awards</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. School system recognition or awards</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Professional organization recognition or rewards</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Verbal praise from principal/supervisor</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Written praise from principal/supervisor</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Praise from community</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Praise from parents</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Praise from students</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Promotion to administrative position</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Smaller class size assignment</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Teacher's choice of teaching assignment</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Increased preparation time</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Extra secretarial support</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Aide support</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Extra materials support</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Privileges (office, parking, etc.)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Leadership opportunities</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Pleasant physical environment</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Mentor/master teacher role</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Options for extra work in the summer</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Options for extra work during the year</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Position exchanges and/or internships</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Early retirement options</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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|   | Longer day and/or year options (with add'l pay) | Flexible work day (year) | Released time for curriculum development | Scholarships for advanced study | Educational loan forgiveness | Paid sabbatical leaves | Expenses-paid attendance at professional conferences | Travel funds for professional development | Support for research and writing | Released time for professional activities | Opportunities for professional advancement | Job protection and security | Attractive insurance benefits | Attractive fringe benefits (personal leave, sick leave) | Attractive retirement benefits | Control of instructional decisions | Influence in school decision making | Freedom to experiment with teaching alternatives | Control over issues and events in work environment |
|---|-----------------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| 28 | 2.3                                           | 1.4                      | 1.4                                      | 0.9                             | 0.26                        | 0.9                    | 2.9                                               | 1.3                                           | 1.4                                      | 0.9                             | 1.1                                           | 2.3                               | 1.0                                           | 4.3                                              | 0.8                                           | 3.6                                           | 1.1                                           | 3.3                                      | 0.9                                           | 2.9                                           | 1.1                                           |
| 29 | 2.6                                           | 1.5                      | 1.3                                      | 0.9                             | 0.29                        | 1.3                    | 2.9                                               | 1.2                                           | 1.3                                      | 0.9                             | 1.6                                           | 2.9                               | 1.2                                           | 4.2                                              | 0.9                                           | 3.6                                           | 1.1                                           | 3.3                                      | 0.9                                           | 2.9                                           | 1.1                                           |
| 30 | 3.6                                           | 1.2                      | 2.3                                      | 1.2                             | 0.12                        | 1.3                    | 3.6                                               | 1.2                                           | 1.3                                      | 0.9                             | 1.6                                           | 3.6                               | 1.2                                           | 4.1                                              | 1.1                                           | 3.4                                           | 1.2                                           | 3.4                                      | 1.2                                           | 2.8                                           | 1.1                                           |
| 31 | 3.2                                           | 1.4                      | 1.6                                      | 1.0                             | 0.11                        | 1.6                    | 3.2                                               | 1.4                                           | 1.6                                      | 1.0                             | 1.6                                           | 3.2                               | 1.4                                           | 4.1                                              | 1.1                                           | 3.4                                           | 1.2                                           | 3.4                                      | 1.2                                           | 2.8                                           | 1.1                                           |
Finally, to assess the similarity between the two types of ratings, a correlation was computed between the two mean ratings across the 46 incentive items. The value obtained for this correlation was .80 indicating a high positive relationship between the two ratings; higher average appropriate ratings tend to be accompanied by higher average availability ratings.

**Implications**

An important finding from this research project for the teaching profession is the linking of career stages to appropriate incentives and the coupling of staff development program delivery techniques to incentives and to career stages. Incentives in both the monetary and nonmonetary categories that are selected as appropriate by teachers at different stages have implications for people who plan long-range staff development programs. It is important to know which teachers react positively to praise and support, which need concrete incentives, and which respond to money and security items only.

The discrepancy data suggest the need to analyze carefully the availability of specific incentives at each career stage to meet more fully the needs of teachers. Attention clearly needs to be given to increasing the availability of incentives which are ranked as highly appropriate by teachers but which have high discrepancy ratings indicated scarcity of this particular incentive.

This research holds important implications for policy makers concerned with providing staff development and incentive support structures for teachers. The differences of teachers in various career stages point to the need to consider models that advocate personalized, individualized support systems. In searching for such models particular attention might be given to the works of Sergiovanni and Starratt (1979), Herzberg (1959), Bents and Howey (1981), Fessler and Burke (1983), and Glickman (1985).

An additional implication for teacher educators and staff developers from this research is the isolation of the teacher induction period as a specific stage in the professional growth of a teacher. Attitudes are positive at this stage, but many needs exist. Teacher induction has been studied by several teacher educators over the past few years. The result of this work supports and expands upon that previous work.
The need to broaden the concept of staff development and professional growth to include concern for the personal needs and problems of teachers is also reinforced by this research. This might include support systems to assist teachers in dealing with family problems, chemical abuse, financial planning, crisis resolution, and retirement issues. Larger districts could examine means for providing internal support systems for such purposes, while smaller districts could explore linkages to existing social service agencies.

For example, for teachers in the preservice/induction stages appropriate support or incentives could be extra work for extra pay, loan forgiveness, control over instructional decisions, aide support, written prefer such incentives as professional advancement, designation as a master teacher, longer year with pay, leadership opportunities, organizational recognition, extra work options, support for classroom research or a flexible work day.

Those teachers in a stage characterized by frustration would find the following incentives more appropriate for them: more aide support, released time for professional activities, "promotion" to administration, organizational recognition, written praise from supervisors or praise from students. Appropriate incentives for the people in a career wind-down or exit stage could include early retirement options, administrative work, master teacher designation, leadership opportunities, released time for professional activities, or a flexible workday.

This study also has policy implications for those considering career ladder models. As the results in Figure 4 indicate, years-in-education or in-position do not distinguish among the growing and enthusiastic, career frustration, or stable and stagnant groups. A similar plateau effect after a certain number of years has been found among employees in other occupations and is apparently related to a decrease or increase in effective performance (Super & Hall, 1978). Since these occupations are structured or laddered in the sense of recognition and advancement, and this study's data indicate a high proportion of teachers already rate themselves competent or enthusiastic and growing, it remains an important question whether the ladder concept and lock-step approaches to career advancement will produce the kind of incentives and rewards that are being claimed for teaching.
These data support the notion that career lattices might be viewed as a horizontal rather than vertical approach to differentiated role assignments. As teachers move in and out of various phases of their career cycles, the career lattice could become an organizational response that provides parallel movement of teachers in and out of various assignments and roles. This approach would view the career lattice as a dynamic tool to address the varying needs and potential contributions of teachers at various points in their careers, rather than as a fixed lock-step approach to "career advancement." The stigma of downward mobility would be reduced and competition might be minimized thus highlighting the collegiality inherent in a profession.

These data put into question the imposition of career ladders as the major or only incentive system for teachers. In education the need for individualization of instruction for children is emphasized. Based on these data, policy makers should also strive to individualize professional development and incentives for teachers. Career ladders may be politically expedient; in and of themselves, they may not make teaching a more professionalized occupation. Career lattice options dependent on career stages should be pursued as an additional or alternative to the current mania for career ladders.

The results given here support the current movement toward career-long teacher education that involves significant consideration of induction, renewal, and redirection activities. Teacher educators are aware of the needs to fine tune preservice preparation, they are designing means to meet the needs of beginners, and they are involved in the development of programs for career teachers. This research has meaning for all of these levels and gives justification to the professional decisions teacher educators and staff developers need to make in planning and performing their tasks.
REFERENCES


Hall, G. E., & Loucks, S. (1978). Teacher concerns as a basis for facilitating and personalizing staff development. Teachers College Record, 80, 36-53.


APPENDIX A
Assessment Instruments

SELF-SELECTION OF CAREER STAGES

A number of stages in the career cycle of teachers has been identified and are summarized below. Please read the following descriptions of the stages and check the stage that best describes you.

This stage is generally defined as the first few years of employment, when the teacher is socialized into the system. It is a period when a new teacher strives for acceptance by students, peers, and supervisors and attempts to achieve a comfort and security level in dealing with everyday problems and issues. Teachers may also experience this stage when shifting to another grade level, another building, or when changing districts completely.

During this stage of the career cycle, the teacher is striving to improve teaching skills and abilities. The teacher seeks out new materials, methods, and strategies. Teachers at this stage are receptive to new ideas, attend workshops and conferences willingly, and enroll in graduate programs through their own initiative. Their job is seen as challenging and they are eager to improve their repertoire of skills.

At this stage teachers have reached a high level of competence in their job but continue to progress as professionals. Teachers in this stage love their jobs, look forward to going to school and to the interaction with their students, and are constantly seeking new ways to enrich their teaching. Key ingredients here are enthusiasm and high levels of job satisfaction. These teachers are often supportive and helpful in identifying appropriate inservice education activities for their schools.

At this stage teachers have resigned themselves to putting in "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay." They are doing what is expected of them, but little more. These teachers are often fulfilling the terms of their contracts, but see little value in professional development programs. They are seldom motivated to participate in anything at more than a surface level and are passive consumers of inservice efforts at best.
This period is characterized by frustration and disillusionment with teaching. Job satisfaction is waning, and teachers begin to question why they are doing this work. Much of what is described as teacher burnout in the literature occurs in this stage.

This is the stage when a teacher is preparing to leave the profession. For some, it may be a pleasant period in which they reflect on the many positive experiences they have had and look forward to a career change or retirement. For others, it may be a bitter period, one in which a teacher resents the forced job termination or, perhaps, can't wait to get out of an unrewarding job. A person may spend several years in this stage, or it may occur only during a matter of weeks or months.

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**Teacher Incentives Inventory (TII)**

**Directions:** Listed below are examples of incentives which may stimulate teaching excellence. For each item, please make two entries. On the left, circle the number that best describes the availability of the incentive to you. On the right, indicate your view of the appropriateness of each incentive for you. Use the following rating scale:

- **1 = NEVER**
- **2 = Seldom**
- **3 = Occasionally**
- **4 = Frequently**
- **5 = Very Frequently**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Available to me</th>
<th>Appropriate for me</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Designation as master or lead teacher 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Professional organization recognition or rewards 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Verbal praise from principal/supervisor 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Written praise from principal/supervisor 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Praise from students 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Promotion to administrative position 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Aide support 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Leadership opportunities 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Pleasant physical environment 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Mentor/master teacher role 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Options for extra work in the summer 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Options for extra work during the year 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. 1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td>Early retirement options 1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available to me</td>
<td>Appropriate for me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Longer day and/or year options (with additional pay)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Flexible work day (year)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Educational loan forgiveness programs</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Paid sabbatical leaves</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Support for research and writing</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Released time for professional activities</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Opportunities for professional advancement</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Job protection and security</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Attractive insurance benefits</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Control of instructional decisions</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Influence in school decision making</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Other (please specify)</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26. Three incentives that influence me most are:
   a. 
   b. 
   c. 

27. Three incentives that influence me least are:
   a. 
   b. 
   c. 

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Arnold M. Gallegos

Reaction to

Incentives and Teacher Career Stages: Influencers and Policy Implications

A Model for Teacher Professional Growth and Development

This is a valuable paper in that it begins to look at incentives for teachers in relation to their appropriateness and availability from the standpoint of the stage in their careers in which teachers find themselves. The conceptual framework of the paper is built around Robert Fessler’s model for teacher professional growth and development.

The Fessler model presents the dynamics of the teacher career model as determined by the interactions of the organizational and personal environments with one’s career cycle. The model, though not all-inclusive, does identify major and important influences on a career cycle and their interrelatedness. This reader, however, felt that perhaps two major influences in one’s organizational environment (i.e., rewards, instructional support) should be included as parts of the organizational environment components listed.

By necessity, since the Fessler model focuses on teachers, the point is made that teachers are the key factor in school improvement and educational reform. This belief is then supported by expressing a need to increase the accountability of teachers and restructuring the profession as well as paying higher salaries to attract the best students into the profession. However, the case could be made that accountability strategies for teachers are contributing to a limited mind-set about the purposes of schooling that is detrimental to good teaching and retaining good teachers. This problem is not addressed and is a major oversight in the problem analyses presented.

Dr. Gallegos is Dean of the College of Education at Western Michigan University and is currently president of the Teacher Education Council of State Colleges and Universities. His research interests lie in the areas of curriculum design and institutional planning.
Goals and Related Problems

The problem analyses included under the section on Goals for Improving the Professional Nature of Teaching focus on what are seen as six major obstacles to improvement. One of these is the growing teacher shortage with the argument made that we must find ways to make teaching more attractive -- the implication being that this would preclude a shortage.

