Disciplinary violations, the violations of school rules, are rightfully censured solely by school district employees. Crimes, however, represent violations of federal, state, or local laws and concern law enforcement agencies as well as school system officials. Since the mid-1970s, there has been a refining of police-school roles; interagency coordination and cooperation ranging from the local to the national level have steadily increased. This document reviews the literature regarding strategies developed between police agencies and school systems aimed at preventing, reducing, or controlling serious student misbehavior and crime. The findings indicate that there are substantial differences between the types of programs that result from police wanting to work with school systems and school systems wanting to help police. When police agencies consider working in a school setting, either with primary or secondary school youth, the emphasis is on education. But when school district officials solicit the police for cooperative programs, the emphasis appears to be upon using the police to help with special patrols or security-related assignments. The programs examined typically did not rely on data collection and analysis for planning, guidance, and success verification with the one exception of the "Safer Schools-Better Students" program. (47 reference.) (KM)
STUDENT DISCIPLINE STRATEGIES:
SCHOOL SYSTEM AND POLICE RESPONSE TO HIGH RISK AND DISRUPTIVE YOUTH

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INTRODUCTION

This paper reviews research on strategies and techniques to alleviate discipline problems in public schools. More specifically, we examine strategies developed between police agencies and school systems aimed at preventing, reducing, or controlling serious student misbehavior and crime. We will spend most of our time examining programs and projects that demonstrate police-school cooperation. When this is not possible, we will turn to programs or projects that apply a crossover technology; for example, school programs using police-like contingency planning or police programs using classroom curricula.

Here, at the beginning of this paper, it is important to differentiate clearly between "disciplinary violations" and "crimes." For the purposes of this paper, disciplinary violations represent only violations of school rules; they are rightfully censured solely by school district employees. Crimes, on the other hand, represent violations of federal, state, or local laws and concern law enforcement agencies as well as school system officials. Usually, when programs share areas of interest and concern they also share communication and planning. In this paper, we examine research into this sharing.
There is not a great deal of formal research about police/school agreements and programs. There are any number of anecdotal accounts of programs, a lesser number of descriptive accounts, and practically no formal evaluations. So, again, it is important to stress at the outset that we will do our best to review everything we can find that is above the level of "anecdotal." Also, we will distinguish between conclusions based on experience and those based on research.

In detailing the relevant research, we will describe the STRATEGY (touching on the assumptions that underlie it and its relative importance in "discipline improvement," move to the particular APPROACH used to implement it, and finally discuss research relating to individual PROGRAMS.

PART I: OVERVIEW OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN POLICE AGENCIES AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS

It does not require a literature review to realize that relationships between school officials and police professionals have changed over the decades. In the period before about 1968, police were generally utilized by local school administrators to respond to specific crises; a "fight" that went too far, a spate of vandalism, a weekend burglary. During the late 1960s and up to the mid-1970s, police and education officials began developing much closer working relations. This period saw the first published tactical manuals to help police manage school riots (Benton, 1971; Vestermark, 1971). During this same time period, most large-city school systems formed school security offices staffed by commissioned law officers but funded out of the district's own budget. Finally, in the period roughly from the mid-1970s to the present, there has been a steady refining of police-school roles; a time
of trials, errors, experiments, and new approaches. It is this current period that interests us. It is here that we begin to see interagency coordination and cooperation ranging from the local to the national level. However, before we move closer and begin to examine the specific research, we might usefully ask ourselves the nature and extent of the information that education and police officials have available. In other words, what do each of the key players — police and educators — know about a student who commits a serious misdeed in a school?

To answer this question, let us first tease out places where differences are likely to occur. First, school district administrators are likely to have various degrees of understanding of the differences between "discipline" violations and "criminal" violations. That is, some educators will be better than others at understanding that much of what they call "discipline" should actually be called "crime." Second, school districts will have various degrees of working relations with local law enforcement agencies. For example, school districts with their own school security offices staffed by commissioned officers (or with active police-liaison programs) will likely have very close relations with local police; districts with school security offices staffed by non-certified personnel will have different, and probably more distant, relationships; and districts with no security or police-liaison program will undoubtedly have the least developed working relations. Third, police departments, themselves, will possess varying degrees of sophistication when it comes to collecting and analyzing data about crime in the city or in a school. Their capabilities will range from small departments that only use a "pin map" to identify problem areas, to major departments that use sophisticated computer modeling to identify activity and trends in any part of their city for any type of offense for any time of the day or season of the year.
So: with all this background, what do we think each party knows about misbehaving students?

School personnel will know the particulars of the problems, of course, but unless they have had special training — or been advised by a particularly astute school board attorney — they are not likely even to realize that the incident is even potentially criminal. As one example (only one of many) school district officials seldom differentiate between “fights” and “battery.” They tend to assume that when two students are battling, they are “fighting.” Both get suspended. That one of the students didn’t want to “fight” does not immediately signal the school administrator that what really took place was a criminal battery. It does not signal him to call the police — if only for advice and counsel.

Also, school administrators seldom realize that some of what is being called “discipline” violations are really criminal violations and subject to reduction through time-tested crime prevention methods. Similarly, it seldom occurs to most principals to develop data sets that enable themselves and their staff to recognize trends and patterns in the discipline violations as well as the criminal violations. In summary, while the education community may know that quite a bit is “going wrong,” it is usually not at all clear WHAT is going wrong.

Police officials, for their part, may be disinclined to respond to a school’s call for help to take a report about a locker theft, even if the contents are valued in the hundreds of dollars. In large cities, the police may not be in much of a hurry to “transport” (to take a suspect from the scene of the complaint to the local police precinct for processing) a student caught with a single marijuana cigarette. After all, these are not “serious” crimes, right? And this brings up another issue. Police officials respond to differ-
ent pressures than do school officials. Unlike school superintendents who have most to worry about the quality of education throughout their district in relation to state and national norms, police chiefs have to set contact and arrest priorities based on local standards of tolerance combined with the necessities of "political expediency." The question of the day may not be so much one of knowing what is illegal, but of knowing what is sufficiently against local norms to warrant assigning manpower and resources to stop it. Viewed in that light, police-school agreements take on an even greater importance, for without them, school officials may well find that police officials care little for the kinds of problems that are crippling certain schools.

