Ten informal papers given at Discussion Forums to U.S. groups are provided which address current South African related issues as they touch upon the South African Information Exchange (SAIE) initiative. Papers have the following titles and authors: "Is There Space for American Involvement in South African Education?" (Merlyn C. Mehl); "Mapping the Future of Black South Africans in Science and Engineering Education" (Gordon Sibiya); "Education for Liberation/Transformation: The Role of Vocational Guidance and Counselling for Young Blacks" (Tahir Salie); "Education for Black South Africans: The Importance of Bursaries and Support Services for Black High School Students" (Pamela Tsolekile and Getti Mercorio); "The Community College Option: A Private Sector/Community Initiative to Break the Educational Logjam" (Stan Kahn); "UDUSA: Microcosm of a Society in Transition (Ratnamala Singh); "The Academic Boycott and Linkages Between U.S. Institutions and Eligible South African Academics" (Farouk Ameer); "Technical Education in South Africa and the Political Implications" (Brian De L. Figaji); "The Struggle to Realise the Freedom Charter in South Africa Today" (Raymond R. Suttner); "Coercion, Persuasion, and Liberation" (Vincent T. Maphai). Short biographical notes are included of each author. (GLR)
South Africans Speak:
Discussion Forum Presentations 1987–1989

Edited by
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SOUTH AFRICANS SPEAK: Discussion Forum Presentations 1987-1989

Introduction

The South African Information Exchange (SAIE) was created to serve both support-seeking and support-granting institutions by collecting and disseminating information on existing or potential resources and, complementarily, on initiatives and projects working toward change in South Africa.

One way that the SAIE shares this information is through publishing a series of working papers surveying a range of support-granting institutions. Titles of previous working papers are listed on the back cover of this publication.

Another way is through sponsoring periodic Discussion Forums at which a number of visiting South African colleagues have spoken informally, on issues of special interest to them, to small groups of Americans--representatives of churches, foundations, corporations, and public policy groups.

After two years and 15 speakers, the SAIE, realizing that it possessed a wealth of different perspectives on current South Africa-related issues, decided to publish some of the presentations in an anthology--the first, perhaps, of another series.

As the Table of Contents indicates, the papers (which are presented chronologically by order of appearance) cover topics as diverse as American involvement in South African education, scientific and engineering education, vocational guidance, student support services, community colleges, the role of the academic in the struggle, the academic boycott, technical education, the Freedom Charter, and the justification for coercion. Each paper reflects, in its own way, the changing educational scene in South Africa. Each shares a commitment to a new South Africa, nonracial and democratic.

We are grateful to the authors for agreeing to put these oral presentations into written form. They have updated their papers according to their subsequent experiences and insights.

In April 1988, Sebolelo Mohajane, Director of the Soweto Careers Centre, Chairperson, Soweto Parents Crisis Committee, and Founder Member, National Education Crisis Committee, spoke to one of our groups in New York on "What now for a brighter future for the youth of South Africa?" Early in 1989 she was killed in an automobile accident in South Africa. Her voice is silent; her spirit is vibrant still. We dedicate this publication to her.
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IS THERE A SPACE FOR AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICAN EDUCATION?

Merlyn C. Mehl

Introduction

1986 saw an unprecedented number of American universities and foundations visiting South Africa. They demonstrated a determined effort to "do something." The reasons for the interest are legion, and certainly, in the case of the universities at least, are frequently related to the importance of the divestment issue among students on their own campuses. In a few cases, the visiting institutions have come with agendas already set--programmatic details were all that remained. At the other end of the spectrum were those who came to investigate what their institutions might do with no idea of the current educational agenda set by black South Africans.

In spite of all this effort, very little has emerged that enhances the educational struggle of the disadvantaged majority in the country. Indeed, many universities now tend to the "soft option;" namely, simply taking more black South Africans into established graduate scholarship programmes at American institutions--a classic no-risk situation. As valuable as these programmes are for the individuals involved in terms of professional advancement, they do nothing in the short- and medium-term to address the very real and pressing educational needs in black education in the country.

The crucial issue that this paper addresses is that of finding the match. How are overseas institutions able to lock into the evolving educational agenda of the disadvantaged communities in South Africa and either contribute to or learn something from it or both?

Educational Innovation: The UWC Experience

The 28-year history of UWC gives some indication of the possibilities emerging in South African education. In 1959, the Extension of University Education Act was promulgated; it resulted in the establishment of racially exclusive, ethnic universities. These university colleges--dubbed "Bush Colleges"--were set up despite opposition from the various population groups they were supposed to serve. The 180 so-called coloured students who enrolled at UWC in 1960 did so only because they were unable to receive permits to study at the white "liberal" universities like Cape Town and Witwatersrand. In the main, the new separate universities were staffed on both academic and administrative levels by Afrikaners. The principal administrative officer of the university (known as the rector or vice chancellor) was appointed directly by the central government. This pattern of staffing reinforced community rejection of the separate universities, and student enrollment grew slowly. By 1970, UWC had 1,000 students.
Protest activity at UWC started in the 1960s and initially was directed almost entirely from students towards the university administration. Practically the only weapons students had were boycotts—either of classes or administration-inspired events—in protest over issues related to university governance. This led to frequent police action on the campus. In 1973, for example, the entire student body was expelled and then unconditionally readmitted after a confrontation between students and the primarily Afrikaner-controlled administration. In 1975, amid much student unrest, the white rector was replaced by a so-called coloured professor, Dr. Richard van der Ross. Under his patient leadership, the institution changed gradually from an instrument of the apartheid system to something quite different. This change evolved out of the struggle between those who wished to preserve UWC as a "separate university" and those who strove to make it answer the demands of the generic black community.

The period from the late 1970s to the early 1980s were characterised by student action to correct perceived wrongs within the university itself, but it was clear that students were also prepared to use the campus as a political platform. For example, in 1984 student opposition to the tricameral parliament led to numerous confrontations with the police and widescale boycott of lectures as a protest of the elections. The late 1970s, however, also marked a growing awareness of another function that UWC was fulfilling in spite of itself.

The birth of UWC under a political blanket is generally acknowledged today, after 21 years of trauma, to have been a mistake. The need for an institution of this nature, however, not of course on racially separate lines, but as a reflection of a particular social requirement, is in no way minimised by that fact. For it is possible to be totally unambiguous about this fact: UWC is an institution for people who are disadvantaged; people by and large unprepared because of political, social, historical, and economic factors, for the rigours of tertiary education. This is said in no way disparagingly, in no way reflecting or, the students, but rather as reflecting a social reality. The question all who worked there had to resolve was whether they could conscientiously work in an institution conceived on ideologies with which they did not necessarily agree, but for which they could envisage nobler aims.

The notion of UWC (dubbed the "University of the Working Class" by van der Ross) as a university away from the elitist British tradition but reflecting more the realities of Africa, has been given expression by the acceptance by both its Senate and its Council of the following educational philosophy:

The UWC interprets its role as a university to include a firm commitment to the development of the Third World communities in southern Africa. By this means, it aims to serve its immediate community and to keep open the possibility of new options emerging for South African society. This commitment of the university will be reflected in programmes aimed at bridging the gap between the requirements of university studies and the
resources the students bring with them; teaching and learning methods and facilities; encouragement both of research and of the development of course material that has a bearing on the Third World; appointments policy, in so far as an active interest in the realisation of these objectives will be a recommendation; outreach programmes to the schools; continuing education programmes; other such programmes and activities as may be from time to time deemed necessary.

The overriding idea behind what can be termed a strategic adaptive philosophy was the determination to place the university in greater contact with the needs and changes of the environment that supports it in order for it to function as a viable subsystem within the changing educational system of society at large. A sensitivity to the kaleidoscopic drift of political, economic, and social problems--society a..it is and not the utopia we all dream about--was at the root of the change that took place over the past few years at UWC.

Among the ways in which concrete expression has been given to this philosophy are the acquisition of the PLATO system of computer-based education to serve as a compensatory tool; the establishment of an extensive outreach programme to neighboring schools; and the creation of the Adult Education Centre. These activities have broadened the community base of UWC and greatly enhanced its credibility as a force for positive change. At the same time, attempts have been made to accommodate the reality of student activism both inside and outside UWC within a developing and evolving academic programme.

The result has been a vibrant academic community of scholars and students where efforts are made to deal with the education, economic, and political realities of the changing South African scene. In the process, UWC has become the fastest growing university in the country, with 8,500 students in 1987 and widespread support from the generically black communities. Indeed, in spite of its start as a so-called coloured university, the number of black students from both Cape Peninsula as well as the rest of the country is growing at a very rapid rate.

The reason for citing the example of UWC is to demonstrate that there does still exist what has been called a "space" within which innovation is possible in South African education.

Does Financial Support by Government Mean Control?

How was it possible for UWC to move so far from its designed purpose while remaining dependent on government funds? The example of UWC shows that control and support are in the same sense separate. Understanding the way in which financial support/control works is obviously crucial in evaluating possibilities for educational change within the country.

The issue that disturbs most South Africans is not that government funds education, but, rather, that the funds are apportioned
inequitably. Given the common wealth of the country, the responsibility of the government to fund education is not in question. The issues revolve more around the discrimination in spending across population groups. As demonstrated above, there is a considerable disparity in per capita spending at the school level. Additionally, massive funds are needed to eliminate the backlog of neglect that characterises black education. The popular cry for a single education ministry for the entire country, rather than the fourteen or so that presently exist, has as one of its primary purposes the equalisation of educational spending across the population.

While government funds 100 percent of education at school level, between 80 and 90 percent of a university's budget is obtained from this source, the balance coming from student fees. The manner of this funding, while the same for all universities, can still be discriminatory, given the historical backlogs in the black communities. This may be illustrated by the following examples:

- In terms of the government subsidy of universities, 50 percent of a fiscal year's amount is calculated on the number of students enrolled by a certain cut-off date. The other 50 percent is obtained from the number of those students who actually pass the courses from which they are enrolled at the end of that academic year. It is easy to see how the historically black universities, which carry the worst manifestations of the unequal educational opportunity, are financially hamstrung by this formula.

- Research is subsidised on the basis of published articles and books per year. Again, the young, historically black, universities, with faculty heavily loaded with teaching obligations and with a very small research tradition, are severely penalised by this provision.

- No government subsidy is available for academic support programmes—innate to the nature of historically black universities—or for outreach activities by universities that attempt to bridge the school/university gap.

- The need for buildings is clearly greater at rapidly expanding universities such as UWC where there are severe backlogs.

In answering the question of whether financial support implies control, it is necessary to distinguish between the various levels of education, since the situation differs dramatically between schools and certain tertiary institutions such as teacher training colleges (TTC) on the one hand and universities on the other. Schools (except private) and all TTCs are racially separate and answerable to various government ministries. Thus, for example, so-called coloured education is under control of one of the chambers of the tricameral parliament and falls under the Department of Education and Culture, House of Representatives, with a minister of education answerable to this house. Black education is administered by the Department of Education and Training (DET) under a minister answerable to the central government. Clearly, education at
this level is rooted in the political dispensation of the day. Control of all facets of primary and secondary education is thus in the hands of a government bureaucracy.

Universities on the other hand are now, by and large, autonomous institutions (UWC has had this autonomy since 1984). Appointments of staff (including the top administrative staff), admissions policy, course and curricula, are decided by a Council completely independent of central government and chosen at the discretion of the particular university. In most cases, state involvement in the day-to-day running of the university is virtually nonexistent. Indeed, given the track record of a university like UWC with regard to its student involvement in prevalent political issues, the efforts of its administration to accommodate this and the search of its staff for academic relevance within the aspirations of the disadvantaged majority in South Africa, it would be impossible to categorise the institution as the handmaiden of the state. Today, UWC is directed by Vice Chancellor Jakes Gerwel, a man whose political convictions have been tested by time in prison.

Does this argue that all universities may be supported and all school-related enterprises should be shunned? No! What must be resisted are carte-blanche categorisations one way or the other. Furthermore, the situation is extremely fluid and institutions with excellent records can be overtaken by government force. At the same time, progress is possible even at the worst institutions.

The issues of deciding which educational endeavors may be supported without fear of adding support to the apartheid system require careful, complex analysis:

- There is a tremendous need for in-service training of teachers. Does supporting such initiatives, many of which are independent of education authorities (e.g., TOPS) or others launched by teacher organisations, lend validity to the separate education authorities or work for long-term development of the education of the disadvantaged majority?

- Universities, whether liberal white or historically black, need to be evaluated in terms of their stated philosophy, objectives, and records, as well as support for specific projects that address the needs within black education and for which it has no subsidy.

Clearly, South African education represents a complex web. To determine what support would be unencumbered by government control is not the simple matter of deciding that "no government-supported institutions may receive funding," as is the present position of the U.S. Agency for International Development. Indeed, the guidelines issued by the South African educators at the Michigan State University Conference on U.S.-S.A. Initiatives in Education in November 1986 recognised this fact.
Some General Criteria for Involvement

A few general principles that may govern involvement are proposed below. This list makes no claim to be either definitive nor exhaustive:

General Collaboration. A new kind of educational imperialism must be vigorously avoided. The idea of overseas universities bringing the accrued wisdom of centuries to enlighten the natives of southern Africa is patently absurd. On the other hand, there are ample opportunities for genuine collaboration on problems that are common to our two cultures. Genuine collaboration obviously implies that credible South African institutions and/or individuals must play a substantive role in formulating plans, initiating action, shaping procedures, and in general seeking, rather than having imposed, cooperative ventures.

Avoid Working Directly with the Government. Credibility depends on avoiding direct association with government activities that are generally viewed with suspicion in the black community. What exactly constitutes a "government activity" is not always easy to define. We have argued that financial support by government does not necessarily imply control. Additionally, there are institutes established at universities that have financial autonomy from the university itself by being supported entirely by nongovernment grants. Numerous community organisations are involved in highly innovative work. In every case, the critical issue is the perspective of the people who are actually doing the work and the manner in which those individuals are perceived by the community at large.

Clear the Way Politically. Programmes of any significant scope need to be discussed with and evaluated by various influential black groups to prevent their shipwreck on the inevitable rocks of suspicion and boycott. Because the political situation is dynamic and highly fluid, it is not easy to determine which groups to consult unless one has up-to-date information.

