Members of minority groups in Germany were subjected to extreme forms of repression and in some cases extermination at the hands of the Nazis. Today, for many different reasons, members of minority groups are living in West Germany again. This paper presents the experience of minorities in West Germany since 1945 in light of the following factors: German history, living conditions, language skills, educational situation, political organizations, cultural activities and contributions, and the way minorities see themselves within the society. Minority-majority relations are especially considered as they constitute significant indicators for the political culture of West Germany or any other country. Four different minority groups are examined: Jews, Sinti and Roma (gypsies), Danish, and labor immigrants. The increasing ethnic and cultural diversity of West Germany, and, indeed, all of Europe, is already a fact, but its consequences will depend on the attitudes of the citizens and the public policies pursued. Major policy areas include: the legal status and political rights of minorities, the equality of opportunities in terms of equal access to public goods, and the promotion of minority cultural activities. A 121-item bibliography is included. (DB)
MINORITIES IN GERMANY AFTER 1945

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Minorities in Germany after 1945

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Introduction

Minorities—nationally, ethnically, racially, linguistically, or religiously differentiated from the majority—have always been exposed to various kinds of stereotypes, prejudices, discrimination in terms of political or legal, social, or economic disadvantages or even suppression and extermination.

Mainly fascist, nationalist, religious-fundamentalist movements and governments subscribe to ideologies of racial, national, ethnic, or religious homogeneity (e.g., Nazi-Germany, pre-war Japan; Bulgaria; Iran; Turkey). They often try—in order to maintain the power of the political elite or to gain societal cohesion—to 'produce' an artificial national identity and cultural, linguistic, or religious homogeneity and to exclude or even destroy minority groups (e.g., Iran since the revolution; recently Bulgaria).

Contrary to their own ideology of Marxist-Leninism, based on internationalism, anti-colonialism, and the equality of nationalities, cultures, and minorities, communist governments de facto discriminate against minorities. This becomes especially obvious, when minorities start to call for special rights such as freedom of faith and creed, the right to have their own schools, the public use of their languages, or self-administration, in short: rights which are perceived to undermine the power of the communist party (e.g., China, Romania). But prejudices and discrimination against minorities are not restricted to the ruling party, they seem to be rather widespread within the socialist societies also (e.g., USSR, Yugoslavia).

Finally, within the north-American, Asian, and West-European pluralist democratic societies, various prejudices and tensions, sometimes even violent conflicts characterize the relationships between majorities and their—autochthone or immigrant—minorities (e.g., U.S., Japan, Spain, Italy, France, U.K.). Besides the diversity of de facto discrimination against minorities within democratic societies, even the legal discrimination is not unknown, which becomes especially obvious when minority group members are not nationals and therefore are denied to fully claim the existing political, social, and economic rights.
The idea of the liberal democracy or 'republic' had a cosmopolitan nucleus, it was based on the principal of universal human rights. Everybody was entitled to become citizen of the republic if he or she applied and confessed to the republican constitution. Contrary to the cosmopolitan open republic, the (European) concept of the nation state was legitimized through particularistic national traditions, constituting its identity through separation and integration. Citizenship was based on national characteristics such as language, denomination, common history, or culture and was acquired by descent. While the United States was founded in reference to the idea of universal human rights, it became a really ethnically open cosmopolitan republic not before the end of the second world war, when Catholics and Jews, blacks and immigrants from Eastern Europe and Asia became fully recognized citizens.

Contrary to the North-American development, Europe transformed into a growing number of nation states during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which—nevertheless—did not realize the basic principle of the nation state: national homogeneity and ethnic identity. Because of dynastic rule, a changeable history and its great number of ethnically diverse regions and dispersed minority groups all over Europe, nearly no European nation appears as a linguistically, culturally, or ethnically homogeneous unit (e.g., Spain, Italy, Yugoslavia, Belgium, France, England, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, USSR).

During the last decades, two partly contrary developments emerged in (Western) Europe: regionalism, i.e. the transformation of mostly autochthone ethnic minorities into regional social movements fighting for self-determination and autonomy, and integration, i.e. the slow, but continuous process of interweaving former separate economic, cultural, social, and political systems within the EC and between EC and EFTA. The increasing Europeanization and internationalization of these states is confronted by a growing parochialism, nationalism, xenophobia, and discrimination against aliens; political right-wing extremism got support of up to 12% of the popular vote in the 1989 European election (e.g., Italy: 5.5%; West Germany: 7.1%; France: 11.7%; Belgium: 4.1%; Danmark: 7.1%). The discrimination against ethnic minorities seems to be fed by a mixture of old nationalism, modernization deficits, bureaucratization of EC-politics, social envy and difficulties of some segments of the European societies esp. within the petty bourgeoisie and among unqualified workers.
to adapt to the socio-economic, cultural, and technological change (joblessness, qualification deficits, housing shortages, anonymity, angst etc.).

In this context, the (West) German case appears to be even more complex because of the traumatic experiences of the physical annihilation of minorities, especially the extermination of Jews, Sinti and Roma ("gypsies", "travellers"), but also—not to forget—of mentally handicapped, homosexuals, and political opponents (communists, social-democrats, resistance fighters); experiences which appear to be difficult to come to grips with for both, minority members and majority Germans, still today. 

Because of many reasons, members of different minority groups are living in Germany again. Among them are:

- **national-ethnic minority groups** such as the Poles who immigrated into the Ruhr area some hundred years ago and are meanwhile mostly assimilated and—since the fifties—Italians, Spaniards, Turks, Yugoslavs, and other **labor immigrants** ('guest-workers') from southern and south-eastern Europe and northern Africa;
- Iranians, Palestinians, and many other **political refugee groups** from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and eastern Europe;
- **autochthone national-ethnic minorities** like the Danes and Frisians which have some parallels with the western European regional movements;
- **religious minorities** like Jews, Muslims, etc.;
- **old ethnic immigrant minorities** like Sinti and Roma;
- new immigrants mostly of German origin from Poland, Romania, and the USSR as well as East Germans re-settling in West Germany;
- finally EC-citizens who are entitled to the freedom to move and to work everywhere within the EC.

This paper emerged out of a larger project—started when I returned from Northwestern University in fall 1988 and continuing a long-standing project about labor migration and social development—about minorities in Germany after 1945 which focuses on the political and legal, social, economic, and cultural aspects of the topic. The living conditions of minorities in West Germany, their cultural activities and contributions, the way they see themselves within the society (identity consciousness), and especially the minority-majority relations are interpreted as significant indicators for the political culture of West Germany and any
the given country (social trust, outgoingness, communication, tolerance, attitudes and prejudices). The topic has still another important impact, since positive minority-majority relationships constitute basic preconditions for the process of continuous integration within the European Community.

There was not very much research done about minorities in West Germany during the first post-war decades, perhaps except the Danish minority. The major publications came out during the last 10-15 years; but still today, there is no basic comparative analysis. No doubt that there is much indifference, but also diffidence and awkwardness toward minorities. Research played a terrible role within the Nazi system of annihilating Jews, Sinti and Roma and other minorities, and so-called "gypsy researchers" continued to play a shameful role in supporting administrative discrimination after the war. Official data about national or ethnic group membership is not ascertained, at least not accessible; and empirical research (e.g., about Sinti and Roma) is often confronted with heavy mistrust and rejection of those concerned.

The paper is committed to the concept of pluralism and multiculturalism. Minorities are mainly constituted by their cultural expression and tradition-shaped consciousness; pluralistic societies get their characteristics by the sum of intercultural activities of their various groups and minorities; assimilation policies are regarded as repressive, outmoded, and as failures. Multiculturalism means that minorities and minority group members are not only allowed, but encouraged to maintain and develop their characteristics, culture, religion, or native language, alongside the dominant ones. It is on them to choose among the various options between the extremes of segregation and assimilation. The relationship which incrementally emerged between the Danish minority and majority may serve as an example for other minorities discussed in this paper; but it should be noticed that the historical preconditions differ widely.
Minority: definitions, theories, and concepts

In daily linguistic usage, the term "minority" is mostly related to numbers in and out of a group. Sociologically, this does not make sense, because not the mere factual differentiation, but the social consequences of those differentiations in terms of power or social subordination do matter. Therefore, even "majorities" in terms of numbers can occupy a minority group status when they are denied equal rights and equal access to social positions (e.g., the Flemings in Belgium until the late thirties, or the blacks in South-Africa). Another aspect of the everyday's usage—and linguistic origin—of "minority" is inferiority or low-quality. The term minority addressed to ethnically etc. differentiated groups therefore includes a devaluation and a positive valuation of the majority.

A minority is generally defined as a group of people, differentiated from others in the same society by language, religion, culture, history, nationality, race, or ethnicity. Both, minority and majority think of themselves as a differentiated group and are thought of by the others as a differentiated group often with negative connotations. Minorities are lacking social or political power and therefore are subject to certain exclusions and discriminations. Dominating groups, even if differentiated by racial or other characteristics and limited to a small number of members (e.g., members of colonial powers; white South-Africans), are not "minorities", following this definition. Not numbers, but consequences drawn from social differentiations matter. Differential treatments and discriminations happen with regard to social, economic, cultural, political, or legal aspects.

Minority definitions in the context of international law often refer to the citizenship as a necessary precondition of a minority. Minority rights and legal claims against possible discrimination thus are bound to the status of being citizens.

In this sense, the UN-Sub-Commission on Discrimination and Minorities defined 'minority' as "a group numerically smaller than the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members—being citizens of the state[sic]—possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics, differing from those of the other members of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed
towards preserving their culture, traditions, or language."68

The Sub-Commission obviously was unable to consent on a minority definition extended to non-citizens and so limiting the states to discriminate legally against foreign residents. Most governments are very reserved to recognize refugee and immigrant groups as minorities which they want to become assimilated. The restrictive definition of minorities within the present international law does not reflect the international individual human rights and is scarcely adequate for analyzing the reality of political, social, economic, or even legal discrimination, since minorities sometimes have been denied for centuries to acquire the citizenship (for instance, Koreans in Japan or Jews in different European states until the nineteenth century). In consequence, just in serious cases of discrimination, 'foreigners' are excluded from referring to minority rights. Any restrictive definition of minority serves the interests of the majority or of its ruling elites to refuse minorities to express special needs and to claim special rights. Labor immigrants and other non-citizens who do not keep the passport of the country they are living in therefore constitute national minorities if they are differentiated as those by the majority and if they understand themselves as minorities.69

The terms "minority" or "majority", when related to really existing different social groups, are merely constructs. First, because there is neither the minority as a closed and homogeneous group which follows precise, unchangeable and unchallenged norms and which is certain of its identity, nor the majority as a group unified by common values, traditions and behavior. Second, because the mere fact or social (ethnic, etc.) differentiation is politically and sociologically irrelevant. While religious differentiation led to discrimination, exclusion, persecution, and physical destruction in many historical societies--the European history between Enlightenment and the nineteenth century can be described as a struggle to eliminate any discrimination with reference to religious diversity--social (i.e., national, linguistic, or ethnic) minority groups emerged when the concept of the nation state was carried through. This concept considered ethnic differences relevant; it differentiated between in-group members who fully enjoyed all citizens' rights and out-group members of an inferior status, thus it strengthened the process of building segregated group identities. Most European nations still today follow the sometimes modified Jus sanguinis principle (citizenship is acquired by descent) contrary to the Jus soli (law of the soil) which prevails in traditional
immigrant societies.

