Based on the author's experience as a professor of educational administration, this monograph is an argument for establishing a link between the humanities and instruction in school administration. Part 1 discusses the instrumental value of the humanities in administrative preparation and recounts the limitations of past attempts by the University Council for Educational Administration (UCEA) to incorporate the humanities. Part 2 is a discourse titled "Chester Barnard's Conception of Authority Considered in the Context of Sophocles' Antigone' as Adapted by Jean Anouilh." Part 3 is entitled "Dante's De Monarchia': An Early Italian Renaissance Backdrop for Thinking about Thomas Jefferson's Wall of Separation'." Part 4 discusses art and artists in their role as imagemakers of a zeitgeist and concludes by emphasizing the importance of cultural sensitivity in institutional leadership. Part 5, entitled "Clio's Footprints in the Textbook Literature of Educational Administration," discusses the importance of historiography in understanding thematic trends in the development of textbooks on educational administration. The third edition is enlarged with a new section on Shakespeare that integrates Machiavellian ideas and their impact on Shakespeare's conception of political power, especially on the tetralogy called the Henriad. An extensive bibliography is included. (LMI)
PATHWAYS
TO THE HUMANITIES
In School Administration

Samuel H. Popper
PATHWAYS TO THE HUMANITIES IN SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION

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Third Edition

homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto
Terence

The University Council for Educational Administration
116 Farmer Building
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In Memory of Sidney Lawrence

“Ein voller Becher Weins zur rechten Zeit
Ist mehr wert als alle Reiche dieser Erde!”

Gustav Mahler, *Das Lied von der Erde*
This book is a masterpiece in contemporary school administration literature. Machiavelli, in his introduction to *The Prince*, expressed the fear that he might be thought presumptuous because he differed from other writers on the art of governing. Professor Popper has dared to be different from other writers, not on the matter of governing, but on the matter of how to present leadership in a way that grasps the totality and complexity of the human condition in our society.

Professor Popper suggests that the humanities can grasp the totality of modern man in all kinds of situations; both micro and macro in scope. He holds that the humanities are preeminently equipped aesthetically to sharpen empathic insight by means of their own way of knowing. To this writer, it is the key we are searching for in our teaching of school administration. What is and what ought to be?

This book is one of the best arguments for establishing a link between the humanities and departments of School Administration in our colleges and universities. In fact, it is a good directional guide of where professors in these two areas can and should teach together in workshops, seminars, and classes. Professor Popper has had this experience. He and a colleague in the humanities collaborated in a seminar for school administrators in the field. It was received with great enthusiasm by the administrators and, in the evaluation, a substantial number of participants spoke of the seminar as one of the best educational experiences that they had encountered. A similar seminar under the direction of Professor George Chambers was given at the University of Iowa with a like reaction from participants.

The author of *Pathways to the Humanities in School Administration* emphasizes two important elements for his colleagues in administration and the liberal arts to consider: 1) This book is just a start; 2) there are other aesthetic pathways to understanding the social and political forces around us. The author has demonstrated that the humanities can be used as an instrument to provide insight into the administrative process and the contemporary theories used to explain it.
Professor Popper demonstrates that he is a scholar both in school administration and the liberal arts. His book moves from contemporary administration theory to antiquity smoothly and in a meaningful way.

This book is an eloquent and practical approach to the humanities as a source of knowledge in administration. It provides a pathway to communicate with others about what we do as administrators.

Willard R. Lane
Professor of Educational Administration
University of Iowa and President, Board of Trustees,
UCEA, 1968-1970
Publisher's Note

I saw the new film version of Shakespeare's Henry V. It is a powerful film and my appreciation of it was enhanced greatly by my having read previously the Shakespeare material added to this third edition of *Pathways to the Humanities in School Administration*. Having been predisposed to juxtapose the heady questions facing King Henry with contemporary challenges, I was reminded of the need to make educational leadership human. Ironically, the larger-than-life cinematic Henry dramatizes the need to restore the human proportion. The compassion, resoluteness, vitality, and humor of the king, created by Shakespeare over 400 years ago, scorns the centuries with its relevance and banishes mechanical/technical definitions of leadership.

The humanities are celebrations of what is human and important to our consciousness. When we are deeply distracted, especially in times of upheaval and change, the humanities guide the human spirit. And so, UCEA is happy to publish a newly expanded edition of *Pathways to the Humanities* at a time when the globe is preoccupied with social change and the reform of North American education is urgently needed. Regardless of the schools reformers will create in future decades, we know that our children must learn from environments that celebrate humanity, its emotions, strengths, accomplishments, and weaknesses. School leaders need to be in touch with this humanity as they build learning environments for the future. *Pathways to the Humanities* is a good starting place.

I hope this book will stimulate the inclusion of humanities content in administrator preparation programs. We are grateful to Professor Popper for this wonderful volume; surely it will endure as a major contribution, touching and changing the lives of many who lead in schools.

Patrick B. Forsyth  
Executive Director, UCEA  
March, 1990
Author’s Preface

Pathways to the Humanities has been germinating in my thoughts since the early 1960s when I served on a UCEA Task Force on Interdisciplinary Content. I was at the time also reading extensively in the philosophy of aesthetics. John Dewey’s Art as Experience I had read before. Upon rereading it then in conjunction with F. S. C. Northrop’s The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities, actually my first encounter with Northrop’s philosophical ideas, I became convinced, as Jack Culbertson was already, that the humanities also ought to be explored for usable “interdisciplinary content” in administrative preparation.

It was my intent at the time to write on the subject for publication, but somehow there was always something else on my agenda which required more immediate attention and time. Then when Jack was about to leave UCEA service, he prepared a detailed memorandum for the file in which, under “unfinished business,” he urged continued UCEA initiatives in the humanities. Charles Willis, his successor as Executive Director of UCEA, was responsive and within several months after he had taken office I had my first contact with him. We were of one mind that the time was right for a renewal of the UCEA effort in the humanities.

My biggest challenge in the writing of Pathways was in the selection of relevant material from the humanities. There was so much to choose from and what was selected had to be compatible with my purpose. I had intended at first, as an example, to use Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman in a section on the motivational value of mythology in social organization, but decided to go with Sophocles’ Antigone instead because of its larger capacity to demonstrate the instrumental value of the humanities in administrative preparation, which, after all, was central to my purpose.

Both plays depict with dramatic impact the sanctioning force of mythology in the universal human situation. For Willy Loman, the salesman, it is the Horatio Alger myth and for Antigone it is the
mythology in Hesiod's *Theogony*. But Sophocles' *Antigone* is also a play about moral constraints in the use of normative power and, therefore, it seemed to me better suited for a treatment of Chester Barnard's conception of "authority." Moreover, *Antigone* afforded me also the opportunity to draw idiomatically from the aesthetic riches in Greek classical antiquity by means of Jean Anouilh's freestyle adaptation of it. Perhaps some future enlarged edition of *Pathways* will include a section on the importance of heroic mythology in social organization.

My hope is that *Pathways* will motivate others in school administration to find their own pathways to the humanities. Indeed, as the reader will note, the definite article "the" is not in the title. Not only are there other pathways to the humanities, but also pathways to the performing arts that ought to be explored. Richard Wagner's tetralogy *Der Ring des Nibelungen*, for one illustration in the performing arts, is myth-based music drama on the grand scale. In it, the "chief executive officer" of a Godhead domain—Wotan—finds his executive capacity disastrously ensnared in moral transgressions of his own making. Wagner's libretti of *Der Ring des Nibelungen*, incidentally, are available in English translation.

Several of the methods in *Pathways* which I urge for bringing the humanities to school administration have been used with telling success at the University of Minnesota. Some of these I feel ought to be noted here.

The Art Museum of the University of Minnesota, a first-rate teaching collection, has provided my seminar in applied humanism ready access to masterpieces of nineteenth and twentieth-century American art. Likewise, colleagues in the Department of Art History have been willing collaborators. It was my late friend Sidney Lawrence who was the first of several art historians to join with me in formal instruction.

I found willing collaborators also among colleagues in the Classics Department. Professors Robert P. Sonkowsky and Helen Moritz, both in Classics, and I wrote a proposal for the University of Minnesota Educational Development Program in 1972 and we
received a substantial grant to develop a graduate-level applied humanities seminar which is now cross-listed between the Departments of School Administration and Classics.

A small grant from the Minnesota Humanities Commission in 1978 enabled Professor Jeremiah Reedy, Classics Department of Macalester College, and myself to organize a six-session seminar for the West Metropolitan School Superintendents Association of Minneapolis-St. Paul on the theme, “Applied Humanism in Executive Decision Making.” Most of the participants held the doctorate and, therefore, did not need academic credit. They did receive renewal credits for continuing licensure. Attendance at each session was near capacity and the seminar itself received high praise from an external evaluator designated by the Minnesota Humanities Commission.

In all, nothing else that I have written has given me as much satisfaction as has the writing of *Pathways*. The reason? It is pay-back time for me. My own professorial development in school administration has benefited greatly from learning opportunities which UCEA has provided me over the years. My first contact with UCEA was in a 1959 Career Development Seminar at Northwestern University. I have been since then a UCEA Plenary Session Representative, have served on several UCEA task-force groups, have organized two UCEA Career Development Seminars at the University of Minnesota, and have been twice appointed a UCEA Program Associate. For all of these enriching experiences, and others, *Pathways* is offered in professional appreciation of the UCEA mission.

*Pathways*, in manuscript form, was the beneficiary of valued criticism from two esteemed colleagues: Professors Donald J. Willower and Jack A. Culbertson. I am beholden to each of them for having taken time from a busy schedule to read the manuscript and to give me their reaction comments. However, the embarrassment of flaws in the published work is mine alone.

Professor Willard R. Lane has written a gracious “Foreword.” His good judgment of my effort is especially welcome because it was his mentorship when he was at the University of Minnesota which had
encouraged my participation in evolving UCEA programs. I thank him for both. Special thanks are due Elizabeth Blurton, Arizona State University, who edited the manuscript and to Lynnette Harrell and Rita D. Gnap; their mastery of the computer/word processor has spared me the nightmares of modern-day publishing.

S. H. P.
June 15, 1985
Author's Preface to the Third Edition

It was not my intention to write another preface to *Pathways* after it was first published in 1985. My rationale for the work, stated in the first preface, has not changed. No preface was written for the 1987 edition. I would not have written any for this one either except for the intervention of what for me were two momentous events; one of joy, the other of sadness.

The first of these was the birth of two grandsons, Daniel and Alexander, six weeks apart. They came along toward the end of 1987 when I still was undecided whether to enlarge *Pathways* with a section on Machiavelli or Shakespeare. Earlier, Bill Lane and I had put together a humanities-based leadership development program for school executives at the University of Iowa and, largely at Bill’s urging, we had devoted an entire week-end session to Shakespeare.

Bill loved the Shakespeare plays and he was well grounded in Machiavelli’s mind-scape. He thought I ought to enlarge *Pathways* with two new sections: Machiavelli and Shakespeare. I had a problem with this. Machiavelli, of course, has been acknowledged universally as a towering figure of the Italian Renaissance. He is identified, however, more with the founding ideas in political science than with belletristic literature. Would a free-standing section on Machiavelli be distracting in a work meant to focus on the instrumental value of the humanities for administrative leadership?

Then, August 3, 1988, Bill died. Coincidentally, it was about that time also when I had decided to resolve the problem by enlarging *Pathways* with Shakespeare and to work into the criticism Machiavelli’s salient ideas and their impact on Shakespeare’s conception of political power; more especially so on the tetralogy which is called the Henriad. Bill, I know, would have approved.

Willard (Bill) Lane, 1918-1988, was a gifted teacher, a productive scholar, and a giving human being. Students and colleagues, myself among the latter, have been beneficiaries of his large capacity for kindness. He has served his professorial calling with devotion. This was acknowledged by his colleagues when they elected him to
the prestigious office of President, Board of Trustees, the University Council for Education and Administration.

The enlargement of Pathways with a Shakespeare criticism is my personal farewell to Bill. Also, it was written in the hope that his grandchildren and mine someday also will discover Shakespeare's dramatic verse, and come to love the enchantment of his genius as we have.

My thanks to Dr. Patrick B. Forsyth for having made available to me the support of UCEA staff and office facilities, to the Wilson Library at the University of Minnesota, to the Folger Shakespeare Library for facilitative courtesies, to Charmin Smith, for whom the wordprocessor "sings" at her command, and to Arthur S. Winthrop for a thorough proof-reading of the manuscript to spare me the embarrassment of a gremlin-infested publication.

S.H.P.
February 7, 1990
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The appointment in 1905 of George D. Strayer and Elwood P. Cubberly as professors in school administration was the beginning of professional preparation for this field of administration in the United States. Academic offerings before then typically were little more than an extension of the teacher-education program. Columbia University, in its Teachers College catalogue of 1899-1901, announced administrative preparation as, "A graduate course leading to the Higher Diploma for research and investigation in any field of education, and for the highest professional training of teachers in colleges and normal schools, and of superintendents, principals and supervisors of public schools."

Discrete programs for school administration did evolve eventually. They were clinically based for the most part and they stayed much the same until after World War II. Cognitive content stressed techniques of the "practical," it was atheoretical and, as Daniel Griffiths (1956) has summarized administrative preparation during the first half of the twentieth century, "School administration had generally lacked a unifying theory around which to solidify. It had lacked a way of looking at itself" (p. 4).¹

Things changed in the early 1950s. School administration had turned to the social and behavioral sciences in search of usable knowledge for the conceptual enrichment of its preparation programs. It was the beginning of a so-called "theory movement" in the field
which, in 1956, brought into existence the University Council for Educational Administration (UCEA).

Initiatives for the use of academic disciplines in administrative preparation came from three organized efforts. Two of these already were on line by the time UCEA was founded as a membership consortium of Ph.D.-granting universities: The National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration, organized in 1947, and the Cooperative Program in Educational Administration, which came on the scene in 1950 with generous support from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation. By and large, however, these two efforts had but a modest impact on program sophistication by the time UCEA had received its charter. An assessment by Andrew Halpin of their developmental impact is informative:

The National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration . . . was aware of some of the developments in the social sciences. Yet when the Cooperative Program in Educational Administration . . . began in 1950, its initial projects paid little heed to the new approach to administration; they tended to ignore the role of theory in research. (p. xi)

UCEA program initiatives, on the other hand, did accelerate the pace of theoretic sophistication. In its first year, UCEA joined with Teachers College and the Educational Testing Service in a theory-based research project which, among other outcomes, had generated empirical data for the Whitman School simulation. The second year saw the Career Development Seminar launched; a program which has as its purpose, still, to take professors of UCEA member universities to the frontier of new ideas and trends.

Altogether, the UCEA agenda was to enrich the intellectual content of preparation programs, to help them break with their atheoretical antecedents, and otherwise to provide leadership in the advancement of school administration as a field of scholarship and practice. Donald Willower (1975), the then UCEA President, assessed the UCEA performance record and he concluded, “At its best, UCEA has been able to stimulate vision, raise sights, and foster excellence in Educational Administration” (p. 457). In the years
following Willower's assessment, and to this day, the UCEA presence in school administration has been the point of forward movement in the field. Select UCEA task-force groups of professors have revitalized periodically simulation materials and have produced literature in such diverse areas as Special Education and Futurology. In time, UCEA also published two refereed journals in school administration, each with an independent editorial board.

The foregoing narrative of UCEA efforts to enrich the cognitive content of preparation programs provides a facilitating contrast for its only so-so success with a like effort in the humanities. The following statement from a UCEA "Annual Report" (1966-67) is a revealing assessment of the UCEA humanities effort:

Concentrating specifically upon the preparation of educational administrators, the University Council for Educational Administration in 1963 established a task force charged with exploring the feasibility of incorporating humanities content into preparatory programs. This resulted in a 1963 career development seminar at the University of Oklahoma at which the relationships between philosophy and educational administration were explored in a series of papers, and in a 1965 Humanities Task Force meeting at the University of Virginia during which participants reacted to a position paper, supporting the use of humanities content in administrator preparation programs. Significant program changes, however, have not resulted from the work of this task force, and those innovations which have occurred comprise a variety of isolated attempts by individual professors with exceptionally strong commitment to the idea of the Humanities Task Force. (p. 3)

Notwithstanding this bleak self-assessment, UCEA did not abandon its quest of usable content in the humanities. UCEA plenary-session discussions to set the agenda for the 1974-79 program period included a reconsideration of the humanities as a source of knowledge utilization in preparation programs. Once again, alas, there was little to show at the end of that five-year UCEA program period. And to this day there still is a marked diffidence in preparation programs toward the humanities. What accounts for this attitude? Two explanations come to mind.

First, the pervasive attitude seems to be that the humanities as high
culture are only of consummatory value for school administrators. Everyone, so goes the argument, ought to be sensitized in human-relations skill by the aesthetic richness in the humanities and this, by specialization conventions in academia, is the task of a humanities faculty. But in an applied field, such as administration and its self-affirmed preoccupation with the practical, one also has to lay out in clear view the instrumental value of the humanities to practice. How, specifically, will preparation programs in school administration, already laden with courses in personnel management, school law, plant development, statistics, and the like, gain in practicality from encounters with the humanities?

Second, advocates of the humanities in school administration have not presented ways-and-means models of how belletristic content might be integrated with other components of preparation programs. It is one thing to say “yes” to the humanities, but quite another to find instrumental applications for their content in program contexts.

If, indeed, these explanations summarize the pervasive attitude in the field, then the first of these is flawed by a hidden assumption which seems to equate the “human-relations model” with “the human-resources model” in management process. But the qualitative difference that sets these models apart is important to specify.

The human-relations model is anchored in civilizing assumptions and objectives, whereas the human-resources model is anchored in assumptions and objectives of administrative transactions between idiographic and nomothetic tensions in formal organization. It is a qualitative difference of importance to the management process.

The former is the quintessential and universal “golden-rule” model, whereas the latter is a model, to use Norbert Wiener’s language, for “the human use of human beings.” More specifically, it is facilitative of administrative transactions between role and personality in formal organization. Members of the organization, in both of these models, have to be respected as human beings and made to feel wanted. However, and this is the critical differentiating value, the sociological significance of the human-resources model is in-
formed by its instrumental orientation. People as role-incumbents contribute with a heightened motivation to the attainment of organizational goals when administrative decisions are attuned to their idio- graphic need-disposition.9

The two-fold task ahead, then, is to demonstrate the instrumental value of the humanities to administrative practice and to suggest feasible instructional methods of integrating their content with practice-oriented objectives in administrative preparation.

2

Leadership and Followership

All preparation programs in school administration have in common the goal of training for leadership. But what is leadership? How is one to distinguish a leader from the nonleader in an administrative role? These are researchable questions and, indeed, there is extant a considerable literature which addresses the multitude of variables in administrative relations which inform these questions. For the task at hand, however, it is enough to state that administrative control which obtains compliance to management decisions by means of a coercive capacity; that is, the enforcement of bureaucratic rules and regulations, is by no stretch of the imagination an exercise of leadership. The sine qua non concomitant of leadership is followership; a condition that is not there when, in a formal interactive relationship, A controls the role-behavior of B not because B is persuaded by the leadership influence of A, but rather because A has an implicitly acknowledged right from B to use authority and, therefore, B grants compliance to administrative directives from A.10

Here exactly is the rub! The skill to shift from a reliance on a coercive capacity in administrative control to a reliance on leadership influence is idiographic. It is a skill derived from multiple insights into the human situation in formal organization. And one such is what
psychologists call empathic insight.

A constituent element in administrative leadership is an ability to *know* empathically the role strain human beings encounter in complex systems of organization. The humanities, it is urged now, are preeminently equipped aesthetically to sharpen empathic insight by means of its own way of *knowing*. John Ciardi (1972), poet and literary critic, thinks of this type of knowing as “esthetic wisdom.” Here is his vivid illustration of “esthetic wisdom:”

Years ago, the psychiatrist Frederick Wertham spent many hours interviewing a young man charged with matricide. The young man was nearly illiterate; yet, as Wertham listened, he began to feel that he had heard it all before. He eventually turned to *Hamlet* and then to Aeschylus’ *Oresteia*. In these plays, Wertham found much of what he had just heard from the young man he had been interviewing—not exactly the same words, but the same feelings stated in the same order.

Wertham need not have felt surprise. He had located in the plays that ability to project oneself vicariously into an emotional situation, which is exactly what we expect of great artists and is what lesser artists try to achieve.

Aeschylus and Shakespeare were not matricides. They were special men capable of understanding what is human. When the human thing turned out to be a matricide, they imagined themselves in that situation (sent out their nerve nets) and brought back exactly the reactions and the order of reactions the clinician will eventually parse out of the actual matricide.

I don’t like the word “wisdom.” It tends to sit a bit sententiously in my vocabulary. Yet every word will find its exact place in time, and here no other will do. That body of knowledge and experience that senses the world as Aeschylus and Shakespeare sensed it is Esthetic Wisdom. Art is not its ornament but its way of knowing. It is what Robert Frost called “a thought-felt thing.” It is the essential human act and the consequence of good art. It is what Vergil represents in the *Divine Comedy*—not Human Reason, and not Antireason, but reasoning that leads to a way of seeing, recognizing, reacting, and giving order to.

(Ciardi’s definition of “esthetic wisdom” as a special type of enlightenment is well taken, as is his illustration of its usefulness to a clinical process. Wertham’s echoic response was triggered by what F. S. C. Northrop (1972) thinks of as “the aesthetic component of
reality" (p. 175). It enabled him to relate with a heightened empathy to the significant other in a professional encounter. Aesthetic enlightenment, likewise, can be useful to the clinical process of administration.

It comes to this: If a program objective in administrative preparation is to lay a foundation for leadership behavior which will be sensitive to the idiographic in formal organization, then Ciardi’s “esthetic wisdom” is a useful source for the cultivation of empathic skill. It is a type of skill which enables one to know by means of intuitive and appreciative perception the emotional state of another. Theodor Lipps, a German phenomenologist of the nineteenth century, had called this type of knowing *Einfühlung*: empathy.

Empathic skill can be of considerable instrumental value to administrative process in the all-important leadership task of fusing informal organization with formal organization. When the tactical objective is to keep in low profile the power dimension of administrative office and to maximize idiographic opportunities to raise system efficiency, then empathy-based perceptions of formal organization are indeed an asset to administrative leadership.

Psychological science can, and does, provide a cognitive foundation for empathic insight into the human situation. Wertham, the psychiatrist, had no doubt learned how to use empathic skill in his medical training. It is an everyday tool in psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. However, as Ciardi has demonstrated, “esthetic wisdom” sharpens this skill with an enlightenment of its own. Enlightenment of this type, moreover, has still other uses in administrative preparation. A glance back in time will illustrate.

3

*Institutional Leadership*

The School of Scientific Management, of which Frederick Winslow Taylor was a founding figure, had provided the generic model for administrative preparation in all fields until to the end of
World War II. Then, the sustained impact of two connected interventions broke its hold. One of these was the publication of Chester Barnard’s *The Functions of the Executive*, the other was a critical need in post-bellum American society of institutional leadership in the management of organizations. A dynamic self-revitalization movement was under way and organizations had to be equipped by means of strategic planning with renewed adaptive capabilities.

Barnard’s *The Functions of the Executive*, published in 1938, was a landmark work. It brought fresh theoretical insight to the management of organized human enterprise. It laid a conceptual base, drawn largely from the earlier Hawthorne Studies, for a human-resources model in administration and, more directly to what was needed in the post-bellum period, it provided a handbook for institutional leadership. Its impact upon administrative preparation in the United States, at first put off by the war, was immediate after the war.

Preparation programs in school administration, nurtured now by the “theory movement,” also were responsive. Institutional leadership in school administration was made the guiding ideal of preparation. Then, when UCEA came on line, Barnard’s *The Functions of the Executive* became, and is still, a standard reference in the field.

The definition of “organization purpose,” one of the three “functions of the executive,” is for Barnard an unending administrative task in raising levels of *transcendence* in bureaucratic organization. Purpose-definition skill sets institutional leadership apart from mere management. At the foundation of this skill is what Barnard has called “moral creativeness.” He acknowledged the importance of “technological proficiency” in administrative leadership, but as he put it, “The strategic factor in the dynamic expression of leadership is moral creativeness, which precedes, but is in turn dependent upon, technological proficiency and the development of techniques in relation to it” (Barnard, 1971, p. 288).

Both the idea and the ideal of transcendence were not entirely new to the literature of school administration. Jesse Newlon, as one example, was of one mind with Barnard in urging institutional leadership in administration. In a book published in 1934, he wrote:
The need for efficiency in education cannot be questioned. But what is efficiency? Efficiency involves more than thorough applications of techniques in the mechanical aspects of administration—finance, buildings, equipment, child accounting, supervision, and the like. It involves the employment of broad social methods for the accomplishment of social purposes. (p. 237)

Newton, of course, was striking at the "cult of efficiency" which then had school administration in its grip. But its source, the School of Scientific Management, was at the time still the dominant influence in administrative preparation. After the war, with American society in dynamic transition, institutional leadership was an idea whose time had come.

Barnard the business executive and Newton the school executive-turned-academician, each out of a different field in administration, saw eye-to-eye the central task of institutional leadership: to harmonize mundane goals of formal organization with transcendent definitions of "organization purpose." The challenge for institutional leadership, therefore, is to generate moral creativeness with which to transmogrify bureaucratic rules and regulations into the language of social values.

Their shared view of institutional leadership was before long reinforced by a flowering literature in the sociology of formal organization. Philip Selznick (1957), whose Leadership in Administration was one of the first in this new literature, eloquently stated the Newton-Barnard idea of institutional leadership in one capitulated sentence: "The executive becomes a statesman as he makes the transition from administrative management to institutional leadership" (p. 4).

Eventually, the centrality of institutional leadership in administration also became a major theme in UCEA publications. "Administrators who head viable organizations," wrote Jack Culbertson (1962) soon after he had become Executive Director of UCEA, "must be concerned with much more than administrative process; the policy and purposes toward which these processes are directed are of equal, if not greater, significance" (p. 4). Clearly, Culbertson had in mind transcendent purpose definition in relation to the ubiquitous problem
Goal displacement by a reversal of ends and means values is an ever-present prospect in formal organization. The research literature has confirmed its reality by many studies. Culturally grounded and value-sensitive administrative action is the only viable defense. It is precisely for this reason that Selznick (1957) has fixed "the maintenance of institutional integrity" (p. 138) as a central task of administrative leadership. It is also, to repeat, the referent in Barnard's pithy "moral creativeness." All of which provides a formulable rationale for the humanities in the training for institutional leadership.

The humanities provide an aesthetic dimension to cognitively derived knowledge with which to reinforce leadership preparation. Cognitive content in most preparation programs is formed, by and large, around a configuration of three skills. Students are trained in technical-management skill to deal with organization as a formal system; to cope with clinical problems of bureaucratic effectiveness. They are trained in social-psychological skill to deal with organization as a personality system; to cope with clinical problems of motivation and efficiency. Last, and most illusive, they are trained in conceptualization skill to deal with organization as a cultural system; to cope with problems of institutional leadership.

Institutional leadership is society's sobriquet for the best in administrative practice. Selznick, and others, have equated skill in institution building with administrative statesmanship. But in this configuration of skills, skill in institution building holds the greatest challenge for training.

Skill in institution building, at the least, requires insight into the way organization-based mythology motivates goal attainment. But such insight also has to be coupled with insight into universal dilemmas of the human situation; of how, for example, humankind has been groping over the ages to discover its transcendental purpose, and of how it has been frustrated in this by an ascending domination of rational conventions in human enterprise. And nowhere is this insight more useful to administrative process than in strategic planning.

Formal organization has to attend periodically to a category of
recurring problems which are generated by what Max Weber has called “the problem of meaning.” Attention to this pattern-maintenance function—to use Talcott Parsons’ language—is where strategic planning begins; most usually with a declaration of the organization’s mission. It is at this stage that institutional leadership is in greatest need of humanistic perspective in order to be effective.17

To summarize: The foremost requisite of institutional leadership in administration is “moral creativeness” in the form of a purpose-defining skill which, when fused with bureaucratic and social-psychological skills, will facilitate the administrative integration of school organization as a formal system of differentiated roles, as a personality system of individuals whose psychological motivation in roles continually has to be reinforced by an optimum balance of burdens and gratifications, and as a cultural system whose dominant orientation in the social division of labor is to the socialization needs of society; again, Parsons’ functional imperative of pattern-maintenance. Purpose-defining skill includes: 1) the art of valuing in administrative decision-making, 2) cultural insight into the collective idealism of society and its relation to both genesis and charter myths, 3) knowing empathically of the nonrational in human enterprise, 4) awareness of the egocentric predicament in administrative behavior, and 5) a humanistically grounded perspective of the omnipresent Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft dilemma in formal organization. “Esthetic wisdom” in the humanities is available to be used, just as the social and behavioral sciences are used already, to enrich this training in administrative leadership.

4

Feasible Pathways

Several already familiar instructional methods are available for using the humanities in school administration. Method selection, as a tactical decision, will be affected by which pathway to the humanities is taken and by whether it is entirely a departmental initiative or
whether it is taken in collaboration with other faculty; say faculties in Philosophy, Art History, Humanities, or Classics.

1. One familiar method is case analysis. The so-called “Case Method,” of course, has been used in university instruction at least since the Harvard Law School of the 1870s. Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration has been identified with case-method instruction from about 1919. By the late 1950s, case method was brought to school administration first by Cyril Sargent and Eugene Belisle and then by Jack Culbertson and Daniel Griffiths.

Griffiths, especially, made an inventive application of the method by using social and behavioral science concepts and models—Selznick and Gouldner models—as tools for analyzing case material which had been prepared for preparation programs; The Jackson County Story (Goldhammer & Farner, 1969) for example. He appeared frequently on UCEA programs to demonstrate his way of analyzing case material, and, in quick-time, the Griffiths’ style had a wide diffusion in the field.

UCEA case-material preparation followed Paul Lawrence’s maxim, “A good case is the vehicle by which a chunk of reality is brought into the classroom . . . .” If “reality” is the controlling instructional value in a good case, and it ought to be, then the humanities have a boundless quantity of engaging and ready-made case material waiting to be used. Reality in human experience, after all, has been given a variety of ontological definitions, and are not belletristic depictions of experience the very essence of the humanities? Terence’s homo sum: humani nil a me alienum puto has been for centuries the universal attitude of the humanities.

The fine point is that ready-made case material in the humanities; the novel and even more so tragedy written for theater, lends itself exceedingly well to case-method analysis. Mutiny on the Bounty, an historical novel, is illustrative.

Transactions between nomothetic and idiographic values in the management of formal organization—in Chester Barnard’s sense between formal and informal organization—is a primary administrative role-expectation. It is this role-expectation, precisely, which
informs the theoretic usefulness of the role-personality model which Jacob Getzels and Egon Guba have adapted from Parsonian theory and have introduced to preparation programs in school administration. The following episode in *Mutiny on the Bounty* (Nordhoff & Hall, 1960) lights up this complex idea with aesthetic realism.

First is this exchange between Captain Bligh and Master-Mate Fletcher Christian before the mutiny:

Bligh: La-di-da, Mr. Christian! On my word, you should apply for a place as master of a young ladies' seminary! Kindness, indeed! Well, I'm damned.... A fine captain you'll make if you don't heave overboard such ridiculous notions. Kindness! Our seamen understand kindness as well as they understand Greek! Fear is what they do understand! Without that, mutiny and piracy would be rife on the high seas!

Christian: I cannot agree. Our seamen do not differ from other Englishmen. Some must be ruled by fear, it is true, but there are other, and finer men, who will follow a kind, just, and fearless officer to the death.

After the mutiny, Fletcher Christian now in command of the Bounty, addresses the crew to instruct them in the basics of reciprocal role-expectations:

There is one matter we will decide once for all ... and that is who is to be captain of this ship. I have taken her with your help, in order to be rid of a tyrant who has made life a burden to all of us.... In our situation a leader is essential, one whose will is to be obeyed without question. It should be needless to tell British seamen that no ship, whether manned by mutineers or not, can be handled without discipline. If I am to command the Bounty I mean to be obeyed. There shall be no injustice here. I shall punish no man without good cause, but I will have no man question my authority. (p. 38, 145-46)

*Mutiny on the Bounty* portrays dramatically structurally induced tensions in formal organization, but in the role-personality model these are depicted as abstractions. By joining the two in a case analysis, one has here a method whose instrumental value will be
acknowledged readily by most professors who are challenged to blend the abstractness of organization theory with empirical equivalents.

Because usable case material from bellettristic sources cannot be expected to have the sharp clinical focus of say *The Jackson County Story*, whose content was drawn from actual events in school-community relations, some may see in this a debilitating condition. For this reason, exactly, material from the humanities has to be selected with care so it will correspond with the objectives of instruction. Perfect artistic equivalents are rarities for much the same reason that social science theories rarely have perfect empirical equivalents. Another illustration.

Clifford Dowdey’s (1967) *Death of a Nation* is a near-perfect case for the study of leadership. Although it is a fictional account of the chance encounter in 1863 between the armies of Generals George G. Mead and Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg, it is nonetheless a fertile setting for the conceptually prepared student to contemplate nuances of leadership, and the limitations of leadership capacity in altered situations. Confederate Generals who were quite competent at Division-level command proved themselves failures when, by the constraints of altered field conditions, they were elevated by General Lee to Corps command.23

Still other case material is available in fictive depictions of human aberration in the pursuit of ideal-driven ends which lead to disaster. In these depictions lie embedded useable models and anti-models of value reversal in human enterprise.

Ciardi, earlier, had informed his definition of “esthetic wisdom” with a recital of how Frederic Wertham’s clinical psychoanalytic insight was enlarged by Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* and Aeschylus’ *Oresteia*. Ciardi could have elaborated further with the now-defunct Students for a Democratic Society—SDS.

When the organization of SDS was formed in 1962, at Port Huron, a manifesto was adopted which read in part:

> We regard men as infinitely precious and possessed of unfulfilled capacities for reason, freedom, and love . . . . Men have unrealized
potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity. The goals of men and society should be human independence: a concern with finding a meaning of life that is personally authentic one which has full, spontaneous access to present and past experiences. Human relationships should involve fraternity and honesty. (Wilson, 1972, p. 54)

Many of those who had signed this statement of student idealism were within a few years, in the words of James Wilson (1972), "... attacking universities, harassing those who disagreed with them, demanding political obedience, and engaging in deliberate terrorism" (p. 54). Social psychology, nodoubt, has a cogent clinical explanation for this incident of the nonrational in human behavior, and it is of value to have it, but Fyodor Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment, in the student Raskolnikov who commits two brutal murders to gain his own ideal-motivated ends, provides "esthetic wisdom" for the imagination to grasp its larger universal meaning in the human situation.

And who has endowed belletristic literature with more variants of what is universal in the human situation than William Shakespeare? No one, not in antiquity or in modernity! His depictions of the human predicament are as contemporary to this time as they were to the age of Elizabeth. Demonstrations of their usefulness in administrative preparation is the thrust of Part VI to follow. An episode of sexual harassment in Shakespeare's Measure for Measure (II, iv) will have to do for now as an example.

Angelo is selected by the Duke of Vienna to rule in his absence while he is abroad because:

If any in Vienna be of worth
To undergo such ample grace and honor,
It is Lord Angelo.

But straight-as-an-arrow Angelo soon is corrupted by his newly bestowed authority and gives free rein to lust when Isabella, a novitiate in a religious community, stands before him to plead for the life of her condemned brother. Shakespeare shows here in dramatization that this type of harassment in a hierarchically unequal relation-
ship is universal both in form and in its denial. How all-too contemporary is the following exchange between Isabella and Angelo once she is on to what he has in mind.

Isabella: Sign me a present pardon for my brother, 
Or with an outstretched throat I’ll tell the world aloud 
What man thou art.

Angelo: Who will believe thee, Isabel?
My unsoiled name, th’ austereness of my life 
My vouch against you, and my place in the state, 
Will so your accusation overweigh, 
That you shall stifle in your own report, 
And smell of calumny. I have begun; 
And now I give my sensual race the rein; 
Fit thy consent to my sharp appetite; 
Lay by all nicety and prolixious blushes, 
That banish what they sue for; redeem thy brother 
By yielding up thy body to my will; 
Or else he must not only die the death, 
But thy unkindness shall his death draw out 
To ling’ring sufferance. Answer me tomorrow, 
Or, by thy affection that now guides me most. 
I’ll prove a tyrant to him. As for you, 
Say what you can, my false o’erweighs your true.

And it is altogether useful in administrative preparation that students be disabused of the notion that Max Weber was the inventor of bureaucracy. By their immersion in Edward Gibbon's *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chapter 3, they will find in the distant past, not in perfect correspondence to be sure, a model of Robert Merton's (1968) "bureaucratic virtuoso" in the person of Emperor Caesar Augustus. Through administrative manipulations of power, and a cunning conformity to republican conventions, Augustus had transformed the Roman Republic into a monarchy. Also, from a reading of the *Cursus Honorum*, the civil service code-manual of the Empire, they will discover how the Romans socialized to bureaucratic roles during the period of *Pax Romana*. 
2. Comparative analysis is another method of using the humanities and, like case method, it is also an instructional tool already familiar to professional preparation. The most troublesome program objective in all fields of administrative preparation is the training in managerial ethics. Such instruction, especially in school administration, has to begin with a lesson which Émile Durkheim (1956) had taught his students at the Sorbonne, where he held professorial chairs in both sociology and education. He pressed upon his students in one lecture that:

Educational practices are not phenomena that are isolated from one another; rather, for a given society, they are bound up in the same system all parts of which contribute toward the same end: it is the system of education suitable to this country and to this time. Each people has its own, as it has its own moral, religious, economic system, etc. (p. 95)

Moral practice, following Durkheim, is not possible in vacuo. The practice of private banking in the United States is moral, in the Soviet Union it is immoral. Instruction in administrative ethics, therefore, without some axiological grounding is futile. Cultural sensitivity to the institutionalized value system of society, once again Parsons' pattern-maintenance system, is its essential stuff.

The acquisition of cultural sensitivity in administrative preparation, however, is no light task. Theoretical literature in the social and behavioral sciences can generate it cognitively, but the humanities will nurture it also aesthetically. Comparative analysis is an ideal instructional tool for the joining of the two in a learning experience. Not only is cultural sensitivity sharpened by such an exercise in comparative analysis, but so is the scholarly imagination.

Comparative analysis toward this end works best when it is set in concept-specific frames. Authority to use power in normative order, as an example, is a subject which is central in Sophocles' Antigone, Machiavelli's The Prince, and Chester Barnard's The Functions of the Executive. A comparative analysis of the three will generate an informative cross-reference to the legitimation of power in cultures separated by time and values. All that is needed in combination is a
concept-specific frame, excogitative imagination, and the right ques-
tions to sort out their commonalities and differences within the
structure of a taxonomy. A brief comment on these three works:

Barnard's *The Functions of the Executive*, as has been noted
earlier, is a standard reference in the literature of administration. His
ideas, however, are jarring for most students in a first encounter. This
is especially so upon first encountering his concepts of "authority," "zone

Sophocles' *Antigone* is a play out of Greek classical antiquity with
layers of meaning. At one level is the egocentric predicament in the
use of authority. Another level is focused on a reversal of ends and
means values. Still another level throws aesthetic light on the
importance of moral constraint in executive decisions to employ
coercion.

Machiavelli's *The Prince* was written as a guide to the practice of
statecraft in sixteenth-century Florentine society. It is, from one line
of vision, a sixteenth-century antecedent of *The Functions of the
Executive*. Machiavelli himself was a major figure of the Italian
Renaissance.

Another concept-specific frame in comparative analysis, to illus-
trate further, might be the centrality of values and valuing in institu-
tional leadership. These inform the ethical and the nonethical in
administrative behavior. Philosophy, especially axiology, is the
cognitive context for thinking about values and valuing. But are not
such problems encountered also in bellettristic literature? Yes.

It is quite correct to say, at a general level of discourse, that moral
philosophy has produced two basic theories in ethics: cognitivist and
noncognitivist. The former is associated in American philosophical
scholarship with the antinominalist pragmatism of Charles Sanders
Pierce, whereas the latter is associated with the eighteenth-century
nominalist idealism of George Berkeley and David Hume. Beyond
this level of background structuring, one has to reach back to four-
teenth-century scholasticism and the nominalism and antinominal-
ism, respectively, of William of Ockham and John Duns Scotus. Most programs in professional education seldom provide such an in-
depth learning experience in philosophy. Through the humanities, however, students in school administration can encounter these ethical theories in moral philosophy—the philosophical face of ethics—either as relativistic moral realism or as intuitionistic moral realism.

Relativistic moral realism is to be found in a plentiful variety of literary works. Examples are Amos Hawley’s *Executive Suite*, a novel which deals with the tensions of corporate infighting for executive succession, and Robert Browning’s *My Last Duchess;* a dramatic poem which, among other things, is a caricature of situational ethics. T. S. Eliot, likewise, fires moral imagination with *Choruses from “The Rock”*. Intuitionistic moral realism is to be found in George Bernard Shaw’s *Man and Superman*, a play whose creative inspiration was Henri Bergson’s moral philosophy. *Don Juan in Hell*, a dramatic reading for four characters, is an extended Act III of *Man and Superman* whose central theme is Bergson’s concept of a “life force”—*élan vital*. Then there is Albert Camus’ *The Fall*, a dramatic monologue whose inspiration was Existentialist moral philosophy.

These representative works are ready-made aesthetic settings for speculative thinking about the values-ethics nexus within concrete contexts of the moral dilemma. Their depiction of the human predicament straightaway will lead to moral philosophy, to theories in ethics, and to questions about moral behavior. What better way is there to illuminate moral issues and of cultivating what John Dewey has called “the habit of reflective thought?”