Easy Match. Programmes that require U.S. (and other) universities to do something for which they may be ill-equipped and in which there is little faculty interest are not likely to succeed. Indeed, the major problem implicit in genuine collaboration is determining the manner in which connections can be established between South African needs and/or strengths and those of the collaborating agency.

Mutual Interest. There is a mistaken notion that assistance needs to be one-sided. The projects that are most likely to succeed are those in which all concerned gain from the activity. South African educators have access to a vast educational laboratory that they can share with interested colleagues from overseas. Such joint research efforts have the potential to inform educational practice around the world. For example, South African secondary and tertiary education abounds with persons of high potential and initiative, but whose manifest levels of academic achievement display only their disadvantaged background. How this potential can be identified and what sorts of instructional strategies will unlock it are questions that need answering far beyond the boundaries of South Africa. In this vein, programmes for South
Africa that may help to fund and/or inform projects of established interest overseas have a far greater chance of success than those that must be created.

Impact. Programmes instituted or operating abroad should hold promise of significant impact on the South African educational scene. Some of the graduate degree programmes offered by U.S. institutions run the risk of minimal or possibly negative effects. Students of high academic ability who pursue traditional fields of inquiry to very advanced levels may find it difficult to leave the lush pastures of American Ivy. Obviously it is appropriate for some individuals to take advantage of just this sort of opportunity; however, programmes that are directed at helping South Africa and the vast majority of her people need to address different questions. What will the programme mean for the candidate's home institution? How relevant is the candidate's research programme for the educational needs in South Africa?

Conclusion

It must be emphasized that what we advocate above is not a carte-blanche to work with everybody and anybody in South Africa. Rather, we argue for reasoned decisions, not simplistic reactions to stereotypes. We need to realize that working in South Africa can be a somewhat "messy" business and that inevitably some opposition may arise. We should not expect that any endeavor will receive perfect consensus with the generically black community, since there are many constituencies both inside and outside the country. Each of us must make our own decisions and face whatever opposition there may be. In the end, however, we will be judged by how positively we contributed to alleviating the unfolding tragedy that is South Africa.
Preamble

Thomas Jefferson and other proponents of a free public school concept strongly believed that an educated society was the lifeblood of democracy. In their view, the objective of school was to socialise the youth to become worthy citizens whose ideals were the upliftment of society. Jefferson once wrote: "I know no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society but the people themselves."

It is indeed a long fall from this esteemed ideal to the devastating reality that confronts the black youth in South Africa today. Children of the black underprivileged class are undereducated in disproportionate numbers when compared to their white counterparts countrywide. On average, black school children academically lag behind their white counterparts of the same age by up-to-four years. This means that it is possible in South Africa today to find a black who is still struggling to pass matriculation at the age of 21, while his white counterpart has by this age quite comfortably finished a first university degree.

One of the harshest realities of the South African education situation is that, because schooling is not compulsory for blacks, at least 1.1 million black children of school-going age have never attended school at all. In addition, nearly half a million out of 5.6 million primary school pupils in the country dropped out in 1987 alone. None of these children had reached the standard 6 level of schooling.

To make matters worse, the crisis does not end at the school or tertiary level. Professional blacks with a university background in South Africa have managed to achieve relative mainstream success in a limited number of careers, notably in law and medicine. However, in key areas that are popularly known as "boffin fields," such as science, economics, computer science, engineering, and technology, which are considered to be the fundamental prerequisites to enable blacks to gain a significant share of political, economic, and social power, black representation is, regrettably, almost completely nonexistent.

Similarly, in big business, industry, and the stock market, the absence of blacks is quite noticeable. Traditional names of multinationals and giant mining corporations, whose history dates back to Cecil John Rhodes and Lord Kimberley, are still household names in the southern African corporate world today. Not a single black company exists at this level of South African macro-economics and probably will not for a long time to come.

This paper attempts to investigate how a sound education in science and engineering is likely to have an impact on the future of black people.
in South Africa. Since the numbers of pupils entering scientific and engineering disciplines will depend on a good "track record" for the pupils at school level, it is important to present a historical overview of the problems that beset black education in South Africa at this level.

**Historical Overview of Black Education in South Africa**

South African literature reports that missionaries performed pioneering work in the formal education of blacks, and that the Natal and Cape Colony governments began to subsidise black schools only after 1850. Black education fell under the control of the provincial administration after the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, although the overwhelming number of black children remained in mission schools. The passing of the Bantu Education Act of 1953 transferred the administration and control of all black education from the Provincial Administration to the Department of Native Affairs of the central government.

In 1958, a separate Department of Bantu Education was created, with its own minister. The aim was to educate black students to accept a certain status in life. This was the forerunner of what is at present the Department of Education and Training (DET). A year later, the Extension of University Education Act of 1959 empowered the minister to establish separate university colleges for blacks only. This meant that blacks were summarily debarred from enrolling at Universities such as Cape Town, Natal, and Witwatersrand, where they previously had enjoyed admission. The Universities of Turfloop, near Pietersburg, and Ongoye in Zululand were subsequently established as colleges for blacks only. The University of Fort Hare, established in 1916, was also later declared a black university.

In this way, the basis for separate but unequal education for blacks and whites was firmly formulated in South Africa. Black education was thus systematically relegated to the present level of inferiority. In the words of Dr. H.F. Verwoerd, one of South Africa's ultra-conservative Prime Ministers and chief architect of apartheid, the purpose of Bantu education was to ensure that blacks were educated to fill subservient positions in a white-dominated society.

Verwoerd, obsessed with white supremacist education policies, presented his grand design almost 40 years ago to ensure the survival of apartheid at any cost. Appointed Minister of Native Affairs in 1950, Verwoerd based his views on one of the most controversial education documents ever produced in South Africa--the Eislen Report on National Education, released in 1951 as the result of a government-appointed commission headed by Dr. W.W. Eislen.

Introducing the Bantu Education Act in 1953, Verwoerd said: "Up till now the native has been subjected to a school system that drew him away from his own community and partially misled him by showing him the green pastures of the European, but still did not allow him to graze there. I will reform education so that natives will be taught from childhood to
realise that equality with Europeans is not for them. Racial relations cannot improve if the wrong type of education is given to natives. They cannot improve if the result of native education is the creation of a frustrated people who have expectations in life which circumstances in South Africa do not allow to be fulfilled."

Verwoerd then posed the question: "What is the use of teaching a Bantu child mathematics when he cannot use it in practice? There is no place for the African in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour. It is of no avail for him to receive training which has as its aim absorption in the European community." He later told a newsmen: "I do not have the nagging doubt of ever wondering whether perhaps I am wrong."

The implementation of the Bantu Education Act in 1954 led to widespread student boycotts and stayaways. However, little was done by the government to attempt to identify the root causes of the problems and to find viable solutions. The first official document that emphasised the waste of human and material resources resulting from a racially segregated education system was the De Lange Report of 1981. Unfortunately, though, De Lange's recommendations were never implemented by the DET.

**Enormity of the Current Black Education Crisis**

The Soweto uprisings of 1976 were triggered by the demand by black pupils that Afrikaans be dropped as a medium of instruction at black schools. This was the beginning of a new era in black education, which was to be characterised by the spilling-over of traditional university protests and boycotts into schools. By the middle of the 1980s, the situation had so deteriorated that police action at black schools and universities had become the order of the day, resulting in heavy and sometimes even fatal casualties. According to the Black Sash, in 1987 alone approximately 42 percent of the black school leavers (about 300,000) pupils left school before reaching standard 3.

In September 1989, it was reported that, out of every 100 black pupils who started school in the early 1970s, only an average of 14 reached standard 10. Out of the R11,89 billion allocated to education in the 1989/90 budget, only R650 was spent on each black pupil, compared to 23,000 on each white pupil. This budget also included an allocation for tertiary education.

There is currently a shortage of 200 black schools in South Africa, while 210 white schools stand empty, because of lack of sufficient numbers of white pupils. Overcrowding, lack of pupil discipline, student politics, poor teacher quality, poor educational facilities such as inadequate classroom and laboratory equipment, poor salaries for teachers, and unequal government expenditure on black and white children have all contributed to the present crisis in black education.
The Witwatersrand University Education Policy Unit recently estimated that it would cost the government more than R20 billion to bring black education to par with white education. A breakdown of this figure included the construction of new black schools, the training of an additional 24,000 black teachers, and operating and maintenance costs for the schools. Among the demands currently being made by pupils and teachers are equal salaries for black and white teachers, and the introduction of one education system for all in the country.

At the time of writing this paper, black education had come to a virtual standstill in South Africa, largely because of the current teacher strike, which has now lasted for almost three weeks. This strike action by teachers followed a recent strike by pupils, which had itself lasted for more than one month. When one considers last year's appalling black matric results--a mere 42 percent pass rate among some 196,000 candidates who sat for the examination--it is not unreasonable to anticipate an even lower pass rate at black schools at the end of 1990. Absenteeism at black schools countrywide is currently estimated to be in excess of 72,000 pupils daily.

It is manifest that the current crisis in black education has reached enormous proportions, whose long-term negative effects are going to be extremely difficult to reverse. In my opinion, teachers should now change their tactics to ensure that the education of children is not unduly harmed. Teachers have a democratic duty to educate our children, whatever the cost may be. Society expects them to safeguard the children's rights to education, while they continue to make their just demands for equal rights. Negotiation and compromise are social skills that need to be learned and mastered by everyone who lives in an enlightened modern society.

Preparing Black South Africans for Careers in Science and Engineering

Scientific and technological education are the touchstone for economic and social development of any country. There currently exists a disturbing lack of scientists, engineers, and technicians in South Africa. One of the causes of this shortage may be ascribed to the "brain-drain." Information supplied by the Minister of Home Affairs, Gene Louw, confirmed that about 100,000 people left South Africa between 1984 and 1988. A sizeable proportion of these people had valuable skills in science and technology. A second cause is that the large unskilled or semi-skilled labour reservoir of almost 70 percent of the black population in South Africa is not being effectively trained and utilised to off-set the shortage of trained personnel in these disciplines.

Statistics of 1986 revealed that out of a total of about 15,000 professional engineers registered with the South African Council for Professional Engineers (SACPE), only 33 were black. According to the National Manpower Commission, there was a shortage of 40,500 people with technical, professional, and managerial skills in engineer-related disciplines in 1988 alone. The University of Stellenbosch Futures
Research has estimated that by the turn of the century South Africa will have a shortage of about 200,000 skilled workers in the technical field.

According to a March 1989 publication by the Scientometric Advisory Centre (SAC) of the Council for Industrial and Scientific Research (CISR), South Africa has a pool of about 163,800 professionals with technological and scientific backgrounds. The proportion of black professionals in these disciplines comprises less than one percent of this figure. In addition, out of a total of more than 100 consulting engineering firms in South Africa, only three are black.

The proportion of degrees awarded in various scientific fields to the total number of degrees (including fields like law, humanities, and education) that are awarded at South African universities in 1981 was computer science 1.84 percent; engineering and technology 4.62 percent; life and physical sciences 5.3 percent; and mathematics 1.49 percent. This means that degrees awarded in the scientific disciplines at South African universities account for only about 13 percent of the total number of degrees awarded. Again, only a very small proportion of these goes to blacks.

In 1986, the overall pass rate of black students in first year engineering at Wits University was only 18 percent of the total of blacks enrolled at this level, which is a shocking statistic. This, together with the foregoing submissions, tend to confirm the thesis that the root of the problem is at the school level.

Wits University has attempted to solve this impasse by introducing a Pre-University Bursary Scheme, which first prepares black students for university entrance after matriculation. ASPECT (Academic Support Programme for Engineering in Cape Town) at Cape Town University has recently adopted a similar approach. These projects are funded by a variety of big corporations that require technical skills in South Africa and appear to be succeeding in increasing the pass rate in engineering among black students. One apparent disadvantage inherent in this programme is that the funding companies seem to compel the black students they support to go along this route to acquire an engineering degree, however capable that student might be. This implies that the student is destined to spend five years doing the B.Sc. engineering degree instead of the standard four years.

An independent group that has also been recently founded to assist in preparing black South Africans for careers in science and engineering is SEASA (Science and Engineering Academy of S.A.), which was established in Johannesburg by concerned black graduates in 1986. SEASA is a voluntary professional association whose members are students, graduates, and professional personnel in science, technology, or engineering. Though SEASA focuses on promoting interest in science and engineering largely within the ranks of the black community, it is nonracial, with a growing membership of white students, graduates, and professional groups.

The unique feature of SEASA as a professional voluntary association
is that it conducts Saturday tuition for school children from standards 7 to 10 in mathematics and science subjects. The children normally attend school elsewhere and only attend SEASA tuition on Saturdays. A team of professional graduates has been assembled to give the tuition. The programme has been described as one of the most promising in the country, having a student enrollment of over 1,000 annually. The average pass rate of SEASA pupils at matric has always been between 15 and 25 percent above the national average. A number of black students who did the SEASA course graduate at university with top marks every year.

Other independent tuition projects that concentrate on preparing black students for scientific or technical careers are SEP (Science Education Project), STEP (Science and Technology Programme), Star Schools, and Protec (Programmes for Technological Careers). All of these projects have been largely successful.

There are more than 6,000 school children attending the SEASA type of Saturday tuition conducted by various organisations at Wits University at this present moment. This number has increased steadily over the past months, as a result of the worsening education crisis in black schools. Speculation is that this will eventually lead to the opening of affordable private schools owned by the Saturday tuition organisations, in order to reduce pupil dependency on state school tuition, with its never-ending problems.

Need for Manpower Development in Science and Technology: Economic and Social Realities

As has already been mentioned, blacks in South Africa have been able to achieve mainstream success only in limited professional areas. A sound technical education, coupled with a dedicated resolution genuinely to address social and political problems, stands a good chance eventually to create the right climate for improved economic growth.

While the economic growth of Japan, the United States, Canada, and the FRG has been around three percent for some time now, South Africa's has been below 0.1 percent. The economic growth rate of a country is dependent on the proportion of its technical and scientific skills. For degrees awarded in natural science and engineering as a percentage of total degrees awarded: France 48.1 percent; U.K. 35.6 percent; FRG 30.7 percent; Japan 22.2 percent; U.S. 16.9 percent; and South Africa 13.0 percent.