The central point of this minority concept is that minorities are constituted by ascription and that the group identity is mainly subjective (identity belief). People of different languages, religions or nationalities may have lived together for a very long time, amalgamating, assimilating or staying separate, without differentiating themselves as “minority” or “majority” groups and discriminating against each other. Therefore a minority must not have produced a long-standing group identity, it can come into existence just as a result of changing social definitions. Variations in respect to language, religion, or ethnicity could have been considered irrelevant, until political events such as the ideology to organize societies homogeneously on the base of certain 'national-ethnic' or 'racial' characteristics sharpened the existing distinctions and made them politically, legally, economically, culturally or socially relevant. Against members of the group singled out was discriminated where or when race, religion, language, or ethnicity were considered important. Especially ethnic differentiation from without produces community consciousness and a feeling of identity from within; social differentiation is combined with cleavages and closings. Discrimination against minorities happens when social or national unity is thought to be endangered, when pluralism, liberalism, or existing differences in regard to language, race, culture, or religion are not recognized values and minorities are available as scapegoats.7

In Europe, it was the nation state of the early nineteenth century which produced the doubtful concept of national (which could be a linguistic, cultural, or ethnic) identity which differentiated members of that society who did not fulfill these criteria and made them a minority (e.g., the Bretons in France,8 the Danes or Poles in Germany,9 the Germans in Poland).10 It was and still is the nation state which awards civil rights only to citizens and restricts the access to the national territory of would-be immigrants in reference to the criteria of assimilation to the ‘national identity’. Shortly, minorities may be definable with respect to objective criteria, but they are groups produced and socially defined with respect to certain historical events (e.g., the emancipated and assimilated German Jewry through the Nazi persecution). This means that their existence is to be seen as a reaction to certain experiences and conditions.
**Jews in Germany**

It was not yet possible to enclose the planned paragraph about the Jewish minority in West Germany which we are still working on.

In 1987, the 66 local Jewish communities (1989: 64) had about 28,000 members; an additional 25,000 unregistered Jews are thought to be living in the Federal Republic. This is about 10% of the pre-1933 Jewish population of 500,000 in Germany. In East Germany, there are less than 600 registered Jews in eight communities; the number of unregistered is not known. The composition of the West German Jewish community is rather heterogenous: there are survivors of the Holocaust, former DP's who stayed in Germany, and refugees who returned since 1945, post-war born Israelis of German descent who immigrated since the sixties, and especially many post-war or recent arrivals from eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Most Jewish communities today are primarily communities of Jewish immigrants; about 10% of the West German Jews only live in the tradition of "German Jews". They maintain their own religious, cultural, educational, and social institutions, are represented in TV and radio councils, and publish own newspapers and periodicals.

As with the other minorities, the project deals with the legal and socio-economic situation, with stereotypes, prejudices, discrimination, and discrimination perceptions, with the history, the post-war and current developments, with Jewish institutions and organizations, with their societal and political role. A major focus will be on how the Jewish community as a whole and especially how its single members have coped with the Nazi persecution, the Holocaust, survival and residence in Germany, and with the post-war German society which leads into the complex question of Jewish identity in Germany today ("German Jews", "Jews in Germany").
Sinti and Roma

Today some 40-50,000 Sinti ("German gypsies") are living in West Germany. Since they do not settle together nor live in a reservation, they belong to a Streumünorität (scattered minority). They are descendants of those "gypsies" who left today's northwest India nearly 1,000 years ago and have migrated into Germany during the 15th century and since then. The about 10-20,000 Roma are descendants of eastern and south-eastern European "gypsies" who arrived and stayed in Germany during the second half of the last century. Besides these two major groups, there is a small group of nomadic Yugoslav, Polish and Hungarian Roma which because of political, social, or economic reasons migrated into West Germany during the last two decades. An unknown number of Turkish and Yugoslav labor immigrants are ethnic Roma, often covering their ethnic background, because they fear socio-economic and administratively discrimination.

German Sinti and Roma are often thought to be Landfahrer, travellers or nomads, but they mostly settled down some generations ago, mainly since the industrialization. Only about 10% of the Sinti travel during the whole year; travelling of the newly immigrated Roma seems to be still more widespread. The about 8-10,000 Jenische, a small, Jenisch or Rotwelsch speaking minority group, mainly rove around southern Germany, although most of them have a fixed abode often at the fringes of the cities. Their professions—many are artistes and showmen on fairs, some are traders, craftsmen or basket-makers, etc.—and their living conditions such as education, housing, income, unemployment rate and social discrimination are similar to the Sinti and Roma. During the Nazi rule, they were persecuted as "white gypsies".

On the background of an originally common ethnic-linguistic history, the different Sinti and Roma tribes developed various dialects and cultural traditions. Despite some common traditions, Sinti and Roma in West Germany today are culturally and linguistically clearly distinguishable groups which live apart of each other. But today probably only a minority among them can still be assessed as ethnically and culturally autonomous. Many Sinti and Roma are bilingual, i.e. they speak German and Romanes. But
since Romanes, mainly used within the families only and therefore not perceived as an own language by the majority society, did not become a written language until recently and because the knowledge of German is often limited and restricted to the spoken language, many Sinti and Roma are illiterate.  

First often welcomed, Sinti and Roma became victims of discrimination, repression, and persecution in all European countries already during the 15th century. The development of close group ties, continuous travelling and the focus on specific professions and trade helped them to survive, but fixed them to the fringes of the society. First systematic attempts to integrate and assimilate them were started in Germany during the 18th century. The policy of settling them down combined with "education to regular work and Christian family-life" and compulsory schooling for the children was actively supported by the churches. But during the 19th century finally, it proved to be a complete failure, because it was mostly perceived as repression and force; and the policy followed only the interest of assimilation without any consideration for the Sinti language, traditions, and way of life. 

The societal and administrative pressure to assimilate did not stop until today, but the living conditions of the Sinti and newly immigrated Roma temporarily ameliorated during the 19th century, when they were able to offer goods and services demanded by the rural population. The increasing industrialization changed the living conditions significantly; administrative reglementation, control and registration of the nomadic "gypsies" were introduced and consequently the pressure to settle down grew. Some German states, for instance, introduced laws "against gypsies, travellers, and the workshy" (e.g., Bavaria 1926, Hesse 1929) which introduced the duty to register with the local authorities or the restricted-residence permission, simply prohibited travelling (Hesse) or created a licence requirement for travelling even in small groups (Bavaria).

But for the National socialism even these measures of harsh repression and compulsory assimilation were unappropriate; the Nazis declared the "gypsies" as and "inferior race", defamed as antisocial and criminal (Nuremberg Race Laws of 1935). Since 1936, the Sinti and Roma were "race-biologically" examined and registered (e.g., Reich Race Hygiene
Institute under Robert Ritter. 19 "Legitimized" with "criminal-preventive" reasons, many Sinti and Roma were interned between 1938 and 1940 (Festsetzungserlaß of 1939), sterilized and resettled within the General-gouvernment Poland (Umsiedlungserlaß of 1940), since 1942 deported to Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen and other death-camps (Himmler's Auschwitz-Erlaß of 1942). 20

It is estimated that roughly 500,000 European Sinti and Roma were victims of the Nazi persecution and killed during the Holocaust. This fact still today has very strong subjective (affective) and objective (structural) consequences. Many cases of psychologically determined disturbances which go back to the traumatic experiences of the death camps are reported among members of the victim generation as well as of the second generation. 21 There is a deeply rooted mistrust against the 'state', be it federal or state administration, police, military, local authorities, or universities. This mistrust was fed by a more or less unbroken 'administrative practice', distrust and lack of empathy for the life-style and behavior of the "gypsies" on the side of police and local offices after the war.

Some of the "gypsy researchers" who had played a terrible role in undertaking "race-biological" research and in selecting minority group members for extermination continued to work as "police advisers" and experts in compensation cases after 1949. 22 "Gypsies" were again defamed as criminal, workshy, and inferior. Nazi registration, persecution, and internation were longtime justified as criminal prosecution, not racial persecution. Discrimination against Sinti and Roma stayed on the agenda in most European countries, therefore they lacked the outside pressure and domestic political interests which supported early compensation payments for Israel and individual Jewish victims since the early fifties. A decree of the Baden-Württemberg interior ministry, for instance, formally instructed the compensation offices about its internal checking of compensation claims of "gypsies" and "half-bred gypsies"; accordingly, these persons were not regarded as primarily racially prosecuted, but because of their antisocial behavior. 23 In the same tradition, an infamous Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) ruling stated in 1956 that gypsies tended toward criminality, esp. larceny and fraud, that they were lacking the ethicly founded respect toward private property, and that racial courses of persecution did not play a role before Himmler's
Auschwitz-Decree of 1942.\textsuperscript{23a}

It took a long time from the first \textit{Federal Compensation Law} of 1956 for the victims of the Nazi persecution to the \textit{Federal Hardship Fund Decree} of 1981 to compensate hardship cases of non-Jewish Nazi victims, a fund which is--different to the similar fund for the Jewish Nazi victims of 1980--administered by the federal minister of finances and the county manager (\textit{Regierungspräsident}) of Cologne. Until today, the system to compensate the Sinti and Roma victims of the Nazi persecution is inappropriate; it turns out to be bureaucratic, petty, and inhumane. The volume of the single payments is inadequate, and these payments, regarded as income, might be balanced with social security claims, only partly limited by a 1986 reform.\textsuperscript{24} The \textit{Central Council of the Sinti and Roma in Germany} is protesting against the discriminating compensation of its members since its foundation; despite some limited success (e.g., the Federal Parliament debate on the Sinti and Roma in 1986)\textsuperscript{25} and the parliamentary initiatives of SPD and Greens,\textsuperscript{26} this question or even the long-standing demand to delegate Sinti and Roma representatives in the \textit{Beirat} or \textit{Fund Council} could not yet be settled.

It took until 1982 that a Federal Government--Chancellor Helmut Schmidt--officially recognized the Nazi annihilation of the European Sinti and Roma as genocide and crime against humanity. Predecessor chancellors and federal presidents still had declined to receive Sinti and Roma delegations.\textsuperscript{27}

Through the Holocaust, the tradition-oriented and family-conscious Sinti and Roma not only lost a great part of the older generations, but continuously suffer breaks and losses of cultural and linguistic transmission, mainly because they cannot refer to written sources. In consequence, but probably also as a result of continuous assimilation processes within the modern consumer society, many Sinti and Roma families speak German and are no longer able to use Romanes.\textsuperscript{28}

Already during the thirties, nearly one third of the Sinti were settled; today about 90\% of the Sinti and Roma population have a permanent residence.\textsuperscript{29} Mainly Roma of Hungarian, Polish and Yugoslav origin are still semi-nomadic, but a significant number of Sinti and Roma
prefer to travel during the summer or at least during the summer vacation.

