A Rebuttal of Essential Sociolinguistics.

The Aristotelian approach to definition, labeled essentialism, is examined, and its relationship to sociolinguistics is discussed. Aristotle taught that a definition points to the essence of something, perhaps by naming it, and then describes it. Popper criticized this approach to definition as overly verbose in that it invites an infinite regression of definitions, and is not helpful in understanding the universe. It is proposed here that, as in other disciplines, many sociolinguists follow the Aristotelian method of definition. Ways to avoid even the appearance of essentialism in definitions include the following: (1) giving definitions that connote right-to-left orientation (e.g., "the study of language in relation to society is called sociolinguistics" rather than "sociolinguistics is the study of language in relation to society"); (2) avoiding use of the term "proving" in philosophically and methodologically sensitive contexts; and (3) not giving the impression that only the concepts that the speaker is addressing are difficult to define and others are not, when in reality no concept can be precisely or ultimately defined. It is concluded that essentialist sociolinguistics is untenable and should be abandoned.
PART I

The term 'essentialist sociolinguistics' is my own term. Essentialism itself, however, can be traced back to Popper (1945, 1957, 1959, 1972), who uses the label in his critical argument against Aristotle. Aristotle claims that all things have their FORM or essences (1983). The essence of a thing is something like its internal source of change and motion (Popper 1945). It is that very Aristotelian philosophical standpoint that Popper refers to as 'essentialism'. For Aristotle (Popper 1945) the term that is to be defined is the name of the essence of a thing, and the defining formula the description of that essence.

Popper summarizes Aristotle's position in the following way:

'Aristotle saw the ultimate aim of all inquiry in the compilation of an encyclopedia containing the intuitive definitions of all essences, that is to say, their names together with their defining formulae; and that he considered the progress of knowledge as consisting in the gradual accumulation of such an encyclopedia...' (Popper 1945:12).

And further:

'Aristotle taught that in a definition we have first pointed to the essence - perhaps by naming it - and that we then describe it with the help of the describing formula; just as in an ordinary sentence like 'The puppy is brown', we first point to a certain thing by saying 'this puppy', and then describe it as 'brown'. And he taught that by thus describing the essence to which the term points which is to be defined, we determine or explain the meaning of the term also. Accordingly, the definition may at one time answer two very clearly related questions. The one is 'What is it?', for example, 'What is a puppy?'; it asks what the essence is which is denoted by the defining term. The other is 'What does it mean?'; for example, 'What does puppy mean?'; it asks for the meaning of a term (namely of the term that denotes the essence' (Popper 1945:13).

It is important to remember that for Aristotle the significance of definitions consists in the fact that they are believed to allow the growth of knowledge. The reasoning runs that the more definitions we have, the more we have been able to say about the essences of things, and thus the vaster our knowledge.

According to Popper (1945 and others), the Aristotelian essentialist view of definitions is wrong. And there are basically two reasons for this. One is that there are absolutely no grounds for treating 'intellectual intuition'.

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extolled by Aristotle, as the way to establish truth, or true knowledge. The other reason is that defining terms always leads to an infinite regression of definitions. Not only, Popper claims, do we not achieve much by proposing definitions, but we also lose much by introducing an unnecessary amount of verbosity.

Anyone adhering to the Aristotelian essentialist method of definition reads definitions 'from the left to the right'. That is, for instance, 'A calf is a young cow' where 'a young cow' is believed to tell us what 'calf' is. The danger of definitional infinite regress is easily seen as the questions that immediately come to the fore are: 'What is a cow?', and 'What is young?' answers to which will create an array of further questions. As this procedure hardly leads anywhere, it is discarding this way of handling definitions that, according to Popper, characterizes those sciences that have been moving forward. Those sciences are reputed to read definitions 'from the right to the left', i.e., with reference to our example above, we get 'A young cow is (called) a calf'. Truly, such definitions do not explain anything (but Aristotelian definitions did not, either, although they were claimed to do so). What they do is only to introduce one short label for a somewhat longish set of labels: 'they cut a long story short' (Popper 1945:14). Additionally, and importantly, such definitions may clarify a problem.