It is therefore not surprising that there is currently a chronic and near-crisis shortage of technically skilled manpower in South African industry, particularly in the areas of design, production, maintenance, and manufacturing. Electronic equipment (e.g., computers), telecommunication systems, scientific equipment, heavy machinery (e.g., agricultural), motor vehicles, are all largely imported from overseas, notably from Japan, the United States, Canada, and Europe.
South Africa has about 12 universities and 13 technikons, with a total student population of some 200,000. There are 46 professional disciplines that may be followed by the engineering technician at technikons. These include, for example, building engineering, ceramics technology, surveying, draughtsmanship, electrical, civil, and mechanical engineering, refrigeration, welding engineering, industrial instrumentation, ventilation and air-conditioning, machine tools, and metallurgy.

Urgent steps must be taken to promote these technical disciplines within the ranks of the black population if the present demand for skills is to be adequately, as well as timeously, met. The present move to seek genuine and lasting political reform in South Africa should contribute positively towards increasing the scientific and technical skills pools in the country eventually.
Vocational guidance and counselling, like any other areas of human concern in South Africa, are intensely political. If we were to locate vocational guidance within the present educational context, we would make the following assumptions: it is not neutral; it reinforces the status quo; and it reflects the interests of the present economic order and structures in society.

With the Soweto uprising of 1976, South Africa was faced with a serious crisis in black education. It signalled the total failure of Bantu education and the rejection of the educational system by the oppressed black majority. This student revolt ushered in an era of militant student politics. The emphasis shifted from the politics of protest to the politics of challenge. The school and education have become an important site of struggle for fundamental social change.

During the aftermath of 1976, the Careers Research and Information Centre (CRIC) was established as a direct response to the needs of students and teachers in the Western Cape. Students in particular were looking for information on sources of financial support and entrance requirements at institutions of higher education as well as the world of work. A counselling component was also added to the information service catering for the individual needs of students. CRIC was the first nongovernmental, nonformal, nonracial, privately funded vocational guidance centre to focus on the provision of an alternative guidance service to the black community.

From its humble beginnings in 1977 as an information and counselling service under the auspices of a community organisation known as the Foundation for Social Development, it has developed into a dynamic and progressive independent, nonformal education resource and training centre with seven interrelated projects under its umbrella. The basic aim of CRIC is to assist people in general and youth in particular to make more informed decisions about work and education within the South African context.

The various projects in CRIC are organised into two major areas—educational outreach and research and development. Regular contact is maintained with schools in the urban and rural areas as well as institutions of higher education through visiting and the coordination of programmes at these institutions. The outreach arm also provides CRIC with a mechanism that enables it to keep its finger on the community pulse and respond to the expressed needs of the community and the research and development component to produce appropriate and relevant educational aids and materials in the form of posters, booklets, and pamphlets. This assistance is needed because most of the materials produced and the methodologies implemented are based on the European,
British, and North American experience of vocational guidance. We need to develop an indigenous model of guidance in South Africa that takes into account the socio-political realities.

The project foci range from work experience in urban and rural areas, counselling, information production and dissemination, to educational outreach that trains trainers and provides a consultancy service to community-based organisations. An important component of CRIC's outreach into rural areas is its distance-counselling project. Through letter-answering, CRIC responds to requests from as far afield as Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Malawi that range from careers information to setting up a resource library. CRIC also presents educational programmes on concepts such as leadership, decision-making, trade union education, unemployment, gender discrimination, and other social problems. In dealing with these issues, CRIC is responding to current needs as well as the broader socio-political environment.

Guidance as a subject was only implemented in so-called coloured schools in the early 1970s and in African schools in the early 1980s. The guidance syllabus is divided into four sections—personal, social, educational, and vocational. The allocation of time for the guidance period is an issue of serious concern to us at CRIC. For example, there are 40 school periods per year of 35 minutes each, which means that 24 hours per year is devoted to every class. If there is an average of 40 students per class, it means that a meagre 36 minutes is spent on each student per year. How does one prepare students for their future in 36 minutes, given the complexities of the South African situation? The time constraint also makes it extremely difficult for the teacher to give qualitative counselling to individual students and to monitor their progress.

Therefore, the extra-curricular programmes for students and teachers have become an important educational resource. As a teacher at one of CRIC's teacher workshops commented: "If it wasn't for the CRIC experience, I would never have coped with teaching guidance." And a comment from a student: "The workshop not only made me aware of the various career options open to me and how to get there, but it also gave me a sense of self-confidence."

These two quotes indicate the value of the CRIC service to students and teachers alike. The workshops also add another dimension—shattering racial stereotypes. As a nonracial education resource centre, CRIC invites students and teachers from African, so-called coloured, Indian, and white schools to attend week-long vacation workshops that focus on career awareness and options. For the majority of black and white students, it is the first time that they come into contact with their peers. After the initial reserve has been broken, open and honest discussions about apartheid and its devastating effects on the lives of black people ensue, with black students displaying a heightened sense of political awareness. This is hardly surprising since the black schools are in the forefront of the struggle for liberation; however, this is also a forum in which friendships across the colour line are formed.
We have found it necessary to respond in this particular way because the existing guidance syllabus is not only outdated, but concerns itself primarily with the inculcation of values and attitudes that reinforce socio-economic inequalities. It does not take into account issues such as unemployment, the high school drop-out rate, rural-urban disparities, gender discrimination, or technological development. Some of the critical issues that face black students at any level when they leave school.

An estimated 200,000 students approximately drop out of school during the first four years of education. The problem is compounded by the fact that guidance is a nonexaminable subject within the education system. As a result, it has a very low status amongst teachers as well as students. The guidance period is generally regarded as a free period. Unfortunately, the "space" that readily lends itself to educational innovation is not utilised to its maximum. Consequently, the majority of black youth is ill-informed and inadequately prepared for the world of work and higher education. Our counsellors have come across students in their final year of secondary school who are still undecided about their future career. This means that one of our most important resources—our youth—is being wasted.

Furthermore, in the Western Cape, where over 60 percent of South Africa's co-called coloured population is located, the legacy of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy, which was officially scrapped in September 1984, placed severe constraints on the work and educational opportunities of African students in this area. In essence, this policy was a racially hierarchical division of labour. African workers were restricted to unskilled occupations, co-called coloureds to unskilled and semi-skilled jobs, and white employees occupied most of the skilled jobs. This policy was aimed at placing co-called coloured workers at a distinct advantage to Africans through the strict enforcement of African influx controls and the "ultimate elimination of Natives" from the Western Cape, as was declared by Eiselen, permanent secretary for Native Affairs in 1955. The retraction of this policy did not signify a turnaround in Nationalist policy. The system of controls over Africans in the Western Cape with regard to housing, employment (and unemployment), and citizenship become more sophisticated and gave the state greater flexibility in its application. CRIC, based in the Western Cape, could not remain aloof to these inequities.

Despite policy restrictions, African students were encouraged to aspire to skilled jobs. CRIC believed that, by showing students the "greener pastures," they would want to break out of traditional career patterns. The political developments of 1976, 1980, and 1985 assisted this process of breaking with conventional career choices such as teaching and nursing. These two professions up to this day make up more than 80 percent of the African professional class. Black professional role models also played a limited but important role in this process.

Therefore, a relevant vocational guidance service is needed to
respond to the short-, medium-, and long-term human resources needs of a post-apartheid South Africa, which will be free of all forms of discrimination. This presupposes a particular kind of social order, based on democratic ideals. This order and its economic implications need to be defined in order for vocational guidance to be functional within the present context and also to contribute to the process of fundamental social change.

The present unequal and differentiated education system (at last count there were approximately 17 different departments) has systematically deskilled and disempowered the vast majority of the black population. In 1985, only 0.1 percent of engineers, 7.4 percent of accountants and auditors, and 3.6 percent of agriculturalists were black (this term includes Africans, so-called coloureds, and Indians). There is not a single black train driver or aeronautical engineer. On another level, it is estimated that a staggering 68 percent of black adults are illiterate and innumerate.

This not only has a serious negative effect on the productive capacity of the economy, it also means people cannot even participate fully in a democratic form of government. Another area of concern is the acute technical skills shortage and the attitude of students and their parents towards manual labour. During the last three years, enrollment at technikons, technical colleges, and universities averaged about 43,000 students, of which three percent were black. Of 11,573 apprenticeships registered in 1985, 80 percent were whites and six percent blacks.

At present there are over 50,000 black teachers without the minimum requirement of a matriculation certificate. This situation is exacerbated by the endemic crisis in black education; however, this does not mean that we should adopt a purely technicist approach to the human resources problem. Although it is evident that we need highly skilled manpower in the professional and technical areas, we need to develop a cadre of professionals with an alternative social consciousness. These new professionals must be able to balance the call of their career with the call for social justice. CRIC is strategically located to intervene at this level by making students aware of the need to become community-responsive through raising questions with regard to conventional attitudes towards careers in the South African context. This is done through the materials that we produce and the educational programmes that we coordinate for students.

An area that CRIC has not been able adequately to address, because of limited resources, is unemployment. Scientists and educators are painting an extremely grim scenario with regard to the problem of structural unemployment in South Africa, where it has reached frightening proportions. In 1981, there were two million Africans unemployed; five years later the figure was somewhere between four and six million. If the figure is as high as six million, then it means that 48 percent of the African working population and 25 percent of the total population is without work. A serious development in unemployment in the 1980s is the growing number of unemployed youth. In 1985, an estimated 70 percent of
African workers under the age of 25 were without work in Port Elizabeth; 65 percent of unemployed so-called coloured workers in Cape Town were between the ages of 16 and 25. To date, it is estimated that over half the African school-leavers across the country were unable to find work.

This is not difficult to imagine when one realises that approximately 400,000 new people enter the labour market each year to compete for fewer and fewer jobs. Most dramatic, however, is the difference between urban and rural areas. In the so-called homelands, rural areas have an estimated rate of unemployment double that of urban areas. This can be ascribed to the government's policy of dumping the unemployed in the so-called homelands. In 1986, an estimated 55 percent of working people in the so-called homelands were without jobs.

Furthermore, we have a situation where an estimated 70 percent of primary school students and 60 percent of secondary school students are in the rural areas. What fate awaits these students, given the lack of economic infrastructure in the rural areas? Other than farm labour and domestic work, the limited options that the privileged few have are teaching, preaching, and social work. CRIC has an extensive education outreach programme in the rural areas— including the farm schools— providing appropriate and contextualised information and skills training programmes on work and education for students and teachers. Students in particular have been trained to organise and run skills training programmes for their peers. Topics include such issues as drug and alcohol abuse, teenage pregnancy, and survival skills. Most of these students on the farm schools have to walk distances of up-to-ten kilometres in order to get to school.

Conventional vocational guidance and counselling had to be adapted to respond to the specific needs of our audience in rural areas as CRIC has been able to do since its inception in response to the socio-political situation concerning South Africa's education crisis.

CRIC has also identified the area of higher education, in particular the universities, technikons, and teacher training colleges, as important points of intervention. There is very little communication between the educational world and the world of work. Consequently, teachers are unaware of the rapid developments in the workplace.

At the request of the University of the Western Cape and one of the teacher training colleges in the Cape Town area, CRIC became involved in teaching guidance in a more formal context to student guidance teachers. This enabled CRIC to address the problem of inadequate teacher training in the field of vocational guidance at a more primary, preventative level, disseminating skills and information to prospective students before they enter the formal schooling system. As mentioned before, because guidance is a nonexaminable subject, there is a "space" that allows teachers to experiment and implement some of the ideas and concepts that they have gained from the CRIC teaching experience. This initiative proved to be extremely successful and CRIC will be providing ongoing support to institutions concerned in planning their guidance...
curriculum. This will ensure that prospective teachers will be adequately equipped to deal with some of the issues facing our youth when they leave school.

This is also a recognition of the important work that a community-based organisation such as CRIC is doing and the need to integrate this experience and knowledge into the formal educational setting. Community-based organisations—in which a commitment to democratic principles exists—are creators of networks that carry new ideas and innovative practices from one site to many others. These networks, which are informal, flexible, and highly efficient, represent a new way of carrying forward the general process of social change.

Interacting in and with these organisations opens up new vistas and methodologies where alternatives are debated. These organisations can also be seen as the training ground for the nation, whereby groups of people are initiated into policy and management issues and making decisions that would effect their future. This makes education a more meaningful process for those involved in it.

In conclusion, I believe that we are faced with an exciting challenge, especially in the educational arena. We need to develop strategies that would link the present reality with the future vision of a nonracial, nonsexist, democratic South Africa.
It is really a pleasure to be here this afternoon. For the last month we have travelled through the United States, and we have been overwhelmed by the hospitality, interest, support, and encouragement for our work in South Africa. We are most grateful for this affirmation. Foremost in this regard has been the Institute of International Education and particularly Ann Micou who cannot be here today as she is on a working visit to South Africa.

We are pleased to have this opportunity to express our gratitude to the IIE. Our trip has been sponsored by USAID in South Africa, and we are thankful to them for this opportunity to learn and share with people in America.

Education for black South Africans is a vital and complex issue. The vastness of this topic, the limitations of our understanding of it, and the brief time we have together this afternoon make it only possible for us to discuss with you a small fraction of our situation as people working in educational aid.

We believe that education for black South Africans is a vital key that may be used to unlock the doors of transformation and development in our country. The slogan of the Catholic Educational Aid Programme is "Education for Transformation." We have chosen these words to express our conviction that, by providing more educational opportunities for disadvantaged black youth, they may develop the leadership skills that will enable them to be effective agents of change.

The political situation in South Africa will change one day. We are working for that future so that black South Africans will have the professional, management, and leadership skills to guide us through the reconstruction of our society in the post-apartheid era.

The educational crisis in South Africa is highly complex. The history of black education in our country is an unhappy one. It dates back to 1652, when the first European colonists landed at the Cape of Good Hope. They brought with them values and systems alien to the indigenous people who lived in those parts. The established social, political, economic, and cultural heritage of the indigenous black people was dismissed as primitive and savage. This denied the rather obvious fact that these communities had led perfectly full and satisfactory lives before colonisation.

By forcing Western European values on the indigenous people of South Africa, the colonists actively promoted the view that these communities were inferior. From this point on, the educational system was designed
to give black people enough knowledge so that they could be economically useful to whites, but too little ever to challenge their domination.

