This paper discusses the issue of pluralism and British society. The following topics are covered: (1) why it is desirable for Great Britain to be a pluralistic society; (2) how far the needs of minority communities can be accommodated without threatening British status quo; (3) what happens in other countries; and (4) what lessons can be learned from these experiences. The major political and intellectual impediments to more judicious consideration of the available policies of cultural diversity in contemporary British society are explored. The meaning of cultural diversity is discussed and then applied to the situation in Great Britain. Political opportunists, both antiracist activists and defenders of a more limited acknowledgement of cultural diversity, are criticized, as is organized religion. The extent to which Great Britain can become structurally pluralistic is discussed. (JS)
CULTURAL PLURALISM, STRUCTURAL PLURALISM AND 'THE UNITED KINGDOM

I have been invited today to speak to the issue of pluralism and British society. In particular, I have been requested to state why it is desirable that Britain should be a plural society, how far the needs of minority communities can be accommodated without Britain feeling threatened, what happens in other countries and what lessons we can learn from them.

Why should Britain be a Plural Society?

In response to the first question, let me state quite unequivocally that we do not have a choice. Britain is a culturally and socially pluralist society and has been for some considerable time. It is not solely the arrival of large numbers of new immigrants in the post-war period that have made it pluralist, although they have usefully served to make it more apparent and fashionable than it was and to put it on the political agenda. But, the big question is: can it really be a one-dimensional pluralism, and if not how can it be best understood and what are the structural implications of such cultural diversity. Especially sharp controversy surrounds the issue of whether cultural diversity can be realistically understood in the context of single factor explanations, so I should state my view at the beginning. In my view, pluralism is never a single factor, unidimensional phenomenon. There may be contrary imaginations about which factors should carry the heaviest weighting, or through which factors it is best to access new policies and insights, or even which disciplinary traditions might serve us best in studying and gaining purchase on it, but not about its multidimensionality.

If we consider the overlapping dimensions of Britain's diversity; racial, religious, linguistic, regional, ethnic, gender, social class and more recently caste, we cannot avoid the conclusion that, not only are 4.5% of the population so-called ethnic minorities, but that the population as a whole manifests a rich diversity across a large number of overlapping cultural factors and dimensions, representing a pluralism of pluralisms which are not usually embraced within the academic and political discourse about diversity in this country. Thus, social policy options are needlessly constrained and social responses and educational practice unnecessarily limited by a false perception, one could say an inadequate apprehension, of what cultural pluralism actually means in the daily construction and negotiation of reality in the lives of ordinary citizens and, thus, how culturally diverse the United Kingdom really is.
Nor should this issue be seen myopically and parochially as a uniquely British phenomenon of contemporary arrival¹. The social and political manifestations of cultural diversity are now becoming increasingly apparent in countries of East and West, North and South, in widely differing social systems and economic contexts, of diverse political persuasions and religious ideologies. Sometimes, that diversity is expressed in peaceful and creative tension, with cultural and social pluralism providing the momentum for social change, the liberation of the human spirit and greater human justice; sometimes, the result is cultural bigotry, repressive hegemony, violent conflict, and even civil war. Accompanying this 'renaissance' of cultural diversity, is a burgeoning of differing intellectual perspectives, which seek to complement and extend the already extensive international literature of the past half century.

The prevailing and countervailing dimensions of cultural diversity and the way in which it is apprehended vary considerably, its cultural composition diverges greatly in different countries and regions, but it is almost invariably complex and multi-faceted. That statement certainly holds good for the United Kingdom, where progress in changing deep-frozen cultural and intellectual paradigms has been slower than in many other countries, for a number of reasons that we might like to discuss later today. The upshot of that social, cultural and intellectual 'ice-age' in Britain has been a resort by academics to static, single factor models and explanations, the reinforcement of false stereotypes, overcategorization and enhancement of social category salience, and the only gentle reworking of essentially androcentric theories²: all rather ill-suited to reflect the dynamism of cultural diversity, let alone to combat the prejudice and bigotry, which inevitably arise as a cultural by-product of that diversity. In the case of educators, such analyses have led to simplistic, and in some cases harmful and counterproductive, pedagogical panaceas, where both left and right have allocated a predominantly technicist role to the teacher, and where social value positions have been seen as absolutes rather than the field of competition of varying ideological perceptions and aspirations. Politically, the upshot has been a backlash by socially conservative and culturally exclusive dominant groups.