The socio-economic situation of most Sinti and Roma families is bad; automation and supermarkets restricted traditional gypsy professions as peddlers, travelling dealers and traders. Besides some 15% well-to-do Sinti and Roma merchants, well educated and assimilated middle-class professionals, most “gypsies” live under very poor conditions; many earn only a small living or depend on social security. The unemployment rate seems to be very high (25%; the current average unemployment rate is below 7%). Many Sinti and Roma trade in scrap metal, antique, textiles, carpets, used cars; some are musicians, artisans and artists. Sinti and Roma are mainly self-employed; only about 20% are employees, and white-collar workers mostly cover their ethnic-cultural identity in order to protect themselves against anticipated stereotypes and discrimination.

The housing conditions are insufficient. About one half of the Sinti and Roma have houses or apartments within the cities. Related to the low-income of many Sinti and Roma, most of these apartments are sub-standard. About 25-30% live in “gypsy settlements” or in Schlichtwohnungen (sub-standard houses) together with the homeless and other fringe groups. Nomadic Sinti and Roma still live in trailers in mostly inadequate trailer parks, where only a few water fountains, showers, and toilets are available; often they are spoon-fed and harrassed by the local authorities and police. If they live in sub-standard apartments or on ‘special’ camp grounds, their neighborhoods are mostly overburdened with social conflicts and are characterized by the lack of a decent socio-cultural infrastructure. During the summer period, travelling Sinti and Roma have difficulties to get access to modern public or private camp grounds which are restricted to ‘tourists’.

The inadequate infrastructure and other socio-economic conditions, generally typical for people from the lowest social classes, seem to be the major variables which maintain the low social status of most of the Sinti and Roma: Poor housing and living conditions limit educational and job opportunities and restrict the life chances. As already mentioned, many Sinti and Roma adults are illiterate in German and in Romanes; the education of their children is insufficient, partly related to travelling during the summer, mainly a consequence of the aforementioned socio-
economic conditions, of educational, vocational and administrative discrimination, and of social prejudices.

The Sinti and Roma neither maintain nor demand own private schools which as they fear would increase social isolation and discrimination. Regular public school attendance is rather high when compared with other European countries; but about one fourth of the Sinti and Roma students are enrolled in special schools for the educationally or socially handicapped. Since only some 3% of the other young Germans are taught in those schools, language and learning difficulties are quickly put forward as an excuse for social rejection and discrimination within the "regular" classes. This seems to be comparable with the children of immigrant workers in particular and from the under-classes in general. The general and vocational education of the Sinti and Roma parents and their motivation mainly influence education and job opportunities of their children; about 80% of the adults never finished or even went to school, more then one third cannot read and write. On the other hand, the school performance and educational opportunities of middle-class Sinti and Roma children do not significantly differ from those of the majority society.

The insufficient general education explains the low level of vocational qualification, since access to more demanding apprenticeships depends on the performance at the Hauptschule (lower branch of the tripartite high school). Cities which started special Sinti housing and schooling programs, show significantly better results in general and vocational education.

The Sinti and Roma civil rights movement emerged in 1979. But the first post-war organizations of the Sinti and Roma were already founded during the fifties. The Association of the Racially Prosecuted of non-Jewish Denomination, founded in 1956 by Vinzenz Rose, was a first organizational attempt to represent material claims of the Sinti. The Central Committee of Gypsies (1956), later Gypsies International, represented mainly foreign, recently immigrated Roma who fought for compensation payments and their German citizenship, similar to the International Gypsy Right Commission, founded in 1968. Since the Sinti did not feel represented by the Commission, the Assembly of German Gypsies (1969) decided to revive the Association, since 1971 Central Committee of Sinti of West Germany and today Association of German Sinti, which has regional organizations in different states. Its goals are the legal equality of Sinti and non-Sinti, the preservation and development of
traditions and customs of the Sinti; compensation payments and pensions for the Nazi-victims; the establishment of decent appartments and houses; unrestricted access to camp grounds; finally, the creation of a Holocaust memorial. The Sinti (also Cinti or Sindhi) Union, founded in 1980, mainly works for the defence of the independent Sinti culture. In the same year, the comprehensive Roma and Sinti Union was founded in order to offer "active help for self-help". Besides them, some small Sinti and Roma associations (e.g., Roma-Forum) exist on the federal, state, and local level.

Until the end of the seventies, all these organizations did not find much public resonance and had no major success; neither politicians (even Chancellor Willy Brandt or Federal President Gustav Heinemann were not prepared to receive a delegation) nor churches nor other social organizations contacted or collaborated with the Sinti and Roma representations. This isolation was broken, when contacts among the Association of German Sinti, the International Romani Union, and the German Society for Threatened Peoples opened the way for a systematic campaign for the civil rights of the Sinti and Roma in Germany.

The 1979 commemoration for the Sinti and Roma victims of the Nazi rule on the ground of the former death-camp Bergen-Belsen, joined by various representatives of the Jewish community, the Christian churches and some federal and state government representatives, made the Sinti and Roma organizations and their demands publicly known.

Other activities, e.g. the Sinti hunger strike in the Dachau memorial about the files of the Race Hygiene Institute, its use by and in general the role of the former Munich-based Landfahrerzentrale (travellers' center),37 and the continued illegal practice of the state interior ministries to maintain "gypsy" or "ethnic data files", drew much national and international attention.

The Third Roma World Congress, hosted by the Association of German Sinti and the International Romani Union, led to the foundation of the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma, an umbrella organization of most of the Sinti and Roma organizations and institutional member of the International Romani Union.

In 1983, the headquarter of the Central Council, funded by the Federal Government, was opened in Heidelberg; it acts as the mouthpiece of all German Sinti and Roma and counterpart for offices, organizations and individuals. A new self-consciousness of the Sinti and Roma emerged. The generational change among the Sinti and Roma leadership and within
the majority society, the new social movements, many contacts to political parties, esp. SPD (working group Sinti and Roma) and Greens, churches and the media, and a growing public interest describe the situation since the mid-eighties.

Traditionally, Romans was only a spoken language; but during the last decades a written language was developed. Publications which came out during the last two decades are mostly in German. The Central Council maintains a small library which is not yet publicly accessible. The Sinti and Roma do not have an own newspaper, but a quarterly is edited since 1986. Finally, the Sinti and Roma Union edits a newsletter for its members.

Nearly all Sinti and most Roma are German citizens. Some Sinti statements express a certain pride about their 600-year history in Germany, so indirectly claiming something like an "autochthone Germanness". Some Sinti and Roma are stateless, partly because the Nazis stripped them of their German citizenship, without regaining their former legal status; and the newly immigrated Roma from Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland do not keep German passports. Some publicly discussed problems emerged recently, when the Hamburg state government tried to deport some Yugoslav Roma families who failed to get the recognition as political refugees, an action that caused much support by church communities and local groups and led to a tacit connivence by the authorities.

As far as sources are available, they seem to confirm a very distinctive identity consciousness of the Sinti and probably of the Roma also, based on common history, traditions and customs, on language or idiom. We can assume that the common experience of suppression and prosecution during the Nazi rule and continuous discrimination thereafter significantly contribute to the feeling of a common identity. There is not much doubt that the majority society ascribes to them a minority group identity, probably less based on cultural, but on ethnic-racial and life-style attributes.

Sinti and Roma, questioned about contacts and relations between their minority and the majority, mainly refer to 'technical problems' with the authorities; but business and work-place or housing and daily-life
related issues are reported also. Contacts with police, local and state authorities (e.g., about compensation and pension payments, social aid, identity documents) are mostly perceived as extremely negative, but mistrust against universities and research is similarly deep-rooted. Sinti and Roma mention various kinds of discrimination and wholesale prejudices or suspicions of criminal acts. Some employees and self-employed in "bourgeois" professions still fear mistrust and prejudices if they were admitting their ethnic identity. Personal contacts esp. of the lower-class Sinti and Roma who live in homeless or "gypsy" ghettos with the majority are rare. Sometimes even small neighborhood conflicts seem to lead in general defamatory statements. The situation seems to be different with middle-class Sinti and Roma who report about adequate relationships. Only few Sinti and Roma actively participate in public life or keep memberships in public clubs and organizations.

Many current problems of the minority are related to its general low social status and the danger of continuous impoverishment: illiteracy or at least unsufficient literacy; inadequate general education, lack of vocational education; low income; joblessness; no decent housing; inappropriate living environment leading youth into drugs, drug dealing and other kind of criminality. In addition, the scattered settlement of Sinti and Roma undermines the traditional close family and tribe contacts; and especially the young tend to lose language and cultural traditions.

There is no comprehensive public policy concept for this minority. Besides some local housing and labor projects, the federal government and the states support, at least since the mid-eighties, the attempts to preserve and develop the independent Sinti and Roma cultures. This seems to be very important because the scattered minority with a high percentage of low-class membership heavily depends on external support. Organized cultural activities of the Sinti and Roma associations are still at the beginning and mainly supported by a few only, since the civil-right struggle absorbed most activities during the eighties. There is a focus on the promotion of Sinti and Roma music, and activities to develop craft, trade, the arts, language and life-styles.

Near Landau (Rhineland-Palatinate), for instance, a Sinti arts and crafts cooperative (Kunsthandwerkstatt Pfälzer Sinti) which collaborates with the College of Art in Karlsruhe serves the education of young as well
as the promotion and further education of adult Sinti artists (e.g., wood and stone cutters, painters, music instrument builders, restaurateurs). Sinti representatives are involved in the development of projects which integrate housing and work facilities corresponding to the cultural traditions of the Sinti (e.g., in Freiburg). Plans to offer language courses for young Sinti and Roma are not yet implemented.

The major cultural initiative of the Association of German Sinti (Dachau 1980) and since 1982 of the Central Council has been the project of a comprehensive cultural center, finally founded in 1988, run by the "Kulturzentrum der Sinti und Roma e.V." at the headquarters of the Council in Heidelberg, and sponsored by the non-profit Freudenberg Foundation until December 1988.42

The cultural center shall symbolize the new self-consciousness of Sinti and Roma and represent their identity as an old German cultural minority with equal rights and freedoms. But concept as well as financing of the center were longtime a source of many controversies: it should be a center for information, education, documentation, and research, or a political forum of national and international civil-right activities, or only a place for communication and cultural activities among Sinti and Roma alone. Further controversies were about the question of centralization or regionalization, public or private funding, accessibility for the general public or only those concerned. Finally, the idea itself was longtime controversial, since some Sinti and Roma have been still very distrustful about the outcome of any public activity of the Central Council, any public self-portrayal, any kind of publicity about their interests, and any research about themselves.

But meanwhile the Central Council obviously got a rather broad support by most German Sinti and Roma organizations, only opposed by the Lower Saxonian Association of German Sinti, a circumstance which allowed the federal government to transfer the first public funds for the Cultural Center of the Sinti and Roma.42a
Danish Minority

The numbers of "Danes" in northern Germany (Schleswig region) who mainly live in the greater Flensburg area, differ related to terms, criteria and sources. There are only a few thousand Sprachdänen ("language Danes") who speak Danish (and German) and understand themselves as a national-Danish minority of German citizenship; and there are about 50-60,000 Gesinnungsdänen ("conviction Danes") who are not or no longer able to speak Danish, but maintain close cultural and emotional ties to Danmark and feel themselves attached to a 'nordic, Scandinavian way-of-life'.