Now with this background, we are ready to begin examining research into police-school "discipline improvement" programs. Many of these programs will really focus on preventing violations of school rules (discipline), just as they claim; others are actually dedicated to crime prevention.

PART II: REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH

In this Part, we will follow a model that says: a "strategy" leads to an "approach" which leads to a "program." For each strategy we will ask: what is the strategy; why should we be concerned with it (rationale); what do we know about it (point of origin, duration, type of evaluations available); and what else might we want to know about it.

Both for the police agency programs and for the school system programs, we will consider three primary strategies. These are the strategies of PREVENTION, RESPONSE, and CONTROL. For the purposes of this paper, "prevention" refers to actions taken in advance of a problem, designed
to increase the probability that the problem will never develop. "Response" refers to programs aimed at limiting the chronic recurrence of similar events. "Control" covers programs designed to stop some acute action that has occurred or that is occurring.

Before beginning a review of the research either on police agency or school system programs aimed at improving student discipline, we should take a step back to consider what the range of research tells us about school-police working relations.

We find the most interesting and useful study of police-school relationships in a doctoral dissertation (Fox, 1964). One of Fox's key research questions concerned whether police agencies and education agencies even use the same basis for judging their mutual working relationships. Fox discovered that once professionals from both lines of work begin to think about it, they agree that they use four key factors to evaluate their relations with others. These key factors are: INFORMATION, ASSISTANCE, INDIVIDUAL CONTACT, and INTERAGENCY ACTIVITIES.

Fox found important differences in responses by police and educators regarding the aspects of their working relationships that met with greatest success and failure. While educators report the greatest occurrence of good and poor working relationships in the area of "assistance," police report the greatest occurrence of good working relationships in the area of "information" and the greatest number of poor experiences in the area of "individual contact." The implication for this paper is that within a single strategy, planners may have to tailor programs to meet the needs of individual school systems and police jurisdictions to fit in to existing patterns of their historical working relations.
Police Agency Programs

"In the high school the police officer’s role is similar to that of an American military advisor overseas" wrote Bud Vestermark in 1971 (Vestermark, 1971:11). His presence may be unwelcome, his advice only grudgingly heard. When needed, for example to respond to a serious "fight," he may insist on resolving it in ways that are contrary to the principal's wishes. The principal may find himself being threatened with charges of obstruction of justice. In a phrase, police on school grounds often present something of a mixed blessing; while they are capable — at least in theory — of resolving crises, their presence may have the unintended consequence of triggering a different kind of crisis even while resolving the first one. Police on campus can be provocative.

To counteract and defuse many of these feelings and situations, law enforcement professionals nationwide have for years endeavored to work with educators to improve relations even while helping local school principals reduce crime and delinquency. The first strategy they have used is that of PREVENTION.

Prevention Strategy

Prevention, as previously mentioned, is a strategy calling for thinking about and planning for events before they become problems. Over the years, police planners have developed a range of approaches that fall into a prevention strategy; they also have developed a variety of programs that fall into one or more of the approaches. For the sake of brevity and overview, we will touch on two methods that are reasonably well documented; within each, we will endeavor to find research about selected programs.

Classroom Education Approach: There are many, many programs that fall within this Approach. These programs assume that disruptive behavior
results in some part from a combination of defiance of authority and unfamiliarity with the consequences of actions. In general, these programs evolved in the late 1960s as a generation of our nation's youth began to demonstrate against almost everything, everywhere. Police, in an effort to counter this social decay, turned to the public schools with "soft" educational programs.

The earliest attempt to describe the range of educational programs appeared in a book titled Police Programs for Preventing Crime and Delinquency (Pursuit, et al., 1972: Section IV). In a series of articles, these authors explore the underlying bases for educational programs, and describe those that they thought would show the most promise. Their analysis of the programmatic rationale is valid today:

1. To promote a better understanding of the law, judicial processes and the role of law enforcement as it affects the youth in the community.

2. To offer the youth an opportunity to ask questions and express their views related to law enforcement and thereby create a better understanding between youth and law enforcement personnel.

3. To inform the youth of laws that affect and guide them.

4. To inform the youth of the crime and narcotics problems among young persons. (Pursuit, et al., 1972:316)

As expected, programs begun in the late 1960s and early 1970s have changed with the times. Among the programs that Pursuit and his co-authors described as adhering to these four objectives, many remain today. These include the "Citizen and the Law Program" that later evolved into the sophisticated and much publicized "Law Related Education" (LRE) program sponsored at times both by the U.S. Departments of Justice and Education (see, for example, publications of the Constitutional Rights Foundation in Los Angeles, and of the Public Education division of the American Bar Associa-
tion in Chicago). From their inception, police-taught education courses were designed both for elementary and secondary students. As alluded to in the opening paragraphs of this section, programs in the early 1970s, such as "Adopt-a-Deputy," "Police-School Cadet Program," "The Be A Good Guy Plan," and "Officer Friendly," appear principally designed to overcome the wave of anti-authority sentiment that then appeared to sweep school-aged children. These early programs were not "educational" in the sense that there was a curricula. They were educational in the sense that they were designed to build friendship through familiarity (Pursuit, ibid: 319). Officers were assigned to schools — particularly elementary schools; their job was to visit classrooms (in uniform) and to speak with students. As fear and animosity toward law officers subsided, educational programs based on a set curricula began to emerge. Begun in Los Angeles by Vivian Monroe's Constitutional Rights Foundation, but eventually adopted widely from coast to coast, these courses slowly grew from short units within "civics" courses to stand-alone units that taught younger children about right and wrong, and taught older children about the finer distinctions between civil and criminal law. The central assumption of these programs was that youth needed clearly to understand the consequences of actions in order to be able to CHOOSE correct over incorrect behavior.

The principal research on modern-day LRE, as it relates to delinquency prevention, is found in Johnson and Hunter's 1984 research over a three-year period. As this program has undergone a rigorous "impact evaluation," it might be well to spend some time describing the findings. From their study of LRE for three years in 61 classes using LRE and 44 classes not using LRE, the authors drew many useful and interesting conclusions. For example, while they found that "LRE can improve students' at-
attitudes, perceptions, and behavior...these favorable outcomes do not follow automatically from adopting an LRE textbook and offering a course by that name. Indeed, the researchers found that "the capability of LRE to improve citizenship and behavior is highly dependent on the way in which the course is implemented." As we do not have space here to describe the wide range of their findings, we refer readers to the original research. The author of this paper found Johnson and Hunter's list of OUTCOME VARIABLES particularly interesting. Our review of other school-based police-initiated educational programs shows that some of these newer programs provide classroom instruction that focuses quite accurately on many elements of the overall LRE approach. That is, while the LRE model takes a wide ranging approach to teaching students about law and justice, new programs have grown up that enable law officers and lay teachers to provide guidance and counsel in specific areas.