3. In all, both case-method and comparative analysis are especially attractive as instructional methods. But others, also familiar to instruction in school administration, should be considered. The following are suggestive:

- Shakespeare’s *Hamlet* provides the clue for how future UCEA simulations of reality could include material from the humanities. *Hamlet* is an Elizabethan model of the play-within-a-play and which by now is a familiar genre in theater. Why not do future UCEA simulations with a scenario that includes a story-line
rationale for, say, a showing of Antigone? Jean Anouilh’s adap-
tation of Antigone has been performed in modern dress on educa-
tional television, with a distinguished company of actors headed
by Fritz Weaver, and it should be available, therefore, in video-
tape. Educational television has other such video-tape gems
available to be used in the same way.

- UCEA simulation brings to mind “The Conference,” a filmed case
produced by UCEA and in much use with UCEA simulation of the
1960s. “The Conference” can stand as a production model for a
theme-specific mini art lecture in color video-tape. Such a lecture
would bring art criticism to administrative preparation for the pur-
pose of reinforcement in instruction. “The Ambassadors” by
Hans Holbein the Younger, the National Gallery in London, will
illustrate the instructional value of a theme-specific art lecture: let
the theme be “the egocentric predicament in administrative be-
havior.”

- The egocentric predicament is a hazard in all formal relationships
wherein one person is authorized, through legitimation, to use
power over another. Much has been written about the corruptive
headiness of power. Herodotus (1939)—c. 484-425 B.C.—is
witness to the antiquity of this type of corruption in human relation-
ships. In his history is written the following pithy observation of
the Persians:

> Of nations, they honor most their nearest, whom they esteem next to
themselves; those who live beyond these they honor in the second
degree; and so with the remainder, the farther they are removed, the less
the esteem in which they hold them. The reason is, that they look upon
themselves as very greatly superior in all respects to the rest of
mankind, regarding others as approaching to excellence in proportion
as they dwell nearer to them; whence it comes to pass that those who are
farthest off must be the most degraded of mankind. (Herodotus, 1939,
pp. 52-53)

Hans Holbein the Younger, of the German Renaissance and after 1536
Court Painter to Henry VIII of England, chose the symbolism of a
memento mori—a reminder of inevitable death—to caution viewers
of "The Ambassadors" about the egocentric predicament in power. Artists and writers of all periods have used the symbolism of a memento mori to state that "A last day is reserved to all of us."³⁰

"The Ambassadors," shows the memento mori as a skull in trick perspective set against symbols of formal office and the opulence of sixteenth-century mercantile capitalism. Artists by and large do not preach nor lecture; these are left to churchmen and academicians, but they do, as Part IV will show, provide aesthetic illumination for subject matter. In this instance, it is the theme of an egocentric predicament in high-status office. A more elaborate illustration is provided by art historian and critic Sidney Lawrence at the close of Part IV, later.

4. Still another method would have to be organized in collaboration with faculty in the humanities and in other fields of administrative preparation. Program initiatives of this kind will not be easy to implement, given the ingrained reticence toward interdisciplinary collaboration in academia. None the less, there is a great need of such a collaboration in all fields of administration.

Administrative preparation in all fields—business, education, social work, penology, and so forth—is in need of like aesthetic reinforcement in instruction. The tactical challenge is in how to join these diverse faculty interest; in a binding collaboration for the attainment of shared program objectives. A negotiation with interdisciplinary faculty might aim at the following collaboration:

- a seminar by a humanities faculty which has been prepared especially for students in all administrative fields,
- a regularly scheduled cross-listed catalogue offering between school administration and some department in the humanities group, and/or
- a short-term, but time-intensive, humanities institute, on or away from campus, modelled after the external program at Harvard, Columbia, Marquette, and other universities.
Pathways to the Humanities

5

Conclusion

To conclude, there are any number of pathways to the humanities and a variety of methods of using their content instrumentally in administrative preparation. Several of these pathways have been discovered already by inventive scholars in the social sciences. Alvin Gouldner in Sociology and Anthony Podlecki in Political Science, as examples, have demonstrated that belles-lettres works of Greek classical antiquity can be of instrumental value to the generation of fresh insight in the social sciences. Lewis Coser, for another, has discovered the availability of enlightening sociological insight in fiction literature. He holds:

Fiction is not a substitute for systematically accumulated, certified knowledge. But it provides the social scientist with a wealth of sociologically relevant material . . . . The creative imagination of the literary artist often has achieved insights into social processes which have remained unexplored in social science.31

Faculties in school administration, likewise, once they take pathways to the humanities, will find much that is useful to preparation programs.

But there is yet one other instrumental value in the humanities which, by itself, is deserving of an essay length commentary. It turns on the consequences of a consuming preoccupation with the practical in administration. Ciardi eloquently has addressed this occupational hazard in a talk to executives, "An Ulcer, Gentlemen, is an Unwritten Poem," who had come together for continuing professional development through the humanities. In it, he distinguishes between the two worlds of practicality and of creative imagination as follows:

The poet enters his world as an as if: he writes as if he were analyzing a real man seated before him . . . . The practical man has no such large freedom. He enters a world called is. When he is at work, he is plowing a field, he is assembling chemical apparatus, he is interviewing an
actual man whose name appears on the census listing and who is offering his services in return for real and taxable wages. . . . There is no poetry for the practical man. There is poetry only for the mankind of the man who spends a certain amount of his life turning the mechanical wheel. But let him spend too much of his life at the mechanics of practicality and either he must become something less than a man, or his very mechanical efficiency will become impaired by the frustrations stored up in his irrational human personality. An ulcer, gentlemen, is an unkissed imagination taking its revenge for having been jilted. It is an unwritten poem, a neglected music, an unpainted watercolor, an undanced dance. It is a declaration from the mankind of the man that a clear spring of joy has not been tapped, and that it must break through, muddily, on its own (Ciardi, 1957, p. 52).

Ciardi’s remarks provide just the right closure for this introduction. Now, on to the pathways!

Notes

1. See also Andrew W. Halpin (1958) Administrative Theory in Education, “Editor’s Introduction.” This volume contains the papers read at the first UCEA Career Development Seminar, cosponsored with the University of Chicago Midwest Administration Center, in 1957.


Culbertson has served UCEA with distinction as its Executive Director for twenty-two years. Halpin, a Social Psychologist, came to Educational Administration in the mid-1950’s and soon thereafter was established as a major figure in its “theory movement.”
3. The Cooperative Program in Educational Administration—CPEA—is no more, but the National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration is still active as National Council of Professors of Educational Administration. Its most enduring literary contribution to the field was published as a multi-authored work the year after the UCEA was organized. See, Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg (1957) *Administrative Behavior in Education*.

For more on the CPEA, see Hollis A. Moore, Jr., *Studies in School Administration* (1957).

4. One such early task force was the Interdisciplinary Content Task Force. It brought forth these two works: Lawrence Downey and Frederick Enns (1963), *The Social Sciences in Educational Administration* and Keith Goldhammer (1963), *The Social Sciences and the Preparation of Educational Administrators*.

5. See also, Robin H. Farquhar (1970), *The Humanities in Preparing Educational Administrators*.


For representative “isolated attempts at the humanities by individual professors,” see Willard R. Lane and Phillip T. West (1972); R. Oliver Gibson and Marilyn Stetar (1975); and Samuel H. Popper (1982).


7. For a well-crafted introduction to the aesthetic richness in the humanities, see *Articulating the Ineffable: Approaches to the*

8. The term “humanities,” as defined programmatically by the National Endowment for the Humanities, “includes, but is not limited to, the study of the following: language, both modern and classic; linguistics; literature; history; jurisprudence; philosophy; archaeology; the history, criticism, theory, and practice of the arts; and those aspects of the social sciences which have humanistic content and employ humanistic methods” (Jeremiah Reedy, 1979, p. 12).

9. For good textbook treatments of qualitative differences between “human relation” and “human resources” models, see Frederick Carver and Thomas Sergiovani (1975) and Robert G. Owens (1981, chap. 10).

Chester Barnard’s concept of an “economy of incentives” in work motivation is helpful in dealing with the values that differentiate these two models. A penetrating analysis of Barnard’s concept has been provided by Douglas E. Mitchell in a paper presented at the April, 1986 Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, “Inducement, Incentive and Cooperation: Barnard’s Concept of Work Motivation.”


11. One illustration of "moral creativeness," or of "transcendence," has been provided by George Bernard Shaw in the following exchange between Captain Robert de Baudricourt and Joan in the play *Saint Joan* (I, i).

Robert tells Joan the more devil a soldier is the better he will fight, "That is why the goddams [the English] will take Orleans. And you cannot stop them, nor ten thousand like you."

And Joan, inspired by voices of saints she claims to hear, responds, "One thousand like me can stop them. Ten like me can stop them with God on our side. You do not understand, squire. Our soldiers are always beaten because they are fighting only to save their skins; and the shortest way to save your skin is to run away. Our knights are thinking only of money they will make in ransoms: it is not kill or be killed with them, but pay or be paid. But I will teach them all to fight that the will of God may be done in France; and they will drive the poor goddams before them like sheep. You and Polly [Monsieur de Poulengey] will live to see the day when there will be but one king there: not the feudal English king, but God's French one."

Further elaboration of Barnard's statement is in Part II and in Part IV, later.

12. For more on the "cult of efficiency" in school administration, see Raymond E. Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency: A Study of Social Forces That Have Shaped the Administration of the Public Schools* (1962).

13. In the same publication (Culbertson, 1962), James G. Harlow, then Dean of the College of Education, University of Oklahoma, elaborated on Culbertson's statement in Chapter IV, "Purposing-Defining: The Central Function of the School Administrator."


The integrative value of organizational mythology is dealt with in textbook literature of other fields under a variety of headings. One such work, as an example, uses “organizational saga” as a sub-head and its authors state, “We use the concept of organizational saga to include the shared group fantasies, the rhetorical visions, and the narratives of achievements, events, and the future vision of dreams of the entire organization.” Ernest Bormann, William S. Howell, Ralph G. Nichols, and George L. Shapiro (1982), *Interpersonal Communication in the Modern Organization*.

16. An instructive elaboration on this theme will be found in Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Society*, translated by Charles P. Loomis (1957). For a humanist’s statement of this ubiquitous dilemma in a contemporary idiom, see Archibald MacLeish (1969), "The Revolt of the Diminished Man."


18. The Selznick and Gouldner models were adaptations of models depicting a variety of sociological and behavioral concepts. They were taken from James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (1958).

19. Perhaps the single publication which best illustrates the Griffiths’ style is Griffiths, *Human Relations in School*.


21. A line spoken by a character in one of the six comedies by Terence which have survived. “I am a man: nothing human is alien to me.”


23. Another example in literature of a near-perfect case, now for the study of obedience to orders—Barnard's three zonal responses to directives from a superior—is Stephen Crane’s Red Badge of Courage, most especially in the protagonist, Henry. In the vault of some film library is a movie version of Red Badge of Courage, directed by John Huston with Audie Murphy in the role of Henry. It is a short film, little remembered, but one of Huston’s masterpieces.


25. The concept of “bureaucratic virtuoso” is in Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 239.

26. It is instructive to call attention at this juncture to a paper Robin Farquhar had prepared for a UCEA-University of Alberta Career Development Seminar in 1979, “Ethics in Administra-
tion.” In it, Farquhar dealt with the problem of training for ethical behavior in administration. He suggested five approaches to the problem and one of them is through the humanities. He wrote, “It involves having recourse to the study of problems in values and moral dilemmas.” Robin H. Farquhar, “Preparing Administrators for Ethical Practice,” unpublished paper, p. 18.

27. There is a plentiful literature in the journals of administration to facilitate the use of Barnard's concepts as tools of analysis. One such is David Mechanic's (1962) "Sources of Power of Lower Participants in Complex Organizations.

Mechanic defines high-ranking positions and, in turn, lower stationed participants, in this way: “One might ask what characterizes high-ranking positions within organizations? What is most evident, perhaps, is that lower participants recognize the right of higher-ranking participants to exercise power, and yield without difficulty to demands they regard as legitimate.” He defines power as “any force that results in behavior that would not have occurred if the force had not been present” (Mechanic, 1962, pp. 350-51).

For ways of taxonomy construction, see Daniel E. Griffiths (1969), Developing Taxonomies of Organizational Behavior. Also useful is Bill McKelvey (1982), Organizational Systematics: Taxonomy, Evaluation, Classification.

28. In his Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, 1710, Berkeley held that particular qualities of objects are known only in the mind, and that they do not exist except as they are perceived by the mind. This nominalist philosophical attitude later was refined in the thoroughgoing skepticism of David Hume. A philosophically-grounded treatment of cognitivism and noncognitivism in moral philosophy is to be found in Sibina Lovibond (1983), Realism and Imagination in Ethics.

For an especially rewarding venture into philosophical attitudes of Hume and Berkeley in belles-lettres literature, see “A New Refutation of Time” in Jorge Luis Borges (1967), A Personal Anthology.

30. A line spoken in Oedipus at the end of Sophocles’ play, Oedipus the King.

A memento mori in Shakespeare is contained in the following exchange, between the King and Hamlet (Hamlet, V, iii):

Hamlet: A man may fish with the worm that hath eat of a king, and eat of the fish that hath fed on that worm.

King: What does thou mean by this?

Hamlet: Nothing but to show you how a king may go a progress through the guts of a beggar.

31. See Alvin W. Gouldner (1965), The Hellenic World: A Sociological Analysis, in 2 volumes; Anthony J. Podlecki (1966), The Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy; and Lewis A. Coser (1963), Sociology Through Literature, p. 3.

In a sentiment kindred to Coser’s, M. M. Kessler, a student of information systems in science, has stated “Even the masterpieces of scientific literature will in time become worthless except for historical reasons. This is a basic difference between the scientific and belles-lettres literature. It is inconceivable for a serious student of English literature, for example, not to have read Shakespeare, Milton, and Scott. A serious student of physics, on the other hand, can safely ignore the original writing of Newton, Faraday, and Maxwell.” Quoted in Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 28.

See the model art lecture by Sidney Lawrence at the close of Part IV, “Pablo Picasso,” for another statement of the same conclusion.
*** PART II ***

CHESTER BARNARD'S CONCEPTION
OF AUTHORITY
CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF
SOPHOCLES' ANTIGONE
AS ADAPTED BY JEAN ANOUILH

1

Barnard's Contribution to the Theory of Formal Organization

The extraordinary impact of Chester Barnard’s contribution to the theory of formal organization has been acknowledged in every field of administrative preparation. *The Functions of the Executive*, the only major book he has published, stands out in retrospect as a point of departure for the more sophisticated theoretical literature on formal organization which followed the decline of Scientific Management in the late nineteen thirties.¹

Barnard is not for light reading. As one biographical profile of him has put it, "The ponderousness of Barnard’s style is the mark, perhaps, of the amateur scholar."² He was also, one could add, a sometime lecturer and only an occasional writer.

After leaving Harvard University short of completing the bachelor’s degree, Barnard went to work for the American Telephone and Telegraph Company in the Statistical Department and culminated his nearly forty-year career with AT&T as President of New Jersey Bell Telephone. Despite a short-lived formal academic education, and notwithstanding his limitations as a writer, his ideas of formal organization, as they are laid out in *The Functions of the Executive*, have made their way into textbooks and the most frequently consulted reference works in all fields of administrative preparation.³ How is it,
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then, that his imprint is so strong?

The Functions of the Executive had its beginning as a series of eight lectures given by Barnard in 1937 at the Lowell Institute in Boston. Had these lectures been of a show-and-tell type; that is, descriptive narratives of Barnard’s executive-level experiences, it is not likely Harvard University Press would have published them in book form nor would it have celebrated its first printing with a thirtieth anniversary edition. Barnard, to be sure, did draw upon his own experience as a business executive, but he did much more.

Just as Talcott Parsons had devoted decades of intellectual effort to the construction of a cognitive map capable of depicting comprehensively the structural-functional configurations of “the social system,” so did Barnard set himself in the Lowell Institute Lectures to sketch the complex configurations of “the executive process” in formal organization. Barnard (1971) elaborated in the “Author’s Preface:”

To me it has long seemed probable that there are universal characteristics of organization that are active understandings, evaluations, concepts, of men skilled in organizing not only in the present but in past generations, which have also been perceived by careful and astute observers and students.

But nothing of which I knew treated of organization in a way which seemed to me to correspond either to my experience or to the understanding implicit in the conduct of those recognized to be adept in executive practice or in the leadership of organizations. Some excellent work has been done in describing and analyzing the superficial characteristics of organizations. It is important, but like descriptive geography with physics, chemistry, geology, and biology missing. More than the topography and cartography of organization would be necessary to understand executive functions; a knowledge of the kinds and qualities of the forces at work and the manner of their operation would also be needed. (p. XXVIII)

The comparison of Barnard with Parsons is altogether in place. Although there was no known collaboration between them in scholarship, there is nevertheless a marked correspondence between the ideas of Barnard and Parsons. Parsons himself has acknowledged
frequently the theoretical correspondence between himself and Barnard. The quintessential insight, to illustrate in an instant this correspondence, which springs from the Parsonian conceptualization of the social system is that formal organization is a cognitive abstraction. Barnard (1971) puts this as follows, "By definition there can be no organization without persons. However, ... it is not persons, but the services or acts or action or influences of persons, which should be treated as constituting organizations . . . ." (p. 83)

Also as with Parsons, the rational model of formal organization was for Barnard only a starting point. He had followed with keen interest Elton Mayo's experimental work at the Hawthorne Western Electric Works. By the time of the Lowell Institute Lectures, therefore, his thinking of formal organization included also the concept of organizational equilibrium; the necessary administrative balancing of burdens and gratifications in order to fuse effectiveness with efficiency in the organization. Barnard, in short, had become aware of what Charles H. Page was to call later "bureaucracy's other face."

What is executive work? Barnard's (1971) response, "Executive work is not that of the organization, but the specialized work of maintaining the organization in operation" (p. 215). Here Barnard illustrates, as he does throughout The Functions of the Executive, why he should be read and reread reflectively in order to get at the profundity of his ideas. Exactly what does "maintaining the organization in operation" mean? The untutored in school administration might respond, as did Jacques Barzun (1969), "... seeing to it that the chalk is there" (p. 96). Not so in Barnard's (1963c, pp. 60-65) thought. He had no custodial "maintenance" in mind. Instead, in his definition of "executive work," Barnard is in correspondence with Parsons in differentiating functionally between technical, managerial, and institutional tasks in formal organization. The primacy of administrative tasks—"executive work"—is oriented toward the integrative needs of organization.

Barnard frames out the interactive relationship between role and personality in the social system. Jacob W. Getzels and Egon G. Guba have brought this concept to the literature of school administration as
a model which depicts the critical need of integration by means of administrative transactions of “nomothetic” and “idiographic” values. Barnard’s (1971) statement of this role-personality model is as follows:

Co-operation [sic] and organization as they are observed and experienced are concrete syntheses of opposed facts, and of opposed thought and emotions of human beings. It is precisely the function of the executive to facilitate the synthesis in concrete action of contradictory forces, to reconcile conflicting forces, instincts, interests, conditions, positions, and ideals. (p. 21)

Barnard, as has been indicated earlier, meant to stress that the orientational primacy in the administrative role is to the integrative function. “Thus, the executive process,” Barnard (1971) held, “even when narrowed to the aspect of effectiveness of organization and the technologies of organization activity, is one of integration of the whole, of finding the effective balance between the local and the broad considerations, between the general and the specific requirements” (p. 238).

This correspondence between the ideas of Barnard the business executive and Parsons the academic theoretician is more than coincidence. Although they had not collaborated as scholars, each had conceptualized formal organization as a social system. Barnard’s intention was, however, to deal with “the executive process” exclusively in *The Functions of the Executive*, whereas Parsons’ entire academic career had been devoted to the construction of a comprehensive theoretic model of the social system. In this model, the idealist tradition of Max Weber and the positivist tradition of Émile Durkheim are fused in a complex synthesis of interactively related variables. More than mere “historical figures” in contemporary administrative thought and scholarship, the ideas of both Barnard and Parsons still infuse theoretical vitality in much of the significant writing today in the field of administration.

And in his treatment of “the executive process,” Barnard straightway directed attention to a moral problem in administrative decision-making. Where should the transactional line be drawn in the
role-personality model between nomothetic and idiographic tensions in the organization? The executive on the one hand is invested with authority to use bureaucratic power with which to perform role-related integrative tasks, but on the other hand there are no predetermined absolute values to guide executive judgment in these transactions. Ultimately, according to Barnard, the executive has to rely upon "moral creativeness." He (1971) elaborates:

The strategic factor in the dynamic expression of leadership is moral creativeness, which precedes, but is in turn dependent upon, technological proficiency and the development of techniques in relation to it. (p. 288)

Barnard used expressions such as "moral complexity" and "moral creativeness" as code words for values and the art of valuing in administrative leadership. The executive who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing is in Barnard's mind incapable of institutional leadership. Moreover, when he wrote that "the dynamic expression of leadership is moral creativeness," he anticipated Selznick's later thinking of "value infusion" in formal organization as an imperative precondition of institutional identity. Selznick (1957):

As an organization acquires a self, a distinctive identity, it becomes an institution. This involves the taking on of values, ways of acting and believing that are deemed important for their own sake. From then on self-maintenance becomes more than bare organizational survival; it becomes a struggle to preserve the uniqueness of the group in the face of new problems and altered circumstances. (p. 21)

Clearly, Barnard did not gainsay the importance of "technological proficiency" in organization. "Moral creativeness" is primary for him in administrative control, but its implementation in the integration of formal organization is dependent upon "the development of techniques in relation to it." Here, in a characteristic allusive style, Barnard points to the moral snare that is latent in executive decision-making: the reversal of means and end values. Barnard's acuity has been anticipated in one of the great works of tragedy from Greek classical drama.
Sophocles' *Antigone*, a play written nearly twenty-five hundred years before Barnard's time, and of which more later, celebrates in one scene humankind's Promethean gift for inventing technology. A Chorus of city elders inferentially caution Creon, King of Thebes, of an immoral value reversal in the royal—say executive—decision he is about to make. The warning is given by the Chorus in Sophocles' great "Ode on Man" (Greene & Lattimore, 1954), just as Creon is about to confront Antigone for having defied his royal edict:

CHORUS: Many the wonders but nothing walks stranger than man. This thing crosses the sea in the winter's storm, making his path through the roaring waves. And she, the greatest of gods, the earth—ageless she is, and unwearied—he wears her away as the ploughs go up and down from year to year and his mules turn up the soil.

Gay nations of birds he snares and leads, wild beast tribes and the salty brood of the sea, with the twisted mesh of his nets, this clever man. He controls with craft the beasts of the open air, walkers on hills. The horse with his shaggy mane he holds and harnesses, yoked about the neck, and the strong bull of the mountain.

Language, and thought like the wind and the feelings that make the town; he has taught himself, and shelter against the cold, refuge from rain. He can always help himself. He faces no future helpless. There's only death that he cannot find an escape from. He has contrived refuge from illnesses once beyond all cure.

Clever beyond all dreams the inventive craft that he has which may drive him one time or another to well or ill. When he honors the laws of the land and the gods' sworn right high indeed is his city; but stateless the man who dares to dwell with dishonor. Not by my fire, never to snare my thoughts, who does these things. (p. 198)
Of all the concepts in Barnard’s delineation of administrative control, the concept of “authority” in formal organization is the most difficult to grasp on a first encounter. But the persistence of a second, and even a third, encounter would well be worth the effort.

Because Barnard’s starting point was to think of formal organization as a cooperative system, and not as the domination system in models of Scientific Management, he had to specify its mechanisms of control. Accordingly, he reduced control in the cooperative system to two theoretic categories: a) a theory of incentives which included both “specific inducements” and “general incentives,” and b) a theory of authority. Barnard rejected the command-obedience definition of authority. He was reinforced in this by a chance reading of Eugene Ehrlich’s *Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law*, whose central thesis “... is that all law arises from the formal and especially the informal understandings of the people as socially organized, and that so far as these practices and understandings are formulated in substantive law and promulgated by lawmaking authorities the ‘law’ is merely the formulation” (Barnard, 1971, p. XXX).

Mindful that his definition of authority “... is so contrary to the view widely held by informed persons of many ranks and professions, and so contradictory to legalistic conceptions, and will seem to many so opposed to common experience ...,” he, therefore, urged “... before attacking the subject it is desirable at least to recognize that prevalent notions are not universally held” (Barnard, 1971, pp. 163-64). Then he cites in support Roberto Michels’ statement on authority in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*:

> Whether authority is of personal or institutional origin it is created and maintained by public opinion, which in its turn is conditioned by sentiment, affection, reverence or fatalism. Even when authority rests on mere physical coercion it is accepted by those ruled, although the acceptance may be due to a fear of force. (Barnard, 1971, p. 164)

Barnard’s idea of authority as a mechanism of control in formal organization embodies Michels’ definition and more. He singles out
a "zone of indifference"—a habituational response to administrative control—which as a concept, follows the meaning of Max Weber (1947) and of those in contemporary social science who think of the acceptance of authority as a "suspension of judgment" (p. 234). The egocentric predicament to which "persons of authority" are vulnerable—the sin of hybris which in the plays of Greek tragedians brings inescapable punishment from the gods—is anticipated by Barnard in his caveat that, in executive functions, "executive responsibility" and "moral creativeness" have to be bound together with uses of authority.

The following excerpts from Barnard's (1971) "theory of authority" constitute its core and in it he states the relation between the coercive and consensual in formal organization:

... Authority is the character of a communication (order) in a formal organization by virtue of which it is accepted by a contributor or "member" of the organization as governing the action he contributes; that is, as governing or determining what he does or is not to do as far as the organization is concerned. According to this definition, authority involves two aspects: first, the subjective, the personal, the accepting of a communication as authoritative... and, second, the objective aspect—the character in the communication by virtue of which it is accepted...

If a directive communication is accepted by one to whom it is addressed, its authority for him is confirmed or established. It is admitted as the basis of action. Disobedience of such a communication is a denial of its authority for him. Therefore, under this definition the decision as to whether an order has authority or not lies with the persons to whom it is addressed, and does not reside in "persons of authority" or those who issue these orders.

... Thus the [other] contributors are willing to maintain the authority of communications because, where care is taken to see that only acceptable communications in general are issued, most of them fall within the zone of personal indifference; and because communal sense influences the motives of most contributors most of the time. The practical instrument of this sense is the fiction of superior authority, which makes it possible normally to treat a personal question impersonally.
The fiction of superior authority is necessary for two main reasons:

(1) It is the process by which the individual delegates upward, or to the organization, responsibility for what is an organization decision—an action which is depersonalized by the fact of its coordinate [sic] character. This means that if an instruction is disregarded, an executive’s risk of being wrong must be accepted, a risk that the individual cannot and usually will not take unless in fact his position is at least as good as that of another with respect to correct appraisal of the relevant situation. Most persons are disposed to grant authority because they dislike the personal responsibility which they otherwise accept, especially when they are not in a good position to accept it. The practical difficulties in the operation of organization seldom lie in the excessive desire of individuals to assume responsibility for the organization action of themselves or others, but rather lie in the reluctance to take responsibility for their own actions in organization.

(2) The fiction gives impersonal notice that what is at stake is the good of the organization. If objective authority is flouted for arbitrary or merely temperamental reasons, if, in other words, there is deliberate attempt to twist an organization requirement to personal advantage, rather than properly to safeguard a substantial personal interest, then there is a deliberate attack on the organization itself. (pp. 163, 170-171)

Conceptions of Power as Authority

Barnard’s “fiction of superior authority” is a cognitive clue that he, like Parsons, thought of “authority” as normative power whose activation in the social system of formal organization is by means of a universally shared cultural symbolism. Parsons in his theory of social action also deals with mechanisms of control; that is, with ways of obtaining results in formal interaction. He has constructed for this purpose a paradigm of modes which depict four circulating generalized symbolic media “... by which one acting unit ... can attempt to get results by bringing to bear on another unit ... some kind of
communicative operation: call it ‘pressure’ if that term is understood in a nonpejorative sense” (Parsons, 1963b, p. 42).

Parsons (1963b) shows these circulating generalized symbolic media as: money, power, influence, and the activation of commitments (p. 45). The “communicative operation” in the Parsonian sense, however, will bear no effective response unless there is a consensual validation—a legitimation—from the recipient of the communication that the sender has a right to issue the communication. For Barnard, likewise, in administrative control this means, “If a directive communication is accepted by one to whom it is addressed, its authority for him is confirmed or established.”

To illustrate further this exceedingly important conceptual nuance: “Money,” as a circulating generalized symbolic medium, is effective in a “communicative operation” as inducement only to the extent that a recipient confirms the symbolic meaning of money as a representation of real value. So it is with normative power. “Power,” as a circulating generalized symbolic medium, will be effective in a “communicative operation” as legitimate coercion only to the extent that a recipient, following Barnard, confirms the authority of the communicator to use power in a formal interactive relationship.

Because the concepts Barnard had used to formulate his executive functions encompass the generic structural properties of formal organization, The Functions of the Executive has been, as was noted earlier, a certifiable classic of enduring theoretical value for every field of administrative preparation. Especially valuable to administrative theory is his treatment of authority. “It seems to me very important,” wrote Parsons in this regard, “that there is an essential continuity between the treatment of authority for total political systems by Weber and others and by Barnard for the formal organization within society” (Parsons, 1963c, p. 325).10

Parsons’ incisive reference to “an essential continuity” in the treatment of authority by Weber and Barnard is informed most especially by their respective preoccupation with the legitimation of normative order. Just as the source of normative order in society is central in Max Weber’s scholarship, so is the source of legitimation in administrative decision-making central in Barnard’s conception of
executive functions. Integrative decision-making is for Barnard the essential device for maintaining formal organization in a state of equilibrium and, therefore, the confirmation of authority in an executive decision—Barnard's executive “communication” or executive “order”—by actors in subordinate roles is imperative.

More, the “essential continuity” across social science disciplines which Parsons has affirmed in Barnard’s conception of authority lends itself to imaginative explorations in the humanities for validations of its universality. How, one might ask, has Barnard’s conception of authority fared in other cultures and in bygone ages? Belletristic literature abounds with problems of the human situation whose pivot is, as Parsons (1963a) has put it, “... the relation between the coercive and the consensual aspects of the phenomenon of power” (p. 249).

3

Background for Sophocles’ Antigone

Sophocles, 496-406 B.C., wrote Antigone, the first of his three Theban plays, at about age fifty-four. He had written more than one hundred plays, of which seven have survived; including the Theban trilogy of Antigone, Oedipus the King, and Oedipus at Colonus. They are referred to as the “Theban trilogy” because their setting is the City of Thebes.

Antigone was written first, although story-line development within the Theban trilogy would make it appear Oedipus the King was first. Oedipus at Colonus was written last, toward the end of his life, but Sophocles never saw it staged. A grandson produced the play five years after his death. Sophocles’ ninety-year life span in Athens was filled with public service, recognized artistic achievements, and a host of other honors. He was a contemporary of Pericles; together with whom he was elected, 440 B.C., one of ten generals.

The Athenian theater of Sophocles’ time, unlike modern-day theater, was not a commercial enterprise. Plays were staged as part of
religious festivals and performances were restricted to holy days as communal events. Playwrights were induced by the *polis* to write for the theater by means of annual competitions—Sophocles won over Aeschylus in the competition of 468 B.C.—and, as part of the prize, the winner’s play was given a public performance under civic auspices. Theater, in short, was for the Athenians at once adult education in moral law, as given by Zeus, and entertainment. Athenian playwrights, therefore, had to infuse their instruction with consummate artistic craftsmanship in order to hold the attention of a massive audience in an open theater. It is exactly this educative aspect of Athenian theater which Robert Beck has studied in depth and to which he gave the title of *Aeschylus: Playwright Educator.*

Aristotle, philosopher and first known drama critic in the western tradition, regarded Sophocles as the foremost of Greek tragedians. He singled out *Oedipus the King,* in his *Poetics,* as the model of tragedy in theater. He had analyzed the play with the key value-laden terms of *hybris;* i.e., excessive pride or excessive violence and *hamartia;* i.e., a fatal flaw of character. These are to this day mainstay concepts in an analysis of the tragic figure. In the earlier given “Ode on Man,” Sophocles celebrates humankind’s inventive craft, but at the same time he hints also of *hybris* in the way the King is about to use his royal authority to punish Antigone.

The epicenter of Sophoclean tragedy, following Hegel’s later definition of tragedy, is the clash of right with right. Tragedy in *Antigone,* by way of illustration, lies primarily in the conflict between two characters asserting a right. Each assertion is justifiable and, yet, both characters are stubborn or blind to the justification of the other’s position.

Creon, King of Thebes, is too confident in his authority to punish and too blind to see the *hybris* of his action. Antigone, his niece and daughter-in-law to be, would martyr herself if need be to uphold the moral law of Zeus. A clash of these two obduracies results in dreadful human suffering. “For Sophocles,” writes David Grene (1954), “the myth was the treatment of the generic aspect of human dilemmas . . . . Behind the figure of . . . Creon stands the tyrant of the legend; and behind the tyrant of the legend, the meaning of all despotic
authority” (p. 10).

Creon did not especially want to be ruler of Thebes. As a member of the royal household and brother-in-law to Oedipus, he devoted scant attention to matters of state. Instead, he cultivated the arts, collected manuscripts, and otherwise occupied himself with pleasure-yielding pursuits. Then, as this is explained in the story-line of Sophocles’ *Oedipus the King*, a plague had struck Thebes because of the presence of a moral pollution in the city. Fruit and cattle perished, women aborted, and hunger had set in.

It was discovered eventually that Oedipus was himself the pollutant. He had unknowingly, and quite innocently, years earlier killed his natural father in combat, married his own mother, and incestuously sired two sons and two daughters: Polynices and Eteocles, Antigone and Ismene. For these transgressions of the moral law, patricide and incest, Zeus had punished Oedipus with a plague on the city.14

Oedipus, upon becoming aware of his moral transgressions, gouged out his own eyes, abdicated the throne, and took exile. By a formal arrangement, Eteocles and Polynices were each to rule Thebes in alternate years. The arrangement did not hold. In the contest between the two brothers for rule of Thebes, civil war ensued. Both Eteocles and Polynices were killed in the war and Thebes was left a shambles.

It is at this juncture in the Theban trilogy that Creon takes power and proclaims his first edict as King: Eteocles is to be buried with religious rites, whereas Polynices’ corpse is to be left in an open field to be devoured by scavengers. Anyone who attempts his usual burial is to be put to death. Creon’s rationale for the decree is to convey by this example the harsh consequences that will follow from further civil strife in Thebes.

Antigone defies the edict and twice attempts to bury her brother. She is caught by the guards and brought before Creon. A highly charged confrontation between them follows. Antigone grants that Creon has the right to issue decrees and to make laws. However, she will not obey his burial decree because it is a contravention of Zeus’ moral law. Barnard might have observed that Creon’s edict landed
outside of Antigone’s “zone of indifference.”

The audience first learns of Creon’s decree in the following first exchange in the play between Antigone and her sister Ismene:

Ismene: What is it? Clearly some news has clouded you.
Antigone: It has indeed. Creon will give the one of our two brothers honor in the tomb; the other none. Eteocles, with just entreatment treated, as law provides he has hidden under earth to have full honor with the dead below. But Polynices corpse who died in pain, they say he has proclaimed to the whole town that none may bury him and none bewail, but leave him unwept, uncombed, a rich sweet sight for the hungry birds’ beholding. Such orders they say the worthy Creon gives to you and me—yes, yes, I say to me—and that he’s coming to proclaim it clear to those who know it not. Further: he has the matter so at heart that anyone who dares attempt the act will die by public stoning in the town. So there you have it and you soon will show if you are noble, or fallen from your descent. (Grene & Lattimore, 1954, p. 186)

Antigone in Jean Anouilh’s Free-style Adaptation

Jean Anouilh’s Antigone retains the salient features of Sophocles’ plot in a free-style adaptation. In the language of theater this means he has made changes to suit his own purpose. The major change he has made in the adaptation is to reset Sophocles’ plot in a contemporary setting and in the idiom of modern-day language. His characters wear modern dress and use no masques; as was the dramaturgical convention in Sophocles’ day. In short, Anouilh has secularized Antigone.

One ancient dramaturgical convention which Anouilh did retain in his adaptation is the Chorus, but as a single voice. The multi-voice Chorus in Greek theater was the earliest use in Western culture of the
invention now thought of in social science research as participant-observation.\textsuperscript{16}

As participant-observer, the Greek Chorus was involved in the action on stage with a detachment which gave to it a wide-ranging dramaturgical usefulness. The Chorus might heighten audience awareness with a narration of the deeper meaning in an action, it might interject in the performance a recital of a long-forgotten event which now has to be recalled for the audience, it might give prophetic warning to the players of consequences to follow from their action, it might convey, as in Sophocles' "Ode on Man," the playwright's moral instruction, or, as the following first Choral statement in the Anouilh (1956) version of Antigone shows, it might do all of these:

Chorus: Well, here we are. These people that you see here are about to act out for you the story of Antigone.

That thin little creature sitting by herself staring straight ahead, seeing nothing, is Antigone. She is thinking. She is thinking that the instant I finish telling you who's who and what's what in this play, she will burst forth as the tense, sallow, willful girl who would never listen to reason and who is about to rise up alone against Creon, her uncle, the King.

Another thing that she is thinking is this: she is going to die. Antigone is only twenty years old. She would much rather live than die. But there is no help for it. When you are on the side of the gods against the tyrant, of Man against the State, of purity against corruption—when, in short, your name is Antigone, there is only one part you can play, and she will have to play hers through to the end.

Mind you, Antigone doesn't know all these things about herself. I know them because it is my business to know them. That's what a Greek Chorus is for. All that she knows is that Creon will not allow her dead brother to be buried; and that in spite of Creon, she must bury him. Antigone doesn't think, she acts; she doesn't reason, she feels. And from the moment the curtain went up, she began
to feel that inhuman forces were whirling her out of this world, snatching her away from her sister, Ismene, whom you see smiling and chatting with that young man, making her an instrument of the gods in a way she cannot fathom but that she will faithfully pursue.

You have never seen inhuman forces at work? You will, tonight.

(CHORUS turns and indicates HAEMON.)

The young man talking to Ismene—to the pliant and reasonable Ismene—is Haemon. He is the King's son, Creon's son. Antigone and he are engaged to be married. You wouldn't have thought she was his type. He likes dancing, sports, competition; he likes women, too. Now look at Ismene again. She is certainly more beautiful than Antigone. She is the girl you'd think he'd go for. Well, there was a ball one night. Ismene wore a new evening dress. She was radiant. Haemon danced every dance with her; he wouldn't look at any other girl. And yet, that same night, before the dance was over, suddenly he went in search of Antigone, found her sitting alone—like that, with her arms clasped round her knees—and asked her to marry him. It didn't seem to surprise Antigone in the least. She looked up at him out of those solemn eyes of hers, then smiled sort of sadly; and she said “yes.” That was all. Well, here is Haemon expecting to marry Antigone. He won't, of course. He didn't know, when he asked her, that the earth wasn't made to hold a husband of Antigone, and that this princely distinction was to earn him no more than the right to die sooner than he might otherwise have done.

(CHORUS turns toward CREON.)

That gray-haired, powerfully built man sitting lost in thought, with his little Page at his side, is Creon, the King. His face is lined. He is tired. He practices the difficult art of a leader of men. When he was younger, when Oedipus was King and Creon was no more than the King's brother-in-law, he was different. He loved music, bought rare manuscripts, was a kind of art patron. He used to while away whole afternoons in the antique shops of this city of
Thebes. But Oedipus died. Oedipus' sons died. Creon's moment had come. He took over the kingdom.

(CHORUS moves downstage. Reflects a moment.)

I'll tell you something about Creon. He has a tendency to fool himself. This leader of men, this brilliant debater and logician, likes to believe that if it were not for his sense of responsibility, he would step down from the throne and go back to collecting manuscripts. But the fact is, he loves being King. He's an artist who has always believed that he could govern just as well as any man of action could; and he's quite sure that no god nor any man can tell him anything about what is best for the common people.

Creon has a wife, a Queen. Her name is Eurydice. There she sits, the gentle old lady with the knitting, next to the Nurse who brought up the two girls. She will go on knitting all through the play, till the time comes for her to go to her room and die. She is a good woman, a worthy, loving soul. But she is no help to her husband. Creon has to face the music alone. Alone with his Page, who is too young to be of any help.

The others? Well, let's see.

(He points toward the MESSENGER.)

That pale young man leaning against the wall is the Messenger. Later on, he will come running in to announce that Haemon is dead. He has a premonition of catastrophe. That's what he is brooding over. That's why he won't mingle with the others.

As for those three pasty-faced card players—they are the guards, members of Creon's police force. They chew tobacco; one smells of garlic, another of beer; but they're not a bad lot. They have wives they are afraid of, kids who are afraid of them; they're bothered by the little day-to-day worries that beset us all. At the same time—they are policemen: eternally innocent, no matter what crimes are committed; eternally indifferent, for nothing that happens can matter to them. They are quite prepared to arrest any
body at all, including Creon himself, should the order be
given by a new leader.

That’s the lot. Now for the play. (pp. 115-116)¹⁷

It should be noted that while Anouilh has retained the Greek
Chorus, he did drop the choral “Ode on Man” from his version. Also,
on omitting one Sophoclean character, the blind prophet Teiresias, he
invents another; Antigone’s childhood nurse and now her surrogate
mother. One might surmise with good cause that Anouilh had
abandoned Teiresias because the blind prophet had prevailed on
Creon in the Sophoclean original, though too late, to revoke his harsh
edict and this did not serve Anouilh’s purpose. Creon, in the
Sophoclean version:

... Now my decision has been overturned shall I, who bound her, set
her free myself. I’ve come to fear it’s best to hold the laws of old
tradition to the end of life. (Grene & Lattimore, 1954, p. 228)

Sophocles’ purpose, as “playwright educator,” to borrow from
Beck, was to teach that transgressions of moral law, knowingly or
unknowingly, will bring relentless divine retribution and there can be
no exculpation by a turning back. Anouilh’s purpose, on the other
hand, was to move his countrymen to resist the Nazi occupation of
France. The withdrawal of a harsh Nazi occupation decree by the
intervention of a spiritual entity, and of which Teiresias was the
symbol for Sophocles, would have been incredible for Anouilh’s
audience.¹⁸ Moreover, as was noted earlier, Anouilh meant to
secularize Antigone.

