A review is made on the impact of educational policy making and institutional change in New York State during the governorship of Nelson Rockefeller. The study reveals how the governorship had been made an instrument of public policy, working with a strongly led Board of Regents and the educational establishment in transforming the State University of New York (SUNY) into the nation's largest multi-campus public university. The expansion of public higher education in New York State is analyzed in the context of political, economic, and social developments throughout the 1960s. While the blueprint for SUNY's growth was central, parallel shifts in the state's public sector and in the City University are important elements in the analysis. The study also shows how a confluence of individuals and events in the state provided the impetus for the growth of higher education, resulting in the nation's first and third largest public universities, largest private university sector, largest student aid program, and a broad-based political support for these enterprises making New York State Higher Education a major political and economic force. Contains 88 notes and references. (Author/GLR)
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Judith S. Glazer, Ph.D.
Long Island University

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of political leadership in state government and its impact on educational policy making and institutional change. The expansion of public higher education in New York State is analyzed in the context of political, economic, and social developments throughout the 1960s. During his 15 years as Governor, Nelson Rockefeller made the governorship an instrument of public policy, working with a strongly led Board of Regents and the educational establishment in transforming the State University of New York into the nation's largest multi-campus public university.

While the blueprint for SUNY's growth was central, parallel shifts in the state's public sector and in the City University are vital elements of the story. A fortunate confluence of individuals and events in the state provided the impetus for the growth of higher education, resulting in the nation's first and third largest public universities, largest private university sector, largest student aid program, and broad-based political support for these enterprises. With 224 autonomous degree-granting colleges and universities and operating budgets totaling $2.3 billion, by 1973, when Rockefeller left office, New York State Higher education had become a major political and economic force.
Higher education in New York State was transformed in the 1960s. Determined to build a first-rank public university rivaling those of California, Michigan, and Illinois, Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller marshaled the requisite human and fiscal resources to devise and support an ambitious blueprint for the expansion of the State University of New York. In his inaugural address on January 1, 1959, he forecast the sixties as an age of “historic decision,” stating: “We must plan—years into the future—expansion of our state institutions of higher education.” In his first message to the legislature six days later, he predicted that higher education enrollments would double by 1970, and he set forth his goal of opportunity for every high school graduate with ambition and capacity to attend college. His first priority, he said, would be to implement the $250 million bond issue approved by the voters in November, 1957. Rockefeller vowed to achieve his goals through close collaboration between the private colleges and universities, the State University, the municipal colleges in New York City, the Board of Regents and the State Education Department.

Within Rockefeller’s 15 years as Governor, the State University and the City University became the nation’s first and third largest multicampus public university systems. SUNY expanded from a system of 41,000 students in 46 colleges in 1960 to 557,614 students in 64 colleges by 1975. CUNY grew from seven colleges with 85,269 students to 20 colleges with 250,818 students by 1975. Private colleges and universities, concerned about the creation of two megaliths with public support, were assuaged with scholarship and fellowship programs, student aid, institutional grants, and low-interest borrowing for capital construction through the state’s Dormitory Authority.

The phenomenon of higher education’s rapid growth in New York State appears even more impressive when viewed in historical perspective. From 1784, when the Board of Regents was founded as a constitutional entity, to 1961 when the landmark Higher Education Act was signed by Rockefeller, New York was dominated by its private sector. Governors and Regents schooled in private institutions showed little interest in expanding public colleges whose mission was confined mainly to teacher training and agricultural and technical programs. A combination of factors ultimately tipped the balance toward the state’s public institutions. Among them were the influx of veterans following World War II, the elitist and restrictive admissions policies of many private universities, the advent of federal aid under the National Defense Education Act of 1958, the civil rights movement of the 1960s, and the growing recognition that educational opportunity was sound social, economic, and political policy.

The role of the Governor in concert with the Board of Regents was pivotal in two major areas in particular: the expansion of access and opportunity in public higher education and the transformation of private colleges and universities into an independent, government-supported sector. This paper traces these two phenomena, which were interrelated and which took place at a time of significant political and social change in the state and the nation. The blueprint for the expansion of higher education originated in the reports of the Rockefeller Panels (1958), the Heald Committee (1960), and subsequent blue-ribbon committees sponsored jointly with the Board of Regents. They came to fruition through the collaborative efforts of political and academic leaders in both the public and private sectors. The rationale for change was articulated by New York State’s Commissioner of Education, James E. Allen, Jr., a persuasive advocate for educational opportunity who convinced a recalcitrant Board of Regents to support the growth of public higher education. Frank Moore, as chairman of
SUNY's Board of Trustees and a man of consummate political skills, was the architect of a decentralized state university and a fiscal policy advisor in the development of a funding formula for its expansion. Rockefeller recognized the benefits that would accrue to the state by fostering a responsive environment for business and industrial growth, particularly in rural upstate counties.

The politics of higher education shifted from local to centralized control and from private to public dominance during Rockefeller's years as Governor. This paper is a historical analysis of the development of public higher education in New York State against a backdrop of political, economic, and social change. Beginning with an account of Dewey's role in establishing SUNY in 1948 and the Regents' reluctance to support its development throughout the 1950s, it focuses mainly on Rockefeller's alliance with Allen and the educational establishment in the expansion of education throughout the 1960s. While SUNY's growth is central to this story, parallel changes in the state's private sector and in the City University are vital elements in the postwar history of higher education. The paper concludes with an analysis of political leadership in state government and its impact on educational policy-making and institutional change.

**SUNY's First Decade, 1948–1958**

To understand the political process that transformed New York State from private to public dominance, centralizing control of its institutions in the statehouse, it is important to outline its origin and early development. By the end of World War II, New York was the only state without a public university. Its public sector consisted of 34 colleges controlled by the Board of Regents: 11 teachers' colleges; six agricultural and technical colleges; seven professional colleges under contract with Syracuse, Cornell, and Alfred universities; six two-year Institutes of Applied Arts and Science; and, in New York City, four four-year colleges. Public colleges were tuition-free by law, and student aid was limited to merit scholarships for use at private colleges and universities in the state for which the total contribution was $300,000.