Education in South Africa today is somewhat more sophisticated, but is underpinned by the same crude strategies. There are different educational systems for white, so-called coloured, Asian, and black South Africans. The white school system is the best, the so-called coloured is rather mediocre, and that for blacks is blatantly inferior. State spending on school education is similarly arranged to favour whites.

This strategy, a cornerstone of apartheid, is embodied in law. It was designed to maintain black South Africans in an inferior position. This strategy has been very successful.

We believe that education is an intrinsic part of the political, economic, and social life of every community. Black South Africans have been legally robbed of any control over these sectors. The results for education have been disastrous.

However, twelve years ago in 1976 black high school students reached a saturation point. They rose up to defy the authorities who were implementing an educational system that was inferior, repressive, and, ultimately, enslaving. Again in 1980 and 1984 black South African youth rebelled against the inequality of their education.

Despite a continuing high level of state repression, the education crisis has seen ongoing resistance to the laws and systems designed to prevent black South Africans from attaining the decent education to which we believe all human beings are entitled.

We live in this situation. Our dilemma in South Africa is to develop strategies that respond, at least in part, to these problems. In developing our response we are constantly aware of the belief that we should not be involved in educational aid at all. We are convinced that the provision of an educational system that is equal for all, adequate, stimulating, and designed to develop the gifts and talents all young people is the role of the state. At this moment the South African government has not shouldered that responsibility.

We have a choice. We can passively observe this, complain about it, and mourn the loss with our youth, or we can take stock of the situation and involve ourselves positively and actively in the vital and complex issue of education for black South Africans.

Two years ago we started a small scholarship programme based in the metropolitan area of Cape Town. The Catholic Educational Aid Programme is a project of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Cape Town. It is a nonideological, nondenominational, nonracial, and nonsexist organisation. We aim to develop a model of a small scholarship programme that provides, not only financial assistance, but also a student counselling component designed to foster the development of disadvantaged youth as whole people in the fullness of their intellectual, social,
political, and economic capacities.

If we look a little tired to you, it is because this is a mighty ambitious task!

When we started our programme in 1987, we naively imagined that providing money for fees, writing materials, uniforms, and transport constituted a scholarship fund. These items remain a pressing need; however, it did not take long for us to realise that money is simply not enough. We are dealing with high school students from very disadvantaged homes. Locked into the cycle of poverty, they live in township ghettos meant exclusively for black people.

The vicious nature of poverty creeps into every aspect of township life. These places have a high crime rate. Unemployment is staggering. Teenage pregnancy, alcohol abuse, and dropping out of education are common. Many people are clinically depressed. The multiproblem family is the rule rather than the exception.

It is in this context that young blacks go to school. The schools themselves are riddled with problems. Many teachers are not well qualified. There is a critical shortage of skilled teachers of English, mathematics, and physical science. Classrooms are overcrowded. Very often there are not enough text books. Laboratory facilities and libraries hardly exist. Sporting grounds are at best pathetic. This is not an ideal climate for good education.

This harsh environment is made tougher by rigid control over schools to attempt to squash student rebellion. Student leaders are often victimised, expelled, or detained. Many live on the run.

Often there are problems between the student and parents. Although most parents see the education of their children as very important, many have themselves had very little education. They are not always aware of the needs of the school-going child to study at home as well as at school. Many parents perceive education as something that happens only at school.

Even where parents do understand the needs of their school-going children, poverty can prevent them from providing what is required. A desk and a study lamp for one student in a twelve-member family living in three rooms is an unheard-of luxury.

Parents who are lucky enough to have jobs usually work long hours. Black high school students have many family responsibilities. They care for siblings, shop, cook, and clean the home. There is little time for homework or sport.

The result of this horrific situation is that the disadvantaged generally remain disadvantaged. Many drop out. Those who complete their schooling are badly educated and seriously underprepared for further education and life itself. Lack of exposure to career and vocational
counselling greatly limits the choices students can make. Poor English and weak tuition in maths and science means that few can choose technological careers.

Our funds are very limited. At present we can reach only 110 high school students. In the tertiary level programme, we work with an additional 210 students at university, technical, and teacher training colleges. We are assisting these few individuals to complete their high school education competently, to work out some of their psycho-social problems, and to be better prepared for higher education. A university degree can give them greater skills that they can share with the community, serving as leaders and role models. They may make a difference in the South Africa of the future.

Tackling this ambitious task is not easy. At present we start supporting students at the Standard 8 level, which is three years from completion of high school. This, we believe, is too late; we plan to change this in future.

Our programme provides the obvious resource of money. With it comes regular personal contact with students. Those with fewer problems are interviewed quarterly, others monthly, and some more often than that. We are available five days a week for consultation with students. The counselling process focuses on the problems and needs identified by the student. The counsellor is a catalyst in this process. Together student and counsellor seek problem-solving intervention strategies.

The problems are very varied. They range from difficulties with academic work to family concerns and the challenges of adolescence in a harsh society. Some students just need to talk to somebody they trust and to air their frustrations.

We refer students to career guidance resources and advise of curriculum choice for specific career objectives. We arrange for groups to attend supplementary classes in the winter and spring vacations. We encourage students to evaluate the usefulness of these resources and to suggest changes where necessary.

On a limited scale we are experimenting with new intervention strategies. At the moment we have a student undergoing an intensive audio-visual mathematics programme designed to remedy past deficiencies and produce competence.

We want to tell you briefly about our work with three students. The first is a Standard 9 pupil who has been actively involved in student organisation. At the beginning of this year he was refused reentry to the high school at which he successfully completed three years. No reasons were given either to him or us by the education authorities. During the period he was attempting to be admitted to other schools, he was arrested and detained for one month. On his release we arranged for a full medical check-up by our doctor and appropriate treatment was given. We successfully negotiated for him to be admitted to a so-called
coloured school and found him adequate living accommodation near to this school. We see this student at his own request once every three weeks. He is making good progress.

The second student is an extremely gifted young man who failed three of his six final exams. This year he has been attending night school to improve these results. Clearly this was not enough to keep him stimulated and occupied. When he expressed a keen interest in computers, we arranged for him first to learn to type and then to go to a computer school. His results in three computer courses have been A's. Today he has a skill.

The last student is a promising young woman who battled strangely with school work. It emerged in the counselling process that for many years her life has been shadowed by violent headaches. Her treatment at the local black day hospital was limited to the equivalent of aspirin, which never relieved the pain. Our doctor found her to be suffering from migraines, and after three months of treatment her performance has improved enormously.

We are not a conventional scholarship fund.

Today we are planning for the future of our programme. We believe in counselling, and we have seen programmes here in America that are doing this work very well.

We need to start working with students when they first enter high school. That is the time to work out a strategy for the entire high school period. We want to provide more counselling, academic supplements, and career guidance. In this way we hope to assist black students to get more out of high school, achieve better grades, and have more choices in every aspect of their lives.
THE COMMUNITY COLLEGE OPTION:  
A PRIVATE SECTOR/COMMUNITY INITIATIVE TO BREAK THE EDUCATIONAL LOGJAM

Stan Kahn

The Structure of Funda Centre

The Funda Centre was built by the Urban Foundation as an educational response to events of 1976. The planning began in the late 1970s and the buildings were completed in November 1983. According to its mission statement, it "aims to give new meaning and value to education in the African community. Its purpose is to develop leadership for social reconstruction. It strives to do this by drawing on resources to innovate in educational and cultural programmes through its components."

The Centre comprises a suite of seven buildings, set on six-and-a-half hectares of land, and houses a range of independent projects, grouped around common interests, called components, of which there are four. The buildings house the administrative and teaching functions of these projects, which are fully autonomous, each from the others and all of them from the Centre itself. This independence covers every aspect of their work, from governance, management, and conception of educational issues with which they wish to deal, through to fundraising, staffing, and entrance and exit qualifications (if any) of the students they teach.

This independence was guaranteed and secured before the projects entered Funda and was, for some of them, a condition of their entry. The only screening applied to projects wishing to use Funda facilities is that they must be educational, tightly interpreted, and they should focus on either teacher upgrading or adult education, defined in broadest possible terms. The four components are the Teachers' In-Service Training Centre; the Adult Education and Training Resource Centre; the Teacher's Centre; and the Art Centre. Their projects are organised as follows:

The Teachers' In-Service Training Centre (TITC). This contains projects that are linked to the Department of Education and Training (DET): a Science Education Centre, which provides primary and high school teachers with both strengthened subject knowledge and methodology; the Soweto offices of Read, a nationwide school library and literacy project; an English upgrade project, whose focus is senior secondary school teachers' ability to teach literature more effectively; and a number of senior school DET subject advisors and a few subject-based teacher groupings.

The Adult Education and Training Resource Centre. This is the base for a wide range of activities that provide life and work skills to adults, including projects in broad-based adult education and research; liaison between blue collar training courses and prospective students; teaching negotiating skills and offering mediation services; English
second language (ESL) improvement aimed at middle school teachers; small business skills education; tutorial assistance for post-secondary education distance learners; and adult literacy working in the migrant labourer hostels of Soweto.

The Teacher's Centre (TC). The projects housed in the TC have as their genesis the voluntary associations of teachers, rather than the DET, as is the case in the TITC. The TC includes a Teacher's Centre, based on the British model; ESL aimed at lower primary teachers' ability to use English; and pre-primary/educare training.

The Arts Centre. This provides a base for projects in drama and theatre; music; fine arts; and community-based photographic and video documentation.

In addition, Funda Centre provides a library, which houses a post-secondary school collection; a large auditorium, available for education-related activities; and a canteen, which is run as a small business by an entrepreneur for his own account.

Each component has a coordinator and a secretary, paid for from the central Funda budget, whose task is to run a User Group Committee (UGC). UGCs are made up of representatives of every permanent project housed in a particular component. In addition to these members, UGCs are required to have 40 percent of their membership drawn from outside the permanent, full-time projects of that component. The UGCs are cross-represented, each on every one of the others, and the Executive has a representative on all UGCs. UGCs run the business of the component. The Projects maintain their autonomy, but cooperate where they deem it appropriate.

The next level of administration comprises the Administrative Executive Committee (AEC) and a proposed Educational Policy Committee (EPC). In the AEC, two representatives and the Coordinator of each UGC sit together with an Executive Director of the Centre to discuss bread-and-butter issues of the Centre. The AEC is specifically excluded from dealing with the educational content of the projects. There has been a proposal to set up a body in which educational issues would be discussed, but this contemplated education policy committee has not taken off because support has been withheld by some projects that see it as an encroachment on their independence.

The owner of Funda Centre is its Board of Directors, which is comprised of two representatives from each of the four UGCs; two from the Urban Foundation; three community educators; one from the DET; two sponsors; one chairman; and two executive co-directors. The governance of Funda is thus heavily biased in favor of representation of the projects. The legal form of the Centre is a company registered as an association not for gain.

Because of the autonomy of the projects, the size of their budgets is not known. An estimate of the 1989/90 expenditure of projects is between
five-and-a-half and six million rand. For the same period, the Board has a budget of one-and-a-half million rand.

The advantages that flow from the structure just described are—in South Africa in general and in Soweto in particular—environmentally very important. The Centre has survived where other initiatives have not. Funda is used by about 1,000 people each day. During the 1984-1986 phase, it was the only post-primary educational institution in Soweto that was not shut down by community action.

The structure, however, does not deliver unambiguously positive results. The projects have variable capacities to yield educational products that serve the needs of the learners. Some students, coming from a school system where disruption has been the norm since 1976, do not really know what they need or, indeed, what they want. They seize any opportunity to learn, without evaluating its capacity to contribute to their future.

In the case of Funda, this means that some students have defined as formal what was intended to be nonformal. As a consequence, some projects have tried to fill the need, but they are just not geared for the delivery of formal education. The high degree of independence the projects enjoy does not contribute to their ability to meet student needs. The results are students whose needs are not being met and, ultimately, an impoverished society.

The South African Post-Secondary Educational Scene

Since Funda seeks to act in the nonformal post-secondary arena, a brief overview of this domain is indicated. In South Africa, academic study is handled by universities, of which there are probably too many, because of the racially determined motivation that for almost 40 years governed their establishment, their administration, and their admission policies. It was government policy to found a university for every "ethnic group."

This led to a proliferation of universities, while there was a simultaneous, relative neglect of other post-secondary educational avenues. The provision of technical and vocational education for all "racial" groups was selectively and badly planned and implemented, and is reflected in the statistics for total post-secondary registrations: Some 420,000 students are currently enrolled at higher-education institutions—300,000 at universities, 68,000 at technikons, and 53,000 at teacher-training colleges (J. File, "Nature," Vol. 341, 1989, p. 97).

Universities are by far the most prestigious post-secondary institutions, and there is a bias against vocational and technical education (J. Dreijmanis, "The Role of the South African Government in Tertiary Education, SAIRR, 1988, p. 21). This preference is generalised throughout most of the population qualified for tertiary education.

The various types of educational institutions do not articulate well,
or even at all, with each other. The segments of the tertiary system are completely self-contained, and students start and finish, with few exceptions, in one institution or the other. There is no easy transfer of credits from one type of institution to any other.

Seen against the background of historical factors, such as Job Reservation legislation, and the coloured labour preference area in the Western Cape (both now repealed), as well as general, widespread discrimination in the broader society, the appeal of intellectual, high-status education can become an "obsession," unrelated to a realistic assessment of the rewards and opportunities that flow from it.

This attitude is reinforced by a weak secondary school system for blacks, acknowledged to be inferior, not just to the white school system, but also to the requirements of the universities, and results in a high first-year university failure rate. High failure rates apply to whites, too, and this particular problem is the subject of special programmes at most of the universities. These programmes attempt to allow the student to make best use of the university opportunity, and simultaneously enable the universities to derive maximum benefit from state, enrollment-driven, subsidy schemes that finance all the South African universities, the formulae for which are partially based on student success.

Potential white candidates for tertiary technical and vocational education have tended to shy away from the field, but because of the racially stratified world-of-work environment, they have been able to make occupational progress that would probably not have been possible in a more open society. Of course this has been noticed by black people, who might also have been strong candidates for such technical and vocational education. The perceived dignity attaching to university education has lured many potential black technical and vocational students to merely tolerable university degrees, and consequent career mediocrity.