One additament: Max Weber’s cross-cultural study of normative
order in society had led him to the conclusion that bureaucracy is an
instrument of power for the one who controls its apparatus (Gerth &
Mills, 1946, p. 228). Barnard came to this conclusion in a reflective
analysis of his own executive experience in bureaucratic
organization. Antigone gives intimations of this in the “esthetic
wisdom” of Sophocles.

More to the point, Antigone is an artistic legacy from the distant
past which confirms the verity of Barnard’s lesson for modern-day administration: Those who are invested with authority to use the coercive capacity of bureaucracy must do so with a reflectively grounded “moral responsibility” or risk penalties for hybris. And to borrow from Dewey (1960), “There is no better evidence of a well formed moral character than knowledge of when to raise the moral issue and when not” (p. 12).

Notes

1. After The Functions of the Executive appeared in 1938, Barnard published Organization and Management as a collection of occasional papers in which he merely elaborated on the central ideas of his first book.


3. Representative of these are Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn (1966), The Social Psychology of Organizations; George C. Homans (1950), The Human Group; Herbert A. Simon (1961), Administrative Behavior; Melville Dalton (1959), Men Who Manage.


Those unfamiliar with Parsonian theory will find a well prepared introduction in R. Jean Hills (1968), Toward a Science of Organization.
5. The correspondence between the ideas of Barnard and Parsons is quite clear even in the way each defines formal organization. Parsons’ voluntaristic theory of action defines formal organization as a rationally-structured network of voluntaristic associates. Barnard defines formal organization as a rationally-structured system of cooperation. Both Parsons and Barnard, moreover, are of one mind that membership in formal organization is induced by a variety of motivations.

6. Two companion journal articles, both by the same author, will be helpful for more insight into Barnard’s “theory of authority.” See, Edward Boland Smith (1975b), “Chester Barnard’s Concept of Leadership;” and Edward B. Smith (1975a), “Chester Barnard’s Concept of Authority.”

Readers will also find enlightening the papers which were presented on Barnard’s ideas at a Symposium of the 1986 Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, “The Functions of the Executive: A Reconsideration of Chester Barnard.” These papers dealt with “authority and organization,” “administrative systems and social system,” “incentives and motivation,” “ethics and organization.”

7. Roberto Michels, author of the “Iron Law of Oligarchy,” was a Swiss-Italian whose major contributions were in sociology and economics. His best known work in the United States is Robert Michels (1962), Political Parties, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Some six hundred years before Roberto Michels, Marsilius of Padua wrote in his Defensor Pacis, 1324, “Laws derive their authority from the nation, and are invalid without its assent.”

A kindred attitude to governance is in José Ortega y Gasset’s The Revolt of the Masses—the chapter “Who Rules the World?”—in which he quotes Talleyrand’s remark to Napoleon, “You can do everything with bayonets, Sire, except sit on them.”

9. For more on the meaning of hybris in Greek tragedy, see “Prologue” in Robert H. Beck (1975), Aeschylus: Playwright Educator.


In an interview conducted two months before his death in 1961, Barnard noted in a retrospective assessment of The Functions of the Executive, “In my opinion the greatest weakness of my book is that it doesn’t deal adequately with the question of responsibility and its delegation.” (See William B. Wolf, 1963).

11. Students of administration will encounter mind-enriching challenges in the construction of a taxonomy within which to compare essential properties of normative order as conceived by Barnard, Machiavelli, and Sophocles; with responsibility in administrative stewardship and “moral creativeness” in executive decision-making held as constant points of reference in the comparison.

Niccolo Machiavelli, 1469-1527, a towering figure of the Italian Renaissance, stands for many as a symbol of political cynicism and unscrupulousness but as the political scientist turned colum-
nist, George F. Will, has noted, "...Machiavelli’s bad reputation is the unjust price he paid for being an unsentimental moralist in a world addicted to moral evasions."

His best known work, The Prince, was intended as a guide, or handbook, for the practice of effective statecraft and it was dedicated to Lorenzo de’Medici, also known as Lorenzo il Magnifico; astute politician, scholar, and generous patron of Renaissance talents.

Like Dante, his fellow Florentine of the fourteenth century, Machiavelli yearned for political stability and, in The Prince, he meant to provide an objective program of how political power is obtained and kept. In his The Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy, Machiavelli laid out the first modern theory of politics and of which the following is the most often quoted passage: "When it is absolutely a question of the safety of one’s country, there must be no consideration of just or unjust, of merciful or cruel, of praiseworthy or disgraceful; instead, setting aside every scruple, one must follow to the uttermost any plan that will save her life and keep her liberty."

12. Here one gets a glimpse of how creative energy works its will independently of the artist’s cognitive structure. Any number of illustrations are available. Shakespeare, as example, had written Richard III (1593-94) before Richard II (1596-97). Another manifestation of this, also in a myth-based work but of a different artistic genre, can be seen in Richard Wagner’s four-part music drama, Der Ring des Nibelungen. Festival performances of the Ring tetralogy are staged in the following order: Das Rheingold, Die Walküre, Siegfried, Götterdämmerung. However, at its libretto-stage of development, Wagner first wrote the poem “Death of Siegfried,” which is performed last as Götterdämmerung. For a light-handed account of this, see George Bernard Shaw (1957), The Perfect Wagnerite: A Commentary on the Niblung’s Ring.

14. For an informative elaboration of Zeus' moral law, see Beck (1973), *Aeschylus: Playwright Educator*, "Moral Lessons in Aeschylean Drama."

15. The spelling is Polyneices in the Wyckoff translation and Polynices in the Anouilh version are not the same.

16. Participant-observation as a research methodology in contemporary social science has been used in the Bank Wiring Observation Room of the Hawthorne Studies and in a study of "street corner society." See William F. Whyte (1943), *Street Corner Society*. Uses of participant-observation can be found now also in the research literature of education and of school administration.

17. A number of artistic treatments have been done of the Antigone. One of them is the "Symphony d’Antigona" by the Mexican composer Carlos Chavez.

Shakespeare, in *Henry V*, made effective dramaturgical use of the "chorus" to present an epic on the otherwise confining stage of Elizabethan theater.

18. In introductory comments to Anouilh’s *Antigone* is the following: 'When Antigone was produced in...February 1944, Paris was occupied by the Nazis, and all plays had to have their approval before performance. Yet Antigone was an immediate and enduring success with the French audiences, because it seemed to blazon before Frenchmen the message of the Resistance—'Say No, even if you die.'” Watson and Pressey, *Contemporary Drama: Eleven Plays*, p. 113.
Thomas Jefferson’s Imprint on the Separation Principle

Justices of the United States Supreme Court have cited with approval Thomas Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor in their interpretation of the “establishment of religion” clause in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Chief Justice Morrison Waite in the 1878 Mormon polygamy case of Reynolds v. United States, and speaking for a unanimous court, pointed to the following excerpt from Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptists Association:

Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach action only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should “make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” thus building a wall of separation between church and state. (Padover, 1943, pp. 518-519)

Chief Justice Waite’s reliance on Jefferson rather than on James Madison’s notes of the proceedings at the Constitutional Convention, as to what Framers of the Constitution had in mind is altogether curious. Jefferson had written to the Danbury Baptists as an incumbent President, a decade after the First Amendment had been adopted.
He was, moreover, not a member of the Constitutional Convention, having served his country at the time as Minister to France. Why, then, have Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, from the time of Chief Justice Waite to now, relied so much on Jefferson's definition of the "establishment" provision in their interpretation of its intended meaning? The answer is imbedded in the experience of church-state relations during the colonial period of American history.

At the time of the Declaration of Independence, with the exceptions of Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware, the British Colonies in America either had an established church or gave some privileged position to a church. In 1786, after a protracted period of advocacy and debate that had been initiated by James Madison, the Virginia Assembly passed Bill Number 82, "For Establishing Religious Freedom," which Jefferson had introduced seven years earlier and which historians hold to be a precursor of the "establishment" provision in the First Amendment. In the ruminations of his later years, Jefferson regarded the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty as one of his three great contributions to social democracy.

So while it is indeed of record that Jefferson was out of the country during the summer of 1789, and had not been present at the final hammering out of the Constitution, his ideas nonetheless seem to have had a controlling influence in the Constitutional Convention on the issue of church-state separation. Chief Justice Earl Warren held to just this conclusion when he stated the First Amendment "underwrote the admonition of Jefferson that there should be a wall of separation between church and state." And Justice Hugo Black, speaking for the majority Court in the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of Education, wrote:

The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion over another..... In the words of Thomas Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and state."
Jefferson's collected correspondence shows him to have been in touch continuously with Madison and others in the Constitutional Convention to obtain a Bill of Rights for the Constitution. But quite apart from the Jeffersonian influence, by the time Framers of the Constitution had gotten around in 1789 to formulating in sixteen words the prescriptive relation between church and state for the newfound Republic, they also had in their cognitive apparatus the history of earlier church-state struggles. Having been intellectual beneficiaries of eighteenth-century Enlightenment, they knew well from the works of Voltaire, Locke, and others of the societal instability which had followed from episodic contests between ecclesiastic and secular authority since the last Roman Emperor, Romulus Augustulus, had laid down his scepter in 476.

John Locke, whose natural law philosophy had influenced profoundly the political thought of the Founding Fathers, and who held that proper governmental activity be limited to the things of "this world," reinforced the intellectual elite of the Revolutionary Generation in holding to a mutual independence for church and government. And the issue had been joined also at the level of popular culture. The "Vicar of Bray" is representative.

The "Vicar of Bray" (Kronenberger, 1935, p. 54), a ballad of unknown authorship, titillated popular culture in both Great Britain and its American Colonies with the following burlesque on the subject of church-state relations:
The Vicar of Bray

1
In good King Charles' golden days,  
When loyalty no harm meant,  
A zealous High-Churchman I was,  
And so I got preferment;  
To teach my flock I never missed—  
Kings are by God appointed,  
And damned are those who do resist  
Or touch the Lord's anointers.  
And this is law, I will Maintain,  
Until my dying day, Sir,  
That whatsoever king shall reign,  
I'll be the Vicar of Bray, Sir.

2
When royal James obtained the crown,  
And Popery came in fashion,  
The penal laws I hooted down,  
And read the declaration:  
The Church of Rome I found would fit  
Full well my constitution,  
And had became a Jesuit  
But for the Revolution  
And this is law, I will maintain  
Until my dying day, Sir,  
That whatsoever king shall reign,  
I'll be the Vicar of Bray, Sir.

3
When William was our king declared  
To ease the nation's grievance,  
With this new wind about I steered,  
And swore to him allegiance;  
Old principles I did revoke,  
Set conscience at a distance;  
Passive obedience was a joke,  
A jest was non-resistance.  
And this is law, I will maintain,  
Until my dying day, Sir,  
That whatsoever king shall reign,  
I'll be the Vicar of the Bray, Sir.

4
When gracious Anne became our queen,  
The Church of England's glory,  
Another face of things was seen—  
And I became a Tory;  
Occasional Conformists base,  
I scord their moderation,  
And thought the church in danger was  
By such prevarication.  
And this is law, I will maintain,  
Until my dying day, Sir,  
That whatsoever king shall reign,  
I'll be the Vicar of Bray, Sir.

5
When George in pudding-time came  
o'er,  
And moderate men looked big, Sir,  
I turned a cat-in-pan once more  
And so became a Whig, Sir:  
And this preferment I procured,  
from our new faith's defender,  
And almost every day abjured  
The Pope and the Pretender.  
And this is law, I will maintain,  
Until my dying day, Sir,  
That whatsoever king shall reign,  
I'll be the Vicar of Bray, Sir.

6
The illustrious house of Hanover,  
And Protestant succession,  
To these I do allegiance swear—  
While they can keep possession:  
For in my faith and loyalty  
I never more will falter,  
And George my lawful king shall be  
Until the times do alter.  
And this is law, I will maintain,  
Until my dying day, Sir,  
That whatsoever king shall reign,  
I'll be the Vicar of Bray, Sir.
Dante’s Imprint

Just as Jefferson has left his imprint on the church-state issue with the “wall of separation” metaphor, so has Dante Alighieri, 1265-1321, some five-hundred years earlier with the “two swords” metaphor. Dante, unlike Jefferson, was no advocate of either social or political democracy. He was an exiled Florentine monarchist and, like Machiavelli later, to his last, of the Catholic faith. Nevertheless, and although they came to the church-state issue with divergent philosophical orientations, both Jefferson and Dante are linked in the history of ideas to the issue of separation in church-state relations.

Historical perspective enlightens this otherwise unlikely connection.

The use of religion to advance the ends of statecraft was an unchallenged convention in the ancient world. As Leo Pfeffer (1953) has put it in his definitive work on church and state:

“The ancient kings used religion as an engine to further the purposes of state: Eannatum of Lagas (c. 2800 B.C.) made secure his conquest of Kis by declaring himself the “beloved spouse” of the highly venerated goddess of that community. Hammurabi unified Mesopotamia and established Babylon as its capital by elevating its city-god to a position of primacy over the previous reigning gods.” (p. 5)

By the time of Dante, the convention of intermingling temporal and spiritual affairs had been challenged by others. Dante, however, capsulated in his challenge the basic ideas in all of them. His methodological apparatuses were the syllogism, historiography, and theological disputation.

The challenge itself Dante put forward in a lengthy treatise of three “books,” written in Latin probably between 1310-1313, and gave it the title of De Monarchia. It is an informative literary legacy of the recurrent frictions between church and state in the Holy Roman Empire, although its importance as a work of original political thought is minimal.

Active in Florentine politics, and a leader of the political party—
Ghibelline—opposed to the extension of papal domination to Florence, Dante had his public career cut short by the success of Pope Boniface VIII in extending his secular authority to that city.¹ Sentenced to exile, Dante passed the rest of his life away from his native city and died in Ravenna. There, he formed a deep disdain for the factionalism that marked Florentine politics. The De Monarchia was Dante’s attempt to bring political stability into the temporal order by establishing a united Christendom under a single temporal monarch.

The basic argument in the De Monarchia rests upon the traditional doctrine of the “two swords” which, to add historical irony, had been first enunciated by Pope Gelasius I at the end of the fifth century. Apologists for both sides of the church-state issue turned to this doctrine during the eleventh century in the conflict between Pope Gregory VII and Emperor Henry IV over the role of secular authority in the appointment of ecclesiastical officials. The Gelasian doctrine invoked St. Augustine’s earlier distinction between communities concerned with spiritual salvation and those concerned with temporal affairs. The doctrine of the “two swords” held to a dual sovereignty in society: the sacerdotium and imperium. Each of these is separate from the other, as are the two substances of which humankind is composed; spiritual and corporeal.

For Dante, the argument in support of an independent secular governance rested on the principle implicit in this metaphor of the “two swords.” Dante’s argument did not prevail, but his treatise does stand to this day as a literary landmark in a long controversy. Dante held to the Aristotelian view of society as the fulfillment of human nature and reason.² The Aristotelian concern with the rational in human experience is incorporated by Dante into the structure of a theosophical argument in which the flesh and the spirit both find their end in God.

In the first “book” of De Monarchia, Dante holds the Empire supreme over all other communities. It is the indispensable condition of peace, world-wide unity, and the fulfillment of rational purpose. The world needs an independent monarchy in order to be perfect according to God’s will. Throughout, there are parallel appeals to reason and to faith.
In the second "book" of De Monarchia, Dante reformulates an old argument. The Empire is by right independent because it is heir to the universal authority once exercised by the Romans. Imperial Rome seemed to Dante to be a special instrument of God in the arrangement of temporal affairs.

The last "book" of De Monarchia is devoted to relevant passages in the Bible and to historical events. The "Donation of Constantine" is introduced to refute the argument that temporal power should be subordinate to the spiritual by virtue of an irrevocable grant from Roman Emperor Constantine I to the Pope. Constantine, upon turning Christian in the fourth century, was purported to have offered the Pope imperial honors, including dominion over Italy. Dante, following the doctrine of "two swords," demonstrates by logical argument that the grant was invalid in the first instance.

Because Dante’s period also marked the beginning when Christian Europe was breaking up into a number of competing national states, De Monarchia is, as Lord James Bryce has observed in his Holy Roman Empire, more like an epitaph of an anachronism. Dante’s hoped for imperial authority was by his time forlorn. Indeed, the Holy Roman Empire even at its apogee had wielded power more as a tradition than as a political actuality. And the universal peace for which Dante had hoped seems in retrospect to have been no more than a nostalgic idealization of the Pax Romana.

De Monarchia as an Intellectual Legacy

De Monarchia, as had been noted earlier, is attractive to modern-day sensibilities more as literature in the history of ideas than as political theory. Dante’s idea of a society in which church and state are mutually independent anticipated a later time when, as in the Constitution of the United States, the idea was to become an integral part of organic law. As a work of the mind, and as an early bud of the Italian Renaissance, De Monarchia has fulfilled Dante’s hope of
leaving behind an intellectual legacy “to the public good.” *De Monarchia* begins with the following statement by Dante:

> It would seem that all men on whom the Higher Nature has stamped the love of truth must make it their chief concern, like as they have been enriched by the toil of those who have gone before, so themselves in like manner to toil in advance for those that shall be hereafter, that posterity may have of them whereby to be enriched.

For he who, himself imbued with public teachings, yet cares not to contribute aught to the public good, may be well assured that he has fallen far from duty; for he is not “a tree by the streams of waters, bearing his fruit in due season,” but rather a devouring whirlpool, ever sucking in, and never pouring back what it has swallowed. Wherefore, often pondering these things with myself, lest I should one day be convicted of the charge of the buried talent, I long not only to burgeon, but also to bear fruit for the public advantage, and to set forth truths unattempted by others. (Wicicsteed, 1929, p. 127)

No straight line of influence can be traced from the time of *De Monarchia* to the “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment. Indeed, precious few instances of straight-line linkages between ideas separated by centuries are to be found in intellectual histories. There is, moreover, no evidence even that Jefferson knew of Dante’s *De Monarchia*; although, as Vernon Louis Parrington (1930) suggests in the following statement, he might well have:

> From the distinguished group of contemporary political thinkers Jefferson emerges as a preeminent intellectual, widely read, familiar with ideas, at home in the field of speculation, a critical observer of men and manners. All his life he was a student, and his devotion to his books, running often to fifteen hours a day, recalls the heroic zeal of Puritan scholars. He was trained in the law, but he was too much the intellectual, too curious -'- out all sorts of things to remain a lawyer. For such a man the appeal of political speculation was irresistible, and early in life he began a wide reading in the political classics that far outweighed Coke and Blackstone in creative influence on his mind. (p. 343)

In the end, whether or not Jefferson was familiar with Dante’s *De
Monarchia is not as important as the belletristic light it sheds on the issue of church-state relations. Public school organization has been, and most likely will continue to be, at the center of church-state issues before the United States Supreme Court. Any enlightenment from the past which is capable of providing enlarged insight into the “establishment of religion” clause is, therefore, deserving of attention.¹¹

Students of school law, immersed in litigious legal briefs which argue the intended meaning of the “establishment of religion” clause in the First Amendment, will find in the De Monarchia a fourteenth-century backdrop for thinking about Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor. De Monarchia, if nothing more, shows the church-state issue working its will over long stretches of time. In the spirit of Voltaire’s attitude toward the past, De Monarchia should be read today “not for the sake of the past but for the sake of the present.”¹²

Notes

1. The other two were his authorship of the Declaration of Independence and the founding of the University of Virginia.

In a more comprehensive account of “separation” ideas which have preceded the establishment clause of the First Amendment, one has to include Roger Williams’ pamphlet, The Bloudy Tenet of Persecution for cause of Conscience, discussed between Truth and Peace, written in the seventeenth century.

The colonial record in America shows that Old World patterns of church-state union were transplanted to the New World and were given standing in colonial charters. The banishment of Roger Williams from the Massachusetts Bay Colony for religious dissent, and the trial of Anne Hutchinson by the same colony, are the more spectacular instances of religious intolerance which must have been known to Jefferson and to Framers of the Constitution.
In the *Bloudy Tenet*, Williams invoked the duality of Tables in the Decalogue to argue for the separation of church and state. It was the business of civil magistrates, Williams held, to enforce the injunctions of the second Table of the Decalogue, which concerned one’s relations with others; whereas the punishment of offenses against the first Table, governing one’s relations with God, was not within the proper sphere of secular authority.

For a most comprehensive account of the Jefferson-Madison collaboration in the Virginia Assembly for religious freedom, see William Lee Miller (1968), *The First Liberty: Religion and the American Republic*.

2. *Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U. S. 1. A sharply divided Court in *Everson*, 5-4, held that a state could reimburse parents for the expense of transporting their children to and from parochial schools without violating the First Amendment. Because the majority considered *Everson* a borderline case, Justice Black, in speaking for the majority, took the additional step of reaffirming Jefferson’s position as to the Framers’ intent. One year later, 1948, in the case of *McCollum v. Board of Education*, the court ruled 8-1 for the plaintiff and again invoked Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor.

It is an irony of history that Jefferson, in his later years, grew fearful of judicial encroachment by the very Federal Judiciary which, after his time, turned to his “wall of separation” metaphor for interpretations of the “establishment” provision in the First Amendment.

3. Kronenberger arranged his Anthology in a chronological order. Following this arrangement by periods, he placed the first appearance of the “Vicar of Bray” in Great Britain sometime between the birth of Oliver Goldsmith in 1728 and the death of Alexander Pope in 1744. It was about this time also when the satirical ballad came into popular literary fashion in Great
Britain and its American Colonies for the making of a public statement about a contemporary issue.

John Trumbull, of the Connecticut Trumbulls, was one of the more prominent academic verse writers in the Colonies prior to the Declaration of Independence.

The ballad itself provides in the concluding verse a clue as to the approximate period of its composition. The first of the five Hanovarian kings of Great Britain, George I, ascended to the British throne in 1714 and, given the free and voluminous flow of literary works from Britain to its American colonies during the eighteenth-century, a getr of satirical verse such as "The Vicar of Bray" may be assumed to have reached the American colonies soon after its appearance in Britain. For more on the satirical ballad, see Vernon Louis Parrington (1930, chap. V), *Main Currents in American Thought*.

4. Dante, according to some Renaissance scholars, marks the intellectual end of medievalism and the beginning of the Italian Renaissance. Such scholars cite in support Dante’s pursuit of personal fame; a characteristic alien to the medieval temperament; his preoccupation with intellectual legacies for posterity, and advocacy of the Italian vernacular for belles-lettres. Read his advocacy in the treatise *De Vulgari Eloquentia* ("About the Vernacular").

Dante, wrote one Renaissance scholar, "... was a unique phenomenon in either the Middle Ages or the Renaissance. Still, his towering figure seems to mark more clearly than any other the vague boundary line between Medieval and Renaissance Culture." Wallace K. Ferguson, *The Renaissance* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1945), p. 73. For a comprehensive work on the Italian Renaissance, and especially its reference to Dante, see Jacob Burckhardt (194-), *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, p. 49.
5. Central to the philosophic thought of both Dante and Jefferson was the idea of “natural law,” whose original source was Aristotle. However, whereas Dante came to natural law philosophy by way of Thomas Aquinas, Jefferson came to it by way of John Locke.

6. There have been several English translations of De Monarchia. The one used here is by P. H. Wicksteed. In the “Appendix,” Wicksteed provides the following helpful background note for the work:

“Boccaccio, in his Life of Dante, after giving some account of the Comedy, and why it was written in the vernacular, continues, ‘In like manner this excellent author, on the coming of the Emperor Henry VII, made a book in Latin Prose, called Monarchia, which is divided into three books after the three points which he therein determines. In the first he proves by logical disputation, that for the well-being of the world the empire is a necessity. . . . In the second he shows by historical documents, that Rome attained to the imperial title by right. . . . In the third, he proves, by theological arguments, that the authority of the empire proceeds direct from God, and not through the mediation of any vicar of his, as it seems the clergy would have it.’” P. H. Wicksteed (1929). A Translation of the Latin Works of Dante, p. 281.

7. One other writer of Dante’s period, Marsilio of Padua, also has left for posterity a major literary work related to the struggles between papal authority and secular rulers. Marsilio’s Defensor Pacis, completed in 1324, is a work of original ideas in political thinking and, as with De Monarchia, its philosophical basis also was derived from Aristotle.

8. Pope Boniface VIII stated his legitimation for the extension of secular authority in a papal bull, Unam Sanctum of 1302, and, although Dante does not and could not so state, De Monarchia was an intended reply to Unam Sanctum.
9. He frequently refers to Aristotle in *De Monarchia* as “the Philosopher.”

10. The document was so ambiguously worded that later Popes claimed all of Western Europe as their proper share. “The Donation of Constantine” eventually was proved to be a forgery in the fifteenth century by the pioneer textual criticism of Lorenzo Valla.


12. Ernst Cassirer is quoted by Alexander Rüstow in the observation: “When Voltaire turns to the past, he does so not for the sake of the past but for the sake of the present. History for him ... not an end but a means; it is an instrument for self-education of the human mind.” See Alexander Rüstow (1980), *Freedom and Domination: A Historical Critique of Civilization*, p. 331.
Part IV

Art and Artists: Images and Image-Makers of a Zeitgeist

Zeitgeist in Expressive Symbolism

Zeitgeist is a borrowed expression one encounters from time to time in literature and for which there is no one-word equivalent in English. Its origin is in the philosophical lexicon of German Idealism. A literal translation of Zeitgeist would be “time spirit,” but “enveloping cultural spirit of a period” would be closer to its intended meaning.

More in keeping with its philosophical origin, the meaning of Zeitgeist should be taken as a concept. It has evolved from the metaphysical in Hegelian philosophy and, as a concept, its most usual literary setting has been nineteenth-century German Geisteswissenschaften; that is, scientific studies of culture. It belongs to that collection of pithy concepts which, according to Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975), are used “automatically” and “contain a wealth of history” (p. ii).

Still another way of knowing a Zeitgeist is through imagistic creations of meaning. A Zeitgeist is after all ethereal, constituted as it is of “spirit,” its articulation, therefore, as an influence upon the thought and manners of a period also has been through the expressive symbolism in spacial art. F. S. C. Northrop thinks of this type of consciousness as knowing “the aesthetic component of reality.” An illustration of what he means by this is in the following:

The sunset in all its indescribable qualitative immediacy which is pure fact cannot be described by either the propositions of the natural history scientist or the equations of the theoretical physicist with his deductively formulated theory. In short, the sunset in the sense of the pure fact
which is immediately apprehended cannot be said; it can only be shown. And the instrument for showing pure fact is not science but impressionistic art. (Northrop, 1963, p. 46)

Although Geisteswissenschaft did not develop in American social science as a discrete discipline, it eventually did exert an intellectual influence on historical writing in the United States. In Germany, where Geisteswissenschaft did develop as a discrete social science, many works of Geistesgeschichte—cultural history—were produced during the second-half of the nineteenth century. In the United States, Leopold von Ranke’s “objective history” was more congenial.

Vernon Louis Parrington’s sweeping Main Currents in American Thought, published in 1927, was the first major work of historical scholarship in the United States to use a Geisteswissenschaft methodology. Parrington did not abandon the canons of objective history. He followed conventions of historical writing as before, but he also included literary works as a primary source in the writing of history.

Parrington used American literature from 1620 to 1920, not as an editor might with explanatory commentaries, but as an analyst and interpreter of a civilization bent on the creation of new meaning out of the material. His documentary approach thereafter qualified the work of period literature as a legitimate historical datum. More, he opened new vistas of thought for studies of the American mind and, of equal significance, he established intellectual history as a genre in American belles-lettres.

There is no direct evidence in Main Currents in American Thought that Parrington consciously embraced the modalities of Geisteswissenschaft. More germane is the fact that, by the time Parrington had begun work on his own classic-to-be, there already were available renowned models of like writing in European art-historical scholarship. Parrington had used period literature as an historical document in exactly the same way as certain European historians had used the period art object as an historical document.
Jacob Burckhardt, a nineteenth-century Swiss historian at Basel University, was the first to include in disciplined scholarship works of art as a usable record of the past. His *Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, first published in 1860, covers a period from the birth of Dante in 1265 to the death of Michelangelo in 1564. Life and manners during these three centuries are depicted in mosaic treatments. Burckhardt had looked to the art of Renaissance Italy for a visually transmitted *Zeitgeist* "...of a civilization which is the mother of our own." Moreover, by looking for what Emile Durkheim has called "social facts" in art objects, Burckhardt (1945, p. 1) laid a foundation for future scholarship in the social history of art.

His successor at Basel University, Heinrich Wölfflin, laid still another foundation. Whereas Burckhardt had looked to art objects for aesthetic indicators of social life in Renaissance Italy, Wölfflin saw in the work of art a communication whose style could be subjected to disciplined analysis for hidden historical information. Wölfflin's (1932) innovative methodology also produced a monumental interpretive work on the art of Renaissance Italy and, at the same time, it laid a foundation for formal style analysis in art criticism.

Wölfflin most especially stressed the communicative significance of style in a work of art. Style for Wölfflin was a means of communication, a visual language within which information can be arranged in the manner of a grammar. According to Wölfflin (1952), style in the visual language of art can be analyzed in three categories: individual style, national style, and period style. These styles are manifestations respectively of an artist's individual temperament, cultural inclinations of a society's value system, and of a given period's *Zeitgeist*.

Knowing how to read a language, however, is not enough; to understand the meaning of its content requires still more of linguistic analysis. Wölfflin's pioneer work in formal style analysis did indeed provide art-historical scholarship the methodological tool with which
to interpret formal conventions in art: its grammatical constructs. But language is at once formal and expressive. Language contains within the style of its formal grammar varieties of expression based in allegory, metaphor, and like symbolism. So it is also with the visual language of art. In order to apprehend its meaning one has to penetrate, and have interpretations of, both its symbolic and formal conventions. This exactly is the stuff of art criticism.

By mid-twentieth century, Wölfflin’s eminence in art-historical scholarship, in the judgment of Erwin Panofsky (1955), was matched by a near dozen German-grounded art historians “... whose names have never lost their magic” (p. 10). Given Panofsky’s own standing in art history, he rightly could have included himself in the group of art historians “whose names have never lost their magic.” But what Panofsky could not do for himself without bruising academic decorum, now that he is no more, posterity has done for him.

Panofsky came to the United States in 1931 from Hamburg, where he was Professor of Art History, by invitation of New York University. He taught alternate semesters of art history in Hamburg and New York between 1931 and 1933. After 1933, he joined the regular faculty of New York University. There, with other refugee scholars, he founded its Institute of Fine Arts. Princeton University invited him in 1935 to its newly-constituted humanistic faculty in the Institute for Advanced Study and there he remained permanently.

Panofsky’s point of departure in art-historical scholarship was the same as that of Burckhardt and Wölfflin: an art object is a valid historical document whose textual and contextual references can be established by disciplined analysis. Each of them, however, has developed a distinctive method of analysis because each had looked for different communicative meaning.

Burckhardt had searched for social facts in visual depictions of Italian Renaissance civilization. Wölfflin looked for a grammar in works of art by means of formal style analysis. Panofsky acknowledged the value for scholarship of both methodologies and then enhanced them by an elaborate classification system of his own. He called his method Iconographic Analysis. Art historians everywhere
now use it for decoding information which has been transmitted through the visual language of art.

An artist, of course, creates a work of art to be experienced aesthetically by its beholder. But consciously or subconsciously, following Panofsky (1955), artists encode other meanings in the aesthetic message which a beholder is capable of knowing.7 Hence, apart from its aesthetic qualities, an art object is held by Panofsky to contain meaning which has been encoded in a visual language whose grammar—this is Wölfflin’s formal style analysis—first has to be learned and then, as a next step, the intent of its symbolism has to be deduced by iconographic analysis.

"Iconography," by Panofsky’s (1955) definition, "is that branch of the history of art which concerns itself with the subject matter or meaning of works of art, as opposed to their form" (p. 25). Panofsky’s definition distinguishes between “subject matter” and "form" because each conveys to the beholder a discrete type of information. "Form" communicates primary data of stylistic convention in the art compositions of a period, whereas "subject matter" communicates "... the world of specific themes or concepts manifested in images, stories and allegories" (Panofsky, p. 29) Iconographic analysis, in short, is a tool with which to reveal the hidden meaning of "subject matter" in art.6

Art criticism is today a mature humanistic discipline largely because its conceptual and methodological bedrock has been formed out of the collective scholarship of Burckhardt, Wölfflin, and Panofsky. It is the pathway to a life-time enjoyment of art and to the aesthetic illumination of social facts which artists have captured in expressive symbolization. It contains also use value to administrative preparation.
Imaginative Beholding

An assessment of art criticism for its use value to administration has to begin with an appreciation of the artist’s radar-like gift for detecting, and then for communicating aesthetically, incipient *Zeitgeist* changes. Wölfflin thought of this gift as “imaginative beholding.” Donald Weismann (1970), in his introduction to art criticism, elaborates:

> Like all human beings, artists are born, live out their lives, and die. They experience joy, boredom, ecstasy, terror, despair, frustration, and fulfillment not totally unlike ours. The telling difference between our experience and the experience of a Rembrandt, a Goya, a Cézanne, or a Picasso is not so much in kind as in how its quality and intensity are faced, felt, acted upon, contemplated, and finally manifested in a work of art. (pp. 3-4)

All of which means to say that neither an artist’s aesthetic impulse nor the work of art is entirely a world unto itself. The ultimate product of “imaginative beholding”—the finished work of art—is a projected image of human experience. The image has been made vital and relevant through the complex integration of many aspects of experience: imagination, feeling, contemplation, intellect, and so forth. The artist’s task is to organize the materials of medium and experience into expressive forms. And when this task is done by a Raphael or a Picasso through design, symbolization, and color, it is for the informed beholder a thing of beauty.

The enjoyment of art for what it conveys aesthetically of human experience requires no other justification. However, *informed* art appreciation can be of value also as an instrument of periodic self-renewal in the administrative office.

Inescapable role-related obligations to such tasks as strategic planning, fiduciary management, and contract negotiations tend to turn administrators into prisoners of the “functional”—Ciardi would say “practical”—mind set. Three types of inter-related occupational
hazards lie hidden in such a mind set: 1) entrapment in the egocentric predicament; an inability to see the world except through one's own eyes; 2) the acquisition of a trained incapacity for empathy; a skill which enables one to comprehend what others feel under stress and 3) the all too familiar spiritual "burn-out" in the administrative role.

Northrop (1963), in an incisive commentary on the enjoyment of art as an instrument of self-renewal has put it this way:

One of the things which makes our lives drab and empty and which leaves us, at the end of the day, fatigued and deflated spiritually is the pressure of the taxing, practical, utilitarian concern with common-sense objects. If art is to release us from the postulated things and bring us back to the ineffable beauty and richness of the aesthetic component of reality in its immediacy, it must sever its connections with these common-sense entities. (p. 170)

Great artists are quick to see "the ineffable beauty and richness of the aesthetic component of reality in its immediacy." They free themselves from the morass of "common-sense entities" to seek a higher level of individual sensibility and perception. "Works of art," wrote John Dewey (1958), "are . . . celebrations, recognized as such, of the things of ordinary experience" (p. 11) It is exactly this gift for "imaginative beholding" of the immediate in "ordinary experience" that qualifies artists as reliable image-makers of a Zeitgeist. Iconographic references to several masterpieces in art will illustrate both Northrop's and Dewey's statements.

Jan Van Eyck had painted the portrait of Giovanni Arnolfini and his wife in 1434 and it is now in the permanent collection of the National Gallery in London. A visual encounter with the Arnolfini portrait discloses the two standing subjects, her right hand is in Arnolfini's left and his right hand is raised as in the affirmation of a vow. They are surrounded by the immediate bedroom details of a fifteenth-century middle-class house in Bruges. Depicted with a heightened realism in portraiture painting which Van Eyck had perfected are slippers, a bed, a metal chandelier, a small furry dog positioned in front of the standing figures, fruit on a window-sill, a rosary on the wall, and a mirror reflection of the artist's physical presence.
the mirror is written in Latin *Johannes de eyck fuit hic*—"Jan Van Eyck was present."  

Van Eyck's Arnolfini portrait is a feast for the eyes. That the artist had captured the beauty "of reality in its immediacy" is confirmed on a first encounter with the portrait. With the guidance of iconographic analysis, however, its aesthetic enjoyment is increased considerably. It turns out upon an analysis of its symbolic content—Panofsky's "subject matter"—that the Arnolfini portrait also is a marriage contract.

Everything is there to formalize a fifteenth-century betrothal: the pledge of fidelity is symbolized by the small dog, a promise of fecundity is symbolized by a bed and fruit on the window-sill, church sanction is symbolized by the rosary, and the artist himself is witness—"Jan Van Eyck was present." However, Van Eyck is more than a witness to the "ordinary experience" of a betrothal. His "imaginative beholding" also makes him an eyewitness to the changing social environment of his time.

That the Italian Giovanni Arnolfini should have allowed himself and his wife to be posed in the bedroom of his house is by itself a revealing *Zeitgeist* statement. A residue of the asceticism and world-to-come preoccupation of medieval life lingered on in early fifteenth-century European society. Many artists of Van Eyck's time, albeit in a changing style and form, still took for their subject matter biblical settings and characters. But Arnolfini was the agent-banker in Bruges of Cosimo de'Medici, a lavish patron of the arts and first Medici ruler of Florence, and, like his Medici principal, Arnolfini reflected the growing desire of his time for personal prestige, social status, individualism, and even posthumous fame.

Artist and subject, one a founding figure of the Flemish Renaissance in painting and the other nurtured by the social environment of a flowering Italian Renaissance, resonated to an incipient secularism which soon was to transform the *Zeitgeist* of European society. It would have been unthinkable for an artist of the Middle Ages to sign a finished canvas with the boldness and compositional energy of a Jan Van Eyck.
Another landmark work of art, closer to the twentieth century, is Georges Seurat’s “Un Dimanche d’été à la Grande Jatte,” or just “la Grande Jatte,” in the permanent collection of the Chicago Art Institute. Seurat exhibited his “la Grande Jatte” for the first time in 1886 at the Rue des Tuileries, where two hundred works were shown of artists who had been refused by the established art galleries of Paris.

Seurat had developed a style of painting in dots of pure color, a technique called pointillism today and which was a refinement on the impressionistic broken color of his contemporaries. The subjects of “la Grande Jatte” are a multitude of figures on holiday. They are shown on an island park in the Seine strolling, children and pets frolicking, or just people looking at the river. What is curious, however, about these holiday-makers spread over the canvas at random is that they do not look at each other. Each figure is presented self-absorbed and, in the larger setting itself, relations among the assembled seem devoid of intimacy or any display of Gemeinschaft behavior. What is the meaning of this imagistically transmuted information?

Seurat’s radar-like perception had captured in the imagery of “la Grande Jatte” an incipient Zeitgeist change. Nor was he alone. Edgar Degas in his painting, “Cotton Exchange in New Orleans,” finished in 1873 and now in the Musee de Beaux-Arts, Pau, France, had done the same earlier. Here all the subjects are in the business of trading in cotton. They are shown at work on their ledgers, reading the newspaper, testing samples and they do these things as if unaware of each other’s presence.

Seurat’s pointillist style, together with the seeming casualness in “la Grande Jatte,” constitute a rebus of David Riesman’s “Lonely Crowd” in twentieth-century society. Is it chance alone which accounts for the fact that the year after Seurat had exhibited “la Grande Jatte” Ferdinand Tönnies had published Gemeinschaft und Gesselschaft? Not likely! It would seem in retrospect that Tönnies’ own sociological imagination was in resonance with Seurat’s image of a Zeitgeist in the making. Here social science reality is sharpened by Seurat’s “imaginative beholding.”

Emile Durkheim’s The Social Division of Labor in Society,
published in 1893, likewise is illustrative. The two concepts of organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity form the core of Durkheim’s sociological classic. Again, is there any connection between the sociology of Durkheim and the iconographic statement of “la Grande Jatte?” The formation of personality, apart from the purely physical, is for both Tönnies and Durkheim a social phenomenon. It is a product of restraints and influences that society exerts on individuals. In a juxtaposition of this idea with “la Grande Jatte,” it appears that Tönnies and Durkheim have dealt with the sociological reality of this phenomenon whereas Seurat, following Northrop, has dealt with it as an “aesthetic component of reality in its immediacy”.

4

Epistemological Relevance in “Imaginative Beholding”

Sociologists, to be sure, concern themselves with ideas that inform relational patterns in society and artists with aesthetic expressions of the imagination. And while the connection between the two is not immediately obvious in all works of art because of a complex symbolism, as in Van Eyck’s Arnolfini portrait, there are certain set pieces in which the artist, without substituting intellect for imagination, did mean to cast heightened luminosity on a driving intellectual problem. Raphael’s “The School of Athens” in the Vatican demonstrates instantly how such works of art can be made relevant epistemologically for a theoretic issue.