The demand for a state university became a major issue in Dewey's campaign for re-election as Governor in 1946. His comptroller, Frank Moore, advised him to defuse the public university issue by appointing a commission to study the problem. Dewey did so, and the Temporary Commission on the Need for a State University, chaired by Owen D. Young, a former Regent and chairman of General Electric, was formed in early 1946. The Young report laid the groundwork for subsequent legislation establishing SUNY on July 1, 1948, as a separate corporate entity under the supervision of the Board of Regents (chapter 695, Laws of 1948). Its 15-member Board of Trustees, appointed by the Governor, was given authority to develop its own master plan for the existing state colleges, to acquire two medical schools, and to establish up to 22 community colleges in the state, including New York City. The new university was predicated on the need to accommodate returning veterans, to end discrimination against Jewish students in medical school admissions, to develop a system of two-year colleges offering technical education, and to give state aid for teacher training to New York City's four senior colleges.
Oliver Carmichael, chairman of SUNY's Board of Trustees, recruited Alvin Eurich as the first president of the new system. The shift in operating authority for the teachers' colleges from the Regents to an independent Board of Trustees appointed by the Governor threatened the Regents' unchallenged dominance of higher education. As a result, Eurich's initial task was to lobby for the defeat of Regents-sponsored legislation that would have rescinded the statute establishing SUNY. This bill had the support of the presidents of the 11 state teachers' colleges as well as most of the private universities. Dewey prevailed, however, and the bill was defeated in March 1949; by June SUNY's first master plan was drafted. A gentlemen's agreement between Dewey and the private university presidents guaranteed that no new liberal arts colleges would be established for the next ten years.

This action was consistent with the principle enunciated by the Young Commission that "the function of State-supported post-high school education should be to supplement, not to supplant, privately supported colleges and universities." SUNY gained control of two private financially troubled medical schools in 1950—the Syracuse University College of Medicine, which became the Upstate Medical Center, and the Long Island College of Medicine in Brooklyn, which became the Downstate Medical Center. SUNY also acquired Triple Cities College, a branch campus of Syracuse as its only liberal arts college, renaming it Harpur College, and founded two community colleges in Jamestown and Orange counties.

In 1948, Moore, then state comptroller, was appointed to the new SUNY Board of Trustees. Two years later he became Dewey's Lieutenant Governor. In 1953, having lost the Republican nomination to succeed Dewey, he resigned from public office to accept Rockefeller's invitation to head the Government Affairs Foundation, a new organization funded by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund to analyze problems of public administration in local government. This ultimately led to the establishment of the Office of Local Government in the Rockefeller administration with Moore as its Commissioner. He became a pivotal figure in Rockefeller's first term as Governor, having served in Dewey's administration when SUNY was first established and as chairman of its Board of Trustees from 1954 to 1966. Periodic efforts to establish a single graduate research center within SUNY were thwarted by the trustees who maintained that "to the extent possible, higher education is brought into all regions of the state to supplement the efforts of the private colleges and universities." While this was an important strategy in the expansion of SUNY throughout the sixties, it also became problematic as resources became scarce in the seventies and competition for available funds intensified among the university centers. In 1957, following passage of the bond issue, a consultant's report commissioned by the Board characterized SUNY as an "academic animal without a head" and recommended an integrated research university on one campus. This was not a politically viable concept, however, due to the attitude of the Regents, and the resulting controversy over publication of this report led to the dismissal of SUNY's second president, Frank Carlson, on December 12, 1957. The date is significant since Carlson's abrupt departure left SUNY without a permanent president and stalled implementation of the bond issue until six months after Rockefeller's election, when a successor was appointed.

When Harriman succeeded Dewey as Governor in 1954, he took little interest in education in general and the new state university in particular. The bond issue was first proposed by SUNY's Board in early 1955 and reluctantly approved by the legislature the following year. Harriman opposed it and the Regents took no position. In 1957, however, after passage of the
National Defense Education Act, the political power structure in New York State became more receptive to supporting public higher education, and the legislature, the Regents, and the Governor now strongly endorsed the bond issue proposal. In their first major public statement of support for SUNY's expansion, the Regents recommended a five-year teacher training college for Long Island, several new community colleges under local control, and need-based scholarships for academically qualified students. The Commissioner and the Regents were then required by education law and the Regents Rules to review and pass on SUNY's budget and to incorporate it into their own departmental budget. Allen correctly interpreted the NDEA as a "stamp of approval on recognition of education as an instrument of national policy." The bond issue approved by the voters in November 1957 was the last time that SUNY's expansion would be subject to public referendum. Harriman did little to implement its provisions, causing Allen to convey in a letter the "grave concern of the Regents and the SUNY trustees regarding the delays, citing the impending deluge of qualified students seeking college opportunities," and urging Harriman to "expedite construction." In the next ten years, Allen became the Regents' point man, providing the Rockefeller administration with the rationale and the data for expanding higher education and implementing a statewide policy of access.

Harriman and Rockefeller both had presidential ambitions and sought to use the Governor's office as a springboard to the White House. One month prior to the election, Rockefeller announced a program for improving education in schools and colleges, accusing Harriman of showing "neither imagination nor initiative in meeting the education challenge." Echoing the Regents' 1957 statement, he went on record in favor of substantial increases in state aid for schools and pledged to "assure college education for every qualified student," based on "proper encouragement of private colleges," expansion of SUNY and the state scholarship and loan program, and awareness that "education was not a static but a growing and continuing problem and that costs would steadily rise." When Rockefeller defeated Harriman in November 1958, he promised to implement fully the $250 million bond issue. In fact, by December 1973, when he resigned to seek the presidency for the fourth and final time, $2.5 billion had been committed to its construction, ten times the original amount with a cost projected to reach $4 billion at its completion. During his 15 years as Governor, 32 new public colleges were created in New York State, almost doubling the existing number.

Rockefeller's enthusiastic support for the development of public higher education was influenced by several political and economic factors. SUNY wished to expand its two-year and four-year colleges and Rockefeller was convinced by Allen and others that the private sector, which then enrolled 75 percent of all undergraduates, could not handle the predicted bulge in college enrollments; and that to expand public facilities, it would be necessary to transform the loose federation of state teachers' colleges into comprehensive liberal arts colleges and to establish publicly supported graduate and professional schools. In turn, he recognized that a strong higher education system could enable him to retain and attract business and industry in the state, and to reverse the tide of outmigration by high school graduates seeking low-cost quality higher education in other states. His family tradition and prior political experience strengthened his resolve in what could be achieved, enabling him to tap the requisite resources for carrying out his objectives. In 1974, when he presented his qualifications to the Congress in support of his vice presidential nomination by Gerald Ford, he observed: "For forty years, I have worked in government at local, state, federal, and international levels, in business and finance, in cultural activities and in philanthropy."
In 1953–54 he had served as the first Under Secretary of the new Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, resigning to seek the position of Secretary of Defense. Thwarted in his goal by George Humphrey, he left Eisenhower’s staff in 1956 to seek elective office. Two events in particular gave him both the visibility he needed to obtain the gubernatorial nomination and the strategy for his campaign. From 1955 to 1957, he chaired the Rockefeller Special Studies Panels on domestic and foreign policy issues. Henry Kissinger, who was then Associate Director of the Center for International Relations at Harvard University, was its director. Many luminaries from public and private life served as a private think tank for the future Governor. The reports, America at Mid-Century, were underwritten by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, of which he was president. Many themes that found their way into the report of the Heald Committee on Higher Education in 1960 originated in the subpanel report on education drafted by John Gardner, member of both committees.25