In so doing, the most obvious and direct way (now being pursued by several states) is to significantly increase beginning teachers' salaries; however, as this paper implies, such moves have created a salary compression issue of major proportions. This means that, unless states and districts move to increase the ceilings on salary schedules in direct proportion to entry-level salaries, many teachers will opt out after only a few years of teaching.

Another problem identified is the presumption that teachers that drop out of the profession are among the most competent. This is not supported by a 1985 Louis Harris survey conducted for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company entitled "Former Teachers in America." According to this report, "This survey dispels one widely held belief -- that the most talented and qualified teachers leave the profession much more frequently than other teachers." In fact, the report states that teachers from the most to the least qualified leave at similar rates. Major causes for leaving are job stress, dissatisfaction with teaching, and the lack of intellectual challenge.

This paper does not directly address these specific problem areas, nor does it identify incentives for overcoming them, other than in the general sense of improving conditions in the workplace. For example, the statement is made that teachers have feelings of alienation from the workplace and resent the lack of autonomy, control, and leadership they have in their schools. It is then implied that these types of concerns could be eliminated through the restructuring of teacher incentives.

Career Stage Theory, Teacher Incentives and Professional Development

The major premise presented in this paper does merit serious attention, analysis, and reflection. This premise is derived from evidence indicating that there are identifiable
career stages for teachers, and that teacher incentives and professional development should be differentiated to coincide with these career stages. In addition, the authors broaden the concept of development to encompass personal as well as professional needs -- an often overlooked aspect of development once one has entered full employment.

One of the more interesting and newer concepts presented is based on the emerging notion of searching "for a new structuring of the teaching profession which will result in a higher level of incentives for the more competent teacher." This concept is called a "career lattice" and is viewed as an additional "horizontal" dimension to the incentives provided by the more common vertical-only career ladder model. That is, a career lattice is designed to provide both vertical and horizontal movement for individual teachers.

And therein lies what could be considered a major problem and concern. As indicated by Susan Moore Johnson (1986) in a recent article entitled, "Incentives for Teachers: What Motivates, What Matters," there is evidence competitive rewards for individuals may be less effective in motivating teachers than inducements that focus on groups of individuals working together toward school-wide and shared professional goals.

Although career lattices are presented as a potential mitigator of the competitive nature of career ladders and their built-in "status consequence of downward mobility" after a certain time period, their greatest contribution may be in identifying nonsalary incentives for use by school districts without funds for significant salary incentives.

After a rather brief description of career lattices that encompass both horizontal and vertical incentive career moves, the authors then get to the heart of their paper which is their belief "that it is imperative that incentives be viewed in the context of teachers' career stages in order to maximize the effectiveness of a school district's efforts." This portion of the paper describes two instruments, one of which was used to assess teachers' career stages and the other to identify the appropriate incentive for a specific career stage. This reader found the latter instrument to be too unidimensional and self-serving, as if incentives had to be solely of the type that rewarded individual teachers for individual performance and competence.
Interestingly, 68 percent of the teachers who responded to the Self Selection of Career Stages instrument identified themselves as being in the competency building or enthusiastic and growing stages of career development. However, there is no way to know the specific data (e.g., age, years in teaching, grade level etc.) of these individuals. We hope these data will be made available to allow us to get a clearer fix on age, years of service, and grade level for each stage.

Some Afterthoughts

It is this reader’s opinion that perhaps the lattice-ladder approach to incentives presented in this paper is an unconscious admission that funds for straight merit or career ladder incentives are not readily available in significant amounts nationally. And, as Susan Moore Johnson (1986) points out, merit pay and career ladders have been with us off and on since the Turn of the Century with very mixed results.

Also, the authors’ view of teaching as an emerging profession perhaps creates a mental set that could lead to some erroneous assumptions about how to go about attracting and retaining the best and the brightest.

You see, to a few of us at least, there is some evidence that the "teaching profession" is in fact in a period of decline rather than in an emergent state. This view is based on the fact that, during the last 10 to 15 years, teachers have lost considerable degrees of freedom on what and how they teach. State and local mandates (many tied to student performance on basic skills) have literally dictated to teachers what to teach as well as when and how to teach it. This has led to the increased use of "teacher-proof" materials and at some grade levels (e.g., primary) has reduced significantly the time available to teachers for creative, spontaneous teaching/learning activities.

Couple the above phenomena with the proliferation of statewide mandated assessments in the basic skills, the demise in opportunities for exercising professional judgment related to individualized rates and modes of learning is self-evident. Such conditions result from requiring all learners in a class to be tested at the same time, in the same way, and on the same subject matter -- conditions which the work of John Carroll and Benjamin Bloom related to mastery learning indicates are contrary to sound
professional practice. Unfortunately, the silence and the absence of protestations in relation to such imposed conditions tell us much about the profession. Needless to say, such conditions will not attract nor retain the best and the brightest, and neither will incentives designed in a general sense for teachers at all levels in a system, as this paper proposes.

In relation to the latter, it would seem that this paper has failed to recognize and consider the different "mental sets" which teachers bring to their professional careers. For example, secondary teachers consider themselves primarily as "content specialists," with their jobs being that of transmitting content in a specific field (e.g., math, history). Primary teachers, on the other hand, view their jobs as ones of facilitating learning for students in several areas of study. If this analysis is accurate, it would seem then that effective incentives for secondary teachers might be considerably different from those for primary teachers.

Likewise, this paper needs to address some of the issues raised in the earlier-mentioned Louis Harris survey, and to attempt to identify differential incentive approaches to meet the major issues identified. These included job stress, dissatisfaction with teaching, and the lack of intellectual challenge. Others should perhaps be added relating to feelings of isolation and the lack of trust in teachers in general. This latter issue (i.e., lack of trust) could perhaps be the critical issue in teacher morale and productivity. A study on this issue alone would seem fully warranted.

It is this reader's opinion, however, that the major omission in this paper is the absence of an analysis and synthesis of so-called "solidary" and "purposive" incentives that are group rather than individually focused. As stated earlier, these are inducements that focus on groups of individuals working together toward school-wide and shared professional goals. Logic would seem to indicate that group-based incentives would be far more effective, less expensive, and their results more long-lasting than individually focused, competitive ones. Let's find out.
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Gallegos
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The Teacher's Role in Policy-Decision Making

Abstract: With the new waves of reports, the tone and the spotlight have focused on the teacher rather than the system itself. The politicians are spending more and more time trying to look like they know what they are doing. The state departments of education are fast catching up on everything from long range planning to experimentation. For the first time in my career and not since I was one of the "Sputnik Kids" has there been so much concern about making the system work better. The only problem in trying to make the same pie better is that it is just not going to work. This paper deals with what is being said about the role, if there is one, of the teacher in policymaking as an education professional.

I am delighted to be asked to present this paper. However, I have no elaborate credentials. That is to say I have none save the fact I am a teacher.

I don't write books. fact or fiction. I don't sit in sterile surroundings and muse about what is right or what is wrong: and then conclude answers based on opinion surveys or well "rounded off" statistics. I don't practice law: either as an attorney or as a judge. I don't run a company and have my finger on the politically profitable pulse of this nation. I am not a farmer or house husband or student or a manager or something or other. I am not a legislator. I am not a governor. I am not a bureaucrat.

I teach. I studied, was graduated, certified and licensed to teach. I'll never forget what it was like that first year. I was going to set the world on fire. Let me tell you what setting the "world on fire" became when it came abruptly up against the reality of the educational enterprise.

- There were not enough books to go around.
- Other "fill in texts" were outdated.
- Paper, pencils, etc. needed to be requisitioned and we ran out in February.
- The length of a student's hair, or skirt, took precedence over achievement.

The district was always in a budget crunch (freely translated this means):

- Put more kids in each class (I already had 35).
- Don't buy new books.
- Cut back on staff.
- Double up on assignments.

Damon Moore is serving his second term as President of the Indiana State Teachers Association. His teaching experience is as a secondary science teacher. He has been recognized as a teacher/leader at the state and national level. Currently he is involved in a career ladder plan in the state of Indiana.
That little litany of my beginning could be told in nearly every community and/or school in this nation. This great and glorious and rich nation, committed to free and equal educational opportunity for all young people.

Every period I would walk into my overcrowded classroom, close the door to the excuses, inane politics, educationally baneful decisions, and teach.

I would interact with each child as a person. I tried to raise the expectation of learning and build an environment where it’s okay to wonder -- to question, to discover. Sometimes I connected and it was magic. Sometimes I didn’t and it hurt. But in that classroom, my classroom, I held the keys to the magic of learning.

I submit to you, that’s how the magic of learning happens in nearly every community and/or building in this nation. I want to throw open the doors to the magic. In so doing, I assert that: the improvement of public education is, out of necessity, embodied in the meaningful inclusion of the teacher, the practitioner in educational decision making.

And what a perfect time to make this "improvement." This time when every educational bureaucrat, every legislator, every governor, every expert, with or without credentials, is calling for, even demanding, that public education be improved. I think it's wonderful!

But I want to deal with the disease, not the symptoms. And the disease to me is that people albeit well meaning, are missing the point. The point isn't longer school days; longer school years; more money for the "best" school systems; more money for the "best" teacher; or, creating labor-management schisms within the teaching ranks. The point is, let those with the expertise to make decisions, make decisions.

Just as a hospital board of trustees does not tell a surgeon which scalpel to use, or where to make the cut, or even if the cut should be made. It makes sure an appropriate scalpel is available; assures a clinical environment and gives space and confidence to the surgeon so that success can be achieved.
But in education, lay people, that’s a euphemism for people who, for the most part, can claim only that they went to school as their basis for educational decision making, decide the books, the curriculum, the class size, the class day, the school year, the grading system, the entrance and exit standards and the promotion/demotion standard.

No wonder public education is in trouble. Where are the experts in all these decisions?

The research abounds from the private sector about how shared decision making and employee involvement in the setting of goals and making policies pays off for the companies in profits and morale. However, the real world of the teacher is not the same as private sector industry. No matter how politicians and state boards of education try to demand better results, the stark reality is that the worker, the professional teacher in the classroom, must have a greater role in the process of setting goals from the building level to the national level if there is to be any real change. Change will only come if the teachers feel some ownership in the change; that can only come with participation in the process.

The question that must be raised is: "Do teachers really want to be involved in the process of policymaking?" The answer is before us and should be of no surprise to those of us who are in the classroom daily. Professor Samuel B. Bacharach, of Cornell University, in his study "The Learning Workplace: The Conditions and Resources of Teaching" (CART) answers the question. (Bacharach, et al, 1986.)

Dr. Bacharach points out that all the reports have all but forgotten the importance of the decision-making structure to the effectiveness of the school. Most of the reformers have overlooked the importance of this topic as well.

The involvement of teaching is vital in goal-setting, in decisions concerning the work process in schools as well as in decisions governing resource use and allocations. The teacher is the expert and holder of the most accurate information on the education process and teachers should be given the chance to contribute to the process. That involvement would better guarantee effective change in the system. Dr. Bacharach’s survey (CART) examined the extent to which teachers are actually involved in and participate in decision making.
The role of the teacher in the decision-making process has been always questionable. Yet, from the time when the teacher in the one room school house had more control of everything to today, the most important person in the process has been the teacher. As long ago as 1857, when the National Education Association came into being, teachers have wanted to and have been policy makers. We still want to have a role in those policy decisions. Those policies, those guiding principles that provide the very foundation for decision-making all too often exclude those closest to the solutions.

Current reform efforts have shed some light on the fact that classroom teachers, for a variety of reasons, must have a greater role in the decision-making process. The wants and needs of the teachers of this nation are clear. It is an understatement to say that teachers should be involved at all levels in all the decisions being made about schools, but finally those in the power roles are beginning to realize the importance of that practitioner input. I agree with Dr. Bacharach that teachers, as professionals, should be and want to be highly involved in the decision process in all school matters. In particular, teachers want to be involved in goal-setting, in decisions concerning the work process in schools, and in decisions governing resource use and allocation. As the experts and holders of the most accurate information on the education process in their schools, teachers should be given the chance to contribute through their involvement in decision making.

From the CART survey we get a view of how teachers feel. The survey was done in 1986 and gives the best view I have seen of teachers feelings about our workplace. The four basic principles of organizational effectiveness identified by academic research and private sector experience can serve as potential models for our schools, with some modification. In short, schools might:

1. define goals, objectives, and priorities to guide decision making;
2. assure that teachers have the resources they need to meet their responsibilities;
3. promote communication and cooperation among teachers; and
4. guarantee that teachers are involved in decision making.

