This paper examines the rhetorician Kenneth Burke's reaction to "technologism," an area where Burke's rage at the vagaries of human motivation, industrial exploitation, and environmental victimage are most clear. The paper analyzes in-depth the formal movement of the Helhaven project as a reflexive satirical treatment of the problems of technology, and illustrates some of the motivational complexities of Burke and his system as they are played out in the satire. The paper concludes with a discussion of Burke's recognition of the centrality of synecdoche and of Burke's skill in commenting on the nature and direction of satire even while sketching out a rough satire of his own. (One hundred and four endnotes are attached.) (KEH)
Form in Technique:
Counter-Nature's "Invitation to Participate"
and the Ethics of Ecology

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A self-proclaimed "Agro-Bohemian Neo-Stoic," Kenneth Burke has been criticized for carrying his stoicism to extremes, for constructing a system that is essentially contemplative in nature, lacking in the capacity to express "warrantable outrage." It seems appropriate to examine this charge in light of Burke's reaction to "technologism," an area where Burke's own rage at the vagaries of human motivation, industrial exploitation and environmental victimage seems most clear. The Helhaven project, a reflexive satirical treatment of the problems of technology, is both an exercise in the expression of rage within the comic form, and a powerful lesson in the choices critics face in confronting the contradictions of their own nature. Envisioning the desecration of the planet, a subject that Burke perhaps expresses the most rage over in the "absolute moments" of his poetry, Burke nonetheless constructs the satire as to avoid the excesses of victimage and transference associated with less "pure" forms of the indictment. Burke does provide us with an "ethics of ecology," but his ethic is a study in ambiguity, an embodiment of the very tension he outlines in the "rottenness" of human symbolic perfection. Introducing some basic components of Burke's thoughts on satire, the paper analyzes in depth the formal movement of the Helhaven project, and illustrates some of the motivational complexities of Burke and his system as they are played out in the satire.

Why Satire?

In 1956, James Sutherland delivered the Clark Lectures on English Satire, observing that an increasingly urbanized and mass-mediated society desperately needs the services of the satirist, if only to counter the "stupidities and vulgarities of a mass
The focus of modern satire has shifted from the individuals in society to mankind as a whole, he concludes, and the "satirist is now concerned to save the human race, either from complete extinction, or from a change so fundamental that its essential humanity would be lost."\textsuperscript{2} Northrup Frye, in his essay "The Mythos of Winter," endows satire as a creative art that defends its own creativity against the oppression of bureaucratization: "Satire on systems of reasoning, especially on the social effects of such systems, is art's first line of defence against all such invasions."\textsuperscript{3}

Burke, on reflection, is critically concerned with the purification of war into symbolic strictures, with inter-national scapegoating, with the tragic assertion of control over Nature, in short, with the survival of the human race. Tracing such problems to the symbolism that characterizes our existence, and to the entelechial fulfillment motivating the rational advance of technology, or Counter-Nature, he is drawn to the principle of entelechy as a founding block for critical inquiry, and as a creative response to the system of rationality which so creatively threatens to subsume humanity.

Burke argues that man, the symbol using and misusing animal, inventor of the negative, separated from nature by instruments of his own making, and goaded by the principle of hierarchy, is "rotten with perfection."\textsuperscript{4} In human symbolism, this is illustrated by the principle of entelechy, or the striving for the fulfillment of one's symbol system. As Burke explains:

The principle of perfection is central to the nature of language as motive. The mere desire to name something by its "proper" name, or to speak a language in its distinctive ways is intrinsically "perfectionist." ... Whereas Aristotle seems to have thought of all beings in terms of the entelechy (in keeping with the ambiguities of his term, \textit{kinesis}, which includes something of both "action" and
"motion"), we are confining our use of the principle to the realm of symbolic action. And in keeping with this view, we would state merely: There is a principle of perfection implicit in the nature of symbol systems; and in keeping with his nature as symbol-using animal, man is moved by this principle.

The clearest example of this entelechial principle is the "tracking down of implications" particular to a terminology. The tendency toward perfection is therefore implicit in the choice of a terminology. The scientific vocabularies, variously concerned with atom-smashing, or gene splicing, offer some stunning possibilities in the perfection of their terminologies.

This tracking down of implications may well be the "invitation to participate" that characterizes the tragedy of our increasingly technological society. The lure of technological progress, of the better and shinier mousetrap, is in a symbolic sense the pursuit of the "perfect" extension--the perfect computer, car, missile, whatever. The lure of this "promissory" stance, the unquestioned and salutary acceptance of technological benefits, is for Burke the plague of modern times. Since technology is "an ultimate direction indigenous to Bodies that Learn Language, which thereby interactively develop a realm of artificial instruments under such symbolic guidance," humans must realign their attitudes toward technology before the by-products and "implications" threaten our own existence. Until humans solve the problem of controlling our invented servants, Burke urges, we have "purpose a-plenty."

In his essay on "Mind, Body, and the Unconscious," Burke directs the critic's attention to the intrinsic entelechial motivations of our symbol systems, arguing that "the 'Unconscious' implications may not be 'made conscious' until one has methodically devoted oneself to the task of inquiring into the fulfillment of a given symbol system
as such.\textsuperscript{8} Drawn by his understanding of the "magic" of words, and of the purifying capacity of linguistic aggression, Burke settles on satire as the rhetorical epitome of the principle of entelechy. Satire takes us to the end of the line, stylistically, in bringing about a greater awareness of the unfortunate implications of the more scenic nomenclatures. It embodies the entelechial move, so characteristic itself of technological advance:

I would apply the term simply to the realm of symbolism, with verbal structures as different as the Marxist view of history, Bellamy's \textit{Looking Backward}, and Lewis Carroll's \textit{Through the Looking Glass}, all illustrative, in their different ways, of the "entelechial" principle, tracking down the implications of a position, going to the end of the line. ...It is thus that satire can embody the entelechial principle. But it does so perversely, by tracking down possibilities or implications to the point where the result is a kind of Utopia-in-reverse.\textsuperscript{9}

Burke is motivated to "dance" the satiric attitude in large part because of this close relationship between the internal and symbolic motivations of technological innovation and the entelechial principle which drives the satire. Rationality, excessive and predominantly unquestioned, is a central component of our current difficulties, and is likewise a founding block for the "logical extreme" of the satiric form. Entelechy, implying the consummation of linguistic and technological implications, is readily apparent in the "fulfillment" of the satiric vision. Human attitudes toward technology, represented for Burke in the celebratory accents of Walt Whitman's poetry, are accessible in the further affirmation of such "progress"--the embrace that reasserts awareness.

Raised in the religious tradition of Christian Science, Burke is sympathetic to the principle of homeopathy, and his move toward satire as a response to the problems of technology reflects this view. The "cure," if there is one, must embody the very principles
that are the source of the problem. The homeopathic critic "seeks to develop tolerance to possibilities of great misfortune by accustoming himself to misfortune in small doses, administered stylistically."\textsuperscript{10}

The internal nature of satire thus reflects, for Burke, the same motivations operant in the advance of technology.