An ongoing disputation in the theoretical literature of school administration turns on the question: which theoretical paradigms are best suited for the field? The hypothetico-deductive paradigms of logical positivism have held the field unchallenged since the first UCEA Career Development Seminar, “Administrative Theory in Education,” in 1957. But no more! The paradigms of hermeneutic epistemology now have mounted a formidable offensive against positivism in such forums as Educational Administration Quarterly, Di-
vision A programs at AERA Annual Meetings, and a 1983 UCEA Career Development Seminar at the University of Kansas.\textsuperscript{17}

The contest for theoretical hegemony between positivist and hermeneutic paradigms is intense. Egon Guba (1983), a staunch advocate of naturalism, shows this intensity in the following introduction to a paper he had presented at the 1983 UCEA-University of Kansas Career Development Seminar:

I shall first describe what I believe to be the salient basic beliefs that characterize positivism, and then place in opposition to them the axioms that undergird the emergent position, which I shall refer to as naturalism . . . . I will also undertake to refute the contention that positivism and naturalism can be compromised in some form of post-post-positivistic [sic] "grand synthesis" which, \textit{mirabile dictu}, re-ignites the basic beliefs of both systems into compatibility. Unfortunately, I shall come to the conclusion that in this case we are dealing with an either-or proposition, in which you "puts down yer money and yer takes yer cherce!" (p. 3)\textsuperscript{a}

Raffaelo Sanzio, or just Raphael, also had a position in this controversy and, as an artist, he stated it through the iconography of his fresco painting, "The School of Athens." At about the same time that Michelangelo was creating a masterpiece in the Sistine Chapel, Pope Julius II, the Renaissance Pope, invited Raphael to Rome and commissioned him to decorate the walls of his new Vatican apartment. There he completed four large fresco—\textit{v'\textcopyright all}—paintings, referred to in the literature as Stanza della Segnatura. One of these was "The School of Athens."

He painted in it the two central figures of Plato and Aristotle separated from other subgroupings by a framing archway, but all figures are surrounded by easy-to-recognize symbols of classical antiquity. Plato is shown pointing skyward with one hand and the other holding his book, \textit{Timaeus}. Aristotle, alongside of him, holds the \textit{Ethics} in one hand and gesticulates toward the assembled accessory figures with the other. With effortless simplicity, and in crisp color tonalities of blues and whites, Raphael depicted imagistically their respective philosophies.
Through the visually ascertainable interaction among the several subgroupings in "The School of Athens," in one of which the artist worked his own likeness into the composition, Raphael made his own position known in the controversy and it was not the either-or stance of you "puts down yer money and yer takes yer cherce." Art historian Edgar Wind (1969) explains:

In the philosophical circle to which Raphael belonged, a doctrine was current that any proposition in Plato could be translated into a proposition in Aristotle, provided that one took into account that Plato's language was that of poetic enthusiasm, whereas Aristotle spoke in the cool tone of rational analysis. Raphael placed the two contending philosophers, who "agree in substance while they disagree in words," in a hall dominated by the statues of Apollo and Minerva: the god of poetry and the goddess of reason preside over the amicable disputation which, concentrated in Plato and Aristotle, is enlarged and particularized in a succession of sciences; these answer each other in the same discords and concords in which Plato and Aristotle converse. (p. 62)¹⁹

It was not Raphael's purpose, of course, to abandon art for philosophy, but, as Wind (1969) has noted, "great artists have always been intellectually quick" (p. 58). Raphael was a master image-maker, a genius at combining intellect with imagination, and these images are at once a source of uplifting enjoyment and enhanced intellectual enlightenment.

No canonical positivist or hermeneutically-inclined "naturalist" is likely to settle for a "grand synthesis" in the controversy over paradigms because of a recreative interaction with "The School of Athens;" the philosophical problem here is much too complex for that, but Raphael's ageless art does contribute three things of value to the current controversy.²⁰

First, "The School of Athens" lifts this controversy out of the "reality in its immediacy" and through creative use of color and design projects its "aesthetic component." Then, through iconographic analysis, "The School of Athens" provides visual testimony to the ubiquity of the problem. It is altogether a useful enlightenment for students of school administration to see that the Quatrocento and
Cinquecento also had wrestled with this problem and which problem many of them now confront for the first time. Last, and also enlightening, is to be made aware by “The School of Athens” that, as far back as Raphael’s time, there already were advocates of a “grand synthesis” and that it is not a de novo proposition out of “post-post-positivism.”

5

Institutional Leadership and Cultural Sensitivity

The nurturing of cultural sensitivity in administration is still another use-value in art criticism. All of the literature, both theoretical and textbook, stresses the importance of institutional leadership in administration. No professional preparation for administration, not in education or of any other field, is likely to produce a full-fledged institutional leader. Mature institutional leadership is produced in the crucible of administrative practice, but the preparation program does have to lay a foundation for it.

Modern-day preparation programs in school administration do, as a matter of course, lay a cognitive foundation for the cultivation of institutional perspective; some more so than others, and it is this program component which in all instances can be enriched by aesthetic illumination.

Institutional perspective, or “moral creativeness,” as Barnard thinks of it, begins with an intellectual grasp of how the institutional value system—this is Parsons’ pattern-maintenance system in his Theory of Action—provides the legitimation of normative order in society. All concepts of formal organization, in both academic and applied fields, are bound to the sociological centrality of the dominant value system as the source of legitimation.

The motivational energy which had brought the “theory movement” to school administration was itself driven by the centrality of the cultural system. School administration had abandoned the three-
B preparation paradigm of beans-budgets-bricks, and it turned to theories of organization for the design of a more sophisticated model, when school boards of the post-World War II period began to expect institutional leadership from administrative stewardship. School organization now had to respond adaptively to new goal demands in society and administration was expected to organize the strategic plan for the change.

The new literature that came with the "theory movement" further reinforced the urgency of institutional leadership in administration. When Barnard (1971) wrote, "The strategic factor in the dynamic expression of leadership is moral creativeness" (p. 216), and when Selznick (1957) stressed the attainment of "statesmanship" in the executive office (pp. 27-28), each had in mind institutional leadership. Each, moreover, alluded to the importance of cultural sensitivity in leadership.

Barnard's (1971) reference to cultural sensitivity is in the following discussion of "the executive process:"

It transcends the capacity of merely intellectual methods, and the techniques of discriminating the factors of the situation. The terms pertinent to it are "feeling," "judgment," "sense," "proportion," "balance," "appropriateness." It is a matter of art rather than science, and is aesthetic rather than logical. For this reason it is recognized rather than described and is known by its effects rather than by analysis. (p. 235)22

Barnard alluded to, but could not define, cultural sensitivity because, as he wrote, its substance "is aesthetic rather than logical." It is nurtured by the emotive component of society's institutional value system which, as a transcending idealism, is best articulated through aesthetic expression.

Transcendent idealism is an aspect of culture which has activated creative imaginations from the beginning of human society. It is metaphysical, but also very much of a piece with received reality. John Turnbull's painting, "The Resignation of George Washington," is illustrative of transcendence articulated through aesthetic expression. General Washington is shown in the act of resigning his
commission before the Continental Congress. His cloak has been hurriedly flung off to one side to indicate iconographically a surrender of power to its legitimate source, representatives of the people, now that the goal of independence had been attained.

And as social reality, this idealism which envelops a society’s regnant value pattern exerts a subliminal influence in cultural adaptation because it provides emotive reinforcement for society’s ethics and morals. In terms of the system’s pattern-maintenance “function,” it is a guiding star. And like a star, it cannot be touched, but, as the seafarer headed toward a destination, society looks to it for direction to its destiny.

American social science has not devoted the singular attention to this aspect of culture as has German Geisteswissenschaft. One explanation of this, and there are others, the strong tilt of the institutional value pattern of American society is toward the rationality associated with technological adaptation. Parsons has characterized it as a value pattern of “instrumental activism.” Social science in America, as the record in intellectual history demonstrates, has been most responsive to positivistic stimuli. Also informative in this regard is that Article I, Sec. 8, in the Constitution of the United States specifically empowers the Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”

6

American Art History

The work of art historians is an especially useful vehicle for the cultivation of that cultural sensitivity to which Barnard had alluded but could not define. American art historians have followed models provided by both Burckhardt and Parrington. Just as Parrington had studied “the American mind” through period literature, so art historians after him, likewise, have studied stages of American civilization through culturally sensitizing images in art. The first such study, and
still a model of excellence and of comprehensiveness, was done by Oliver Larkin.

Larkin’s *Art and Life in America*, published in 1949, was awarded the Pulitzer prize in history. Its purpose, as stated by the author, was to show how the “...arts have expressed American ways of living and how they have been related to the development of American ideas, particularly the idea of democracy” (p. V). Through images of historical periods, Larkin presents a pictographic account of American culture and its nurturing idealism from the early 1600s to 1960.

*Art and Life in America* also is social history at its best. However, what sets Larkin’s work apart from other good social histories is its treatment of Zeitgeist imagery. In *The Rise of the American City*, for example, Arthur Schlesinger (1933) draws on a vast body of vital statistics to explain the dynamic urban thrust of the post-Appomatox period. Larkin’s (1960, chap. 25) history also deals with the social reality of urban development, not by means of cold vital statistics, but through the expressive imagery of “Mop, Pail, and Ashcan.”

“Mop, Pail, and Ashcan” is a metaphoric reference to a group of artists of the early twentieth century who found their subject matter in the commonplace and sometimes unattractive landscape of the city. Because they persisted in painting also the seamy side of city life, their work, like that of Seurat in the 1880s, was refused at traditional exhibitions. Robert Henri, as an example, painted “Snow in New York,” now in the National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C., in which he depicted the drabness of a large city on a snowy and overcast day. These artists are collectively referred to by art historians as the “Ash Can School” of painters. For them, as artists, the driving motivation was aesthetic expression and not intellectual discourse. As it turns out, however, they also had made a sociologically insightful statement about twentieth-century life in urban America.

The use-value of art history to the cultivation of cultural sensitivity is greater still when images of one period’s Zeitgeist is juxtaposed with that of another. Volumes, for example, have been written by social historians of how the environment of American society had been transformed in the span of less than one century from the pastoral
to the urban. Facts which inform this transformation are documented in these volumes, but the emotive response to this transformation is to be found in art. Even as the “Ash Can School” had painted in the early 1900s prophetic images of an emerging urban Zeitgeist, so did the “Hudson River School”—about 1825 to 1860—paint images of a soon-to-be lost pastoral innocence. The “westward movement” in the United States, driven by a dynamic manifest-destiny myth, was expanding the continental United States from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner had awakened American society to the fact that there no longer was a wilderness frontier.26

Even as these events were making their mark in American history, and before the frontier had all been settled, artists of the “Hudson River School” were expressing their intuitive foreboding of a lost American wilderness in dream-like images of rustic landscapes. Their brown tonal veils were suggestive of the biblical Adam dreaming of a once-known paradise.27

George Inness is not identified stylistically with the “Hudson River School” of landscape painting, but he was a contemporary. He also depicted intuitive images of an America in transformation. “The Lackawanna Valley,” painted by Inness in 1855, and also in the National Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C. but without the tonal veils of early “Hudson River School” artists, is more direct at stating aesthetically the Adamic dream.

“The Lackawanna Valley” shows a countryside: the lengthening shadows of a sunny day, a church spire of a close-by town, tree stumps left from a forest clearing, and a hillock with a large tree under which a reclining figure wearing a red jacket is looking at the landscape below. But there is more. An engine, icon of the machine age, belching smoke is shown pulling a long train of coal cars. Also shown is a distant roundhouse and marshaling yards.

Inness sharpens cultural sensitivity by depicting aesthetically the reality of a turning point in the development of American society. The reality in this instance is the transformation of American society from the pastoral to the urban. The cumulative effect of exposures to this type of aesthetic material is reinforcement in the nurturing of institu-
tional leadership. Cultural sensitivity, as Barnard had indicated, "transcends the capacity of merely intellectual methods." Indeed, it is more a matter of aesthetic insight into the mythopoeic infrastructure of culture.

How programs in school administration can best make use of art history and criticism is, as has been suggested in Part I, a matter of tactical inventiveness. The inclusion of Art History in the course-spread of a program's supporting-field is the most direct way. Another, and one which would be more attuned to program objectives in administrative preparation, is a collaboration with Art History faculty in the development of a service course for all administrative preparation programs on campus. Still another way is to bring the Art Historian to school administration by means of a color video-taped lecture.

The lecture itself would have to be prepared around core concepts and program objectives in administrative preparation. Relevant slides would then have to be selected from the color-slide collection in Art History.

Art historian and critic Sidney Lawrence, one-time student of Erwin Panofsky, has demonstrated that the preparation of such an art lecture is a facilitative collaboration. The occasion was a 1973 week-long summer Institute for students of school administration at the University of Minnesota. Lawrence was invited to prepare a lecture on art with the following objectives in mind: enjoyment, aesthetic illumination of key reality in the twentieth century, and the usefulness of empathy. Out of this evolved a lecture by Lawrence bearing the title, "Pablo Picasso: Twentieth Century Man."

Lawrence proposed Picasso as the focal point of the lecture for two altogether persuasive reasons. First, no other painter since Michelangelo has so completely embodied the temperament of his
age, both in his work and personality, as has Pablo Picasso. Second, to enter the world of Picasso is the great, central twentieth-century aesthetic experience; fully comparable to entering the Elizabethan period through the works of Shakespeare and the Baroque through the music of Johann Sebastian Bach.

His lecture was received well. It ranked at the top in student evaluations of the Institute. Lawrence combined wit with the right mix of art criticism to satisfy the instructional needs of an applied field. His lecture is presented here in its entirety to serve two ends: Lawrence's lecture provides an elegant recapitulation of principal ideas in this section and, then, it is made available as a model for other theme-specific art lectures which might be prepared for instructional use in administration.

PABLO PICASSO: TWENTIETH CENTURY MAN
by Sidney Lawrence

Pablo Picasso was born in 1881. He was nineteen when the twentieth century was born. He lives now in the South of France near Aix-en-Provence and Cannes. He continues to work and to express his enthusiasms, wit, and satire in ingenious inventive ways that make it difficult for us to realize that here chronologically, if nothing more, is indeed a man of the twentieth century.

On the other hand, he has so thoroughly entered the realm of the modern classics that his name has become a cultural byword.

You may have heard the story of the East Indian marriage broker who presented a series of photographs of a prospective bride to the young man's parents for approval. The girl, it was assured, came from a fine family, well educated, accomplished in music and all the social graces. She was wealthy also. "But her arms seem to be peculiarly long and she has six fingers," said the boy's mother. "And her eyes don't seem to focus correctly," added the father. "And she is standing pigeon toed," they exclaimed in unison. "I see," said the marriage broker as he collected the photographs with some disdain. "I see," he repeated, "you evidently don't like Picasso."

Recently, in a parlor charade, a wag put his eyeglasses on the side instead of the front of his head. "Guess what I am," he asked: "A portrait by Picasso."

I am going to make a few appreciative remarks about a man whom I consider one of the greatest, if not the greatest, pictorial genius
of all time. I cannot take the time now to defend that statement in all its complexity, but if there is any doubt about its objective validity, I would appreciate your courtesy in accepting it as an autobiographical note; that is, it says something about Sidney Lawrence if it doesn’t say much about Picasso.

Art is an intelligible communicative medium which, as a document, is also a marker in the history of the spirit and the affairs of humankind. Picasso’s art fulfills this function in aesthetics not merely by creating new notions of beauty, but also by giving us new insights into our relationship with the world about us: relationships with nature, other human beings, and the meaning of art. He teaches us how to look at the world. To find “true” relationships.

To understand the spirit of the twentieth century which reflects Picasso’s genius as much as it motivates his genius, I would like to speak for a moment about the meaning of truth in its relation to the art object. I forgot the name of the scientist, it might have been Einstein, who in paying tribute to the past, said that he had to stand on the shoulders of his predecessors in order to see beyond to new horizons; that new discovery came with the testing of the knowledge of the past and that new truths grew out of facts no longer true. This does not obtain in art history. The art truths of the Parthenon sculpture are just as valid today as when they were made. Michelangelo’s Sistine Ceiling is just as true today as when it was painted in the early sixteenth century. Rembrandt’s, “The Jewish Bride,” is hardly a lie, even though we know now that it was based iconographically on an episode from the life of the Prodigal Son when he was in bad company. Picasso is no more true in his blue period, or his cubist period, or the period of the great Guernica Mural.

The truth of the art object is as lasting as is its material existence. What merits definition and redefinition is the “truth” of the humanism of the artist or the period which produced the object.

What then is the special advance in knowledge that makes it possible for us to understand an artist in the various ways he communicates his perception of the world around him—nature, human inter-relationships, other art objects—how he uses technique, material, and style to transform the world he perceives into a work of art? I use “perception” the way psychologists use it. One perceives not only with one’s eyes, but with one’s whole personality, culture, and purpose. It is the element of purpose which is most important here. We cannot enter into a social, useful communicative process with anyone unless we appreciate the other’s purpose. This may be more difficult with artists who must communicate through an art object, but it is essential if we wish to share in the experience of new exciting and rewarding
perception. The development of perception techniques is a mark of knowledge on the part of an artist and equally important on the part of an informed audience.

Another area of sensitivity is that of empathy. The great artists of all times seem to me to have had special talents of empathy with aspects of nature and culture. They seem to be able to use art techniques; that is to say, the development of style through the handling of material which adds up to a kind of prophetic image of the times they live in, and for encompassing large ideas and social movements. The talent for empathy is also a noble virtue when employed by an informed audience.

In the art of the twentieth century there have been two giants. Each has given us new experiences in perception and empathy, revealing aspects of art and nature which have become characteristic of our time. One is an institution; a group of men with a common philosophy that, for the sake of convenience, I will describe as an interest in the materialistic aspect of contemporary life. This is the Bauhaus movement in Germany which I believe is the most significant motivating resource for contemporary abstract art. The other is Pablo Picasso whose genius has somehow touched every aspect of contemporary art which is humanistic, whose style and search is in the organic rather than the mechanical, who describes the more fugitive aspects of nature rather than its permanent aspects.

We will see how this is reflected in his work. How may we describe twentieth century man? There are innumerable qualities and areas of analysis. May I suggest the following three conditions:

1. The man of the twentieth century must learn to be comfortable in a world of change, characterized by quick change rather than slower evolution. Advances in technology create a climate wherein abrupt change is more characteristic of our time than slow change. We are caught in a dilemma of yearning for stability while reality itself appears unstable. And we must find ways of being comfortable and rational in such a condition.

2. The twentieth century man must be a universal man. Nothing should be foreign to him. He must feel comfortable in many cultures and he must contribute to the creation of a new culture which synthesizes in line with its own purpose, techniques, values, ideas, and art from other cultures. He must know how to cherish differences and traditions without permitting differences and traditions to become barriers to common goals.

3. The twentieth century man, if he is to survive at all, must be a man of love and not of hate; a man of compassion and not of greed. He must understand the aspirations of the isolated, the dispossessed, and the
social dynamics of culture which may at times make the last first.

Let us look at some of Picasso's work in the light of these three observations. First, his contributions in the field of perception and empathy:

- his understanding of change,
- his universality,
- his humanity.

(Show slide, "On the Globe," a painting of a boy balancing on a large ball while another is seated on a solid square box. This painting symbolizes the problem of living with constant change and the yearning for stability).

If we look now at his artistic development over a large span of time, we recognize the forces of revolutionary change rather than evolution in his work. He doesn't grow like a Rembrandt or a Titian from a tight to a loose style. How else can we explain these striking changes of style?

- "Man With a Hat" (Collage)
- "Woman in White"
- "The Lovers"
- "Picasso"
- "Man With a Pipe"
- "The Mirror"
- "Girl Writing"

These changes of style have little to do with concepts of evolutionary development that come with slow "inner growth." They have a great deal to do with experimentation; with perception influenced by social, political, and artistic events. Picasso helps us break through conformity at a revolutionary pace and teaches us many ways to look at nature and art.

"Les Demoiselles d'Avignon", painted in 1906-07, was the first great break-through in European art on a cultural front. Here for the first time the art of "primitive" Africa enters in as a resource for Europeans. It was this painting, more than any other, that took artists away from their studies in the Louvre and brought them to the "anthropological" museums where African art had been kept in crowded cases as artifacts. Picasso brought the art of "backwards," or children's art, or of non-historical cultures, into his art and made us understand it in terms of twentieth-century perception as form and shape, design and color, rather than function. He led us to the original source and to see with new eyes the art meaning of ancient classical and "primitive" forms previously considered inferior. This event went hand in hand with a whole new ferment in anthropology where the genius of a culture was beginning to be understood in its own terms, its own purpose, rather
than in the terms of a technologically disparate culture. The kind of exhibitions of primitive art now current in our art museums would have been impossible fifty years ago. They would have been held, if at all, in a Museum of Natural History, or Museums of Man, where many of the best collections are still stored. If we are able to enjoy these objects as works of art in the same way we enjoy Greek sculpture as works of art, it is because Picasso, and those influenced by him, have given us new perceptions and new feelings of empathy with cultures heretofore thought of as inferior, foreign, or curious.

He has not only done this with unfamiliar cultures, but he has made us take a new look at our own. He reviews for us the limitations of the styles and techniques of other periods in Western art.

In the painting "Green Still Life" he brings into a new dimension the meaning of pointillism and reveals new nuances in the work of Seurat or the early Fauves like Derain and Matisse. In this painting he helps open the eyes of a Roy Lichtenstein to the "pointillism" of newspaper "screen" reproduction. The entire history of art is his and he has taught us by his genius and his sheer prolific output a new way of looking at art of the past so that when we look at some Pompeian painting, our comment is "It reminds us of a Picasso." Thus a whole revival of interest in engravings on ancient classical bronze mirrors develops because they look like Picasso, after Picasso has introduced the engraving style in his own work.

This aspect of universality is, of course, another side of his changing style. If he gives us new insights and sensations regarding styles in Western art history and in traditional subject matter, as in his "Two Seated Women" or "Pipes of Pan," which urge us to take another look at the architectural sculpture of classical antiquity, he also helps us discover new and wonderful virtues in everyday manufactured objects which he employs as new art materials in his collages. Wall paper and news print are used like other artists use paint and color. The junk heap now becomes a romantic source for art material and Picasso gives us new lessons in the meaning of the accidental, the spontaneous, the unrehearsed. He provides us with new symbols to express the ravages of time on nature and culture. Objects of trivia gain their own dignity, nostalgia, and poetic mystery as they are recreated in a composition by Picasso.

In one of the films on Picasso he is shown at lunch where a flounder is served. Picasso eats the fish carefully, removing the flesh from the skeleton with a curious grace. He then takes the skeleton and impresses it on a clay plate which is then fired to produce a characteristic Picasso. There is some kind of magic which flows from him in this act of creating a work of art. The finished object is unmistakably a Picasso.
We see in this pre-occupation, experimentation, and inventive-
ess with material something akin to the interests of the Bauhaus, but
the difference is the difference between Picasso and the painter Kurt
Schwitters; it is the difference between saying that something is no
longer useful, or is worn out, and saying that it is junk.

If we note his humanity, it is also interesting to observe that
Picasso's earliest affinity was Toulouse-Lautrec rather than Cézanne.
For Cézanne, the human figure was seen as an object of form, as an
artist's model, as a studio prop. For Toulouse-Lautrec the human
figure, recruited almost always from the artistic, bohemian, and a
deviant sub-group in society, is more than an object. Picasso recog-
nized Toulouse-Lautrec, rather than Cézanne or Degas, as a kindred
spirit who, through art, comes to grips with problems of understanding
and living in a world of tension and change, where conflict is associated
with progress, and duplicity is an element of stability.

To conclude, I have attempted to explain in outline Picasso as a
twentieth-century man the way Michelangelo is often described as a
Man of the Renaissance. If, indeed, the twentieth century will be de-
scribed in terms of revolution, universalism, and humanism, then
Picasso the artist does indeed express these complex trends of our
century. I believe that an increased perception and empathy with the art
of Picasso will help to guide us to alternatives of direction and to
corrective insights into the realities that face us as culturally sensitive
participants in the affairs of our society.28

Notes

1. Giinter's Truth and Method deals with philosophical herme-
nenetics and, in Part I of the book, with Geisteswissenschaft, whose plural form is Geisteswissenschaften.

Those who might want more on Gadamer's intellectual orienta-
tion will find it in Hans-Georg Gadamer (1983), Reason in the
Age of Science, translated by Frederick G. Lawrence.

2. See also Gadamer's Truth and Method for a similar statement, pp. 65-6.

3. Leopold von Ranke, 1795-1886, is acknowledged as founder of
the German School of Objective History. Of his many works, some 54 volumes, perhaps the best known is *The History of the Roman Republic*. Part V, to follow, has more on Ranke's "objective history."

Although *Geisteswissenschaft* did not develop in the United States as a discrete social science, its importance for the study of society as a social system had been affirmed by Talcott Parsons in his *Theory of Action*. Parsonian theory is a synthesis of core concepts in Utilitarianism, Positivism, and Idealism. For an elaboration of this, see Edward C. Devereux, Jr., "Parsons' Sociological Theory," in Max Black (1962), ed., *The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons*.

4. Georgio Vasari, an Italian artist and pupil of Michelangelo, in his *Lives of the Painters*, also included works of art in biographical sketches of such as Raphael, Michelangelo, and Leonardo da Vinci. Vasari's *Lives*, however, is flawed by gross inaccuracies and is read today more for entertainment and for information about Renaissance technical methods than as history.

5. Historian Wallace Ferguson (1945) has confirmed the sharpness of Burckhardt's mosaics some ninety years later in the observation that Burckhardt's "... picture of the Renaissance leaves a vivid impression of rampant individualism, creative energy and moral chaos, with the supernatural sanctions and Christian traditions of the Middle Ages giving way to something more like the ancient p: e-Christian ways of thought" (p. 4).

For more on Burckhardt's pioneer work in art history, see Alfred Von Martin (1945), *Sociology of the Renaissance*, translated by W. L. Luetkens.

6. These men of eminence in art-historical scholarship held university art history chairs in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland.
Their names are given in Erwin Panofsky (1955, p. 323), *Meaning in the Visual Arts: Papers in and on Art History*.

It should be further noted that, although the art historians in Panofsky’s reference now are identified with diverse schools of art-historical methodology, they did hold in common one intellectual objective in the writing of art history: *Künstgeschichte als Geistesgeschichte*; that is, art history as the spiritual history of a culture.

7. “We do not need very much expertise in the history of art,” writes William Barrett (1984), “to be able to situate a given work in its approximate historical period. Somehow the individual work carries the look of its time about it. It bears all the pressures of its period, however individual and rebellious the artist may have wished to be. And perhaps the more he seeks to escape them, the more crudely his work will bear the historic marks of his period” (p. 39).

8. A closer look at Panofsky’s iconographic analysis shows it to be in a comfortable congruence with the more familiar field of communication analysis as it is encountered in the literature of administration. Harold D. Lasswell’s model for communication analysis is a convenient case in point. The skeletal structure of Lasswell’s model, it will be recalled, consists of five questions: Who? Says what? In which channel? To whom? With what effect? Both Lasswell and Panofsky have as their objective the analysis of an act of communication for what its content reveals and means. Whereas Lasswell’s act of communication is in spoken or written language, Panofsky’s is in the symbolization language of the spacial arts: painting, sculpture, architecture, and the like. However, it is quite clear in Panofsky’s detailed explanation of iconographic analysis that he and Lasswell had in mind similar touchstone questions in their respective guides to analysis. In short, it is a tool of excogitative imagination useful for communication analysis both in the universe of formal
organization and of aesthetic expression.

It is also useful to recall in this regard that the interview phase of the Hawthorne Studies had opened a fresh source of information when investigators began to discriminate in content analysis between what workers revealed and what they meant in a communication.

For Panofsky's detailed explanation of iconographic analysis see "Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance Art," in Panofsky (1955), Meaning in the Visual Arts (pp. 26-54).

9. Wölfflin uses the expression "imaginative beholding" to mean an artist's "mode of vision" at a given historical period. See "Preface to the Sixth Edition" and "Introduction" in Wölfflin, Principles of Art History.

10. Northrop's idea "of the aesthetic component of reality in its immediacy" can be the starting point for gainful speculation in the domain of the sociology of knowledge. A good preparation for such an exercise of the mind is Janet Wolff (1983), Aesthetics and the Sociology of Art.

11. Jan Van Eyck was one of the first to use a resin, or an oil medium, in order to maximize realism through spacial depth. For more on the Arnolfini portrait, and on Van Eyck's "realism," see E. H. Gombrich (1972), The Story of Art (chap. 12).

12. Before the Council of Trent, opened in 1545 and closed in 1563, a priest was not required to solemnize a Catholic marriage.

13. For more on Seurat and his time, see Roger Shattuck (1968), The Banquet Years: The Origins of the Avant Garde in France, 1885 to World War I.
14. Degas’ brothers were cotton merchants in New Orleans and, on a visit, he observed first-hand the inside of a cotton exchange in New Orleans.

15. The verity of an artist’s radar-like gift for detecting, and then of communicating aesthetically, incipient Zeitgeist changes has been reaffirmed in the twentieth century by Robert Beverly Hale (1950), Associate Curator of American Art, Metropolitan Museum of Art, in the following:

“We have seen, in our century, the development of fantastic scientific paraphernalia and much ill will. We live in the fear of some monstrous event which will bring, at best, a curious and distorted future; at worse, annihilation. The artist is in part a prophet. We should not complain if the shadows that have lately haunted us have for some time been visible upon his canvas” (p. i). See also end note 22 of Part V.

16. Sociological kinship between intellectual ideas and expression in art is more immediately obvious when a distinction is made between “the sociology in art” and “the sociology of art.” Seurat’s “la Grande Jatte,” to illustrate, yields sociological information simply by a reflective observation of the manner in which the artist posed figures in relation to each other; this is “sociology in art,” whereas the use of sociological ideas in art criticism is the “sociology of art.” For a demonstration of the latter in sociological literature, see Vytautas Kavolis (1972), History on Art’s Side: Social Dynamics in Artistic Efflorescences. Kavolis applied Talcott Parsons’ AGIL model of social change to explain the phenomenon of cycles in artistic output. See also in this regard note 21 to follow.

17. For a comprehensive survey-review of this dispute, see Jack Culbertson (1983).

The Seminar title at the University of Kansas was “Linking New Concepts of Organizations to New Paradigms for Inquiry: Fruitful Partnerships in Administrative Studies.”
18. There is no indication in Guba’s paper as to which ontological system his “naturalism” is related. However, since the time of this seminar, a publication by Lincoln & Guba explains it all. See Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon Guba (1985), *Naturalistic Inquiry.*


21. In the scholarship of Georg Simmel there is another example of how “sociology in art” has been used to light up a social-science idea. Simmel’s ground breaking sociology of conflict delineates the social function of conflict in its variety of forms. A certain type of conflict can lead to group unity and, to illustrate his point, Simmel used Raphael’s “Disputa” or, its more formal name, “The Disputation Over the Sacrament.” See George Simmel (1964), *Conflict,* translated by Kurt H. Wolff (p. 15).

The “Disputa” is another of the four fresco paintings in Raphael’s Stanza della Segnatura group and it, too, is a classic model of multi-figured painting. Its subject matter is depicted at two levels, in heaven and on earth, in a complex symbolism. Its literal intent is to show an assembly of Fathers and Doctors of the Church in an animated disputation over mysteries of the sacrament.

22. For a work that deals with the importance of cultural sensitivity in relation to leadership at the level of operations, see Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc. 1985).

"In Dispraise of Existential Humanism in Educational Administra-
tion." For more on the cultural character of American Social
Science, see Don Martindale (1982), Personality and Milieu:
The Shaping of Social Science Culture. A reading of James
Madison's "Federalist No. 43" in the Federalist Papers will
enhance insight into Article I, Sec. 8, of the Constitution.

24. See also, John Manfredi (1982), The Social Limits of Art.

25. Other "Ash Can School" painters, with Robert Henri, were such
now-renowned artists as George B. Luks, John Sloan, George
Bellows, William J. Glackens, Everett L. Shinn, Arthur B.
Davies, and Ernest Lawson.

26. For more on the American frontier and its social significance, see
George Rogers Taylor (1956), ed., The Turner Thesis: Concern-
ing the Role of the Frontier in American History. Turner was the
Archivist at the University of Wisconsin. He first called atten-
tion to the significance of the frontier in a paper, "The Signifi-
cance of the Frontier in American History," which he read at the
1893 Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association in
Chicago.

27. "The Hudson River School" took its name from a group of artists
who, at about 1825, did many landscape paintings in the Hudson
River Valley of upper New York State. Thomas Doughty, Asher
B. Durand, and Thomas Cole are the more renowned artists of
the early "Hudson River School." For more on the "Hudson
River School," see Larkin (1960, chap. 16) Art and Life in
America.

28. Lawrence gave his illustrated art lecture with color-slides bor-
rowed from the University of Minnesota Department of Art
History. These are reproductions of key works in Picasso's
output and are, therefore, to be found in most slide collections.
Zeus had nine daughters with Mnemosyne, goddess of memory. It is from her name that English language has derived the word "mnemonic." These preternatural daughters of Mnemosyne assumed roles in the Olympian division of labor as Muses—say patrons—of the arts and sciences. So it is that Clio came to be the Muse of History in the stories of Greek classical mythology.

Story telling was a Hellenic tradition at least from the time of Homer, when story-tellers transmitted from generation to generation those myths that formed the world-view of the Greeks. Once writing came into fashion, specialists called logographoi wrote these matters of the myth into the genesis narrative of towns, temples, and of royalty (Thompson, 1942, p. 62). Logographoi are the ancestral source of the modern-day logo. Herodotus, however, was the first to write history in the Western tradition. He is acknowledged as the Father of History.

Herodotus, ca. 484-425 B.C., wrote of the Persian Wars, 500-449 B.C., in a style that gave birth to the specialized meaning of History as a humanistic discipline. His was the first research-based comprehensive secular history with a purposeful humanistic orientation. The Greek word historia means "research" or "inquiry" and it is often used by Herodotus in his nine books of The Histories. In the manner of writing on a title-page today, Herodotus informed readers that his purpose in writing history is to teach by example:
These are the researches of Herodotus of Halicarnassus which he publishes in the hope of thereby preserving from decay the remembrances of what men have done, and preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and Barbarians [foreigners] from losing their due need of glory, and withal to put on record what have been their grounds of feud. (Thompson, 1942, p. 36)

Historical writing by and large followed in the methodological tradition of Herodotus until the eighteenth century, when historians of the Enlightenment became aware that history has a double meaning. It is a chronicle of what happened to people in the course of time, and it is also a record of how it happened. Rational assessments, therefore, have to be made of precipitating causes and of facilitating, or proximate, determinants. Otherwise, so Voltaire held, history is “no more than a collection of human errors.” “One demands of modern historians,” he wrote in Diderot’s Encyclopedia, “more details, better ascertained facts, precise dates, more attention to commerce, finance, agriculture, population. It is with history as it is with mathematics and physics” (Thompson, 1942, p. 67).

Today, some think of history as a bridge between the past and the present, others think of it as a conversation with the past. More germane to the writing of history is that the use of both of these metaphoric references have been made possible by the scholarship of Leopold von Ranke, 1795-1886.

Ranke transformed historical writing into the mode of Voltaire’s rationalist prescription and, for this, he is acknowledged as progenitor of modern scientific history. Credited with having invented in the early 1800s “the seminar” at the University of Berlin, teacher of Jacob Burckhardt and of a brilliant galaxy of other German historians of the 1850s, a prodigious writer of histories, Ranke’s method of writing history became the universal standard in Western historiography. When the American Historical Association was founded in 1885, Ranke (1973) was elected as its first honorary member and he was called “the greatest living historian” (p. XV).

The writing of history was for Ranke a disciplined, non-judgmental method of reconstructing past events by documentation: it
was for him a calling. All sources, particularly documents contemporaneous with events under study, had to be scrutinized in order to ascertain causality by methods of intensive analysis and broad synthesis.

In a lecture of the 1830s, Ranke (1973) began, “History is distinguished from all other sciences in that it is also an art” (p. 33). Then he proceeded to explicate the character of scientific history by means of five principles:

1. The first demand is pure love of truth.
2. Therefore, a documentary, penetrating profound study is necessary.
3. A universal interest.
4. Penetration of the causal nexus.
5. Impartiality. (pp. 39-41)

Peter Gay (1974), in a study of form and content in the writing of history, characterized Ranke as “the respectful critic” and concluded:

Just as the painter paints and the novelist writes so that the critic has something on which to exercise his discrimination, so a Cromwell or a Napoleon changes the world so that a Ranke can discover wie es eigentlich gewesen. (p. 80)

Ranke’s prescriptive “penetration of the causal nexus” in the writing of history is what makes it possible to think of history in the metaphor of a conversation with the past. Rational analysis of causal connections, followed by broad synthesis in the telling of “what actually happened,” is the essential feed-back loop in a communication with the past. Ranke’s insistence on truth, objectivity, and the avoidance of parochialism in the writing of history is to assure distortion-free communication.

Ranke’s historical scholarship exposed all documentation of past human experience to Clio’s panoptic scrutiny. Not wars alone, or the rise and fall of dynastic families, but also the origin and developmental course of cultural specialization were now made the historian’s province.
Jacob Burckhardt, following the principles of historical scholarship he had learned from Ranke, turned to art objects for documentation of "what actually happened" in the civilization of Renaissance Italy and thus had laid a foundation for art historiography. Ranke's methodological imprint is likewise clear in Max Weber's historical sociology. Analysis and broad synthesis, as example, were used by Weber to penetrate "the causal nexus" of a nurturing Protestant ethic and a nascent capitalism. In quest of a causal relationship between the two, Weber (1930) asked:

Now, how could activity, which was at best ethically tolerated, turn into a calling in the sense of Benjamin Franklin? The fact to be explained historically is that in the most highly capitalistic center of that time, in Florence of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the money and capital market of all the great political Powers, this attitude was considered ethically unjustifiable, or at best to be tolerated. But in the backwoods small bourgeois circumstances of Pennsylvania in the eighteenth century, where business threatened for simple lack of money to fall back into barter, where there was hardly a sign of large enterprise, where only the earliest beginnings of banking were to be found, the same thing was considered the essence of moral conduct, even commanded in the name of duty. To speak here of a reflection of material conditions in the ideal superstructure would be patent nonsense. What was the background of ideas which could account for the sort of activity apparently directed toward profit alone as a calling toward which the individual feels himself to have an ethical obligation? For it was this idea which gave the way of life of the new entrepreneur its ethical foundation and justification. (pp. 74-75)

George Counts (1952) has employed a similar methodology to penetrate "the causal nexus" between American schooling and American civilization, as has Lawrence Cremin (1951) in his history of the American common school. In fact, the Muse of History has thus inspired also period studies of American education. Her inspiration of period studies in school administration is exemplified by Raymond Callahan's *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*, dedicated to George Counts, which provides valuable historical insight into the professionalization of school administration in the United States. But the
Muse of History, albeit more narrowly focused, can be of similar value also to the study of core concepts in school administration. The concept of administrative control is illustrative. And a good place to begin is with Barnard’s imperative of “moral creativeness” in administrative leadership.

Chester Barnard’s concept of “moral creativeness,” is as one with Philip Selznick’s concept of “creative leadership.” Both concepts address the utility of a motivating transcendence in administrative control. “The art of the creative leader is the art of institution building,” Selznick (1957) holds, and the use of what he calls “socially integrating myths” is central to this art (pp. 149-154). These socially integrating myths, however, cannot be invented ex nihilo. They have to evolve out of an organizational saga, a credible search backward in time when the organization was less complex and values basic to its legitimation more readily discernible. “The organizational saga,” when used in operational contexts, “answers such questions as, What kind of organization are we? What kinds of people are members of our organization? What do we do? What is our purpose? What exploits of the past are we proud of? Why are we admirable? What great things do we plan to do in the future?” (Bormann, Howell, Nichols, and Shapiro, 1982, p. 94). These heuristic questions are in accord with Barnard’s remark to an interviewer in the last year of his life, “... the executive needs to be guided by what has gone before so that the consistency or integrity of the organization is preserved.” (Wolf, 1963).

Following Callahan’s model of historical writing in school administration, Clio’s guidance is invoked now for the purpose of tracking with an historical survey of textbook literature evolutionary stages in the definition of administrative control in school organization.
Administrative control in formal organization, as a matter of theoretical necessity, has to take the use of power as a given. Moreover, it matters not whether the referent organization is a loosely-coupled system or an ideal type bureaucracy. Talcott Parsons (1963c) explains why: “The value system of society legitimizes the organization’s goal, but it is only through power that its achievement can be made effective” (p. 41). Societal legitimation conveys to formal organization the right of participation in social exchange and provides it with the legal sanction for governance by means of an institutional subsystem. Governance, to continue in Parsons’ meaning, entails a coercive capacity—authorized use of power—with which to mobilize organizational resources in behalf of official goals.

In K-12 systems of school organization, the institutional subsystem is a board of education. It is a board of regents, or a board of trustees, in systems of higher education. The board of education, as a governing body with fiduciary responsibility, sets performance expectations for all other members of the organization, among whom is a chief executive officer called a Superintendent. A delegated authority is the figurative conduit through which the legitimation of an administrative control is conveyed by the school board and it is made flesh in day-to-day operations of school organization.

Evidence of temporal changes in the expectations of administrative control has survived in the textbook literature of school administration and this literature, as Callahan has demonstrated, qualifies as an enduring repository of primary source material. Only a discriminating analysis is required to draw from it embedded indicators of a temporal change. Emile Durkheim’s dual concept of mechanical and organic solidarity suggests itself as a conceptual tool for such an analysis.

Durkheim had devoted six chapters in The Division of Labor in Society to the treatment of mechanical and organic solidarity. At the
minimum definition, a mechanical solidarity in the division of labor is grounded in role commonalities; work-related specialization is undeveloped and, hence, individuals are interchangeable with one another. Whereas an organic solidarity is grounded in specialization among roles and, hence, their functional interdependence is critical for a sophisticated division of labor.