It follows that 'from the left to the right definitions' should not be taken seriously. Contrary to common belief, they do not make things simpler, or more precise; they make things more complicated and less precise. And this is primarily because any definition entails the necessity of further definitions with a continuously growing number of terms to be further defined. The 'from the right to the left definitions', though not explaining anything, are nevertheless very handy because they save discussion time and writing paper!

It is Popper's belief that the Aristotelian method of definition and essentialism taken together have not only been unhelpful in the understanding of the universe but also harmful in some ways. One negative effect that essentialism brings about is verbalism, i.e., talking about the meaning of words, which procedure seems to have no end. If one believes, however, that such 'looking for the right definition' in principle makes sense, much disillusionment is likely to ensue, because one will always feel that one falls short of catching that one right definition.

Essentialist thinking leads to what Popper (1945, 1972) calls 'what-is'-questions, e.g., 'What is love?', 'What is freedom?', 'What is science?'. If one agrees with the argument invoked in this paper, such questions are very unfortunate formulations never to receive any one unambiguous answer. It is important to remember, however, that both many scientists and a large number of lay people behave (the
former in their research and the latter in their daily interaction) as if such a one unambiguous answer were possible, i.e., as if the question itself ('what-is'-question) were in principle legitimate.

For lack of space I can only mention here that implicit in the essentialist philosophy is the belief in, and thus the search for, precision in scientific expression. Popper manages to show, however, that similarly to the case of ultimate definitions (cf. above) precision is only a phantom, and trying to reach it (as many authors do) is thus a 'wild goose chase'.

It should be mentioned in passing that Popper's criticism of essentialism is perhaps the most salient criticism existing in the literature. There have been, however, other authors who more or less at the same time detected the Aristotelian fallacy. I have in mind here the general semanticists of the thirties and forties of this century; especially A. Korzybski and S.I. Hayakawaj2. Also, more recently, pertinent aspects of Aristotle's philosophy have been challenged by cognitive linguists (e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987)3.

In what has preceded I have very briefly presented the idea of essentialism and the criticism rejecting it. In what follows I will concentrate exclusively on sociolinguistics. Thus, I will try to show that, similarly to other disciplines, sociolinguistics still suffers to some degree from the ailment called 'essentialism'. That is, I claim that a significant number of sociolinguists (but clearly not all) either consciously or unconsciously, and either explicitly or implicitly, still follow the Aristotelian method of definition.

PART II

The following examples are intended to point to some evidence for my conviction that many sociolinguists are essentialists. At the many linguistics conferences in which I have taken part I have been asked what 'context' was, and that question, I am sure, was not an attempt at having me theoretically define context. Similarly, I have witnessed many interchanges in which the straightforward questions such as 'What is standard language?', 'What is a variety?', 'What is the sociolect?', 'What is communicative competence?' were asked. All my experience as a (socio)linguist makes me claim that many of our widely respected colleagues believe that 'what-is'-questions such as those quoted above make sense. Even more discouraging and disappointing is the way those questions are answered. Namely, dozens of times, I have personally heard answers such as: 'Well, the question is obviously very important, I know, and it is a very difficult question; I realize that it has not been answered unambiguously and convincingly, as yet,' and, possible, added to
Unfortunately, in sociolinguistics there are still terminological disputes, and this is a difficult problem, indeed.

No doubt, in the area of sociolinguistics there are still terminological disputes. A marvelous reflection of such a dispute is Siegel's article (1985), where he reports on definitional debates and partly contributes to them.

Siegel discusses a number of definitions of 'koines' and 'koineization', finds fault with all of them, proposes his own definition, but even in his own view he still sees problems. He states that:

'A major question concerning the terms koine and koineization is whether they should (my emphasis, K.J.) be restricted to dialect mixing or extended to other kinds of language mixing' (368).

If one wants to take the statement seriously one immediately gets into the problem of defining dialect, language, and mixing. Having been preoccupied with problems such as: 'But to say that pidginization and koineization are different is not to say that pidginization cannot play a part in koineization' (372).

Siegel addresses himself to the question of the difference (or similarity) between creolization and koineization, and, interestingly, states the following:

'...there are striking parallels between creolization as described by Hymes... and what happens in the later stages of koineization. A wider definition of creolization might be applicable to both pidgins and koines in their later stages of development: expansion of content, admixture, extension of use, and nativization of a new, reduced, mixed variety of language which resulted from language contact. But, like Hymes, I will leave this question open to debate (my emphasis, K.J.)' (372).

particularly the last emphasized sentence is worth noting; the debate will doubtless continue!