A second characteristic of satire, perhaps equally important in shaping Burke's critical preferences, is its participation in the comic frame. Comparing satire to the direct indictment, what he terms the Cult of the Records, Burke labels the direct use of evidence and documents as invective, and while admitting that an occasional use of this mode might be justified, denigrates it on the grounds that it partakes more of the tragic mode than he can accept. In \textit{Attitudes Toward History}, Burke states that his "attitude of attitudes" is the comic frame, that "the movement towards the humane and civilized is maintained precisely insofar as the astute self-consciousness of comedy is "implemented" by the accumulated body of comic shrewdness."\textsuperscript{11} He maintains that we must resist a purely debunking vocabulary, since this frame ultimately can only transcend downward, a disintegrative force rather than a creative force.\textsuperscript{12} The direct indictment, then, forsakes the "resources of comic ambivalence," without which one is "not equipped to gauge the full range of human potentialities."\textsuperscript{13} Satire, richly ironic, operating always at two or more levels of abstraction, contains this comic ambivalence. Burke accepts the possibilities of other modes of criticism, but his vision necessarily partakes of the comic frame, and does so in such a way as to implement the entelechial principle he outlines as the root of the current problems of technological progress.
But satire also knows a harsher nature, a biting and punitive "cutting edge" leveled against the perceived ills, injustices or immoralities of the day. In characterizing satire as an expression of hatred or fear, Kernan acknowledges the often muted violence of the satiric mode:

Even when the hostility is not openly expressed, it is latent in the ugly ways in which satire characteristically presents its victims, and in the imagery traditionally associated with the satiric attack: biting, flaying, throwing acid, whipping, administering purgatives, and anatomizing. Even if they are not personalized, satires do have victims. If the "traditional" satiric attack is lacking in some instances of a softer and subtler fictive caricature, the fear and the anger are never far from the surface of the mode itself. Worcester's classic point that satire is "the engine of anger, rather than the direct expression of anger," bears repeating here if only to reflect back on the frustration and sometime despair that Burke brings to his writings on technology. This anger is channeled into a humorous, yet ultimately ascerbic attack on corporations, yea-sayers and the instrumental motivations driving the innovative genius of industry.

In his efforts toward the purification of war (Ad Bellum Purificandum being the preface to A Grammar of Motives), Burke settles at last on satire, the rhetorical descendant of magical incantation, cursing, invective, and lampooning. The history of satire, which Kernan describes as an uneven but continual process of "making anger and attack morally and socially acceptable," begins with the Iambic verses of ancient Greece, expressions of hate and ill will designed to exert a malefic power. In Arabia, where the poets composed satires against the tribal enemy, the hurling of invective was considered as important as the fighting itself. And in Ireland,
a rich history of celtic curses and magical verses attest to the social importance accorded the poet. Laws were even drawn up to restrain the use of satire and to provide restitution to the victims of a satiric attack. Burke's predilection for satire is therefore appropriate since the progressive purification of war to the realm of symbolism, which the history of satire reflects to a large degree, is a long-standing preoccupation.

But there exists an obvious tension when, in the embrace of a subtly violent and essentially anger-driven method of criticism, there is a concomitant validation of the comic frame, the light-hearted assertion of attitude. In his introduction to *Attitudes Toward History*, Burke accepts the "Aristophanic assumptions, which equate tragedy with war and comedy with peace."18 His early work on satire likewise describes it as embodying the tragedy of war, a "factional" tragedy that ritually transfers evils onto another and leaves one with a program of action because of the divisive nature of the strategy.19 There is in satire an ever-present ambiguity between the attack mode, the expression of anger and frustration, and the humorous mode, the communication of mischievous wit and merriment. Burke, however, is ever comfortable straddling an ambiguity, and in fact his location of creativity and the power of language in the ambiguous moment would seem to propel him toward critical modes that share this tension.

**Irony and Synecdoche in Helhaven**

In his placement of satire as a means of instilling human attitudes toward technology, Burke locates the rhetorical force of his system in the Helhaven project. Donald Bryant underscores the
suasory nature of the satiric mode in his discussion of certain satires by Jonathan Swift:

Of all imaginative literature—of "creative writing," as it is distinguished in some of our departments of English—satire is the most frankly rhetorical, the most obviously able to condition readers' or hearers' attitudes, beliefs, and behavior, while generating amusement and delight in vicarious experience. Understanding the satiric ground that Burke is operating from, along with some of the motivations that bring him to satire, it is appropriate to examine in greater detail the range of transformations and manipulations that are the rhetorical culmination of Burke's reaction to a pervasive technologism. A close reading of the Helhaven works is thus a significant way into the purification of Burke's own rage.

To briefly summarize the project, it is largely contained in two articles which intertwine a discussion of the nature of satire and of technology with a truncated description of the various attributes of Helhaven. Burke's first description of Helhaven, the "Mighty Paradisal Culture-Bubble on the Moon," pictures the "Ultimate Colony, merging in one enterprise, both Edenic Garden and Babylonic, Technologic Tower." Briefly, Helhaven offers a choice of false environments, a proper climate, a "Super-Lookout" for watching the "worse-than-Yahoos" that still populate the Earth, a location in the Sea of Tranquility, a plot-line whereby the effort of salvation actually destroys the Earth, and coordination by the Vice-Personalist, who serves the Prime Personalist (The Master). The analysis of satire, broaching some of the issues surrounding the purification of violence, delves into Burke's Helhaven project through two of his tropes, irony and synecdoche. Burke's notion of form, as the creation and satisfaction of an appetite, is pertinent
as a reflection on the movement and "energy" of the satire. His three principles of form--progressive, repetitive, and conventional--illustrate the strength and the potential weaknesses of the general interaction of irony and synecdoche in the text.

Irony--The Master Trope

A traditional understanding of irony sees the trope as a difference or an opposition between what is said and what is implied. There is added significance seen by the audience and unknown to the character in the drama, and there is the verbal irony wherein vocal qualities or context assert the opposite of what is explicitly stated. To a more traditional view of irony, Burke brings a rather different and more inclusive definition. In his essay on the "Four Master Tropes," Burke pairs the tropes with a different set of names: metaphor with perspective, metonymy with reduction, synecdoche with representation, and irony with dialectic. Here dialectic is used in a restricted sense, not embracing the entirety of linguistic transformations, but limited to the ideation, or protest, between agents, or "characters." As Burke defines the trope:

Irony arises when one tries, by the interaction of terms upon one another, to produce a development which uses all the terms. Hence, from the standpoint of this total form (this "perspective of perspectives"), none of the participating "sub-perspectives" can be treated as either precisely right or precisely wrong. They are all voices, or personalities, or positions, integrally affecting one another.

Irony, usually seen as a relativistic indulgence in the unstated or oppositional point of view, is actually a "resultant certainty" which "requires that all the sub-certainties be considered as neither true nor false, but contributory" to the overall perspective. Burke observes that relativism results when any one perspective gains the
upper hand and frames all other views. In irony, the use of all terms restrains the tendency to one subjective view, and maximally develops a perspective of perspectives. Presaging his Helhaven "twists" by 44 years, Burke notes that true irony will always involve "an 'internal fatality,' a principle operating from within, though its logic may also be grounded in the nature of the extrinsic scene, whose properties contribute to the same development." The rhetorical choices involved in the ironic composition recognize the internal fatalities of the subject, and fulfill the transformation of the characters:

"As an over-all ironic formula here, and one that has the quality of "inevitability," we could lay it down that "what goes forth as A returns as non-A." This is the basic pattern that places the essence of drama and dialectic in the irony of the "peripety," the strategic moment of reversal."