Barnard (1971), in a pithy paragraph of three sentences, has captured Durkheim's quintessential meaning and its clinical relevance for administrative control:

Authority is another name for the willingness and capacity of individuals to submit to the necessities of cooperative systems. Authority arises from the technological and social limitations of cooperative systems on the one hand, and of individuals on the other. Hence the status of authority in a society is the measure both of the development of individuals and of the technological and social conditions of the society. (p. 184)

One need but look to modern-day organization for the way in which tension between the centrifugal-like effect of specialization and a need of coordination has generated a control problem. Bureaucratic rules as "bearers of organizational authority" have been the traditional mode of obtaining compliance with administrative control, but no more. Administrative control now tilts more and more toward the interdependent organic model of organization; "beyond bureaucracy" to use language by Warren Bennis, because the authority of technical expertise presents an effective counterpoise to the delegated authority of administrative office.

Bennis holds for this reason to the centrality of a coordinating "linking pin" in administrative control. As reliance on mechanical solidarity gives way to a need of organic solidarity, there occurs a concomitant transformation in the morphology of formal organization. It is an evolutionary development which has turned obsolescent traditional modes of administrative control and has made necessary the invention of others.
The mode of administrative control in modern-day school organization is a far remove from that of the late 1800s, when the first textbooks were published for school administration. Two textbooks, one published by William Payne in 1875 and the other by J. L. Pickard in 1890, define administrative control as supervision of instruction with a coercive capacity. Both authors disclose remarkable sociological intuition insofar as they seem to have sensed the morphogenic connection between specialization and the structure of organization before Emile Durkheim had published The Division of Labor in Society. Also exhilarating is to find in these two textbooks a striking anticipation of Barnard’s definition of executive work as “specialized work.” Some lines in the following passages from Payne (1875) have been italicized to note their nascent bearing to modern-day sociology of organization:

The great law of the division of labor has called into existence a new class of professional men, whose duty is the supervision of schools and school systems; yet up to this time, no work, not even the most elementary, has been published on an art whose importance can scarcely be over-estimated . . . .

Then there is the special fact that, as yet, there has not been a clear differentiation between teaching and superintendence. The fact that superintendence requires a different kind of knowledge, perhaps a higher order of knowledge, is not generally admitted . . . . The real fact is . . . that the complicated structure of a graded system of instruction requires a constant oversight by one responsible head, able to direct the movements of the whole system, and vested with sufficient authority to enforce, if necessary, a compliance with his decisions; and, further that, in response to this need, the law of the division of labor has called into existence . . . a new body of professional men who differ from teachers as an architect differs from the workmen who follow the plan which he has prescribed. (pp. vi, 22-23)5

Pickard’s textbook, School Supervision, followed pretty much the
thematic pattern set by Payne. "In every branch of human industry," he wrote, "the importance of supervision grows with the specialization of labor. The more minute the subdivision of labor, the greater need of supervision . . . ." Out of this need of supervision, Pickard (1890) went on to elaborate, emerges "... one whose special work it is to adjust the parts, himself familiar with each, but freed from active work in any part. He is the overseer, the superintendent" (pp. 1-2, italic added). Again, remarkable sociological intuition: Pickard anticipated here a similar statement by Parsons and Shils in Toward a General Theory of Action.16

Supervision of instruction stayed fixed in the general textbook literature as the modal expectation of administrative control to the time of Ellwood Cubberly. Before then, from about 1900 to 1916, textbook literature communicates a groping effort to differentiate conceptually between supervision of instruction and administrative control. The following from William Chancellor's (1904) textbook is typical:

In the good superintendent, skill in supervision is more important than ability in administration. One is art, the other is power. Supervision is professional, administration is universal. Supervision is an educational matter, a specialty; administration is business management, an executive quality. Supervision is an acquirement; administration is largely a native quality. (pp. 105-6, italic added)

No such groping for a definition of administrative control marks the textbook literature from the time Cubberly's Public School Administration was published in 1916. Instantly, Cubberly's textbook became the model for those that followed it; more so, when Cubberly was appointed in 1917 the first Dean of Stanford's School of Education.17 Public School Administration had several revisions and in each the dominant theme was two-fold: a school superintendent has to have professional preparation and the foremost expectation of administrative control is the application of business norms to the management of school organization. The following excerpts from the 1922 edition of his textbook are indicative:
The opportunities offered in this new profession [of school administration] to men of strong culture, courage, exact training, and executive skill, and who are willing to take the time and spend the energy necessary to prepare themselves for large service, are to-day not excelled in any of the professions, learned or otherwise. (Cubberly, pp. 130-131)

More:

Wholly within the past decade one of the most significant movements in all of our educational history has arisen . . . . The movement is as yet only in its infancy, but so important is it in terms of the future of administrative service that it bids fair to change, in the course of time, the whole character of school administration . . . .

The significance of this new movement is large, for it means nothing less than the ultimate changing of school administration from guesswork to scientific accuracy . . . . (Cubberly, pp. 325-326)

In a textbook on the principalship, published in 1923, Cubberly displays his unqualified embrace of Frederick Winslow Taylor's principles of scientific management in the following passage:

Every manufacturing establishment that turns out a standard product or series of products of any kind maintains a force of efficiency experts to study methods of procedure and to measure and test the output of its works. Such men ultimately bring the manufacturing establishment large returns, by introducing improvements in process and procedure, and in training the workmen to produce a larger and a better output. Our schools are, in a sense, factories in which the raw product (children) are to be shaped and fashioned into products to meet the various demands of life. The specifications for manufacturing come from the demands of twentieth-century civilization, and it is the business of the school to build its pupils according to the specifications laid down. This demands good tools, specialized machinery, continuous measurement of production to see if it is according to specifications, the elimination of waste in manufacture, and a large variety in the output. (p. 15)
have been collectively causative. There was no nurturing intellectual reinforcement in academia for such intuitive insight. Although Lester Frank Ward had published *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883 and *The Psychic Factors of Civilization* in 1893, it was in the 1930s when the maturity of Sociology as a social science discipline was acknowledged in academia by the formation of sociology departments. Perhaps, also, it is because in the ideological contest between Social Darwinism and Liberal Darwinism in the formation of social policy after Appomattox, the positivistic intellectual influence of Herbert Spenser had prevailed. Mechanistic scientific management and Social Darwinism, after all, have complementary orientations and, given the influence of Cubberly’s eminence, what Callahan has characterized as the “Cubberly pattern” of textbook writing was established as the regnant model.¹⁸

4

*Jesse H. Newlon*

The Cubberly pattern went unchallenged in textbook literature until Jesse Newlon, one-time school superintendent turned professor at Teachers College, Columbia published in 1934 *Educational Administration as Social Policy*. Newlon (1934) did not gainsay the need of efficiency in administrative control, “The need of efficiency in education cannot be questioned” (p. 237). What he did question was the unbridled use of scientific management in school organization. “The administration of education,” he wrote, “does not take place in a vacuum. It proceeds in a welter of social forces . . .” (p. 26). Then he tied his argument to ideals of American social democracy:

The administration of education has become one of the most vital functions of modern society. This generalization applies with special force to a country which from its very beginnings has regarded popular education as one of the cornerstones of its social and political systems, and has accepted the idea of equal educational opportunity for all from the primary school to the university. (p. 1)
Newlon urged the critical importance of social and philosophical foundations in school administration, and in this he was a pioneer among twentieth-century textbook writers. His textbook, alas, was no match for Cubberly’s prevailing influence. A new generation of textbook writers, and of which Fred Engelhardt is representative, held to the Cubberly pattern.

Engelhardt was appointed to the faculty in school administration at the University of Minnesota shortly after he had completed his doctorate, 1925, at Teachers College, Columbia. His textbook, *Public School Organization and Administration*, was published in 1931. Newlon did a content analysis of Engelhardt’s textbook and according to Callahan (1962):

As with Cubberly’s text and others examined by Newlon the entire volume of some 600 pages was devoted to legal, financial, organizational, and mechanical aspects of Education. In the Cubberly pattern the school “executive” was treated in the grand manner while “teaching Corps and other Employees” were dealt with under “Personnel Management.” (p. 250)

Callahan (1962) has drawn two sweeping conclusions from his study of the Cubberly era: school administration was raised to the standing of a professional occupation, the cultist embrace of scientific management principles in school administration constituted “an American tragedy in education” (pp. 244, 251).

Newlon’s *Educational Administration as Social Policy* may not have been a match in the market for textbooks written in the Cubberly pattern, but its publication does qualify it in the annals of textbook literature as an historic marker. The waning of mechanistic school administration and the advent of human relations models can be traced back to its publication. Newlon had in mind three objectives in his textbook: to define the practice of school administration within an institutional context, to anathematize mechanistic school administration, to advocate an alternative participation model. These objectives are capsulated in the following passage:

In education, the problem is not so much one of securing efficiency, as of determining the ends to which efficiency shall be
directed and of utilizing all available professional knowledge and insight in the formulation of policies. Educational administrators must see that the exclusion of teachers from the process of formulating policies atrophies their power to think, and eventually makes of them the most unquestioning and submissive of conformists. (Newlon, 1934, p. 244)

Content analysis is as vulnerable to the tendency of confusing correlation with causation as is any other methodology; this is why Ranke had urged "penetration of the causal nexus" as a principle in historical writing. Accordingly, no one single event of the period can be ascribed as causative of Newlon's qualitative leap in the writing of textbook literature. It could have been a study Newlon had done of school administration for the Commission on the Social Studies of the American Historical Association in the early 1930s, or his textbook might have reflected the intellectual influence of colleagues in the Foundations of Education Division at a time when its faculty included George Counts, Harold Rugg, William H. Kilpatrick, and I. L. Kandel, or he might have known of J. L. Moreno's pioneering work in Sociometry, also published first in 1934, or, and more likely, Newlon's Educational Administration as Social Policy was one with a Zeitgeist in transition.21

The great depression of the 1930s, persistent and itself dehumanizing, had precipitated a sweeping disenchantment with social Darwinist conventions in American society. Newlon seems to have given the emerging Zeitgeist a harbinger's exposition in Educational Administration as Social Policy, even as artists of the WPA Federal Art Project had given it aesthetic expression on canvas and in the wall murals of public buildings.22

5

Human Relations in Administrative Control

The idea of a Zeitgeist in transition is useful as a general explanation of Newlon's qualitative leap in the writing of textbook literature.
A more focused explanation, however, is to think of Newlon's departure from the Cubberly pattern as a shift, following Durkheim, away from an administrative control centered in mechanical solidarity to one centered in organic solidarity.

Role differentiation by specialization, as has been stated earlier, is basic to conditions that necessitate organic solidarity in social organization. By 1934, the publication date of Newlon's textbook, specialization in American life had become pervasive. L. Urwick, in a 193f address before the Institute of Management in New York City, informed his audience, "The growth of specialization and hence of discrimination of function has outstripped our inventiveness in devising organization patterns to meet the new situation" (Campbell & Greg, 1957, p. 105). Newlon's larger trajectory was fixed on a process of school administration which is sensitive to the modalities of organic solidarity. "Unfortunately for American education," Callahan (1962) lamented, "Jesse Newlon's point of view did not prevail" (pp. 203-204).

But a disenchantment with anti-humanistic conventions in the 1930s brought in its wake a confusion of pluralist political democracy with the instrumental value of human relations in administrative control. Authors of textbooks missed altogether the instrumental value in Newlon's urging of participatory decision-making in school administration. A loss of "power to think," as Newlon had put it, is no small loss to an organization in which teacher personnel is the most costly human resource. Passages from the following two textbooks are indicative of how this confusion was sustained well into the literature of the 1940s and mid-1950s:

American industry in many cases has sought to achieve efficiency by subordinating person to the machine and to the administrative system. Through autocratic exercise of power and control, industrial management has increased production and reduced costs. However, the application of the techniques of industrial management to the business of social engineering inevitably has an undesirable effect upon the personality of the administrator concerned, to say nothing of the effect upon the student and faculty personnel. The spirit of democracy
is essentially a spirit of respect for the intrinsic worth of individual personality. (Koopman, Miel, Misner, 1943, p. 41)

And:

Some school systems have operated in an undemocratic way so long that the relations of teachers, custodians, and others to administrators are more than tinged with fear and tension. Almost any teacher can bear witness, for example, to the fact that at a social gathering of teachers only there is a more relaxed air and spirit of camaraderie than in a company which includes administrators or board members. Perhaps this is human nature; perhaps it is in part due to the fact that administrators have for generations held the whip over school employees. .... Nor is it only in social situations that fear exists; it carries over into professional contacts. One of the most difficult problems in fostering democracy in administration is overcoming this unwholesome quality in personal relations, and most of the responsibility for doing this rests with administrators. (Grieder & Rosenstengel, 1954, p. 97)

Daniel Griffiths' Human Relations in School Administration, published in 1956, was the first textbook in school administration whose "basic purpose" was to provide a social-psychological rationale for the instrumental value of human relations in administrative control. Griffiths (1956) wrote in the Preface:

Many people in school administration may be discouraged with this book because it does not contain lists of human relations rules or techniques of behavior. This is not a cookbook; it is a textbook. As such, theory will be discussed and evaluated and brought to bear on the important problems in school administration. The basic purpose of this book is to bring together in one volume what is known about human relations and relate it to school administration. (p. VII)

Griffiths was right to anticipate the textbook's jarring effect on the field. Antecedent textbooks had so mesmerized the field with notions of "democratic administration," even the author of the invitational "Foreword" to Human Relations in School Administration had failed to grasp the larger significance of Griffiths' (1956) purpose. The following is from that "Foreword:"

...
Many familiar with pressures, tensions, conflicts, and demands upon the public schools would agree that the basic need is general application of the principle of the golden rule to school and community. This is the meaning that the author gives to “human relations” as employed in this book—simply the acceptance and application by the school administration of the spirit of good will of one toward another in all human relations. (p. V)

Not so! Griffiths’ Human Relations in School Administration meant to provide a utilitarian rationale for human relations in administrative control, to free its axiological definition from “golden rule” thinking, and to redefine its meaning in the context of behaviorist-based administrative theory. It was a task of creative synthesis in textbook writing for which Griffiths intellectually was equipped by academic preparation. And because its publication also is an historic marker in the textbook literature of school administration, a comment on its ideational gestation is in place.

Griffiths’ Ph.D. dissertation at Yale University, completed in 1952, was developed from a performance investigation of successful and unsuccessful school superintendents. The source of items for his instrument, called Administrative Behavior Checklist, was Helen Jennings’ sociometric investigation of behavior characteristics of leaders and nonleaders (Griffiths, 1956, pp. 150, 244). Jennings, it will be recalled, had collaborated in the early 1930s with J.L. Moreno in sociometric research.

Early use in professional fields of Moreno’s work was in social work, where Griffiths found Jennings’ research instrument. Then, in 1947, probably about the time Griffiths was getting ready for advanced study, the National Training Laboratories—NTL—of the National Education Association opened its doors for intensive training in group dynamics. Eminent behavioral scientists were invited by NTL to lecture, give workshops, and to participate in the preparation of sensitivity-training materials and films. All of which is indicative of the strong behaviorist influence on Griffiths’ graduate-school years.

Griffiths’ interest in applied behavioral science as a graduate student was later nurtured at Teachers College, Columbia where he
was appointed to the faculty in school administration. Teachers College, from the early 1950s, included "T-group" type of sensitivity training in its preparation program for school administration. More germane, together with other Centers of the Cooperative Program in Educational Administration, the Center at Teachers College was heavily into the empirical study of interpersonal relations in school organization (Anderson & Lonsdale, 1957, p. 439). However, for Griffiths and others, the paucity of a theoretical base for much of this human relations research in school organization was troublesome.

The corrective was obvious in Griffiths' mind: school administration had to have a general theory of human behavior in organization capable of integrating management process and human relations skill in administrative control. Out of it came *Human Relations in School Administration*.

Perhaps the most obvious indicator of the textbook's propitiousness is that its publication and the founding of the University Council for Educational Administration were both in 1956. The search for theory in school administration in Centers of the Cooperative Program in Educational Administration had made ready the intellectual climate for both. Soon, however, the question of adequacy surfaced: was behaviorist-based administrative theory alone adequate for administrative preparation?

It took a while for textbook literature to confront this question. Largely because of Griffiths' communication skills and intellectual influence, behaviorist-centered content was the inclination of textbook literature following the publication of *Human Relations in School Administration*. Griffiths had been a driving presence within the theory movement for some time and, not altogether by coincidence, the year his textbook was published he also was elected to UCEA's first governing board. It is understandable therefore, why textbook writers would have looked to *Human Relations in School Administration* as a model. Then, also, there was the reinforcing behaviorist influence of Andrew Halpin.

Halpin's academic preparation had been in clinical psychology. His career in education was first as a school psychologist, then as a research psychologist with the Personnel Research Board at The Ohio
State University. Fortuitously, one of the eight regional centers of the Cooperative Program in Educational Administration also was at The Ohio State University and it was there that Halpin conducted a study of administrative leadership behavior in school organization. The publication of this research in 1959 was Halpin's calling-card and the field was impressed. He then published *The Organizational Climate of Schools* in 1962, now in collaboration with Don Croft, and his reputation soared. The research was funded by the U. S. Office of Education and, among other outcomes of value to school administration, it confirmed empirically Barnard's (1971) conception of an "organization personality" (pp. 88, 174, 281).

Halpin's intellectual influence on textbook literature was exerted mostly by means of published research, an occasional essay, and as a participant in UCEA programs. He did very little teaching, but whatever he published was endowed with elegance, wit, enlightening metaphor, and with never a compromise of the scholar's integrity. Textbook writers read or listened attentively when Halpin had an idea or insight to impart. So it was! Griffiths' and Halpin's scholarship had opened a window on the behavioral sciences in programs of school administration. UCEA soon thereafter opened another window, but now on the social sciences. It did so in 1957 with the first of its Career Development Seminars.

6

*Administrative Control as Transaction*

Held at the University of Chicago, with the Midwest Administration Center as host and cosponsor, the Seminar theme was "the role of theory in educational administration." Papers at that three-day Seminar, November 11-13, were a mix representative of the behavioral sciences, social sciences, and school administration. Griffiths and Halpin read papers, so did Talcott Parsons, James D. Thompson, Roald F. Campbell, and others. Seminar papers were published later
as Administrative Theory in Education, with Andrew Halpin as editor. Their diffusion heightened the theoretical sophistication of textbook literature in school administration.

Two papers read at the UCEA Seminar were especially instrumental in providing textbook writers with instant theoretical insight into the organic complexity of formal organization. One was by Jacob Getzels, in which behavior in formal organization is shown pictographically as a transaction between role and personality; that is, as an administrative transaction between idiographic and nomothetic dimensions of organization. The other was by Talcott Parsons in which administrative control is laid out in relation to the flow of line authority within three hierarchically arranged subsystems of formal organization. It is, therefore, altogether in point that two textbooks in school administration to reflect the heightened theoretical sophistication of the UCEA era also had Roald Campbell as coauthor. He, it will be recalled, had given a paper at the 1957 UCEA Seminar.

Both textbooks, The Organization and Control of American Schools (Campbell, Cunningham, & McPhee, 1976) and Educational Administration as a Social Process (Getzels, Lipham, & Campbell, 1968), had defined administrative action in school organization as an amalgam of conceptual—human relations—technical skills. But Campbell, as textbook writer, seems to have had a before-and-after conception of human relations. He had coauthored another textbook several years before the 1957 UCEA Seminar. Its identification with the human relations school of administration is made clear in a dedicatory statement which reads, "To the Members of the National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration, Pioneers in Democratic School Administration." In this book’s first chapter, not written by Campbell, is delineated differential administrative role expectations in a two-column schema under the political science rubrics of "in democracies" and "in dictatorships" (Walquist, Arnold, & Campbell, 1952, pp. 19-20).

Published writing by Campbell after the 1957 UCEA Seminar is warrant for the speculation that could he have done it over, Campbell might have urged on his earlier coauthors a different view of human
relations in administrative control. In 1968, the publication year of *The Organization and Control of American Schools*, Campbell also wrote for an edited book of multiple authors in which he drew upon social system theory to make the following trenchant valuation of human relations process in administrative control:

... I wouldn't throw out the whole business [of human relations]. People are important. Teachers are important. We can't run a school without teachers. Teachers are people, and people have needs-dispositions. So we can't throw human relations away. But again, this is only a partial picture. Anybody who thinks he can equate administration or supervision with human relations is fooling himself.... Schools have an exceedingly important social function to perform, and they have been set up by society to perform this function. (pp. 192-193)

Before-and-after comparisons in intellectual history are useful, but they do have to guard against what A. N. Whitehead has called "misplaced concreteness." Did the founding of UCEA in 1956 exert a transforming intellectual influence on how textbook writers defined administrative control in school administration, or were the founding of UCEA and theoretical sophistication in textbook writing events of the same proximate determinants? Documentary evidence is supportive of the former as the "causal nexus."

There is no doubt UCEA was founded in an intellectual climate made ready by the National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration, formed in 1947, and the Cooperative Program in Educational Administration, formed in 1950. The intellectual influence of these two on textbook literature, however, does seem to have induced no more than an awareness of its atheoretical content and a concomitant groping for theoretical perspective.

To illustrate: In the "Preface" of the heretofore referenced multi-authored *The Administration of Public Education*, 1952, one reads, "The theoretical material so often placed before the reader in early chapters—and then largely forgotten—is here placed near the end of the book where it will mean far more to the reader" (Wahlquist, p. III) And what is “near the end of the book?” A chapter in which very little in its content is theoretical even by standards of the early UCEA era.
However, there are passages in the chapter, to borrow from William James, that do have "practical cash-value" for historical perspective.

In one such passage in the book there is an implied definition of an administrative control in relation to morphological transformations in school organization:

The school executive should see his job in historical perspective. He should sense that from colonial times to the present day the pattern of school organization has never remained static, nor have there been any abrupt revolutionary changes. While old ways of doing things tend to persist, gradual changes have come in response to new conditions, new forces, and new visions. To change concepts and practices in school administration radically is a herculean task. (Wahlquist, 1952, p. 566)

A textbook published in 1971, and this is the point of the illustration, also has dealt with administrative control in relation to the phenomenon of morphologic change, but now with recognizable theoretical awareness. The authors of this textbook characterized "bureaucratically oriented schools" as a "mechanistic model" and "professionally oriented schools" as an "organic model" (Sergiovanni & Starrat, 1971, p. 64).

One more comment about UCEA in relation to heightened theoretical sophistication in the textbook literature. There is ample evidence that textbook writers in school administration of the UCEA era have looked to business administration for state-of-the-art applications of social and behavioral science, just as those of the Cubberly era had looked to business administration for state-of-the-art applications of scientific management. Harvard Business Review, as one example, had been the source for a schematic discrimination between human relations and human resources models in a school administration textbook of the early 1970s (Sergiovanni & Starrat, 1971, pp. 152-153). Inherent historical significance, however, is not in that textbook writers of both eras looked to business administration for useable knowledge, but in that textbook writers for school administration of the UCEA era now were aware that what was borrowed had to be filtered through the mesh of theory."
Conclusion

In Clio’s panoptic sweep of textbook literature in school administration, key textbooks mark evolutionary stages in the definition of administrative control in school organization. Each reflects in its content the available conceptual capital of its time. It, therefore, would be a misuse of the historian’s craft to demean textbooks of yesteryear out of advantages provided by later intellectual sophistication. There is an epistemological tradition in the writing of history, from the time of Voltaire, which recognizes the difference between historicism and the wisdom of Clio. Perhaps it is this tradition that Dewey (1916) had in mind when he wrote, “The past just as past is no longer our affair, but knowledge of the past is the key to understanding the present” (pp. 250-151).32

Notes

1. For more on History as a humanistic discipline, see Hajo Holborn (1972), History and the Humanities.

2. Voltaire himself produced, among other historical works, The Age of Louis XIV and The History of Charles XII.

3. Thompson (1942) wrote in the “preface” of his two-volume work on historical writing: “I was tempted to entitle this book The Bridge of Clio…. History may be regarded as a great bridge which arches the stream of Time and links the Past and the Present together” (p. VII).

4. The expression, wie es eigentlich gewesen, is the signature quality of Ranke’s historical craft. Its meaning is “What actually happened” and it appears in the preface of his first, 1824, major
publication Geschichten der romanischen und germanischen Volker von 1494-1514, as follows: "History has had assigned to it the task of judging the past, of instructing the present for the benefit of ages to come. The present study does not assume such a high office; it wants to show only what actually happened." (wie es eigentlich gewesen). Quoted in Leonard Krieger (1977), Ranke: The Meaning of History (p. 4).

5. Historical survey methodology as used here is a variant of content analysis. It can be quantitative or qualitative, and follows O. R. Holsti (1969), Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, and Thomas F. Carney (1972), Content Analysis: A Technique for Systematic Inference from Communications.

"General textbook literature" means to differentiate between this type of literature and specialized texts written in school law, school finance, and the like. The textbooks treated in this survey, N=28, were from major publishers.

6. It would be of help for what follows to set this statement in the context of Part I, earlier, "Leadership and Followership." Also of help would be a reflective engagement with the following two schemata from T Parsons' Theory of Action: the A-G-I-L schema of equilibriative development and the schema for "Ways of Getting Results in Interaction." R. Jean Hills in Toward a Science of Organization provides an instructive exposition of the former. For the latter schema, see the two companion essays by Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence" and "On the Concept of Political Power," both of which have been cited heretofore in Part I.

7. The meaning of "loosely-coupled system" will be found in Karl E. Weick (1976), "Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems."
8. An informative commentary on power as a latent variable in organizational analysis is provided in Mary F. Rogers (1977), "Goffman on Power."

9. Parsons, "Some Ingredients of a General Theory of Organization," in Andrew W. Halpin, ed., Administrative Theory in Education. Parsons had written "Some Ingredients" for the first UCEA Career Development Seminar, February 1957, at the University of Chicago. At the center of this paper is the now frequently used concept of "three levels in the hierarchical structure of organization" and in which an "institutional subsystem" in school organization is defined.

For the legitimation of participation in social exchange, consult Peter M. Blau (1964), Exchange and Power in Social Life.


11. "The larger and more differentiated an instrumental system the more essential management or management coordination becomes to keep the organization going as a functioning concern. With this, there emerge executive or managerial roles" (Parsons & Shils, 1951, p. 212).

12. Callahan (1962) reports that Jesse H. Newlon did a content analysis of eighteen textbooks on school administration for his doctoral thesis at Teachers College, Columbia University (p. 200).

14. For the "linking pin" model by Bennis, see Warren Bennis (1965), "Beyond Bureaucracy"; also, Warren Bennis (1966), Changing Organizations. For how this evolutionary development impacts as well on military organization, look to Morris Janowitz (1960), The Professional Soldier.

15. Of course, the idea of a "division of labor" had been diffused in the intellectual heritage long before Durkheim gave it a focused social science formulation. It had been implied by Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, published in 1651, and in Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws, translated into English in 1750. Eli Whitney, it is relevant to recall, had applied the idea to mechanical engineering in his invention of standardized interchangeable parts for the manufacture of musketry.

16. See this statement in earlier end note 11.

17. A thumbnail biographical sketch of Cubberly is in Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency, pp. 182-184.

18. For intensive historical treatments of this period, see David W. Noble (1970), The Progressive Mind, 1890-1917; Richard Hofstadter (1945), Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860-1915.

19. A propos the low estate of school administration, William C. Reavis, himself a distinguished Professor of school administration at the University of Chicago, recounted in retirement the following experience when he was doing a school survey in the early years of his career: "Early in this study the [survey] staff and I met with the board of education. I was introduced to each member in turn and invited to take a seat at the table. I had, in the meantime, noticed a man sitting quietly at a desk in the corner of the room. Since I had not met him I asked the board president whom he might be.
'Oh,' said the president, 'he's the superintendent. We might happen to want him for something.'” Harold G. Shane and Wilber Yauch (1954), Creative School Administrations: In Elementary and Junior High Schools (p. 546).

20. A critical discrimination has been made in this analysis of textbook literature between books that stand out as an “historic marker” and those that stand out as a “best seller.” A case in point is Paul R. Mort’s Principles of School Administration, one of the two most widely used textbooks in school administration before the UCEA era, Arthur B. Moehlman’s School Administration is the other. In a critique of theoretical strength in Principles of School Administration, Daniel Griffiths has concluded, “In analyzing Mort’s theory it is difficult to discern its conceptual base.” See Daniel E. Griffiths, “Toward a Theory of Administrative Behavior” in Roald F. Campbell and Russell T. Gregg, eds., (pp. 371-372).

21. Here is an often encountered problem in historiography which urges restraint in the attribution of influence in the diffusion of ideas. Apart from the probable influence on Newlon by the social ideas of intellectually eminent colleagues, one also has to reckon with the advent in 1933 of the Educational Frontier; a journal of social reconstructionist thought.

For Moreno’s sociometric studies, see J. L. Moreno (1934), Who Shall Survive?: A New Approach to the Problem of Human Interrelations. Helen Hall Jennings, about whom there is more later, is credited as “collaborator” in the publication.

22. The work of these artists can be found in most public museums, including those of colleges and universities, throughout the United States. Especially successful wall murals—frescoes—in which the more humanistic Zeitgeist is celebrated, are those by Philip Evergood in Richmond Hill Branch Library of New York City, and in the U. S. Post Office in Jackson, Georgia. The Old
Post Office in San Francisco has the most spectacular WPA mural art, done by Anton Refregier, in which the cultural spirit of the transforming period is captured.

For an historical account of antecedent events in American life that had prepared the social climate for a transformed Zeitgeist, the following works ought to be consulted. Richard Hofstadter (1945), *Social Darwinism in American Thought: 1860-1915*; Frederick Lewis Allen (1952), *The Big Change: America Transforms Itself 1900-1950*; and Milton J. Nadworny (1955), *Scientific Management and the Unions, 1900-1932: A Historical Analysis*.

23. For a look at Jennings' instrument, see Helen Hall Jennings (1950), *Leadership and Isolation: A Study of Personality in Inter-Personal Relations* (pp. 145-150).

24. Among behavioral scientists who had participated in NTL work were Chris Argyris (Department of Industrial Relations, Yale University), Kenneth D. Benne (Human Relations Center, Boston University), and Ronald Lippit (Research Center for Group Dynamics, University of Michigan).

25. Griffiths' own participation in this type of research was published in John K. Hemphill, Daniel E. Griffiths, and Norman Fredericksen (1962), *Administrative Performance and Personality*. Material for UCEA simulations of the "Whitman School" was drawn from this research.

See again Part I for more on the Kellogg Foundation sponsored Cooperative Program in Educational Administration.

26. Andrew W. Halpin (1959), *The Leadership Behavior of School Superintendents: The Perceptions and Expectations of Board Members, Staff Members, and Superintendents*; Andrew W.
Halpin and Don B. Croft (1962), *The Organizational Climate of Schools*. Shortened accounts of the Organization Climate and Leadership Behavior studies, as well as the best of Halpin’s theoretical essays, are in Andrew W. Halpin (1966), *Theory and Research in Administration*.

27. It would be a rewarding effort in scholarship to ascertain as well Halpin’s intellectual influence on doctoral theses written during the 1960s. Dissertations, like textbooks, contain useful primary source material for the writing of history.

Among the fond recollections this writer has of colleagueship with Luvern L. Cunningham at the University of Minnesota in the 1960s is of an invitation we had extended to graduate students at the thesis-writing stage to join us evenings in informal seminars at the Faculty Club to explore researchable thesis topics in Halpin’s just-published study of Organization Climate. Five Ph.D. dissertations came out of those sessions.

28. Roald F. Campbell, then Director of the Midwest Administration Center, in Halpin, *Administrative Theory in Education*, p. V.

29. Following the theory Seminar of 1957, UCEA launched other energizing initiatives by means of “task forces” composed of professors from its member institutions. Among others, there was a task force to think about “school as a political institution,” another was charged to develop “new instructional materials and methods,” still another was set to explore useable “interdisciplinary content” in preparation programs. This writer had served with the latter task force for a number of years.

30. It is further relevant, even if as a nuance only, that in *The Organization and Control of American Schools*, p. 210, a reference to the one-time interchangeable use of *human relations* and *democratic* as adjectives in definitions of school administration,
“democratic” is set in quotation marks, but not so the words human relations.

31 Not alone was this so in textbooks for general school administration, but also, as is indicated in the following titles, in textbooks for the principalship. See, as representative, Lloyd E. McCleary and Stephen P. Hencley (1965), *Secondary School Administration: Theoretical Bases of Professional Practice*; Charles F. Faber and Gilbert F. Shearron (1970), *Elementary School Administration Theory and Practice*.

32. In a passage that can stand for an elaboration of Dewey’s statement, Belisle and Sargent (1957) have written, “The search for the beginning of anything in history always seems to reveal some traces lying behind the time and the events at which there is a pattern sufficiently clear that its tracing thereafter becomes self-revealing; nonetheless the emergence of some fairly clear crystallization followed by some evidence of subsequent continuity is exceedingly useful as a point of departure” (p. 85).
Why Shakespeare?

Part I, earlier, had laid out the argument for using the humanities as a source of facilitative value to administrative leadership. The humanities were said to have their own way of knowing. John Ciardi, poet and literary critic, there referred to this type of non-positivist knowing as "esthetic wisdom." In his illustration of aesthetic wisdom, a psychiatrist interviewing a matricide, he included Shakespeare among those "special men capable of understanding what is human." Ciardi’s pithy characterization of Shakespeare is the marker which now points to still another pathway to the humanities: The Shakespeare plays.

There is no one single canon of work in belletristic literature more accessible and more infused with aesthetic wisdom than are the plays of William Shakespeare. As a literature wherein complexities of human personality have been mapped out in the expressive language of dramatic verse a near-four hundred years before the advent of behavioral science, and as a recreational refuge for the "unkissed imagination"—Ciardi’s "An Ulcer, Gentlemen, is an Unwritten Poem" at the end of Part I—Shakespeare’s universal mind is boundless in aesthetic wisdom for the nurturing of what Chester Barnard has called "moral creativeness" in executive functions. "The creative
function as a whole,” Barnard (1971) wrote, “is the essence of leadership. It is the highest test of executive responsibility . . .” (p. 281).

In a style marked by ambiguities of teasing subtlety, ambiguities that have challenged each new age to provide them with its own meaning, Shakespeare has dramatized “what is human” by means of intuitively derived perceptions of the human disposition from its darkest depths to its most enlightened heights. Each encounter with Shakespeare, therefore, is capable of becoming an aesthetic revisit with aspects of rational and non-rational human behavior. As in any encounter with a work of artistic intuition, most essential to the interaction is imaginative perception. It is this what John Dewey had in mind when he wrote in Art as Experience, “For to perceive, a beholder must create his own experience.” But first, what about that perennial authorship question which has been associated with the Shakespeare canon?

Was There a Shakespeare?

Michael Polanyi (1958) has written, “We need reverence to perceive greatness, even as we need a telescope to observe spiral nebulae” (p. 96).1 Granted! However, an unbridled reverence for Shakespeare’s genius easily can turn into what the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges (1967) has characterized as cultist “magnification to the point of nothingness” (p. 119), and thereby obscure a cognitive dissonance which periodically has surfaced in Shakespeare scholarship.2

“Cognitive dissonance,” a foundation concept of Equilibrium Theory in Social Psychology, holds any two cognitions to be dissonant if the obverse of one follows from the other.3 By following this definition, confrontational dissonance in Shakespeare is instant: How could a grammar school drop-out of fourteen, who at age twenty-eight first turned to playwriting by happenstance, have become the shining
beacon who flooded the English Renaissance with the light of his artistic sweep? One Shakespeare scholar, Schoenbaum (1979), expressed this dissonance even more bluntly, “Could that supremely intelligent being have been born to illiterate parents in backwater Stratford, reared with yokels in a bookless neighborhood, and then gone on to write Hamlet and the rest?” (p. 183). Efforts at resolving these two dissonant facts of Shakespeare’s life have either taken the form of outright denial; Shakespeare is a fraud and some other extraordinary talent had authored the works attributed to him, or the form of Jacob Burkhardt’s (1945) sublime affirmation, Shakespeare’s “mind is the rarest of Heaven’s gifts” (p. 191).

The nineteenth century was especially rife with Shakespeare denial. Having attained but modest recognition in his own lifetime as playwright, unlike his contemporary Ben Jonson who had attained eventually laureatship-level celebrity, Shakespeare was vulnerable. “The still silence in which this greatest of Englishmen came into this world,” so goes one lamenting look back, “is equalled only by the silence in which he left it again” (Gollancz, 1932, p. xxvi).4

Some have put forth the 17th Earl of Oxford, Edward de Vere, as the true author of works attributed to Shakespeare. Plausibility for the claim is in that de Vere was a patron of letters, as was the Earl of Southampton, Henry Wriothesley, Shakespeare’s own patron and to whom he had dedicated his two first published poems—Venus and Adonis, The Rape of Lucrece. Having been of the same social stratum with Southampton, who incidentally is also thought by some to be the true author, de Vere most likely knew Shakespeare because he himself dabbled in the writing of poetry. However, and quite apart from matters of internal textual evidence, the principal external problem with this claim is in that de Vere died in 1604; the year in which Shakespeare had written King Lear and Macbeth, followed in later years by Antony and Cleopatra, The Tempest, and others.

A much greater attention getting denial of Shakespeare’s authorship was that of Delia Salter Bacon. Born in Ohio, 1811, and later migrated to England, she put forth Francis Bacon and a group of his associates as the authentic Shakespeare. She published, 1857, The Philosophy of the Plays of Shakespeare Unfolded, with a Preface by
Nathaniel Hawthorne, to press her argument. Bacon, of course, was the renowned author of *Novum Organum, The New Atlantis, The Advancement of Learning*, part-author of *Instauratio Magna*, and he outlived Shakespeare by ten years. Delia Bacon’s resolution of the cognitive dissonance in Shakespeare authorship, therefore, seemed plausible. However, as in the case of de Vere, and again quite apart from matters of *internal* textual evidence, the principal *external* problem with this claim is twofold: Bacon’s near-lifetime involvement with governance in both the Court of Queen Elizabeth and of King James I, her successor, and his enduring fame as founder of inductive method in philosophy and science. Bacon, according to Morris Raphael Cohen (1958), “is still revered as the ‘father of scientific method’ by those who pride themselves on following the inductive rather than the deductive method” (p. 170).

Bacon had entered Parliament at age twenty-three, 1584, was knighted eventually and he attained the high office of Lord Chancellor. He retired to private life, following a prosecution for having accepted bribes from litigants, to devote the six last years of his life to writing and to scientific experimentations. Clearly, Bacon’s habit-of-mind was with scientific method and not with the “mighty line” of dramatic verse.

Shakespeare has written the earlier named two long narrative poems of little over 3,000 lines, 154 sonnets, three lesser poems, and thirty-seven plays. Is it to be believed that Bacon, who for most of his adult life was in Court service, and who has written the founding scientific work in inductive methodology, could also have been the author of poetry and stage works attributed to Shakespeare? On the other hand, back again to the enigma that is Shakespeare, is it credible that an otherwise failed Elizabethan, who turned actor because he had no other marketable skill with which to support his family, and who had not written for theater before age twenty-eight, could have written the plays in whose performance every age since has reflected its own values by the way in which they are presented? The overwhelming consensus of Shakespeare scholarship, in response, has been stated by Schoenbaum (1979), “The Shakespeare documents all cohere in
attesting to his authorship of the plays and poems that go by his name” (p. 183).

Schoenbaum and other Shakespeare scholars the world over have come to this resolute conclusion with the backing of the most advanced tools of both external and internal analysis available to Shakespeare criticism—textual, source, form, redaction, linguistic—which began with John Dryden in 1668 and has continued unabated to this time. Indeed, with the exception of biblical exegesis, more has been published in Shakespeare criticism than in that of any other artistic genius of whichever expressive medium.

Biographic research, likewise, has produced a voluminous literature and it also has given a collective resolute answer to the question: Was Shakespeare a fictive persona? Beginning with Edmund Malone’s (1821) The Life of William Shakespeare, biographies of Shakespeare have been published in a steady stream since; leading one twentieth-century Shakespeare biographer to conclude, “More is known about Shakespeare than about any other playwright of the period with the single exception of Ben Jonson; and some parts of his life are better documented even than Jonson’s” (Chute, 1949, p. IX).

Ultimately, disentanglement from this cognitive dissonance has to come from an acknowledgement of Shakespeare as having been one with “the world-old miracle of genius,” to borrow from T. W. Baldwin’s (1944) land-mark study of Shakespeare, or else indulge in the sport of denial either for amusement or sensationalism. Like Mozart in music, Shakespeare, alas, was a Natural. His genius is sui generis in world literature. Having been endowed with inborn gifts of a penetrative psychological intuition, a quick intelligence, an affinity for the music of language, and these multiple gifts having been nurtured by a propitious convergence of social and economic forces during his lifetime, Shakespeare combined these advantages in an artistry of inexhaustible inventiveness to become, in the words of James Joyce, “the playwright who wrote the Folio of the world” (Schoenbaum, 1972, p. 183).
In was John Dryden, made England’s Poet Laureate in 1668, who was the first in Shakespeare criticism to imply what Jan Kott (1964) has called Shakespeare’s “gift of psychological clairvoyance” (p. 44). “All the images of Nature were still present to him” wrote Dryden (Gollancz, 1932), “and he drew them not laboriously, but luckily: when he describes any thing, you more than see it, you feel it too.” Then, in an allusion to Shakespeare the fourteen-year old grammar school dropout, Dryden went on, “Those who accuse him to have wanted learning, give him the greatest commendation: he was naturally learn’d; he needed not the spectacles of Books to read Nature; he looked inwards and found her there” (p. 338).