The CART survey sought to assess, via a survey of a national sample of teachers, the degree to which the organization of work in the schools allows teachers to perform as well as they can. Among the findings was that teachers do not have the opportunity to bring their professional expertise to bear in decision making and that communication between building level administrators and teachers is less frequent than desired.
Those are important points and we all realize that with communication comes trust. That trust could well be the cement that holds together the new foundation for educational reform. It won't come early, but change never comes easily. Decision making should be a shared process; the private sector does it; why not schools? Our history is very different from that of private industry and the comparison is not fair or true. The CART survey showed that very few teachers feel that they have more than an occasional chance to participate in decisions or organizational policies. At least three-quarters of the respondents felt that they had little chance to participate in decisions in organizational policies such as staff hiring, expenditure priorities, or student-teacher interfaces like student rights, or grading policies. In the area of teacher development and evaluation, or work allocation such as school assignments, or grade/subject level assignments, the same 75 percent of respondents felt they had, at best, occasional opportunity to participate.

For most this may not seem out of line, since those policy issues are most often thought of as traditional management issues. All the evidence points to the fact that teachers are given an extremely small chance to exercise their influence on basic school decisions.

The cost of excluding the practitioner from all the decisions that are made can be high. Dr. Bacharach calls it "decision deprivation," the difference between the amount of involvement in decision-making process teachers feel they should have, compared to the amount they feel they actually have. This measure gives some reading as to teachers' sense of powerlessness and the impact on the effectiveness of the decision. Few teachers feel the need to be less involved in the process on any issue. This feeling of powerlessness is only multiplied by the conditions that belittle teachers and make them feel as if they are very small children. Conditions such as constantly changing policies that the teacher had little if any part in making. School policy issues are not usually thought of as teacher issues, rather, they are thought of as management issues or more truly political issues. Teachers involvement in politics is really a reaction of necessity to the politicians. As long as the politicians solely make the decisions that affect the classroom or its atmosphere, teachers will be involved in politics.
The implications for school reform with reference to the involvement of teachers in basic decisions might be a major hurdle to overcome. As Dr. Bacharach indicated, whenever the questions of teacher participation in decision making is raised, school management seems to react in one of two ways. First, there is the "caring administrator" reaction, epitomized by the administrator who contends that teachers already have so much to do that they do not want to be bogged down with decision-making responsibilities. On the other hand the "paranoid administrator" reacts by assuming that teacher involvement somehow denies management its decision-making authority.

Many researchers have emphasized a need for a comprehensive policy-making structure instead of piecemeal structures. For example, we talk about mentor programs and internships, or evaluation, or training teachers. A lot is said and a big fuss made in each of those areas, with little attention to effects on any of the other areas. That point cannot be understated. But observations about the short-sighted needs of many elected officials only identifies the complications of our current policy-making mess. It has taken 150 years to get education in the predicament it's in and we're not going to straighten things out in a legislator's term or some governor's term. There must be a long-term vision.

There must be more. When the experts are removed or excluded from the policy-making process, that's wrong. There must be a new process that considers the human side of the institution, that considers policies that allow centralization when it's called for and decentralization when necessary. We must be flexible enough to allow for variety in our schools and make sure that the long-term vision will be inclusive.

All in all, teacher involvement is a new venture and we must never forget that public education has always been valued in this great country of ours. From our very beginning, our citizenry has been concerned about freedom, democracy, the education of our youth, and the improvement of our society.

During the last five years, public education has been the recipient of tremendous media time and space. A plethora of reports, written by a variety of task forces have called the attention of all segments of our society to the importance, the problems, and the needs for improvements in public education. There are many suggestions as to how we
might correct the problems and improve public education, but there are few new solutions offered to make the changes work.

There has been a call for improvement in the expertise of the practitioners. There has been a call for improved curricula, and, finally, a call for improved salaries. Some would pay all teachers more; others would attempt to pay a selected few according to merit. Merit pay projects have demonstrated beyond a doubt that such a concept is ineffective, divisive, and doomed to failure because it creates a cast system designed to cause educators to be divided and fight amongst themselves, thus working in direct opposition to the collegial trends also draining energy from the school which should be used to educate our youth. We need to reward all teachers, not only a small group of practitioners and broaden the base of salary improvement.

Policy making is very tedious, but necessary. The process must include the practitioner and, as surveys have shown teachers want to be a part of the process. Teachers do not want to just feel a part of the process, but, to actually be a part of the process. As a group, we want to help those in administration, but we don't want to be administrators. As a teacher, I want to know who is in charge. The task of the administrator, as decided by those in charge, should not be confused with the process of policy setting.

In Indiana we have a collective bargaining law that would be the prime example of how a process could work. Public Law 217, Section 5, which contains permissive subjects of bargaining which are also mandatory subjects of discussion, has a wide range of items that reach into all corners of the education program, thus the education policies. The list includes working conditions; curriculum development and revision; textbook selection; teaching methods; selection and assignment of personnel, as well as promotion of personnel; pupil teacher ratio; class size; and even budget appropriations.

In reality, not many items are omitted from our Section 5 of Public Law 217. This law offers boards and teachers in Indiana, and could serve as a model for other states, the right to be involved in bilateral decision-making process that gives each party its equal role. This is where many administrators prefer to try to abrogate the rights of employees by seeking pseudo systems of employee involvement. Those systems include
quality circles, participatory management, collaborative decision-making, and nonconfronting discussing just to name a few. All of these programs are designed to give employees a feeling of involvement, while the decision-making truly still rests in the hands of the administration. The administration dominance has been practiced since the beginning of the system more than 150 years ago. History proves that the time is here to try discussion under laws like Indiana's Public Law 217.

There is no attempt nor desire to do away with administration in public education. Administration is needed; good administration is badly needed. However, at the same time it should be recognized that the professional practitioners who spend their time in the classrooms on a daily basis have the expertise that must be utilized if we are going to recognize the best possible educational programs and a system that meets the needs of all our students.

A master contract should include items that are not in need of constant change. Items that can be of an annual nature should be in the contract. Other items that may need more frequent attention should be discussed on either the school corporation level, or on the building level, depending on the issue. It is totally appropriate to have association discussion teams on the building level to deal with building policies and the implementation of the curriculum within a given building. It is also equally important to have an association discussion team to discuss a variety of corporation wide policies that relate to a wide scope of matters concerning effective schools, practitioners and programs.

Once all of these policies are established, it is then the administration's responsibility to oversee the implementation of the policies, or the articles that are established in the contract.

With all this, the policymakers and the political leaders have started to listen to teachers and will begin to benefit from the expertise of the classroom practitioner. The policy process itself can be an obstacle if it excludes teachers, local school boards and/or administrators and the level of trust and respect that is necessary is not there.
Teachers who are in the nation's classrooms day after day and year after year are in a unique position to add to the knowledge and perceptions of national commissions and committees that study, observe, theorize, and pronounce what this nation should do to improve education. They can point out dramatically and graphically how much better schooling could be if certain conditions were different. They welcome the current national talk about education and intend to be aggressive in joining the quest for excellence in education. The final observation is the same as the thesis of this paper, in order to improve public education, the practitioner must play a demonstratively meaningful role in education decision-making, otherwise all is for not and we will undergo another great illusion of educational reform in our country.

If we are going to cause real changes and real improvements in the public education, let us not tarry over cosmetic and politically popular themes. Let us get to the heart of the issue and make it possible for the experts, the practitioners, to fashion the environment so that kids can learn and teachers can teach. Let's let the magic happen for everyone.
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Barbara J. Holmes

Reaction to

The Teacher's Role in Policy-Decision Making

Mr. Moore's paper, about the role of teachers, emphasizes the isolation teachers feel in the practice of their daily responsibilities. He asserts that teachers are not often consulted about educational procedure or practice and, therefore, do not participate in the decision-making process. Since decisions are made elsewhere and then "handed-down" to them for implementation it is only logical that teachers will feel "powerless" over their own professional lives. I want to suggest that colleges of education, in the preparation of future teachers and through collaboration with local districts, may play an active role in changing the feeling of Mr. Moore and other teachers. Opportunities for collaboration between teachers, local district personnel and colleges of education are incentives that would enhance the education profession.

As Mr. Moore mentioned, a number of recently released reports have made sweeping recommendations for various changes in education. Moreover, states have mandated changes--many of which are to be implemented in the fall of 1987. Both the reports and state mandates are responses to a widespread negative public perception of education and the process of schooling.

I want to make three observations:

- Notably absent from the hue and cry of the past five years has been leadership from subject-area organizations such as the International Reading Association, the National Council of Teachers of English, the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics and associations comprising principals and other school administrators. Moreover, the teacher's unions have not been quick to seize the opportunity to design the necessary changes either.

- The recommendations made in the major reports generally differ as to the degree to which they directly impact student achievement versus teaching. In other words, some of the reports emphasize the professionalization of teaching; improved student achievement (K-12) is implicit, not explicit. For example, the report of the Holmes' Group, Tomorrow's Teachers, is an example of the former emphasis. A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st Century, by the Carnegie Task Force on the Teaching Profession, makes improved student achievement the cornerstone of its various recommendations. In other words, all of the recommendations, if implemented, will likely converge in such a way as to provide an environment where student achievement is nurtured.

- The state mandates that impact teachers and the practice of teaching exceed those targeted to students.
State Mandates Impacting Students

Curriculum changes (especially in science and mathematics)
Placement and promotion
Athletic participation
Assessment/testing
Academic recognition
Graduation requirements

State Mandates Impacting Teachers

Instructional time/longer school year
Texts and instructional material
Certification and recertification
Competency testing and evaluation
Incentives to schools
Loan forgiveness
Career ladders/merit pay plans
Staff development
Remedial education

Of the nine major state mandates for teachers five are "incentives" -- attraction of teacher candidates, compensation for those presently teaching, staff development, and remedial opportunities for those presently teaching. The other four impact teachers but also establish standards or parameters that ultimately help students. However, change mandated from above is difficult to implement; it is difficult not only because it comes from above, but also because it emanates from external sources. Another problem with change mandated by external entities is that some aspects or elements of the so-called "problem" are actually surrogates or substitutes for the real issue. I believe this is what causes Mr. Moore to speak of teacher isolation and lack of decision-making opportunities. Reports by associations and organizations and mandates by states do not actually address those practices and procedures over which teachers have little or no control or about which they feel powerless. Mr. Moore's major points are these:

1. Teachers should be empowered to make educational decisions.

2. Communication between teachers and communication between teachers and administrators of various levels needs to be improved.

The period of transition between mandated initiatives and implementation (much of which does not take effect until 1987) provides a moment for reflection and for consideration of this point: state teacher testing initiatives have really underscored the responsibilities of teacher education programs to upgrade standards. Unfortunately, in
too many cases, there is little, if any, articulation between practicing elementary/secondary teachers and the state's teacher education institutions. Teacher education institutions will have to create bridges connecting the public schools, universities, and the state, in order to respond constructively to the testing movement and lay the groundwork for an environment in which teachers are trusted to set and maintain their own standards.

The Role of the College of Education

Generally, the debate about the quality of teacher education turns on three major points: (1) attraction and retention of able students to teaching careers; (2) a perceived lack of rigor in the configuration of clinical and academic components of teacher education; and (3) professionalization of teaching by eliminating the undergraduate education degree. Major recommendations for change in teacher preparation have been presented by the National Commission on Excellence in Teacher Education (1985), The Holmes Group (1985), the Southern Regional Education Board (1985), and the California Commission on the Teaching Profession (1985). These recommendations are aimed at various program requirements for teacher education programs and suggest roles that various actors should play, such as federal and state governments and colleges of education.

Colleges of education can and should be leaders in improving the teaching force and, by doing so, set the stage for change in the process of schooling. They have unique expertise and they have access to the real world of schooling. Arthur Wise offered this analysis at the Wingspread Conference, which brought together education deans and members of the Council of Graduate Schools from 15 institutions that prepare teachers: Schools of education must identify and define their own mission and constituents. There are few constituents for reform in teacher education except colleges of education and teachers themselves (Wise, 1985). If the track record of colleges of education had provided evidence of higher performance and thus engendered credibility for their graduates, the tendency of state policy makers to mandate accountability and to set standards might have been forestalled. But collectively, although there are many single instances of exemplary programs, colleges of education have been somewhat slow to
participate in a major formulation of professional standards and in the design of evaluative measures of teacher performance. However, it is not too late.