The reversal, which simultaneously accepts the contribution of all the elements to the dialectic or irony, is for Burke the master trope of satire. Etymologically, satire is akin to Burke's own view of irony and dialectic. From the Latin word *satura*, which means "full," or "a mixture of different things," the reference is to a dish of various kinds of fruit, or to a food with many different ingredients. Incorrectly attributed to the root *satyr* for many years, satire was associated with the coarseness of style of the "satyr-folk," and etymologically the similar words like "satirist," "satirize," and "satirical" all come from the root of *satyr*. The full mixture, or medley of *satura*, however, is the source of fictional variety in satire over the centuries, and the ground on which a dialectical understanding of ironic satire can be based.

Moving from the general relationship between irony and satire to the the Helhaven project, three basic ironic moves can be discerned...
in the larger reversal between affirmation and admonition: the dialectical tensions created between the multiplicity and unity of perfected Counter-Nature, the metonymic reduction of his "Vision of Division," and the reflexive plot lines outlined in constructing the satire. In isolation, this formal movement is both essential in reasserting a reflexive and comic awareness about technology, and instrumental in distancing the reader from the emotional impact of the human dilemma.

In his article on creativity, Burke foreshadows a reaction to Glenn Seaborg's endorsement of positive thinking about the role of science and technology in the evolution of contemporary society. Extending his early concern with the problems of "progress," Burke would categorically question any turn from "negativism" to "positive thinking." The new technology which defines our "second nature" is a vast network of new man-made powers. And such powers need controlling; which is to say they need laws, regulations; and laws, regulations are essentially under the sign of "thou shalt not." The hortatory negative is thus the foundation of the satiric enterprise, and is invoked by the affirmation, the over-affirmation of the Culture-Bubble. Burke cautions us about technology by embracing the ultimate technological escape from the polluted and ravaged Earth, by ironically spelling out just how the technological fix "saves" us. This admonitory/affirmation is the basic move of the Helhaven project, as it is with Swift's Modest Proposal, and with satirists from Horace to Buchwald. Satiric action is "always a double action, a regress in the form of a progress, a presentation in the form of a violation." In this instance, the reader is startled by an excess of consistency, a patently gross exaggeration of current thinking about the benefits of technology. The principle of
progressive form is epitomized here in the reversals of the text, what Burke terms the "keenest manifestations of syllogistic progression." What goes out as "good" technology comes back as undesirable technology. It is the ironic form which transforms the perfection of a particular idea or term into its dialectical opposite--into the admonition.

The corporate project of Helhaven itself, in its explicit duality, is an extended study in dialectic. In his summarizing description of the Culture-Bubble, Burke merges both the Edenic Garden and the Babylonic, Technologic Tower. The transcendance of both multiplicity and unity is thus achieved within Helhaven itself:

A womb-heaven, thus in the most basic sense Edenic, yet made possible only by the highest flights of technologic progress--hence, Eden and the Tower in one. A true eschatology, bringing first and last things together--the union of Alpha and Omega.

The return to Eden, made possible by a grant from Lunar Paradisiacs, Inc., is the attainment of dialectical transcendance between the singular peacefulness of Nature, and the varied and conflicting "voices" of technological creativity. It is no coincidence, either, that the technologic multiplicity is represented by the tower of Babel, the foundation of verbal divisions and complexities. For human conflict is purified in the contradictions and ambiguities of language, and Babel represents another kind of fall into the conflict of symbolism. Burke's reference in the satire, however, involves not a synthesis, or a transcendance, but rather a transformation of the personal and biological into the instrumental: the fulfillment of what, "in The Education of Henry Adams, is called the 'law of the acceleration of history,' as per what is now called an 'exponential curve' (involving a machine ecology as distinct from a biological
ecology)."36 Thus, while Eden is the haven of Helhaven, its unity is actually the sterile productivity of industrial multiplicity. The ironic point is that the transcendance (or merger) of unity and multiplicity (Eden/Tower), is actually the transformation (or fall) into the machine ecology. Burke "saves" us satirically by dissimulating an underlying multiplicity as a compromise between what is natural and what is Counter-natural.

A second, and perhaps related irony in the characterization of Helha'en is Burke's Apocalyptic Vision of Division—the purification of the virtues of technology and the removal of any ills. The perfection Burke offers envisions an ideal future that "would attain fulfillment in an ultimate state of absolute eschatological divisiveness."37 This "principle of transformation" which reflects the purely beneficial technology of the Culture-Bubble, is also indicative of the necessary split between the realms of motion and action. In Helhaven, there is no biological scene which founds human symbolic action. The seashore, the ski slope, the environment as a whole is artificial, a grand effusion of creativity. Reacting to the metynomy of behaviorism, Burke creates his own ironic metynomy. Skinner reduces purpose to behavior; Burke here reduces the biological to sheer technique. His illustration of the principle of division, reflecting his position on Big Technology and the current political fictions, is frankly skeptical:

Whitman's promises are as good as ever. The ills of technology could be left to "oil the Earth, the virtues of technology could rise transcendently elsewhere. (I think of an equally neat but less radical variant in Lukacs's discovery that everything wrong with technology is to be identified with capitalism, and everything right with it is to be identified with socialism.)"38
Where Skinner and others are didactic, Burke is subtly rhetorical in the excesses of his purified Vis' n of Division.

The vision is also a comment on the prospects of the "technological fix," the application of technology to alleviate the problems of technology. Technologism, as he frequently reminds us, is predicated on the assumption that "the remedy for the problems arising from technology is to be sought in the development of ever more and more technology." The "unintended side effects," or the byproducts of technology are eliminated in the vision, with technology overcoming its nature and purifying itself. Burke satirically violates his own "paradox of substance," the quandary that personal identity is indistinguishably woven into the things, situations, relationships with which one happens to be identified. With a separation from that context, there is no sense of personal identity, no existence apart. The origins of the word "substance," Burke argues, illustrate the paradox of a definition in isolation:

[T]he word "substance," used to designate what a thing is, derives from a word designating something that a thing is not. That is, though used to designate something within the thing, intrinsic to it, the word etymologically refers to something outside the thing, extrinsic to it.

When Burke separates ill from virtue, or symbolism from biology, he violates the paradox by isolating the defining characteristics from the thing to be defined. The underlying schema is that life in the Culture-Bubble is not human life--it is not biologically grounded, neither is it cognizant of the inherent ills of human creativity. In the final poem by The Master, stressing the "regrettable division inherent in the Vision," the millions and millions left behind on Earth are wrapped in the image of sewage, decay, and the infected tissue and yellowish fluid of an abscess. The Chosen are levitated
above the biological, the natural, and deposited in their comfortably cool and spacious artificial womb.

In this characterization, Burke stresses the paradox humans must live with even as he "resolves" it. The progression in the poem signifies the moral implications of dichotomizing the realms of action and motion. "It will not be without guilt," the verse begins, which is modified to "it will not be without exceptional regret," which changes to "it will not be without cruelty," and finally "it will not be without loathing."\(^{43}\) The rage and frustration Burke feels about the industrial violation of nature, the introduction of imbalance into a delicate web, is typified here in the "absolute moment" of The Master. This internal transformation at once describes the moral implications of separating the symbolic and the animal aspects of humans, and satirically expresses Burke's own loathing of technological excesses, along with his guilt for partaking of the benefits of such excesses. The kingdom of Helhaven, in proper ironic form, is within Burke as well.