In 1956, with the help of Republican legislative leaders, Rockefeller persuaded Harriman to appoint him chairman of the 15-member Special Legislative Committee to Revise and Simplify the State Constitution.26 Harriman thought this appointment would effectively remove Rockefeller from political contention as a potential opponent. The appointment, however, proved to be a disastrous political miscalculation, since it afforded Rockefeller the opportunity to travel around the state, conduct public hearings on local issues of interest to potential voters, meet county political leaders, and garner support within the Republican party. He recruited William Ronan, former dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration at New York University, who later became his secretary and chief of staff operations, as director of the Constitutional Commission, which eventually completed a series of background studies, including one on education, giving Rockefeller a “grandstand seat from which to view State government and the State itself.”27 In preparation for his campaign in 1957, Rockefeller recruited a staff of researchers to draft position papers on issues confronting the state.28 The paper on education, when combined with Gardner’s report to the Rockefeller Panels, the Constitutional Commission findings,29 and position papers by the Regents and the Heald Committee staff, helped to define higher education policy in Rockefeller’s years as Governor.

In August 1959, at the inauguration of SUNY’s third president, Thomas H. Hamilton, Rockefeller pledged to build a great state university, quoting John Masefield: “There are few earthly things more beautiful than a university . . . more enduring than a university . . . for century after century.”29 To achieve his goals, he cultivated Allen and the Regents, while at the same time carefully controlling the selection of new Regents by the Republican-dominated legislature. Allen was an insider, having been Executive Assistant and Deputy Commissioner from 1947 to 1955 when the Young Commission was active and SUNY was under the Regents’ direct control. He served as Commissioner from 1955 to 1969 when he became U.S. Commissioner of Education. His strongly articulated vision of higher education’s needs sought to overcome the Regents’ antipathy toward public higher education and legislative animosity toward the Regents by devising a strategy through which the Regents would assume greater responsibility for coordinating all levels of education, public and private.31 While he failed to gain control over the governance and financing of CUNY and SUNY at the time of the Heald Committee deliberations, he subsequently obtained master planning authority.

Frequent strategy meetings throughout the 1960s between Rockefeller and his cadre of political advisors were coupled with negotiations with competing legislative factions to achieve
ambitious objectives. Out of conflict came consensus among public and private constituencies. Issues of policy magnitude were addressed in terms of the equitable distribution of available resources rather than the long-range impact on state and local budgets. Rockefeller used task forces and legislative committees to generate support for his ideas in every aspect of state government, appointing to them prominent public figures with impeccable credentials who could give legitimacy and visibility to controversial proposals and whose recommendations would be less subject to challenge in the political arena. He made the Regents his partner in the formation of three major blue-ribbon committees on higher education between 1959 and 1968: the Heald Committee on Higher Education in 1959, the Muir Committee on Medical Education in 1961, and the Select Committee on Private and Independent Higher Education in 1967 (Bundy Committee). The following analysis of their recommendations, derived from in-person interviews and a review of primary documents, provides insights into ad hoc policy formation in the Rockefeller administration.

The Heald Committee

This committee was the first and most critical in his successful maneuvers through the thicket of higher education politics. Rockefeller appointed three prominent educators: Henry Heald, president of the Ford Foundation and former president of New York University; John Gardner, president of the Carnegie Corporation and the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching who had chaired the Rockefeller Panel on education in 1957; and Marion Folsom, former Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and architect of NDEA legislation. Rockefeller asked Allen to make his staff available to assist the committee in its work. Heald consulted 100 individuals and commissioned several technical papers in carrying out the committee’s mandate to develop proposals that would assure full educational opportunity for all New York State residents for the next generation and place the state in the forefront of business, science, technology, health care, teacher training, and cultural development. The report became the blueprint for Rockefeller’s higher education policy. Utilizing state data on demographic trends, its estimates of manpower needs were enormous—one million trained teachers, engineers and other skilled professionals by 1980. To achieve this outcome, the report urged that: (a) SUNY be expanded with federal and state support; (b) an independent City University of New York be formed from existing municipal colleges; (c) statewide planning be coordinated by the Board of Regents; and (d) a system of tuition assistance grants and uniform tuition be initiated by all public colleges in the state and New York City.

In a confidential memorandum to the Regents, Allen set forth his agenda as to “who should be responsible for state leadership in higher education.” What he sought and what he got are indicative of the leadership struggle that ensued between the Governor and the Regents and how it was eventually resolved. In this memorandum, Allen proposed to “tie together as an organic whole under the leadership of the Regents” the Board of Trustees of SUNY, the Board of Higher Education of the city colleges, and the trustees and staffs of the private institutions, with the Commissioner as “chief of staff for statewide planning and development.” His “possible proposal” included the breakup of SUNY through creation of a downstate university under the supervision of a Board appointed by the Regents, including all community colleges in the city, the Downstate Medical Center, the State University college on
Long Island, and other four-year public colleges in the metropolitan area; and the reconstitution of SUNY as an upstate university, removing the contract colleges and community colleges from its supervision. The Regents would appoint the presidents of these colleges and supervise curriculum, budgets, and degrees, as well as appoint all community college trustees.

Opposition to this proposal arose at once. Hamilton, outraged that as president of SUNY he was being treated as subordinate to Allen, complained of the failure of the Heald Committee to inform him of its proposals prior to their announcement and he sought Rockefeller’s approval for SUNY’s autonomy from the Regents and for legislation “designed to give us the independence we seek.” His stance was supported by Carroll Newsome, who was president of both New York University and the Association of Colleges and Universities of the State of New York (ACUSNY), then an association of influential private institutions. Newsome’s advocacy of SUNY’s financial autonomy and his endorsement of Hamilton’s position won its approval with the result that control over SUNY’s budget effectively shifted from the Regents to the Governor through his budget office. It also facilitated establishment of the State University Construction Fund, through which SUNY’s expansion would be managed. In turn, the private institutions gained access to the state’s Dormitory Authority, enabling them to obtain low-cost loans for capital construction of academic buildings. The concept of tuition assistance raised a further issue of whether student aid should be based on financial need rather than on academic merit, the eligibility of students in denominational colleges, and the use of student aid in lieu of free tuition. Both student aid and uniform tuition were essential to the formula that Rockefeller sought as a means of funding the debt service on future construction at SUNY, accelerating its pace and avoiding the statutory need for public referenda. Rockefeller called the search for a mechanism to meet the demand for “tripling our higher education facilities” one of the state’s major responsibilities in the coming decade.