Interestingly, at a conference a speaker has made a reference to an article in the Sociolinguistic Newsletter where the question was posed of how far sociolinguistics has advanced since its conception. The answer in the article was reported to have been: 'Not much, or not at all; there are still terminological disputes'. It is my conjecture that the terminological disputes in question spring, among other things, from the belief held by many linguists that 'what-is'-questions make sense. As I think otherwise, as illustrated above, I wish to claim that 'what-is'-questions, such as 'what is actually communicative competence?' do not create a difficult problem. They do not in fact create a problem at all! They simply should not be asked (unless they imply asking for a theoretical definition which is supposed to clarify the stating of a problem; e.g., 'How do you, more or less, define context?).

We may want to pause for a moment at Popper's reference
to empty verbalism and the Aristotelian method of definition (cf. above). That reference should be viewed against the report on the article from Sociolinguistic Newsletter, mentioned above. It may be that many sociolinguists find themselves unable to liberate themselves from the vicious circle of definitions, and that fact may actually be the reason why some claim (as does the author of the article in Sociolinguistic Newsletter) that sociolinguistics has not advanced much, or not at all.

In order to better support the claim that essentialism creeps into the work of many sociolinguists, I would like to look in some detail at a recent introductory textbook in sociolinguistics (Wardhaugh 1986), and briefly at some other written sources. As Wardhaugh's book is a classical introduction, with references to many authors, it is sometimes difficult to say whether an opinion expressed in the book is Wardhaugh's, some other author's and shared by Wardhaugh, or some other author's and not shared by Wardhaugh. In fact, a decision concerning these three possibilities is not really important at all for my purposes because it is not my intention here to criticise any one author's views but to show the reader that my charges pertaining to the essentialist thinking on the part of many (socio)linguists are not unjustified or concocted.

The salience of essentialism is evident in:

'Following Chomsky's example, many linguists have argued that you should not study a language in use or even how the language is learned without first acquiring an adequate knowledge of what language itself is. In this view linguistic investigations should focus on developing this latter knowledge. The linguist's task should be to write grammars to develop our understanding of language: what it is... (my emphasis, K.J.)' (Wardhaugh 1986:6).

'While sociolinguists have talked at length, however, about communicative competence, attempts to specify just what it is (my emphasis, K.J.) have not been very successful, probably because it is so complex and all-encompassing' (Wardhaugh 1986:362).

In my opinion, essentialism permeates (socio)linguistics in a number of ways. In addition to evident cases like the above, one prominent sphere where essentialism clearly comes up is that of definitions. The value that some sociolinguists impute to definitions is well illustrated by Wardhaugh's section on speech community. A note might be first made, however, of Wardhaugh's comment that it is not only the terms 'language', 'dialect', and 'variety' (which Wardhaugh discusses earlier in the book) but also 'speech community' that are difficult to define. One immediately gets the impression here that the sociolinguistic terms in question are particularly unfortunate (as they are difficult to define), as if others were not only easier to define, but perhaps ultimately definable. Accepting the difficulty that we face trying to define terms in sociolinguistics, Wardhaugh
cites a number of definitions of 'speech community' and offers some comments:

'A simple definition of a 'real' speech community is offered by Lyons (1970:326) - 'all the people who use a given language, or dialect' (114).

'We must also acknowledge that using linguistic characteristics alone to determine what is or is not (my emphasis, K.J.) a speech community has proved so far (my emphasis, K.J.) to be quite impossible...' (114).

'For very specific sociolinguistic purposes we might want to try to draw quite narrow and extremely precise (my emphasis, K.J.) bounds around what we consider to be a speech community' (114).

This last quotation deserves a brief comment. While the first part of the sentence implies to me non-essentialist thinking (except that I think 'might want to try' should be changed to 'must try') as it encourages theoretical definitions for specific research purposes, the second part of the sentence, requiring extremely precise bounds, moves us back into essentialism. This is so because belief in extreme precision invokes undoubtedly ultimate, essentialist explanation.

And further, I detect essentialism in the following:

'Labov's definition of speech community: 'The speech community is not defined by any marked agreement in the use of language elements so much as by participation in a set of shared norms...'' (115).