Colleges of education could be a major force for positive change in the teaching profession and in the process of schooling if they:

1. Design assessment processes and procedures that strengthen the teaching force over time and present innovative, short-term ways to increase the pass rates among black and other minority teacher candidates on tests for initial certification.

2. Seek to improve conditions of work and employment for teachers.

3. Design programs to prepare school administrators.

4. Create linkages between schools and colleges of education and between institutions.

5. Stimulate the development of multicultural awareness in school personnel.

Assessment Processes and Procedures

One major role to be assumed by colleges of education is the professionalization of teaching. Most of the reports about teacher education call for the development of a research base on the art of teaching and for a deeper comprehension through research connections between thinking, learning, and teaching. Moreover, the reports call for a redesign of curricula and a reconfiguration of content of teacher education programs. Establishing a research base and the development and design of innovative techniques and instruments for assessing and evaluating teacher competence and performance can occur concurrently with the other two. The combination of these activities could make a significant contribution to strengthening the country's teaching force and thus, in preparing American students for the future.

A shortage of black and other minority students is impending for the short-term. Leadership from groups such as the National Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education and others could give direction, visibility, and encouragement to intervention programs (e.g., the ETS/SREB collaboration) so that more institutions could join in designing programs to ameliorate the deficient number of minority teachers.
Umbrella organizations that cover most of the traditionally black institutions could play an active role in encouraging institutional commitment to the preparation of black teachers. Moreover, organizations of minority education professionals could provide a very valuable service by gathering and analyzing the data that would answer questions such as: the relative success of black (and other minority) teacher candidates attending predominantly black and predominantly white institutions; the comparative graduate rates by discipline of black (and other minority) students from predominantly white institutions. In other words, is the black student in the predominantly white institution more likely to major in and graduate in education than in other disciplines?

Conditions of Work for Teachers

Decreasing the weight of bureaucratic procedure that lessens the time teachers spend with students is an overriding aim of many who would improve the workplace for teachers. There are at least three interrelated sub-sets of concern within this area.

Isolation of Teachers: Are there aspects of the clinical experience that can help new teachers feel connected to a larger whole of professional interests and concerns as well as the broader fabric of the school? Are there features of clinical professional programs (such as that described in "The Clinical Professor in Teacher Education") (Hazard, W.R., & Chandler, B.J., 1972) that can be capitalized upon to provide classroom teachers with opportunities for involvement in the university and the college of education? Is it feasible and practicable to engage new teachers in a team effort with a career teacher? Some of the new career ladder programs include the concept of an experienced teacher working with new teachers. The movement to team teaching might be a broader remedy to an entire range of potential gaps and problems that can be positive for both teachers and students.

One way of lessening the feeling of isolation, especially among new teachers, may be to expand the use of interns, aides and work-study students from colleges of education. Ideally, the team-teaching concept would help, but it may be costly. Programs which capitalize on the need to provide early clinical experience to prospective teachers could
also indirectly increase involvement by classroom teachers. This would, in turn, lessen their day-to-day isolation from other adults.

Teacher Resistance to Change

Research about teachers likely to initiate change has implications for school staffing and classroom management. Several studies are reviewed by Seymour Metzner (1970) in an article, "School-University Partnerships: A Tale of Dichotomous Desires." According to that review, teachers most likely to resist change are those over 40, without a master's degree, 11 or more years of teaching experience, and who teach elementary students.

"Mixed" staffing that included aides and interns may benefit career teachers by providing increased stimulation in the work environment. The Carnegie Task Force (1986) recommends the use of a variety of types of teachers: board certified, adjunct teachers and teaching assistants. A related, but slightly different idea may be to allow people from a variety of selected professions to teach, on a temporary and part-time basis, in the schools, e.g., performing artists, artists in the plastic media, writers and journalists, and others who may welcome the opportunity to have part-time employment while pursuing other careers. Colleges of education might play the liaison and coordinating (screening, selection, placement) role in such programs with local school districts.

Inservice training is one area that states have not impacted significantly and is an opportunity for those currently teaching to work with colleges of education in designing stimulating staff development programs. Coalitions of teachers and education faculty could play a major role in designing inservice programs to include the factors that only they know, as a result of their experience. This could result in improved conditions of both work and student outcomes. Recently, a dean from a noted eastern university predicted that colleges of education will have only about 20 percent of the inservice training to do. "Normal" schools and programs will be initiated by local districts, with help from state departments of education and the unions. This dean felt that his college of education should teach the teachers for the normal school programs.
Preparation of school administrators: Colleges of education have an opportunity to influence the development of a strong cadre of school principals and other school administrators. The school effectiveness research stresses that successful schools (defined in large measure by student achievement and faculty satisfaction) are headed by strong principals. Strong principals are visionary, help faculty and staff articulate standards, are instructional leaders and insist that all students live up to high expectations. Traditionally, school principals and other school administrators have not received their initial administrative preparation in the college of education. Too often, teachers are elevated, as an upward career opportunity, to principalships and other supervisory and/or administrative positions within the district. Preparation actually occurs through a process of inservice development sought by the individual. While we have been fortunate in the past to gain the services of many outstanding principals and other administrative personnel in this fashion, colleges of education could now become proactive in providing the administrative education for future principals. In other words, those who wish to pursue an administrative role in the school district should be identified and trained at the beginning of their careers. Principalship should not be just a career boost for teachers. Becoming a good teacher and becoming a good principal should be perceived as two separate lines of career development available through the college of education.

Because colleges of education have been slow to seize the moment, administrative preparation is handled by the state departments of education. Many states are designing leadership activities for school administrators and old programs have been revived.

Linkages Between Colleges of Education and Schools and Between Higher Education Institutions

Many strong programs exist in colleges of education that illustrate one or more of the following characteristics:

- clinical experience for prospective teacher candidates featuring collaboration between colleges of education and local school districts; including utilization of the classroom teacher in the college of education;
- outreach efforts designed to attract secondary school students to teaching careers; and

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programs that show evidence of attracting minority students to teacher education and of increasing pass rates among minority students on various tests for teacher certification.

In some states, clusters of institutions are collaborating in order to accomplish common goals. One example is the South Carolina Center for Teacher Recruitment which includes public, private, predominantly white and predominantly black institutions in an effort to attract able high school students to careers in teaching. Another example occurs in Texas where five deans of colleges of education have formed a group called "The Houston Education Deans Consortium" to work on common concerns about teacher certification and other mutual teacher education interests. This group includes the public and private institutions in the Houston area.

Examples of collaborative enterprises abound and they must be highlighted so that their model features and characteristics can be replicated by others. Because exemplary programs need to be identified and highlighted ECS plans to use a proposed forum series as one means of systematically disseminating information about such programs.

Renewal of College Faculty

Some experts predict that the heaviest periods of retirement among public education faculty and higher education faculty will occur during 1991 and 1995. Institutions can seize this opportunity to define and articulate the kinds of faculty expertise required to produce a new configuration of competencies, skills, and professionalism in a future teaching force. We have sufficient knowledge to identify what we need, and to plan to meet those needs.

Multicultural Awareness

Genuine multicultural awareness and appreciation is not fostered by simply eating at a Chinese restaurant or attending a German beer festival. Emphasis of superficial cultural and/or social differences does not enhance multicultural awareness, either. School personnel require a deep comprehension of the central characteristics and mechanisms expressed in all human cultures. All cultures have social structures, such as families, and other means of delineating sets of relationships, roles and responsibilities between people. Moreover, all have social institutions such as informal
and formal systems of education, religion, government, and so on. The actual manifestations of these social institutions may be different, but, cultures are more similar than different because of a common set of organizing structures. If we are to live cooperatively in a multicultural society, schools must play an active part in promoting harmony rather than conflict between ethnic groups. (See Education Week's Special Report, "Here They Come, Ready or Not," 1986.)

Some of the points to be considered when designing effective multicultural education could be these:

1. Clear goals and objectives should be developed that allow for development of culture-general and culture-specific awareness in prospective teachers. If we are to prepare for the increasing number of diverse ethnic and racial groups forecast by Hodgkinson (see "Here They Come, Ready or Not"), then colleges of education must play a major role in preparing the teaching force to maximize the learning potential of all students.

2. Curriculum in the college of education could be built upon the need to meet certain multicultural dimensions: general comprehension of cultural diversity and similarity, and awareness of the acquisition of language among all humans. Specific curriculum components should reflect the demographics of the actual geographic area served by the school district(s) most likely to hire the institutions' graduating teachers.

3. Clinical experience of teacher candidates could be enriched by well-designed exposure and laboratory-type experiences in a variety of neighborhoods and communities within the school district.

4. Ways and means of disseminating information about effective multicultural modules within the configuration of teacher education programs must be developed and, where they currently exist, shared.

State policymakers and educators need opportunities for enriching their comprehension of the roles they each play. Moreover, they need to learn more about the processes and instruments each has available. States have used a variety of policy tools -- some of which have provided incentives and some of which have been inhibiting. From the vantage point of the Education Commission of the States, it seems that states are pushing higher education institutions to be even more creative and resourceful.
Issues surrounding the process of schooling will not be handled by one sector any longer; long-term collaborative relationships will have to be forged in places where they have not traditionally existed. The importance of teaching in transmitting the values of American culture and society cannot be overlooked. As a teacher recently said, "Teaching produces all of the professions." If significant, thoughtful, and constructive change is to occur in teaching, educators will need to explore the issues included in this survey of opportunity areas with state policymakers in environments free of partisan protectionism.

In conclusion, I wish to make the following assertions:

1. We need to attract and retain better teachers.
2. The political realities must be reckoned with when we talk about education reform.
3. Student performance should be the central issue as we discuss the process of schooling and teaching.
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The Role of Teacher Unions in the Development and Implementation Of Incentive Programs

Abstract As we enter phase II of the nation's interest in education reform and the development of programs and policies designed to attract new, talented, college graduates to the teaching force, the focus of attention has switched from "reform" to "educational incentives." Professional teacher organizations have joined the search for new teachers, the development of educational incentives, and the expansion and implementation of education reform initiatives.

The American Federation of Teachers, in its report of the AFT Task Force on the Future of Education, has pointed out the fact that over half of the nation's teaching force will be replaced within the next decade, as a result of retirements, resignations, and a diminishing pool of potential new teachers. To date no definitive program has been developed to attract new teachers, or to retain talented career teachers in a shrinking workforce.

With the increased emphasis on professionalism in teaching, upgrading standards for new teachers, revising certification procedures and improving evaluation policies and procedures, a new role has been developed for teacher organizations involved in collective bargaining with local school districts.

In its report on the Future Trends of Education, the AFT Task Force recommends that the second stage of education reform be responsive to the demographic and structural changes affecting society, to the needs of the membership, and to the needs of the nation for a well educated, democratic, productive citizenry.

Mrs. Jacqueline B. Vaughn is President of the Chicago Teachers Union, AFT, Local 1. She is a former Chicago Public School teacher with 12 year's experience, having taught kindergarten, primary, and special education. She was appointed a language arts consultant for the Chicago Board of Education, and is currently on leave of absence. Mrs. Vaught has conducted training seminars on classroom management, and methods of teaching at Prairie State Institute and Chicago State College. She currently serves as a vice president of the American Federation of Teachers, and the Illinois Federation of Teachers, and is an active participant and consultant of the education reform movement nationwide.
In fulfillment of these goals, phase two of the education reform movement should seek to restore professionalism to teaching, to restructure public schools, to promote student learning, and to seek new methods for recruiting talented college graduates to the field of teaching.

Chicago Teachers Union, AFT, Local 1, is currently involved in collective bargaining with the Board of Education of the City of Chicago to develop an effective incentive program for a teacher internship project designed to recruit new teachers to the profession, as well as to identify a motivational incentive for consulting educators who may volunteer to assist career teachers identified as "troubled."

In the process of determining which incentives will enhance the teaching profession, and who will determine the policy and procedures inherent therein, mutual agreement must be reached between the Board and the Union.

Teacher Recruitment/Internship Program

The American Federation of Teachers has taken a major step to launch a new program to recruit teachers into the profession and offer talented, experienced ones new career opportunities without leaving teaching. The incentives are part of a joint venture between the American Federation of Teachers and the American Can Company Foundation.