Furthermore, the teachers at technical institutions represent a social group with whom entering black students do not feel comfortable. This further reinforces the distance of black students from such educational opportunities. In black society there are few technically trained people to act as role models, as well as a lack of knowledge of career opportunities based on technical training.

This negative attitude flies in the face of the demands of the black communities. There are services that are simply not available, because of the lack of training and proficiency, but for which there might well be a demand and an affordability. This does not take account of the requirements of the "white," First-World economy at all, which perennially complains of a "skills shortage," especially in technical areas.

While I understand that the above is significantly a racially based argument, I would ask that you bear with me for a little longer, since I am attempting to extract its development potential.
The Structure and Contribution of the Community College

In September and October 1988 I travelled across the United States as an Alan Pifer Fellow, visiting community colleges to assess the relevance of these institutions for Funda and for the South African educational scene. Community colleges are "American inventions" (T. Diener, Growth of an American Invention: A Documentary History of the Junior and Community College Movement, Greenwood Press, 1956), and they contribute a particular mix of level and purpose to tertiary education. Given the lacunae in tertiary education in South Africa, and the Funda structure, a restructuring of Funda as a community college could provide a new type of institution in a situation that is crying out for innovation, and that could do with an injection of unconventionality to solve a widely recognised problem.

Four areas of activity, and the relationships between them, emerge as the core of the community college contribution to tertiary education options available to learners in the United States--Adult Basic Education, Vocational and Technical Education, the College Division, and Community Service.

Adult Basic Education (ABE). This aspect of the work of community colleges relates to giving adults a "second chance," because of poor previous encounters with the formal school system, as well as providing recreational and nonformal adult education. Community colleges admit students with a very wide range of entrance levels. They provide courses for the entire range of adult education in the formal and nonformal sectors. The need for "second chance" education may be brought about by leaving the formal system functionally illiterate, in the worst case, or not having achieved a level of education with which the world of work can be successfully negotiated, at the better end of the spectrum. The ABE functions to bring students to a school leaving equivalence, enabling the students to have access to post-secondary education, if that is their goal.

Vocational Technical Education (Voc/Tech). In this division the entire range of technical and vocational courses, demanded by the environment in which the community college is located, is offered. For example, colleges in agricultural areas present courses appropriate to that environment, while colleges in cities where a particular industry is based offer courses tailored to requirements of the industry in question. These courses are characterised by a high degree of flexibility in course content, funding, and staffing, and a high degree of interaction between labour unions active in the occupation in question, management of that industry, and the academics teaching the courses.

Many of the staff used as instructors in this division of the community colleges are practitioners of the particular skill that they teach and are hired as part-time staff. This expertise, and the cooperation previously mentioned, keep courses up to date and relevant to occupational demands.
The College Division. This division of the community college movement deals with more traditional academic aspects of study. It admits students to two year "Associate" degrees in Arts or Science, after which students either go out to work or transfer to traditional four-year institutions. The reasons for starting at a community college, rather than going directly to the four-year institution, are multiple. Four-year institutions are more selective, and the weaker students find admission to the community college easier; community colleges are neighbourhood institutions, so residence costs are not incurred; and the costs per student at a community college are much lower than the cost per student at a four-year institution.

Community Service. The Community Service function is undertaken by community colleges in precisely the same manner as universities. Community colleges make their facilities accessible to the communities in which they are located, and the teaching staff of community colleges make their academic and practical skills available to those communities also. This makes community colleges community-oriented, not just by being in tune with the formal and nonformal educational needs, but also to the more practical space- and physical-resource needs of the communities in which they are located.

The final remarkable feature of community colleges that requires attention is the relationships between the various elements. Frequently courses taken in the ABE division of the community college are able to be transferred to the Voc/Tech division, and courses taken in the Voc/Tech sector can be used as credits in the college section. In states where the collaboration between the segments of the tertiary education system is well developed, the credits from community colleges can be applied to full degrees at state universities.

Students can test themselves at various levels in the post-secondary sphere, and if they find themselves unsuited to one kind of study they can transfer to another, within the community college, without having "failed." Thus community colleges have a discrete place in the panoply of post-secondary educational institutions, while being simultaneously integrated into the system.

Conclusion

By virtue of its location, the nature of its control, its scale of operation, and the high degree of acceptability that it enjoys, Funda is in a unique position to make a contribution to the broad educational development, not just of Soweto, but the country as a whole.

The tertiary educational domain in South Africa effectively stands on one leg--the university. The changing nature of the society demands that this imbalance be redressed. The community college option, were it to be explored at Funda, would address a number of concerns that the changing political reality, with its historical education antecedents, brings to the fore. This is the test that these times bring to Funda.
In this address, I would like to provide an organisational balance sheet after one year of existence; to discuss The Union of Democratic University Staff Associations (UDUSA)'s political role in the terrain of tertiary education; and to express some concerns and hopes for the future.

An evaluation of our achievements and failures

A ruthlessly frank self-evaluation is an indispensable condition for us to move forward effectively. In our case, such a self-evaluation will probably include more deficits than credits. Before we start confronting our shortcomings, it would be useful to survey what we have achieved and to bear in mind that we are only one year old. Let us not forget the tremendous struggles, the commitment, and the energy that it took to establish the organisation in the first place. This is not only because the individualism of intellectuals makes them difficult to organise, but also because of the divisions and conflicts generated by apartheid. The complex spectrum that we straddle is due to the divided nature of the society that we inhabit. That an organisation was established that is as comprehensive in its constituency as UDUSA and that is united behind a common political and educational agenda is an achievement that should not be glossed over. In taking stock of ourselves, it would be useful to keep in mind the political implications of getting the organisation off the ground in the first place.

At our launch in July 1988 we had 14 branches affiliated to us. A year later we have four new branches--Pretoria, Unisa, Potchefstroom, and Vista (Mamelodi). Despite the repressive attention of both university and "homeland" authorities, UNIBO and Fort Hare have remained within UDUSA. Since facilitating the organisation and consolidation of branches is one of our constitutional aims, we have made good progress in the past year.

We have a greater degree of organisational cohesion especially after our visit to Lusaka. This is due to the fact that the political legitimacy of the organisation, at least at a formal level, has been established more firmly. Through a commitment to the aims embodied in our constitution, UDUSA has signalled that it has chosen to be on the side of those struggling towards justice, democracy, and nonracialism in South Africa. Even though it will only be our praxis and our programme of action that can, in the final instance, legitimate our claim to be part of the progressive forces in this society, nevertheless, we have been formally acknowledged as an organisation that could take its place in the mass democratic movement. Our doubts, suspicions, criticism, and fears notwithstanding, we now seem to have the sense that we are an organisation whose successes or failures lie in our own collective efforts.
UDUSA is structured in such a way that, for it to be really effective, its constituent members must participate with integrity in order to further the aims of the organisation as a whole. It is the combined strength and commitment of the branches that constitute UDUSA. There is no leadership in the conventional sense in UDUSA that is separate from the branches. Certainly there are office bearers, but they are facilitators rather than decision-makers and policy-makers for the organisation. The organisation is structured in that way in order to be democratic. Branches need actively to seize and translate our democratic rights and responsibilities through placing before fellow participants in the executive council motions that reflect our concerns and interests. Branches have their own identities but, insofar as they are affiliated to UDUSA, it is their responsibility to propose the specific issues that are close to their hearts and commitments to lobby, to persuade, and to get the support of the others within the organisation. This is not an abdication of responsibility on behalf of the office bearers but, as far as I understand it, the way in which participatory democracy works.

Other achievements include opening up UDUSA to international contacts with equivalent academic organisations and unions; meeting with F.W. de Klerk concerning repression on university campuses, salaries, conditions of service, rationalisation and restructuring, the effects of conscription on the universities, and the terms of the Labour Relations Amendment Act; making considerable progress on the question of academic exchange through our own internal discussions, our consultations with NAMDA and other progressive internal organisations, and our clarification of this issue with the ANC; and holding a conference on rationalisation and restructuring on the basis of which we could move on to more specific and concrete action.

The second and more crucial aspect of this self-evaluation concerns what we have not done. We have not dealt seriously and systematically with the two major issues that ought to have been our primary concerns—repression and the democratisation of universities. Our failure to direct our organisational attention and resources to these two items has been largely responsible for:

- Our failure to develop a concrete programme of action;
- Our weak profile both on the campuses and outside;
- Our inability to generate initiatives on campuses that could promote our constitutional aim; and
- Our lack of focus and our rather fuzzy or perhaps even nonexistent politics.

Our failure to initiate a major campaign around repression must have been puzzling and disturbing not only to our colleagues within UDUSA who come from campuses where repression is severe but also to students and other sectors outside UDUSA. We have spent time, energy, and financial resources on the exchange issue and on rationalisation, which are,
without a doubt, vital issues that affect or will affect us all. However, the question of repression—which in its crudest and most direct way daily affects a sector of UDUSA but which in its various forms affects the entire university community—we have not yet confronted.

Why have we failed to address this urgent priority? It may be that there is a combination of reasons for our failure:

- Those who do not experience it directly and continuously have not experienced it as a priority;
- Those who are directly affected have not taken the lead in asserting it as a priority;
- The office-bearers have not taken the responsibility of putting it squarely on the agenda; and
- A lack of financial and administrative assistance within the organisation has prevented an effective follow through on the issue after the initial resolution at our first congress and a letter from the President thereafter requesting information from branches about repression.

Whatever the reasons for our lack of sustained attention to this issue, it is quite clear to me that a continuing failure in the coming year to address the question of repression as well as the issue of democratisation will severely damage the organisation's progressive potential if not destroy it completely. In any case, the value of whatever else the organisation does or achieves will be vitiated by our not mobilising around the issues of repression and democratisation.

**UDUSA's political role in the terrain of tertiary education**

The urgency of a programme of concrete tasks cannot be stressed enough for the sake of our political and educational legitimacy. In Lusaka it was indicated the UDUSA's tasks were seen as threefold:

- To carry the intelligentsia into the struggle;
- To develop a programme for the transformation of the universities; and
- To prepare a technically competent and committed intelligentsia.

Our response to these tasks is that the mass struggle is a cluster of specific as well as overlapping struggles. For UDUSA as an organisation, the most powerful and focused way to carry the university community into the struggle is to involve its members in the transformation of the university. This applies not only to the university where individuals are located, but in terms of the entire community of universities. Even though our constitution does commit us to struggles in society at large, our chief site of struggle is the universities and tertiary education.
Our primary political task is to work towards the transformation of the universities so as to facilitate an educational process that can produce citizens who can take their place in and sustain a democracy and democratic institutions.

To do this we need to embark on a common project that can be creatively applied, depending on the conditions prevailing at different campuses. The struggle to democratise our universities could be the beginning of the project of transformation. The university as an institution, both in its classical as well as its technocratic phases, is intended to realize the agenda of the ruling class. However, this agenda can be contested by different sectors of the university community; e.g., students and faculty. We need to pay rigorous attention to ways this can be achieved.

Democratisation will have to encompass different dimensions of a struggle to:

- Challenge and alter power relations at universities to enable all sectors of the university community to participate in decision-making. This struggle would also encompass the attempt to increase access to the university for all those who would benefit from its various activities, especially those who are, at present, structurally disadvantaged;

- Establish new teaching methods and course content that is appropriate to an alternative social order;

- Establish a greater and more organic relationship between the university and the community. In this respect questions like accountability, autonomy, and social responsibility will have to be addressed. The struggle to democratise the universities must link up with broader struggles to democratise other institutions and practices outside the university. Without this link, our internal struggles will, at best, run parallel to, but will not be enriched by, related struggles outside. At worst, we will become marginalised as a group that proclaims its own self-interests above and apart from those of others. As a first step, we urgently need to seek and formalize working alliances with progressive educational and other groupings.

The project of democratisation will have to be a two-pronged strategy that includes:

- A reactive aspect requiring us to struggle against forces like repression, authoritarianism, hierarchy, concealment of information, manipulation, and lack of autonomy. This aspect will have to take its cue from the specific conditions prevailing at each campus even though, at a national level, we must articulate some core set of principles that we could defend and around which we could mobilise. The responsibility for undertaking what are almost case studies of each university must lie primarily with the branches and the regional structures.
A proactive aspect involving the development of conceptualisations of an alternative model of an appropriate university for South Africa. This is an urgent national task for us since our challenge to existing practices and our struggles for democratisation can best be guided by the postulation of an alternative vision. As a start we could begin by drawing up a resource list of people within and outside of universities who are already working on issues like alternative curricula, academic support and development, admissions criteria, and "people's education." When more funding becomes available, such resource persons could be included in a formal UDUSA research project.

Further, a project of democratisation would enable us to address actively several of our constitutional aims (for example, the elimination of various forms of discrimination, the defence of academic freedom, the promotion of critical research and education, and the promotion of an equitable use of the resources of universities). The struggle for democratisation is already underway at many campuses; however, we need to make it a specific UDUSA concern for the coming year and find the most appropriate way of linking up with already existing initiatives being conducted on different campuses.

I now come to the question of repression, which most campuses experience in some form or other and which is therefore a matter of national concern for us. However, I want to focus on the stark forms of repression experienced at the black campuses, of which Turfloop is a standing reminder and symbol for us.

On our trip to Lusaka, something came to the surface that was organisationally problematic but politically quite understandable—a black university caucus developed. Before the launch we had worked through quite extensively a number of UDUSA issues concerning the interests of white universities and black universities, different agendas, and hidden agendas. Since our launch, because of our need to project a unified nonracial image, we have, in a sense, repressed the ways in which race and privilege continue to make us vulnerable to varying degrees, and different in our needs, priorities, and expectations. I would like to suggest that we address directly these differences among us, prioritise some of these differences, and make them a national concern. The question of what is going on at the historically black campuses is not an issue for those campuses alone, but for all of us in UDUSA. We must use the black university caucus from a position of strength within the organisation and in a way that demonstrates that the various forms of state, administrative, and academic repression that occur on the black campuses are a national priority in UDUSA's programme of action.