The notion of need-based student aid was controversial among many constituencies: The private college sector that was then experiencing enrollment declines and financial problems, Protestant and Jewish groups opposed to aid to denominational institutions, Catholic leaders seeking equal benefits for their students, the Regents concerned about need-based financial aid, and free tuition advocates opposed to any formula that would threaten continuation of that policy. Equally controversial was the future governance of SUNY and CUNY, pitting Rockefeller and the leaders of these institutions against the Regents and the private sector, and granting their boards the “capacity to act decisively and effectively” in future expansion, giving them more direct access to the Governor through the Division of the Budget and to the legislature through its oversight and appropriations committees. According to participants in the negotiations, agreement on a formula for need-based student aid linked to imposition of tuition for full-time undergraduates was fundamental to gaining legislative approval of the entire plan, and ultimately for financing SUNY’s expansion.

As a result of many trade-offs among these special interest groups, seven statutes were shaped from the Heald Committee’s recommendations. Robert McCrate, Rockefeller’s counsel, worked with Allen and Hamilton in preparing a package of bills that would be acceptable to the Regents, SUNY’s Board of Trustees, and the Board of Higher Education (BHIE) in New York City, the presidents of major private universities, and Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish groups concerned about the church-state issue as it related to student aid proposals. On April 11, 1961, Rockefeller signed into law the Higher Education Act.
(chapters 388–394 of the Laws of 1961), citing it as a "major breakthrough in New York's efforts to assure an opportunity for higher education to every young man and woman in the State who has the ability and desire to achieve it. . . . a balanced program made possible by the outstanding cooperation and support of the Leaders, Committees, and Members of the legislature. . . ."\textsuperscript{42}

CUNY was established as an autonomous university and granted approval for the state's first publicly supported doctoral programs in exchange for initiating graduate tuition. The Regents gained master planning authority over all public and private institutions while SUNY and CUNY gained control from the Regents of governance and financing policies, and SUNY gained control of all community colleges. Need-based scholar incentive grants of $100–$300 for undergraduates and $200–$800 for graduate students were authorized for students in public and private colleges who paid at least $200 tuition.\textsuperscript{43} By 1962, almost 50 percent of all SUNY students paid tuition charges ranging from $240 in the community colleges to $700 in the medical schools. SUNY adopted a uniform tuition policy of $400 for undergraduates and $600–$800 for graduate students, thus becoming eligible for scholar incentive awards of $100–$300.\textsuperscript{44} A State University Income Fund was created to receive all tuition and fee income and a portion of the annual state appropriation as payment on lease-rental agreements for new buildings erected and financed by the State University Construction Fund, a public benefit corporation that gave it autonomy from the Department of Public Works and permitted it to expand without any constraints of public referenda.\textsuperscript{45} Scholar incentive grants restricted to students attending colleges that charged tuition provided indirect aid to the private sector. By giving SUNY this level of freedom, Rockefeller, who appointed its Board of Trustees, gained the leverage he needed to permit its unimpeded growth and alter its historic role of "supplementing" the private universities. The magnitude of this policy shift was visible in the planning for new university centers. While the Regents had sought only one five-year teachers' college on Long Island in 1957, the Heald Committee called for two entirely new centers with a range of graduate and professional programs on Long Island and in Buffalo, and two others to be built around existing colleges at Binghamton and Albany. In its 1961 master plan, SUNY now recommended that all of its teachers' colleges be transformed into multipurpose liberal arts colleges, following an earlier Regents statement that "the State Colleges of Education be expanded to include strong liberal arts programs and the granting of liberal arts degrees."\textsuperscript{46} Through the efforts of State Senate Majority Leader Walter J. Mahoney in 1962, Rockefeller and the legislature approved the merger of the private University of Buffalo with SUNY and its subsequent designation as a university center.

Construction also began for a graduate center incorporating Albany State Teachers' College as its nucleus, and another at Binghamton built around Harpur College. Through the efforts of Assembly Speaker Joseph Carlino and Frank Moore, a university center for Long Island was founded at Stony Brook in 1962.

The Muir Committee

The Rockefeller family had a long-standing involvement in the improvement of medical education and scientific advancement,\textsuperscript{47} the federal government had declared expansion of training in the health professions as a major priority, and SUNY's founding had been linked to
demands for access to medical schools. It was not surprising, therefore, that Rockefeller used the Heald recommendation to strengthen medical education as the basis for appointing another blue-ribbon committee in December 1961. Its members were Malcolm Muir, president of Newsweek, as chairman; William R. Willard, former dean of the Upstate Medical Center; and Thomas Parran, former United States Surgeon General. Their report, issued in 1963, constituted a comprehensive plan for the next two decades on education in the health professions. It recommended that future expansion occur within SUNY and through contractual arrangements in the private institutions. The construction of three new medical schools was proposed, one by 1970 at Stony Brook, which was already being built, the other by 1980, possibly in Westchester County, and a third private medical school at Mount Sinai Hospital in New York City. The report went beyond medical education to include recommendations on dentistry, nursing, social work, and public health. It emphasized the "invaluable complementary relationship of private institutions to public institutions [and the need for] an atmosphere of close cooperation." Despite the rhetoric in this report, by 1963 SUNY consisted of 53 units—three graduate centers, two medical centers, a graduate school of public affairs, 24 state colleges (18 four-year and six two-year), and 23 locally sponsored colleges. The takeover of the University of Buffalo (including its medical center) gave SUNY three medical schools. Sixteen SUNY colleges also had eight nursing and 19 other health-related programs. At the outset of the Muir deliberations, the private sector supported seven medical schools, two dental schools, and the majority of the nursing schools, and awarded almost 90 percent of the 2,805 degrees earned in the health professions.

SUNY's Growth Problems

Hamilton resigned as SUNY's third president in 1962, and for the next two years, it was governed by Moore as Board chairman and an acting president, J. Lawrence Murray. Rockefeller was dissatisfied with this arrangement, particularly in the light of SUNY's deepening problems with the legislature and the Regents. A rift developed between Moore, who felt that he was not being consulted on decisions affecting SUNY, and the Governor's office, and opposition mounted within the private sector to SUNY's further expansion. Samuel Gould, president of the Public Television Network in New York City, and formerly Chancellor of the University of California at Santa Barbara and president of Antioch College, became SUNY's fifth president and first chancellor in 1964. He recalled that "nobody wanted the job; there hadn't been a permanent president in more than two years and Moore and Murray were running the place." Gould inherited several major problems and immediately set about rewriting SUNY's master plan based on the concepts of unity, quality, and identity. The Construction Fund was empowered to hire prominent architects to design new colleges and restore existing ones. Two new four-year colleges were established—the College at Old Westbury in Nassau County and the College at Purchase in Westchester County, both of which were actively sought by political leaders in those counties.

Purchase was designated SUNY's campus for the arts and became a favored project of Rockefeller whose estate was in Westchester and whose family had founded the Museum of Modern Art and were prime movers in the establishment of the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in New York City. It was conceived as an "academic village," and was described in an architectural exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art as the country's most
conspicuously successful university building program. Gould was able to articulate SUNY's needs to both Rockefeller and Allen and to gain considerable autonomy for its many campuses and budgetary support for its programs. Moore stepped down as chairman in 1966, and was succeeded in 1968 by trustee Elizabeth Luce Moore, a close personal friend of the Rockefellers.