Dryden’s reference to an innate gift “to reade Nature” was to become a frequently used signature theme in Shakespeare scholarship; in criticism, biography, general-interest books, and also visual art in which Shakespeare himself is the subject. It all began actually with the First Folio of 1623; a first-time posthumous publication in one volume of Shakespeare’s collected plays, and for which John Heminges and Henry Condell provided both the editorial and entreprenurial initiative. The latter two were members of the same acting company with Shakespeare and, in a to-the-reader statement, they made reference in the Folio to Shakespeare as “a happie imitator of Nature.” Ben Jonson, Shakespeare’s friend and some-time rival in Elizabethan theater, composed a eulogy poem, an encomium, for the First Folio in which he wrote that “Nature her selfe was proud of his designes, / And joy’d to weare the dressing of his lines!” Dryden later locked on to these allusive cues in the First Folio, and because he was the first major literary figure to write Shakespeare criticism, others after him, both English and non-English, followed his gift “to reade Nature” theme in the writing of Shakespeare criticism. Thomas De Quincey and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe are representative of these writers.

De Quincey (1937) wrote in a criticism of Macbeth, 1823, “O
mighty poet! Thy works are not as those of other men, simply and merely great works of art, but are also like the phenomena of Nature ...” (p. 1095). Goethe, likewise, took to Dryden’s gift “to reade Nature” theme in an essay of 1816—Shakespeare und kein Ende—”Shakespeare Ad Infinitum”:

If we call Shakespeare one of the greatest poets, we mean that few have perceived the world as accurately as he, that few who have expressed their inner contemplation of it have given the reader deeper insight into its meaning and consciousness. It becomes for us completely transparent: we find ourselves at once in the most intimate touch with virtue and vice, greatness and meanness, nobility and infamy ... Everything which in an affair of great importance breathes only secretly through the air, or lies hidden in the hearts of men, is here openly expressed ... We experience the truth of life,—how, we do not know! (Spingarn, 1921, pp. 175, 175)

Goethe, already renowned in the world of letters by the time of Shakespeare und kein Ende, would not have had in mind Shakespeare’s craftsmanship in the “how” of his exclamatory after thought. Goethe, after all, himself was a master of the poet's craft. Moreover, he had written some twenty years earlier a now celebrated Shakespeare criticism, “Wilhelm Meister’s Critique of Hamlet,” in which Shakespeare’s “poetic merit” was included in the treatment.

No, Goethe’s “how” was an expression of wonderment at Shakespeare’s psychological intuition; his “spiritual truth” as Goethe called it (Spingarn, 1921, p. 175). Late twentieth-century consciousness may well join with Goethe in wonderment: How, as in King Lear, did a forty-one year old Shakespeare know so well the psychological vulnerability of old age? The Fool chidingly says to Lear (I,v), “Thou shouldst not have been old till thou hadst been wise.” How, as in Hamlet, did Shakespeare know the “elemental nature of the crisis” in the psychological development of youth, and which Erik Erikson (1968) has acknowledged of value for modern-day psychoanalytic insight? (p. 236). How, as in Mercutio’s whimsical “Queen Mab” discourse on dreaming, Romeo and Juliet (I, iv), did Shakespeare know before psychiatry that in dreams human beings do
not think differently, but merely remember differently? Prospero in
*The Tempest* (IV,i), "We are such stuff/As dreams are made on. . . ."
How, as in the following stream-of-consciousness soliloquy did
Shakespeare know, and again before psychiatry, that feelings of
inadequacy drive the emotion of self-loathing and the destructive
behavior which springs from it? The Duke of Gloucester, and later
King Richard III after he has had his brother and two small nephews
murdered, reveals for the audience (*King Henry VI*,3, III, iii):

Why, love forswore me in my mother’s womb
And, for I should not deai in her soft laws,
She did corrupt frail nature with some bribe,
To shrink mine arm up like a wither’d shrub;
To make an envious mountain on my back,
Where sits deformity to mock my body;
To shake my legs of an unequal size;
To disproportion me in every part,
Like to a chaos, or an unlick’d bear-whelp
That . . . tries no impression like the dam.
And will I then a man to be beloved?
O monstrous fault, to harbour such a thought!
Then, since this earth affords no joy to me,
But to command, to check, to o’erbear such
As are of better person than myself,
I’ll make my heaven to dream upon the crown,
And, whiles I live, to account this world but hell,
Until my mis-shaped trunk that bears this head
Be round impaled with a glorious crown.
And yet I know not how to get the crown,
For many lives stand between me and home:
And I,—like one lost in a thorny wood,
That rends the thorns and is rent with the thorns,
Seeking a way and straying from the way;
Not knowing how to find the open way,
But toiling desperately to find it out,—
Torment myself to catch the English crown:
And from that torment I will free myself,
Or hew my way out with a bloody axe.

Such "how" questions can go on, in Go...’s words, *ad infinitum*. Shakespeare, of course, did not come to know these psychologi-
cal interiors by means of any canonical positivism, but he could “reade Nature” and it is this knowing by intuition that sets him in the company of those “special men capable of understanding what is human.”

Shakespeare’s intuitive perception of what is human seems to be of a piece with Sidney Lawrence’s earlier observation in his “Pablo Picasso” lecture, Part IV earlier, “The great artists of all time seem to me to have had special talents of empathy with aspects of nature and culture.” Likewise, American poet Sidney Lanier had perceived Shakespeare’s special talent “of empathy” as a metaphysical phenomenon. “Shakespeare’s [sic] plays,” he told a Baltimore audience of the 1880s, “always seem to me as if the gods came down and played men and women for our instruction” (Lanier, 1908, p. 301). Peter Brook, long-time director with the Royal Shakespeare Company, is less metaphysical and more empirical. He does not concern himself with Goethe’s “how” question, but advocates instead the use of “our present-day consciousness” as the bridge to Shakespeare’s intuitive insight:

To me, the total works of Shakespeare are like a very complete set of codes, and these codes, cipher for cipher, stir in us vibrations and impulses which we immediately try to make coherent. If we accept this way of looking at Shakespeare’s writing, we see that our present-day consciousness is our own aid. And this consciousness into which we plunge has of course its own dark forests, its own underground, its own stratosphere. (Brook, 1987, p. 96)

4

A Quick Intelligence

Cheek-by-jowl with Shakespeare’s gift of psychological intuition was a quick intelligence; a gift of cognitive apparatus which, in the colloquialism of today, enabled him to be a quick study in the role of playwright. Allusions to this singular giftedness already have been made earlier; Dryden took Shakespeare to be “naturally learn’d” and
Schoenbaum thinks him to have been a “supremely intelligent being.” In an appreciative sonnet written in 1849, “Shakespeare,” English poet and critic Matthew Arnold pointedly characterized Shakespeare as an autodidact, “And thou who didst the stars and sunbeams know, /Self-schooled, self-scanned, self-honored, self-secure, /Didst tread on earth unguessed at.” Lanier (1918) later enlarged upon Arnold’s characterization in the following argument:

Shakspere’s [sic] vocabulary is wonderfully large: it does not seem to have occurred to those who have thought him an unlearned man that whatever words he uses he must have read; for words, which are wholly artificial products, cannot come by intuition, no matter how divine may be one’s genius. (p. IX)

That Shakespeare had the autodidact’s passion for reading, as is implied in Lanier’s lines, should be of no surprise. Nor is it unusual that he should have been unlearned and also a “supremely intelligent being.” After all, any creative writer whose work has survived the centuries, even when unknown as is the author of the cuneiform-written Gilgamesh, has to be presumed to have been of an uncommon intelligence. What does stand out as an extraordinary attribute of Shakespeare’s intelligence is its quickness. He was quick to spot in diverse literary sources useable material to his playwright’s purpose and he was quick to assimilate his own observations for the purpose of dramatization. As illustration of the latter is the merchant metaphor in Troilus and Cressida. Ulysses says to Nestor (I, iii), “Let us, like merchants, show our foulest wares/And think, perchance, they’ll sell; if not/The lustre of the better yet to show, /Shall show the better.” Another illustration in Shakespeare of assimilated personal observation is master William Page’s exercise in Latin conjugation, The Merry Wives of Windsor (IV, i), “What is your genitive case plural, William?”

It is this quickness of mind in everyday observation, coupled with his intuitive psychological perception, which enabled him to invest certain of his characters with an occupational verisimilitude from which some have ventured to extrapolate autobiographic traces.
The Rev. H. N. Hudson (1872), a case in point, wrote in a two-volume work of Shakespeare biography:

It is indeed difficult to understand how he could have spoken as he often does, without some study in the law; but, as he seems thoroughly at home in the specialities of many callings, it is possible his knowledge in the law may have grown from the large part his father had, either as a magistrate or as litigant, in legal transactions. I am sure he either studied divinity or else had a strange gift of knowing it without studying it; and his ripeness in the knowledge of disease and of the healing art is a standing marvel of the medical faculty. (p. 189)

Shakespeare, as is known, had no formal schooling beyond an interrupted grammar-school education, nor is there historical evidence of any occupational training beyond the learning in his father’s tannery and glove-making shop, so his “strange gift” to seem “thoroughly at home in the specialities of many callings” had to be a cognitive manifestation of the quick study. Samuel Taylor Coleridge thought so, “The body and substance of his works came out of the unfathomable depths of his oceanic mind: his observation and reading, which was considerable, supplied him with the drapery of his figures” (Hawkes, 1969, p. 122).11 A fast-forward of Shakespeare’s career in Elizabethan theater, from the time he left Stratford in 1587 as an actor with a touring company of country players to 1592 when he was established already in the playwright’s craft, will free Coleridge’s affirmation of any hyperbolic suspicion.

He had married Anne Hathaway in 1582; he of age eighteen, she eight years older and three-months pregnant. Soon there were three children, of which two were twins, and all lived in the family home where Shakespeare himself was born. “All he required now,” Schöenbaum (1979) cuttingly notes, “was a career” (p. 43). Shakespeare had no marketable skill with which to support a family. So, instead, a career found him.

A touring troupe of actors played Stratford in 1587. They had lost a member earlier to a fatal brawl. Shakespeare signed on as his replacement, probably as an apprentice, and so began his career as actor. The next five or six years of his life are called by Shakespeare
scholars "Lost Years" or "Missing Years." There are legends, but nothing is certain of what he actually did. Most likely, following general conjecture in Shakespeare biography, he toured the provinces and he eventually arrived in London. The exact year is unknown, but it is there where a second career in the theater again found him.

Commercial theater was thriving in London at the time of Shakespeare's arrival; the first professional playhouse having been opened in 1576 by James Burbage. There were twelve by 1599, including "The Globe" in which Shakespeare had equity. These theaters competed fiercely for paid admissions, so that whatever was staged had to draw an audience and be capable of an extended run. "Plays," according to Sir Edmund Chambers (1933) "did not have long runs. One which did not draw was quickly discarded and a new one called for, often on short notice" (p. 85).

Custom was that a company of players would buy a play outright from a writer and perform it for so long as it drew an audience, and playwrights aplenty there were. Most were well grounded in a classical education—Christopher Marlowe, George Peele, John Lily, Robert Green held MA degrees either from Oxford or Cambridge—and writing for a commercial theater always hungry for fresh material was a rewarding outlet for their talents. This, then, was the London, city of an efflorescent commercial theater, to which Shakespeare the actor, with a family to support in Stratford, came to earn a liveable wage. He was, to use an idiom of the theater, a hungry actor.

Exactly why Shakespeare had turned to writing also is unknown. The conjecture of scholars is that *Henry VI*, 1 may not have been playing well and needed doctoring. Robert Greene, he of the "university wits," as the then playwrights with MA degrees are referenced in the literature, had written the earlier version in collaboration with Thomas Nashe. Whether Shakespeare had collaborated with them in the rewriting or whether he did it on his own initiative is conjectural, but revise the play he did. Poet and critic John Berryman (1976) speculates, "Maybe he really just began casually doing it, dissatisfied, like his fellow actors, with the script they had bought; discovering in himself . . . an intellect, an imagination, a structural sense, a sweetness and energy of versification, a syntax . . ." (p. 50).
Edmund Malone, late eighteenth-century editor of a ten-volume edition of the Shakespeare canon, concluded with the support of stylistic analysis that Shakespeare became involved with the play sometime in 1590-91, but "could not have written more than a scene or two in it" (Chute, 1949, p. 359). Greene, at any rate, did not take kindly to this new rival in the playwright's craft. An actor, no less, was now identifying himself in authorship with a play in which Greene had a hand. Actors, after all, generally were looked upon as the dregs of Elizabethan Society. But now Shakespeare's talent for writing dramatic speech in verse was unlocked, as was his genius for infusing dramatic material with penetrative intuition. Soon there was more work from him—Henry VI, 2, 3 (1590-91), Richard III, Comedy of Errors (1591-92)—and by the time Greene lay dying in 1592, Shakespeare was an established playwright; the only known actor of the time who also was a playwright.

Greene did not much care for actors. He sold them his plays, but thought of them as "painted monsters," "apes," and, even as some playwrights do today, he held them to be "puppets that speak from our mouths" (Chute, 1949, p. 83). An actor who also wrote successful plays was too much for him. He vented these feelings in a death-bed testament called Greene's Groatsworth of Wit, in which he singled out Shakespeare for special invective, "There is an upstart crow, beautiful with our feathers, that, with his tiger's heart wrapped in a player's hide, supposes he is as well able to bombast out a blank verse as the best of you; and being an absolute Johannes fac totum, is in his own conceit the only Shake-scene in a country" (Chute, 1949, p. 83).14

Johannes fac totum was Greene calling Shakespeare a Jack-of-all-trades. Disparaging it was meant to be, but when the reference is stripped of its pejorative intent and set in an evidentiary context, it is Greene's witness, albeit given in muted language, to Shakespeare's quick intelligence. This was a young actor with a family in Stratford to support who came to London sometime in the late 1580s or early 1590s, where he performed regularly as an actor, he wrote plays audiences liked, and if the skill he reveals in Hamlet (III, ii) for giving direction to actors is any indication—"Speak the speech, I pray you, as I pronounced it to you, trippingly on the tongue,"—he most
probably directed plays also.

Chute’s (1949) testimony is that “Shakespeare was an actor throughout the whole of his life in the London theater” (p. 92). His company—formed in 1594 as the Lord Chamberlain’s Men—had to compete with rival acting companies for playwrights, Ben Jonson and Thomas Dekker among them, whose work was drawing audiences. According to Chute (1949), “His company put on about fifteen plays a year and Shakespeare, as a regular acting member of the company, must have appeared in most of them” (p. 154). Here, then, was Shakespeare’s opportunity for additional income by writing fresh material for an acting company eager to stage it. Driven by a yearning for the wealth that would entitle him to a coat of arms in the Herald’s Register, and thereby attain the status of “gentleman” in Elizabethan society, he made the most of this. Shakespeare wrote at a furious pace for nearly twenty years and turned out, on average, a play in little less than seven months.¹⁵

Given all this, a quick intelligence had to be there to accommodate such a pace of creative writing for theater which, according to Berryman (1976), was “hardly by anyone ever paralleled” (p. 83). It is for this that encounters with Shakespeare plays, whether for entertainment or serious study, had best be guided by the admonition of Harry Levin (1959), “The theater is always his main habitation; from it we depart at our own risk and to it we return for the most appropriate criteria.” With this admonition as guide, then, it has to be understood that Shakespeare wrote expressly for a commercial repertory theater which consumed material as fast as does television theater in this time. Imagine Paddy Chayefsky having to write a Marty or Rod Serling a Requiem for a Heavyweight every seven months for twenty years. These are the best quality plays yet written expressly for television. Where would the material for plots and character development come from? A playwright, even one with the gift of deep psychological intuition, cannot write about subjects unknown.

Shakespeare overcame this problem in the expected style of an autodidact: he read widely! He read in the chronicles of English kings and their wars. He read in translated Greek and Roman works, he read in the translations of Montaigne and Machiavelli, and, as with Arthur...
Brook’s *Romeus and Juliet* of 1562, he read the works of other playwrights and poets. There were no public libraries in London, but as Schoenbaum (1979) writes, “in the bookstalls of St. Paul’s, Shakespeare found his infinite riches in a little room” (p. 76). He read widely not for high intellectual ends, but as a self-learned playwright in search of adaptable dramatic material for “the drapery of his figures,” as Coleridge had put it earlier.

He followed the rule of expediency in the gathering of material for his plays. He shamelessly lifted lines from other writers, he distorted historical personalities in dramatization, and, when it so suited his creative design, he mislocated geography. A quick instance of line lifting, among others that might be shown, is Sir Thomas North’s translation of Plutarch’s *Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans* and from which Shakespeare had woven some 550 lines into his *Coriolanus* (Brooke, 1957, p. 158).

5

*Shakespeare and Popular Entertainment*

Shakespeare wrote for entertainment. Plays were the popular technicolor escapism of his time. Historical accuracy or the proper attribution of lifted lines was for him of no concern, but how a work will play for the “groundlings” was. Groundlings—tailors, cordwainers, sailors, and the like—so called because they sat at lowest-priced ground level in Elizabethan theater, were the largest paid admissions. They had no interest whatever in knowing which parts of *King John* Shakespeare had adapted from an earlier playwright’s version, or whether his *King Richard III*, “dreadful minister of hell,” had been modeled faithfully after the historical Richard. Their presence in the theater determined the run of a play and Shakespeare was a master at tickling their ear. Germaine Greer (1986) has set Shakespeare’s work for theater in a telling perspective, “An essential aspect of the mind and art of Shakespeare . . . is his lack of self-consciousness” (p. 5).

A lack of self-consciousness also informs the absence of ideo-
logical bias in his plays. Shakespeare's dramatic work was not meant to nurture any driving ideological cause, as did the work of poet Vladimir Mayakovksy of the Russian Revolution, the painter Jacques Louis David of the French Revolution, or of the classical Greek tragedians, Sophocles and Aeschylus, who espoused the moral law of Zeus. "This," Berryman (1976) has concluded, "was one of the least didactic major poets who ever lived" (p. 19).

It would be wrong to conclude from this that Shakespeare had no interest in moral issues; in matters of right or wrong. Quite the other way, his plays are loaded with axiological problems. Seminar discussions without end can be planned around moral dilemmas Shakespeare's characters are made to confront. But he does not moralize. "There are no dearth of Shakesperian characters ready to interpret the world to anyone who will listen," Greer (1986) adds, "but to assume that any one of them is the repository of Shakespeare's own ideological certainties is to ignore the fundamental relevance of the theater paradigm" (p. 108).

Exactly so! His stage characters do make choices among values. He invests these choices with credible psychological motivation and his audience is made privy to all of this usually by means of the soliloquy. He lets his audience do the valuing. The audience is made aware of the range in human vulnerability and, as Kott (1966) has written in confirmation, "In Shakespeare all human values are brittle ..." (p. 47). Sir John Falstaff's moral dilemma in choosing between honor and personal well-being is illustrative.

The Falstaff character was used by Shakespeare in several of his plays. In The Merry Wives of Widsor he is a baggy-pants burlesque figure, but in Henry IV, 2 he is a corrupt recruiting officer; a jovial, exploitative fat knight who is close with Prince Hal. A battle is pending and Falstaff, his personal safety in mind, spins an antecedent alibi should he be caught in cowardice. But Hal is on to him and says, "Why, thou owest God a death." Falstaff, now alone on stage, speaks a response to Hal's line in a prose soliloquy (V, i):20

'Tis not due yet: I would be loath to pay him before his day. What need I be so forward with him
that calls not on me? Well, 'tis no matter; honor pricks me on. Yea, but how if honor prick me off when I come on? How then? Can honor set to a leg? No. Or an arm? No. Or take away the grief of a wound? No. Honor hath no skill in surgery then? No. What is honor? A word. What is in that word honor? What is that honor? Air—a trim reckoning! Who hath? He that died a Wednesday. Doth he feel it? No. Doth he hear it? No. 'Tis insensible then? Yea, to the dead. But will it not live with the living? No. Why? Detraction will not suffer it. Therefore I'll none of it. Honor is a mere scutcheon—and so ends my catechism.

Is this how Shakespeare actually thought of personal honor? In another play, Othello, Iago’s exhortation should disabuse any such notion (III, iii):

    Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,  
    Is the immediate jewel of their souls. 
    Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing; 
    'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands; 
    But he that filches from me my good name 
    Robs me of that which not enriches him 
    And makes me poor indeed.

Iago is Shakespeare’s archetypal figure of evil. Nothing of what he has to say about a “good name” is believed by the audience to be a personal credo, any more than is his solicitude of Othello in the same scene, “O, beware, my lord of jealousy! It is the green-eyed monster, which doth mock/The meat it feeds on.” Everyone knows he is out to get Othello because in an earlier Act I soliloquy he said so, “I hate the Moor.../The Moor is of a free and open nature/That thinks men honest that but seem to be so;/And will as tenderly be led by the nose/As asses are.” But Iago’s villainy aside, where in theater is there a more compelling argument for personal honor than in the seven lines Shakespeare has given him?

Shakespeare’s characters and plots are creations of his imagination meant for popular entertainment. Most were lifted from histories
and other works. They were adapted to suit his playwright’s purpose. Lines these characters speak have the ring of psychological truth because a quick intelligence at adaptation has worked in tandem with a genius for knowing intuitively the universal drives of human behavior. He was quick, for example, to grasp the dramatic possibilities in Aristotle’s idea of *hamartia* in human destiny. *Hamartia*, as it was defined in earlier Part II, is a fatal flaw of character which destroys an otherwise heroic person. His dramatizations of *hamartia* inform the core literature of what scholars call “Shakespeare’s tragic vision.” Hamlet says to his friend Horatio (I, iv):

So oft it chances in particular men
That for some vicious mole of nature in them,
As in thei. birth, wherein they are not guilty,
... Their virtues else, be they as pure as grace,
As infinite as man may undergo,
Shall in the general censure take corruption
From that particular fault.

Whether Shakespeare came to the insight of a “vicious mole” by intuition or by having read Aristotle’s *Poetics* is unknown, but he most certainly used it with consummate artistry in the writing of tragedy. His model may have been treatments of *hybris* and *hamartia* in classical Greek tragedies.22 Hamlet’s own vicious mole is in not being able to forget. “Must I remember?” he despairs in the memorable soliloquy (I, ii), “O that this too too solid flesh would melt...” Othello dies by his own hand “upon a kiss,” destroyed by the vicious mole of jealousy. Macbeth’s moral chaos, brought on by the vicious mole of a “vaulting ambition,” takes him to the ultimate human abyss where he concludes life is a zero (V, v), “Life’s but a walking shadow/... it is a tale/Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,/Signifying nothing.” Coriolanus’ contempt for the common folk was his vicious mole (III, iii), “You common cry of curs! Whose breath I hate/As reek o’ the rotten fens whose loves I prize/As the dead carcasses of unburied men/That do corrupt my air...” His own mother, Volumnia, anticipates his epitaph (V, iii), “The man was noble,/But with his last attempt he wiped it out/Destroy’d his country,
and his name remains/To the ensuing age abhorr’d."

These flawed characters are turned back in twists and turns of plot to the vicious mole in their nature; like a Möbius strip that is forever turning back on itself. At the end, just as in Greek classical theater, Shakespeare’s audience attained cathartic self-insight and enhanced empathy for human failing.° His dramatizations provided at once entertainment and the balance of insight his audience required for empathic understanding of human vulnerability. Falstaff’s show of cowardice in Henry IV, 2, as example, was made amenable to empathic understanding when audiences heard in Measure for Measure (II, i), “The weariest and most loathed wordly life/That age, ache, penury, and imprisonment/Can lay on nature is a paradise/To what we fear in death.”

A quickness of mind sustained his fast-paced writing, and his gift “to reade Nature” invested what he wrote with enduring psychological truth, but popular entertainment was always his metier. Chambers (1933) has summarized his style of adaptive playwriting as follows, “He is taking a story, using so much of it as appeals to his sense of dramatic values, altering what does not, and giving it literary form through his command of language” (p. 92). However, as with his other inborn endowments, Shakespeare’s “command of language” has been unmatched in expressive splendor by any other playwright since; so much so, Isaac Asimov (1978) holds him to be “the supreme writer through all the history of English literature . . .” (p. viii).

The Music of Shakespeare’s Language

Allusions to Shakespeare’s “command of language” appear in the literature most often in reference to him as a word-smith. George Orwell called him a word musician (Greer, 1986, p. 106). Both fit true. But gifted as Shakespeare was in the use of expressive language, he never distinguished between art and popular entertainment in his verse. Shakespeare used language with the instrumental disposition
of a craftsman. He was an actor writing for actors. Be it the musical language of a verse line structured in iambic pentameter, his favored metrical style, or the narrative speech of prose, his purpose always was to use language so that it had the effect of enchantment. Lanier (1908) had just this Shakespeare aesthetic in mind when in one of his lectures he said, “Shakspere [sic] is at once the truest and the most unreal of writers” (p. 298).

There is in Shakespeare’s dramatic verse what William Wordsworth had called “metrical excitement.” He did not always follow fixed literary convention, to the sometime annoyance of his more self-conscious friend Ben Jonson, because for Shakespeare character development values came before rules for the writing of dramatic verse. In short, he relied on his own sensibility to obtain the desired “tone-colours” for his verse line by means of rhythms, timbre of words, and the rhythms of rhymes.24 “Shakespeare knew well the inherent capabilities of his verse line,” George Wright (1988) has concluded in a definitive work on Shakespeare’s metrical art, “what heights of passion it could research, what depths of anguish it could sound, what harmonies of dramatic action and resolution it could help the characters achieve” (p. 285).

It is quite easy to reach into the plays with an unrestrained arbitrariness for illustrations of how well Shakespeare knew “the inherent capabilities of his verse line.” Romeo, as example, upon seeing Juliet for the first time from a distance at the Capulet's torchlight party registers his feeling for her with the audience in the following ten lines, rhymed ab, ab, and which can free-stand as love poetry, Romeo and Juliet (I, v):

O, she doth teach the torches to burn bright!
It seems she hangs upon the cheek of night
Like a rich jewel in an Ethiop's ear;
Beauty too rich for use, for earth too dear!
So shows a snowy dove trooping with crows,
As yonder lady o'er her fellows shows.
The measure done, I'll watch her place of stand,
And, touching hers, make blessed my rude hand.
Did my heart love till now? Forswear it, sight!
For I ne'er saw true beauty till this night.
No such lyricism is anywhere in the blank verse which opens *Antony and Cleopatra*. Antony had spent an amorous night with Cleopatra and, like King Edward VIII who in 1936 gave up the English throne for "the woman I love," he is now disposed to give up his power as "the triple pillar" of the Roman world for her (1, i), "Let Rome in the Tiber melt and the wide arch of the ranged empire fall! Here is my space, Kingdoms are clay" Soldiers of his personal guard hold him in contempt for this seeming weakness. For them it is just too much; the affair with the Egyptian Queen "O'erflows the measure." Their feeling is registered straightaway with the audience in a marble-like blank verse marked by harsh plosive words (1, i):

Nay, but this dotage of our general's
O'erflows the measure: those his goodly eyes,
That o'er the files and musters of the war
Have glow'd like plated Mars, now bend, now turn,
The office and devotion of their view
Upon a tawny front: his captain's heart,
Which in the scuffles of great fights hath burst
The buckles on his breast, reneges all temper,
And is become the bellows and the fan
To cool a gypsy's lust.

Then there is certain verse throughout the Shakespeare canon so rich in imagistic color it brings on instant synesthesia: it induces recall of the iridescence in a Chagall painting or the lyricism of music by Mozart. One such, *A Midsummer-Night's Dream*, is Titania's recital of myriad calamities mortals have suffered because of Oberon's persistent jealousy (II, i), "These are the forgeries of jealousy: . . . /The ox hath therefore stretched his yoke in vain/The ploughman lost his sweat; and the green corn/'Hath rotted ere his youth attained a beard:"

Another is Juliet's nuptial poem, called an epithalamion, in *Romeo and Juliet* (III, ii), "Gallop apace, you fiery-footed steeds . . . ." Still another is Jacque's account of his encounter with a fool in the forest, *As You Like It* (II, vii):
A fool, a fool! I met a fool i’ the forest,
A motley fool; a miserable world!
As I do live by food, I met a fool;
Who laid him down and bask’d him in the sun,
And rail’d on lady Fortune in good terms,
In good set terms and yet a motley fool.
‘Good morrow, fool!’, quoth I. ‘No, sir,’ quoth he,
‘Call me not fool till heaven hath sent me fortune’:
And then drew a dial from his poke,
And, looking on it with lack-lustre eye,
Says very wisely, ‘It is ten o’clock:
Thus we may see,’ quoth he, ‘how the world wags:
’Tis but an hour ago since it was nine,
And after one hour more ’twill be eleven;
And so, from hour to hour, we ripe and ripe,
And then, from hour to hour, we rot and rot;
And thereby hangs a tale.’ When I did hear
The motley fool thus moral on the time.
My lungs began to crow like chanticleer,
That fools sha
be so deep-contemplative,
And I did laugh. sans intermission
An hour by his dial. O noble fool!
A worthy foe’. Motley’s the only wear.

An even more telling illustration of Shakespeare’s “command of language” is to compare his verse in *Romeo and Juliet* with that of Arthur Brooke’s earlier poetic version of the story. First, from Brooke’s *The Tragical History of Romeus and Juliet*:

Fair lady mine, dame Juliet, my life (quoth he)
Even from my birth committed was to fatal sisters three.
They may in spite of foes, draw forth n, y lively thread,
And they also, who so saith nay, asunder may it shred.
But who to reave my life, his rage and force would bend,
Perhaps should try unto his pain how it could defend.
Ne yet I love it so, but always, for your sake,
A sacrifice to death I would my wounded corpse betake.
If my mishap were such, that here, before your sight,
I should restore again to death, of life my borrowed light,
This one thing and no more my parting sprite would rue:
That part he should, before that you by certain trial knew
The love I owe to you, the thrall I languish in,
And how I dread to lose the gain which I do hope to win
And how I wish for life, not for my proper ease,
but that in it, you might I love, you honor, serve and please
Till deadly pangs the sprite out of the corpse shall send.
And thereupon he swore an oath, and so his tale had end. (Cole, 1970, p. 3)

Compare now this stumbling verse, and its forced soporific ab, ab rhyme—"my life (quoth he)/Fatal sisters three"—with Shakespeare’s verse in which the same emotion has been transmogrified by imagistic magic and metrical grace (III, ii):

But soft! What light through yonder window breaks?
It is the East, and Juliet is the sun!
Arise, fair sun, and kill the envious moon,
Who is already sick and pale with grief
That thou her maid art far more fair than she.
Be not her maid, since she is envious.
Her vestal livery is but sick and gree,
And none but fools do wear it. Cast i. off.
It is my lady; O, it is my love!
O that she knew she were!
She speaks, yet she says nothing. What of that?
Her eye discourses; I will answer it.
I am too bold; 'tis not to me she speaks.
Two of the fairest stars in all the heaven,
Having some business, do entreat her eyes
To twinkle in their spheres till they return.
What if her eyes were there, they in her head?
The brightness of her cheek would shame those stars
As daylight doth a lamp; her eyes in heaven Would through the airy region stream so bright That birds would sing and think it were not night.
See how she leans her cheek upon her hand!
O that I were a glove upon that hand,
That I might touch that cheek!

Still another aesthetic in Shakespeare’s “command of language” was first noted in criticism by Goethe’s fictive Wilhelm Meister. He tells a friend in a critique of Hamlet, “His men appear like natural men, and yet they are not.” Then he elaborates in metaphor:
These, the most mysterious and complex productions of creations, here act before us as if they were watches, whose dial plates and cases were of crystal, which pointed out, according to their use, the course of the hours and minutes; while at the same time, you could discern the combination of wheels and springs that turned them. (Spingarn, 1921, p. 146)

Goethe had isolated in these lines an aesthetic nuance to which Lanier (1908), some one hundred years later, devoted considerable critical thought. In an elaboration of his earlier given enigmatic statement—“Shakspeare is at once the truest and the most unreal of writers.”—he called attention to an overlooked commonplace in human communication:

Everywhere the lack of ability to express one’s self is so common in real life as to become characteristic of it. In Shakspere[sic], on the other hand, everybody, clown or courtier, king or shepherd, villain or patriot, lover or lunatic, man or woman—everybody is gifted with the power of expressing, instantly and vividly and precisely, every movement of the spirit, from the most nimble caper of wit to the most ponderous writhing of wounded passion.

You must see, then, that in this view alone there is not a real man or woman in Shakspere. Yet, while the men and women of Shakspere are not real, they are absolutely true. Their beautiful speeches, though simply impossible in real life, give us conceptions of the emotions which underlie them. (pp. 300-301)

How did Shakespeare, the grammar-school dropout, come to this extraordinary command of verse language? The short answer: Shakespeare was a genius with talent. His genius for intuitive perception of the psychological landscape was matched by a talent for word enchantment. Ben Jonson’s encomium in the First Folio had acknowledged this talent, “Yet must I not give Nature all: Thy Art, /My gentle Shakespeare, must enjoy a part.” Shakespeare’s fellow actors Heminges and Condell in the First Folio added affirmably in their “To the Great Variety of Readers” statement, “His mind and hand went together: And what he thought, he uttered with that easiness that wee have scarse received from him a blot in his papers.”
Only Mozart, who could write a “Linz” Symphony—No. 36—in five days, comes to mind as having been another genius with such a talent.

Of course Shakespeare’s quick intelligence helped also. Having been a persistent hunter in literary sources for dramatic material suitable for adaptation, is it conceivable that this resident dramatist for the most successful Elizabethan acting company would not have been in touch with latest fashions in verse language? Then there were his playwright friends Christopher Marlowe and Ben Jonson. Marlowe, born in the same year as Shakespeare, was stabbed to death by a drinking companion at age twenty-nine. These friends gathered regularly in Mermaid Tavern for drink and talk. What likely would have been included in the leisure-time talk of these leading playwrights of the day? Poet William Carlos Williams provides an informative clue: at the time, “iambic pentameter was wonderfully new and timely” (Wright, 1988, p. 1). A quick study such as Shakespeare was could not have had better drinking companions for informal instruction in the metrical art. However, Shakespeare might well have remained, to borrow from Dante’s De Monarchia, a “buried talent” had it not been for a nurturing cultural environment whose effective time had coincided with Shakespeare’s own life span.

A Nurturing Cultural Environment

Sidney Hook (1943) has related in his study of the hero in history that, “Writing in 1880, William James banteringly asked Herbert Spencer whether he believed that if William Shakespeare had not been born in Stratford-on-Avon on April 26, 1564, the convergence of social and economic forces would have produced him elsewhere” (p. 81). A titillative question it was; having been motivated perhaps by preponderant historical evidence that “the convergence of social and economic forces” did indeed generate the nurturing cultural environment which had enabled Shakespeare’s gifts to flower in Elizabethan theater.
There was no commercial theater building in England at the time of Shakespeare's birth in 1564. What acting-for-pay there was took place in the open yard of great London inns or on wooden scaffolds in the marketplace of towns. Performances consisted largely of dumb shows—pantomime—or of dramas cut from the template of medieval morality plays in which Everyman is confronted by Vice and Virtue in variform allegorical settings. It was, moreover, an evolving commercial theater that was barely tolerated at upper levels of society. The attitude of London's Lord Mayor was typical. He complained to the Privy Council, "that the plays caused unthrifty [sic] waste of money by poor persons, sundry robberies by picking and cutting of purses, uttering of seditious matters, and many other corruptions of youth, and other enormities" (Hodges, 1971, p. 23).

Notwithstanding the Lord Mayor's low regard for this commercial theater, "the plays became increasingly popular, and larger and larger crowds gathered to see them" (Hodges, 1971, p. 24). So quickly did this commercial theater flourish into a pop culture that by the time Shakespeare was twelve, and still in grammar school, James Burbage built on leased land the first London "plaie howse" in 1576 called "The Theatre"—short for Amphitheatre. He did well; so well, Burbage built another playhouse the following year next door, "The Curtain"—so called because it was erected on a site then known as Curtain Field (Hodges, 1971, p. 26).

It is toward this nascent commercial theater culture that Shakespeare made his way in the late 1580s from backwater Stratford. Accounts in the literature of his success in London are plentiful. Chute (1949), perhaps with the hero-in-history question in mind, has summarized this literature as follows:

Shakespeare came to London at a fortunate time. If he had been born twenty years earlier, he would have arrived in London where underpaid hacks were turning out childish dramas about brown-paper dragons. If he had been born twenty years later, he would have arrived when the drama had begun to lose its hold on ordinary people and was succumbing to a kind of self-conscious cleverness. But his arrival in London coincided with a great wave of excitement and achievement in the theatre and he rode with it to its crest. William Shakespeare brought
great gift to London, but the city was waiting with gifts of its own to offer him. The root of his genius was Shakespeare's own but it was London that supplied him with the favoring weather. (p. 57)

The "favoring weather" to which Chute refers was the social and economic fruitage of landmark events that had transformed London from, to continue with Chute, "still in many ways the medieval city that Geoffrey Chaucer had known"—he died in 1400—into a vibrant city of an "increasingly excitable population." This population, which had doubled during the reign of Elizabeth from roughly 100,000 to 200,000 indulged itself in Sunday play-going, as did the Queen herself, and in other secular enjoyments. "The fall of Antwerp," Chute explains, "had made London a substitute commercial center and the religious wars on the Continent had doubled the foreign population of London in thirteen years" (Chute, 1949, pp. 38-60).

8

The Great Chain of Being

Very much also a part of this cultural transformation was what Renaissance scholar E. M. W. Tillyard has called "the Elizabethan world picture." This world picture—called Weltanschauung in the German philosophical lexicon—was changing during Shakespeare's stay in London. It was not an immediate cause-and-effect type of change brought on by such current events as the fall of Antwerp or the defeat in 1588 of the Spanish Armada by the English, it was more in the pattern of change induced by the force of ideas. Among such compellable ideas of the 1500s were those published in the works of Machiavelli, Copernicus, and Montaigne.

Their ideas challenged received assumptions in the Elizabethan world picture, even as the ideas of Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud were to challenge the assumptions of a later Victorian world picture. Conceptions of human nature and of normative order in society were shaken, as if by an earthquake, in both instances.
Cultural origins of the Elizabethan world picture were grounded in Ptolemaic cosmology: spherical earth is stationary and is the center of a universe in which the sun and other celestial bodies revolve about it. Although Nicholas Copernicus had published, 1543, his treatise on the heliocentric system fifteen years before the reign of Elizabeth had begun, Tillyard (1950) found, “In spite of Copernicus and a wide knowledge of his theories ... the ordinary educated Elizabethan thought of the universe as geocentric” (p. 34). All of which is altogether understandable; after all, in close juxtaposition with Ptolemaic cosmology had evolved a granite-like teleology which laid out the norms of social order in the medieval world.

Medieval Christian theology prescribed a hierarchical system of social order whose model was God’s own order in the universe. The ordering of human society and of the universe were in this system bound with each other. Humans were set hierarchically in this order below the angels but above all other life on earth. A treatise on governance of a time close to Shakespeare’s own is quoted by Tillyard (1950) to convey the quintessential heaven-earth nexus of this teleological conception:

Hath not God set degrees and estates in all his glorious works?  
First in his heavenly ministers, whom he hath constituted in divers degrees called hierarchies. (p. 9)

Shakespeare knew first hand the social ramifications of this medieval teleology. Lacey Smith’s (1967) account of Shakespeare’s England points to this:

Throughout Europe the official view of the social order was static, closed, hierarchical and religiously inspired. The Elizabethan state was no human contrivance constructed to advance the material well-being of man. It remained a divinely ordained structure into which individuals were born with prescribed duties and fixed status. (p. 52)

Scholars have conceptualized this teleology as “the great chain of being”. They borrowed a lilting metaphor, “the vast chain of
being,” from Essay on Man by Alexander Pope and have published about it a literature that has enriched both Shakespeare criticism and the history of ideas. The first to publish was Arthur Lovejoy (1942) who lectured successively “on the constitutive pattern of the universe” at Harvard University in 1932-33. These lectures were published later as The Great Chain of Being. Soon thereafter, a year before Tillyard had published The Elizabethan World Picture, Theodore Spencer’s (1942) lectures, also given at Harvard University, were published by the title of Shakespeare and the Nature of Man. Its subject is the Renaissance view of human nature in conflict with medieval conceptions of social order and of how Shakespeare had woven “with great force and grandeur” the cultural tensions of this conflict into his dramatization.25 Spencer’s conclusion is that the Elizabethan world picture had been compromised at its mythological mooring by the sweep of new ideas. Spencer (1942) writes in elaboration, “Copernicus had questioned the cosmological order, Montaigne had questioned the natural order, Machiavelli had questioned the political order” (p. 29).

As was stated earlier, Shakespeare never distinguished in his dramatizations between art and popular entertainment, nor, it should be added now, did he ever distinguish there between intellective profundity and entertainment. Not a hint of intellectual pretension has been attributed to him by any documented Shakespeare scholarship. He was a playwright with a quick intelligence who also had a sociological sense of how theater, by reflection, depicts what Durkheim has called “social facts.” Hamlet, as an example, instructs Polonius to have the actors who are about to perform before King Claudius “well bestowed” (II, ii), “Do you hear, let them be well used, for they are the abstract and brief chronicles of the time . . . .” Spencer (1942) again provides a helpful elaboration:

In order to express his time, and the general truths with which its best minds, like himself, were concerned, Shakespeare did not have to spend his days turning pages in a library. That is the task of the critic and scholar who would try to understand him three hundred years late: . . . . (p. 1)
Shakespeare, as has been stated already, wrote for a theater entertainment that would please the groundlings. They, not the nobility nor an occasional invitation to perform before a royal audience at Whitehall or Greenwich assured the success of a play. At the same time, however, he also transmitted in this entertainment to generations hence “the abstract and brief chronicles of the time.” Was he fully conscious of what he was doing? Most likely, he was not. Spencer (1942) asks, “What artist ever is?” (p. IX). More to the point is plentiful evidence within the plays which shows clearly that Shakespeare did indeed “abstract” the ideas that were changing the Elizabethan world picture.