Perhaps the best current examples of programs that target a specific offense are Project SPECDA (School Program to Educate and Control Drug Abuse, developed by New York City Police Department and the New York City Schools and implemented in fifth- and sixth-grade classes in the Bronx and Brooklyn school districts) and Project DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education, developed by the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles Public Schools and implemented in elementary and junior high schools in the LA area). Both SPECDA and DARE have common elements and common assumptions: both endeavor to equip children with "the skills for resisting peer pressure to experiment with alcohol, tobacco, and drugs" (DeJong, 1986: 2); both programs assume that today's school-age youth need strong and decisive adult leadership and counsel to help them overcome the tremendous peer pressure to engage in illegal drug activity. The goals set forth for SPECDA
clearly demonstrate the focus and intensity of this new genre of program. The broad goals of earlier education programs have been focused; the general interest in improving school/police relations have been honed.

The Police Department and the Board of Education joint program planning committee define three SPECDA program goals:

1. To constructively alter the attitudes and perceptions of young people as they pertain to drug usage.

2. To increase student awareness of the effects and consequences of drug and substance abuse.

3. To build foundations for a constructive, ongoing dialogue between police officers, drug counselors, and young people. (Jacobs, 1936: iii)

Perhaps the best example of a program that targets a specific population (rather than a specific problem) is the Youth Awareness Program co-sponsored by the District of Columbia Public Schools and the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. This program focuses on urban adolescents; it aims to help them make appropriate life-choices in the face of negative peer pressures and difficult socio-economic circumstances. Again, the program planners assume that children — in this instance children of lower socio-economic standing who attend urban schools — need forceful adult leadership in order to overcome strong peer pressures to engage in contra-legal activity. The sponsoring agencies work together to develop new policies, procedures, instructional materials, to train liaisons and resource personnel, etc. The courses last a semester. The program was evaluated in the 1983-84 school year. Pre- and post-testing revealed that younger students (12-14) gained significantly in knowledge and improved attitudes while gains among older students (15+) were not significant (District of Columbia Public Schools, 1984).

On-site Presence Approach: While there are many programs initiated by school districts that result in police officers spending some time in the
schools, we will not discuss them until we reach "School System Programs; prevention strategy, school security approach" somewhat later in this paper. For this section, the principal programs that lead to police officers being assigned to schools — but that are initiated from the law enforcement side of the equation — are called Police Liaison Programs.

Police Liaison Programs grew out of a project with the Flint, Michigan police department, funded by the Mott Foundation. It was initially conceived between 1958-60, and had been implemented in other locales by the mid-1960s. By 1968, when the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) began promoting Police Liaison Programs, the Flint model had already been replicated in Tuscon and was in various stages of development in some nineteen other cities nationwide (Pursuit, 1972; 306).

While specific goals and objectives certainly differ between cities, the basic goals of Police Liaison Programs are:

1) to establish collaboration between the police and school in preventing crime and delinquency;
2) to encourage understanding between police and young people;
3) to improve police teamwork with teachers in handling problem youth;
4) to improve the attitudes of students toward police; and
5) to build better police-community relations by improving the police image." (Shepard and James, 1967; 2)

Unlike educational programs in classrooms, Police Liaison Programs represent an early model of law enforcement intervention and counselling in informal school settings. This "marriage" of education and law enforcement appears to be the earliest form of police-school interagency cooperation, a topic that we discuss in a later section of this paper. Readers should note that unlike most of the police-school agreements that will surface later, Police Liaison Programs appear to be initiated by local police professionals.
rather than by local educators. It appears that an underlying assumption of these police planners that by placing officers in secondary schools, they could fulfill a "security" function and also have informal access to the very youth who were committing delinquent acts in the community.

By the early 1980s, liaison programs had grown and matured into sophisticated units of city law enforcement departments. In 1981 the Wisconsin Juvenile Officers' Association published their Police/School Liaison Program Development Policy Guidelines complete with evaluation guidelines. In 1984, the South San Francisco Police Department published a complete history and evaluation of their school liaison program, including their updated Procedure Handbook for Police Liaison Officers. Their evaluation is best described as a "process evaluation:" contacts, meetings, arrests. This evaluation is only of limited use for this paper, as the "evaluation" simply concludes that effective prevention and early intervention is taking place, and the program should be continued. They have attached numerous support letters; they all reiterate that theme.

Response Strategy

Response strategies, as previously discussed, contain approaches designed to curtail further occurrences of a group of acts that the school system or the police department want to curtail. Like drug sales. Or gang activity. Or vandalism. Or burglary.

There are not many descriptions of programs involving the police that truly represent responses to particular problems. The bulk of the extant descriptions appear in three sources: in Surratt (1974); in Violent Schools—Safe Schools, 1977 (hereafter, the Safe School Study); and in Vestermark and Bleuvelt (1978). In these works, we read about the range of police assistance programs for specific events: using police to help monitor after-school
events; school arrival/departure safety; officers working "undercover" to help curtail drug transactions; tailoring police nighttime patrol patterns better to monitor school buildings that might be subject to vandalism or burglary; and helping the district stop an employee theft ring.

Of the three works, Surratt's doctoral dissertation (A Survey and Analysis of Special Police Services in Large Public School Districts of the United States, 1974) and the Safe Schools Study contain some quantitative findings, while Vestermark's is descriptive. The latter goes into much greater detail than the first two about WHEN, WHY, and HOW to involve police in school matters. As the focus of this paper is upon a review of research, we will limit this discussion to Surratt and to the Safe Schools Study.

Surratt surveyed 932 school superintendents nationwide. Of 519 usable surveys (56%) he found that "more than two-thirds of the large school systems...utilized the services of local police departments in the areas of protection at after-school events and school arrival/departure safety; [that] fewer than half of the large school systems...[used police] for protection of buildings and grounds after school hours, patrolling halls and grounds during the school day, and instruction or counselling;...[that while] a majority of the police departments paid for most of the police services reported in three of five areas of special police services, the question of fiscal responsibility for police services was unresolved." (Surratt, 1974; 49, 170-171).