'Hymes (1974:47) disagrees with both Chomsky's and Bloomfield's definitions of a speech community. He claims that these simply reduce the notion of speech community to that of a language and in effect, throw out 'speech community' as a worthwhile concept. He points out that it is impossible to equate language and speech community when we lack a clear understanding of the nature of language (my emphasis, K.J.) (117).

Reference to Labov's definition is worth another comment. I would accept the claim that we may have doubts as to whether the following definitions imply essentialism: 'A speech community is a group of people who interact by means of speech', or 'A speech repertoire is the range of linguistic varieties which speakers have at their disposal and which they use appropriately as members of their speech community'. That is, one may always claim that such definitions should be read from the right to the left (we would thus give the author the benefit of the doubt) rather than the other way round, unless other parts of the argument indicate otherwise. Thus, we may say that we do not really know whether the author of - 'A speech community is a group of people who interact by means of speech' believes that this is the right, only one good definition (i.e., reads the definition from left to right), or whether he treats the definition as a theoretical statement useful for his research purposes (i.e., reads the definition from right to left). Such a liberal, double possibility reading is, however, highly unlikely in the case of Labov's definition (cf. above).
external problem to the solving of which one definition and
not another is thought to be better. Labov's formulation
implies to me that some one definition is better or worse
than others in some absolute sense, and this is precisely
where essentialism emerges again (cf. Hudson 1980 for
support, and Romaine 1982 on Labov's attempts at being
definitely right).

In my understanding, one can speak of essentialism also
whenever the opinion is voiced that some one concept (or a
set of concepts) is difficult to define, the implication of
which is that others are not difficult to define, and that we
are particularly unlucky to be involved in a discipline with
that kind of difficulty. 'For example, we cannot adequately
define either 'language' or 'dialect', nor can we infallibly
(my emphasis, K.J.) distinguish the one from the other'
(Wardhaugh 1986:362), or

'Solche Textproben zeigen, dass Soziolinguistik und Sprach-
soziologie weder vom Begriff noch vom Gegenstand und der
gegenseitigen Abgrenzung her eindeutig zu bestimmen sind...
Die Schwierigkeit der Begriffbestimmung mag daher rühren dass
sich eine grosse Zahl wissenschaftlicher Teildisziplinen um
denselben Forschungsgegenstand gruppieren' (Löffler 1985:22).

And,

'We have seen that 'speech community' may be an impossibly
difficult concept to define. But in attempting to do so, we
have also become aware that it may be just as difficult to
c characterize the speech of a single individual. Perhaps that
second failure follows inevitably from the first' (Wardhaugh

The question thus seems to be, if one follows the
reasoning above, that once we have located the culprit (i.e.,
the concept that is easy to define, or ultimately definable)
we may liberate ourselves of the present difficulty. The
reasoning in other words is the following: It is difficult to
define 'speech community' because it is difficult to define
'language'; and it is difficult to define 'language' because
it is difficult to define 'social group', etc. And the moment
when one of those 'difficult cases' turns into an 'easy one',
our predicament may be brought to an end. That is how I think
the essentialist reasons, and that is why he is caught up in
a web of endless verbal quibbles, because the moment for the
'difficult' to turn into the 'easy' never comes.

It was mentioned above that the formulation of many
definitions in sociolinguistics may give the impression that
the author of the definition is an essentialist (e.g., 'a
speech community is a group of people interacting by means of
speech') while in fact he might not be one at all. I will
call such cases 'apparent essentialism'. Definitions formu-
lated in the left to the right fashion are, however, not the
only source of such possibly unjust essentialism assignment.
Other sources include:
(1) Formulations including the notion of 'proving', e.g.,
'The most valid conclusion concerning the Whorfian hypothesis
is that it is quite unproved (my emphasis, K.J.) (Wardhaugh 1986:218).

When reflecting upon formulations such as the one above, it is difficult to say whether 'proving' is used here technically (implying positive knowledge and ultimate explanation) or informally, without the implication in question.

(2) Formulations concerning the difficulties of making distinctions, e.g.,

'We might also say that certain attempts to distinguish people who are bilingual from those who are bidialectal may (my emphasis, K.J.) fail' (Wardhaugh 1986:95).