Different to every other European nationality group or national minority, the "Danes" in (South) Schleswig as well as the "Germans" in southern Danmark (North-Schleswig) cannot be clearly defined through language, descent, culture or ethnicity. The former speak German as colloquial speech and are German citizens, only a very small number still speak Danish within the families, some refer to Danish in their clubs, churches and schools; accordingly, the latter speak Danish, keep Danish passports, and may use German for their personal affairs.

The political border between Danmark (South Jutland) and Germany (Schleswig-Holstein) never constituted an ethnic-linguistic or since the emergence of the nation state a clear national border. Since the high middle ages, Schleswig was a transitional area with a mixed population. The Duchy of Schleswig whose northern border followed the small Königsau river and the Duchy of Holstein were linked to the Danish Crown through personal union since 1460, when the Danish King Christian I was elected Duke of Schleswig and Earl of Holstein by the knights of Schleswig-Holstein. But the territories became not integrated part of the Danish Empire. The language of administration and trade was High German, the 'burghers' spoke German, the peasants in the northern part Danish and Frisian, otherwise Low German. Since the mid-nineteenth century, when German became more wide-spread, nationalist Danish and German movements tried to integrate Schleswig either into Danmark or into Germany. In 1848, an independent Schleswig-Holstein government was formed which led to a three-year war with Danmark, won by the latter. Five years later, the Danish constitution included Schleswig, contrary to
the London Statement of 1852.

The originally dynastic feud about the two duchies, their relationship between each other, to the Danish Crown and to the German Federation now transformed into a national conflict which led into the 1864 German-Danish war, lost by Danmark. When in 1867 Prussia annexed the two provinces which claimed the status of an independent German state within the newly created North-German Federation, the new Danish-German 'national' border along the Königsau created a Danish minority in Schleswig (Germany) which fought for the reunification of Schleswig with Danmark.

The present border goes back to the Articles 109-114 of the Versailles Peace Treaty which demanded a popular vote in two zones of the northern half of Schleswig. Because of a Danish majority and an en-bloc count within the first zone, the most northern part of Schleswig (North-Schleswig) was yielded to Danmark in 1920, despite a pro-German vote in some 40 communities of its central and western part. Nazi Germany which had occupied Danmark between 1940 and 1945 did not touch the border of 1920 inspite of the demands of the German North-Schleswigers. The breakdown of Nazi Germany, nevertheless, had significant consequences for the German minority in Danmark of which many had collaborated with the German occupation power.

The British occupation government as well as the Danish parliamentary majority and government—except the short-living Cabinet Kristensen 1946-47—resisted Danish nationalist attempts during the forties to demand the formal annection of South-Schleswig. Because of extensive financial support and food deliveries from the economically flourishing and undestroyed Danmark and the now full knowledge of the Nazi crimes, the organization of the Danish minority, the South-Schleswig Association (SSV), became very popular. Its membership grew up from 2,700 in May 1945 to 75,000 in 1948, but fell down already since the mid-fifties to 22,000 in 1970. During the seventies, the membership stayed on the level of 21,000 (1980s: 19-20,00). The SSV which the British temporarily granted the status of a political party during the first 1947 state parliament elections got nearly 100,000 votes and won 6 mandates. The South-Schleswig Voters Union (SSW) which followed the SSV as the political party of the Danish minority got 75,000 votes (5.4% of the vote in Schleswig-Holstein) in the first Bundestag elections in 1949.
The British Military Administration and the German political parties did not look at the Neudänentum (new Danes movement) of the forties as a primarily national, but social movement related to the political, social, and economic post-war situation. As a consequence of the fast political and economic stabilization of Schleswig-Holstein and West Germany, but also of the new-settlement of refugees from the lost East German territories which increased the 'German' population, the electoral support for the Danish minority went down. It leveled off in accordance to the reduced SSV membership and thus prepared the preconditions for the existence as a permanent minority. When the political aspirations of the activists within the Danish minority during the first post-war decade to integrate South-Schleswig into Danmark had fully proved to be an illusion and the Neudänentum turned out to be only a transitional phenomenon, its aims since the German-Danish minority agreements in 1955 were "to stay as Danish as possible". But this rigid attitude became more flexible since the seventies when a more independent regional self-understanding and regional-cultural identity emerged. But doubtlessly, the minority—in order to preserve its different identity and not to become completely assimilated—continues to maintain very close links to Danmark.

The first major step on the way to a permanent settlement of the minority problems in both parts of Schleswig was the Kiel Declaration of the Schleswig-Holstein state government of 1949 which came out as the result of talks with Danish minority representatives. The declaration anticipated already all major principles of the later 1955 German-Danish agreements about status and rights of the two minorities. Its four paragraphs confirmed the basic human rights, outlined the minority rights, established a minority committee, and finally emphasized the same rights of the Frisian minority.

In reference to the Basic Law or Federal Constitution of 1949, it stressed that everybody, and therefore the members of the Danish minority also, without respect to the language preferred, had the same basic rights and freedoms. According to these principles, it stated that the conviction to be Danish and the belief in the Danish people and culture were free and might neither be verified nor registered officially. The use of the Danish language was unrestricted. A law would lay down the use of Danish at the courts and with the authorities. The minority was entitled to have Danish kindergartens, schools and institutions of adult education and should have
adequate access to the media; parents were free to choose between private or public schools. Danish private schools should teach German also and would offer the degrees of the public German schools. A special committee was established to check proposals and complaints of the Danish minority.

Since a common agreement with the Danish government was still out of reach, the statement expressed the expectation that Danmark would guarantee the same rights and freedoms to the German minority.\textsuperscript{49} The forthcoming German NATO membership and especially the fact that the Danish minority failed to pass the five-percent hurdle and lost its state-parliamentary representation in 1954 led to talks between the two governments in Bonn and Copenhagen about mutual declarations which were adopted by the two parliaments.\textsuperscript{50}

Both statements referred to Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 and repeated the major principles of the one-sided Kiel Statement of 1949, especially its cornerstone of the "subjective minority right". This meant: The affiliation to the Danish or German minorities depended on the subjective expression of will to belong to it only; in short: "Dane [German] is who wants to be a Dane [German]" (principle of Optionsminderheit or optional minority). Both minorities are basically guaranteed the same rights; and, but only implicitly, both governments recognized the existing border as definite.\textsuperscript{51}

The Schleswig-Holstein parliament had rose the 5%-clause up to 7.5% in 1951, but was forced to returned to 5% by a Federal Constitutional Court ruling in 1952.\textsuperscript{52} A second attempt of the SSW, the Danish minority party, to fight the 5% minimum hurdle for parliamentary representation also, failed in 1954.\textsuperscript{53} Because of the decline of the so-called New-Danes Movement, the SSW got only 3.5% of the vote in the 1954 state elections. Yet, when the Bonn and Copenhagen Statements were adopted, the Schleswig-Holstein parliament fully exempted the SSW of any minimum clause. Consequently, the SSW got again a parliamentary representation in Kiel, since 1962 with only one deputee. Hopes that Danmark which has no federal system would exempt the German Schleswig Party from the 2%-clause of the Danish Folketing or national parliamentary elections did not fulfill.\textsuperscript{54}

Since 1955, both sides have modified their minority policies toward active support and thus significantly increased their financial subsidies for educational and cultural facilities and activities of the two
minorities.55

The socio-economic situations of minority and majority do not differ. There is no significant social-class affiliation of the Danish minority, besides the general fact that middle-class members generally more often join organizations and ask for educational or cultural services. School participation figures for the secondary level confirm a social-class structure of the Danish minority which corresponds to that of the majority.

The Danish School Association for South-Schleswig maintains 63 kindergartens with about 1,900 students and in total 54, mostly six-year elementary schools, linked with Hauptschulen, additionally four Realschulen (middle level high schools), and one Gymnasium (upper level high school) with a dormitory. These schools are legally private, but 100% publicly funded56 and supervised by the ministry of education in Kiel. The enrollment figures declined until the mid-eighties; currently about 5,200 students are enrolled (Grund- und Hauptschulen: 3,300; Realschulen: 950; Gymnasien: 850; special schools for the handicapped: 300).57 In accordance to the Optionsminderhet principle, kindergartens, pre-school courses and schools are open to everybody. Danish is the regular school language: all subjects except German are taught in. The Association employs some 550 school teachers, educated in Danmark or in Germany, and about 100 kindergarten teachers.

Institutional focus of the Danish minority's cultural activities are the Helmvolkshochschule (adult education center, 'folk high school') in Jarplund and the Danish Central Library for South-Schleswig in Flensburg with some local branches. Structure and concept of these institutions correspond to those in Danmark, both are part of the national Danish library and adult education systems, but are funded by the users and the Copenhagen and Kiel governments, facts which circumscribe the quality of the minority-majority relationships best. After a period of decline, the library could increase the lending figures significantly; library and adult education center offer Danish language courses. The latter has a broad program of shorter and longer courses up to five months, the so-called winter-school program. According to the Grundtvig concept of Danish Helvolkshochschule,58 this program combining liberal arts, social sciences, and creative activities primarily aims at personality develop-
ment of the participants who mainly come from Danmark.

The SSV with its 130 local branches and 36 culture and assembly halls is the main organizer and sponsor of cultural activities of the Danish minority (theater, music, exhibitions, lectures, etc.). Its goals are to "keep a vivid connection with Danmark, esp. North-Schleswig, and Scandinavia, to promote the Danish life-style, and to spread the knowledge about Schleswig". It closely collaborates with the Association of National Frisians with nearly 1,000 members. The Danish Church in South-Schleswig, an association of Lutheran Danish parishes, contributes—supported by the (German) Protestant Church of Schleswig-Holstein—to the Danish cultural life. Other organizations of the minority are the South-Schleswig Danish Youth Organizations as an umbrella of 65 clubs and some 11,000 members; various agricultural, language, arts, and women organizations; the Danish Health Service for South-Schleswig; a credit bank, and a small, meanwhile bilingual newspaper (Flensborg Avis). The activities of all 27 Danish organizations, associated with the SSV, are coordinated by a Common Council.

The already mentioned liberal-oriented SSW, political party of the Danish South-Schleswigers, is besides the Bavaria Party the only regional party in contemporary Germany, but only the SSW as a minority representation is freed of the 5% minimum clause. Only in 1949, the SSW got one seat in the Bundestag (5.4%); since then, a special committee keeps contact with the federal government. With about 1.5% of the popular vote in Schleswig-Holstein during the eighties, the SSW just acquired one of the very last mandates in the state parliament; but 101 SSW deputees are members of local and county parliaments. The SSW with its local sub-organizations is active only in the (South) Schleswig region. Its 1961 manifesto overcame the rigid Danmark orientation and limitation to the representation of Danish minority interests of the early years. Now, it covers a broader field of regional domestic politics; as a liberal party, it is ideologically closer to SPD than CDU. Its opening to voters of the majority turns out to be more and more a condition for its political survival.