The Safe Schools Study stands as the only national research into the nature and extent of crime in American schools, and a catalogue of what is (or was) being done about it. Among the lists of "things being done," we find security office operations and police action. (The author of this paper assumes that readers are familiar not only with the Safe Schools Study, but also with its research methodology and history.)
While there is not a great deal of information on policing in schools in the Safe Schools Study, some of the findings are unusual enough to warrant further thought and discussion. For example, we find that suburban areas, then small cities, then rural areas, and lastly large cities report "very much support" from local police (47%, 41%, 39% and 29%). But when we look at areas served by police, the order is different. "Police on regular patrol," infrequent at best, ranges from only 8 to 11% of responding schools — is most frequent in large cities (as would be expected). If we now juxtapose these findings, we discover that while about 11% of all large city schools have police on regular patrol (and 5% of them also have police stationed in the schools), it is these same respondents (administrators of schools in large cities) that are least likely to say that they receive "very much support" from local police.

The author of this paper recognizes that the "research" reported both by Surratt and by The Safe Schools Study is strictly quantitative and as such, of little use to those endeavoring to derive conclusions about the utility and effectiveness of particular approaches and strategies. We have been unable to locate any "impact" research or evaluations of these types of police-initiated school-based prevention programs. Furthermore, the author of this paper is surprised to note that it appears that short-term interventions that are planned and carried out by policing agencies either succeed in meeting their intended purpose (and are then discontinued) or fail to meet their intended purpose (and are discontinued). The only apparent difference (since the conclusions are the same) is that if they "succeeded" in the eyes of the commanding officers, they will likely be tried again. Tried often enough, some report of them reaches the general public. Quite a bit of time can elapse
before these experimental/practical programs do, indeed, reach the attention of the general public.

It may do well to provide an example of this point. Irving Spergel in his recent 212-page definitive study of gangs and their handling in the Chicago Public Schools (Youth Gang Activity and the Chicago Public Schools, 1985) fails even to evaluate the activities and programs of the Chicago Police Department's "Youth Gang Squad" division. This is only noteworthy because this author has in his possession specific programmatic guidelines that police have been developing for the past three years just for schools. To this date, then, special police projects and programs focused at preventing particular school-based problems appear never to have been subject to an impact evaluation.

Control Strategy

There are two general conditions when schools system administrators turn to police to control events: first, when there is a sudden event that appropriately falls within the domain of law enforcement; and second, when a problem turns from chronic to acute. More simply, principals call the police either to handle standard complaints, or to manage a crisis.

Research on normal school-police relations comes from Sterling Fox's 1964 doctoral dissertation (University of Southern California). As we have mentioned previously, Fox's work is particularly interesting, as it catalogues differences of perceptions between policing and educating agencies regarding each others' cooperation. However, Fox restricts his inquiry to RELATIONSHIPS. He does not catalogue either the nature or the extent of contacts between these two agencies. So again, we find a gap in the research base; no impact evaluations into normal police responses in schools.
Research on acute school-policing relations is somewhat more plentiful, but — again — we mostly find descriptive information rather than impact evaluations. In this instance, the author of this paper proposes that descriptions of these policies and practices would not have been published/printed had they not been tested, even if only pragmatically. So perhaps we have some empirical research, after all.

Among this literature, Vestermark and Blauvelt (1978; 161) describe how to manage bomb threats. Blauvelt (1977) instructs us how to handle hostage situations in public schools. Vestermark (1971), writing a general treatise on "collective violence" presents what remains to this day the definitive tactical procedural manual for situational (spontaneous) and guided (planned) riots on school grounds. Williams (C 1978) gives us a crowd-control plan for schools; Campbell (1982) authors a manual for police/school handling of street gangs; the Milwaukee Police Department's Gang Crimes Unit (1984, 85, 86) produces an annually updated directory of gang indicia, terms, and signals; and Mourning (1985) discusses current policies and practices regarding the use of metal detectors in schools. To restate: these are all descriptive, and we can only suspect that they work because they are being promulgated, even if only — in some instances — as "fugitive literature".

School System Programs

By the mid-1970s, the nation had begun to realize that students were actually committing crimes in the public schools. The Gallup organization began reporting that "discipline" was the greatest educational concern in the country (Gallup Polls of Public Attitudes Towards Education) and the U.S. Senate began holding hearings in an effort to understand the phenomenon (U.S. Congress, 1975). By 1975, the then-six-year-old National Association of
School Security Directors had some 350 members; of these, all but a handful were commissioned law officers employed by school districts (Rubel, 1977).

But it is just as difficult, not as it was then, to grasp either the nature or the extent of crimes committed on campuses. While it would be natural to expect that school districts with their own security departments would be able to keep track of the entire range of incidents occurring at local schools, that is — and always has been — far from the fact. For example, the Safe Schools Study expends quite a bit of time and space describing and explaining just why and how certain kinds of offenses seem to be substantially underreported by educators (Violent Schools - Safe Schools, 1977: 46-48). Perhaps the most thorough, recent treatment of the problems faced by the educational community accurately to define and to report criminal incidents appears in the 1985 booklet School Discipline Notebook produced by the National School Safety Center. In their chapter entitled "Criminal and Noncriminal Acts" the author points out that the general confusion over what is really a crime and what is really a violation of a school rule hampers educational planners (probably, but not necessarily local school principals) in their efforts to curtail their "discipline" problems.

That point now becomes central to this section of this current paper. It is apparent from this review of the literature most school-based strategies involving police agencies or school security departments are GENERAL rather than SPECIFIC in scope. That is, they appear to address general problems of delinquency rather than specific types of criminal or severely disruptive behavior. Only when we reach our discussion of the roles of school security programs as part of PREVENTION STRATEGIES do we begin to hear a recurring call for a planning process that involves the clear separation of student
crimes from disciplinary infractions as a precursor to developing and implementing truly effective programs.

While more detailed discussion of this schism should probably be held for Part III of this paper, readers might want to consider something of the differences in education and training of those in the law enforcement or school security fields as opposed to those in the education field. That is, those in control of educational planning appear to develop general responses to problems of discipline or delinquency while law enforcement professionals appear to develop "target-specific" data-based planning tools and programs aimed at particular populations of offenders. Of course we see all around us how these different planning processes lead to quite different programs and approaches for working with youth-in-trouble. General educational programs planned by educators; specific crime prevention programs planned by the police.