SUNY's transformation under Gould and the presidents of its colleges, coupled with changes in student aid policy, support of private colleges, programs for the disadvantaged, and the rapid growth of CUNY, catapulted New York State into the first tier of multcampus higher education systems. It was now the fastest-growing educational enterprise in the United States in both operating and capital support. By 1966, Rockefeller was able to assert: "My purpose as Governor, in the field of higher education has been that of totally overhauling state programs and launching many new ones to make sure that increased educational needs are matched by increased educational opportunities of continually improving quality." Governing boards of public and private institutions seeking support for new buildings encountered a hospitable climate, low interest rates through the Dormitory Authority, and acquiescence for new proposals. Rockefeller's speeches frequently focused on opportunity and access as well as quality education in the liberal arts, sciences, and the professions. The original plan for a decentralized state university became the means for gaining legislative support from more conservative regions of the state. While SUNY was the major beneficiary of state largesse, private institutions and the City University were well compensated. Rockefeller and his advisors recognized the political benefits to be reaped as SUNY's colleges primed state and local treasuries in support of their municipal services.

A monumental state university was not without its critics. Ada Louise Huxtable referred to the $4 billion building program as putting Rockefeller "right up there with the popes and pharaohs." The Construction Fund, which was responsible for the financing, planning, design, selection of architects, and supervision of construction, completed 752 projects at a cost of $957 million by 1971, had another 284 projects valued at $508 million under construction, and another 333 projects adding up to $1 billion then in design. "By 1974," Huxtable estimated, "the grand total will be 2,000 projects worth the awesome $4 billion." In fact, the legislature set a maximum of $3 billion on the construction program the following year. While the legislators in whose districts these colleges would be built continued to lobby for such lucrative projects, the private sector became increasingly uneasy and outspoken about the shadows being cast by SUNY's presence throughout the state. CUNY, up to its limit in overutilized buildings, also pressured its elected officials for access to construction funds. There were very few nay-sayers, however, and by decentralizing SUNY, public attention on any single institution was localized and minimized. Decentralization proved to be a brilliant tactic in terms of expansion, although less satisfactory operationally.

Problems of Growth at CUNY

By 1963, under pressure to provide greater access for minorities in New York City's municipal colleges, Rockefeller sought a bonding authority to foster CUNY's expansion. Having been reelected on a "pay-as-you-go" platform, he supported a constitutional amendment for home rule and imposition of undergraduate tuition at CUNY. On December
19, 1963, Allen and the Regents reaffirmed that “all publicly supported higher education in the state should have a uniform pattern of financing,” and that CUNY and SUNY should charge comparable tuition rates. The issue of minority enrollments was raised by black leaders who alleged that CUNY’s admission and tuition policies limited access for blacks and Puerto Ricans. In 1965, CUNY’s second chancellor, Albert Bowker, admonished his board to “trade off tuition for better access to Albany,” asserting that CUNY would need $400 million to build new facilities, and proposing a “theoretical tuition rate” of $400 per year per student which, through a combination of scholar incentive, mayoral scholarships, and federal NDEA grants, would be merely paper transactions. The board’s vociferous opposition to Bowker’s suggestion and his subsequent resignation precipitated a crisis. Frustrated in his own efforts to win the battle over ending free tuition at CUNY, Rockefeller announced his intention to establish five new SUNY colleges in New York City unless the board acquiesced. Bowker was reinstated, and the crisis ultimately resolved in June 1966 through passage of the City University Supplemental Aid and Construction Act (chapter 782, Laws of 1966) authorizing $400 million of new construction for CUNY. In his message of necessity on this bill, Rockefeller observed that CUNY was now receiving more state aid than 23 state universities in the United States. A new method of apportioning aid empowered a City University Construction Fund to enter directly into lease-rental agreements funded from state and city appropriations, noninstructional fees, and graduate and nonmatriculated tuition. Under this new formula for its future growth, CUNY gained eight new colleges, converted two divisions into colleges, and signed an affiliation agreement with Mount Sinai’s new School of Medicine.

In its 1968 master plan, the BHE approved the concept of open admissions for all New York City high school graduates by 1975. However, racial tension following Martin Luther King’s assassination and subsequent confrontations between black and Puerto Rican students and senior administrators at City College, combined with New York City mayoral politics, accelerated pressures to meet the demands of militant students and calm a politically volatile situation. On July 9, 1969, Bowker recommended, and the board approved, initiation of open admissions in all CUNY colleges by September 1970. Mayor John V. Lindsay expressed his concern about the fiscal implications of open admissions at a time when the city was experiencing serious budget shortfalls. Once again, Rockefeller, Lindsay, and legislative leaders attempted to trade off imposition of uniform tuition for more state aid to fund open admissions. Buffalo’s Senator Earl Brydges raised the prospect of a CUNYSUNY merger; the BHE countered that it would neither modify its free tuition policy nor merge its 15 colleges with the 57-unit SUNY system. One month prior to a mayoral election that Lindsay was in danger of losing to a conservative candidate, he switched his position and announced his support for open admissions; the issue became one of civil rights for the city’s minorities. Ethnic politics replaced fiscal politics, and after extensive negotiations among the Governor’s office, the city’s black coalition, Allen, the Regents, and Bowker, a compromise was reached whereby Rockefeller agreed to support and partially subsidize open admissions as part of a Full Opportunity Program, pledging “access to a meaningful further education” for “every young man and woman graduating from high school in New York State.” Characteristically, Rockefeller’s version of full opportunity policy exceeded open admissions guidelines for New York City to encompass every aspect of academic and vocational training beyond high school in the state including an increase in operating aid from one-third to 40 percent for open-door community colleges, expansion of program aid for disadvantaged students in public and private colleges, more state operating aid for SUNY’s senior colleges, open admissions at all
CUNY colleges, and an increase in institutional aid to help the private sector increase its minority enrollments. The character of CUNY’s selective senior colleges changed as freshman enrollments increased by 75 percent between 1969 and 1970. Rockefeller’s role in CUNY’s expansion was fraught with controversy, partly due to his cool relationship with Lindsay, and to his inability to win the board’s acquiescence to exchange free tuition for student aid. The unintended consequence of open access at CUNY was its benefit to white middle-class students who enrolled in great numbers, threatening the stability of the city’s private and denominational colleges and universities, arousing their anger and concern, and bringing Rockefeller more directly into heated rivalry between public and private interests.