At the first glance, the comprehensive network of organizations, which reminds to the former co-operative networks of the European labor movement, seems to reflect a very high degree of segregation and
isolation from the majority society. This is not completely wrong. Among older 'Danes' especially, reservations and stereotypes toward the 'Germans' may be still present. But it should be mentioned that many of the aforementioned organizations go back to the twenties, founded as self-support organizations and linked to the early reunification dreams and rigid, sometimes openly nationalist Danmark orientation or reflecting the period of rivalry with 'German' organizations. Today, the relationships between minority and majority are widely relaxed and satisfying, based on communication, mutual support, and sometimes common activities.

But the survival of a national minority depends on both, separation and integration. This seems especially to be important when there are no 'external' ethnic or linguistic cleavages and only 'belief' or 'conviction' define a minority. Finally, it should be stressed that the cultural activities of the Danish minority within the German environment contribute to bilingualism, interculturalism and international understanding.

The situation of the Danish minority is sometimes described as a 'modell' for other regions and minorities, Sinti and Roma representatives, for instance, sometimes referred to it. Apart from the fact that in detail additional support and various ameliorations are probably still possible, in principle any further development of the relationship between majority and Danish minority seems to be unthinkable. The standard for the protection of national minorities as formulated by United Nations, UNESCO or international non-governmental organizations is more than fully practiced.

In this sense, there is a certain modell-like achievement of minority rights:

1. The individual options between minority and majority are absolutely unrestricted;
2. the cultural development of the minority is ensured through special rights on the field of education as well as public grants and private activities;
3. educational, social and economic opportunities of majority and minority members are equal;
4. there are no relevant reservations and prejudices between majority and minority;
5. the opportunities of political participation are appropriate.
But, on the other hand, the situation in (North and South) Schleswig is based on some singular conditions:

1. reciprocity of conflicts, interests and possible approaches work as incentives for appropriate political measures as well as mutual control;
2. regional concentration of the minority;
3. exclusion of extreme alternatives (e.g., secession, political autonomy) touching national interests;
4. very low level of permanent differences (and difference perceptions) between minority and majority.
Labor Immigrants

Most German or English terms available are inappropriate. The popular, but slowly vanishing term Gastarbeiter or guest-workers is related to the original concept: the western European industrialized countries hired additional work-force abroad for a limited time ('rotation' principle); but the transitorial stay of working 'guests' transformed into a long-time or permanent residence. The Swiss, historically less burdened and sensitive than the post-war Germans, still use the pre-war term Fremdarbeiter or alien workers. The authorities of the European organizations (EC, European Council, OECD) refer to Wanderarbeiter or migrant workers which causes some misunderstandings internationally, so in the US. The English term foreign workers stresses that most of them are not yet citizens of the receiving countries, but misses like the terms ausländische Arbeitnehmer (foreign employees) or immigrant workers the fact of an increasing self-employment of those concerned. Therefore, labor immigrants—referring to the motif and so differing from political refugees—seems to be the more adequate expression. But the two latter or the simple term immigrants are not fully adequate, because neither the 'immigrants' ever decided to immigrate, i.e. to settle permanently, nor many West European countries, especially West Germany, are willing to recognize their stay as permanent immigration legally. Consequently, second-generation immigrants, although born in the country, do not automatically acquire its citizenship.

The question of linguistics is not so very relevant, but enlightens the full uncertainty which goes for the legal status, the minority status, self-understanding and identity, life-planning and future perspectives, attitudes and relationships toward the German majority and vice versa. It might appear doubtful to call labor immigrants or—more accurately—the single national groups of Italian, Turkish, Yugoslav or other ethnic labor immigrants social minorities. But as stated at the beginning, minorities are mainly constituted by ascription which often stamps the development of the subjective group identity. Variations in respect to language, religion or ethnicity can be considered irrelevant, until prejudices, stereotypes, or events (e.g., labor or housing shortages) emerge which make the existing distinctions politically, legally, economically, or socially relevant. Thus, labor immigrant groups of which most members
settle in West Germany for longer than 15 years, are ethnic (and sometimes religious) minorities. This may not cover the various existing differences; neither 'guest-workers' as a whole nor the single national minority groups are homogenous. Among the latter, there are many differences in terms of duration of stay (including permanence or continuous migration) 65. education, profession and income, social integration, social class, religion, experiences and cultural norms. But as already stated, homogeneity is not a reliable criteria to define minorities.

Migration and immigration are less exceptions, but characteristics of the European and German history. 66 During the last 100 years only, growing industrialization—and as the case of the GDR demonstrates which imported workers from Viet Nam and Poland, not only within the capitalist societies—brought large immigration waves into several, mostly western and northern European nations, importing workers who otherwise would not have been available. Modern mass migration was and still is the result of internationally imbalanced modernization processes between the less developed peripheries and the industrialized centers, which happened within the labor exporting countries also (e.g., Turkey, Italy).

In Germany, the number of foreign workers increased to about 1.2 millions—nearly one half from eastern Europe—in 1914; 67 France had reached this figure already during the nineties and recruited more than three millions until the 1930s. In Nazi Germany, the number of foreign, mostly forced workers rose to over five millions. 68 Since the seventies, over 15 million foreign workers and dependants are living in Western Europe. 69

After 1945, (West) Germany could meet her economy's growing manpower needs first from the 12 million refugees, fled from the annexed eastern territories, and displaced persons not returned home, later from East German refugees, a source which finally was drying out in 1961, when the Intra-German border was hermetically closed. The West German government signed bi-national recruitment agreements (1955: Italy; 1960: Spain and Greece; 1961: Turkey; 1963: Marocco; 1964: Portugal; 1965: Tunesia; 1968: Yugoslavia) and opened recruitment bureaus in those countries.

The number of foreign workers rose from 70,000 in 1954 to 2,6
millions in 1973 (11.9% of all employed), when the recruitment ban (November 1973) tried to stop any further foreign access to the German labor market. But the decline of the non-German population was less high than expected, because once returned to their native countries, foreign workers would have lost the possibility to come back. Excepted from the recruitment stop, migrant workers from the EC countries are entitled to settle and work unrestrictedly within the EC territory. Therefore, the greatest part of the foreign workers from non-EC nations, mainly Turks and Yugoslavs, now forced to decide to stay or to return, brought their spouses and children into Germany. As a result, the percentage of foreigners who were not part of the workforce rose from 37% in 1973 to 62% in 1975, and declined only slightly after that. The consequences for the social infrastructure (housing, schooling, working; cultural needs etc.) are obvious. In the course of the economic decline, caused by the oil price crisis, the number of foreign immigrants declined about 280,000 between 1974 and 1976, but the foreign residence grew over 12%.

In 1987, there were 4.58 million foreign workers and dependants in West Germany (1982: 4.67 million) and over .3 million permanent political refugees and illegal aliens from a total of 61.2 million inhabitants (1987). In West Germany, the percentage of aliens of the total population was 7.5%, in Belgium 8.6%, in France 8%, and in Switzerland 15%. The percentage in Holland, Austria, Sweden and England was between 3.8% and 4.6%. The share of foreigners on the labor market dropped from 11.9% (2.6 million) in 1973 to 7.7% (1.6 million) in 1986. Nearly one third of the foreign population are Turks (1.47 million; this is 80,000 more than the total agricultural population of West Germany); with nearly 600,000, the Yugoslavs constitute the second largest group, followed by Italians (540,000), Greeks (280,000) and Spaniards (150,000). The regional distribution of immigrants is imbalanced: more than two thirds live in four states (North Rhine Westphalia, Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse); the highest percentage is in West Berlin (12%) and Baden-Württemberg (10%). Among the big cities, Frankfurt and Offenbach have the highest concentration of foreigners with 20-25%, followed by Stuttgart, Munich, Düsseldorf and Mannheim (15-20%) and other industrial towns, e.g., Duisburg, Berlin, Nuremberg, Cologne, Hamburg (10-15%).

The discrepancy between the decline of the number of foreign workers and increase of foreign residents clearly shows the change from
transitional stay to long-term residence and permanency. The recruitment stop thus had important counter-factual effects: It reduced the present foreign labor force temporarily only, increased the foreign residence, expanded the infrastructural demand, and created a mostly permanent and stable immigrant minority. Finally, a permanent immigration happens since foreign legal residents often marry abroad; their spouses are allowed to immigrate and are granted a labor permission after a waiting period of four years.

Until the late seventies, the living conditions of foreign workers and families were extremely bad. The housing shortage was still grave, and the interest of 'guest-workers' to invest money into apartments and furniture was very low. Since the mid-eighties, the social situation has seriously improved; in view of a political goal like social integration, there are still major problem areas which weigh differently within the migrant generations and national groups.

Due to acute housing shortages in the industrial areas during the sixties which sprang up again since the mid-eighties, when the baby-boomers of the sixties and native Germans from Eastern Europe heavily increased the demand, employers were required to provide housing facilities for the workers they had imported. The standard of these facilities was generally very low. Meanwhile, nearly all labor immigrants are living in their own apartments. In 1985, less than 7% were still living in collective employer supplied housing facilities. But the standard of apartments available for lower-income families is often still inadequate. Foreign neighborhoods, giving an opportunity to closer ethnic and linguistic contacts, segregate from the German population and restrict the opportunities to ameliorate their language skills in German. These immigrant ghettos often run down fast, since landlords often want to rebuild higher-profit apartment buildings.

The educational situation of second-generation immigrants slightly grew better. The absence and drop-out rates declined from 60% (1980) to 33% (1985). In 1987/88, 76.7% of the students got a high school degree (Hauptschule: 48.4%, from Realschule: 22.1%; from Gymnasium: 6.0%; from Fachoberschule: 2.2%). Even the number of vocational-education enrollments slightly increased, but still is on a very low level. In 1987/88,
the number of foreign students reached a peak of 9.1% (8.5% foreign residents); this percentage was 1.7% in 1970 and went up to 6.3% in 1980. The ratio between general and vocational schools is 84.4% to 15.6% (for German students: 72.9%:27.1%).

Different age structures, but unequal educational opportunities also explain the variation. This becomes already obvious when we compare the data for different types of schools. The average foreign percentage in elementary schools, where both German and foreign students are enrolled, is 12%; in Hauptschulen and Gesamtschulen (comprehensive schools, comparable to American high schools) the average increases up to 17.7% and 17.6%, 16.1% are enrolled in schools for the handicapped and learning disabled. The percentage drops for the academically more demanding Realschule and Gymnasium to an average of 6.5% and 4.0%. This means that from 100% foreign high school students, 50.4% go to Hauptschule, 14.9% to Realschule, and 16.0% to Gymnasium, while 26% of the German students attend Realschule and 29% Gymnasium; the ratio for the basic Hauptschule is 63% to 32%.

The enrollment figures for foreign students remind of those of German blue-collar workers' children during the early sixties before the educational reform policies started. Since it is mainly parents who decide about a more demanding type of school for the fifth graders, a less stratified secondary school system would at least partly change these unequal educational opportunities. But some of their major reasons are mostly beyond the reach of school policy and teaching: the high concentration of immigrant workers within certain neighborhoods where schools are mainly visited by non-German students; poor language skills of the parents and lately immigrated adolescents; illiteracy of the parents; low family income, poor housing and living conditions; low educational aspirations.