**Prevention Strategy**

Within this first strategy, the research points to two types of law enforcement approaches open to educators when dealing with youth who present problems of serious disruption or crime. First, the district's administrators may turn to the police in an effort to develop closer working relations; and second, if the school district has its own office of school security, district officials may look there for help developing methods for improving "discipline" in the schools. In either case, the assumption on the part of the education officials is that those with law enforcement backgrounds have technical skills to offer that may well supplement the district's own planning or technical skills.

**Working-With-Police Approach:** When we were discussing ways police work with schools, we saw programs that brought law officers into schools as
educators. When schools initiate the contacts, it appears that the programs are substantially different. Here, for example, we see a decided concentration upon efforts at coordination and cooperation. This might be expected, if we recall from Fox's dissertation that "contact with police" represented the area of poorest relations for educators. It appears to be a central assumption of this approach that these meetings help to put police and education professionals clearly on one team, and to put severely disruptive and criminal youth on the other team. And in that, there is undeniable benefit.

School Security Approach: About two hundred school systems in this country have their own divisions of school security (National Alliance for Safe Schools, 1985). Most of the directors of these divisions have had many years of law enforcement experience. Usually, the director and his officers are commissioned peace officers or special officers. They certainly have arrest powers on school grounds, and in some school systems they have arrest powers in the city as well. In many large urban centers, these school peace officers or school security agents are armed. Minimally, they carry handcuffs.

There are two publications that describe school security operations and personnel. The first is a 1979 doctoral dissertation by Melvyn May entitled: "A Descriptive View of Security Services in Selected School Districts by Geographic Region and Student Population." The second is a National Directory of Public School Security Operations (NASS, 1985). As these documents provide descriptive rather than impact information, we will not discuss either one in this current paper. However, when a school district's strategy calls for using security operations, there are three separable approaches that we can usefully explore: data collection/planning; physical security; and child-centered intervention programs.
Data Collection/Planning Approach: This approach assumes that by defining acts clearly and by collecting "clean" and current information about the nature and extent of problems it will be easier to plan successful programs. Put another way, before program planners can hit a target they have to at least SEE the target. Surprisingly, careful data collection and planning is by far the exception rather than the rule in delinquency prevention programs run by school districts. Frequently the process of collecting and analyzing data is omitted entirely from the planning cycle. This fact is tacitly acknowledged by the American Association of School Administrators in their 1981 publication on Reporting: Violence, Vandalism, and Other Incidents in Schools when they wrote; "In many cases, school districts still do not have clear records of incidents of school crime" (American Association of School Administrators, 1981: 2) and then went on to write a booklet telling how to do it correctly. That school administrators are hampered in their planning of prevention programs because they often misname events (confusing disciplinary violations with law violations) is also discussed in detail in the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention-sponsored School Discipline Notebook (National School Safety Center, 1985: Chapter 3). This theme — about the need to separate discipline from crime — is picked up by Rubel and Ames (1986), as they are discussing a problem-solving strategy for school-based crime and discipline for the National Institute of Justice's "Issues and Practices" document entitled Reducing School Crime and Student Misbehavior: A Problem-Solving Strategy. Here, the authors push the need for naming events and tracking their occurrences; they describe (in Chapter V) the form and format for a computer-driven incident analysis system. This is the first point at which this author has seen the law enforcement technology known as "incident analysis" applied in an educational setting.
There is not much research about the ways that collecting and analyzing data can help reduce problems of discipline and crime in public schools. Interestingly, the first work in this area is actually an in-house proposal to the Louisiana State Department of Education, Bureau of Curriculum, In-Service, and Staff Development, Office of Discipline by its own staff. This is a proposal written in 1979 to launch a statewide incident-based reporting system for crime and disruptive behavior in the Louisiana public schools. The proposal was prepared by the State Supervisor of Discipline, the Director of the Center for Research and Analysis for the Louisiana Criminal Justice Information System and a research statistician. In this document (Louisiana State Department of Education, 1979), the authors have done a spectacular job justifying the proposed process for collecting and analyzing diverse data. An important section describes how to program and test the system; another describes the evaluation criteria.

The second evaluation of the impact upon a school system of implementing an entire data collection and analysis system focuses on the Safer Schools - Better Students program of the National Institute of Justice. This evaluation is more fully described later in this paper in the section dealing with national programs that have a district- or agency-level focus.

Physical Security Approach: The second approach within the School Security Strategy has the security office conducting "needs assessments," purchasing, installing, and monitoring a wide range of physical security devices. While the author of this paper has been advised that the Department of Education is not particularly interested in research on this approach, it would be remiss not to cite the single objective analysis of the impact of intrusion detection devices upon crime prevention in schools. Robert Murray, writing a doctoral dissertation in 1980, selected the topic: "The Effectiveness of Intru-
ion Alarm Systems in Reducing School-Related Crime and Vandalism in an Inner-City School District." Here, he found that while intrusion alarms appeared to have some capacity to reduce burglary, there appeared to be no other statistically significant reductions. That is, attendance did not change substantially, and daytime offenses were unaffected. Of course, the author of this paper can't help but wonder what else he expected to find: the usual assumption among security specialists is that intrusion alarms (burglar alarms) help prevent after-hours-hours break-ins by electronically simulating a populated building. Put differently, the idea is that the type of person who declines to enter an occupied building to commit a theft will also be dissuaded from entering an alarmed building to commit a burglary because the alarm will — at least in theory — summon people who will discover his presence.

Child-Centered Intervention Approach: Perhaps the most notable effort to bridge the gap between a school district's security operation and the principals who run the schools is seen in the National Association of Secondary School Principals' book Effective Strategies for School Security (Blauvelt 1981). Here, the author has combined humor with common sense and hard-headed policing to produce a work that on the one hand provides solid guidance for handling youth who commit crimes in schools, and on the other hand remains sensitive to the reality that the offenders are public school students and the district administrators have to conduct themselves within the bounds of reason and prudence. The underlying assumption, shared by NASSP, was that school principals could probably do a great deal more to help reduce and prevent crime in their schools if they possessed more technical skills to help them in that task.