The final ironic transformation is found in the construction of the satire itself, the reflexive nature of the plot line and of the presentation of the satiric gesture. Burke insists, at several points, that a paradox of paradoxes be built into the satire, that the "Final Flight will have been made possible the very conditions which made it necessary."\(^{44}\) The Ad Interim Field, which is the manipulation of capital stocks and funded research occurring until the departure for the moon, is thus responsible for the destruction of the Earth. Burke emphasizes this point, as if to underscore the rhetorical effect of the irony:

The pattern gets its ultimate refinement in the Ad Interim principle whereby those very persons who are among The Chosen can
accelerate the pace of the decay by temporarily investing in the stocks of whatever corporations are secretly contributing to the project with funds derived from enterprises that further the ecological deterioration.45

The "ultimate refinement" is an obvious strategic point of reversal, a cycle of "causality" whereby attempts to solve the problem through a technological fix will aggravate the problem all the more. If this ironic device was omitted from the satire, then the message about consequences would lose its poignancy. Then there is no "sting" to the development of the Culture-Bubble, only the horror of the sanitized and biologically isolated existence. The admonition would lose its power because the affirmation has no consequence; the A returns as A, and not-A is lost in the irresponsibilities of glorious affirmation.

In the presentation of the satire, Burke also toys with the reflexivity whereby he himself is subject to the satirical bite. In his earlier work on the poetic category of satire, Burke observes that "the satirist attacks in others the weaknesses and temptations that are really within himself."46 He refuses to take a "holier-than-thou" attitude, yet even in the reflection of the satire on its author, it contains the possibilities for homeopathic inoculation:

I must be among my victims. That is to say: I take it that my satire on the "technological psychosis" will be an offspring of that same psychosis. But to my earlier notion that we are all, including the satirist, tarred by the same brush, there are added the sophistications whereby we can get the curative accents of assertion and perfection by calling for a Utopia-in reverse.47

Burke places himself in the satire, ostensibly in the guise of The Master, but he is not ensnared like Swift's aging bureaucratic proposer, or like Orwell and his helpless and anonymous Smith. Burke
is unwilling to sacrifice his own moral ground and proposes that he, too, can be cured.

The trope of irony, in transforming affirmation into admonition, is clearly the master trope of Helhaven, the form which asserts a reflexive attitude toward the benefits and by-products of technology. The repetitive principle is amply demonstrated in the continual twisting and reflecting of the ironic moves. Burke insistently restates the nature of our technological salvation, each twist and turn a reiteration of the basic reversal being played out. In the syllogistic progression from affirmation to admonition, the audience becomes active, participating in the satisfaction of their appetite. Blankenship and Sweeney's discussion of the "energy" of form is insightful here:

[C]onventional form comes to the listener as the most "completed" of forms; the listener/reader merely has to recognize and acknowledge it for conventional form to be operative in discourse. Syllogistic progression, particularly in its enthymematic manifestation, comes to the listener in the most "incompleted" form; the listener/reader must complete it, not merely acknowledge it. 48

The strength of audience participation in Helhaven, in the ironic reversal to admonition, is shaped partly by the ironic excesses of the satire, and partly by the formal means of identifying the audience with the dilemma. The question arises: how does Burke mobilize the energy of the satire, and actively involve the audience in the reversal? A second movement within the project is the effort to make Helhaven meaningful and contemporary to the reader. The rhetorical means by which such representation is effected will be discussed in relation to the trope of synecdoche.
Synecdoche--Re-Presenting Technology

The evolution of satire has brought the art to where modern satire largely "charges whole armies,"\textsuperscript{49} rather than skewering individuals. For these satires to have meaning to the reader, they must in some way touch aspects of their individual experience, they must represent for the individual the larger meaning behind the ironic parable or the tongue-in-cheek monologue. The more effectively the satire "brings home" the point, the more representative it is of the immorality, corruption or injustice to the individual.

Synecdoche is the trope of representation, where the part becomes representative of the whole, and the whole is representative of the part. We have heads of state, for example, and we call for "all hands on deck." The dictionary definition is clear enough here:

a figure of speech in which a part is used for a whole, an individual for a class, a material for a thing, or the reverse of any of these (ex.: bread for food, the army for a soldier, or copper for a penny).

The paradigm instance of synecdoche, Burke observes, is the relationship between the microcosm and the macrocosm. The macrocosmic whole is represented in the part, and the microscopic part is represented in the whole. It is in this pure sense that Helhaven is for Burke the microcosmic whole of the entelechial trap of Counter-Nature. The project is named for the conjunction of Heaven and Hell, representing the dualities of human symbolism. As Rueckert notes, the "man-made Hell is the only Haven left. It is a synecdoche for the technological counter-nature man created on mother earth by means of which he polluted and destroyed her for human and other forms of life."\textsuperscript{51} The ascendance of Burke's vision is clear in the
priority of his construction (Hell comes first), and in the syllabic emphasis (being neither HelHAVen or HelhaVFN But HELhaven).

Several other levels of representation operate within the project, however, and the question to be addressed is the possibility of these synecdochic moves activating the audience. In his discussion of literary criticism, Burke identifies several "components" of synecdoche, or symbolic qualities that critically partake of the trope: naming, associational clusters, scapegoating, and foreshadowing.52 A close reading of the text for these qualities leads to three critical views of Burke's "stylistic diversions": that the reflexive manner of presenting the satiric project may well constitute the "evasion" of his vision; that the instrumental principle dominates the project to the point where personal attachment may be lost; and that as a result the moral "ethic" of Helhaven is muted by the choices Burke confronts as a critic. Synecdoche is thus a critical way into the functioning of the project, in the conjunction of irony and meaning for Burke's audience.

In the context of his plan for writing satire, Burke emphasizes the need to avoid an "efficiency" of text; he prefers the "deflective stylization" of satire rather than the direct indictment of technology. His best hope to avoid the tiresome efficiency of the complaint is to amplify his thesis by "watering it down."53 Several times he comments on how satire can overcome the boredom of the diatribe and indictment, as it is "a continual effort to 'compromise'" with his "hypothetical readers."54 The task of the satirist, he urges, is to "set up a fiction whereby our difficulties can be treated in the accents of the promissory."55 But Burke does
not set up a fiction—he outlines the possibilities for it, and discusses the nature of it, but he does not write his vision, he analyzes it.

We are led into his dilemma by way of his synecdoche for the capstone article on Helhaven: the ambiguity of his title "Why Satire, With a Plan for Writing One." In the second paragraph of the article, Burke summarizes the duality of his titular representation, and the motivations behind it:

Even my title somewhat reflects my perturbations. In its first form it ran, "I Want to Write a Satire." Then things so developed that I did not want to do anything of the sort; hence the form, "I Wanted to Write a Satire." Then came developments that got me to wavering. Did I or did I not, want to write a satire? So now, in the spirit of compromise, I have hit upon a title that somewhat straddles the issue, and that probably fits best in any case, since the underlying design has remained the same; namely: I propose to interlard observations about satire in general with notes towards one particular satire which, on and off, has been exercising me. Representing the article, that is, containing the essence within it, the title reflects a fundamental difficulty Burke has in writing any more fiction. It is important here to return to basic fact of the project: whereas Burke has a vision of Helhaven, and of admonition through affirmation, he does not write the vision. By and large, the articles are "notes towards" a satire, forsaking the coherence and formal satisfactions of a developed fictional account. Satire, Burke writes, is for several reasons a "troublous form," and in addition to the problems he cites in audience misreadings of the satirical work, there is a discernible break in the movement of the vision exactly where he settles on a reflexive rather than a demonstrative piece.