Focusing on the black universities in a specific project will enable us to deal directly with what is going on at these campuses. We need to establish the basic characteristics of how these universities function and to develop our strategies accordingly. Some of these characteristics are military and police presence; reactionary white or black administrative control; links with "homeland" governments; academic
control through the vetting of research; reactionary white and black academics; the role of subjects like Police Science in the production of functionaries for apartheid structures; small numbers of progressive staff often in junior positions and quite vulnerable to harassment; and heavy teaching and marking loads that leave academics with little time for research and allow the monopolisation of knowledge production by those at white universities.

As a response, UDUSA could, for example, do the following:

- Initiate or support campaigns to get the military and police off the campuses. One could galvanize the university community in this country and abroad into supporting these campaigns;
- Start a repression monitoring group;
- Provide or increase various forms of support for UDUSA branches at these campuses, perhaps through the regional structure;
- Encourage academics at these universities to theorize local struggles;
- Explore ways of reaching the rectors as well as senior academics at these universities, the latter perhaps through discipline-based associations.

A national UDUSA focus on the conditions at black universities will enable us to deal not only with the question of repression but with possibilities for democratisation as well at institutions where, up to now, most of the energy of progressive groups, such as they are, have been directed against repression.

The struggle for democratisation and against repression could constitute the basis of the politics of an organisation such as ours. It is the direction in which our constitutional aims point and it could encompass the expectations of progressive forces within and outside of the universities. Most importantly for us, it could furnish us with a sense of direction and a concrete programme of action for the coming year and thereafter.

Further, we ought not to overlook the mobilising potential of campaigns connected to salaries and conditions of service. We need to develop, as part of the struggle for democratisation, campaigns to address the material interest of our members. We must find ways of establishing what are legitimate financial and material aspirations for us, given the resources available in this country as a whole. The declining salaries and living standards of university personnel could be the basis for building solidarity with other groups instead of only leading to struggles for selfish advancement. However, we need to locate struggles concerning the material aspirations of our members within a broader political programme of action. One mobilising strategy could revolve around struggles towards a basic set of conditions of service and benefits for all universities. Another could be the attempt to expose
the perks resources available to senior administration and struggle for a more equitable distribution of these usually hidden resources.

Some concerns and hopes for the future

For UDUSA the pressure for a programme of action--for concrete and specific tasks, for activism--is an urgent and indispensable one and likely to be a constant claim on our resources. We are called upon to act in order to demonstrate our proclaimed commitments. This will require a critical examination of the terrain and the context that we inhabit and this context is likely to predominate as the object of our political and educational attention. Our projects and especially our research must include a serious measure of self-reflection on what defines us especially as a constituency: where we come from, what our interests are, and what is to be the precise nature of our relationship with other constituencies that may have similar commitment but different interests. No doubt some of these issues will be clarified in other of our projects that do not have self-knowledge as their primary agenda. But, in the long run, it would be unwise to let questions about our specific identity and interest as a constituency emerge only in a haphazard and unplanned way. Besides, our activism can be better grounded if it is based on a clarification of our role or roles as critical intellectuals in society. Our programme of action must include the dimension of critical reflection and self-reflection. In actual fact, it will have to find a balance between obsessive and narcissistic self-reflection and an inadequately reflected-upon activism.

In UDUSA up to now we have not directly addressed the issue of the role of academics and intellectuals except for a brief discussion in Lusaka, where it was important to indicate that critical intellectuals may be problematic for all governments and that they should be able to take their place not only in the struggle against apartheid but also in a post-apartheid society.

As producers and disseminators of knowledge, all intellectuals occupy a privileged position in society. Despite the progressive commitments of progressive intellectuals to the interest of "the majority" or to "the people" or to the black working class in this country, their own interests are not necessarily identical to the interests of those in the latter categories. As intellectuals who have organised ourselves into a progressive organisation, thus ranking ourselves with other progressive forces, we need to clarify the exact nature of our interests in order to establish an appropriate relationship between accountability on the one hand and claims to relative autonomy and critical distance on the other. Some of these interests may, on investigation, prove to be quite murky and even insupportable. But others, like the need to preserve a critical space within which to pursue the basic functions of knowledge production and reproduction, is an interest that ought to be consciously and continuously defended. This interest, however, though vital to the functioning of intellectuals, should be struggled for as part of a general struggle for a more democratic, nonauthoritarian, open society.
Reflection on the interests of intellectuals, the role of intellectuals, the relationship between accountability and autonomy, and between intellectuals and other sectors should be an essential part of UDUSA's programme of action as well as its ongoing concern as a specific constituency among the progressive forces in this country.

Within the organisation we straddle such a vast spectrum of ideologies and expectations that we are bound to have differing views about our roles, relationships, and tasks. We are therefore likely to make different and sometimes contradictory demands on the organisation. Through a commitment to the aims embodied in our constitution, we have signalled that intellectuals could be a resource for democratic struggle in South Africa. However, advancing the effective organisation of intellectuals as such a resource ought to be premised as much on nonsectarianism and the accommodation of plurality as unity and commonality of commitment. The commitment to democracy is a commitment both to a broad socio-political goal as well as to processes and means to achieve that goal. UDUSA's commitment to democracy must therefore encompass a tolerance of critical debate within the organisation. The building up of such a tradition can only strengthen the organisation in the long run.

My hope for UDUSA is that it continue to hold together as an organisation, grow stronger and better organised, set tasks for itself that address the interest of its members, and effectively organise intellectuals to take their place in the struggle for democratic political and educational goals. In the expectations that people have of UDUSA, both within it and outside, it would be appropriate to see us as a microcosm of the struggle for a transformed South Africa. We differ in race, language, and political and economic advantage. We are vulnerable to repression in different degrees. We inhabit and operate in an authoritarian culture and even within progressive parameters and have various ideological positions contending for our attention. Yet we have to work together democratically in order to achieve common goals, which is the real political challenge that confronts UDUSA. It is going to require us to go beyond rhetoric and to be based on a clear understanding of what is at stake and of what is necessary and, above all, on organisational strength, solidarity, and discipline.
The isolation of South Africa is a familiar theme at the United Nations and many other international forums and is in fact an integral part of the overall strategy of the ANC. During the past 20-odd years, there have been many attempts to deny South Africa access to sporting and cultural links, nuclear technology, as well as the free purchase of military hardware. Recently, more punitive actions have been employed, namely in the form of trade sanctions, and all these have been orchestrated by some external intervention to coerce the South African government to expedite a peaceful and negotiated settlement to the crisis of apartheid and white minority rule.

The world's revulsion against apartheid had made it relatively easy to extrapolate the isolation strategies to the allegedly apolitical world of academics--hence the inception of the academic boycott in South Africa. In the past few years there have been ever-increasing moves to isolate South Africa in medical, scientific, and other fields of academic pursuit, and, as the academic boycott has gained momentum, an increasing number of academic organisations abroad have begun restricting or terminating exchanges with South Africa. As a direct corollary of this I feel somewhat morally obliged to look at the arguments used by the proponents and opponents of an academic boycott.

Let us look at the reasons in favour of an academic boycott. It has been stated that the aim of the academic boycott is to help bring an end to apartheid and win back fundamental human rights. The mechanisms through which the academic boycott is supposed to promote this aim are as follows:

- By blocking the South African government's access to foreign information and expertise and thereby limiting its ability to maintain the present state of oppression;
- By adding to the cumulative effects of other isolation tactics thereby weakening the ruling bloc whilst strengthening the democratic opposition;
- By limiting any propaganda advantage that South Africa might gain from any international exchanges of any sort (visitors have frequently been used by the government in its ideological campaign aimed at reassuring its supporters morally and psychologically, while on the contrary the government has denied access to academics who might be critical of the racist system prevalent in South Africa);
- By denying South African academics such opportunities as studying abroad and attending international conferences, which would thus compel academics to confront more directly the problems of apartheid.
in their own institutions and in the country as a whole.

The world’s abhorrence of apartheid and the collusion of a large sector of the academics in the maintenance of the system have resulted in the academic boycott. The academic boycott is an established fact and its initiation and propagation were primarily based on political and moral imperatives.

Let us now look at the arguments used by the opponents of an academic boycott, and, just to be explicit, this is essentially the view of the racist regime and its collaborators:

- The first reason afforded is that the academic boycott is a political strategy and its intrusion into the allegedly apolitical world of academics is strongly opposed;
- The second reason presented is that the academic boycott is frequently opposed on the grounds that it contradicts the principle of academic freedom, the free exchange of knowledge, and the progress of science;
- The third reason presented is that the academic boycott will cause long-term harm to the academic institution in South Africa and will compromise the capacity of universities to respond to the long-term goals of education.

The three arguments presented would certainly have been justified in a normal society where no discrimination exists; however, in the South African context these are highly questionable. Justification of this statement emanates from the scrutiny of the above-mentioned reasons.

Political neutrality is one of the first reasons afforded against an academic boycott. Most blacks and progressive members of society believe that education is determined fundamentally by political and economic factors. More specifically, the wasteful fragmentation of education along racial lines, unequal access of different race groups to education, racially discriminatory training of students, and many similar examples all testify to the fact that apartheid is inimical to sound and proper education. We therefore believe that people involved in education in South Africa should have a moral obligation to contribute to change in South Africa.

Academic freedom is essentially the second ground of objection to an academic boycott. It is a view of the black academic sector as well as the other progressive members of society that academic freedom cannot simply be realised without the prior and prerequisite basic human freedom. A delineation between the two is certainly not acceptable because academic freedom can only be appreciated once human freedom needs are acceded to. It is a known contention that the progress and spread of science and knowledge in South Africa is fundamentally obstructed by the policy of apartheid. Arguably the priorities in terms of academic freedom lie in the areas of censorship, free speech, adequate schooling for all, the allocation of resources for education on an equitable basis,
and the elimination of any racist discrimination from the educational system. Of course, the absence of all of these other prerequisites for academic freedom is no reason for further restrictions that would be created by an academic boycott. What it does mean, though, is that it is morally inconsistent for academics to demand the unfettered international contact, on the one hand, if they are not also actively opposing the fundamental obstacles to scientific freedom and progress on the other. Furthermore, it is entirely consistent with a commitment to academic freedom that academics demonstrate their commitment to the basic issues in education and human rights.

It is thus evident, after a careful scrutiny of all the arguments, that an academic boycott is a necessity to add to the cumulative effects to coerce the state and its collaborators to expedite a peaceful and negotiated settlement to the crisis in South Africa.

However, a total academic boycott, applicable to one and all, may be catastrophic in that it could lead to a retrogression of the academic standards beyond any redemption. What is envisaged is a selective academic boycott applicable to the conservatives and the state collaborators, on the one hand, and a linkage between United States institutions and disadvantaged academics as well as those who have sincere convictions towards a democratic South Africa, on the other.

The disadvantaged academics are those essentially associated with black universities, while the progressives are the ones linked to the more liberal white campuses. A dire need for the said linkage thus exists; however, a "gate-keeping" role will have to be in existence. In South Africa this may be possible through the Union of Democratic University Staff Associations (UDUSA), which has branches on those campuses where academic members have sought affiliation, and it may be fair to say that these organisations would be able to decide judiciously on eligible participants in the linkage program.
Background

In order for any discussion on education in South Africa to make sense, it is necessary to establish some basic understanding of the structure of the educational system operating in the country.

There are four so-called "independent" states and six self-governing states in South Africa. Each of these states manages its own education system. In what remains of South Africa, there are four further departments of education: one for each of the groups classified as African, white, Indian, and so-called coloured. Each of these education departments is responsible to a specific Minister of Education. This means there are four Ministers of Education. However, because of the tricameral political system, two problems emerge:

- While education is regarded as an "own" affair (i.e., to be controlled by the Parliament for that specific race group), parts of the system are common to all departments and these parts are regarded as "general" affairs (e.g., policy, salaries). This, therefore, requires an additional minister who coordinates education matters and is responsible for national policy.

- Since African people have no political representation, a white minister is given the portfolio of African education. This department is called the Department of Education and Training (DET).

Apart from the independent or self-governing states, there are therefore five Ministers of Education in South Africa. Separate departments are meant to supply equal but separate education to the South African population, a task the United States Supreme Court found to be impossible. The following tables tell the story of the disparity in the provision of education in South Africa:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
<th>Enrollment Sub A to Std 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>4,911,000</td>
<td>954,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>27,271,000</td>
<td>6,644,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>913,000</td>
<td>234,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>3,069,000</td>
<td>812,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,164,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,648,678</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Carstens 1988, p 5)
The table on the previous page shows that African pupils make up 76.9 percent of the school population, while whites make up 11 percent, so-called coloureds, 9.4 percent, and Indians, 2.7 percent.

The next table gives the latest available figures for per capita education expenditures for fiscal year 1984/85:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Per Capita Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>R 1,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>R 224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>R 1,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>R 639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1986/87 education budget totalled R 6.7 million and was allocated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Group</th>
<th>Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>R 3,100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>R 2,400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>R 300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloured</td>
<td>R 900,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This clearly shows that it is naive to expect the same educational outcome from these vary disparate systems, as is illustrated by the 1986 Standard 10 examination results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>African</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Coloured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. of candidates</td>
<td>64,327</td>
<td>99,725</td>
<td>11,406</td>
<td>17,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pass: Matric Exempt.</td>
<td>28,071</td>
<td>13,460</td>
<td>3,787</td>
<td>2,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pass: School leaving</td>
<td>34,447</td>
<td>37,867</td>
<td>6,142</td>
<td>9,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Passes</td>
<td>52,915</td>
<td>51,327</td>
<td>9,929</td>
<td>11,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Passes</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Carstens 1988, p16)

The secondary school systems for the African and so-called coloured groups are plagued by underqualified teachers, overcrowding, and a lack of material resources (Africans are much worse off than the so-called coloureds).
A further factor contributing to this low comparative pass rate is the lack of options available to secondary school pupils.

Options such as technical and commercial subject choices are rare at these schools. Hence pupils leave secondary school with the notion that their preparation has been for academic study only. Added to this is the historic stigma attached to any nonuniversity path through higher education. Dr. Verwoerd, a past South African Prime Minister, stated quite openly, when he was Minister for African Education, that Africans should be educated for subservience. This has encouraged all black (inclusive term for all people who are not white) pupils to avoid any education that even seems to be associated with manual work.