For the above reasons, it has, therefore, always been somewhat perplexing for me to accept the intellectual validity and political viability of perceptions of the field of cultural diversity, which seek to explain and propose policies for appropriate responses to that diversity on the basis of

¹ A more extensive discussion of my views on the need to set educational policies to respond to cultural diversity within a more international context is to be found in Lynch, J. (1989), Multicultural Education in a Global Society. Basingstoke: Falmer Press. In particular, it seems to me that those advocating policies responsive to cultural diversity must come to creative terms with implications of their own economic and cultural hegemony vis-à-vis developing countries.

single factor analyses and one-dimensional perspectives. I call them grand but groundless theories. Is it, for example, really conceivable that the overlays of factors; gender, religious, racial, ethnic, linguistic, social class, regional caste and other circumambient cultural influences can be coalesced into a meaningful and realistic single factor explanatory schema? Or do such analyses lead to a skewed and simplistic chimera that provides neither increased understanding nor improved policies?

This enigma applies, in particular, to approaches, called anti-racist, which take on themselves the exclusivity of legitimate commitment to combating racial prejudice, bigotry and inequality, in the face of a reality which includes many different groups and approaches, whose efforts and aspirations have often been spurned by antiracists. True a more cooperative, less illiberal and coercive, ridiculous and authoritarian antiracist education is beginning to emerge, than the variety, which has done so much damage to race relations and the cause of an effective response to cultural diversity in the United Kingdom. More recent publications have sought, for example, to set antiracist education within the context of a broader civic, moral and political education, which "seeks to extend participation in the democratic process by equipping young people with the range of skills and dispositions needed to become, decent, fairminded, responsible and informed citizens". Now, the reader may detect major but usually unacknowledged similarities with Dewey here and ponder the question, whether we should not now reassess him as an antiracist. They may even ask, how it is possible to set antiracist education within the context of a broader moral education, without even acknowledging the contribution of other scholars, such as Kohlberg, or the feminist and other critiques of that work by such writers as Gilligan. How can the virtues of collaboration and collaborative group work be extolled without any reference to the work of such research practitioners as Sharan, or the work of the Centre for Social Integration at Bar Ilan, led by such scholars as Amir or of other schools of collaborative group work in the United Kingdom?


4. The old illiberal rhetoric and revolutionary purity is beginning to be cast aside in favour of cooperation with other movements, sharing similar and in many cases wider aspirations to social change. See, for example, Carrington, B and Short, G. (1989), 'Race' and the Primary School. Windsor: NFER-Nelson.

5. See, for example, Gilligan, C. (1982), In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

United States, such as that led by the Johnson brothers⁷?

Then too, there is the rather worrying concentration on cognitive, as opposed to affective, means of engaging with issues of race, when the literature of the last fifty years eloquently and extensively indicates the cognitive, affective and conative dimensions of prejudice and the efficacy of tackling it at those levels. And the fetish-like zeal for a kind of Shavian 'brute sanity', or worse, even downright antidemocratic coercion in some cases, rather than on empowering people as a means to change their own prejudiced attitudes, flies in the face of what we know about systematic change and how to achieve it. Now, of course, I am not suggesting that there is no difference between different forms of prejudice. But then, neither is it the case that there are no commonalities or similarities.