The problems of technology are so tiresome, and so platitudinous, that Burke sees no alternative but to alter the strategy, to compromise with the audience, and entertain while
moving, leaving the informative mode behind. He likens the satire to a bagpipe, playing a single note as a drone, but the dance of the melody above it keeps the attention. Thus, the "nagging theme of pollution would never let up, yet the developments built atop it would call for attention in their own right."57 But in his avoidance of the efficiency of the indictment, Burke has over emphasized the efficiency of the descriptive and analytic mode. "Here are the principles it is built on..., here is why it should be done..., here is how it could be done..., here is how I was doing it," but never "here it is." It is not enough to say that Burke is writing about satire and intermingling critical and demonstrative elements. His title of titles, the representation of his project as a whole, is quite clear on this point: Burke simply does not write the satire and that choice has consequences.

The primary effect may well be a loss of narrative coherence, the means by which audience anticipation is met (or violated) and a consubstantiality of purpose is engendered. The synecdochic move between the microcosm (my situation) and the macrocosm (the global problem of technological advance and exploitation) is unclear. Kernan observes that satire "usually lacks a consistent, even development and an obviously harmonic arrangement of parts."58 Much satire, even in the narrative mode, thus consists of "flickering vignettes, a series of brief, seemingly unrelated scenes. This newsreel technique of rapid, abrupt shifts intensifies the already powerful tendencies to fragmentation and meaninglessness."59 By emphasizing the currency of the situation, Burke contends that he doesn't really need science fiction to write the satire, nor does he need to rely on the "quasi-reporting" style of H.G. Wells and Jules
Verne to make his point; the current advanced state of technology minimizes the measure of fantasy he must interject, and reduces "such baggage to a minimum." But he is, in a significant way, "quasi-reporting" on the potentialities of satire. In the sense that "fiction must always be subordinate to the rhetorical purpose of satire," Burke rightly privileges the analytic over the demonstrative. But the synecdochic force of the culturally instilled response to a coherent and fulfilling narrative is lost in the reflexivity of the piece—it informs about satire, it entertains about technology, but it does not move the reader. In his efforts to "hang on even while dodging," Burke avoids the boredom of the indictment, but he forsakes the power of participation.

It is in the avoidance of narrative, indeed of the dramatic development of the plot, that Burke signals his logological inclinations. Through Logology, the study of words and the implicit relations that are always synchronically present, Burke presents us with the implicit properties and implications of a set of terms—the equations and transformations of the promissory attitude expressed in Helhaven. Since Dramatism is his admitted ontology, and Logology his epistemology, Burke approaches the problem of attitudes toward technology as a question of knowing rather than a question of being. Because the details of the satiric narrative he was writing were so overwhelming, Burke confesses, he makes "haste to discuss the subject in general, rather than getting entangled in a clutter of particulars." Representing the idea of Helhaven in an analytic mode, rather than a narrative mode, seems to forsake the participation of "being" in Helhaven; that choice, or "way out" of
the details of the narrative, arguably undercuts the rhetorical purpose of the project as a whole.

The second critical point highlighted by a perspective on the synecdocchic moves of the text is the ascendance of the instrumental principle over the personalistic. Helhaven is, of course, a purified form of the instrumental principle. It is a perfection of technique, a Vision of Division where the ills of technology are left behind and the virtues are shipped to the moon. In this purification of the instrumental, the workings of the personalistic principle are of great interest.

Naming, for Burke, is the creative moment in language that at once asserts control over nature and reflects the perspective of the "controller." There is, he argues, a "magical decree implicit in all language; for the mere act of naming an object or situation decrees that it is to be singled out as such-and-such rather than as something-other." Naming is both a way of seeing and a concomitant way of not seeing something. It shapes and deflects attention while reflecting the nature of that attention. In the naming of his Helhaven constituents, Burke initially privileges the instrumental over the personal.

Almost all of Burke's titles in the Helhaven project are institutional or scenic in nature; the titles of individuals are abstract and summarizing even as they connote individuality. The impersonality of his vision is readily apparent. The "Culture-Bubble" has a "Luna-Hilton" hotel, and is contrasted with other inferior ventures such as the "Seabottom Meadows" and the "Martian Promotion." Interim investments are being channeled into the "Mutual Helhaven Super-Multinational Conglomerate."
"Detection-Deflection Corps," and a "Great Astronaut Corporation," and the Bubble itself has "Chambers of Discomfort" and a "Super-Lookout Chapel." These are ultimately impersonal and objectified labels, the capital-letter representations of essences. Even the "Lunar Paradisiacs," who are "The Chosen," are completely scenic in their title; the moon geographically adjectivized, paradise conceptually rendered. This essentializing move may well signify a break from a more proportional and individualized approach to representing the characters of his development.

There are no personal names in Helhaven, no Winston Smith of 1984, no Bernard Marx or Lenina Crowne of Brave New World. The closest Burke comes is in mentioning "our man," the administrative coordinator who turns out to be the "Vice Personalist." In their summarizing qualities, the names created by Burke for his Helhaven project are largely instrumental and impersonal in nature, the personalistic principle is subjugated to the efficiency of his text. The one emblem of the personalistic principle is Burke's own persona within the satire, "The Master."

Burke actually posits two individuals: the Vice Personalist, of coarser stock, who administers the project, and The Master, the visionary and author of the concluding poems, who is the "Prime Personalist" behind "our man." It would be tempting to identify Burke as The Master (the Visionary) in this scheme, but that would forsake the insight that Burke is both The Master and the Vice-Personalist. It is worth speculating here that in their respective roles, the visionary and the bureaucrat are split components of the same person. The Master is easily identifiable as part of Burke, since he is described as a Whitmanite who has overcome
the trap of celebrating the expanse of human industrial creativity. Burke's corpus reflects a long struggle between the organization and presentation of his ideas and the jumbled poetic moments that reflect his vast creative capacity. The Master provides the spirit, the vision behind the project, and the Vice Personalist organizes it. In their roles, The Master provides the imaginative ideations, and the Vice Personalist bureaucratizes that imaginative. The oneness of the two is a compelling thesis, since it plays again on the larger tension within the project—the privileging of technique over the vision.