Despite these political and social implications, the need for trained technical manpower brought about the creation of the technikons. The Goode Committee identified the shortage of engineers and technicians as retarding the economic development of South Africa. The acute shortage of technicians caused engineers to be employed at tasks that would normally be done by technicians. With an economy based on mining and depending on increased industrialization, South Africa needs people who know what to do—the university graduate; and those who know how to do it—the technikon graduate.

The Present Position of the Technikons

Presently there are seven technikons established to serve the white community, two for the African community, one for the Indian community, and one (Peninsula Technikon) for the so-called coloured community. All the technikons will admit students from other race groups; however, this practice is not unconditional. The white technikons will only admit students to courses where there is a low enrollment of white students. This means that white students still get preferential treatment. Certainly no black student is allowed to live in the general technikon housing. One or two technikons have separate housing arrangements for students who are not white.

The Peninsula Technikon decided a number of years ago to violate the regulations applicable at that time by admitting students regardless of colour. All students admitted had equal access to all the technikon facilities. While we only have about 150 white students, the rest of our residential and nonresidential student body is racially mixed. Our present enrollment is 3,500 students with an annual increase of around 15 percent.

As part of our educational process we find it essential to:

- Show our students how to learn as opposed to memorizing or rote learning, which is what they are taught to do at secondary school;
- Give our students exposure to modern technology, an exposure normally taken for granted by affluent students from the city.
In order to achieve these two goals, we currently have five pilot programs aimed at giving students confidence in their own ability and creating an atmosphere that is more conducive to learning by participation.

These programs are self-paced learning; peer group learning; senior tutor groups; and two bridging programs. All these programs are currently in their second year and are due to run for three years before a full scale evaluation is done. The funding for these programs has been obtained partly from sponsorship, but largely from the Technikon's budget by rearranging the budget priorities.

At the Peninsula Technikon, we have come to accept that, while the school system does not adequately prepare students for higher education, we have to compensate for this disadvantage. Our way of compensating is to change our teaching style without lowering the standard of education.

In addition to the programs referred to above, we have also used two positions in student affairs to appoint two persons whose sole function is to find students industrial placement, since most of our programs require in-service training. In this regard, we are leading the other technikons in services rendered to our students.

We have done all this because we recognize that many of our students are really disadvantaged and therefore we accept the challenge to correct this in so far as it is possible for us to do.

As to the general situation with regard to technikons, it is a fact that technikons in South Africa are in competition with universities for recognition as institutions of equal status to universities. This drive on the part of the technikons gave rise to the creation of the hierarchy of technikon qualifications, which match the university qualifications in duration and graduation.

In fact, the higher qualifications at the technikon require fairly extensive research as does the university qualification. I am a critic of this technikon hierarchy for a number of reasons, the most important being that:

- We do not have the qualified manpower to sustain both university and technikon research;
- We cannot, as a country, afford two infrastructures set up to support research for small numbers of students.

Technikons, therefore, have two choices: to become technical universities or to concentrate on producing technicians.

I favour the latter option, which will mean technikon training will last for a maximum of four years. However, students must be given an option for further study, so I recommend that technikons negotiate with universities to give their students credit for courses done at the technikons. This would mean that students can transfer to university with
a minimum loss of academic time. This model is similar to that of the community college in the United States, granting associate degrees.

In Britain and West Germany, the polytechnics and the technical institutes became technical, degree-granting universities. This does not, unfortunately, resolve the problem created by the shortage of technicians.

The model proposed for South Africa will affect the status of the technikons, but, I believe, the prosperity of the country is more important, particularly a post-apartheid South Africa, than institutional rivalry.

Black institutions of higher education have a responsibility to turn out quality students and this requires innovation, hardwork, and, most of all, a shift in the financial priorities of these institutions.

I hope that our efforts will prove to motivate our students to take responsibility for their own learning and future careers so that we, as black people, will be better equipped eventually to run the country.
The Freedom Charter is a unique document. It was created through unprecedented and thorough consultation with the ordinary, oppressed people of South Africa. For many months, some 35 years ago, a campaign was conducted to elicit from the masses what their grievances were and what type of South Africa they would like to live in, instead of the state of apartheid. People sent in their demands on paper from cigarette boxes, old school exercise books, and whatever else could be used to write down both simple and complex grievances and aspirations. Those who could not write asked campaigners to write down their demands for them.

All these were collected and consolidated into one document, which we now know as the Freedom Charter. It was adopted by the Congress of the People, held at Kliptown, in the Transvaal, on 25 and 26 June 1955. Those who had sent in demands came from all walks of life and all parts of South Africa. Likewise, delegates were drawn from the countryside, urban townships, the mines, factories, women's organisations, educationists, and students.

The process was so broad and democratic that the resulting Charter is justified in claiming in its first words to speak on behalf of "the people of South Africa." In those words also lie the qualities that make it subversive of the current racist social order, which has no moral justification for its existence, representing as it does a minute percentage of the population of the land.

From its opening words the Charter challenges the legitimacy of the existing state, asserting that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people."

As the first step towards remedying this situation, the opening clause of the Charter declares that "THE PEOPLE SHALL GOVERN!" The people have never governed in South Africa. The present state was created after conquest of the majority of the population. For decades (and, in the case of the Xhosa, a century) wars raged while the African people resisted the seizure of their land. With the aid of the British imperial army, all of these peoples were ultimately conquered and in 1910 the Union of South Africa was created. In effect, this Act of the British parliament handed independent statehood to the whites. For all practical purposes, the black majority have continued to live as colonial subjects. From the analytical perspective of all sections of the democratic movement, South Africa is a special type of colonial state, special because colonisers (the white minority state) and colonised (the black population) are not geographically separated and their relationship persists within one territorial unit.
The assertion that the people shall govern is a demand for popular sovereignty, that the South African state become a truly South African state and not continue as a "European" state in Africa. [It is significant that until fairly recently whites used to refer to themselves as "Europeans" and blacks were called "non-Europeans" and, in the case of Africans, "Natives." ]

The Charter is basically a very simple document in that it deals with the ordinary grievances encountered in the daily lives of black South Africans, but it also connects these ordinary demands for remedies to the broader demands that can ensure that they are met. If we take for example, the statement that "the aged, the orphans, the disabled, and the sick shall be cared for by the state," this deals with a situation that remains unresolved in the black community where state care for these categories of people is minimal. At the same time it is located under the Charter heading: "THERE SHALL BE HOUSES, SECURITY, AND COMFORT!"

In other words, realisation of the demands for social responsibility towards the aged, orphans, and so on is part of a broader demand that all should enjoy houses, security, and comfort. But this in turn needs to be related to other clauses of the Charter. Unless the people govern and share in the country's wealth, resources cannot be made available to meet these and other needs.

The political importance of this interrelationship between grievances experienced by specific groups and the broader demands that are in turn related to one another is that people can see, through the Charter, how what they experience in their lives can only be remedied by political organisation, aimed at meeting more fundamental aspirations.

Sitting in an academic lecture hall it is easy to find fault with the Charter. Many scholars might find (and in fact do claim to find) better, more precise formulations or wording that conform more precisely than the Charter does to one or other doctrines. The Charter was not drawn up as a scientific document. It is a people's Charter and it has continued to be regarded by most South Africans as the most accurate statement of their grievances and aspirations. At the time of its adoption, delegates reported back to their constituencies and organisations and there was general satisfaction with the contents of the Charter.

There have been people who allege that the contents of the Charter do not correspond with the demands that people made. Some critics suggest that the demands were diluted by communists, so that the Charter has a less socialistic content than the masses had wanted. Alternatively, others have suggested that the communists manipulated the demands in the opposite direction, including clauses on nationalisation of monopoly industry, because of their revolutionary inclinations as opposed to what the people actually requested.

Interviews conducted for the book Thirty Years of the Freedom Charter indicated that the wording of the Charter corresponded to basic demands as they were actually voiced by workers, women, landless peasants, and
others. Naturally every eccentric demand could not be included. The approach in drafting such a document is to include that which is the consensus. And that consensus was easily identifiable as it still is today and remains substantially in accord with the Charter.

The Charter Today

Political developments in recent years have provided the democratic forces in South Africa with experiences and insights that have enriched our understanding of the Charter. The period since 1984 has seen the rise of what have been called elementary organs of people's power. Following the eviction of state officials from many townships and the neutralisation of state repressive forces in many situations, popular organisations sought to move from a situation of "ungovernability" (that is, the inability of state organs to function) to popular control.

There are naturally considerable limits on what the masses of South Africans can construct while they remain removed from state power. But experiences gained at a local level have been significant. The growth of street, block, zone, and other grassroots-level committees has enabled people in many townships to take over (and often with much success) such activities as crime control, mediation in various community disputes, and, in the case of Port Alfred, establishment of a creche in what had been a government building and many other functions that had previously been outside of popular influence and control.

We have learned repeatedly that people are not very receptive to spectacular political theories when their immediate problems are unattended. For many ordinary people, one of the most pressing problems is crime. It has been one of the weaknesses of the democratic movement in South Africa that we have often only been able to "deliver boycotts" at most times. Groups who collaborate may not enjoy much support, but they do have access to various facilities that enable them to dispense patronage.

Being able to reduce crime significantly has made a significant impact on communities and has given people a sense of their own power, their own capacity, to deal with problems. I recently spoke to an African from a township where street committees had been crushed by the state repressive forces. He spoke wistfully of what he termed "the time of the UDF [United Democratic Front]," when people could walk the streets of his township safely. The democratic process through which these and other activities have been organised (though there have been many cases where there have been abuses, mainly when the various segments of the community were not all represented, and youth predominated) has ensured that people feel involved in whatever political decisions are taken. People do not need to be coerced into consumer boycotts when they themselves are involved in the decision.

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In many cases, people who form part of these processes of people's power have seen themselves implementing the clause of the Charter that says the "The People Shall Govern." Certainly the experience of this period enriches our understanding of what the potentialities are for popular participation, in realising the sub-clause "All bodies of minority rule, advisory boards, councils, and authorities shall be replaced by democratic organs of self-government."

**Constitutional Guidelines of the African National Congress**

Another very significant factor, affecting any contemporary assessment of the Charter, is the recent publication by the ANC of its constitutional guidelines. The guidelines are submitted for discussion, amendment, and revision by all sections of the South African people, as part of a process leading to the ultimate establishment of a truly popular constitution.

The guidelines are not meant to replace the Charter but are intended to stimulate thinking on the type of constitution that might derive from the Charter. In the mass democratic movement within the country, we consider this a very important intervention and we are hoping that many of our structures will initiate discussions on a widespread basis, as broadly as the original Congress of the People Campaign. The result, we hope, will not only be that we reestablish links that have been severed in the continuing repression of the states of emergency, but that whatever constitution ultimately emerges from this process will enjoy great legitimacy.

My impression is that already, at this early stage, ordinary people are taking seriously the invitation to treat the guidelines critically. There has been controversy over the reference to any form of incorporation of "traditional leaders," a multiparty system of government, and alleged inadequacy of reference to popular participation. Positions are by no means settled and the consensus that will emerge will obviously not satisfy everyone. What we hope, however, is that all who want to express a view will feel that it has been considered, even if it is not ultimately accepted.

**The Question of Peace**

The final clause of the Charter reads "THERE SHALL BE PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP!" It is the view of the democratic forces that there will not be peace in South Africa or in the southern African region so long as apartheid exists. The creation of a state based on the Freedom Charter will allow the peoples of southern Africa to achieve their long-desired state of justice and peace.

At the time of preparing this paper (early December 1989), there are
suggestions from some quarters (in particular the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mrs. Thatcher) that the road to peace may be via the new South African President, F.W. de Klerk. Much as the people of South Africa desire peace, they have learned very painfully that mere professions of good faith and desire for discussion rather than warfare do not necessarily mean that that is what is in fact intended.

To secure peace we need to ensure the complete dismantling of apartheid and creation of a government and state system established through universal suffrage (quite apart from the many other demands of the Charter, though universal suffrage may go some ways towards their achievement). In demanding the vote for all adults, we do no more than is accepted as fundamental in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Mr. de Klerk has, however, stated that universal suffrage would mean the end of democracy.

Whatever changes have been initiated by the new President do not, therefore, have as their objective the establishment of a democratic state. Indeed, indications are that he remains wedded to the conception of a South Africa where "group rights" (that is, group privileges, the privileges of the whites) coexist with the disabilities of blacks.

The road to peace is mapped out elsewhere. A significant Declaration was adopted in August 1989 by the Organisation of African Unity and subsequently also by the Non-Aligned movement, with a view to a negotiated settlement of the South African conflict. The starting point is the aim to establish a nonracial democratic state with universal suffrage. The process cannot even begin unless there is agreement on so fundamental and universally accepted a premise.

Once that is agreed the South African government is required to create a climate for negotiations; that is, they must release all political prisoners and detainees unconditionally and refrain from imposing any restrictions on them; lift all bans and restrictions on all proscribed and restricted organisations and persons; remove all troops from the townships; end the state of emergency and repeal all legislation, such as, and including, the Internal Security Act, designed to circumscribe political activity; and cease all political trials and executions.

A ceasefire on the part of both the South African government and the liberation movement can then be negotiated, prior to the establishment of a transitional government. The mandate of this government will be to oversee the election of a constituent assembly that will create a new constitution.

This Declaration is an important contribution to the peace process. It is part of the new context, which may lead to the speedier realisation of the goals of the Freedom Charter--the creation of a new South Africa that will truly belong to all who live in it, black and white.
Political liberation seems to be an intractable problem for liberalism. In a repressive climate, such as South African society, underground organisations face a dilemma. It would appear that, in order for them to be effective, they may have to be undemocratic. Liberation movements are outlawed and cannot organise publicly and openly. Of their nature, such liberation struggles are often underground and covert. Invariably, they cannot be democratic, at least not entirely. If a liberation movement is undemocratic, it might lose important moral high ground. However, if it democratic, in the short term it could easily become ineffective, because important strategic information could reach all and sundry, including the state's intelligence network.

Almost every major political program of resistance in South Africa is characterised by a measure of both persuasion and coercion. School, rent, and consumer boycotts, and national stayaways, for example, are monitored closely by a group of youths and the consequences for the violators are sometimes perilous. Critics have been quick to point out that people should not be coerced, but rather educated and persuaded to support the liberation struggle. There is a dilemma of always trying to make the means and the end commensurate—a dilemma that is widespread in South Africa. For example, does a nonracial goal require nonracial means, as the critics of the Black Consciousness Movement maintain? Similarly, does a democratic goal necessarily require democratic means?