The $114,000 program, which is targeted to seven of the largest school systems in the United States -- New York, Chicago, Miami/Dade County, Minneapolis, St. Paul, Atlanta, and San Francisco -- was announced at the 1986 convention of the American Federation of Teachers by Mr. William Woodside, chairman of the American Can Company and Mr. Albert Shanker, president of the American Federation of Teachers.

The program is incentive oriented, in that it gives newcomers a chance to try teaching through a supervised internship and access to practical, researched-based seminars.
William S. Woodside has said that "the American business community has a vested interest in the quality of public education, for today's students represent the work force of tomorrow. As we face the formidable challenge of maintaining a quality, professional teaching staff for the nation, we are pleased to support the AFT model programs to recruit highly qualified graduates and retain the best teachers within the system as mentors."

The tripartite relationship involves collaboration among the teacher unions, the school system, and local universities to design and implement a recruitment effort to attract the academically talented into teaching.

The Chicago Public School System, Chicago Teachers Union, and University of Illinois at Chicago have started to collaborate on the teacher recruitment/internship project. Chicago Teachers Union has met with representatives of the University of Illinois at Chicago, a consultant from the University of Wisconsin, and the North Central Regional Educational Laboratory. A tentative draft plan has been submitted by a joint union/board committee to the superintendent of Chicago Public Schools, Dr. Manford Byrd, Jr., and initial implementation of the program is under discussion along with plans to include other universities in both programmatic and recruitment efforts. Mentor selection and the AFT/ER&D (Educational Research and Dissemination) training will take place this year, and recruitment plans and efforts to secure program funding will be initiated in the coming academic year. Summer seminars and the internships will also be launched in 1987. The draft plan calls for the development of "teaching schools" in high school sites for the preparation of teachers. This would be a model for teacher preparation in other locations across the country.

The purpose of a Teacher Recruitment and Internship Project is to provide the first major step toward an internship for all beginning teachers, conducted by experienced, practicing classroom teachers acting as mentors for the intern-teachers, and to recruit bright liberal arts or equivalent college graduates into teaching with a set of incentives and with the help of recruitment advocates in the colleges, faculty, and administration. Incentives include a structured internship with on-the-job introduction assistance for beginning intern-teachers, seminars and other course work directly tied to success in the classroom and schools, assisting the intern teacher to meet certification
requirements by using the internship and related seminars/coursework to meet state and local licensing mandates, and financial assistance (fellowship or scholarship) for graduate study to: 1) gain the masters degree required for teaching careers or attend graduate or professional school in a field chosen by the recruit; 2) maintain a strong teaching force by offering the mentorship as a career opportunity for effective, experienced, knowledgeable classroom teachers, preferably with status as a faculty colleague in a college, who will enjoy increased salary compensation for their mentor work (Note -- mentors should be released part time; however, they must not give up teaching responsibilities); 3) change the attitude and pattern of advice in the colleges, particularly among facility advisors in the arts and sciences, with regards to careers in teaching, specifically for faculty to become recruiters of outstanding students including minorities and women who have other career options; and 4) to strengthen the programs of teacher preparation by offering an opportunity to review and rethink the design of teacher education and strengthen its efficacy vis-a-vis classroom teaching.

In our quest to realize the proposed objectives of the Teacher Recruitment and Internship Project, goals were set to: 1) recruit academically successful college graduates -- liberal arts and science majors or equivalent -- to try a teaching career; 2) work for the success of the initial teaching experience by providing structured internships for beginning teachers -- a move to abolish the pathological "sink or swim" teacher induction method; 3) offer talented, experienced teachers new career opportunities -- as mentors to the intern -- while retaining their teaching roles; and 4) begin to alter teacher preparation programs to encourage the interaction of practical, useful knowledge with an understanding of subject matter, pedagogy, and educational issues.

Recruitment/retention incentives included: a chance to try teaching with the support of a supervised internship and practical, research-based seminar; the ability to receive a teaching license/certificate through the internship/supportive seminars (without having to invest a sizable part of undergraduate study), and a fellowship to attend graduate or professional school in return for teaching service of one or two years beyond the internship.
Who Should be Involved in Planning

The first step of the project is to secure agreement from each of the participating organizations (local union, school superintendent and/or board, and university official) that they will engage in a collaborative planning process.

These are general recommendations covering a wide variety of participants. Each location will have to determine specific participants; however, the union, school system, and university must have designated representatives at each planning session. While it is probably wise to start the planning with a small group of one to three representatives of the people who will be involved in program, implementation should be phased in when the planning gets more detailed.

Key Roles of Involvement

Teacher Union Involvement

Union leaders and/or their representatives, preferably those working on school involvement and/or staff development, e.g. Educator Research Dissemination (ER&D) coordinator or linkers, must play a key role in the initial implementation of the project. When planning gets down to specifics, several classroom teachers, who will be serving as mentors, should become involved.

The teacher union is charged with the initiation of the program, gaining collaborative partners; assuring teacher involvement in planning and implementation; assuring that the program includes academic work geared toward the initial teaching experience and classroom success; development of (with appropriate collaborators) mentor selection and preparation effort, use of political, educational, and legislative representation to gain appropriate state or board approved funding, participation in any evaluation design; and corrective action from lessons learned in the initial year.
Local School District Involvement

The school system representative is the component who understands personnel, staff development, and/or legislative and board policy issues. At some point it would be wise to include several school principals from schools where interns will be placed.

The school system must join in the program as a collaborating partner. Appropriate administrators should work to gain initial approval from the school board, work with the union and university to identify priorities with regard to recruitment, match school sites with intern/mentor sites, join in the effort to gain funding from the legislature and school board, provide time for both interns and mentors to work together during the school day, work with the union on the selection and development of mentors, seek appropriate regulatory changes or waivers to assure certification for the intern teachers, develop (with appropriate collaborators) a program to assess the success of the program, and collaborative ways to correct the program based on what is learned in the first year, and develop ways to use this program to begin the process of establishing a system-wide internship for all beginning teachers.

University Involvement

University representatives act as the school of education (teacher preparation program, in the collaborating university and the appropriate representative of university-wide administration. Where there is a union or strong faculty senate, it is important to get faculty support in recruitment efforts beyond the school of education.

The local university agrees to enter into a planning collaboration and involves officials from both the education school and those with university-wide responsibilities. The local university also develops (with appropriate collaborating partners and faculty) programs of certification and/or postgraduate study which will be compatible with the internship/recruitment program, collaborates on a university-wide recruitment effort, assists in the development of program evaluation (where possible), develops procedures for involving mentor teachers as faculty colleagues, cooperates with the union and the
school system on the preparation of mentors and school principals, and works with collaborators on legislation or regulatory changes to accommodate the program.

In order for the project to be used to develop statewide support for internships and mentors, it is important to have representation from the state legislature (member of the education committee staff and/or executive department) to guide legislative strategies and/or seek necessary changes or waivers in regulations.

Project Principles and Fundamental Components

Each site must have collaboration among the teacher union, school system, and university(ies) to design and implement a recruitment effort to attract the academically talented into teaching.

University involvement must include university-wide leaders as well as those involved in preparation of teachers and education research, and the project must include a well instructed internship program and supportive seminars or coursework which will serve teacher license requirements. In addition, each project must provide incentives -- through tuition waivers, grants, or fellowships -- for intern-recruits to support graduate or professional study, and include plans to sustain the project beyond the initial implementation.

Experienced, effective classroom teachers will have primary mentor responsibility for the intern-teachers and, where possible, enjoy university status and compensation (in addition to their classroom teaching positions). Within the constraints of these principles and fundamental project elements, the specific plans and operations must emerge from the collaborative planning process.
Incentives: "Providing Pollen for the Bees"

Dr. Bartell, in her overview, describes an incentive "as that which induces, motivates and encourages participation or performance." She states that "incentives which are used as inducements to behavior are subjective and value related" (1986).

On the other hand, a disincentive has been described as that which discourages participation or performance. Herzberg (1959), describes "satisfiers v. dissatisfiers as stemming from work related conditions, physical environment, type of supervision status, administrative practices and compensation. Removing dissatisfiers does not automatically cause satisfaction, nor does the enhancement of satisfiers erase the effect of dissatisfiers."

Satisfiers: Sergiovanni's findings indicate that teachers are motivated by achievement and recognition along with work, responsibility and possibility of growth (Sergiovanni & Carver, 1973, p. 77).

Dissatisfiers: Teachers were found dissatisfied by routine housekeeping, paperwork, corridor/lunchroom duties, insensitive and inappropriate supervising, irritating administrative policies and poor relationships with colleagues or parents (Sergiovanni & Carver, 1973).

Incentives can further be defined as those factors which increase the level of satisfaction and which provide increased effort toward higher achievement, while disincentives diminish the level of satisfaction and may lead to the reduction of teachers' efforts or abandonment of their work.

Herzberg's theory describes satisfiers as "intrinsic" rewards (motivators). He states that dissatisfiers provide extrinsic rewards or maintenance factors. It is further suggested that "maintenance factors" cannot motivate people at work.

An incentive system based primarily on financial rewards will have to provide substantial amounts associated with senior rungs on the career ladder if the plan (or related reform) fails to deal with the basic issues raised by teachers considering whether to stay or leave the profession -- working conditions, supervision, work load, authority to carry out responsibilities, and so on.
Even when career ladders offer teachers meaningful opportunities to work on curriculum development, to mentor intern teachers, to select and develop instructional materials, and to participate in redesign and restructure issues facing schools, success is unlikely without adequate participation and training -- including experience in collaborative planning and decision making.

Intrinsic Incentives

A. Example of an intrinsic incentive is illustrated by a proposal to upgrade the status of teachers. Such a concept was considered during the debate on education reform.

LEVEL I: (tenured status) proposes to offer minimum statutory salary basis. The tenured teachers' status remains throughout his/her career on the basis of satisfactory service and must be observed and evaluated annually for the first 10 years, semi-annually after that.

LEVEL II: (voluntary category) proposes to be offered to all eligible classroom teachers after completion of four years of service and shall be paid $3,000 annually in addition to regular salary; agrees to provide local school assistance in inservice development, curriculum, text and material selection; agrees to accept additional staff development; additional service as necessary up to four weeks over regular school and an equivalent of time as determined locally; status shall be reviewed every three years.

LEVEL III: (voluntary category) is proposed to be offered to all teachers at completion of seventh year of teaching or any time thereafter; shall be paid $5,000 annually in addition to regular salary; agrees to provide both local and district assistance in inservice development, staff development, curriculum, text and material selection, learning materials development, additional service as necessary up to four weeks each year or an equivalent of time as determined locally; at least 50 percent of the duties assigned shall be instructional in nature; status shall be reviewed every three years; limited to 10 percent of the district's total.

LEVEL IV: (voluntary category) offered to all teachers at completion of tenth year of teaching or any time thereafter; shall be paid $8,000 annually in addition to regular salary; agrees to provide both local and district assistance in inservice development, staff development, curriculum text and material selection, learning material development, peer assistance and intern training; additional service as necessary up to four weeks each year or an equivalent of time as determined locally; at least 25 percent of duties shall be instructional in nature; status shall be reviewed every three years; limited to 5 percent of district's total staff.
Selection of staff above teacher level (additional career compensation):

1. Assignment to positions for Level II, III, and IV designation shall be made on the basis of the following conditions:

- experience and educational background set by state;
- exemplary teaching performance based on measurable, fair evaluation; and
- additional consideration as determined by local districts and negotiated with local bargaining agents.

2. Selections shall be made by recommendations of committee of peers and building administrator with final approval by local board.

Status review shall be completed every three years by a panel of peers and building administrators or superintendent.

The state shall fully fund the designated annual salary compensations to Level II, III, and IV teachers by reimbursement to the local districts. These compensations shall be:

- $3,000 -- Level II
- $5,000 -- Level III
- $8,000 -- Level IV

The salary schedule for statutory compensation for teachers should be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Additional Career Compensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Probationary</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Probationary</td>
<td>$21,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Probationary</td>
<td>$22,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Teacher (tenured)</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>$30,250</td>
<td>$3,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>$33,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>$36,600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>$44,300</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>$48,700</td>
<td>$8,000***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Indicates teacher is eligible for voluntary application for designation of Level II.