The poetic moments which conclude the Helhaven vision are balanced by the organizational strategies for its presentation. The three stages of his initial vision (with addendum!) become the five sections of his plan for writing one, which includes three platitudes, seven steps in the pattern, and an architectural skeleton for materializing his vision. Burke the bureaucratizer, the wielder of symbolic technique par excellence, is working side by side with Burke the visionary. Burke has a vision of Helhaven, but his role of The Master is a "somewhat mysterious shadowy role," a figure behind the Vice Personalist. Although The Master is the enspiriting force behind the vision, he is subservient to the exigencies of the bureaucratic tendency. The choice of the reflexive mode is for Burke the ascendance of technique over the vision—the textual resolution of the tension between The Master and the Vice Personalist. Even as Burke urges that satire should never become "directly 'efficient'," not two paragraphs later he presents his seven step summary of the satiric pattern.
A final brief point is simply that Burke does not mobilize perhaps the most representational and most synecdochic instance of technology today—the computer. The subject of a short and isolated treatment in "Towards Helhaven," the computer is never mentioned in the context of Helhaven. Implicit in many functions, yet never developed explicitly, the computer is for most people the summation of the vast technologic scene of contemporary culture. Burke's choice of a generalized technological advance, rather than the use of a specific and familiar technology places the text at risk of undercutting the personalization of the satire. Burke's Helhaven thus moves from macrocosmic to microcosmic, avoiding the entanglement of particulars but lacking specific technological referents to complete the part-to-whole/whole-to-part movement of the trope. The loss of the personalistic element in the satire is a tricky problem balancing intention and effect. Burke clearly wants to purify the instrumental principle in Helhaven; in fact his thesis depends on it. But in so doing—in naming and objectifying essences, in subjugating the visionary to the bureaucrat, and in forsaking personal commonplaces such as the computer—Burke again bypasses the element of consubstantiality from one human to another and focuses on consubstantiality between human and machine. It strengthens his thesis, but it hinders his purpose.

A final function of synecdoche is the foreshadowing that attaches to the omnipresence of Helhaven. Burke takes great pains to resurrect the spirit of Helhaven in each of us now, to amplify the vision and bring it to our awareness of who and where we are at this time. Often in books or plays an early occurrence will foreshadow what is to come; Burke's essential move in Helhaven is to
concurrently foreshadow what will come and to place the audience morally in Helhaven right now.

Sutherland observes that there is a judgment implicit in the satirical act:

_the satirist always intends to persuade his reader to share his own critical attitude. You cannot be a satirist just by telling the truth; you are a satirist when you consciously compel men to look at what they have tried to ignore, when you wish to destroy their illusions, or pretences, when you deliberately tear off the disguise and expose the naked truth._

The standpoint from which this truth is exposed reveals the moral force of the satire, the ethical predication of the fictional enterprise. While the moral stance, or judgment of the satirist has been a commonly accepted defining characteristic of satire, Lewis quickly counters that "truisms" by noting that "The Greatest Satire is Nonmoral," and that there "is no prejudice so inveterate, in even the educated mind, as that which sees in satire a work of eulification." Objecting to the sham and self-deception that accompanies the morally grounded view of satire, Lewis believes that satire for its own sake is possible, and that laughter has its own function in shaping human consciousness. Feinberg concedes a normative stance in satire, but he is unwilling to attribute it necessarily to a moral judgment:

_In actual practice, satirists usually apply a standard not of morality but of appropriateness—in other words, a social norm. It is a norm concerned not with ethics but with customs, not with morals but with mores; and it may be accepted by an entire society, or only one class in that society, or just a small coterie._

Burke, in questioning what is normative in society, operates from what might be termed an "ethics of ecology" in his rhetorical construction of the Helhaven project. The reason of our age, the mores of the industrial age, does provoke moral outrage. In citing
the example of weather control, Burke argues that the creativity of our time necessitates "a corresponding new batch of moralistic controls." It is his hope that the Helhaven satires will be the synecdoche, the representation of our plight that remoralizes our outlook on the present. This is the foreshadowing of the project—the presence of Helhaven in us now. What is a vision of the future is actually a vision of the present, with all the ironies, by-products and inevitable substances of the technological condition.

In the first paragraph of "Why Satire," Burke asks "where are we now?" He asks it not in a professorial way, bringing the class up to date, but with "the sort of question that has the connotations, 'in the name of God or the Devil, at this stage in our history, where in Hell's name are we?" His discussion of the Aswan dam project, and the environmental disorders whereby the river Volga burns easily, while aimed at illustrating the ineffectiveness of the direct indictment, emphasizes the currency of the problem. The clearest foreshadowing that occurs is in his explicit insistence that Helhaven is here already, within us:

For underneath the satire must be the fact that in principle the Helhaven situation is "morally" here already. For instance, you're already in Helhaven insofar as you are, directly or indirectly (and who is not?) deriving a profit from some enterprise that is responsible for the polluting of some area, but your share in such revenues enables you to live in an area not thus beplagued. Or think of the many places in our country where the local drinking water is on the swill side, distastefully chlorinated, with traces of various industrial contaminants. If, instead of putting up with that, you invest in bottled spring-water, to that extent and by the same token you are already infused with the spirit of Helhaven. Even now, the kingdom of Helhaven is within you.

In the conclusion, preceding the last poetic moment of The Master, Burke repeats this castigation, and hopes that "you and your friends
and your descendants can enjoy such discriminations for good, come Helhaven." The satire, at least in Burke's reflection on it, thus aims to represent the admonition of Helhaven for the individual, to bring about an awareness of the morality, or rather the immorality, of the promissory stance as it is embodied in each of us.

It is particularly appropriate, given the purification of violence in the satiric mode, that satire carry the moral resonance of Burke's ecological balance. In his discussion of Bentham in Permanence and Change, Burke underscores the symbolic conflict of moral edification:

Morals, shaped by the forms and needs of action, become man's most natural implement when exhorting to action. As implicit in censorial words, they are the linguistic projection of our bodily tools and weapons. Morals are fists. An issue, raised to a plane of moral indignation, is wholly combative in its choice of means. From this point of view, the moral elements in our vocabulary are symbolic warfare. To the handling of complex cultural issues we bring the equipment of the jungle. With the "censorial appellatives" of righteousness, one pardons or smites. No wonder we find the jungle still with us, in the very midst of our "enlightenment," when the law of the jungle is preserved in something so integral to our ways as speech.

Burke is no simple moralist, and when he locates the realm of the ethical as the study of "action and passion," he is concerned with the union, or the unity—within humans—of the great two: animality and symbolism. The loss of this duality, in the ascendance of the instrumental principle, is the immorality of Helhaven.

It is of significant interest, then, that in his discussion of the Agent in A Grammar of Motives, Burke grounds his moral action in the ideation of humankind, the understanding of reason:

We cannot know that there are God, freedom, and immortality; but we should act as if there were. Hence, moral action is rooted in the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality. (Unlike sensations and concepts, ideas can have no empirical reference. As the understanding uses the materials of sense, so reason uses the materials of the understanding). These ideas thus refer back to the transcendent realm. The moral motive is thus our bond between
the realm of necessity (the caused) and the realm of freedom (first causes).  

In this sense, Burke's Dramatism grounds a notion of freedom, not in the biological, or the physical, but in the realm of symbolic action, in the "adequate ideas" that name the situation confronting humanity. Burke's morality again privileges the instrumental over the personalistic, the epistemology over the ontology. Burke takes great pain to reflexively instill Helhaven within us now, to foreshadow the total devastation of the planet in the current imbalances. His synecdoche, the immorality of total instrumentality, is the shadow of his ecological ethic. But his moral vision is captivated by the technique he brings to the effort, and thereby underscores the very problem he isolates in human symbolism writ large.