The vocational education of young immigrants is still absolutely inappropriate. Only 5.1% (in Berlin 9.3%) of the part-time (Berufsschule) and 6.9% (12.3%) of the full-time (Berufsfachschule) vocational school students are foreigners. Accordingly, only a minority of immigrant youth (27% from the 15 and 18 year-old foreigners [70% of the Germans of that age group]) get a full vocational education within the 'dual system' of school (state responsibility) and apprentice-ship (economic system). This
situation is less a result of discrimination than consequence of the weak position of foreign applicants who often are missing the required formal school degrees and are therefore failing within the competition for scarce apprenticeships.\textsuperscript{77b}

Since the seventies, various special programs of state governments and non-governmental agencies are run for the second generation to raise the language skills, to promote the general and vocational education, or to develop the prerequisites for successful job training. In addition, adult education courses, offered to different first-generation target groups, are oriented to more specialized work-place demands or daily-life needs (e.g., sewing courses for Turkish women [which include teaching about pregnancy, contacts with the authorities, linguistic and cultural aspects] in order to break up their isolation).\textsuperscript{78} Major goals have been to increase the integration opportunities and employment prospects. The unfavorable German labor market since 1980 had a strong negative impact on these activities in particular and on the foreign workers in general. Educational success did not always translate into better job opportunities or work-places. The number of apprenticeships did not correspond to the demand. Immigrant workers who had got jobs primarily in less favorable economic sectors (e.g., mining, steal production, building and constructing etc.) were fired when the production was going down. The conditions began to change about three years ago although representative data is not yet available. There is growing surplus of open apprenticeships—companies fear a skilled-worker gap during the nineties—which will ameliorate the vocational and job opportunities of immigrant youth significantly. But the unemployment figures of summer 1989 still stay close to the two-million mark (rate: 6.6% to 7%).

Most male immigrant workers have acquired a basic knowledge of German on the job. As far as foreign women are working, there is no significant difference between the sexes; but those staying home often literally do not speak any German. Even after a stay of more than ten years, the German of many first-generation immigrants is rather poor; many are functionally illiterate. Language programs longtime failed, partly because of inappropriate methods, not adapted to needs and sometimes low level of elementary education, mostly because they were rejected as added burdens to workers who rather used their time for overtime work. In respect to the increasing period of residence, statistically each forth took
part in some kind of language course. The role of radio and TV although providing additional, partly bilingual programs or even channels seems to be limited. Many Turks, for instance, prefer imported Turkish videos.

The language skills of second-generation foreigners, when born and raised in Germany, do not significantly differ from young Germans of the same age group and social milieu. But youngsters, already 10-17 years old and without graduation from a school in their native countries prior to their immigration, have significant language difficulties, are often illiterate in both languages, and have only poor educational and job opportunities.

Social contacts outside their ethnic group, although requested as polls indicate, are mostly restricted to the unions and to sport clubs. Common activities together with Germans prove especially limited for first-generation immigrants who prefer to spend their free-time within the families.

While only Germans enjoy the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of assembly and of association (Articles 8 and 9), Federal Assembly Law and Federal Association Law extend these rights—the former unrestrictedly, the latter with certain limitations—to non-Germans also. During the seventies, the Yugoslav, Italian, Spanish, Greek and Turkish minorities began to use these rights extensively: they founded numerous workers' clubs, self-help groups, associations and cultural centers for both, intra-group communication and information, mutual help and support for new immigrants, political activism and interest representation on the one hand and—to a certain extent—for interaction and communication with the German majority on the other.

There are different federal bureaus to coordinate the activities of the various associations, but there is no single comprehensive umbrella organization of 'guest-workers'. The diversity of interests between extreme right and left-wing groups makes any common policy impossible. But the International Forum of Foreign Workers Associations (FIA) in Hesse is an important umbrella organization representing at least the integrationist, moderate and liberal immigrant associations. The Turks, with nearly 30% the largest immigrant minority, founded most interest organizations which are mainly involved in political issues related to
Turkey and West Germany. The Yugoslav Cultural Clubs are primarily focussing on cultural affairs, while the Spanish organizations, especially the Parent Associations, are primarily involved in educational issues. But in 1980, in order to get a federal representation for other issues also, the Spanish Immigrant organizations founded the Federation of Spanish Social and Cultural Associations and the Federation of Spanish Youth Organizations and Young Spaniards in the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Turkish organizations are highly politicized and mostly linked to Turkish political parties. A part of the violent political extremism in West Germany goes back to the activists of some of these organizations which are supervised by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

The communist Federation of the Workers Associations from Turkey (FIDEF) is the biggest left-wing association. Founded in 1977, it has some 60 local bureaus and about 15,000 members. It fights against the right-wing extremism among Turkish workers in Germany and works for a more liberal German immigration policy. The social-democratic Confederation of Progressive People’s Associations from Turkey in the Federal Republic of Germany (HDF), linked to the CHP, the Republican People’s Party of Turkey, has some 30 local bureaus and about 10,000 members in West Germany. It closely collaborates with SPD, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, and DGB and is the most-reputated Turkish organization in West Germany. It organizes adult education courses, financially supported by the Krupp-Foundation, edits a Turkish newspaper and a German journal, and has branches in other western and northern European countries. A third minor left-wing organization is the Federation of Democratic Worker Associations (DIDF), fighting against xenophobia. FIDEF, HDF and DIDF collaborate with German institutions and work for the Integration of the Turkish immigrants.

The biggest Turkish right-wing association in West Germany is a branch of the nationalist-fascist Turkish National Movement Party (MHP). This organization has some 110 local bureaus and about 26,000 members. The mostly nationalist Islamic Cultural Centers with 210 local clubs and some 18,000 members are linked to the Süleymançio Movement which is outlawed in Turkey. The cultural centers enjoy a certain influence on the Turkish-Islamic minority since the Süleymançio Movement founded the anti-integrationist Koran Schools. Some West German states (e.g.,
Hamburg, NRW) tried to reduce their racist influence and religious intolerance by introducing voluntary Islamic-religious instruction within the school curriculum. The Islamic Union pursues the goals of the Turkish National Salvation Party, fighting for re-Islamization and against modernization and social integration of the Turkish minority. It claims to have some 20,000 members. Within the right-wing spectrum, Hür-Türk is the smallest organization, founded with the support of the CDU and the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation. It is politically linked to the Turkish Justice Party.83

The system of Greek immigrant organizations is similar to the Turkish one; but politicization and right-left cleavages appear somewhat less extreme. The major organization is the Association of Greek Communities with 63 local branches. It works closely together with the Turkish FIDEF and the Spanish parent organizations, its goals are more liberal German immigration and integration policies and the local suffrage of labor immigrants. The focus of conflicts among Greek organizations is school policy. The Association of Greek Parents supports the German school policy which tries to integrate the foreign students, while the nationalist Federation of Greek Parent Associations, defaming this approach as "Germanization", fights for segregated Greek national schools to maintain the cultural identity of Greek youth.84

The organizational degree among Italian immigrants is rather low; it is estimated that only about 6% are organized.85 Their most important organization is the Federation of Italian Emigrant Workers and Families. In addition, Italian political parties maintain sections in West Germany, because Italian workers get free-tickets from their government to vote in Italy. Among the most active Italian party sections in West Germany are, for instance, the PCI (Communists), the DC (Christian Democrats), and the PSI (Socialists) which is very active and closely cooperates with the SPD.86

Since the immigrant minorities did not yet acquire the status of 'national minority groups of German citizenship', they are not allowed to vote, to become elected or to found political parties.87 The existing political parties are open to non-German members, but not many foreign workers keep membership cards, as the existing separate political associations of the immigrant minorities or national-party branches clearly demonstrate. This is different with the trade unions which
meanwhile actively represent immigrant workers’ interests also; some 46% of the immigrant-worker population are enrolled members. About each second Turkish, but only each forth Italian worker is organized.88 Foreign workers hold posts as shop stewards and as factory committee members. Inner-factory participation (Mitbestimmung) is higher valued than union activities.

There is a long-standing debate about the suffrage of non-natives in all West European countries; meanwhile, the Netherlands, Danmark, and Sweden introduced a local foreigners’ suffrage.89 So did Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg in 1989; but in both cases, the oppositional CDU, arguing that a constitutional amendment was necessary, called upon a ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court before the new law will be applied in the forthcoming elections. Therefore, in the realm of politics foreigners still depend on foreigners’ parlaments, councils or committees for foreigners’ affairs at the city administrations or local parliaments which serve as political representation and transmission to local foreigners’ associations. On the national level, the federal government created the Office of the foreigners’ Representative (Ausländerbeauftragter) who is not elected by the foreign minorities, but appointed by the government. The office works as a link and an intermediary between immigrants and government and influences its immigration and integration policies.90 The initiatives and activities of these different representations should not be underestimated, but they cannot conceal the basic deficit that 45 million inhabitants lack elementary democratic-political rights. The reference of the Christian Democrats to a comprehensive European legislation can neither hide the lack of German initiatives in Brussels nor be the final answer, since many foreigners belong to immigrant minorities from without the EC.

Naturalization on the other hand still proves to be complicated, expensive, and touches the identity consciousness; some sending states even do not allow their citizens to give up their citizenship. Receiving countries, however, like West Germany hesitate to allow dual citizenships.91 Former polls turned out that less than 10% of the labor immigrants wanted to acquire the German citizenship; in a new 1989 poll, about 44% of the five major immigrant minorities (Turks, Spaniards, Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Italians who come to some 68% of the non-German population) expressed the wish to become naturalized.92
16 years after the recruitment stop, the immigration and integration policies of the federal and state governments still are inconsistent and contradictory. Its three major goals of integration, limitation and remigration are oscillating and were not put forward seriously. Many programs are run especially on the field of general education, language and vocational training. The long-term need to keep and to integrate the immigrants simply because of the decline of the German birth rate is not seriously questioned; not to talk about the legal status of most of the immigrants allowing a permanent residence. But on the political theater, neither the social-liberal coalition until 1982 nor the present conservative-liberal coalition were or are able to draw the necessary conclusions on the fields of legal policies (legal status of the immigrants, citizenship, political participation, minority rights). The integration policies are half-hearted and unreliable, still today differentiating among the economic, labor-market, social, political, and legal policy areas. To give two examples: first, it is still legally possible to expel an immigrant worker, if he applies for social aid even after having paid his taxes and duties for years; second: a wife and her children who immigrated into Germany as dependents of her husband respectively their father may be expelled if the marriage was divorced. Legal amendments are in preparation.

The statistics on foreign residence show that its percentage of the total population only had slightly declined between 1974 (6.7%) and 1978 (6.5%); since 1978 (6.7%), it increased again to a peak of 7.6% (nearly 4.7 million) in 1982. After a new decline in 1984 and 1985, it levelled off at 7.4% and reached again about 4.5 million. So, the second policy goal of limitation had failed also.

Finally, the remigration policies were just as contradictory and unsuccessful. Since remigration by force would be illegal and unconstitutional, a 1983 federal law offered financial incentives for voluntarily remigrating foreigners which were much too low to attract high numbers. In fact, some 250-300,000 mostly Turkish remigrants, often 'free-riders' who had already decided to go back as it turned out, left the country. Again, conclusions were not drawn from the obvious failure of this goal; the often announced reform of the 1965 Alien Law, currently put on the political agenda of 1990, will not be carried out during this
legislature (until 1991). But the lack of political decision making is politics also and has clear political effects: the government is not forced to put off its clientele of the nationalist right; the immigrants feel intimidated; they serve as scapegoats for deficits of the housing and labor market policies; intolerance and hostility are growing.