At least one possible reading of the quoted sentence is that while some attempts may fail to make the distinction in question, others may succeed, which further reads that in principle it is possible to tell who is (what-is-a-) bidialectal person, or who is a bilingual person. Continuing that reasoning, it would be further claimed I think that we are now unable to clearly state the difference between the two, but one day we are going to be able to do so. This brings me to (3).

(3) Formulations where the 'we are unable now but will be able in the future' stance is expressed explicitly, e.g.,

'Ob das Niederländische ein deutscher Dialekt oder überhaupt zum Deutschen zu zählen sei...oder ob im Elsass deutsch gesprochen wird, ist damit noch nicht geklärt (my emphasis, K.J.)' (Löffler 1985:60).

Needless to say, in order to clarify that question we would first need to answer the questions of what 'das Niederländische' is, of what 'dialect' is, of what 'Deutsch' is, and possibly others. Is the author of the above question an essentialist? The noch nicht component makes me suppose so. Here, again, similarly to (2) above, the reasoning is, I think, that that question is answerable in some absolute sense, and that it will be answered in the future.

(4) Existential formulations of the following kind: 'Is there really such an entity as the 'middle middle class'' (Wardhaugh 1986:143).

One reading of this question is the essentialist reading: 'Does middle middle class exist as a group of people clearly distinct from other groups, such as for instance upper class?'. If we are ready to give the author the benefit of the doubt, then the reading could be: 'Is it justifiable, from the point of view of the problem that we are trying to solve, to distinguish middle middle class as a theoretical category?'.

Incidentally, it has been suggested to me by Edmondson (personal communication) that perhaps my detecting essentialism in an author's text is a function of the author's style (such as using left-to-right definitions, e.g., 'language is...'), and does not at all follow from his/her philosophical commitment to ultimate definitions. While this may in fact sometimes be true (particularly in those cases which I call 'apparent essentialism cases'), I feel convinced that in the overwhelming majority of the cases that I have studied the matter is not merely stylistic. Usually there is
more evidence in one author's text (beyond the evidence quoted here) which suggests essentialism. I have not included those other parts of texts here for space limits. Interestingly, in some cases I have been able to confront an author's oral statement with his written work, and both have given evidence for the author's essentialist thinking.

I repeat that (1) through (4) above as well as definition formulations either reflect the author's essentialist thinking or induce the reader to think that the author is an essentialist. While in individual cases the outside critic is unable to say whether the former or the latter is true, the wrong-doing is there. In Part III of this paper, I give a number of suggestions as to how 'apparent essentialism' could be avoided.

Before giving those suggestions, however, I wish to provide some more quotations in support of my claim on the existence of essentialism in sociolinguistics. The reader who may still remain unconvinced about the legitimacy of this claim is requested to make note of the following:

'The concept of 'diglossia' has been applied, with varying degrees of conviction, to several types of speech community, and it is now taken for granted that the label should be part of any attempt at typological classification of sociolinguistic situations. This has led in many cases to confusion rather than clarification, and to much tortured debate about the precise meaning of diglossia and what really constitutes a diglossic situation (my emphasis, K.J.)' (Winford 1985:345).

'Tanzania's linguistic composition is complex, for there are today over one hundred vernacular language groups. This is, however, only a rough estimate, since little analysis has been done as to what objectively constitutes a dialect, and what a language (my emphasis, K.J.)' (Zuengler 1985:242).


And,

'What would help the sociolinguist most in his work would be if he could identify some kind of natural speech community with reference to which he could make all his generalizations, and much of sociolinguistics has in fact been carried out on the assumption that this is possible! (my emphasis and interjection, K.J.)' (Hudson 1980:29). And,

'Few problems continue to generate so much endeavor and so much conflict as the problem of style. Even conferences are called to attempt to answer the questions: 'What is style? (my emphasis, K.J.), how can we study it? ... Marozean began by admitting that the question of style is as open today as it was two millennia ago. Some progress was made in the nineteenth century when scholars began 'traiter de style comme une object de science', but consequently the question of what style is (my emphasis, K.J.) became more pressing' (Gray 1969:7-8).
PART III