Implications

In several reviews and assessments, Burke has been charged with political quietude, with an emphasis on form and eloquence to the detriment of a sustained focus on social criticism. Granville Hicks' review of Counter-Statement excoriates Burke for privileging the clarity, intensity and formal satisfaction of reader appetites over an involvement in the controversies of the day; for preferring eloquence over social commentary. Jameson's analysis of Burke's critical system characterizes an "ultimate structural distance between Burkean dramatism and ideological analysis proper":

Burke's system has no place for an unconscious, it makes no room for genuine mystification, let alone for the latter's analysis or for that task of decoding and hermeneutic demystification which is increasingly the mission of culture workers in a society as reified and as opaque as our own.
All of which is loosely summarized in Simons' observation that Burke seems to have left us with no means of expressing warrantable outrage. The expression of moral outrage in Burke's system, Simons argues, "requires that outrage be converted dialectically, usually into comic irony."83

Which brings to the forefront a consideration of satire and the role of Helhaven in Burke's corpus. Williams argues that satire is not detached, and that in the purpose of the admonition, Burke's muted unease with the current controversies finds release in the praxis of the satiric mode. Rueckert's answer that satire purifies outrage rather than expressing it is unacceptable to Williams, who argues that "satire becomes a critical rhetoric which aims at transforming human relations and social practices..."84 Heath also takes the view that Helhaven is, for Burke, a means of "participating in social criticism."85 The interaction of the tropes and the general formal movement of the satire are thus directly pertinent to the question of warrantable outrage and the application of Helhaven as a means of asserting ecological awareness. The dialectics noted above are the key rhetorical devices in bringing the point across—admonition by affirmation, the joining of Eden and the Tower, the division of the ills and virtues of technology, the reflexive plot line and the involved persona are all ironies that bring home the ecological attitude. "Satire is not a gentle art," write Kiley and Shuttleworth, it "must often use shock and exaggeration to make its point—shock to snap us awake and exaggeration to dramatize."86 The point is that the very rationality of irony, and of Burke's mode of satire, concomitantly fosters an attitude of detachment, of removal from the exigencies of the moment. In Burke's Horatian
style, there is ironic amusement, there is appreciation of the reflexivity of his technique, but there is very little rage, or even shock.

In the indirect effect of the satirical mode, an appeal to reason and human rationality often culminates in an ironic detachment from the passions of the message. Bryant speculates that it is this "indirection of satire which makes it characteristically a vehicle of convincing illumination, of rational, or deliberative, or contemplative enlightenment."87 Addressing the limitations of satire, Feinberg argues that "good satire appeals more to the intellect than to the emotions."88 Since the "detachment of the satiric method minimizes emotional involvement on the part of the spectator or reader," he concludes, it "limits the amount of empathy that he can experience."89 Worcester's "engine of anger" finds its function by invoking a cold and lofty anger, a "reasoned" response to the excesses of the immoralities or injustices submitted by the satirist. In his depiction of the range of satire, Worcester places any particular satire between the extremes of detachment and involvement:

Innumerable intermediate stages, by combining emotion and intellect in different proportions, lead from one pole of blind, human feeling to the opposite pole of divine, or inhuman, detachment. The spectrum-analysis of satire runs from the red of invective at one end to the violet of the most delicate irony at the other.90

Along this spectrum, it is hard not to place Burke's project almost at the extreme of delicate and detached irony. The logical consistency has, for Burke, an internal source, a set of implications which are pursued in the completion of the dialectic transformations. The strategic reversals he insists on, which largely constitute the rhetorical force of the satire, are amusing, even instructive, but
they operate from a vantage point, a stepping back from the reality of pollution. The problem is internal to humankind, he would have us understand, but that understanding is reached by a finely spun web of internal contradictions and logical extremisms. We appreciate it, and that's just the point: we appreciate it, but we don't feel it.

Seidel remarks that in recovering satire from its falsely attributed etymology of satyr, something crucial was lost. These disturbing, if erroneous, origins preserved for Vico a coarse and subversive nature. In his discussion of De Gourmont, Burke himself observes that "ironic detachment is a difficult position to uphold when men are being copiously slaughtered." Worcester acknowledges that irony is a useful tool for overcoming an "over-attachment" to the dramatic play, but he also notes that "irony tends to neutralize all passions and to turn all men into spectators of the human comedy. Up to a point, this is a useful function." The implication is simply that the ironic dialectic of Helhaven, the devices wherein the rhetorical point of the project is made, may be hindered by the stylistic detachment Burke invokes in the finely wrought web of irony. Burke's secular prayer builds a "character" that is rational and detached, a voice of instrumental analysis and understanding, rather than a sense of being a part of Helhaven. The rage expressed therein is not the rage of Juvenal, or of Swift, but the fine "raking" of the ironic twist, a Horatian and essentially bloodless commentary. Helhaven is the fine point of the 'epee, rather than the slash of the sabre. Hence Vico's concern about the urbanity of the civilizing influence, the loss of the satyr in satura. Burke is unwilling to transform the ironic point into a personalized and coherent internal feeling of the immorality of Helhaven. Even as
Helhaven is the opposite of the "pastoral" of Empson,94 there are signs of the rhetoric of courtship in the underlying validation of the principle of hierarchy itself. There is no class mystery per se being validated here, but an instrumentally asserted principle of order whereby the twist of affirming pure instrumentality is further twisted in the reflexivity of presentation, the impersonality of style, and the polite humor of refined irony. The homeopathic cure here risks receding into itself, since the stylistic treatment of technique by affirming technique overemphasizes technique in the curative application. Even as he courts the irrational through the overly rational, Burke is unable to release anything but the most purified and ironic form of verbal conflict.

Burke dances the attitude of satire with great skill and finesse, commenting on the nature and direction of satire even while sketching out a rough satire of his own. In his assessment of synecdoche, Burke is convinced that "this is the 'basic' figure of speech, and that it occurs in many modes besides that of the formal trope."95 His recognition of the centrality of synecdoche is not, it appears, matched by a proper mode of representation in the Helhaven works. A personal sense of the problems of technology is lost somehow, in the generalized macrocosm of the Culture-Bubble; the coherent voice of narrative is forsaken for a depersonalized entitlement of the project components, the computer, perhaps the clearest representation and culmination of technology, is never mentioned, and the empathy of "being" is sacrificed in the ascendance of technique to the understanding of "knowing." In his "deflective stylization," Burke may have overshot the mark—he is Horatian to a "T," and the Vice Personalist has transformed the Visionary.
The notion of form reenters here, in a comparison of the potential progressions of the Helhaven project. A qualitative progression, where "the presence of one quality prepares us for the introduction of another,"\textsuperscript{96} is apparent in the excess of Burke's vision. The attitude of excess, embodied in the ironies of the Culture-Bubble, prepares us for, or creates an appetite for, an attitude of moderation. But whereas the energy of the syllogistic progression (from technology is wonderful to too much technology is evil) involves a rational movement, the qualitative progression preparing us for an ecological ethic is lost in the personal technique of Burke's presentation. As Blankenship and Sweeney note, "[s]ince qualitative progression most clearly reflects an emotional potency, we might consider it as an active counterpoint to the 'logic' of syllogistic progression."\textsuperscript{97} The dominance of the instrumental mode over the personalistic in his writings on Helhaven may well undercut the qualitative progression of Burke's larger purpose.