** Indicates teacher is eligible for voluntary application for designation of Level III.

*** Indicates teacher is eligible for voluntary application for designation of Level IV.
Rewards for teaching must outweigh frustration (March & Simon, 1958). Dan Lortie, in his book School Teachers described extrinsic rewards as earnings, prestige, and power. He defines ancillary rewards as length of day and job security, and psychic rewards as "subjective valuations made in course of work -- satisfaction from seeing children learn; opportunities for creativity."

Bartell (1986) reported that recent studies show that teachers (53 percent) mentioned psychic rewards. Intrinsic values were thought to be collegiality, mastery of subject matter, and working with young people.

Hawley (1985) states that pay does not compensate workers for the unsatisfactory aspects of their jobs.

In comparing programs developed with teacher involvement and union supervision with merit performance based experiments the following problems have been documented:

- Inadequate, poorly administered and rigid evaluation or assessment procedures

- Cost of evaluations exceeding the benefits of reward for a few outstanding teachers who could have been identified by peers or a more flexible assessment system

- Criteria for assessment which are inconsistent with best learning practices or that are geared to reinforce bureaucratic structures

- Inadequate funds to meet the planned rewards (including arbitrary quotas on limits on the number of eligible teachers)

- Poor preparation for advanced roles for individuals in the top rungs of the ladder

NOTE: In the design of plans which may serve as incentives to teachers, it is important to determine what incentives are strongly valued by teachers, incorporate as many potential motivations into the plan, and minimize disincentives.
Joint Venture in Critical Thinking

An example of teacher union involvement in upgrading standards for students and teachers is reflected in a joint venture to develop critical thinking skills and teaching techniques.

Chicago Teachers Union and the Chicago Board of Education agreed to a joint venture in implementing a Critical Thinking Project in the Chicago Public Schools. The American Federation of Teachers agreed to assist the Union and the Board through its Educational Issues department, in developing the basic components and funding the necessary training for the project.

The basic components of the joint CTU/BOE Critical Thinking Project are:

1. Selection of 30 classroom teachers to be trained under the AFT Critical Thinking Project

2. Criteria for selection of teachers:
   - Applicant must be a regularly appointed classroom teacher with five years continuous experience in Chicago Public Schools.
   - Applicant must have a rating of excellent or superior for three of the last five years or must have a recommendation from the building principal and two colleagues from the same certificate area or department.
   - Applicant agrees to implement the skills and components of the AFT Critical Thinking Project in their classroom and to act as a trainer of other teachers in District 299.

3. Selection processes:
   - Appropriate department is to advertise system-wide for applicants.
   - Selected applicants are to be reviewed by CTU and appropriate Board of Education representatives by September of 1986.

4. Training program implemented as follows:
   - Training was conducted during Fall '86 on Saturdays.
   - Trainer's expenses were borne by the AFT and CTU.
   - Trainees received two hours credit toward Lane III placement or an additional stipend for six hours of work required of trainees.
Teachers selected for such service were reimbursed at the rate of $20 per hour for the 20 hours of training required.

The Board of Education provided substitute teachers as needed as part of the training program.

5. A periodic review of the effectiveness of the Critical Thinking Project in the school setting, the training program in staff development and the dissemination of information concerning the program will be conducted by representatives of the Chicago Teachers Union and the Chicago Board of Education.

Closing Statement

Research has shown that those programs or projects which produce the most effective results are those which have utilized the expertise and talents of classroom teachers. Programs developed through the joint efforts of the collective bargaining agent and the school board enjoy greater success, and more active participation of those most responsible for implementing the programs -- the classroom teachers. The most effective incentives are those of recognition and respect.
REFERENCES


Ralph Fessler

Reaction to
The Role of Teacher Unions
in the Development and Implementation
of Incentive Programs

In her paper "The Role of Teacher Unions in the Development and Implementation of Incentive Programs," Jacqueline Vaughn describes some specific projects being supported by the Chicago Teachers Union, the organization she serves as president. The programs she reviews offer some interesting approaches to teacher incentives that merit consideration and analysis. Of perhaps greater importance, however, is the fact that projects such as those described in Vaughn's paper have found their way into the agenda of teacher union-management negotiations. This critique will briefly assess the value of the programs described, as well as attempt to analyze the significance of the expanding agenda for collective bargaining.

Three specific projects are described in Vaughn's paper. The first is a teacher recruitment/internship program. This program provides assistance for beginning teachers through a supervised internship, support seminars, and financial assistance. Practicing teachers serve as mentors for the interns. This mentoring opportunity carries with it the extrinsic incentive of monetary compensation, as well as the more subtle, intrinsic rewards of recognition of teacher expertise and importance in the educational process. These teacher-mentors are being involved in areas where they possess considerable expertise and where they have a stake in what occurs.

A second project relates to teachers' involvement in a critical thinking skills project. This model again provides recognition to teachers and involves them in decision making regarding their professional development activities.

Dr. Fessler is Professor of Education and Director of the Division of Education at The Johns Hopkins University. An experienced teacher and administrator, his recent research interests have centered on the development of heuristic models in the areas of supervision, staff development, professional growth, and teacher career stages. He is a member of the Collegial Research Consortium.
The third project described in the Vaughn paper relates to working with troubled teachers. This project furnishes support for teachers who are experiencing difficulty in the classroom and provides the opportunity for accomplished teachers to assist their less successful peers. The project responds to the needs of teachers in trouble, while concurrently providing opportunities for successful teachers to share their expertise, demonstrate their competencies, and participate in highly professional activities. The model addresses both the instructional improvement needs of one group of teachers, and the esteem and professionalism needs of a second group. This program reflects a very positive recognition and response on the part of the union that some teachers do need extra help to get them to satisfactory levels of performance.

In Vaughn's verbal comments she adds additional examples of the importance of teachers being viewed as professionals and being actively involved in professional decisions. Her examples are drawn from her experiences in Chicago as well as from her recent trip to Japan.

One major generalization seems to encompass many of the ideas presented by Vaughn in both her paper and oral presentation. This can be simply stated in the proposition that teachers are professionals and should be involved in decisions that affect them. This proposition is based on the assumptions that teachers have much to contribute to quality decision making, that the climate created by broad-based involvement and participation in decision making is conducive to increased morale and productivity, and that the act of participation itself serves as an incentive for teachers to pursue greater involvement and productivity. It is further assumed that teacher involvement results in greater recognition of their importance and feeds their esteem needs. There is a long-established literature base to support these and related propositions and assumptions, both from the general literature in motivation and management theory (Maslow, 1954; McGregor, 1960; Herzberg et al., 1959) and from literature more specifically applied to teachers (Sergiovanni & Starratt, 1983; Halpin & Croft, 1966; Little, 1982; Rosenholtz & Smylie, 1983). We can relate as well to many anecdotal examples of effective schools where the fostering of sharing and participation in decision making creates a positive climate in which energies are channeled into growth and the pursuit of teaching excellence.
If the importance of teacher participation in decisions that affect them is supported by organizational and administrative theory and is widely practiced in some school settings, why then is it presented here as a new, innovative strategy? The lack of such a participatory approach is a clear message in the Vaughn paper and was echoed in Damon Moore's presentation at this conference. These urgent calls for teacher involvement suggest that this is a newly discovered phenomenon. In fact, while these ideas are indeed important, they are not really new. What is new is the emergence of a greater recognition on the part of teacher unions that the agenda for collective bargaining must be broadened beyond the extrinsic incentives associated with salary and fringe benefits. The new expanded agenda includes a recognition of the importance of teacher involvement and participation, conditions that affect the intrinsic, higher level needs of teachers. While monetary rewards remain important, the new agenda recognizes that they are not sufficient and that teacher morale and performance are also influenced by teachers being involved in decisions related to the curriculum, instruction, and other areas that impact on the everyday life of teachers and students. This recognition of the importance of such involvement is new and might be considered as part of the "greening" of teacher organizations, or a broader vision that comes as organizations mature.

While the broadening of the agenda for collective bargaining is to be viewed as a positive sign, one might argue that the absence of teacher participation in decision-making is related to the adversarial relationship that exists in many settings between teacher unions and management. The agenda for collective bargaining that has emerged over the past 15 years has centered around extrinsic rewards (or terms of contract) such as salaries, fringe benefits, and hours of work. Until recently, little attention has been given to the higher level needs of teachers, those that relate to recognition, autonomy and esteem.

Herzberg's work (1959) related to motivation in the workplace can be used as a basis for analyzing this situation. As summarized in Figure 1, the "terms of contract," extrinsic rewards are labeled by Herzberg as "hygiene factors," or incentives which address basic lower level needs. If these needs are not satisfied, workers will not produce at a level of "a fair day's work for a fair day's pay." Satisfaction of these needs will lead to a fulfillment of the terms of contract, but will not stimulate workers to go beyond that "fair day's work . . .". In order to pursue higher levels of performance, it is necessary to address what Herzberg calls "motivational factors." These include needs such as recognition, autonomy, respect, and esteem. (See Figure 1, p. 218).
Relating this model back to collective bargaining, it may be that the process of negotiations has fixated the concerns at the hygiene level. Both teacher unions and management have defined incentives in terms of extrinsic rewards and have given little opportunity for higher level needs to emerge for discussion and consideration. This preoccupation with "hygiene" factors undoubtedly has reflected the union's point of view that basic needs were not being adequately met. While concerns in this area remain, the expansion of the agenda to "motivational" factors reflects a realization that these higher level needs must also be addressed if the system is to be affected.

As teacher unions and management pursue this new agenda, a note of caution should be considered. It should not be assumed that involvement of the teacher union has taken care of the need for teacher participation in the decision-making process. The literature supports the notion that individual teachers must be active participants in decisions that affect them. While it is most appropriate for teacher unions to represent teachers in negotiating for the right to participation, the actual participation must be decentralized to the level of individual teachers. It is only through active involvement at the teacher level that motivational factors such as autonomy, esteem, and recognition can be addressed.

This new, more enlightened agenda for collective negotiations emerges at a key time in the history of public education. The criticism of schools and of teachers has been extensive in recent years. Numerous national reports and studies have called for major reforms in our schools and in the way we prepare our teachers. Indeed, this conference on teacher incentives can be viewed as a response to the prevailing climate which calls for changes in teachers and teaching.

At a time when the profession is clearly in a state of flux, it is encouraging that teacher unions and management are identifying the need to work together for the improvement of education. The problems facing the profession cannot be solved if the traditional adversarial relationship between teacher unions and management remains the accepted mode of operation. It is in the interest of all concerned with the future of education to bury old differences and to enter into a new era of healing and collaboration. The projects reviewed in the Vaughn paper describe movement in that direction.
REFERENCES


Perspectives and Observations:
A Summary of the Group Discussion

Overview

This final chapter summarizes key points of the participants' discussions during the seminar. During the two-day seminar, transcripts were made of all primary presentations, reactions, and group discussion. The comments from the group discussion, however, are the main focus of this chapter as they are not reflected elsewhere in the document. Also, because the discussion reflects the views and opinions of participants from diverse backgrounds and perspectives, it provides important insights not typically reflected in the individual papers. Further, because the primary focus is on issues, ideas and conclusions, and discussion points in most cases are not attributed to individual speakers, as this would unnecessarily lengthen the summary. The original thematic and reaction papers contained in previous sections of this report may be reviewed for primary sources and quotes if appropriate.

One key theme that runs throughout this summary, as well as the formal papers, is the overall complexity of identifying and implementing meaningful incentive policies and programs for either prospective or current educational professionals. This complexity is further exacerbated by our failure to directly address several basic, though typically unstated, questions.

Ashburn, for example, raised perhaps the most fundamental question in asking succinctly, "What are we about and what should we be about in our schools?" On the one hand, the question suggests the need to more carefully and explicitly identify the basic substance, values and beliefs that form the foundation of the entire educational enterprise, and further, to understand that what we "are about" in our schools will significantly affect what we do regarding incentives.

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On the other hand, the question reminds us that we must consider a complex set of environmental factors -- political, educational and economic -- as well as the constant pressure of real, misinterpreted, or imagined time constraints. In addition, if the often reported statistics about future teacher shortages, and the consequent concerns about educational quality are correct, then the need to attend to the current demands for educational reform, and to develop incentives to attract the "best and brightest" into our schools becomes even more immediate.

However, opinions about the urgency of the issues, and the dynamics of the constraints vary so greatly, that the "experts" themselves either are confused, or are polarized themselves in extreme and incompatible positions.

It was in this context that seminar participants set out to address the issue of attracting and retaining the highest quality teachers and other education professionals our colleges and universities are capable of producing.