It has been my task in some of the preceding paragraphs to show that the existence of essentialism in sociolinguistics is not the result of my concoction or fantasy. As mentioned above, some arguments and discussions leave little doubt that we deal with essentialist reasoning. It is also mentioned above that, in addition to those fairly clear cases, there is some evidence in the literature (as well as in the spoken discourse around us, in fact) pointing to what I call 'apparent essentialism'. Those are the cases where one can easily infer essentialism, but where at the same time, given the benefit of the doubt, imputing essentialism may perhaps be unfair. To all the authors fitting in that category, I would like to suggest the following:

(1) Give definition that connotes the right-to-the-left orientation (cf. p. 2). 'The study of language in relation to society is called sociolinguistics' (or something like: 'I suggest that we call the study of language in relation to society sociolinguistics'), rather than: the left-to-the-right orientation, as in, for example, 'Sociolinguistics is the study of language in relation to society'.

(2) Do not use the term 'proving' in philosophically and methodologically sensitive contexts because to the philosophically interested reader or listener 'proving' suggests final, positive knowledge, certainty, precision, and ultimate explanation, i.e., essentialism.

(3) Do not give the impression that it is only those concepts that you deal with that are difficult to define whereas many others, or most others do not really create a problem. Clearly, the impression in question should not be given because no one concept can be precisely or ultimately defined. Similarly, do not give the impression that some concept or a given set of concepts have not been 'explicated' so far because researchers have simply been unable to explicate them as yet. If necessary in the context of some problem solving, the reader should always be told point-blank that an 'explicated' or 'precise' concept is only a phantom.

Similarly, do not give the reader or listener the impression that the fuzziness that you refer to is something extraordinary, or perhaps endemic to the phenomenon of your concern. Again, if necessary in the context of some problem solving, the reader should be told explicitly that fuzziness is everywhere to be found; this is in spite of the fact that the degree of fuzziness may vary significantly (i.e., from very close to discrete to extremely fuzzy) depending on the phenomenon tackled.

In view of what was said in PART I of this paper, it should become evident to the reader by now that essentialist sociolinguistics is untenable and ought to be abandoned. It appears that numerous attempts to unequivocally define such notions as 'speech community', 'style', 'sociolect', 'dialect', and very many others, have not produced any successful results. In connection with that, precision, or
exactness in general, turned out to be an unattainable goal. Clearly, the result in question is not at all a function of the complexity, specificity, unique nature of the discipline, or any inherent intricacy of the concepts that the discipline makes use of. On the contrary, our brief discussion in the first part of this paper indicates that essentialist thinking pertaining to any discipline will bring about results comparable to those of essentialist sociolinguistics.

NOTES

1. I wish to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, which sponsored my research during the academic year 1986/87. The present paper is the result of a part of this research.

2. The question of definitions as helping clarify problems is important especially in the context of Popper's general argument, present in all his writings, intended to downplay the significance of definitions. Popper is unappreciative of the function of definitions in science unless some (and obviously never ultimate, precise, unambiguous) definition may help clarify the problem into which research is attempted. In his philosophy of science, Popper attributes utmost value to explicit formulation of problems, and he views definitions as valuable only to the extent that they contribute to that problem formulation.

3. Korzybski published his famous book Science and Sanity in 1933; Popper's first original German edition of The Logic of Scientific Discovery (where he first mentioned 'essentialism') appeared in 1934. In neither of the books do we find any trace of influence of one author upon the other.

4. For more detailed analysis of the relationship between Popper, General Semantics, some aspects of Cognitive, Prototype-oriented linguistics, and sociolinguistics, see Janicki in preparation.

5. The way all these questions have been asked (whenever I heard such questions asked) indicates to me quite unequivocally that they were questions asking for the real, natural, the one good definition. I came to this conclusion on the basis of the context of these questions in the discussion, including paralinguistic phenomena.

6. Certainly, looking for the right, 'this one proper' definition has been the practice not only in the area of sociolinguistics. The whole of linguistics has always been flooded with definitions (which, though for different reasons, is perhaps best illustrated in Grucza 1983), and that may actually have been one of the reasons why the whole of linguistics, whatever orientation one may think of, has not produced so far any remarkable research results.

7. The underlined part of the sentence translates to me into 'when we do not know what language really is'.
Interestingly, Gray adds: "Regardless of the amount of effort, money, and time expended on the problem [of establishing what style is] results curiously fail to materialize" (Gray 1969:8).

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