Aid for Private Colleges

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Regents supported and largely controlled student aid through its scholarship and fellowship programs, including scholar incentive grants that were disbursed through the State Education Department’s Bureau of Special College Programs. From 1913 to 1959, the Regents University Scholarship Program had awarded 211,701 merit scholarships; in Rockefeller’s first two terms as Governor, awards increased by 72 percent to 504,474.6 Between 1959 and 1974, $375.4 million was distributed through nine programs as the rationale changed for grants–in–aid based on economic need rather than academic merit. Although increases in scholar incentive grants were approved periodically, this aid did not begin to close the tuition gap between SUNY and the private colleges as enrollment shares shifted toward the public sector in both undergraduate and graduate education. Between 1962 and 1968, CUNY and SUNY both experienced a 230 percent increase in graduate enrollments compared to 54 percent in the private sector. By 1966, SUNY offered 43 Ph.D. programs, had a large Research Foundation, and gave evidence of a growing commitment to the health sciences. Alarm about its rapid growth into high cost graduate and professional programs and the shift in enrollment shares caused the presidents of the state’s 16 large universities, which enrolled 96,500 (50 percent) of full–time enrollees in private institutions, to urge Rockefeller to address their concerns.6 Efforts were made by both the Regents and the Democrats to thwart a program of direct aid to private colleges and universities by recommending that scholar incentive awards be increased to $1,000 to close the tuition gap. To counter such pressures as well as to forestall the exchange of student aid for free tuition at CUNY, the education committee of the 1967 State Constitutional Convention proposed an amendment supporting statewide free tuition for all public and private higher education and repeal of the Blaine Amendment.7 Rockefeller agreed that Blaine was overly restrictive, but continued to express his support for more generous financial aid programs rather than free tuition.68

The Bundy Committee

Neither faction sought to hold the line on expenditures, however, until late 1967 when Rockefeller convened the Bundy Committee, the first of three task forces on higher education financing. In October 1967, he invited the Regents to join him in appointing a committee to study the financial needs of private institutions, calling it “the logical successor to the Heald Committee”69 (which had recommended direct aid to the private sector in its 1960 report). After some consultation, McGeorge Bundy, president of the Ford Foundation, was appointed

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chairman of the Select Committee on the Future of Private and Independent Higher Education. Committee members were selected to represent all sides of the church-state and public-private issues, and included James Conant, former president of Harvard University and a leading spokesman for educational reform; Abraham Sachar, president of Brandeis University and Jewish; Theodore Hesburgh, president of The University of Notre Dame and Catholic; and John Hannah, president of Michigan State, representing the public sector. The Committee’s charge was to determine “how the state can help preserve the strength and vitality of our private and independent institutions of higher education, yet at the same time keep them free.” The assumption was that government has a responsibility to preserve the financial stability of private institutions but not to interfere in their governance. The report, couched in careful language, found evidence that through better management, “strong private support,” and “a modest amount of public aid,” the private sector could be preserved. Its proposals, made with support from Gould and Allen and over Bowker’s objections, centered on better coordination between the public and private sectors and a formula for giving direct grants to eligible institutions for general educational purposes. It was the definition of eligibility that eventually brought about profound change among the state’s church-related colleges. The funding formula authorized payments of specified amounts for each degree conferred annually by a private institution with differentials for the appropriate levels and types approximately proportional to average differences in cost—$400 for each bachelor’s or master’s degree and $2,400 for each doctorate. The state’s Roman Catholic and other denominational institutions could qualify only by laicizing their governing boards and amending their charters. Of the 143 private colleges in the state, only 52 were ruled eligible by the Regents under criteria defining “nonsectarianism.” The issue of constitutionality was avoided by rejecting the Blaine Amendment (Article XI, section 3) as too restrictive. Most denominational colleges complied with the new requirements, changing their charters and adding lay members to their boards as the Bundy plan established the principle of granting public monies directly to private institutions for general rather than categorical purposes. Aid was not restricted to New York State residents on the assumption that many private colleges relied on out-of-state students for their enrollments. If aid had been limited in this way, the private and public sectors would have been competing for the same potential students. On June 16, 1968, Rockefeller signed chapter 677 of the education law and the politics of higher education gained a new bargaining chip—Bundy aid. In his message to the legislature, he affirmed the state’s “deep responsibility to help preserve [but not dominate] the values of our private educational system.” Thereafter, at annual budget negotiations, formula increases were traded for CUNY–SUNY operating aid increments. What was not foreseen in either Bundy aid or scholar incentive grants was (a) the magnitude of federal student aid in the 1980s, (b) competition for students as enrollments declined, and (c) the widening tuition gap stemming from the inflationary spiral in college costs that started with the Arab oil embargo in 1973–74.

Rockefeller set up a committee on financing higher education chaired by Norman Hurd, his director of state operations, in November 1971. A draft report issued in February 1972 revealed fundamental disagreements among its members, a diverse group representing CUNY, SUNY, the private sector, and the legislature. Unable to reach consensus over student aid and tuition policy, it recommended the appointment of a task force on future higher education financing. The economics of postsecondary education were changing and attention now shifted to the “new federalism” as public policy. Cost containment, revenue sharing, and state budget freezes became the new directives.
In 1959, New York State’s full faith and credit debt was $912 million; when Rockefeller left office in 1973, it was $3.4 billion. “Expenditures for debt service had grown an astonishing 1,633 percent.” The political arena altered its focus from implementation of existing master plans to resolution of public–private conflicts arising from competition for scarce tax dollars and retention of previous gains. The thrust was now toward access rather than expansion in a system that was being perceived by the Regents and the legislature as overbuilt in relation to revised demographic trends. A new Commissioner, Ewald Nyquist, who had been Allen’s deputy, expressed his concern about escalating budgets and projected enrollment declines. In a strong position paper, the Regents urged Rockefeller, the legislature, and higher education leaders to match resources to enrollment demands. Rockefeller’s tone changed during the state’s fiscal crisis and he froze educational appropriations for the first time in 1971. In a split with the Regents, he appointed his own task force headed by Francis Keppel, a former U.S. Commissioner of Education, to make recommendations on future financing.

The Keppel report, issued to Rockefeller and the legislature in February 1973, recommended uniform tuition at CUNY and SUNY, coordination of state student aid programs with the new federal Basic Educational Opportunity Grants, payment of tuition and fees for low-income students in private colleges through a combination of grants, loans, and work-study, and greater state control over CUNY’s financing and governance. As for the Regents, it proposed a separate statewide planning council to coordinate all postsecondary education and the appointment of all Regents by the Governor; both proposals were promptly shot down by the Regents and the legislature.

Student aid had been designed to equalize public–private tuition differentials but the incremental growth of various aid programs resulted in a diffuse, confusing, and inequitable student aid policy. Keppel sought to rectify these problems by combining several aid programs into one overarching formula. The eventual legislation incorporated several provisions directly benefiting private institutions: An increase in Bundy aid, emergency capitation aid for private medical and dental schools, incentive aid for recruiting more low-income students, emergency aid to the Polytechnic Institute of New York to absorb N.Y.U.’s School of Engineering, and establishment of a Higher Education Services Corporation as a semiautonomous agency to process and coordinate all student aid and loans, removing this function from the Regent’s authority.