Blauvelt has authored many other works on school security and administrative management of crises, but one speaks to this section with particular
clarity. "Interface: Security and Students" (Blauvelt, 1984) describes a program conducted for many years in the Prince George's County Schools whereby security office personnel worked as faculty sponsors for an extra-curricular "club" called the Student Security Advisory Council. This program enabled students to define and to solve the problems of crime and criminality that most concerned them. Those who planned this program assumed that if high school students participated in identifying not only the problems that faced them but also the solutions to those problems, they would at least feel that the school district administration was on their side; that the administrative staff of the district cared about their concerns and valued their advice and recommendations. NOTE: This author is familiar with the modified application in an elementary school of the "Student Security Advisory Council." The principal called it her "Little SAC" (Student Advisory Council) for the lower grades and her "Big SAC" for the 5th and 6th graders. She expanded the program to accommodate problems more wide-ranging than crime and discipline.

Unfortunately, no one has conducted impact evaluations on either of these two aspects of this approach. The author of this paper considered omitting this section entirely because of this defect, but finally decided to include it. It is this author's opinion that these programs describe an important option for educators; an opportunity to apply some degree of law enforcement rigor to discipline and crime prevention practices that can be implemented in elementary or secondary school settings.

Response Strategy

We saw that when law enforcement professionals initiated in-school crime reduction programs, these programs were designed to repulse specific events. In this same vein, once educational planners are moved to imple-
ment some program to address a particularly chronic problem, they focus quite specifically on the "intolerable behavior" that they want changed. While there are volumes upon volumes of school-based prevention programs that are designed to encourage good behavior, improve the social climate of the school, or target slow learners with enriched curricula, these all fall outside the scope of this paper. Indeed, this survey of the research has shown that there are very few descriptions of programs that feature highly focused, school-initiated responses to seriously disruptive and criminal youth. The author of this paper suspects that the reason for the paucity of evaluative research follows from the very nature of the programs that the educational planners must consider; quick and decisive responses to particular problems. Like locker thefts; bicycle thefts; assaultive behavior; drug dealing. Usually, the problems don't stay around long enough to design a program, set up a research agenda, and seek money to fund it. But occasionally they do; there appear to be a few programs that are caught by the "response strategy" net that have been reasonably well described and evaluated.

Before presenting these individual programs, readers should realize that the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), U.S. Department of Justice has for years taken a keen interest not only in programs, themselves, but also in the theoretical basis for preventing delinquency in school settings. In 1979 OJJDP published Delinquency Prevention: Theories and Strategies, an exhaustive examination of the range of strategies then available to school systems and communities to address severely disruptive youth. More importantly, this work discusses in detail the practical implications for each strategy. Put differently, the authors carefully catalogue each of the many theoretical approaches to delinquency prevention and explain why they would or would not succeed based on findings from research.
This author encourages readers to review this OJJDP publication before planning new programs.

While this paper is to limit itself, generally, to works that have more substance than "simple description," this author would like readers also to consider two publications of the Office of the Superintendent of the Los Angeles County Schools. These two works are: Strategies for Reducing Violence and Vandalism (1980) and Constructive Discipline: A Resource Manual of Programs and Strategies (1986). Unlike journalistic retelling of a story (where the enthusiasm of those involved in the story and the inexperience of the reporter of the story often conspire to produce curious but inaccurate tales) the dozens and dozens of short, clever, focused interventions (and even preventions) have here withstood tests of time and bureaucratic peer review and have been formally endorsed by one of our nation's largest school systems. Furthermore, these books communicate the important — if intangible — assumption that it is through careful attention to the tone and temper of MANY aspects of schooling that children learn to "be nice and do right" (in the words of the Superintendent of Schools for Colorado Springs, CO). As none of these techniques have been formally evaluated, there is little more to say but that many are very clever, apply well in elementary school settings, and are probably quite effective.

That, finally, brings us to the only work this author could find that actually evaluated "response strategy" programs designed by educational planners and implemented in public schools. These programs, collectively, are known as "Alternative Education Programs." This project, begun in late 1980, saw the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention funding and rigorously evaluating eighteen demonstration projects operating in 94 sites nationwide. The program:
...implements selected alternative education approaches in order to enhance student learning and prevent behavior problems. These include more individualized instruction and reward structures, goal oriented work and learning emphases in the classroom together with enhanced student-teacher relationships and administrator support to create a positive school climate.

The program is being evaluated in order to determine the process by which different schools implement the programs, and to measure project impact on student achievement, delinquency and on related behavior problems among program participants.

The expected goal...is to produce and verify a positive program impact as measured by improved learning, reduced delinquency, dropouts and expulsions, and by successful student transition to higher education or employment.... The program...will require 3 to 4 years to complete. (OJJDP, 1983).

Control Strategy

School district strategies for dealing with acute problems of disruption are pretty well limited to "crisis contingency plans." Here we are speaking about options open to a school principal when there has been a homicide, a rape, a bomb threat. Again, the author of this paper finds himself repeating a distressing but recurring theme: there are many examples of contingency plans and none of them have ever been researched or evaluated for their effectiveness. As with police control strategies, the true test of "success" appears to be that the particular plan has survived the rigors of review and made it into print.

Examples of contingency plans for educators range from the U.S. Department of Justice's Community Relations Service publication "School Security: Guidelines for Maintaining Safety in School Desegregation" (1978) through the National Alliance for Safe Schools' "Checklist for School Crisis Contingency Plans" (NASS, 1984). These plans share a root assumption; that the very process of planning puts educational leaders in control of events, rather than allowing the events, themselves, to control the decision-makers.
Perhaps the best collection of contingency plans prepared in a form and format that school district administrators can use is seen in the National Alliance for Safe Schools' 1984 document: "Guide for Creating School Safety Plans." In this collection we find the document used by the New York City Board of Education to require such plans of their principals; the text of Milwaukee Public Schools' safety plan as it applies to rumor control, bomb threats, and inter-group conflict; and the Community Relations Service's overall recommendations for establishing conflict management programs for school systems.

National Programs

To this point, we have been examining in detail programs and practices of police and education agencies who must deal with severely disruptive and criminal students. All these projects share a common theme: they evolve locally to meet local needs; there has been no attempt to develop a shared structure with similar projects nationwide.