Which leads us to speculation on the critical functioning of the Helhaven project. Technology, Burke admits throughout the Helhaven works, becomes his own "fixation"—he compulsively collects clippings on the subject, while the issue continually confronts him. At the juncture of his own Cult of Records and his preference to avoid the tragedy of the efficient indictment, Burke embraces the ambiguity of satire:

I would love to get shut of the whole idea, even to the extent of inattention by dissipation. But it goes on nagging me. Consequently, as I hope to make clear, my thoughts on satire in this connection come to a focus in plans for a literary compromise whereby, thanks to a stylistics of evasion, I both might and might not continue with the vexatiousness of this idée fixe, this damned committed nuisance.
Rueckert observes that "[n]owhere in Burke are the dilemmas of humanist and word-man in our technological time more apparent than in the different works that make up this project." The frustrations Burke feels in observing the acceleration of history are expressed "inefficiently" in Helhaven. The satire, which he notes has been "exercising" him, is the closest he comes to an outraged diatribe on the immorals of pollution, despoilment, exploitation, and the promissory attitude toward technology. If the Helhaven project is the vehicle of Burke's frustration and rage at the creativity of the modern world, then we are brought to ask why, in the name of God or the Devil, doesn't he just write the satire itself?

The range of motivations operant in Burke's "dancing" is too complex to ascertain with any certainty. Three speculations, however, serve as points of departure in summarizing the role of satire in Burke's critical system and within Burke himself. The first is simply that Burke is indeed caught up in the paradox of his own substance, and the reflexivity and bureaucratization that constitute his situation prevent him from escaping to the purity of his visionary moment. The satirist is satirizing what is within himself, and the instrumentality of his critical technique, even as he strives for inefficiency, renders his vision impure.

The second is that Burke's experience with his vision compels him to forsake the purity of it; his brush with fiction comes close to radically decentering his own frame. In his discussion of creativity, Burke recounts the tribulations of a symbol-user:

God only knows how autosuggestive one's work with symbol-systems can become. I know of at least one fellow who wrote a novel about a word-man's cracking up. By the time he had finished, he had got himself so greatly entangled in his plot's development, he barely did escape ending in an asylum himself. Several steps were needed to help him dispel the spell that the sustained engrossment in his
fiction had imposed upon him. And among them was a deliberate renouncing of his emergent plans for another novel. He turned to criticism instead—and that subterfuge served him passably. He does not content that novel-writing necessarily produces such results. But he's adamant in his insistence that it worked that way with him.  

Which brings us finally to the critical force of the Helhaven project, by way of understanding the nature of the satiric mode and stylistic diversion Burke brings to his satire. Burke at one point notes that "rage too spontaneously expressed can usually but lead to powerlessness." There is a spectrum of rage, where the purple of violent fury becomes the finely wrought violet of the ironic twist. Satire, as invective, handily expresses the fury of biting social commentary, but as comic insight, it equally expresses the sardonic view of the critic as they comment on society's foibles. Burke's critical system finds an outlet for rage, but the full intensity of expression is in his view unwarranted. For Burke, the purified violence of satire may induce understanding, but it shades the attitude along the lines of the tragic, and he is unwilling to undertake the cathartic release of his own aggression while skewering human attitudes toward technology. Burke is above all concerned with the purification of war, with the avoidance of modes of victimage that so characterize human relations that they threaten our very existence. This is consistent with his insistence on the primacy of the comic frame, as he greatly fears the destructive power of the victimage implied by the tragic frame.  

The lesson for rhetorical critics is especially poignant given the depth of Burke's commitment to an ecological attitude. William Bowen recognized Kenneth Burke as one of the earliest critics to call attention to "one little fellow" among the sciences named ecology.
and Burke's own view along the way has urgently proclaimed that ecology is "technology's self criticism." Burke's fictional Herrone Liddell, "haunted by ecology," is perhaps most clearly indicative of the tremendous sadness and dispair Burke feels about the despoilment of the environment and the potentialities for global holocaust. Yet even in the intensity of these feelings, Burke will not victimize, even symbolically, as he is convinced of the tragedy implicit in the Cycle of Terms. Critics ascending the platform to vent their rage risk, in Burke's view, the tragic outcome of violence and victimage. This essay, assessing the incomplete movement of irony and synecdoche in the Helhaven project, underscores the complexity of instilling ecological attitudes operating within the comic frame. Even as tensions and ambiguities of the project are detailed, however, the essential problem of human symbolic "perfection" confronting the discipline is highlighted by Burke's own choice: those calling for warrantable outrage in social criticism must consider the implications of the frame within which they operate, as they purge themselves of their own rage. Confronted by injustice, by exploitation, and by victimage, the "last temptation" of criticism is to lash out in a blast of fury at the tribulations of hierarchy and human weakness. The disintegrative force of such a purely debunking vocabulary, Burke insists, runs counter to an awareness of self in proper relation to Scene and Agency. Raging at the degradation of our environment, yet drawn to the comic frame, Burke is nonetheless hesitant to fulfill the vituperative and harshly personal nature of the satiric attack. The choice, Burke would agree, is more complicated than that.
Endnotes

2Sutherland 21.
4LSA 3-16. For purposes of clarity and simplicity, the books by Burke will be identified by a short abbreviation. His central works, in the editions available to the author, with their abbreviations, are as follows:
   (understatement (1931; Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1968), hereafter CS.
   Dramatism and Development (Barre, MA: Clark UP, 1972), hereafter DD.
   Other works will be fully cited and subsequently referred to with a short, identifiable title.

   5LSA 16-17.
   6PC 296.


8LSA 70.


10ATH 44-5fn.
11ATH 79fn.
12ATH 92-3.
13ATH 74.


Kernan 214.


ATH introduction.

ATH 188fn.


"Towards Helhaven" 20.

CS 30-31.


GM 503.

GM 512.

GM 513.

GM 517.

CS 517.


34 CS 124.

35 "Why Satire" 316.

36 "Why Satire" 330.

37 "Why Satire" 331.

38 "Why Satire" 327.

39 DD 53.


41 GM 23.

42 "Why Satire" 335.

43 "Why Satire" 337.

44 "Towards Helhaven" 21.

45 "Why Satire" 330.

46 ATH 49.

47 "Why Satire" 317-18.


52 PLI 18-40.

53 "Why Satire" 329.
54 "Why Satire" 324.
55 "Why Satire" 315.
56 "Why Satire" 307.
57 "Why Satire" 324.
58 Kernan, "Satire" 215.
59 Kernan, "Satire" 215.
60 "Why Satire" 319.
62 "Why Satire" 323.
63 "Why Satire" 322.
64 PLF 4.
65 "Why Satire" 326.
66 "Why Satire" 329.
67 Sutherland 11.

68 For assessments of morality see Ronald Paulson, The Fictions of Satire (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins P, 1967) 3; Hight, The Anatomy 150.


71 "Progress" 323.
72 "Why Satire" 307.
73 "Why Satire" 328.
74 "Why Satire" 321.
75 "Why Satire" 332.
76 PC 192.
77 GM 137.
This discussion benefits immeasurably by the work of David Cratis Williams, who is in no way responsible for the inaccuracies of the author.


Kiley and Shuttleworth 1. See also Hight, The Anatomy 18-20.
100 "Why Satire" 307.

101 "On Creativity" 77.

102 "King Lear" 15.