We hope that this report of those deliberations, and the participants' collective commitment to the improvement of the field of education, the instructional process, and ultimately student learning, will be an impetus for the development of policies that will help all our schools become the best they can be.

It should be noted that throughout the discussion, there were many areas of both agreement and disagreement. However, it is important to emphasize that discordant opinions focused primarily on the means for implementing, or the attributed value (priority) of the policies and strategies addressed during the sessions, and not on the appropriateness or legitimacy of the ultimate goals. In fact, perhaps the most heartening aspect of this endeavor may lie in the participants' collective integrity of purpose, commitment, and willingness to collaboratively explore the issues through extended dialogue and debate.

Finally, though readers are encouraged to draw their own conclusions, one clear point of agreement is that in the development of incentive programs, each situation requires unique "solutions" based on the best available information. What follows is an exploration of that theme.
The Role of the Teacher in Planning and Assessment

The first issue to be addressed was the meaningful involvement of the teacher or practitioner in the educational decision-making process. This issue is a high priority for teachers' unions and other organizations who argue that many "reformers" and "decision-makers" have not included the people who are most directly affected by the planning process. The issue of who is to be involved in decision making, and at what level, is a recurring theme throughout this summary.

Another constant theme, articulated most forcefully by Damon Moore, centered on the need for comprehensive policy rather than a piecemeal approach, and the need for long term "vision" at every level. These issues incorporate both political and economic factors to be addressed in more detail later. Once the political and economic factors have been delineated, questions regarding media coverage and the public's perception of and attention to policy issues need to be addressed in a systematic and proactive manner.

Issues related to teacher and administrator preparation, assessment, and evaluation were also recurring concerns related to the development of effective incentives policies. The fact that teachers are continually "lost" to the area of administration because of the lack of incentives to remain in the classroom, and that administrators are often inadequately prepared to assume management responsibilities were very sensitive and controversial issues that provoked much discussion. Arnold Gallegos stressed that administrators and teachers need to be well prepared in, and more familiar with, assessment and evaluation.

Several aspects of the social, economic, and political implications of assessment were also discussed, including: the current focus on improving student test scores, and the consequent tendency for teachers to "teach to the test"; politicians, who appear not to understand the difference between assessment and attainment, and, therefore, frequently base funding decisions on test scores; and, the use of test scores as a basis for developing educational policy and legislation. In general, participants viewed these approaches as an inappropriate way to deal with complex educational issues.
Likewise our view of school improvement has also become far too simplistic and narrow. Gallegos suggests that increasing teacher accountability without expanding teacher authority over professional decisions is likely to diminish rather than enhance the professionalism of both teachers and administrators. In fact, many participants argued that the current accountability process is in many ways limiting if not destroying the freedom teachers need to improve teaching and learning in our schools. Since one of the main motivators for entering and remaining in teaching is the freedom to explore individual potential and style in teaching and learning, a top-down, rigid and monolithic approach to accountability acts as a disincentive. These are strong statements, no doubt, but they express the broad base and serious concerns surrounding the issue.

**Issue of Professional Development**

Another critical area was the need for incentive programs that incorporate career-long professional development. The need to personalize or individualize such programs was widely agreed upon. In addition, participants identified a number of key variables that should be taken into account in incentive programs, including: the individual's career stage, teaching level and area of certification, organizational and personal influences, and personal characteristics and/or interests. It was also agreed that district-wide professional development strategies, where all teachers are exposed to the same program, have not been highly successful as a rule, and frequently serve more as disincentives to either remaining in teaching or pursuing additional professional development opportunities.

The need to develop collegiality and trust among education professionals was also considered to be critically important to reducing the current tendency toward isolation that has created many of the problems that we are now trying to solve. Isolationism has consistently been identified as a cause for teacher dropout and the lack of transfer of a common body of knowledge on the "craft of teaching," from more experienced to beginning teachers.

Career ladders and other forms of vertical reward systems overemphasize competition and downplay individualization; the career lattice concept is horizontal and considers the individual needs of teachers, says John McDonnell. McDonnell and Judy Christensen suggested that incentives have different meanings depending on where one
is in the career cycle, noting that the cycle for teachers tends to be cyclical rather than a lock step process. From this perspective, career lattice options related to different career stages should be pursued in addition, or as an alternative to the current focus on linear career ladders. Gallegos believes that whatever career development plans are used there is a need for more careful planning, observation, and assessment than has typically been the case. He also states that nontraditional instructional support for teachers such as access to secretarial staff, phones, and office machines can greatly increase motivational levels, teacher productivity, and provide ongoing personal incentives for teachers at a fairly moderate cost. The isolated "flash-in-the-pan" approach to incentives has been ineffective because it is not generally based on teachers' goals and needs, and generally does not offer the stability or support that are necessary for increased staff satisfaction, productivity, and longevity.

Competition between teachers for limited rewards is another characteristic often associated with incentive programs, especially the career ladder approach. Is competition effective in increasing competency and efficiency in schools? The notions that without competition incentives lose power, that competition within the work setting increases motivation and productivity, and that competition should, therefore, be a part of the solution are drawn from models in the corporate sector. Ashburn cautions that comparisons of education to the private business sector may be taken too far; our bottom line is not profit or productivity in the usual business sense of the word. In addition, schools do not have the same flexibility in using public resources that businesses have in allocating private ones.

**Weak Incentives**

While participants generally agree that incentives for teaching are extremely weak, Gary Sykes suggested that weak incentives might be adaptive and serve certain functions. This provocative notion was based on the following factors:

- We expect all schools to have the same basic curriculum and to be structured in very similar ways.
- Teachers must manage groups and create a positive learning environment, yet contr. neither the conditions or resources of their work.
Few advancement positions exist to fulfill ambitions, provide variety and challenge or stimulate growth.

Teaching has been institutionalized as temporary work with easy exit and re-entry.

Career and work incentives contribute to the notion of privacy and individualism, and teachers tend to protect autonomy in the classroom at the expense of collegial and professional community relationships.

Teachers strive to secure "rewards" from their own students' progress while resisting organizational demands that divert them from this quest.

Teachers are expected to meet the needs of individual students yet are required to confront them in groups of 25-30. In this regard, it is important to note that even if we had the money to reduce all class sizes to 20 or less (which we don't) we could not produce enough teachers.

Given these realities, weak incentives may actually produce some benefits. Sykes speculated that weak external incentives tend to support the service ideal in teaching, with nurturing/caring relationships with students serving as the primary sources of professional and personal gratification and is, therefore, functional. Performance contracting or other forms of pay for results, therefore, might well dehumanize teaching as teachers pursue external rewards at the expense of caring relationships with students.

Sykes also noted that one of the contradictions embedded in our system of education is that while services are said to be delivered by a model of human caring and responsibility, the bureaucratic delivery system is a model of detachment, resource limitation and constraint. Psychic costs created by the lack of professional autonomy and responsibility, while seeking to maintain a sense of caring and idealism, takes a toll on the inner life of teachers and often erodes their spirit. Also, the pressure to trade quality of service to the individual, in favor of serving quantities of students, creates additional doubt and anxiety. Ashburn added a note of caution, suggesting that we draw the line between "weak" and "too weak" incentives. Have incentives slipped to the "too weak" level? Weak incentives may serve as a psychological resource in the educational process, helping to rationalize the gradual loss of ideals while holding onto self esteem.
Another outcome of weak incentives is that they help promote turnover in staff, which may be necessary. Burnout is common in the human services field. Sykes commented that although weak incentives often leave teachers unsupported, they also provide room for the creative "subversion" of bureaucratic rules and regulations which often get in the way of good teaching.

Incentives Research

Another area of discussion focused on research into various incentive programs: how to identify effective or successful attempts and how to increase their impact on other schools. For example, teacher salaries may not be purely an issue of how much a teacher makes, but what he or she could potentially make in another line of work.

Organizational factors in schools also have a powerful impact on teacher satisfaction and effectiveness. Sykes says, "There is no distinction between what is good for teachers and what is good for students." If you want to make teachers more satisfied with their line of work, help them to get better at it. Creating an environment that emphasizes attention to teaching through relieving teachers from intrusive administrative chores, reducing outside distractions, and insuring that teachers have the resources with which to teach, cannot help but benefit students as well.

Concerning the climate, Sykes believes that one of teaching's greatest variances is in the behavior of the principal and that what teachers find most rewarding are the underlying psychic rewards from students. The effectiveness of teaching is heavily influenced by teacher confidence, the ability to manage students' behavior, and organizational flexibility. Other conditions that support the work of teaching are: norms of collegiality; shared work within the school; continuous improvement; and organized ongoing, analysis, re-evaluation and experimentation. Sykes reiterates that how incentives are developed and implemented, and the role the teachers play in the process will have a significant impact on their effectiveness.
Once again the issues of the involvement of teachers in the planning process, what motivates teachers, as well as improving working conditions were identified as important considerations in planning incentive programs, and as areas where additional research is needed. Educators must also make better use of the existing literature in the social sciences concerning incentives and motivation.

Policymaking was another issue which generated considerable controversy and discussion. We need to ask how our knowledge about teacher efficacy translates into policy development and procedure implementation of teacher incentives. Again the concern is that policymaking not be piecemeal but rather holistic and systematic. Trust remains a real factor in the large picture; and the assumption that cooperation and trust can be mandated by many legislators and policymakers is extraordinary. Ashburn and others noted that we need to develop and encourage cooperation rather than competition.

A related question is how to encourage local control of reform, avoiding top-down directives. Jacqueline Vaughn asked: how can we make policy and conduct inquiry so that teachers are involved? She also stated, however, that if school district employees are involved in the planning of policy and inquiry, then they need to be held accountable for process and results. Vaughn also suggested that highly rigid and bureaucratic ladder schemes be avoided in favor of the creation of more informal opportunities, noting that the hierarchically organized system of moving up in the corporate structure does not necessarily motivate service-oriented professionals. Teacher involvement in establishing clearly defined standards of practice at every level is also necessary if teachers are ever to be truly regarded as professionals.

Who is to be involved in the planning of teacher incentive programs and at what level? It has previously been mentioned that teacher input is critical. What then is the potential role of unions and teacher associations in the planning and implementation of such programs? Vaughn made it very clear that it is not the responsibility of unions or associations to hire or fire persons in the classroom, but rather to give them representation in the processes. She feels that increased attempts should be made to remediate poor performance, rather than seeking termination without first offering opportunities for improvement. Teachers need to be offered incentives if they are going to take on added responsibilities. Responsibility with authority may in itself be a powerful incentive. It must be stressed again that higher salaries alone will not solve
the problem. In addition, money invested in incentives programs should not be allocated through top-down decisions. People who will be responsible for carrying out programs as well as those who are normally responsible for program design and evaluation should be involved. If the ultimate goal is to have a positive impact on children, teachers need to be involved directly in decisions that affect them on a daily basis.

School Climate

The issue of school climate further highlights the complexity of factors involved. Ralph Fessler believes that what is new is that teacher organizations at national and state levels are beginning to go beyond exclusively monetary issues into areas that impact on the total school environment or climate, including teacher motivation, the character of the work itself, recognition, and esteem. He suggests that if we desire a higher level of performance related to "satisfiers," unions must focus on more than "dissatisfiers," such as salary, fringe benefits, and retirement.

Another factor which affects the delivery of service is "what else is going on in and around schools," e.g. drug abuse, gangs, and family circumstances. Vaughn suggests that we need to get out in the "real world" and ask for opinions on what incentives are needed or desired. Other "real world" climate variables which affect incentive programs include the differing male/female ratios of teachers at specific grade levels as well as the inherent content and organizational differences of these levels.

Fessler states, "We all have to begin to look at healing processes and at the fact that we're all part of the same picture, whether we're school administrators, superintendents, teachers or union representatives." As we address the healing processes that look at roles and responsibilities, and building climates, we find ample literature with implications for the preparation of school administrators. Fessler also believes that there ought to be ways to develop mutual motivation and interaction between administration and unions, involving not only the preparation of principals but their sensitization to the issues of incentives. "(This) would be an important step." He cautions, however, as was mentioned by others, that we need to differentiate between
programs that emphasize accountability for personnel decision-making activities and support systems that aid professional growth. We also need to look at the possibility that teachers (in the accountability process) who are currently being labeled as "bad" might only have been misplaced in a field that does not fit them. Climate involves looking at every aspect of work, including "job redesign" literature from industrial psychology and sociology.