These areas in South African resistance politics are pertinent here. First, the black consciousness organisations have been criticised on the basis that their goal of nonracialism is at variance with their policy of exclusive black membership. Similarly, when anti-apartheid organisations (or their known members) forcibly enlist support for their programmes, the same questions are raised about consistency between goals and ends.

This presentation addresses two distinct, but related, questions: Do the oppressed have an obligation to liberate themselves, even to the point of coercing one another into participating in the liberation struggle? What kind of moral claim do covert liberation movements have upon their members and the sympathetic on-looker?

The first question is not about whether or not the oppressed should join the struggle, but whether they can be demanded to support the struggle. A distinction is made between duty and obligation. Duty refers to the weaker notion of moral benevolence. For example, a person is said to have a duty to help strangers, love his neighbor, tell the truth, and feed the hungry. In this context, obligation refers to the stronger claim that involves corresponding rights on the part of others to enforce the obligation or to defend their rights.

If the oppressed have obligations, to whom is this obligation owed?
To themselves; to the fellow oppressed; to future generations; or to the liberation movements? Was this obligation incurred solely through their involuntary membership in an oppressed group? Assuming that there is such an obligation, then there should be an agent entrusted with the power and responsibility to enforce obligations and protect rights. This is what is perceived to be the basic function of governments. This provides the link between the two questions.

The second question is whether covert political organisations are entitled to act as a government in exile, to enforce the oppressed's obligation to free themselves. If anti-apartheid political organisations have the right and duty to coordinate the liberation effort, what is the precise content of these rights and powers? Liberalism is pertinent here for another reason. Generally liberal values inspire revolutions, although they often fail to initiate or sustain them. Revolutionaries often appeal to concepts like liberty, rights, and equality—all thematic and central to liberal debates. However, they insist that these values must also be respected by the oppressed in the process of liberation. For example, almost all liberal organisations in South Africa have opposed economic sanctions and violence, the means deemed by the oppressed as the only effective ones.

Similarly, they reject coercion within the oppressed community, insisting that if organisations were not democratic then they would be no different from the government they oppose. While this is true, this is not the whole story. This attitude does not take serious cognisance of the difficulty of always making the means commensurate with the goals. A liberal must provide a satisfactory account of how one can be democratic without being able to call a meeting.

This concern raises a crucial question in political morality. How can organisations organise democratically in an undemocratic, repressive, and underground climate? How does anyone consult so widely and obtain such a mandate? It seems that in the end some coercion will be inevitable. What then are the implications? One could halt the struggle if the price people have to pay is constant coercion. Alternatively, some might plead for moderation and as much consultation as is humanly possible under the repressive conditions. They would accept coercion only as an ultimate, not initial, step and, even then, organisations would have to take precautions to ensure that such coercion remains proportionate to the circumstances.

The second question involves the relationship between the oppressed people and the political organisations at the forefront of the liberation effort. While a substantial number of people may be sympathetic to the aspirations of these organisations, nonetheless the bulk of the oppressed are not members. Others may not even have heard of these groups or their leadership. On the other hand, these political organisations cannot function effectively without the collaboration and support of ordinary men and women, whatever their formal relationship with the organisations. As a result, political groups have sometimes made certain demands on people in terms of support and cooperation.
The demand for support is based on the belief that the liberation struggle requires from the oppressed some sacrifices in return for some future political liberty. People are expected to forego certain benefits, or whatever is left of comfort in the current South African situation, in order to further the course of the liberation struggle. This raises some moral dilemmas for both individuals and the organisations. For individuals the dilemma is two-fold: Whom to support and what to support? A member of the oppressed may be neutral about, indifferent to, or completely resigned to the oppressive status quo. The person may also be "nonsectarian;" that is, politically committed to the cause of liberation, though not necessarily to particular organisations. Such a person might choose to exercise political options through other institutions--religious or economic.

How does such a person fulfill the obligation to the liberation struggle? South Africa boasts its fair share of political factions. This dilemma is compounded by the various forms of the liberation effort, the rivalry among the political organisations themselves, and their differing conceptions of what a liberated society should look like. The form of resistance and types of action undertaken vary from place to place, and from time to time.

People might be sympathetic to the cause, and be willing to support it. Where there is only one major organisation, they might find it easy to channel their efforts through this organisation. However, where there are a number of groups competing for support, even to the point of causing confusion, the issue becomes foggy. Which of the groups can legitimately make demands upon people? This becomes even more frustrating when people find themselves under pressure from all sides, the government and its opponents. As a result, it is possible for people to deny any obligation to any one group.

There are essentially two conceptions of what liberation is. One is a minimal conception in which there is no reference to race and all discriminatory legislation has been abolished. The other, a maximal definition, is that liberty is impossible except in a noncapitalist mode of production. If people are indeed obligated to liberate themselves, then it is essential to spell out in what sense of liberation they are obligated. Are black individuals who support a free market system obligated to bring about a socialist system, even at a great peril to themselves? The "struggle" is not a tidy concept with determinate features and boundaries. It is a process, often a mixed bag. Part of the problem is that it is also defined by its protagonists, and sometimes the definitions become tainted with sectional interests of the various constituencies of the oppressed.

The focus of this discussion is nonsectarian "bystanders," members of the oppressed who share the concerns of the liberation struggle and yet do not belong to a political organisation. They might feel that choosing a political organisation at this stage is not crucial. What is crucial is supporting whoever is effective. They may feel that organisations are in fact divisive and at times obstructive. Supposing they are invited by
one or more organisations to join the struggle. What is their response and what are their obligations?

Two liberal models of obligation, consent and fair play, are possible bases of participation in a liberation struggle. Liberalism places a heavy premium on personal liberty, individual rights, and extreme individualism. This makes it a hard case for coercion; however, if liberation is taken seriously within this tradition, then perhaps liberalism cannot but sanction a measure of coercion towards participation. (Although violence is a form of coercion, coercion is not reducible to violence. There are various nonviolent forms of coercion, such as boycotts, ostracism, and public ridicule.) From the perspective of consent theory, people are only obliged to support if they voluntarily offer themselves. They cannot be forced if they choose to protect their job and family interests.

According to this theory, only consent generates obligations. There is no need to do more than examine what consenting to the South African struggle would entail in practice. Consent could mean that people are free to join marches, consumer boycotts, rent boycotts, and stayaways. No one should force them to do so. This position seems to be on moral high ground. Surely, no one should defend a situation where people lose their autonomy and personal liberty. After all, this is precisely why the apartheid system is condemned; however, it seems also odd to suggest that people should only pay taxes when they feel like it, or should stop at the red light when this is convenient, or when they are not particularly in a hurry.

Consent theory presupposes a climate of free political activity, or parties debating, formulating policy, exchanging views publicly, and electing leaders freely. It presupposes an environment of free speech and freedom of association. This is totally inapplicable in totalitarian states and difficult in authoritarian states. There is indeed some political "space" that activists should explore, but the entire struggle cannot rest solely on this.

If consent is indeed the sole basis of political obligations, then it has to be concluded that a substantial number of people have no obligations at all to support underground opposition political organisations. Only the card-carrying members of these organisations would be obligated. The practical effect is to halt, or at least undermine, the liberation effort. A staunch consent theorist would simply shrug his shoulders and exclaim: So much the worse for the struggle. No doubt such a position is internally consistent. Yet, there is something suspect about the notion of personal liberty that is designed to protect the right of an individual to be a slave. This option is an example of a cure that is worse than the disease. Besides, it seems inherently unfair to expect a handful of people to give up their lives, and subject their families to untold miseries, in order to bring about a mutually desired benefit. Either this is accepted as normal, or an alternative account of the genesis of obligations is established.
In short, consent theory generates a paradox. Its primary concern is the protection and enlargement of personal liberty, yet in the case of political liberation, a single-minded commitment to this principle results in the perpetuation of an oppressive system. It stifles rather than promotes personal and collective liberation. Posing the question differently, the issue is not whether the individual wishes to join; rather, what are the consequences for everyone, including the individual, if someone does not cooperate in the liberation struggle? This approach focuses on the kind of loss that society would suffer as a result of someone's refusing to cooperate with the rest of the group.

According to this principle of fair play, if anyone benefits, or will benefit, from a certain cooperative venture, then this person is obliged to support that venture. The understanding, of course, is that the undertaking is fair and conforms to the demands of justice. In practical terms, if a person benefits from liberation, then he should support the struggle for liberation. While there are problems with this approach, it at least points in the right direction. It emphasizes that certain issues are of such crucial importance that they cannot be subjected to individual fleeting emotions. Liberation is one such issue. It requires collective effort. As a result, it seems only fair that everyone should contribute to its realisation. Those who fail to participate harm the community by denying it an essential benefit.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, organisations may demand support from nonmembers. The issue then becomes: Which organisations may demand what kind of support? If people do have an obligation to support the liberation struggle, they are not required to join a political organisation. The obligation could involve support for extra parliamentary political activities. One could choose which programme to support from any of the political organisations. While they should support certain activities undertaken by the political organisations, these are activities in which individuals are not exposed to unreasonable dangers out of proportion with the action taken. Consequently, they have an obligation to join in marches when required, to support consumer and rent boycotts, as well as stayaways. The individual should not be isolated for specific actions through which he is individually exposed to dangers. The obligation is strong where the action is collective.

Organisations must meet the requirement of substantive rather than procedural consent. In other words, what matters is what they represent rather than whom they represent. They represent no one except their small membership. One could choose which programme to support from any political organisation. Having said this, it should also be remembered that some organisations have better claims than others. Some form of legitimating criterion on the part of the organisations is required. The most basic requirement is that such a movement must look like a potential decent government. Here are some minimum conditions for such claims.

Organisations should provide evidence of commitment to a democratic ideal. This should be evident from their structures and practices.
People cannot be expected to replace one dictator with another. The leadership should be elected, however small and elitist that electorate might be. The elections should be reasonably free and frequent. Where elections have not been held for decades there is cause for concern; where nepotism and tribalism is rife, there is need for caution.

An organisation should have a record of effectiveness. The material and human cost of the liberation is heavy, and for this reason it should be worth the price. The achievement of liberation should be humanly possible. This must be demonstrated before people are randomly drafted. Such effectiveness can be measured by the organisation's record of achievement in relation to its age. This means that the principle of fair play is likely to be applicable in the mature phase of the struggle. Before then, the leadership has to rely largely on persuasion and education. Those who take the initiative do so voluntarily. No claims could be made against people until organisations have proven their initial mettle.

Specific programmes that people are demanded to support must be politically possible. Where coercion is possible, abuse abounds. A political organisation that has lost control of its members and cadres cannot lay claim to any legitimacy. Similarly a government whose police and army are above the law is not worthy of serious respect. In the case of liberation, enforcement cannot be left to a band of undisciplined street roammers accountable to no one. Where consultation and education are possible, they should take place. Communication channels could and should be developed.

Organisations should recognise the variety of abilities and temperaments and not impose intolerable burdens on people who simply cannot carry them. Involvement in the struggle is not a "neat package." There are less costly, but effective means. These should be recognised. You cannot sacrifice your entire community. Invariably, some should carry a heavier burden than others. The leadership should be willing to take greater responsibility than others. Leadership is not merely a burdensome position, it is also rewarding. It carries prestige and power, which many people do not loathe. This may explain why it is difficult to dislodge political leaders from their positions.

Coercion should be a safeguard against free-riding, rather than a daily dose. Even elected governments rely on coercion. However, if coercive measures are the only or even prime means of advancing, then there is something fundamentally wrong. People should also be allowed to refrain from methods considered at variance with their moral convictions. Assent aside, one can argue that organisations that conceptually and organisationally honour the struggle for freedom in all its specifics, those that display certain structural virtues, are those deserving of support. From the fact that an institution can be necessary for the promotion of liberty, justice, and welfare, there can be an obligation to obey such an organisation. If such an organisation is stable, effective, organised, and fair, then there may not only be an obligation to support it, but also a duty not to set up a rival organisation.
These measures are somewhat arbitrary and it is possible to include some and exclude others. They are not to be considered sufficient conditions for the claims by organisations, which will meet them in varying degrees. These are designed to protect individual liberty as much as possible, and still place some moral limits on that liberty. At the same time, it gives organisations sufficient scope to enlist support without demanding a blank cheque. The aim is to strike a happy medium between the demands of personal liberty and collective efficacy, to promote the values of consent theory and the principle of fair play.

Both models—consent and fair play—illuminate the South African problem to a degree. Nonetheless, they fail to give an adequate account of any obligations the oppressed may have towards the liberation struggle. It is simply dangerous to suggest that people incur obligations in virtue of benefits they have received or will receive. Such a principle is open to wild abuse. As Nozick suggests, one may not simply impose benefits on people and later demand payment from them.

In the light of this it may be appropriate to rephrase the questions. In stead of asking whether liberation movements have a right to demand cooperation, we could ask whether they are justified in coercing people into activities they are not ordinarily obliged to undertake. Clearly it is not always immoral to violate people's rights. One may morally, though not legally perhaps, use a neighbor's car without permission if this were required to save someone's life. Conversely it may be immoral to press ahead with legitimate rights in certain circumstances. A millionaire who takes a destitute debtor to court does not rate highly on the moral scale. Consequently, just as it may be wrong for people to enforce their rights, similarly it may be right for them to make demands to which they are not entitled.

Perhaps if the principle of fair play is prefaced in this manner it could begin to be helpful. If coercion towards liberation is wrong, the wrongness lies in something more significant than simple interference with personal liberty. Similarly, if people are entitled to decide on their political right, that right alone does not exclude the possibility of their being coerced. There is more to morality than rights and obligations. Of course there should be limits to what people can be coerced into doing. Since risk is built into the liberation struggle, one can hardly demand that people should not be exposed to risks. Still, the greater hazards should be reserved for the lion-hearted, who have consented to exposing themselves to such perils.

To conclude, while respect for personal liberty and autonomy should form the basis of a civilised moral system, coercion towards liberation cannot simply be dismissed by appeal to hackneyed phrases like rights and liberty. Where respect for individual rights and liberty lead to greater individual and social harm, then a re-evaluation is called for. No moral or political system should become more important than the people themselves.
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