Elizabethans, for example, must have recognized with instant delight “the English face of Machiavelli” when the deformed Richard, Duke of Gloucester and later King Richard III, assures the audience at the end of the earlier cited stream-of-consciousness soliloquy in Henry VI, 3 of his villainous intention to obtain the English crown (III, ii):

I can add :lolours to the chameleon,
Change shapes with Proteus for advantages,
And set the murderous Machiavel to school.
Can I do this, and cannot get a crown?
Tut, were it farther off, I’ll pluck it down.

Machiavelli’s English face was that of a power-grasping diabolist and Shakespeare’s Richard fulfilled in the popular imagination expectations of the Machiavellian persona (Raab, 1964). Never mind that the historical Richard was not the monster depicted in the play; Shakespeare wrote plays, not history. Critics from time-to-time have taken him to task for having distorted history, most especially Charles Lamb (1936) in the early 1800s, but it is a finding of fault entirely without merit. Any historical record was for Shakespeare, like all other literary material, stuff to be transformed and used for his own dramatic purpose. As for Machiavelli’s English face, “He was universally described as an atheist and an unscrupulous fiend; he was referred to no fewer than 395 times in Elizabethan drama as the
embodiment of human villainy" (Spencer, 1942, p. 44). It is not certain whether these 395 references to Machiavelli in Elizabethan drama are in addition to the "four-hundred-odd references in Elizabethan literature" that Isaiah Berlin (1979) reports in his essay, "The Originality of Machiavelli" (p. 35), what is certain is that "murderous Machiavel" is Shakespeare's "abstract" of them all in the popular culture of his day.

There was, however, another literature available to Shakespeare in which Machiavelli is depicted in a more benign light. This was an intellectual literature which, as that of Francis Bacon, acknowledged him as one among others "who openly and unfeignedly declare and describe what men do, and not what they ought to do" (Berlin, 1979, p. 32). Shakespeare most likely knew of this literature as well. Indeed, a reflective analysis of his great tetralogy—Richard II, Henry IV, 1, 2, and Henry V—will show it to be a dramatization of much that is in The Prince, but in an English history context. Section 11, later, will elaborate. So why "the murderous Machiavel" in Henry VI, 3? He wanted to create a character in whom the audience would connect instantly with well-known political assassinations and other power struggles of the age. Richard III was created by Shakespeare as an archetype Machiavellian of the popular imagination, just as he later was to create Iago as the Elizabethan incarnation of Vice; the familiar obligatory character of medieval morality plays. "The greatness of the Elizabethan age," Tillyard (1950) has noted, "was that it contained so much of new without bursting the noble form of the old order" (p. 6).

Shakespeare's most likely link to the works of Machiavelli and Montaigne was John Florio, an Italian emigré who settled in London and who was the Earl of Southampton's tutor in Italian. He made his literary reputation as a linguist, he wrote an English-Italian conversation book, and one of his works he offered in dedication, as had Shakespeare, to Southampton. More to the point, he translated also into English Machiavelli and Montaigne (Chute, 1949, p. 40, 114; Rowse, 1963, p. 220). "Shakespeare," Levin (1959) has concluded, "was . . . one of the first and most devoted readers of Montaigne in
Florio's translation, as is evidenced by numerous turns of speech and by a certain essayistic movement of thought” (p. 11).

Shakespeare seems to have been drawn most especially to the dramatic potential he saw in Montaigne’s essay, “Apology for Raymond Sebond.” Montaigne had translated from Latin into English, at his father’s urging, a medieval work, *Natural Theology,* by Raymond Sebond. It was in response to this work that he wrote his “Apology”; an essay in which he challenged with an unyielding skepticism medieval certainties of the human estate in nature. As Spencer (1942) has put it, “Montaigne gave the accepted view of the second of Nature’s domains such a series of blows that it was almost entirely demolished; one by one the cards were knocked down until the whole house lay flat on the ground” (p. 32). Here is Montaigne himself in one of these “series of blows” as quoted by Spencer (1942):

The frailest and most vulnerable of all creatures is man and at the same time the most arrogant. He sees and feels himself lodged here in the mud and filth of the world, nailed and riveted to the worst, the deadest and most stagnant part of the universe, at the lowest story of the house and the most remote from the vault of heaven, with the animals of the worst condition of the three; and he goes and sets himself in imagination above the circle of the moon, and brings heaven under his feet. (p. 35)

Whereas medieval teleology held the human domain in nature to be special, of an order higher than that of beasts but lower than that of angels, Montaigne argued that a universe having been built by a “blind watchmaker”—Richard Dawkins’ expression—imposed no moral sanction on human action. Humans are simply another animal genus on the earth and “most vulnerable of all.” Shakespeare was quick to behold a tragic vision in Montaigne’s terrible limits of the human condition. His dramaturgical talent then enabled him to exploit entertainment possibilities in these opposed conceptions of what is human. Here is one of many available illustrations of how Shakespeare did it.

Hamlet in the exchange between himself, Guildenstern, and Rosencrantz speaks these lines (II, ii):
What a piece of work is man, how noble in
reason, how infinite in faculty, in form
and moving how express and admirable, in
action how like an angel, in apprehension
how like a god: the beauty of the world,
the paragon of animals....

Tillyard cites this encomium to illustrate textually in
Shakespeare "the noble form of the old order." He points out that
Hamlet's words have been mistaken "as one of the great English
versions of Renaissance humanism." Not so, according to Tillyard
(1950), "Actually it is in the purest medieval tradition" (p. 1).
Measure for Measure, however, does show, in Tillyard's words, "so
much of the new" in the age of Elizabeth.

Part I, earlier, had cited the corruption of straight-as-an arrow
Angelo in Measure for Measure as an episode of sexual harassment
in Shakespeare. Angelo is a main-stream citizen who is held to be of
"ample grace and honor" in the eyes of the community. Because he
is so regarded, Angelo is appointed acting head-of-state during a
short-term absence of the ruler. It is in this role that Angelo comes on
to the novitiate Isabella as she stands before him in formal audience
to plead for the life of her brother.

Several scenes before Angelo's lust is so disclosed, Shakespeare
shows the audience that his action is not the aberrant behavior of
impulse; a momentary lapse of virtue. Shakespeare gives Angelo two
soliloquies which take the audience straight into Angelo's stream of
consciousness. The first of these is given when Isabella bids Angelo
farewell—[God], "Save your honor"—following the first audience
with him. Angelo, alone now, responsively thinks aloud (III, iii):

From thee, even from thy virtue!
What's this? What's this? Is this her fault or mine?
The tempter or the tempted, who sins most?
Ha, not she. Nor doth she tempt; but it is I
That, lying by the violet in the sun,
Do as the carrion does, not as the flow'r,
Corrupt with virtuous season. Can it be
That modesty may more betray our sense
Than woman's lightness? Having waste ground enough,
Shall we desire to raze the sanctuary
And pitch our evils there? O fie, fie, fie!
What dost thou, or what are thou, Angelo?
Dost thou desire here fouly for those things
That make her good? O, let her brother live:
Thieves for their robbery have authority
When judges steal themselves.

Then Angelo again reveals himself in a soliloquy just before his
second audience with Isabella (II, iv):

When I would pray and think, I think and pray
To several subjects: heaven hath my empty words,
Whilst my invention, hearing not my tongue,
Anchors on Isabel: heaven in my mouth,
As if I did but only cheer his name,
And in my heart the strong and swelling evil
Of my conception. The state whereon I studied,
Is like a good thing, being often read,
Grown seared and tedious; yea, my gravity,
Wherein, let no man hear me, I take pride,
Could I with boot change for an idle plume
Which the air beats for vain. O place, O form,
How often dost thou with thy case, thy habit,
Wrench awe from fools, and tie the wiser souls
To thy false seeming! Blood, thou art blood.
Let's write "good angle" on the devil's horn,
'Tis not the devil's crest.

Shakespeare seems to have been deliberate—two soliloquies—
that his audience does not mistake Angelo for one of those in whom
"some vicious mole" had been planted at birth. Such are "particular
men," to use Hamlet's words; men afflicted by hamartia, a concept
out of Aristotle's Poetics which, like other Aristotelian ideas, also had
been taken over by medieval thought. No, Angelo's depravity is in the
"abstract" of Shakespearean drama pure Montaigne. Human nature
cannot be taken for granted. Angelo is Shakespeare's metaphor for
deprieved human nature: "What dost thou, or what art thou, Angelo?"
A character whom the audience first beholds as a paragon of civic
virtue, and who is conscious of what he is about, surrenders to coarse sensuality and concludes “Blood, thou art blood” and proceeds willfully to “write ‘good angel’ on the devil’s horn”: meaning phallus.

There are throughout the canon other such contrasts to illustrate how Shakespeare dramaturgically has captured with an inventive aesthetic the cultural tension of his age “without bursting the noble from of the old order.” Two plays especially show the Copernican-Ptolemaic contrast quite sharply. In Troilus and Cressida, Ulysses compares the consequences of disorder in society to the catastrophies of disorder in nature. It is this speech by Ulysses about order and degree which scholars most frequently quote to illustrate medieval teleology in Shakespeare (I, iii):

The heavens themselves, the planets and this centre,
Observe degree, priority and place,
Insistur: course, proportion, season, form,
Office and custom, in all line of order:
And therefore is the glorious planet Sol
In noble eminence enthron’d and spher’d
Amidst the univ. whose medicinable eye
Corrects the ;: aspects of planets evil,
And posts like the commandment of a king,
Sans check to good and bad: but when the planets
In evil mixture to disorder wander,
What plagues and what portents, what mutiny,
What raging of the sea, shaking of earth,
Commotion in the winds, frights, changes, horrors,
Divert and crack, rend and deracinate
The unity and married calm of states
Quite from their fixture! Oh, when degree is shak’d,
Which is the ladder to all high designs,
The enterprise is sick!

Edmund, in King Lear, will have none of this medieval correspondence-in-order thinking. He has read Copernicus. When his father, Earl of Gloucester, tells him that recent troubles in Britain have been caused by an upset of “degree” in nature—”These late eclipses in the sun and moon portend no good to us”—Edmund thinks aloud
this to be poppycock (I, ii):

This is the excellent foppery of the world that when we are sick in fortune, often the surfeit of our own behaviour, we make guilty of our disasters the sun, the moon, and stars; as if we were villains by necessity, fools by heavenly compulsion, knaves, thieves, and treachers by spherical predominance; drunkards liars, and adulterers by an enforced obedience of planetary influence, and all that we are evil in by a divine thrusting on.

No one knows the actual on-the-spot effect upon Elizabethan audiences when they heard Edmund disavow his father's medieval thinking, or when they heard Cassius in Julius Caesar say (I, ii), "The fault dear Brutus, is not in our stars, /But in ourselves that we are underlings." Conjecture might help. Imagine a believing French audience of the 1940s watching an Existentialist play by Jean Paul Sartre—say No Exit—and hear from the stage, "God is dead." In either case, it is hard to imagine a drowsing audience.

Samuel Johnson published an edition of Shakespeare's plays in 1765. He wrote in the "Preface," "Shakespeare engaged in dramatic poetry with the world open before him; the rules of the ancients were yet known to few; the public judgment was unformed; he had no example of such fame as might force him upon imitation, nor critics of such authority as might restrain his extravagance." In an age that has been eye-witness to humans walking on the moon, one still is tempted to add a vestigial medievalism to Johnson's statement: Shakespeare was born under a lucky star.

There has not been another like him since in all of expressive literature. In his plays the English Renaissance had attained its apogee. There is in these plays unending discovery, recreational pleasure, and insight into what Andrew Halpin (1966) has thought of as "the ineffable ambiguity of the human condition" (p. 272). Imagination is the "open sesame" to this vast universe of aesthetic wisdom. Vast as it is, however, this universe is an easy access.
All of Shakespeare's work—plays, sonnets, narrative poems—is available in one volume from a number of publishers as "complete works" for less than the cost of a movie and dinner for two. Paperbacks of single plays—published by Signet Classic, The Folger Library Shakespeare, New Penguin, The Pelican Shakespeare—cost less than three dollars and all contain user-friendly excerpts of acclaimed criticism, biographic commentary, source information, and facilitative notes at the bottom of each page keyed to numbered lines of the text. This easy access to Shakespeare is by itself witness-in-fact to his enduring contemporaneousness. In retrospect, like much else about Shakespeare, this too is an irony.

Shakespeare's plays, as has been given before, were written for popular entertainment and not as literary works. So little did Shakespeare care about literary fame that the first of his early plays to appear in Quarto form did not show his name. Ben Jonson, on the other hand did make a self-conscious, and successful, effort at literary fame. The very year in which Shakespeare died, 1616, he published *The Works of Benjamin Jonson*; the first man of letters in England to do so. The irony is, following Levin earlier, while one is closer to the Shakespeare aesthetic at a performance of his dramatic work on stage, Charles Lamb (1936) was of the opinion that reading a Shakespeare play was preferable to a live performance:

> It may seem a paradox, but I cannot help being of [sic] opinion that the plays of Shakespeare are less calculated for performance on a stage, than those of almost any other dramatist whatever. Their distinguished excellence is a reason that they should be so. There is so much in them, which comes not under the province of acting, with which eye, and tone, and gesture, have nothing to do. . . . The truth is, the characters of Shakespeare are so much the objects of meditation rather than of interest or curiosity as to their actions, that while we are reading any of his great criminal characters . . . we think not so much of the crimes which they commit, as of the ambition, the aspiring spirit,
the intellectual activity which prompts them to overleap these moral fences. (pp. 291, 297)

What troubled Lamb (1936) was the dull literalism of early nineteenth-century stagecraft, especially in the staging of *King Lear* and *The Tempest* (298, 301). The short modern-day response to Lamb is in a remark by Peter Brook in *The Shifting Point*, “Who said that Shakespeare laid down that in a staging of Lear you have to see a poor old man tottering with a stick into the storm?” Anyone who has ever seen a *Lear* directed by, or acted in, by the late Sir Laurence Olivier will attest to the truth of Brook’s remark. Shakespearean stagecraft has become now a showcase of imagination in the hands of directors such as Peter Brook, Liviu Ciulei, and Laurence Olivier. These directors, and their acting companies, have restored the theater magic which Shakespeare had intended for his plays. At the same time, back now to the irony of Shakespeare’s literary fame, all this has given a renewed credence to Lamb’s opinion: Shakespeare is today the most widely read playwright of all time. Why?

A Shakespeare play in today’s professional theater is fast-paced. Scenes most likely will have been rearranged, even eliminated altogether, either to have a smoother continuity in the performance or because of time constraints. Performance time of an uncut *Hamlet*, according to Kott (1966), would take a near six hours (p. 58). What this means is that the enjoyment of *Hamlet* in the theater can be sustained indefinitely by a later reading of the play, to borrow from Lamb, as an object of meditation. A few examples in elaboration.

Act V of *Hamlet* opens with a long scene set in a churchyard where two gravediggers—Shakespeare calls them clowns—are making ready Ophelia’s grave. Most professional productions of the play cut the scene as close to Hamlet’s “Alas poor Yorick” speech as dramaturgic license will permit. A cut beyond “poor Yorick” is not acceptable to a Shakespeare audience; so familiar is this speech the world over. Unhappily, what gets to be cut also is a sampling of how Shakespeare has used humor—comic relief—in his darkest tragedy. First with a bit of gallows humor:
Then here is Shakespeare poking fun at his fellow English. Hamlet returns from England where he was sent, after he had killed Polonius, to recover from a presumed onset of madness. On encountering the gravediggers, who do not recognize him, the following exchange transpires:

Hamlet: Ay, marry, why was he [Hamlet] sent into England?
Clown: Why, because a' was mad: a' shall recover his wits there; or, if a' do not, 'tis no great matter there.
Hamlet: Why?
Clown: 'Twill not be seen in him there; there the men are as mad as he.

A riveting memento mori often is lost in performance and in which, as in the painting “The Ambassadors” by Hans Holbein the Younger referenced earlier in Part I, a skull is the symbol. Before Hamlet takes in hand Yorick’s skull, he picks up several others the gravediggers had unearthed. Holding one such, Hamlet says:

There’s another. Why may not that be the skull of a lawyer: Where be his quiddities now, his quillities, his cases, his tenures, and his tricks? Why does he suffer this mad knave now to knock him about the sconce with a dirty shovel, and will not tell him of his action of battery?

To retrieve such play cuts for the enhancement of a Shakespeare experience in theater is reason enough for reading, but Brook’s (1987) judgment of Shakespeare as playwright is by far more compelling:

I think that one of the things that is very little understood about Shakespeare is that he is not only of a different quality, he is also
different in kind. So long as one thinks that Shakespeare is just Ionesco but better, Beckett but richer, Brecht but more human, Chekhov with crowds, and so on, one is not touching what it’s all about. (p.75)

One’s own discovery of “what it’s all about” in Shakespeare, for the reason given by Brook, requires reading and re-reading in the plays. A first discovery will be that he is fathomless. Goethe’s earlier quoted *Shakespeare und kein Ende* will be proven a non-hyperbolic essay title. Also early will come the discovery of how amazingly contemporary Shakespeare can be. Once the initial effort at discovery is made, Shakespeare’s dramatic verse will jump-start the imagination because he expected the collaboration of projective imagination from his audience. In *Henry V*, as example, the play begins with a prologue, spoken by a single-voice Chorus, in which Shakespeare invokes the fired-up imagination of his audience. Chorus imparts to the audience that “this wooden O”---Globe Theater—could not otherwise present this epic play convincingly, “O for a Muse of fire that would ascend/The brightest heaven of invention,” and in act III, Chorus again, “… eke out our performance with your mind”33

*The Tempest* in which Prospero has to be believable when he says, “graves at my command/Have waked their sleepers,” and *A Midsummer-Night’s Dream*, in which Puck tells the audience at the end, “That you have but slumbered: ere, /While these visions did appear,” cannot be staged without a Muse of fire in the audience. The storm in Act III of *King Lear* has to convey the menace of a performing presence, or else it is just a spell of bad weather. Can this be accomplished on stage without projective imagination in the audience? Likewise, a Muse of fire is needed for the reading of a Shakespeare play. The task of connecting in the mind’s own “wooden O” what is read with “present-day consciousness” is an exercise of the imagination.33 And this manner of connecting in the imagination, called by Psychology excogitation, is exactly the habit-of-mind which Chester Barnard has urged for the attainment of “moral creativeness” in executive process. For barnard (1971), it will be recalled from Part IV earlier, “the sensing of the organization as a whole” is a leadership skill of an aesthetic nature. “It is,” as he has put
it, "a matter of art rather than science, and is aesthetic rather than logical" (p. 235). Here is the rub exactly! Where, and how, in administrative preparation is this skill of "sensing the organization" following Barnard, to be learned?

"Sensing," quintessentially is an exercise of imagination in administrative leadership. Its nurturing, therefore, has to be integrated with professional preparation. The problem is that preparation programs in administration, whose intellectual moorage largely is in social science/behavioral science epistemology, tend to emphasize positivist linearity in habits of the mind. But Barnard's "sensing" is a "a matter of art rather than science," and there is very little of this "art" in process-oriented instruction. Barnard's additament, therefore, could well have been, O for a Muse of fire in the preparation for leadership in all fields of administration.

10

Quiet Time with Shakespeare

Program incentives to self-direct one's reading in Shakespeare is one pathway to the Muse of fire in preparation programs. Its value for administrative leadership can be both instrumental and gratifyingly personal. Insofar as it enlarges "sensing" capacity—say imagination—in administrative process it is instrumental, but it can be also as an elixir for Ciardi's "unkissed imagination." There is fun in discoveries of how close to modern-day life Shakespeare can be once he is corrected with present-day consciousness.

A good place to start is with the expressiveness of everyday English speech for which Shakespeare is the source. The following frequently heard expressions have been plucked at random mostly from earlier cited plays. Act and scene markings in this section are withheld deliberately in the interest of advancing self-discovery: "fancy-free" and "cheek by jowl" (A Midsummer-Night's Dream), "milksop" and "pitchers have ears" (Richard III), "green-eyed monster" (Othello), "thereby hangs a tale" (As You Like It), "razor's edge"
(Love's Labour's Lost), “brave new world” and “struck to the quick” (The Tempest), “fame is the spur” (Richard II), “an itching palm” and “the quick and dead” (Hamlet), “star crossed lovers” and “time out of mind” (Romeo and Juliet), “nothing in his life/Became him like the leaving it” (Macbeth), and much, much more.

Many who know of the westward expansion of the United States from movies believe “westward-ho!” was the command for “forward” invented by a John Wayne-type wagon master on the frontier. Not so, look for it in Twelfth Night. Discover in A Midsummer-Night’s Dream the source of the names Jack and Jill in the nursery rhyme by the same name, “Jack shall have Jill;/Nought shall go ill;” and the source of “pickled,” now a familiar synonym... for being drunk, is The Tempest:

Alonso: Is not this Stephano my drunken butler?

Sebastian: He is drunk now. Where had he wine?

Alonso: And Trinculo is reeling ripe. Where should they Find this grand liquor that hat gilded ‘em? How can’st thou in this pickle?

Trinculo: I have been in such a pickle, since I saw you last, that I fear me will never out of my bones.

Likewise, the word “panderer” was given its modern-day meaning by Shakespeare in Troilus and Cressida; a play whose source might have been Chaucer’s poem of the same name. The meaning is in the following lines of prose spoken by Pandarus:

... let all pitiful goers-between be called to the world’s end after my name; call them all Pandars; let all constant men be Troiluses, all false women Cressidas, and all brokers-between Pandars!

Then there is fun in the instant recognition of geflügelte Worte in Shakespeare; a German term, Levin (1959) explains, for “those winged words literature coins and men live by” (p. 11). These words
become lifetime residents of the mind and the Shakespeare canon is filled with them. A handful as examples:

"And so, from hour to hour, we ripe and ripe, /And then, from hour to hour, we rot and rot;/And thereby hangs a tale" (As You Like It). "There is a tide in the affairs of men,/Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;" (Julius Caesar). "The web of life is a mingled yarn, good and ill together." (Troilus and Cressida). "The quality of mercy is not strain'd/It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven/Upon the place beneath: it is twice blest;/It blesseth him that gives and him that takes:" (The Merchant of Venice). "An honest tale speeds best being plainly told" (Richard III), "False face must hide what false heart doth know" (Macbeth), "Thieves for their robbery have authority/When judges steal themselves" (Measure for Measure), and perhaps the best known of all (Hamlet):

Neither a borrower nor a lender be,
For loan oft loses both itself and friend,
And borrowing dulls the edge of husbandry.
This above all, to thine own self be true,
And it must follow, as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.

Another gratification likely to follow from a quiet time with Shakespeare is an echoing in the storehouse of the mind. "The mark of creative imagination in the arts," writes W. T. Jones (1967), "is the capacity to condense feeling into ever new and fruitful metaphors, which have expressive power because they evoke old echoes in new contexts" (p. 205). A few illustrations in Shakespeare of such "old echoes in new contexts."

In the film "Fiddler on the Roof" there is a scene in which long-time married Tevya and his wife Golda retire for the night. Following a brief silence, and in a faint light, Golda in a soft voice asks, "Do you love me?" Tevya is nonplussed by the question. "What a question is this from a woman who has been married all these years and whose own daughter is about to be married?" is Tevya's evasive response. Golda will not put it off. A few seconds later she asks again, "Do you love me?" Again, an evasive response from Tevya. Connect now this
experience at the movies with the scene which begins *Antony and Cleopatra*.

The watch guards express their contempt for Antony because, recall from before, "The triple pillar of the world" has been transformed into "a strumpet's fool." Antony and Cleopatra now enter the public space of the royal palace from their trysting place:

Cleopatra: If it be love indeed, tell me how much.

Antony: There's beggary in the love that can be reckoned.

Cleopatra: I'll set a bourn how far to be beloved.

Antony: Then must thou needs find out a new heaven, new earth.

A messenger enters at this point with news from Rome and the exchange ends abruptly. In the storehouse of the mind, however, there is an echoic sound. An Egyptian Queen and a milk farmer's wife in a Russian village, separated by oceans of time, have the same non-rational need of a partner's reassurance in a committed relationship. Both get like evasive responses.

In *King Lear*, it will be recalled, the Fool says to Lear chidingly "Thou shouldst not have been old till thou hadst been wise." The Fool's reproachful words echo anew in these words from a biography of the late Herbert von Karajan, long-time conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic, "He doesn't understand people—doesn't trust the people he should trust. He is seventy-five but he does not have the wisdom of an older man" (Vaughan, 1986, p. 81). One is a literary echo of the other.

Very much in present-day consciousness is the evangelical preacher on television done in by scandal. Does the following from *Hamlet* produce an echoic sound in the mind's storehouse?:

Do not, as some ungracious pastors do
Show me the steep and thorny way to heaven,
Whiles, like a puffed and reckless libertine,
Himself the primrose path of dalliance treads
And reeks not his own rede [advice].
Likewise, present in all human consciousness of this age is the prospect of nuclear war. Much has been written by both scientists and humanists of its unthinkable consequences. Here is a hint of this horror in verse from *The Tempest*:

The cloud-cappe’d towers [skyscrapers?], the gorgeous palaces, 
The solemn temples, the great globe itself, 
Yea, all which it inherit shall dissolve, 
And, like this insubstantial pagent [life?] faded, 
Leave not a rack behind.

Did Shakespeare of the early 1600s actually have a nuclear winter in mind when he wrote these lines? Of course not. These lines are from Prospero’s speech following a masque—a fantasy entertainment—which he had conjured up in celebration of his daughter’s wedding. Such ambiguities in Shakespeare’s dramatic verse are old echoes given a modern-day relevance. And to deal imaginatively with ambiguity in Shakespeare is to do what iconographic interpretation does in art criticism. Recall, as example, the reference to Raphael’s “The School of Athens” in Part IV earlier, or look to the Libyan sibyl in Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel masterwork for the way excogitative imagination will find fresh meaning in aesthetic ambiguity.

Still another source of fun with Shakespeare is to encounter in his dramatic verse tantalizing allusions to familiar concepts in the sociology of formal organization. And this is more likely to happen with the plays as “objects of meditation” in reading, Lamb’s expression earlier, than in a performance. Because Shakespeare’s plays in professional theater are fast-paced, what might sound as a throwaway line on stage will in a reading of the same line give it a fresh meaning. An illustration from *Hamlet*.

A key concept of role theory has been stated by Barnard (1971) in the following two sentences, “By definition there can be no organization without persons. However . . . it is not persons, but the services or acts or action or influences of persons, which should be treated as constituting organization . . .” (p. 83). Surely this cognitive abstraction is, or ought to be, by this time with the capital goods of all
programs in administrative preparation. It is, as was indicated in Part II earlier, Barnard's explication of the role-personality model. Is not the following fast-paced exchange in *Hamlet* a complaisant echo of Barnard?

Hamlet has slain Polonius. King Claudius directs Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to ascertain from Hamlet where he had hid the body:

Rosencrantz: My lord, you must tell us where the body is and go with us to the King.

Hamlet: The body is with the King, but the King is not with the body. The King is a thing—[throw-away line?]

Guildenstern: A thing, my Lord?

Another illustration. A pivotal concept in Talcott Parsons' General Theory of Action is "the pattern-variables." These are five pairs of matched opposite value orientations available to an actor in a given formal interaction with another. The actor's dilemma is in having to choose from these polarized matches the one value orientation which is to be maximized in the relationship. Both values of a pattern-variable cannot be maximized at the same time in a given formally structured ego-alter relationship. What a surprise to encounter an allusion to the same idea in the following lines from *King Lear*.

Lear and his daughter Cordelia have been captured by Edmund and he wants them imprisoned forthwith. He commands a captain whom he suspects might be "tender-minded" to escort them to prison and there kill them. Cordelia's death is to be staged as a suicide:

Edmund: Come hither, captain; hark.
One step I have advanced thee; if thou dost
As this instructs thee, thou dost make thy way
To noble fortunes: know thou this, that men
Are as the time is [ego's situational need]: to be tender-minded
Does not become a word [soldier]: thy great employment
Will not bear question [discussion]; either say thou 'It do't,
Or thrive by other means.

Captain: I’ll do it, my lord.

Edmund: About it; and write happy when th’ hast done.
Mark; I say, instantly, and carry it so [Cordelia’s faked suicide]
As I have set it down.

Likewise, can anyone who knows primary group theory fail to recognize Charles Horton Cooley’s “looking-glass self” metaphor in the following exchange between Ulysses and Achilles in *Troilus and Cressida*?:

Achilles: What are you reading?

Ulysses: A strange fellow here
Wraps me: “That man, how dearly ever parted,
How much in having, or without or in,
Cannot make boast to have that which he hath,
Nor feels not what he owes, but by reflection;
As when his virtues shining upon others
Heat them, and they retort that heat again
To the first giver.”

Achilles: This is not strange, Ulysses.
The beauty that is borne here in the face
The bearer knows not, but commends itself
To others’ eyes: nor doth the eye itself,
That most pure spirit of sense, behold itself,
Not going from itself; but eye to eye opposed
Salutes each other with each other’s form:

Elsewhere in *Troilus and Cressida* Hector says to Troilus, “‘tis mad idolatry/To make the service greater than the god.” Where in English letters is better stated this ever present latent moral snare in human enterprise: a reversal of means and ends values? Last, Bamard (1971) labors in nearly one full page of text to illustrate the multiple roles of an individual in society, but Jacques in *As You Like
It does it in four lines (pp. 71-72):  

All the world's a stage,  
And all the men and women merely players:  
They have their exists and their entrances;  
And one man in his time plays many parts . . . .

Shakespeare did not of course have sociological theory in mind when he wrote dialogue for his characters. His dramatic verse has the ring of sociological truth, even as it has the ring of psychological truth, because he had grafted his dramatic art with insights drawn from a fathomless intuition of what is human—Ciardi's words again. Elizabethan archaism notwithstanding, the reverberant truth of this art has been the entertainment delight of generations. He seems especially to have been taken with the range of human variability. Indeed, human variability connects all his plays—tragedies, comedies, romances—as a recurring theme. He was drawn to the works of Montaigne and Machiavelli because their ideas opened new vistas on human variability. And in Machiavelli's conception of political power, Shakespeare also found behavior models for his tetralogy: Richard II, Henry IV 1, 2, Henry V. Indeed, Machiavelli's influence in these plays—called the Renaissance—is so strong, it is instructive to read them with The Prince close at hand.

Shakespeare's Two Machiavellian Princes

It is altogether understandable why Shakespeare, actor-turned-playwright, should have been attracted to Machiavelli. Quite apart from what the latter had to say about human behavior in the body politic, two other cogent explanations inform this attraction: Machiavelli's outrageous reputation in the popular culture of Shakespeare's time, and his conception of political power in The Prince. Machiavelli's bad reputation was a heaven-sent gift for Shakespeare's
budding career as playwright. His first works were English chronicle plays; the reign of Henry VI, and of which he had a hand in the doctoring of Part I. He wrote Henry VI, 2 and 3 by himself.

Henry VI of history became king when he was less than a year old—"in infant bands crowned King/Of France and England"—following the reign of his father, Henry V, hero of Agincourt. His reign was long—1422-61 and 1470-71—but it was made turbulent by dynastic struggles for the throne of England between the noble houses of Lancaster, whose badge was a white rose, and York, whose badge was a red rose. These struggles, on and off, lasted for thirty years—1455-85—and is known to history as Wars of the Roses.42

It is a dramatic reconstruction of these episodic struggles for political power in fifteenth-century England that forms the story-line of Henry VI, 1, 2, 3. Richard of Gloucester, brother to King Edward IV, and later himself crowned as Richard III, is a key villain in these plays. Shakespeare has portrayed him as having a hunch back and a withered arm. There is no historical evidence for any of this, but he had been portrayed as deformed in earlier plays—The True Tragedie of Richard the Third by an unknown author and Richard Crookback attributed to Ben Jonson—and these physical attributes were a good fit for a character whom Shakespeare intended as the embodiment of evil in pursuit of a crown.

The popular stereotype of a Machiavellian ruler was for Shakespeare a ready-made model for the character of King Richard III. He had laid a foundation for Richard's character in Henry VI, 3 when, as Duke of Gloucester, he had him soliloquize his intention "to get the crown" by identifying himself with "the murderous Machiavel." So when Richard, still as Duke of Gloucester, moved stage-front in Richard III to celebrate the restoration of his brother Edward IV and he delivered the first lines of the play in the soliloquy, "Now is the winter of our discontent/Made glorious summer by this sun of York," Shakespeare's audience knew him instantly as a menacing presence.

In the popular entertainment of Elizabethan theater, a Machiavellian prince was a certified master of villainous strategies, a manipulator, a wearer of masks. Elizabethans most likely went on automatic pilot with their fantasy upon hearing "Machiavelli," in the
same way as do fans of Sherlock Holmes today—Baker Street Irregulars—upon hearing “Dr. Moriarity,” or movie-goers of the 1930s-40s upon hearing “Dr. Fu Manchu.” Of this reflexive popular response to Machiavelli’s reputation in Elizabethan England, Felix Raab (1964) has written, “He horrified them, instructed them, entertained them—in fact he affected them over the whole attraction/repulsion spectrum through which basically new concepts are often seen in times of rapid social change” (p. 67).43

The character of Richard, Earl of Gloucester, in Henry VI, 3 was just too juicy with entertainment potential to let go. It is patently clear that Shakespeare already had in mind another play in which the physically deformed Earl would take the crown as Richard III. In Machiavelli’s bad reputation, Shakespeare had a ready model for the character and in the story-line of Richard III he had a continuity with Henry VI. The death of Richard III on Bosworth Field—1485—at the hands of Henry, Earl of Richmond, who then succeeded Richard to the throne as Henry VII, ended the Wars of the Roses. Richard’s last words in the play are, “A horse! a horse! my kingdom for a horse!”44

Shakespeare had his hoped for stage success with Richard III. To repeat from before, he wanted a character in whose stage presence the audience would connect instantly in their recollection of political assassinations both at home as well as on the continent, and in Richard he had created such a character. “Richard the Third,” Chute (1949) has written, “was a very popular villain with Englishmen…” (p. 172). In actual fact, however, “murderous Machiavel” is an undeserved term of obloquy Shakespeare had laid on the real Machiavelli.

He was no “murderous Machiavel” in his private life nor in his conception of political power. He was a family man, of the faith—Catholic—all his life, and for twenty of his fifty-eight years he was in government service with the Republic of Florence. He acquitted himself with distinction in this service. When a political upheaval in 1512 forced him into retirement to an inherited home in the country, he devoted the last fifteen years of life to quiet reflection, to what today is called library research, and to writing.

Driving this scholarly activity was the ongoing political turbulence in Renaissance Italy, known to history as the Italian Wars, 1494-
1529. The ultimate solution to this political instability, Machiavelli concluded, was in a pragmatic ruler free of the theosophically-derived moral code and with a will to use power as an instrument of state policy. *The Prince* and its companion work *Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy* are vulnerable to grotesque distortion when they are read apart from this historical background.

*The Prince* was written as a pragmatic handbook for acquiring and retaining political power. It also is an empirical work, developed methodologically in historical survey and participant-observation data. The latter data were generated fortuitously when Machiavelli was sent on diplomatic missions to Italian and foreign courts. He was a keen observer and he kept notes. As an objective thinker, he wrote, “Kingdoms known to history have been governed in two ways: either by a prince and his servants, who, as ministers by his grace and permission, assist in governing the realm; or by a prince and by barons, who hold their positions not by favour of the ruler but by antiquity of blood” (Machiavelli, 1940, p. 15). However, he concluded, the breaking down of traditional authority in feudal Europe had changed all that.

He conceived instead of the state as an organic entity, as a law unto itself, and the morality of statecraft as something apart from a theosophic morality. Machiavelli did not gainsay the imperative of moral virtue in private life. Quite the contrary, he urged the ruling prince to encourage moral virtues in the civil population and to show himself in outward appearance as virtuous. But in the conduct of statecraft, when to do otherwise would imperil the safety of the state, a ruling prince is not bound by the moral constraints of others. A resort to fraud and cruelty, therefore, is permitted to the prince when their use is necessary in statecraft.

His singular preoccupation was with the safety of the state and the well-being of its people, and these he held up as virtues having a morality of their own. And because the ultimate moral responsibility of the prince is to the safety and prosperity of the state, *kindness as well as cruelty* can be a virtue or a vice.

He elaborated on this argument with an empirical illustration. Cesare Borgia, ruler of Romagna, was considered cruel, but his
cruelty united that city-state and brought it to "peace and fealty." The
Florentines, in contrast, wanted to avoid the stigma of cruelty in their
state policy and allowed a province to be destroyed. "A prince,
therefore, must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the
purpose of keeping his subjects united and faithful . . . ." And more:

I know that everyone will admit that it would be highly praiseworthy in
a prince to possess all the . . . qualities that are reputed good, but as they
cannot all be possessed . . ., human conditions not permitting of it, it is
necessary that he should be prudent enough to avoid the scandal of those
vices which would lose him the state . . . . And yet he must not mind
incurring the scandal of those vices without which it would be difficult
to save the state, for if one considers well, it will be found that some
things which seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one's ruin, and
some others which appear vices result in one's greater security and
well-being. (Machiavelli, 1940, p. 81)

It is just this dilemma in the conduct of statecraft which has
challenged moral philosophy since publication of The Prince. Isaiah
Berlin in his touchstone essay, "The Originality of Machiavelli," has
attributed this dilemma in valuing to Machiavelli's juxtaposition of
"two incompatible moral worlds:"

Few would deny that Machiavelli's writings, more particularly
The Prince, have scandalised mankind more deeply and continuously
than any other political treatise. The reason for this . . . is not the
discovery that politics is the play of power—that political relationships
between and within independent communities involve the use of force
and fraud, and are unrelated to the principles professed by the players.
That knowledge is as old as conscious thought about politics—certainly
as old as Thucydides and Plato . . . .

Far more original, as has often been noted, is Machiavelli's
divorce of political behaviour as a field of study from the theological
world-picture in terms of which this topic is discussed before him . . .
and after him. Yet it is not his secularism, however audacious in his day,
that could have disturbed the contemporaries of Voltaire or Bentham or
their successors. What shocked them is something different.

Machiavelli's cardinal achievement is . . . his uncovering of an
insoluble dilemma, the planting of a permanent question mark in the
path of posterity. It stems from his de facto recognition that ends
equally ultimate, equally sacred, may contradict each other, that entire
systems of value may come into collision without possibility of rational
arbitration, and that not merely in exceptional circumstances, as a
result of abnormality or accident or error—the clash of Antigone and
Creon or in the story of Tristan—but (this was surely new) as part of the
norma: human situation. ([italic added] Berlin, 1979, pp. 78, 74-75)48

The Prince was written in 1513, but not printed until 1532. It was
put on the Index in 1557 when the latter was established by papal
authority as an instrument of the Counter Reformation. Both in
intellectual mien and in its content, the book was in a full confronta-
tion with the Catholic Church in matters of moral secular rule and of
the legitimation of rulers: the juxtaposition of “two incompatible
moral worlds.” Once the work had been anathematized by the
Church, Machiavelli himself became fair game to calumny. “The
Jesuits of Ingoldstadt,” Spencer has written, “burnt him in effigy; to
Cardinal Pole he was obviously inspired by the devil . . . . , the
Protestants considered his ideas directly ressponsible for the massacre
of St. Bartholomew” (Spencer, 1942, p. 44). So by the time
Shakespeare had turned playwright, a mere generation after The
Prince had been proscribed by the Church, Machiavellian comment-
tary in popular culture, more often garbled and in dark tonalities, was
at its zenith. Robert Greene, he of the splenetic attack on Shakespeare
in 1592 from his deathbed, provides an illustration which is represen-
tative:

Why, Prince, it is no murder in a king,
To end another’s life to save his own:
For you are not as common people be,
Who die and perish with a few men’s tears;
But if you fail, the state doth whole default,
The realm is rent in twain in such a loss. (Smith, 1967, p. 46)

Richard III was Shakespeare’s first smash play. As a mark of its
success it is significant that Richard III was the first playbook of a
Shakespeare play to show his name as author. He was always on the
lookout for a good story to dramatize, and there in the popular
imagination of Elizabethan London was the bogey-man fantasy of a
"murderous Machiavel."

Such a sense of what Shakespeare was up to harkens back to Harry Levin's earlier guiding admonition, "The theater is always his main habitation; from it we depart at our own risk and to it we return for the most appropriate criteria." Levin's guiding counsel at this juncture provides perspective to the historical disorder in which Shakespeare's chronicle plays were written. Had he written them in true historical sequence, they would have come along in the following order: Richard II (King, 1377-99), Henry IV, 1, 2, (King, 1399-1413), Henry V (King, 1413-22), Henry VI, 1, 2, 3 (King, 1422-61, 1470-71), Richard III (King, 1483-85). But, to repeat, Shakespeare was not writing history. He was a fledgling playwright who, after helping other writers with Henry VI, 1 went on to write Henry VI, 2, 3. And in the dramatis personae of these chronicle plays was the physically deformed Yorkist, Richard, waiting for Shakespeare to make him king. He did make him king in Richard III. But Shakespeare's Richard III was not the Renaissance ruler of Machiavelli's The Prince, his Henry V was.

Shakespeare's audience first had encountered Henry on stage in Henry IV, 1 as Hal, Prince of Wales. Here he is a scapegrace, a keeper of bad companions, among whom is Falstaff, and he is not above acts of brigandage for the sport of it. He and Falstaff are first-name friends. Shakespeare wanted his audience to know this early in the play and so the following exchange (I, ii):

Falstaff: Hal, what time of day is it, lad?