In this section, we will describe two programs that present school district responses to severely disruptive and criminal youth. Unlike all that has gone before, these are federally sponsored explorations into quite unusual directions. The first program, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education, can be said to be exploring the success of a model that calls for cooperation to promote planning to achieve an improved learning environment. The second program, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice, has borrowed some of the lessons learned from the preceding program and added a twist; here they are exploring the success of using information to motivate planning to produce improved management of disruptions and disruptive youth. The purpose in now featuring these programs is that we are likely now to view their aims
and accomplishments differently since we have had a chance to read about the wide range of single-focus projects in this field.

U.S. Department of Education

For the past twelve years, the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Education division of the Department of Education has provided instruction to school officials nationwide in the "school team approach" to problem solving. Over this period, the "problem" has been drug abuse and disruptive behavior in schools. During part of this time, the Office of Juvenile Justice sponsored research and evaluation to ascertain the success of this model.

The School Team Approach is an effort to build competence to deal with local problems. Implementation of the Approach begins with recruitment of a school whose administrator is concerned about given problems and committed to efforts to do something about them. Two weeks of residential training is provided to a school-selected team consisting of seven persons drawn from both school and community and including the school's principal or another administrator. (Grant, 1981; 1)

By providing intensive workshops to members of the school's community (parents, teachers, students, administrators) this program has been able to build a team of highly skilled PLANNERS. By the time this School Team leaves a training cycle, they have with them a well developed plan for combating drug dealing, drug abuse, or some other disruptive school-based problem.

As mentioned in the introduction to this section; this program uses COOPERATION among members of the school's community to drive PLANNING to combat a significant problem, to achieve an IMPROVED LEARNING ENVIRONMENT.

Writing in the Executive Summary of the OJJDP-sponsored evaluation of Phase I of this program, Joan Grant notes that "The findings suggest that such an effort can decrease the amount of victimization reported by students
and may also decrease the level of tension, fear, and danger perceived by students in the school.” In general way, the evaluations exposed a general weakness of all training programs; they point out that without strong and dedicated leadership, the excitement and drive that develops in an intensive workshop setting soon dissipates along with the intended impact. Many of the school teams never implemented their written plans. But for those who did, the experiences were rewarding (Grant, 1981).

This “School Team Approach” program is both sophisticated and complex. It contains four major thrusts: a strategic thrust made up by the team programs, themselves; a discipline thrust; a communications thrust; and a human relations thrust. As all these were evaluated in the final report on this phase of the ongoing program, readers are referred to the relevant documents, rather than subjected, here, to a lengthy retelling of the story (Social Action Research Center, 1983).

U.S. Department of Justice

Responding to widespread concern that serious disruption and crime was harming American public education, the National Institute of Justice in 1981 began to explore approaches to assist school principals and district education officials better understand the nature and extent of student misbehaviors as the step preceding planning or implementing specific programs (Rubel and Ames, 1986). Quite early in this exploration, NIJ entered into a formal interdepartmental agreement with the Department of Education that involved co-funding and also sharing elements of the School Team Training approach.

As we saw that the Education Department’s School Team Approach used a model of cooperation to lead to planning to help improve the educa-
tional setting, the Justice Department’s program incorporated that same strategy and expanded it. Here we see a model that is testing the assumption that “information is power” and that computer-aided data analysis about the nature and extent of school-based misbehaviors must precede planning, and that planning based on this solid information should lead to improved management of student crime and misbehavior. It is also a fundamental premise of this program that CRIMES (violations of laws) must be carefully identified and catalogued separately from DISCIPLINE (violations of school rules).

As the model developed — and was tested in a total of 77 schools in four school districts nationwide from 1983 to 1986 — it asked the research questions:

1. Will local school districts accept and benefit from a program that addresses crime and discipline problems in school through partnerships between education and law enforcement?

2. Will a data-based analysis process be effective in helping schools identify and reduce recurring problems? (Rubel, 1986a)

To date, the program has shown promise in these areas:

1. **Helps Students**
   a. Brings troubled youth to the assistant principal’s and counselor’s attention for early intervention.
   b. Reduces FEAR of crime/disruption to increase student’s attention on the business of education.
   c. Communicates consistency within the school both for policies and practices (rules and consequences).

2. **Helps Principals**
   a. Enables principals to target his/her energies to attack one problem at a time.
   b. Shows precisely who and what is going wrong throughout the school (students or teachers).
   c. Checks whether the specific intervention is working, as planned (on-line feedback loop).
3. **Helps Central (District) Office**
   a. Evens out the districtwide application of **policies** (e.g.: handling drug sales; weapons; gang activity).
   b. Ensures consistent districtwide application of **dispositions** (e.g.: degree of censure for theft of property worth $50 or $200; prosecution for battery).
   c. Helps the superintendent to build bridges of communication and cooperation to police and youth-serving agencies (memoranda of understanding). (Rubel, 1986)

The only evaluation prepared to this point covers the first two years of this field test; 1983-84 and 1984-85 school years in 44 secondary schools in three sites (Tremper, 1985). Since then, the program has been implemented in 33 secondary schools in one additional site. The program has undergone so many changes as it has moved into this current site that few of the evaluation findings remain relevant. This current site was specifically selected as a "refined field test"; a district in which this program could be implemented with all the modifications suggested from the two previous years of experience.

One aspect of the original field tests that apparently remains unchanged in the current "refinement" was that of **interagency agreements** between the school systems and the police departments. Here, Tremper's evaluation findings remain valid:

Finding 5: The project emphasis on interagency coordination addressed a strongly felt need for better responses to serious and repeat criminal offenders.

Finding 6: Interagency groups favor informal arrangements over written agreements. They did, however, make substantial progress toward undertaking joint endeavors and strengthening informal ties.

Finding 7: The partnership between the federal Departments of Justice and Education served as a valuable model of cooperation to spur local efforts.
PART III: DESCRIBING A RESEARCH AGENDA; FROM THE PRESENT TO THE FUTURE

For the author of this paper, there have been some surprising findings. First and foremost, it appears that there is a substantial difference between the kinds of programs that result from police wanting to work with school systems versus school systems wanting the help of the police. It appears that when police agencies consider working in a school setting, the emphasis is on education, either with primary or secondary school youth. The education may be informal (Officer Friendly) or carefully planned (McGruff). On the other hand, when school district officials solicit the police for cooperative programs, the emphasis appears to be upon using police to help with special patrols or security-related assignments. In some cases, the emphasis is on formal or informal agreements about how the police departments will respond in certain circumstances. While this author does not know exactly what to make of this difference, the theme is too common in the literature to be wholly disregarded.