Even after a very long residence in West Germany, many first-generation immigrants are deeply split about the question to stay permanently or to return, an uncertainty which has to do with the aforementioned inconsistencies also. This uncertainty influences their personal and collective identity as well as their socio-political activities as national or ethnic minority groups. First and often for a long period of time, the immigration situation reinforces the orientation toward religious norms, traditional values, and national behavior. And partly different to the US, Canada or Australia as traditional immigration countries, the immigrants can travel home by car and thus try to keep close ties to their homelands. Daily-life conflicts between Turkish parents (fathers) and children, result of the two cultural systems they are living in, are often 'solved' in an extremely authoritarian and rigid manner.

The daily experience of ethnic differentiation and social discrimination from outside where race, religion, language or culture seem to be considered important produces ethnic community consciousness and in the long run a feeling of identity from within. Turkish immigrants, for instance, painfully recognize this emerging new identity, when they are on vacation 'at home' where they appear as 'foreigners' to their compatriots, called Deutschländer ('German landers'), and begin to realize significant differences in terms of interests and life-orientations, values and behavior, sometimes even of their language.

Primarily in cities with larger immigrant groups, shops, garages, workshops, restaurants, travel agencies, clubs, printer's and publisher's, libraries, theaters and art studios run by 'labor immigrants' contribute to the local cultural life. Immigrants edit their own newspapers; a new middle-class of immigrant employees and self-employed emerged. Immigrants joined the cultural scene as painters, musicians, conductors and writers; there is a growing literature, first in the native languages, meanwhile increasingly in German. A major focus of literary contributions is the life of the 'guest worker', the loss of Heimat and identity, the lack
of social communication, the coldness and hostility of the majority; but some immigrant writers already go beyond this topic. The cultural policies of the cities, counties, states, and non-governmental associations support these activities of the immigrant communities and offer incentives. The immigrant minorities seem to develop somewhat original and independent cultural identities which no longer simply reflect the national cultures of origin, but of course stay in touch with them.
Multicultural Society

Despite her common grounds, Europe has always been culturally heterogenous or 'multicultural'; and even the post-war 'Americanized' daily-life culture of the modern industrialized western European societies did not level out regional or national differences. Flows of migration have run through the continent for centuries, developing, changing, and enriching the variety of existing cultural traditions. As a result, we find new national or regional entities regarding to language, territory, culture, behavior, and consciousness. In this sense, the new interethnic and intercultural differences constitute no new phenomenon in European history. Sure, the extent of the new social and cultural, linguistic and religious diversity related to the degree of relative homogeneity of the single European societies is significant: many of the new immigrant groups originate from Africa and Asia; most immigrants into France come from the Arabic northern African countries; 30% of the immigrants into Germany are Turks, and more than 40% are Muslims, among whom forces of fundamentalism and intolerance seem to grow. The distance toward the modern European societal norms and structures is not irrelevant; but as we have seen, immigration transforms the immigrant groups into minorities. It is not new that intercultural differences generate emotional distance, conflicts, and hostility within the receiving societies, because a scarcely reflected consent about traditions and social norms is questioned and angst mostly about social status, jobs, and neighborhoods may arise. Immigration and the permanence of ethnic minorities prove to be part of the post-war internationalization and socio-political modernization of the traditional nation states which may end up in a politically integrated Western Europe.

No doubt that the increasingly diverse 'multicultural' Europe societies have to maintain a consensus about a common core of social norms, values, and political attitudes (e.g., recognition of individual freedoms and human rights, non-violence, religious tolerance); diversity is enriching up to the point where it may become divisive. Minorities, especially the new immigrant minorities, cannot expect that the majority societies go beyond principles and rights such as democratic rule or equality of races, beliefs and sexes, for instance, they have fought for over a long period of time. Where differences seriously restrict social communication and cause
prejudices, intolerance and hostility, socio-political stability is put at risk. But rigid assimilation policies which discourage minority languages and cultures do not always ensure a larger social cohesion; they require that minorities gave up their identities, lead to a substantial loss of linguistic and cultural values, and cause the resistance of those concerned.

The increasing ethnic and cultural diversity in Europe is already a fact, as the growing of regional movements in many parts of the continent and in Britain or the activities of the numerous minority organizations show. But the extent, quality, social esteem, and consequences of this new diversity will depend on the attitudes of the citizens and the public policies pursued; major policy areas are the legal status and the political rights of minorities, the equality of opportunities in terms of equal access to the public goods (education, jobs, housing), the promotion of minority-cultural activities.

'Interculturalism' is the main idea underlying a pluralist minority policy, primarily important in educational and cultural policies. The intercultural approach is not confined to the education of minority children, although it does mainly concern them to the extent that intercultural education seems the most appropriate way of achieving the educational objectives of equality of opportunities as well as of cultural development and identity. But interculturalism emphasizes that minorities, their cultures, traditions, and needs are a matter of the community as a whole; it is the exchange among cultural systems which may challenge as well as enrich each other. At least, the intercultural approach secures the long-time or even permanent existence of the minority cultures along with the majority culture which—in the long run—will influence each other. Minority cultural systems are not homogenous; depending on durance of residence, social class, religious commitment, degree of social integration, or personal option minority group members will tend to more conservative and segregated or to more liberal and assimilated cultural orientations. First generation immigrants, for instance, often are closely bound to their original cultural patterns, while among second-generation members bicultural orientations emerge; they seem to be able to live within both majority and transforming minority cultures.

The premises of intercultural integration approach, relevant for
different minority policy areas, are the following:
- Intercultural integration is based on cultural pluralism of majority and minority groups which may be constituted by religion, culture, language, nationality or a common way of life;
- Intercultural integration is a mutual process, based on cultural equality, tolerance, communication, and cooperation of majority and minorities as well as on legitimate voluntary separation of the latter;
- Intercultural integration depends on the recognition of a basic common core of rules and values such as human freedoms and civil rights, democracy, tolerance, empathy and non-violence;
- Intercultural integration depends on equal rights in society, economy and politics and on special rights which protect the cultural, religious or ethnic needs of the minorities;
- Intercultural integration may require equal-opportunity policies, since many minority group members often belong to lower classes or fringe groups which are not able to emancipate themselves;
- Intercultural integration depends on educational and cultural policies which support the minorities to maintain and further develop their cultural heritage and enable the majority to communicate with the minorities culturally;
- and finally: Intercultural integration constitutes a continuum of options and opportunities only the minority groups and members may decide about including their basic right to join or leave a minority and to assimilate.
All political parties, represented in the Bundestag, strictly reject any non-voluntary remigration of labor immigrants; and most non-recognized political refugees are 'tolerated', i.e. not compulsorily returned to their country of origin, as demanded by the UN-High Commissioner for Refugees. The major political parties officially recognize the legitimate rights of the other minorities, mostly of German nationality, and maintain generally adequate relationships with their representations and associations and support their cause.

The obvious inconsistencies especially of CDU/CSU immigration policies and programs are last, but not least result of the competition with minor extreme right wing parties which have been able to draw from its clientele since 1986. New-fascist and reactionary splinter parties like NPD and DVU explicitly demand a rigid limitation, reduction and return of the non-German immigrants. The right-extremist, nationalist Republicans, led by the Sträuser-like populist and former CSU member Franz Schönhuber, first participated nation-wide in the 1989 European elections. With 7.1% of the popular vote, they successfully draw from those right and partly left-wing voters (petty bourgeoisie, workers, unemployed) who--much more than the other social classes--realize the 'foreign infiltration' in their neighborhoods and who compete with immigrants, East Germans and native German new-settlers from Eastern Europe about scarce appartments and jobs. The 'Reps' led a frankly anti-immigrant and xenophobic campaign, although some regional activists tried to keep distance toward outspoken new-fascist groups and parties which seem to undermine successfully the regional 'Republican' organizations. The leadership pursues outspoken revanchist positions toward Poland ("reunification within the borders of 1937"); its attempt to 'normalize' the historical consciousness of the Germans might be interpreted as another close link to new-fascist parties, but the demand itself proves to be rather popular.

Disapproval, intolerance, and hostility toward immigrants including new-settlers of German origon are rather wide-spread within the German society; but it should be added, that reliable data that would allow a quantification of anti-foreigner attitudes is not available. The absolute number of violent crimes toward foreigners (esp. grievous physical injury, arson, homicide) which always got much public attention is very small.
Since the mid-fifties, the Danish minority is no longer victim of any kind of prejudices and mistrust, different to Sinti and Roma who still suffer disapproval, stereotypes, and mistrust within the more conservative segment of the society. But the civil-rights movement which made public some kind of continuous administrative and social discrimination against Sinti and Roma significantly contributed to a change of attitudes and to solidarity against repression and expulsion mainly among the young.

The Jews in West Germany in general are not individually victims of disapproval, prejudices, hostility, or any kind of personal aggression; actions against Jewish institutions, cemeteries etc. mainly during the fifties and sixties should not be concealed, however. But as survivors, dependents of victims of the Holocaust, or at least as Immigrated members of a collective that was to be annihilated in Germany, Poland, and Austria, they suffer from traumatic experiences which inevitably create a high level of sensitivity and criticism toward their non-Jewish environment. Not rarely, they are confronted with diffuse anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic attitudes and stereotypes which are closely linked to the historical insensitivity of the majority. Jews feel violated by the inability of so many non-Jewish Germans to come to grips with their Nazi history and to draw appropriate conclusions when they deal with minorities today. They are disturbed when German historians criticize Habermas' notion of the "singularity of the Holocaust" and seriously discuss the Stalinist genocide as its historical forerunner, when people demand a 'normalized' attitude toward the Nazi rule or when young people ask for a less burdened history. On the other hand, it should be added that most West Germans lack the opportunity to communicate with members of the Jewish communities and thus to reflect their own attitudes. Finally, many close links arose again between Jews and non-Jews; but it will take generations, until—if possible—a basic trust will replace latent doubt and angst.
Endnotes


3 See Reuter and Dodenhoeft 1988.

4 Grulich and Pulte (1975) have edited a small documentation on European national minority groups; and Stephens (1972/1979) more extensive study also touches only on the Danish and Frisian minorities; Doerdelmann (1969) edits some journalistic essays on minorities and fringe groups, the selection appears somewhat arbitrary; Köglers scholarly literature study (1976) covers besides labor immigrants also social fringe groups only.


6 Ethnic data about the "gypsies" were collected by the so-called Landfahrerzentrale (official name: Zentralamt für Kriminalidentifizierung und Polizeistatistik) still during the fifties, sixties and probably during the seventies also; since 1982, the Federal Government repeatedly stated that special data files about Sinti and Roma at the police and other administrative authorities did no longer exist and that official statements for the media might not include any information that an individual belonged to the group of the Sinti and Roma; see last, e.g., Bundestags-Drucksache 11/2196 (April 25, 1988); about the practice of the states and the mistrust of the Central Council of the German Sinti and Roma, see Rose 1985, p. 22-29.