Career Development

Ann Hart, in discussing the issue of redesigning work for current and future teachers, stated the need to think not only in terms of promotion, but in terms of "career development opportunity" which is a career-long sense that someone is growing and changing in their potential to do a better job, and to have a greater impact on a building's teaching staff as a whole. This is similar to Sykes' issue of the need for teacher impact on the nature of the teaching craft.

There was disagreement on what is a promotion and what should be thought of as career development opportunity. Hart expressed concern that people have jumped into the reform movement and have increased regulation without the necessary components of collegiality, interaction, and increased capacity building. "We are not talking about increased capacity building; we are talking about control." Incentive packages should not get translated into regulation, control, and punishment.

Understanding and acknowledging the fundamental characteristics of how the school is structured and how work is accomplished is also critical. The features of the work place cannot be isolated from one another. Hart believes that it is essential to look at what motivates teachers and students to improve their performance in order to formulate a "vision" for school level planning.

As mentioned previously, the top-down hierarchical imposition of a structure that treats everyone the same regardless of the challenges that they face in their individual classroom and schools is inappropriate. This raises some politically sensitive questions. If you promote job redesign for a target population, the chances are that you may be
creating a disincentive for another group. Hart feels that any role transition is a big problem for principals and an even bigger one for teachers. Job redesign also puts incredible pressure on any evaluation system.

Robert Hatfield observed that overload can be a problem when asking teachers to take on additional or redefined responsibility. Some teachers may be willing but many may not be to do so on a long term basis. He feels that it is necessary to foster task interdependence not only with other teachers but in the total school climate. Incentives, therefore, should be built into the job instead of being conceived as an additional program.

There is also an inherent conflict between autonomy and collegiality. He states, "We are at a point when we are talking about having people look at teaching more professionally, which includes more autonomy. At the same time we're looking at the studies on staff development which show we need a collegial nature. There has to be a fit between the two."

Another area of concern is that of communication and self perception. In redesigning and adding new roles we need to take a close look at what is currently in place and how people define their jobs. We also desperately need to bring curriculum and staff development people together. Likewise, the roles of curriculum and staff development specialists need to be intermeshed. The question raised was "how," but the real question may be "when."

It is also necessary to decide how formal we want such a system to be. Hatfield asks, "Is it something that can be done within the framework of what we have, building on what we have, getting more visibility and looking at a wide range of incentives?"

Another issue to be dealt with is how to bring together the relevant research to inform decision making. We need to decide what are the policy and legislative issues that require funding and by whom: what needs to be handled through negotiation in professional organizations; what has to be dealt with in professional programs; and what should be a "self development," as a responsibility of teachers and administrators.
Concerning educational reform and all of its present ramifications, Bartell states that one problem is lack of encouragement of our "brightest" children to enter teaching. Lack of money and respect is only part of the problem. She further emphasized the problems of both quantity and quality of teachers projected to be available in the next ten years.

During her extensive research in the area of incentives, Bartell, in conjunction with the North Central Regional Educational Laboratory (NCREL), has developed a matrix which lists the following as goals of incentive planning: attraction, retention, improvement, and enhancement. The motivators in the matrix are: monetary, career status, awards and recognition, professional responsibilities, and conditions of the workplace. The ideal incentive plan would be one which addresses all of the factors in all goal and motivation areas.

Bartell also noted the need for strong national leadership, while avoiding top-down management. National needs and leadership can generate interest, discussion, debate and action, funding of research, loan assistance, and teacher recognition programs. At the state level, teacher recruitment and training proposals must also include funding and other provisions to ensure fair and equitable disposition of resources, recognition and representation. Local incentives, Bartell feels, will undoubtedly be the most crucial factor in the determination of teacher attraction, retention, and continued professional growth. One point of consensus was that incentives initiated at any level will fail unless steps are taken at the local level to offer organizational inducements to remain in the classroom and perform at the highest level.

On this point, Kathryn Lind noted the growing concern about cosmetic approaches to incentives. The purpose of an incentive project and all of its functions needs to be made clear. If too much is expected of local school districts they may not perceive the changes as positive, but simply another top-down mandate. Lind emphasizes, "Incentives may just make the reform movement look cosmetically better while perpetuating the status quo." She poses the questions of how incentives will be realized, "with carrots or with clubs?"; what will be the intended results; and what will be the impact?
The politics of education including economics, competition with other countries and education's role in preparation for today's world were issues brought out by both Gallegos and Larry Murphy. Murphy, who held the unique status of the sole legislator in the group, felt that many politicians use schools for their own ends. JaMille Webster cautions that if the goal is to have kids that are able to survive into the 21st century, the kinds of decision making used in the past years won't work. Moore goes on to say, "The point is in terms of public reception, and like it or not we live in a democracy; the public reception is what actually dictates the dollars that flow in education. It's part of that engine that runs the whole system."

Murphy added that a major shortcoming in attempts at educational reform has been in the area of public leadership. There are problems in many states where one party controls the governorship and another controls the legislature; governors lay out their "agenda" without clear definitions for policymakers of what is really needed. He says this phenomena might be expressed as, "Bring me a bill and if you don't bring me a bill, we'll bring you a bill to live with." An appropriate response would be for politicos to lay out some areas where research is needed. If the information is already available, it needs to be pulled together and the message conveyed in a timely manner.

Another problem in the reform of education is local politics and allocation of funding, according to Murphy. An example of this is the disparity between salary schedules in urban and rural areas. The state needs to take a greater and more active role in attracting people to the field of education. Education is also an economic development issue; it is hard to attract business or people to an area that doesn't have a school, or does not have the kind of school that people desire for their children.

Some possibilities for increased educational resources do exist. The large numbers of teachers and administrators who will be retiring in the next 15 years will create some short term resources, since salaries of newer staff will be significantly less than those of the current workforce. Murphy believes that another possibility in some areas is use of increased sales taxes to generate additional monies. For example, in his state of Iowa, sales taxes are currently lower than average. He adds that some restructuring to create money in the system may also need to take place. For instance, in Iowa 40 percent of the people working in education are noninstructional personnel; this might
be reduced sharply. The area of telecommunication also opens avenues of better utilization of resources, particularly in specialized areas, thereby cutting personal, transportation, and related costs.

Murphy warns, however, "You aren't going to fix things with one or two bills." Again, it needs to be stressed that the quick-fix approaches attempted in the past will not suffice. He feels that we also may need to start differentiating the type of training that we have for teachers depending on the areas they are going into (rural, urban, minority populations, etc.). Another caution is that we don't have the leisure to simply address theories of education; every year that goes by, we are losing too many kids. We only have about 8-12 years to educate children and if we don't do it well then we are "talking remediation." "So there is an urgent need for educational change," he concludes.

Concerning change, Murphy feels that we need to decide what to do with those districts that aren't "bad" -- they just aren't "good"; they don't attract attention and they don't want to change. While many comments were made during the seminar concerning the importance of local control over incentives, there is also concern that if policy is left entirely at the local level, two or three generations of teachers will pass by before any change actually occurs.

Other present problems can be anticipated to become increasingly serious. One of these is increasingly high costs of education, not just for salaries, but especially in programs for "at risk students." In addition, there is the need to address how the whole family can be involved in the support of education. Three particularly troublesome areas which still need attention, if any long term effects are to be seen, are those of parental involvement, day care and pre-school programs. Another problem is that of low salaries in teaching and the ever-increasing debt load due to high college costs that we are placing on college students and young teachers. Others expressed the concern that while as a nation we say that we want an educated population, current trends and philosophy in business and industry suggest a need for employees trainable in simple tasks, not "educated." Gallegos stresses the many ramifications for teacher preparation this might have if it permeates school planning, tracking, and similar educational practices.
Financial Factors

Among the most neglected areas concerning incentives are those of financial implications and fiscal responsibilities. The issues of program development and finance cannot be separated. The costs of affordability of various incentive programs has to be a primary consideration. A second factor is that of cost effectiveness, i.e. is the benefit, if any, worth the cost? A third factor is that of "opportunity cost," that is where do we spend the money if we have it? We have only a finite amount of resources. James Ward observed, "We have to move quickly if we are going to achieve change because once we begin to recognize the true costs and real complexity, we will probably lose the political leverage that we need to raise additional funds to make real changes in the system." Public attention and support for educational change is lost through prolonged delay or inaction. Ward feels that we need to do more than just draw attention to the issue, put some solutions out there through literature and conferences and somehow expect change to take place at the local level. Clear goal setting must occur at high levels. There is still too much of a tendency to try to come up with a "magic answer," write it into legislation, get it passed at the state level and expect or make local school districts do it.

Ward believes that incentives need to be approached in a global way:

If we are going to be talking about altering the incentive system and reward system for teachers, that probably isn't going to be very productive in terms of reaching our ultimate goal, which I maintain is increasing the quality of schooling, without also looking at the entire incentive structure within the system-for administrators, for children, for parents, for board members, and others. To only focus on one aspect of the incentive system for teachers doesn't alter the rest of the institutional arrangements and therefore is not likely to have a tremendous effect on the quality of schooling and what goes on in schools.

Self-interest of all the participants must be understood if we want to create or change incentives, and thereby schools and learning.

School finance is a fundamental issue in any educational policy change, because financial resources are necessary even if they are not by themselves sufficient to effect change. Only a few states have made significant financial commitments to support school reform efforts. Only two states in the NCREL region, for example, exceed the
national average on per pupil expenditures; all other states in the region were well below the national average. These states where education has not had a powerful influence on state funding decisions are beginning to fall behind.

Ward believes that money for funding incentives will have to come from the states. The issue is whether the states have the ability to provide the funding. He believes that we must at least raise the state's share of financial responsibility for education to 50 percent, since local districts can't do it. He adds that only two states in our region are close to this level of state support. Again the emphasis is on the consideration of political, economic, and educational factors concerning teacher incentives. There is a need for clear goals, explicit articulation of goals, careful planning, (including all the factors involved) and attention to the process of implementation. Like it or not, the fiscal dimension is a most dominant one even if dependent on other environmental factors.

Another real question is whether the various monetary incentives will encourage adequate numbers of talented individuals to enter or remain in teaching or assist current teachers to upgrade skills. If incentives do prove to be effective in the above areas, there still remains the question of the impact on increased learning for students. Fred Hess points out that we need to have track results over time to see if incentives such as decreased class size, teacher/student ratio, and work load are effective. Now we are back to the previously identified stated issue of cost effectiveness: Will incentives achieve any demonstrable purpose?

Hess believes that some incentive plans aren't necessarily very expensive and that we need to consider these options as well as the more expensive ones. He stresses that increased salaries as a way of improving the quality of teacher performance in schools is a long-term payback situation; it takes a long time to get enough new teachers of higher quality in the faculty to have their presence show significant improvement in system-wide test score or other similar measures of that nature. Projections are that in the next 5-10 years enrollments will be increasing by 5 percent, and we will need additional state resources to simply maintain current funding levels let alone increasing them.
But financial incentives alone are not enough to bring about the desired reform. We need to also be talking about promotion, professional growth and career advancement. We need to develop the shared craft of teaching and break down the isolation. We need to prevent the "brain drain" in the teaching profession. Richard Messer stresses again the key factors of collegiality, climate and trust which do not occur simply through legislative mandates or top down control. Sykes reinforces the need for voluntary programs rather than accountability programs. Each program needs to be tailored to the individual school and teacher situation.

Key Elements

The preceding discussion has generated some important themes. The following appear to be key elements concerning incentives.

- The isolationism in the profession must be addressed and alleviated.
- State level support and financial assistance are necessary in order to implement change.
- Top-down or hierarchical control, and inflexible and mandatory regulation must be avoided.
- Local control should mean local authority, funding, and expertise to tailor the comprehensive incentives policy to building needs.
- Policy must be comprehensive rather than piecemeal.
- Programs must be well-designed and flexible with a wide range of options.
- Programs must to be tailored to specific situations and individual needs.
- Comprehensive incentives policies must either include or encourage career-long professional development and incentives programs.
- Teacher involvement in the planning, development, and implementation of programs and policy is essential at every level.
- Decisions at every level must consider the educational system as a whole and recognize that it is not isolated from political and economic factors.
- Much thought must be given to developing creative funding sources.
- Incentive policies must include horizontal as well as vertical programs.
- The public's attention must be captured and retained if long term change is to be nurtured, cultivated and funded.
- There is no time to waste.