Another surprising finding is that school and police programs that target specific chronic problems of youth crime have seldom been researched. From the school side, we don't know much about curricula to prevent drug dealing, weapons possession, or battery. From the police side, we don't have an array of response or control options for common problems such as theft of school property or battery on school grounds.

How Much Planning and Analysis is Going On?

The only program found during this research that relies heavily on data collection and analysis to guide project planning and to verify the suc-
cess or failure of specific intervention strategies is the Safer Schools - Better Students program developed under the leadership of the National Institute of Justice and co-sponsored by the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Educational Research and Improvement.

Other projects and programs seem to evolve from one of two sources; first, plans sometimes develop from the belief that the content of some program will help keep the students from repeating a certain kind of unwanted behavior; or second, projects sometimes evolve from an individual's charismatic or dynamic leadership.

Two substantial issues arise when projects are developed and implemented without a solid base of data. First, the project may miss the real target. Those designing and implementing the project may have selected an issue that appeared to be "The Problem" but wasn't; planners made a subjective "judgment call" that could not have been substantiated by data-based fact. Also within this category, the project designers could have selected a "problem" that had somehow either subtly changed over time or disappeared completely, leaving only the impression that it still remained. Second, once implemented, the project managers have no objective way to determine the extent to which their intervention strategy is making a difference. Indeed, they have no way of knowing even when "The Problem" has been solved.

Both of these issues have been addressed in the Safer Schools - Better Students program. The very nature of the constant data collection and rapid feedback process enables building-level administrators to identify shifts in trends in misbehavior, to separate real from illusory problems, to monitor the success or failure of specific prevention or intervention projects, and — of course — to recognize when a problem no longer exists.
What Form Does This Planning Take and Does it Help?

The planning model currently being tested in the Safer Schools - Better Students program of the Departments of Justice and Education is described in detail in Rubel and Ames (1986). Fundamentally, this is a computer-aided incident analysis system that calls for recording certain information from every teacher's referral of a student into the office of the principal or assistant principal for discipline. The data are entered daily and processed by a school district's central computer on a routine basis. This routine is established by the local school district.

The district's computer produces tables and charts displaying key elements of information relating either to individual students or groups of incidents. For example, it is possible to produce a table of the students most frequently referred by teachers to the main office. It is also possible to produce a table of the teachers most often referring students out of their classes. Or it is possible to request a table of the kinds of dispositions a particular administrator is making for a particular kind of offense. Or it is possible to produce a chart displaying the period of day, day of week, and zone of the school where any type of incident is occurring (fights, battery, vandalism, locker thefts, tardiness, etc.)

This list is practically endless, and can be modified by each school district to produce the specific information that they want. Clearly, the information collected on the teacher's referral form determines what is placed into the computer; that, in turn, defines the output options.

Once the data are returned to the principal and assistant principals in a useful form, that administrator begins to plan — using the planning methods developed by the Education Department's Drug and Alcohol Abuse Pre-
vention Education "School Team" training model. The result is an "action plan," again, patterned from that "School Team" training model.

The "Does it Help?" question is easy to answer and hard to prove. A great many people think that this approach helps both local and district education professionals, or they would not pay for its continued testing or suffer its intrusion into large school districts. Those educators who have been involved with this program contend that it enables the central office of the school district continually to monitor — with only a few weeks of lag-time — a wide range of misconduct that is continually present in modern American schools. Those same educators also laud the improved districtwide policies and practices that evolve from examining internal actions relating to the handling of criminal and disruptive youth — a process of self-examination that precedes meetings with representatives of the juvenile justice community.

Research Needed

There can be little doubt that more research is needed both concerning the transferability of the Safer Schools - Better Students model but also into the implications of some of Fox's findings that seem to indicate that police and education professionals report satisfactory working relations in DISSIMILAR areas of contact.

The Safer Schools model has been implemented only in limited settings; what happens if it is implemented within an entire state, all at once? What about three states? How large or small can a district be to still find the program useful? Will it really be of any use in a 2,000-student district where the most serious problems are tardiness?
Some of the questions raised by Fox suggest other avenues of inquiry. Fox examined working relations of "line officers" with "line school administrators." The answers were useful, even though the research is now over 20 years old. His study should probably be refined and replicated. What, though, of the working relations of the next two tiers above the local officials? In school districts, what of the relations at the field-supervisor level; what of the relations of the district's superintendent and the chief of police? There is some evidence from the experiences of project personnel associated with the Safer Schools program that relations at the "line" level are controlled by local precinct captains and may not accurately reflect a superintendent's working relationship with the chief of police. Of course, that — too — carries implications for policy and practice, and must be considered in any school district plan to work cooperatively with the police to curtail crime and disruption in the schools.

Implications for Practice

Most of the major themes in this paper carry SOME implication for practice.

We have noted how law enforcement professionals have developed many kinds of programs over the last 25 years. The first projects were aimed at overcoming youth's antagonism for authority. The next wave of projects were aimed at taking advantage of youth's capacity to learn about, and participate in, crime prevention. The current cycle of projects endeavor to instruct youth how to apply peer pressure to reduce specific problems, such as drug use. When planning projects that are meant to be co-sponsored between police and education departments, some of this history is useful. It would also be useful to recognize the increasingly sophisticated use by police
We have noted how education system professionals have turned to the police community for advice and counsel regarding crisis planning as well as planning projects to combat specific types of crimes occurring in the schools. Also, we have noted frequent references in the literature to the wide disparity among school principals — from school to school and from district to district — when it comes to defining the parameters of acts they consider sufficiently serious to warrant calling the police.

Finally, we have noted how after many years of separate development within the U.S. Departments of Education and Justice, a program has emerged that appears to combine key elements of each discipline. By combining the "school team approach" to planning and problem-solving with the law enforcement method of collecting and analyzing data, we appear to have a model with almost universal appeal. A model, moreover that addresses the central theme of this paper; school system and police agency inter-agency cooperation and planning. Perhaps some of the Education Department's future research can be channeled into determining with even greater clarity the capacity of this ongoing program to be implemented in diverse settings, addressing the entire spectrum of disruptive and criminal incidents. Perhaps some future research can show how cooperative planning, based on solid data and using an on-line feedback loop, can re-energize public education in America.
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