In October 1973, on the occasion of SUNY’s 25th anniversary, Rockefeller observed that its presence reached into every corner of the state. Decentralization had brought at least one and sometimes two campuses into most of the state’s counties. His years as Governor had given New York the nation’s largest student aid program, largest private sector, largest public university, the only remaining municipally supported university, and broad-based political support for these enterprises. With 224 autonomous degree-granting colleges and universities, 80,000 faculty members, 500,000 full-time students and 764,000 students in all categories, and operating budgets totaling $2.3 billion, higher education was now a major political and economic force in the state.
Conclusions

What spurred Rockefeller's political ambition and shaped his strategy in support of higher education? How was he transformed from a patrician into a determined, shrewd, and flexible strategist of political action? What were his political skills? In a study of political leadership, James MacGregor Burns defines leadership as an interactive process engaging many persons and constituencies. He distinguishes between transactional and transformational leaders as well as between leaders and powerholders, identifying purpose as the crucial variable in differentiating between these two types. The transactional leader exchanges with another to achieve a short-term objective while the transforming leader induces followers to act for certain goals that represent the values and motivations, wants and needs, aspirations and expectations of both leaders and followers. “The genius of leadership,” he observes, “lies in the manner in which leaders see and act on their own and their followers’ values and motivations.”

Burke suggests the need to move beyond the “great man” theory of leadership to recognize that “personal influence flows in many directions, vertically and horizontally, through complex networks of two-step and multi-step processes.” Leadership in this context becomes an interactive process engaging many persons and occurring in a complex environment. Ultimately, the most lasting tangible act is the creation of an institution that exerts leadership and fosters social change long after the leader has left the scene.

Rockefeller was a transformational leader who used the political process to identify leaders and invest them with the power to carry out mutually compatible goals to which other leaders and followers would adhere. The external environment in the 1960s, when combined with his own education, values, experience, ambition, and resources, enabled him to make the necessary linkages between needs, opportunities, and objectives. Rockefeller was an activist and a problem solver whose style of leadership was appropriate to that time in the state’s history. The link between his statewide actions and his national ambitions cannot be overlooked. He wanted New York to be the premier state in education as well as other areas; he ran for Governor in 1958 expecting to run for President in 1960; he was able to tap the unusual policy-making powers of the Board of Regents; and, because of his great wealth, he could dominate the state Republican Party and the state legislature. As Burns observed: “Political leadership is a product of personal drives, social influences, political motivations, job skills, the structure of career possibilities... fired in the forge of ambition and opportunity.”

Rockefeller adopted the ideas of leading educators of the period, and used his substantial resources and political skills to implement them. He outflanked the Regents and the legislature whom he cultivated assiduously in building the State University, on scholar incentive, and on Bundy aid. He centralized the governorship through tighter administrative control, took a detailed interest in physical planning and in finding financial resources to fund his projects. The times reflected his broadened horizons of the purposes of state government. It was a period of activism and optimism about government’s potential problem-solving role. With his persistence and enthusiasm for the application of new concepts and approaches to intractable problems, and the wealth of resources at his disposal through his social and political connections, he was able to bring about profound change in New York State.

Senator Jacob Javits observed that “Nelson had the biggest mind in what he wanted to achieve, and money’s only value was in what it could accomplish. He used a blend of his own
imagination and the prestige of the Rockefellers with all their national and international connections to attain his objectives." He was persuaded of the need to expand public higher education before he even got to Albany, and this perception was reinforced by Allen, Heald, Gould, Gardner, Bowker, Moore, and others who provided him with the blueprint for carrying out his ambitious plans. He responded to the parallel demands of large and prestigious private institutions through their presidents and trustees, many of whom he knew personally.

While the Board of Regents under Allen’s leadership exercised its historic responsibility for formulating educational policy, it was the Governor who had both the political and fiscal powers to transform viable proposals into legislation and to allocate the needed resources. Rockefeller made the governorship into a highly effective instrument of public policy that could only have occurred with a like-minded, strongly led Board of Regents and legislative support. It was a fortuitous confluence of individuals and agencies interacting in a responsive environment that transformed higher education in the state in the 1960s. Allen was prompted to write to Rockefeller in 1966: “No Governor can boast of a finer record in education than yours, and I am grateful, as I believe all of education in the State is, for the tremendous support you have given us.”

Dewey had established the framework for SUNY in the aftermath of World War II at a time when demand for more schools and colleges was very high. Many of the leaders from that era provided Rockefeller with the background data he needed to formulate a plan for his administration. Two Republican Governors, Dewey and Rockefeller, became the advocates for a public state university, partly due to the political benefits accruing to upstate and suburban counties where their main constituencies were strongest and partly due to pressures from downstate constituencies to expand access for high school graduates.

Harriman’s administration was plagued with financial problems and his reputation as a spendthrift gave Rockefeller an opportunity to present himself to the electorate as an advocate of fiscal responsibility. Yet, ironically, he outspent Harriman in every aspect of state government, raising taxes his first year in office and leaving a legacy of overbuilt campuses and large capital debt. From the outset, the need for access was evident, new federal programs for student aid and construction aid were available, and the national mood was expansionary in response to the postwar baby boom and an optimistic outlook about education as an instrument of social policy, a mood that rapidly changed to one of disillusionment after the student protest movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Rockefeller, the institution builder, wanted a flagship university on a par with California, and a neglected SUNY was ripe to fulfill this function. Political antipathy increased between Democratically controlled New York City and the Republican legislature dominated by upstate and suburban interests. The relationship between CUNY’s Board and the Governor became more fractious as it sought to preserve its entrenched policies and its autonomy while benefiting from state largesse being lavished on SUNY. Ultimately, the private colleges expanded proportionately as they demanded and received more aid. The seventies were characterized by retrenchment, public-private competition, resource scarcity, and a national mood of pessimism in the wake of the struggle for civil rights by the nation’s minorities and of a severe economic recession. When Rockefeller resigned in December 1973, the great and glorious years of the golden age of higher education had already passed into history. The architects of the grand plan were gone and the major players had left the stage—Allen, Bowker, Gould, and Moore. The advent of
federal aid had shifted much of the burden to Washington. By 1975, owing to fiscal crises and demographic changes, the halt to educational expansion was complete.

Nevertheless, Rockefeller's legacy is evident as one travels across the state to visit the sprawling architectural behemoths where normal schools and agricultural institutes once stood. Higher education is a major industry in which competition for tuition and state and federal aid is keen. In the current political climate, accountability, productivity, and quality are considered more appropriate goals. Outmigration and minority access continue to be concerns, but for different reasons. The demographics have changed and the optimistic projections of the Rockefeller era have shifted to population decline exacerbated by attrition, inadequate aid, and public disenchantment with education at all levels.