Prince: Thou art so fat-witted, with drinking of old sac and unbottoning thee after supper and sleeping upon benches after noon, that thou hast forgotten to demand that truly which thou wouldst truly know. What a devil hast thou to do with the time of the day?

Shakespeare had a dramaturgic reason for showing the audience early on Hal's character and life-style. He already had in mind another play in which the undisciplined heir-apparent would be transformed
into a strong ruler upon becoming Henry V. As his father the King, *Henry IV, 2*, is breathing his last, and is rebuking his son’s wild ways, Hal vows he will change (IV, v):

> God witness with me, when I here came in,
> And found no course of breath within your majesty,
> How cold it struck my heart! If I do feign,
> O, let me in my present wildness die,
> And never live to show the incredulous world
> The noble change that I have purposed!

Upon becoming Henry V, the one-time scapegrace reveals at once to “the incredulous world” the “noble change” within him. In the last scene of *Henry IV, 2* he encounters Falstaff in the presence of the Chief Justice. Nothing has changed in Falstaff’s perception of his relationship with Hal. Although he is now King, Falstaff greets him as follows (V, v):

Falstaff:    God save thee, my sweet boy!
King:       My lord chief justice, speak to that vain man.
Chief Justice:  Have you your wits? know you what 'tis you speak?
Falstaff:    My king! my Jove, I speak to thee, my heart!
King:       I know thee not, old man: fall to they prayers;
            How ill white hairs become a fool and jester!

Having so demonstrated publicly his “noble change” in *Henry IV, 2*, Henry is even more convincing in *Henry V*. The Archbishop of Canterbury sees in Henry’s change the return of the biblical prodigal son. He says to the Bishop of Ely at the beginning of *Henry V* (I, i):

> The course of his youth promised it not.
> The breath no sooner left his father’s body
> But that his wildness, mortified in him,
> Seemed to die too. Yea, at that very moment
> Consideration like an angel came
And whipped th' offending Adam out of him,
Leaving his body as a paradise
T'envelop and contain celestial spirits.

Such perceptions of his “noble change” in the church was of
great advantage to the new king who was eager to follow his father’s
counsel, given from the deathbed, “to busy giddy minds/With foreign
quarrels.” His father’s reign had been troubled by rebellions. Henry
V, in the manner of Machiavelli’s precept that nothing brings a prince
into greater respect than the undertaking of great enterprises, follows
his father’s counsel by moving strategically to reopen a long dormant
quarrel with France and thereby bring unity to his realm. First,
however, he needed unshakable bonafides. With the piety of a “noble
change,” he asks the Archbishop of Canterbury to ascertain the
legitimacy of his cause (Henry V, I, ii):

My learned lord, we pray you to proceed
And justly and religiously unfold
Why the Law Salique that they have in France
Or should, or should not, bar us in our claim:
And God forbid, my dear and faithful lord.
That you should fashion, wrest, or bow your reading,
Or nicely charge your understanding soul
With opening titles miscreate, whose right
Suits not in native colours with the truth;
For God doth know how many now in health
Shall drop their blood in approbation
Of what your reverence shall incite us to.

Shakespeare’s Henry V is a strong Renaissance ruler. He also is
a Machiavellian wearer of masks, a master of strategems, but with
none of the grotesqueries of his Richard III. Richard’s cruelty is self-
serving. No legitimizing social value, such as Machiavelli’s “safety
of the state” or “prosperity of the people” is invoked by Richard in
justification of his cruelty. He ascends the throne and, first thing, he
beckons Buckingham, who had been his stalking-horse in villainy, to
approach him (Richard III, IV, ii):
King Richard: Give me thy hand.

Thus high, by thy advice
And thy assistance, is king Richard seated:
But shall we wear these honours for a day?
Or shall they last, and we rejoice in them?

Richard’s young nephew, Edward, the rightful heir to the throne, lives and he asks Buckingham to arrange for his murder. This is the point in Richard’s question, “But shall we wear these honours for a day?”

The character of Richard III actually is Shakespeare’s anti-model of Machiavelli’s ruler, whereas his Henry V is a strong ruler crafted in the paradigm of The Prince. Shakespeare shows this influence of Machiavelli when Prince Hal had just succeeded to the throne upon the death of his father and the Chief Justice greets him with, “Good morrow, and God save your majesty!” The erstwhile scapegrace responds and acknowledges his responsibility to the stewardship of rule. (Henry IV, 2, V, ii):

King: This new and gorgeous garment, majesty,
Sits not so easy on me as you think.

* * * * * * * *

For me, by heaven, I bid you be assured,
I’ll be your father and your brother too;
Let me bear your love, I’ll bear your cares:

Had Shakespeare actually read Machiavelli in the interval between Richard III and his second tetralogy of English history plays? No one can say for certain. He may have plowed through the at-times ponderous underbrush of The Prince. Shakespeare, after all, was a quick study with the autodidact’s passion for reading. More likely, given his work-packed twenty years in the theater, he had learned of Machiavelli’s mindscape from John Florio; the emigré Italian linguist who, it will be remembered, had translated Montaigne and Machiavelli and who was in the Earl of Southampton’s circle. “In Southampton’s immediate circle,” writes a Shakespeare biographer, “Shakespeare was certain to be acquainted with Florio; if he needed
anything for the Italian coloring of his plays there was a source of information at hand” (Rowse, 1963, p. 220). Howsoever he got to now Machiavelli’s writings, it is certain that Shakespeare’s own conception of political power had turned more sophisticated in the interim (Spencer, 1942, p. x).

*Richard II*, 1596, dramatizes the demise of medieval kingship and with it the myth of a divine right in rule. Before Richard is deposed by his cousin Henry Bolingbroke, he turns psychologically toward his medieval heritage for a reassurance of his right to the throne (*Richard II*, III, ii):

King Richard: Not all the waters in the rough rude sea
Can wash the balm off from an anointed king;
The breath of worldly men cannot depose,
The deputy elected by the Lord:
For every man that Bolingbroke hath press’d
To lift shrewd steel against our golden crown,
God for his Richard hath in heavenly pay
A glorious angel: then, if angels fight,
Weak men must fall, for heaven still guards the right.

No angels materialize to save Richard’s crown. Machiavelli would have adjudged him a weak ruler. He made powerful enemies—Bolingbroke for one—but failed to protect himself against them. He used his kingdom indulgently in the belief it was a personal possession. His dying aged uncle, John of Gaunt, reproached him for having exploited the kingdom, (II, i) “Landlord of England art thou now, not king.” At the end of *Richard II*, but now as a deposed monarch imprisoned in Pomfret Castle, Richard acknowledges lamentably his failed stewardship (V, v), “I wasted time, now doth time waste me.”

A weak king is dethroned under duress and murdered in *Richard II*. The promise of a strong ruler in his successor is dramatized in the two parts of *Henry IV*. Henry IV has just been crowned when he demonstrates—*Richard II*, V, iv, vi—in the oblique manner in which he has Richard murdered a talent for the “plausible denial” which modern-day statecraft has developed into an art and which in *The Prince* is called deception. But the fulfillment of this promise is enervated by uprisings—“inward wars”—in Wales and Scotland.
But his son, as Henry V, is Shakespeare's full-drawn dramatization of Machiavelli's ruler.

He is cruel, in Machiavelli's sense, when he has to be for the safety of the state. He consents to the execution of Bardolph, one of his drinking cronies in the "greener days," because he was caught stealing from a church in occupied Harfleur. Had he not given his consent, then Henry's pietistic invocations in preparation for, and after, the French campaign would have been drained of credibility. After Henry's great victory at Agincourt, he pronounces "God fought for us" (Henry V, IV, viii):

Come, go we in procession to the village:
And be it death proclaimed through our host
To boast of this, or take praise from God
Which is his only.

To three treason-charged nobles he says before they are executed, (Henry V, II, ii), "Touching our person, seek we no revenge, / But we our kingdom's safety must so tender, /Whose ruin you have sought that to her laws/We do deliver you." To the governor of a French town under siege by the English, he issues the following harsh ultimatum (Henry V, III, iii):

King: How yet resolves the governor of the town?
This is the latest parle we will admit:
Therefore to our best mercy give you selves,
Or, like to men proud of destruction,
Defy us to our worst; for, as I am a soldier,
A name that in my thoughts becomes me best,
If I begin the batt'ry once again,
I will not leave the half-achieved Harfleur
Till in her ashes she lie buried.
The gates of mercy shall be all shut up,
And the fleshed soldier, rough and hard of heart,
In liberty of bloody hand shall range
With conscience wide as hell, mowing like grass
Your fresh fair virgins and your flow'ring infants.

Shakespeare has other characters in Henry V attest to Henry's strong rule. Exeter, for example, responds to the Dauphin's demean-
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ing reference to Henry’s wastrel youth—his “greener days”—(II, iv), “Now he weighs time/Even to the utmost grain.” Shakespeare uses time here as a metaphor for the strong ruler, as he has in Richard II for the weak ruler: recall Richard’s lament, “I wasted time, now do I see waste me.” And throughout the dramatic landscape of these four plays is the imprint of Machiavelli. As has been suggested before, it is instructive to read them with The Prince close at hand.

Machiavelli in his time had looked political reality openly in the face and of what was there he wrote in The Prince. That which in his vision had shocked Elizabethan sensibilities is the nitty-gritty of what a later age will call Realpolitik. Shocked they may have been, but practice Machiavellian statecraft they did:

The success of the Tudors [Henry IV-VIII, Elizabeth I] was a triumph in the application of a Machiavellian view of leadership, whether they would acknowledge it under that name or not—and there is ample evidence of the approving familiarity men in Tudor English public life had with Machiavelli, despite their official opposition to his name and ideas. (Manheim, 1973, p. 2)

Of course, most underbrush in The Prince now is obsolescent. In Machiavelli’s mindscape, however, is an early grounding of modern-day political science, a forerunner to the Hobbesian question of how order and individualism are reconciled in society, and, as the following from the literature of Business Administration indicates, there is also inferential relevance in Machiavelli for administrative leadership:

Machiavelli called his book The Prince, and not something like The Art of Government, because he saw success and failure for states stemming directly from the qualities of the leader. Success and failure for corporations also stem directly from the qualities of their leaders: Management techniques are obviously essential, but what matters is leadership. (Jay, 1968, p. 26)

More to the point of Shakespeare’s aesthetic, Machiavelli wrote of power and Shakespeare wrote “the drama of power” in his history plays.50 The four plays of the Henriad, especially, are in their larger

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trajectory a dramatization of political power as it is laid out in *The Prince*. An illustration of this follows.

Machiavelli has pointed to an endemic dilemma in leadership by asking: Is it better the ruler be loved or feared? His counsel is that it is desirable to be both, but he urges the ruler to cultivate the love and loyalty of his subjects and not to rely entirely on the fear of coercion. Shakespeare's dramatization of this from *The Prince* is one of the high-point scenes in *Henry V*.

The night before the fighting at Agincourt, there is high tension in the English camp. The French outnumber the English 5:1 and they have also superior equipment. Henry in disguise as a soldier of the line, circulates in the camp to learn first-hand the morale disposition of his troops. He comes on a cluster of three foot-soldiers—John Bates, Alexander Court, Michael Williams—and he engages them in conversation. In the course of their exchange, the question of moral responsibility in command arises (IV, i):

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Court: Brother John Bates, is not that the morning which breaks yonder?

Bates: I think it be; but we have no great cause to desire the approach of day.

Williams: We see yonder the beginning of the day, but I think we shall never see the end of it. Who goes there?

King: A friend.

Williams: Under what captain serve you?

King: Under Sir Thomas Erpingham.

Williams: A good old commander and a most kind gentleman. I pray you, what thinks he of our estate?

King: Even as men wracked upon a sand, that look to be washed off the next tide.

Bate: He hath not told his thought to the king?
King: No; nor it is not meet he should. For though I speak it to you, I think the king is but a man, as I am. The violet smells to him as it doth to me; the element shows to him as it doth to me; all his senses have but human conditions. His ceremonies laid by, in his nakedness he appears but a man; and though his affections are higher mounted than ours, yet when they stoop, they stoop with the like wing. Therefore, when he sees reason of fears, as we do, he fears, out of doubt, be of the same relish as ours are. Yet, in reason, no man should possess him with any appearance of fear, lest he, by showing it, should dishearten his army.

Bates: He may show what outward courage he will; but I believe, as cold a night as 'tis, he could wish himself in Thames up to the neck; and so I would he were, and I by him, at all adventures, so we were quit here.

King: By my troth, I will speak my conscience of the king: I think he would not wish himself anywhere but where he is.

Bates: Then I would he were here alone. So should he be sure to be ransomed, and a many poor men's lives saved.

King: I dare say you love him not so ill to wish him here alone, howsoever you speak this to feel other men's minds. Methinks I could not die anywhere so contented as in the king's company, his cause being just and his quarrel honorable.

Williams: That's more than we know.

Bates: Ay. or more than we should seek after, for we know enough if we know we are the king's subjects. If his cause be wrong, our obedience to the king wipes the crime of it out of us.

Williams: But if the cause be not good, the king himself hath a heavy reckoning to make when all those legs and arms and heads, chopped off in a battle, shall join together at the later day and cry all, 'We died at such a place,' some swearing, some crying for a surgeon, some
upon their wives left poor behind them, some upon the
depts they owe, some upon their children rawly left. I
am afeard there are few die well that die in a battle; for
how can they charitably dispose of anything when blood
is their argument? Now, if these men do not die well, it
will be a black matter for the king that led them to it;
who to disobey were against all proportion of subjection.

King:

So, if a son that is by his father sent about merchan-
dise do sinfully miscarry upon the sea, the imputation of
his wickedness, by your rule, should be imposed upon
his father that sent him; or if a servant, under his master's
command transporting a sum of money, be assailed by
robbers and die in many irreconcil'd iniquities, you may
call the business of the master the author of the servant's
damnation. But this is not so. The king is not bound to
answer the particular endings of his soldiers, the father of
his, nor the master of his servant; for they purpose
not their death when they purpose their services. Be-
sides, there is no king, be his cause never so spotless, if it
come to the arbitrement of swords, can try it out with all
unspotted soldiers. Some peradventure have on them
the guilt of premeditated and contrived murder; some,
of beguiling virgins with the broken seals of perjury;
some making the wars their bulwark, that have before
gored the gentle bosom of peace with pillage and rob-
bery. Now, if these men have defeated the law and out-
run native punishment, though they can outstrip men,
they have no wings to fly from God. War is his beadle,
war is his vengeance; so that here men are punished for
before-breath of the king's laws in now the king's quar-
rel. Where they feared the death, they have borne life
away; and where they would be safe, they perish. Then
if they die unprovided, no more is the king guilty of
their damnation than he was before guilty of those im-
pieties for the which they are now visited. Every sub-
ject's duty is the king's, but every subject's soul is his
own. Therefore should every soldier in the wars do as
every sick man in his bed - wash every mote out of his
conscience; and dying so, death is to him advantage; or
not dying, the time was blessedly lost wherein such
preparation was gained; and in him that escapes, it
were not sin to think that, making God so free an offer,
he let him outlive that day to see his greatness and to teach others how they should prepare.

Williams: 'Tis certain, every man that dies ill, the ill upon his own head - the king is not to answer it.

Bates: I do not desire he should answer for me, and yet I determine to fight lustily for him.

King: I myself heard the king say he would not be ransomed.

Williams: Ay, he said so, to make us fight cheerfully; but when our throats are cut, he may be ransomed, and we ne'er the wiser.

King: If I live to see it, I will never trust his word after.

Williams: You pay him then! That's a perilous shot out of an elder-gun that a poor and a private displeasure can do against a monarch! You may as well go about to turn the sun to ice with fanning in his face with a peacock's feather. You'll never trust his word after! Come, 'tis a foolish saying.

King: Your reproof is something too round. I should be angry with you if the time were convenient.

Williams: Let it be a quarrel between us if you live.

King: I embrace it.

Williams: How shall I know thee again?

King: Give me any gage of thine, and I will wear it in my bonnet. Then, if ever thou dar'st acknowledge it, I will make it my quarrel.

Williams: Here's my glove. Give me another of thine.

King: There.

Williams: This will I also wear in my cap. If ever thou
come to me and say, after to-morrow, 'This is my glove,' by this hand, I will take thee a box on the ear.

King: If ever I live to see it, I will challenge it.

Williams: Thou dar'st as well be hanged.

King: Well, I will do it, though I take thee in the king's company.

Williams: Keep thy word. Fare thee well.

Bates: Be friends, you English fools, be friends! We have French quarrels enow, if you could tell how to reckon.

King: Indeed the French may lay twenty French crowns to one they will beat us, for they bear them on their shoulders; but it is no English treason to cut French crowns, and to-morrow the king himself will be a clipper.

Following a reflective analysis of what has transpired in this scene, a fired-up imagination will soon discern inferential connections between it and the following excerpts from the leadership literature in administration.51

Chester I. Barnard (1971):

The creative function as a whole is the essence of leadership. It is the highest test of executive responsibility because it requires for successful accomplishment that element of "conviction" that means identification of personal codes and organization codes in the view of the leader. This is the coalescence that carries "conviction" to the personnel of organization, to that informal organization underlying all formal organization that senses nothing more quickly than insincerity. (p. 281-82)

Peter M. Blau (1964):

The crucial problem for the formal leader, with undeniable power, is to win the loyalty and legitimating approval of subordinates, particularly since his power may tempt him to dominate them instead of winning their respect and willing compliance. (p. 134)
Herbert A. Simon (1961):

How broad is the area of indifference within which a group will continue to follow its leadership? In a very real sense, the leader, or the superior, is merely a bus driver whose passengers will leave him unless he takes them in the direction they wish to go. They leave him only minor discretion as to the road to be followed. (p. 134)

Immediately following the disguised Henry's encounter with the foot-soldiers, the scene ends with a soliloquy by him—"Upon the king! Let us our lives, our souls, /Our debts, our careful wives, /Our children, and our sins, lay on the king!/We must bear all."—in which Shakespeare sheds light on the social value that justifies morally the strong ruler: the well-being of the people. Is there inferential relevance in this also for Chester Barnard's conception of administrative leadership? "O for a Muse of fire, that would ascend/The brightest heaven of invention."

Shakespeare in a Summary Retrospect

Shakespeare left London, 1610, for retirement in Stratford to live as a "gentleman" for six years before he died at age fifty-two. He had acquired wealth, but he also was burned out after twenty years, as Berryman has put it, "of activity hardly by anyone ever paralleled." Berryman (1976) adds, "His memory may have been failing" (p. 83).

His friend and contemporary Ben Jonson lies in Westminster Abbey with the encomium "O Rare Ben Jonson" inscribed over his tomb, whereas Shakespeare lies buried in the church of an English village. Perhaps it could not have been otherwise at that time. As Howard Staunton has written in his preface to The Globe Illustrated Shakespeare, "No other author ever gave up his works to fortune and time with so little care..." Still, this is the Shakespeare who had created "the greatest series of plays and the most wonderful proces-
tion of people that one man has fathered in the history of the world” and who after nearly four centuries after his death is called “our contemporary” (Chute, 1949, p. 294). It is all so enigmatic.

Two writers of Shakespeare criticism are of help. One offers a revealing capsulated account of Shakespeare’s twenty-year career in London theater:

For a while Shakespeare reinvented himself almost every day. He had to; he was an actor. In the Elizabethan repertory system, he might be expected to perform in six different plays on six consecutive days. Many times he would rehearse one play in the morning and perform in another that afternoon. On most days he probably played more than one character; Elizabethan actors doubled, tripled, quadrupled roles, their versatility helping to hold down costs. When he was not acting in plays he was writing them. Like actors, Elizabethan playwrights were encouraged to demonstrate their adaptability. In less than twenty-four months at the turn of the seventeenth century Shakespeare wrote Much adoe about Nothing, The Life of Henry the Fift, The Tragedie of Julius Caesar, As you Like it, and The Tragedie of Hamlet Prince of Denmarke, probably in that order, probably one right after the other. Even before he finished one play he had begun thinking about or even writing the next; toward the end of Henry the Fift he borrowed images from the same pages of Plutarch that he would use as source material for Julius Caesar. As an actor he needed to become only two or three characters per play; as a playwright he had to perform all the parts in his head, momentarily recreating himself in the image of each. He juggled selves. (Taylor, 1989, p. 3)

The other writer, Jorge Luis Borges, also thinks of Shakespeare in the metaphor of “juggled selves.” He calls to mind the aphoristic words of George Santayana (1989), “Words and images are like shells, no less integral parts of nature than are the substances they cover, but better addressed to the eye and more open to observation” (p. 131). In the exquisite poetic portraiture of “Everything and Nothing,” the blind Borges, like Teiresias the perennial “seeing” blind character in classical Greek drama, has a vision of the enigma that is Shakespeare which is clearest of all:
There was no one in him: behind his face . . . and behind his words . . . there was nothing but a bit of cold, a dream not dreamed by anyone. At first he thought that everyone was like himself. But the dismay shown by a comrade to whom he mentioned this vacuity revealed his error to him and made him realize forever that an individual should not differ from the species. At one time it occurred to him that he might find a remedy for his difficulty in books, and so he learned the "small Latin, and less Greek," of which a contemporary spoke. Later, he considered he might find what he sought in carrying out one of the elemental rites of humanity, and so he let himself be initiated by Anne Hathaway in the long siesta hour of an afternoon in June. In his twenties, he went to London. Instinctively, he had already trained himself in the habit of pretending he was someone, so it should not be discovered that he was no one. In London, he found the profession to which he had been predestined, that of actor: someone who, on a stage, plays at being someone else, before a concourse of people who pretend to take him for that other one. His histrionic work taught him a singular satisfaction, perhaps the first he had ever known. And yet, once the last line of verse had been acclaimed and the last dead man dragged off stage, he tasted the hateful taste of unreality. He would leave off being Ferrex of Tamburlaine and become no one again. Thus beset, he took to imagining other heroes and other tragic tales. And so, while his body complied with its bodily destiny in London bawdyhouses and taverns, the soul inhabiting that body was Caesar unheeding the augur's warnings, and Juliet detesting the lark, and Macbeth talking on the heath with the witches who are also the Fates. No one was ever so many men as that man: like the Egyptian Proteus he was able to exhaust all the appearances of being. From time to time, he left, in some obscure corner of his work, a confession he was sure would never be deciphered: Richard states that in his one person he plays many parts, and Iago curiously says "I am not what I am." The fundamental oneness of existing, dreaming, and acting inspired in him several famous passages.

He persisted in this directed hallucination for twenty years. But one morning he was overcome by a surfeit and horror of being all those kings who die by the sword and all those unfortunate lovers who converge, diverge, and melo-
diously expire. That same day he settled on the sale of his theater. Before a week was out he had gone back to his native village, where he recuperated the trees and the river of his boyhood, without relating them at all to the trees and rivers—illustrious with mythological allusion and Latin phrase—which his Muse had celebrated. He had to be someone: he became a retired impresario who has made his fortune and who is interested in making loans, in lawsuits, and in petty usury. It was in character, then, in this character, that he dictated the arid last will and testament we know, from which he deliberately excluded any note of pathos or trace of literature. Friends from London used to visit him in his retreat, and for them he would once more play the part of poet.

History adds that before or after his death he found himself facing God and said: I, who have been so many men in vain, want to be one man, myself alone. From out of a whirlwind the voice of God replied: I am not, either. I dreamed the world the way you dreamed your work, my Shakespeare: one of the forms of my dream was you, who like me, are many and no one. (Borges, 1967, pp. 115-117)

“He was not of an age, but for all time!”

Ben Jonson

Notes

1. *The Study of Man* is a compilation of three lectures in which Polanyi “denies any discontinuity between the study of nature and the study of man” (p. 72); an intellectual attitude in which he is with F.S.C. Northrop’s *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities*, and with Talcott Parsons’ (1970) essay, “Theory in the Humanities and Sociology.”

2. Borges died at age eighty-seven in 1986. He became near-blind in his middle fifties but, his handicap notwithstanding, had attained in the judgment of literary critic Joseph Epstein the
standing of "mandarin among modern writers." *A Personal Anthology* (Borges, 1967) provides joyous access to the style and thought of Borges, in that it is a compilation of his best criticism. For a good quick-sketch portraiture of Borges, see Joseph Epstein (1987) "Señor Borges's Portico."

3. For a comprehensive treatment of the concept, see L. Festinger (1957) *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*.

4. Jonson was given the royal perquisites of a Poet Laureate, but the office itself was not established until after his time. Shakespeare did not himself publish any of his plays.

5. Another general-interest biography of Shakespeare is S. Schoenbaum (1977) *William Shakespeare: A Compact Documentary Life*. For a more detailed biography, there is [Sir] Edmund K. Chambers (1930), *William Shakespeare: A Study of Facts and Problems*. Abridged by Charles Williams (1933) as *A Short Life of Shakespeare with the Sources*. A more current, but specialized, biographic work is that of handwriting expert, Charles Hamilton. Only six signatures of Shakespeare have survived and one of them is on the last page of his will; the clearest of all his signatures. He had signed "By me William Shakespeare." But did Shakespeare actually write the will by hand; i.e., is the will holographic, or had someone else written it and Shakespeare signed, as was the convention then, with the antecedent "By me?" Hamilton (1985) has confirmed the Shakespeare will is a holographic document.

6. An illustration of Shakespearean cognitive dissonance for amusement is the 1987 Symposium held in Washington, D. C., "The Authorship Question," and in which three justices of the U.S. Supreme Court participated. A columnist's account of the affair has stated (Schwartz, 1987), "Professional Shakespeareans, as you might call them, are pretty much unanimous in agreeing that, of course, Will Shakespeare wrote his works, and..."
only elitists naive about the Elizabethan era could think any differently."

7. The phenomenon of a “Natural” in extraordinary talent has been confirmed in biography and fiction in a variety of fields. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, 1756-91, has been adjudged the most prodigious Natural genius in the history of music. Irving Berlin, with no more than a sixth-grade education, and with no instruction in music, was a Natural at writing captivating music and lilting lyrics. The sports-minded, of course, know baseball’s last .400 hitter—.406 actually in 1941—Ted Williams as a Natural. And in baseball fiction there is Bernard Malamud’s Natural in the character Roy Hobbes. “He stood at the plate lean and loose, right-handed with an open stance, knees relaxed and shoulders squared. The bat he held in a curious position, lifted slightly above his head as if prepared to beat a rattlesnake to death, but it didn’t harm his smooth stride into the pitch, nor the easy way he met the ball and slashed it out with the flick of the wrists. The pitchers tried something different every time he came up, sliders, sinkers, knucklers, but he swung and connected, spraying them to all fields.” “He was,” Red Blow said to Pop, “a natural . . . .” (Malamud, 1967, p. 84).


9. Frequent reference is made in Shakespeare criticism to the expressions “Folio” and “Quarto.” A Folio, in its literal meaning, is a book whose sheets have been folded once to form four pages; whereas sheets of a Quarto have been folded twice to form eight pages. Following the First Folio of 1623, there was a Second published in 1632, a Third in 1663, and a Fourth in 1685.
Thereafter, Nicholas Rowe’s publication of “Rowe’s Folio” in 1709, included for the first time a general introduction to the plays as well as act-scene divisions and cast lists.

Shakespeare, as has been indicated earlier, did not have any of his plays published. Single plays were published during his lifetime by others as Quartos; unauthorized and more likely than not pilfered, and some of these have been given the name “Bad Quartos” because of corruptions in the text. *Romeo and Juliet*, as example, was published unauthorized as three Quartos—1597, 1599, 1609—of which the 1597 version was corrupt and, therefore, is a Bad Quarto. For an enlightening essay on this subject, see Howard Staunton (1986) “Preface.”

10. Sigmund Freud most likely would have concurred in Brook’s advocacy. He wrote to the Austrian playwright and novelist Arthur Schnitzler, “The impression has been borne in on me that you know through intuition . . . everything that I have discovered in other people by laborious work” (Epstein, 1989, p. 33).

11. Samuel T. Coleridge, he of the familiar poems *Kubla Khan* and *Rhime of the Ancient Mariner*, together with Charles Lamb and William Hazlitt are held to have been the foremost English writers of Shakespeare criticism in the early 1800s.

12. This is a work of literary criticism which contains the finest prose from Berryman’s pen. It was written over the years at the University of Minnesota, where he taught and was made Regents Professor for this eminence both as teacher and poet. The three essays of Shakespeare criticism herein have been acknowledged to be gems. These are: “Shakespeare at Thirty,” “Notes on Macbeth,” “Shakespeare’s Last Word.” Recollection of lectures he gave on Shakespeare at the University of Minnesota is this writer’s own treasured remembrance of him.

13. In Elizabethan society, “Actors, by an ancient statute often
renewed, are legally vagabonds, men who if caught masterless are to be branded and put to forced labor, except as they have status being servants to some nobleman or gentleman who protects a company" (Berryman, 1976, p. 31).

14. Chute has modernized Greene’s original language for convenience; for Greene in the original, see Chambers, A Short Life of Shakespeare, Appendix II, p. 187.

15. More recent twentieth-century scholarship is tilted toward the conclusion that Shakespeare’s collaboration with other playwrights was not as extensive as has been heretofore attributed to him. Modern-day criticism, as example, has credited Shakespeare with more input to Henry VI, 1 than the two scenes Edmund Malone had acknowledged. There still is agreement that he had collaborated with John Fletcher in the writing of Henry VIII; Fletcher having succeeded him as principal dramatist of the King’s Men, as Shakespeare’s acting company was called after 1603 when James I ascended to the English throne. The Two Noble Kinsmen was held to have been written in collaboration with Fletcher, but a recent study has concluded “that the play must have been entirely the work of Shakespeare.” Paul Bertram (1965, p. VI).

16. For more of Arthur Brooke’s long metrical version of The Tragical History of Romeus and Juliet, see Douglas Cole (1970), Twentieth Century Interpretations of Romeo and Juliet.

17. This was also Shakespeare’s source for Julius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra.


19. For a criticism of morality in the Shakespeare canon, see Alfred Harbage (1947), As They Liked It: An Essay on Shakespeare and
Morality.

20. Performances of Shakespeare now often resort to the pre-recorded reading of a soliloquy, so the player can do stage business in silence even as the audience hears the lines. For an informative literature on the significance of the soliloquy as a convention of Shakespeare’s theater, see Wolfgang Cleman (1964), *Shakespeare’s Soliloquies*.

21. In Giuseppe Verdi’s *Otello*, Iago affirms in his great Act II aria,—a sung soliloquy actually—“Yes, I believe that I was made the image of someone on high, someone himself a monster.” For a fascinating study of Shakespeare’s Iago, see Stanley Edgar Hyman (1960), *Iago: Some Approaches to the Illusion of His Motivation*.

22. There is a vast literature on “Shakespeare’s tragic vision.” Solid grounding for getting into this literature is provided by N. J. Calardo (1968), *Tragic Being: Apollo and Dionysus in Western Drama*; J. M. R. Margeson (1967), *The Origin of English Tragedy*; Northrop Frye (1967), *Fools of Time*.

23. For more on the subject of catharsis in the Shakespeare plays, see T. J. Scheff (1979), *Catharsis in Healing, Ritual, and Drama*. Catharsis in Greek classical theater, it will be recalled from earlier Part II, is treated in Robert Beck (1975), *Aeschylus: Playwright Educator*.

24. The expression “tone-colours” is from Sidney Lanier’s technical discourse on the writing of verse line. Verse, unlike prose, follows a regular pattern of recurring pause —called a *measure*—and a regular pattern of recurring stress —called a *meter*. These are basic elements of the musical sound in poetry. Just as compositions written for mechanical instruments follow rules of notation to produce a desired sound, so do compositions of poetry to produce a desired sound with the human voice. It is for
this, exactly, why the poets of antiquity were called song-singers.

The iamb, a metrical foot of two syllables; a short accent followed by a long or an unaccented syllable followed by an accented, together with measure indicate the sound desired in a verse line. Classical epic verse was written in dactylic hexameter, a line of six metric feet which first appeared in Homer. Shakespeare preferred the verse line of five metrical feet.

Even this less than adequate introduction to composition in poetry should be enough indication that the language of poetry, whether written in rhyme or blank verse, is musical. It is, therefore, a happy fortuity that Lanier, who in himself was a poet, Shakespeare scholar, and also professional musician should have dealt in technical depth with “tone-colours” in the Shakespeare canon. Lanier (1908) played flute with the Peabody Orchestra, Baltimore. For his discourse on the music in poetry, see in Shakespeare and His Forerunners, chapters VII-XIII.

25. Spencer’s work has been a frequently draw upon reference by later Shakespeare scholars who have used “the great chain of being” concept in their own work. Kott’s Shakespeare Our Contemporary is one such, another is Norman Rabkin, Shakespeare and the Common Understanding. An excellent capsulation of this concept is in Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current, pp. 67-70.

26. Of special interest should be the essay, “On the Tragedies of Shakespeare.”

27. See end note 2 on page 2 in Berlin (1979), Against the Current.

28. For a modern-day treatment of this argument, see Richard Dawkins (1986), The Blind Watchmaker.

29. Of course, to say Edmund had read Copernicus is fanciful. The
plot of *Lear* is set in pre-feudal England, whereas Copernicus published in 1543 his *magnum opus*.

30. Halpin over the years has contributed a number of essays to the literature of school administration; each of them has been composed in a style and grace of good literary criticism. This writer's favorite is "The Eloquence of Behavior."

31. Shakespeare seems to have taken special pleasure in this sport. He did it in another tragedy, *Othello*, in the scene (III,iii, where Iago compares the English drinking style with "Your Dane, your German, and your swag-bellied Hollander."

32. In *Richard II*, Shakespeare has the deposed King Richard, now alone imprisoned in Pomfret Castle, produce "breeding thoughts" with imagination (V,v), "I have been studying how I may compare/This prison where I live unto the world: /And for because the world is populous, /I cannot do it./Yet I'll hammer it out:/My brain I'll prove the female to my soul, /My soul the father, and these two beget/A generation of still-breeding thoughts/And these same thoughts people this little world/In humors like the people of this world." Students at the thesis-writing stage of a doctoral program might be inspired to see in these Shakespeare lines a helpful guide to the task of conceptualization.

33. One of the better guides to the reading of Shakespeare states, "...Shakespeare's plots are always open and easy to recount on the stage of the imagination." Then follows this advice: "Even the simplest of Shakespeare's plays will repay a double reading. It is best to read the play rapidly once for the story and a second time for plot structure, characterization, and other elements. ...the first reading should be done in the manner indicated, reproducing the play in the imagination. The play, in other words, should be read *as a drama*, not as a novel or an essay. The second reading may be done more slowly and more methodically with..."
the attention alert for whatever technique of playwriting and other elements are to be noted.” Richard Hosley (1965), Romeo and Juliet: An Outline-guide to the Play (p. 5).

Still another guide to the reading of Shakespeare, one deserving of a “must read” endorsement, is Christopher Morley’s “A Letter to a Reader” preface in William Aldis Wright (1936), The Complete Works of William Shakespeare.

34. Points of the compass seem to have had an attraction for playwrights of the English Renaissance. Ben Jonson, in collaboration with George Chapman and John Marston, wrote a play, 1605, with the title of Eastward Ho!

35. Bartlett’s 1968 edition of Familiar Quotations, where “winged words” are collected and arranged by author, has devoted eighty-five pages to Shakespeare.

36. In “The Eloquence of Behavior,” Halpin (196) asks, “How then, can we sensitise ourselves to the eloquence of our own behavior? How can we use communication to discover who we are? Here is an old-fashioned suggestion, one which in our time sounds almost obscene: READ! Read good literature” (p. 271).

37. There are twelve sibyls—wise women or sorceresses—in Michelangelo’s masterpiece. The Libyan sibyl, one of the twelve, has been interpreted to be positioned so that one foot stands in antiquity and the other in modernity. For more, see Monroe Stearns (1970), Michelangelo.

38. Parson’s pattern-variables is considered by some to be the most complex idea in his General Theory of Action. Also, it has been acknowledged universally as a discriminating sociological tool for the analysis of role conflict. For an exposition of the pattern variables, see Parsons (1963d), The Social System, pp. 38-112.
39. An acceptable equivalent is the couplet from T. S. Eliot's *Murder in the Cathedral*: “The last temptation is the greatest treason:/To do the right deed for the wrong reason.”

40. Eugene L. Belisle and Cyril G. Sargent in their chapter, “The Concept of Administration,” have noted, “All the tragedies—and comedies—of Shakespeare . . . revolve essentially around the role concept with respect to life quite generally” (Campbell & Russell, 1957, p. 116).

41. Overcoming Elizabethan archaism in Shakespeare is made easy in every paperback of his plays by word explanations at the bottom of a page. Beyond this help, one can have fun transposing in the mind Shakespeare’s English into modern-day spoken English. Here is an example of this with Edmund’s earlier given exchange with the captain:

Edmund:  
Come here, captain; listen.  
One step in rank I have advanced you, do  
As I instruct you, more will come:  
Etc., etc., etc.

42. Yorkist Edward defeated the Lancastrians in 1461, deposed Henry VI, and was proclaimed King Edward IV. He fled England in 1470 and Henry VI was restored to the throne until 1471 when Edward retook the crown. Twice deposed Henry VI died in the Tower of London in 1471.

43. A good source for more on Shakespeare’s chronicle plays is E. M. W. Tillyard (1944), *Shakespeare’s History Plays*.

44. Sir Laurence Olivier’s 1955 film of *Richard III* is a ready illustration of the story-line continuity in the *Henry VI* tetralogy. Instead of opening the film with Richard’s soliloquy, “Now is the winter of our discontent . . . .,” as does the original, Olivier shows first Edward’s coronation scene from *Henry VI*, 3 and conveys to the audience Richard’s character in a splicing of the “Now is
the winter" soliloquy with the second half of the soliloquy in *Henry VI*, 3 in which Richard identifies with "the murderous Machiavel."

45. Machiavelli also wrote a history of Florence, on the art of war, poetry, and plays. His play *La Mandragola* was performed by the Shakespeare Theatre at the Folger, Washington, D. C., as recently as the 1986-87 season. See again end note 11, Part II, for more on Machiavelli.

46. The sanctioning of "force and fraud" as instruments of statecraft did indeed have, as Berlin has stated, an ancient ancestry by the time of Machiavelli. From Plato's *The Republic* is the following: "Then if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the State should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with enemies or with their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good" (Jowett, 1937, p. 89).

Those who might think Isaiah Berlin's conclusion hyperbolic; i.e., Machiavelli's moral dilemma "as part of the normal situation," ought to ponder the Captain's predicament in the novel *Billy Budd* and that of the Commanding General in the film *Breaker Morant*. And, of course, as Sophocles has shown in *Antigone*, there can be tragedy also in choices made by a young woman in a care-free life.

Also enlightening is the following commentary from James March on the relation between truth and justice in models for social action. "Like truth and beauty" March holds, "justice is an ideal rather than a state of existence. We do not achieve it; we pursue it. In that pursuit we accept responsibility for social myths by which we live." Then March goes on to an affirmation of Isaiah Berlin's conclusion in the following argument about models in social action:

"Independent of its truth value, a model has a justice value."
Different models suggest different actions, and the attractiveness of the social and moral consequences of those actions do not depend entirely on the degree to which the models are correct. Nor is this problem solved in any significant way by producing a more correct model. Since two equally correct models may have radically different action implications and radically different moral force, we can easily imagine a circumstance in which we would be willing to forego some truth in order to achieve some justice.” (italic added, March, 1972, p. 414)

47. A reference is made to him by his father, Henry Bolingbroke and later Henry IV, in Richard II as “my unthrifty son.”

48. A. B. Steel, an historian, is quoted by E. M. W. Tillyard as having written, “Richard was the last [English] king of the old medieval order” (Tillyard, 1944, p. 254).

49. Those who have watched the televised Iran-contra hearings in the summer of 1987 will recall the frequent invocation of “plausible denial” for the legitimation of deception.

50. See in this regard especially, Moody E. Prior (1973), The Drama of Power: Studies in Shakespeare’s History Plays.

51. Again, the superb primer in theory of formal organization, and more especially of Parsonian theory, by R. Jean Hills will be of help in these exercises of the imagination. This primer has been cited in Part II as Toward a Science of Organization.

52. In a statement echoic of Borges’ portraiture, Germaine Greer (1986) has written, “His attitude was profoundly pragmatic; he took what was there, without troubling to consider whether it should have been there or not. Because he imposed no post hoc system upon the multifariousness of his experience and based his utterance upon what could be comprehended and registered in the conditions of dramatic representation, his work continues to breathe—its audience gives it lungs” (p. 125).
NOT THE END

TO BE CONTINUED BY CREATIVE PROFESSORS OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION WHO, TOGETHER WITH STUDENTS, WILL FIND THEIR OWN PATHWAYS TO THE HUMANITIES.
References


Teachers College Columbia University.


About the Author

Professor Popper began his career as teacher in the high schools of New York City, followed by two years with Queens College of the City University of New York. He was appointed Associate Professor in 1958 at the University of Minnesota, where he taught until his retirement in 1987.

He was awarded the Ph.D. by the Graduate School of Arts and Science of New York University in 1952. Post-doctoral study at the School of Education, New York University, qualified him for professional certification in general and secondary school administration.

His published works over the years reflect a sustained interest in ideas which inform institutional aspects of organization and the structure of administrative leadership. *Pathways to the Humanities in School Administration*, likewise, has evolved out of a long-held conviction that a formulable rationale is available for the joining of cognitive and belles-lettres content in professional preparation for administrative leadership.

Professor Popper has been President of the Minnesota State Conference of the American Association of University Professors and of the Minnesota School Facilities Council of Education, Architecture, and Industry. He has been a consultant for the National Institute of Mental Health and a lecturer for the National Academy for School Executives of the American Association of School Administrators. He has received an award from the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge in 1959.