In the Kiel, Bonn and Copenhagen Statements of 1949 and 1955 about the Danish and German minorities, both sides formally declared that no official statistics should be drawn up about the minority membership; statistics available (e.g., see Schleswig-Holsteinischer Landtag 1986) are drawn from the Danish minority organizations and refer to formal memberships in those non-governmental organizations. About labor immigrants and asylum seekers, statistical data are collected regularly and published by the Federal Office of Statistics and the Foreigners' Representative of the Federal Government.

Statistics about the Jewish population in West Germany exist within the Jewish communities, as far as Jews are members of the communities, and are published by Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung, Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland and the American Jewish Yearbook.

6a Published in: RICJ 1984, p. 38.


7 Francis and Reschhofer 1960; Schilling 1963; Rose 1968; Hackmann 1978; Müller...
France often appears as the homogenous nation state par excellence, but as a matter of fact includes a even much broader variety of minorities than Germany: so the authochtone Basks, Alsatians, Lorrainers, Occitanians, Bretons, Catalans; and the immigrant minorities like the blacks, Jews, Roma, Armenians, Tunesians, Algerians, Moroccians, etc.


About the development of the national state and its consequence for minorities, Oberndörfer 1989, p. 3-13; about the history of European migration, see Bade 1985 (2 vol.s).


The German, French, and Spanish words (Zigeuner, tsigane, gitano) probably go back to the Persian "cinganeh" which means musician and dancer; the English term "gypsy" is probably a parody of the name of "Egypt" where the "gypsies" were thought to come from.

Internationally, the "gypsies"--a collective term which they refuse as discriminating, similar to "negroes" by the blacks-- call themselves Rom (plural: Roma) which means man or human being. They are organized in the International Romani Association. The Sinti are also called Manusch, the Roma also Kaidar or Calé.


Hundsalz 1982, p. 69-76.

About 90% of the Sinti and Roma are catholic, 10% protestants, see Rose 1987, p. 167.
20 See Hohmann 1981; Böhmer and Meueler 1984; Müller-Hill 1984; Züll 1983; Zimmermann 1987:
21 There are no studies about the psychological and somatic consequences of the Holocaust, as they exist about Jewish survivors; but the fiction-style reports in Krausnick 1986.
22 Eva Justin had been employee of the Rassenhygienische und Bevölkerungsbiologische Forschungsstelle (Race-Hygiene and Population-Biology Institute) of the Reich Health Office and assistant to Robert Ritter, director of this institute who had done "race-biological research" on gypsies (Ritter 1938, 1939, 1942) and thus had prepared selection, sterilization and killing of Sinti and Roma in the death-camps (about Ritter, see Hohmann 1988, p. 114, 138 ff.). Eva Justin had written her doctor's dissertation (1944) about the compulsory sterilization of Sinti and Roma (about Justin, see Hohmann 1988 p. 161 ff.). After 1945, she reappeared as a "gypsy expert" in compensation proceedings until the sixties when she died. A prosecuting attorney's examination against her was not finished before she had died. In the same tradition stood another heavily biased post-fascist "gypsy expert": Hermann Arnold (some of his publications are mentioned under references) had worked as an employee of the now dissolved Zentralamt für Kriminalidentifizierung und Polizei-Statistik and was regarded by police and other authorities as "the gypsy expert" until the late seventies (about Arnold, see Hohmann 1988, p. 198 ff.).
23a Jan. 7, 1956, published in BGH RzW 1956, p. 113; partly revised by the verdict of Dec. 18, 1963, pub. in RzW 1964, p. 209, ruling that "racial causes [for persecution] were relevant at least since 1938".
25 Bundestags-Drucksache 10/6287.
27 Cf. also Bundestags-Drucksachen 9/2360, p. 3; 10/3292 and 11/2196, p. 3.
33 Hundsalz 1982, p. 57-69.
34 Hundsalz 1982, p. 69-82.
37 The official name was Zentralamt für Kriminalidentifizierung und Polizeistatistik.
38 Rose 1987, p. 10 f.
39a One of the newest examples is the nation-wide published conflict about the “Model Cologne”, a widely acclaimed tripartite concept consisting of a Zentrale Anlauf- und Beratungsstelle (contact and advice center), a social-work office for delinquent Roma youth, and sponsorships of parishes and single individuals for the Roma families. The trust into the Anlaufstelle, other city offices, and the model itself was destroyed when information was leaked to the German Roma initiative that the principal of the Anlaufstelle had transferred data to the city alien: office, the former is subordinate to, thus supporting its policy to deport the non-German Roma families; cf. FR no. 197/34, August 26, 1989, p. 1 and TAZ, September 4, 1989, p. 9.
41 Hundsalz 1982, p. 31-43.
42a Woche In Bonn 16/89 - VII/288, Oct. 4, 1989, p. 38
44 See Brandt 1976; Pollmann 1985.


49 Cf. so-called Copenhagen Statement of the Danish Prime Minister toward representatives of the Federation of German North Schleswigers, October 27, 1949, which did not fulfill the expectations of the North Schleswigers and of Germany, In: Jäckel 1959, p. 50-55.

50 For details, see Lagler 1982, p. 74-104.


52 Federal Constitutional Court decision of April 5, 1951, in: BVerfGE 1, 208 (258).


54 The Schleswig Party of the German minority lost its seat in the Danish Folketing or diet in 1964 which it had won in the elections of 1953, 1957 and 1960.

55 About grants and subsidies, see Schleswig-Holsteinischer Landtag 1986, p. 67-79; about legal aspects see Messtorff 1987, p. 36, 65, 89, 97.

56 The 100% subsidy of the state government is related to the amount the public school expenditures per capita; the former SSV chairman holds the opinion that this contribution covered about 60% of the effective costs; see Vollertsen 1988, p. 14.


62 Cf. Stephens 1979, p. 84.


64 Sweden has a very liberal immigration law, based on individual option; France automatically naturalizes French born foreigners at 18 after a stay of at least 5 years. About naturalization in Europe, see Ausländerbeauftragte 1989, p. 36 f.

65 Some Italians and Yugoslavs, e.g., return to their homelands in winter.

66 See Bade 1984.

67 During the First World War, in total over 200,000 Belgians and 500-600,000 Polish and Russian mainly forced workers were in the German Empire; besides that, workers from the Entente and neutral powers were hired to serve in the war industry; see Lothar Elsner, Ausländerbeschäftigung und Zwangsarbeitspolitik in Deutschland während des Ersten Weltkrieges. In: Bade 1985, Vol. 2, p. 527-557.


69 About labor immigration into Western Europe, see: Just and Groth 1985; Power 1979; Körner and Mehrlender 1986.

70 Ausländerbeauftragte 1989, p. 6f.; related to the 1987 national census, accompanied with much social protest and resistance, the foreign percentage was only 6.8% (4.15 million). The national statistics are only partly comparable; in France, annually about 20,000 foreigners born and living in France for the last five years automatically acquire the French citizenship when they are 18 years old; without this modified jus soli the foreign percentage would be higher. The British data do not reflect the figures of ethnic minority members who are British citizens.

71 Just and Groth 1986; Ausländerbeauftragte 1987 and 1989. The figures about foreign workforce and foreign residence exclude the Nato servicepersons and dependents as well as the new immigrants who are native Germans from East Germany, Poland, the USSR and Romania (since 1983 about 500-600,000).

72 Ausländerbeauftragte 1987, p. 15.

73 Since 1983, more than 250,000 East Germans and more than 200,000 native Germans from eastern Europe settled in West Germany.


75 Repräsentativuntersuchung '85, P. 46-73; Reuter and Dndenhoeft, p. 78-87, 90-94.


76 KMK 1987, p. III.

77 The missing percentages are high schools students, enrolled in comprehensive and handicapped schools. Percentages are based on figures (for 1986) as published in BMBW 1988, p. 34 f., KMK 1987, p. IV, 51, 64, 73, 86, 99, 112, 113, 127, 140; and Ausländerbeauftragte 1987, p. 31.

77a Percentage of foreign students at the two-year (vocational) Fachoberoberschule and the seven- or nine-year (vocational) Fachgymnasium: 7.9%; at the Fachschule or technical college: 1.7%; see Mitteilungen und Informationen des Sekretariats der KMK 3/89, p. 3.

77b KMK cit. p. 3 and KMK 1988/89, p. 59, 61.


79 Repräsentativuntersuchung '85, p. 422-438.

81 Repräsentativuntersuchung '85, p. 422-454; Reuter and Dndenhoeft, p. 44.


83 See Annual Reports of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

84 Faruk Sen, Die Selbstorganisationen der Wanderarbeitnehmer. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In: Just and Grothe 1985, p. 222-238.

85 Sen op. ibid., p. 226-228.

86 Breitenbach 1982, p. 113-115.


88 Repräsentativuntersuchung '85, p. 135; Jürgen Eckl, Internationale Solidarität im


90 The city government of Berlin created a similar representative; currently, both offices in Bonn (Liselotte Funcke) and Berlin (Barbara John) are held by women.


97 See the analysis of the Republicans of Müller 1989.


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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>BGH</td>
<td>Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Supreme Court)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BVerfG</td>
<td>Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVerfGE</td>
<td>Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidungen, Amtliche Sammlung, Tübingen 1952 ff., Vol. 1 ff. (decisions of the BVerfG, official decision collection)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union of Germany)</td>
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<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich Soziale Union Bayerns (Christian Social Union of Bavaria)</td>
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<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People's Party of Turkey</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>[Italian] Christian Democrats</td>
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<td>DGB</td>
<td>Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (German Federation of Labor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIDF</td>
<td>Federación de las Asociaciones de Trabajadores del Türkmen (Federation of Turkish Labor Associations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>DVU</td>
<td>Deutsche Volksunion (German Peoples Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>EG</td>
<td>Europäische Gemeinschaft (EC)</td>
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<td>FIDF</td>
<td>Föderation der Arbeitervereine der Türkei in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federation of Workers Associations of Turkey in the Federal Republic of Germany)</td>
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<td>FR</td>
<td>Frankfurter Rundschau (daily)</td>
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<td>HDF</td>
<td>Konföderation Progressiver Volksvereine der Türkei in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federation of Progressive People's Associations from Turkey in the Federal Republic of Germany)</td>
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<td>MHP</td>
<td>Nationale Bewegungspartei der Türkei (National Movement Party of Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NJW</td>
<td>Neue Juristische Wochenschrift</td>
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<td>NPD</td>
<td>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCI</td>
<td>Communist Party of Italy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSI</td>
<td>Socialist Party of Italy</td>
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<td>RCJ</td>
<td>The Review, International Commission of Jurists</td>
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<td>RzW</td>
<td>Rechtsprechung zum Wiedergutmachungsrecht (monthly supplement of the periodical NJW)</td>
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<td>SSV</td>
<td>Südschleswigscher Verein (South-Schleswig Association or Sydslesvigsk Forening)</td>
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<td>Der Südschleswigsche Wählerverband (South-Schleswig Voters Union or Sydslesvigsk Valgarforening)</td>
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<td>TAZ</td>
<td>Tageszeitung (daily)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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