The fortunate confluence of individuals and events in the sixties led to massive growth of higher education. While the primary beneficiaries were the state colleges, all sectors reaped the rewards and were transformed as a result. Rockefeller was the catalyst for that transformation, motivated both by family tradition and his personal predilection for taking on challenging public issues.

I am simply a man who delights in tackling tough human problems. Nothing delights me so much as facing up to a complex issue, with all its confusion, turmoil, and intensity, and trying to pull together the human resources to deal with it. I like the challenge and excitement of trying to develop concepts within which new and complex issues can be interrelated, reconciled, and solutions can be found.
Notes

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4. The State University of New York consists of 34 state-operated colleges including four university centers, two medical centers, four specialized colleges, 13 arts and science colleges (including Empire State College), six agricultural and technical institutes, five statutory colleges, and 30 community colleges; Appendices to Origins and Development of State University of New York. Albany: State University of New York Office of Institutional Research, September 1977, Appendix G.

5. The City University of New York consists of ten four-year colleges, eight community colleges, one affiliated medical school, and one university center.


7. Education at all levels is under the supervision of the University of the State of New York governed by the Board of Regents. The State Education Department is the Regents' administrative agency and the Commissioner of Education, its chief administrative officer. This framework, which has evolved through constitutional amendment and education laws, is designed to protect the educational system from political interference. However, the 15 Regents who are appointed by the legislature from the state's ten judicial districts, or as at-large representatives, have no taxing powers. This lack of fiscal independence has led to a dichotomy in policy formation, since it is the Governor who proposes the education budget to the legislature and who determines how much revenue should be allocated for each level of educational institution. The Governor, in turn, must accept the commissioner as a member of his cabinet although he does not have direct control over his actions; Interview with Carl Pforzheimer, New York City, June 1982.

8. The original state colleges and their founding dates are: Albany (1844), Buffalo (1867), Brockport (1867), Cortland (1868), Fredonia (1866), Geneseo (1871), New Paltz (1885), Oneonta (1887), Oswego (1867), Plattsburgh (1889), and Potsdam (1867); the professional colleges: Agriculture (1904), Home Economics (1925), Industrial and Labor Relations
(1944), and Veterinary Medicine (1894) at Cornell; Ceramics (1900) at Alfred; Forestry (1911) at Syracuse; and the Maritime College (1913); the agricultural institutes: Canton (1906), Alfred (1908), Morrisville (1908), Delhi (1913), Cobleskill (1911), and Farmingdale (1912); Appendices, Appendix C.


13. Triple Cities College in Endicott had been established in 1946 by Syracuse University to accommodate returning veterans. In 1950, SUNY's Board of Trustees approved its transfer as a four-year liberal arts college, renaming it Harpur College. Its geographic location in the center of New York State and powerful political support in Albany led to its transformation into a university center in neighboring Binghamton in 1962. George Hinman, a close Rockefeller advisor and Edgar Couper, Chancellor of the Board of Regents at the time, were Binghamton residents. In addition, IBM had established a corporate facility in the Binghamton–Endicott area and a university center was viewed as a means of attracting further industrial development.


21. Ibid.

CUNY colleges founded during this time included Baruch (division of CCNY, 1968), John Jay (1964), Lehman (division of Hunter, 1968), Medgar Evers (1970), Richmond (1965), York (1965), Graduate School and University Center (1964), affiliation of Mount Sinai School of Medicine (1967), and five community colleges: Borough of Manhattan (1963), Kingsborough (1963), Hostos (1968), LaGuardia (1970), and New York City Technical College (transferred from SED in 1964).

23. Rockefeller’s paternal grandfather, John D. Rockefeller, established the University of Chicago in 1885, recruiting William Rainey Harper as its first president. He also founded the Rockefeller Institute of Medical Research in 1901, the General Education Board in 1903, the Rockefeller Foundation in 1913, several Baptist colleges, and, through the GEB, the first public schools for blacks in the south. His maternal grandfather, Nelson Aldrich, had been a powerful Senator from Rhode Island for 31 years (1881–1912), including 17 years as Majority Leader. His father, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., became so preoccupied with philanthropy that he turned over his business interests to his sons at the age of 36 in order to devote himself to education, historic restoration, international relations, and scientific research. Both his father and grandfather gave away $1.2 billion to establish various foundations, philanthropic institutions, and charitable activities; Nelson A. Rockefeller, “Statement of Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller,” in Analysis of Philosophy and Public Record of Nelson A. Rockefeller, nominee for Vice President of the United States, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 93rd Congress. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974, pp. 12, 13.

24. Ibid., p. 18.


34. Memorandum of James E. Allen, Jr., to Members of the Board of Regents (June 23, 1960), History File, Commissioner, Box I, Allen Papers, New York State Archives, Albany, N.Y.


36. *Ibid.*, pp. 9–13. The proposal to regionalize the state and city universities into downstate and upstate systems was revived in 1977 in the report of the Temporary State Commission on the Future of Postsecondary Education in New York State (the Wessell Commission), in the aftermath of CUNY's restructuring as a state–operated system.

37. Memorandum of Thomas H. Hamilton to Frank Moore (January 11, 1960), SUNY Archives, Albany, N.Y.

38. Letter of Carroll Newsome to Hamilton (March 16, 1961), SUNY Archives, Albany, N.Y.


40. Extensive coverage of the negotiations on each aspect of the recommendations was provided by *The New York Times* and the *New York Herald Tribune* (1960–61).


44. Moore, "Revised Pc'icy," p. 11.


52. Gross and Murphy, p. 94; Interview with Elizabeth Moore, New York City, June 12, 1982.


55. *Ibid*.


65. The nine programs included Regents College Scholarships; Scholar Incentive Grants; Basic Nursing Scholarships; Regents College Teaching Fellowships; Regents Scholarships for Medical, Dental, and Advanced Nursing; Regents Fellowships for Doctoral Study; Lehman Graduate Fellowships; Scholarships for Children of Deceased and Disabled...
Veterans; and War Service Scholarships; State Education Department, Regents Information Center and New York State, Help for Your College Education. Albany, N.Y.: Executive Chamber, 1972.


68. Ibid., p. 296.


70. Interview with McGeorge Bundy, New York City, June 24, 1952.


72. Ibid., p. 55.

73. Ibid., p. 47.


76. Underwood and Daniels, Governor Rockefeller, p. 167.


82. Ibid., p. 19.

83. Ibid., p. 134.
84. Ibid., p. 454.

85. Ibid., p. 126.

86. Interview with Jacob Javits, Stony Brook, July 12, 1984.