The parlous state of human rights in the majority of the countries of the world, not to mention women's and children's rights⁸, owes much to that same spring of human cruelty and irrationality, which nurtures racism. But, it also owes much to that form of human endeavour which seeks to advance through coercion and intimidation rather than persuasion and normative reeducation. Citizenship education, values education and law-related education, or even curriculum developments in the field of Global Education and World Studies, have made common cause against such human aberrations long before anyone dreamed up the term antiracist education. Yet, they are treated as 'Stalinist' non-movements by antiracists. The global war on women and children remains unaddressed in the work of antiracists, because every human issue has to be forced through the gossamer of a biologically dubious racial interpretation of human enterprise, a strategy which far from decreasing racial prejudice, increases the dubious biological theory that there are different human 'races', strengthens the social category salience of that definition and, thus, increases prejudice.

So at the outset of our endeavours today let us agree two things; firstly racism and all other forms of prejudice are detrimental to a harmonious and healthy pluralist society, and it is the duty of all good democratic citizens to combat them. But there are many valid routes, by which such prejudice can be challenged. Secondly, in spite of what the race industry would have us believe, there is a need for a fundamental review of the way in which we have thus far approached the attenuation and eradication of all prejudice and discrimination in our society, and sought to combat racism, sexism and 'childism'.

In the brief time allocated to me by our kind chairman today, I have begun with what I consider to be the major political and intellectual impediments to a more judicious consideration of the policies available to us to respond creatively to the fact of cultural diversity in contemporary British society; namely the hijacking of the concepts associated with race by political and educational opportunists. I have done this, not to seek to


rubbish genuine measures to combat racism, let alone to deny its existence or detrimental impact at every level, but to advocate a move from the extreme 'ourselves alone' position of British antiracism to a recognition of the need for anti-racists to coalition with all democratic forces of good will, which seek to combat pernicious prejudices, such as racism and sexism, yes and 'childism', and to strive, at a time of deep political conservatism in many western countries, for greater human justice and enlightenment.

Rather, my criticisms, looking at Britain now from the more detached perspective of international distance, are an exhortation to move from the deep seated and continuing parochialism, ethnocentrism and intellectual myopia of even the most enlightened of British anti-racism. For, until British antiracism can come to terms with the precursor and collateral traditions of intellectual and practical endeavour, which are essential to its cause, it will continue to be regarded as a convenient haven, at best for starry-eyed political opportunists, often in secure and well-paid academic posts, at worst for ill-fated and nihilistic revolutionaries who have little knowledge and even less concern for the educational welfare and progress of children in schools, and who stand no chance of gaining purchase on the social ills of this sick society or on policy and practice to improve it.

But, if I castigate the antiracist lobby, neither am I happy with the pious and rather superficial perspective on cultural diversity offered by an organized religion, which runs for cover at the first signs of conflict even in the face of downright undemocratic demands, which infringe the human and civic rights of citizens. A random and balkanised series of religious perspectives on society and its cultural diversity does not and cannot provide that core of common values, which can hold society together. There has to be something more fundamental than a Babel of self-righteous organizations each despising the other and claiming to possess the truth. What I have said in no way denies the importance of the spiritual dimension of life to millions of citizens, but we must have answers as to where the state as a whole stands, when that spiritual perspective denies the human rights of women or enslaves children in cultural bondage to their parents. In the Indian subcontinent, the tradition of bride-burning is as potent as that of non-violence, but both cannot be acceptable to a democratic society which respects the human rights of all and recognizes the supra-statal rights of its citizens beyond its own legitimation.

In reading some books, written from a religious perspective, one cannot escape a compelling and depressing feeling that the soft religious tradition will only serve to increase false social and cultural category salience, and will, therefore, only augment the very typecasting and prejudice, which it seeks to combat. It is certainly unlikely to be able to make a real contribution to that dialogue and discourse in pursuit of common values and meanings, to which the United Kingdom must commit itself, if it is to survive as a multifaith democracy, multicultural, multiracial, multilingual and politically pluralist, yet not balkanised, where at the same time basic freedoms, such as the right to disagree fundamentally without being subject to threat and intimidation can be safeguarded and extended: a society, in other

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* One recent text for example uses such a gross categorization to try to apprehend cultural diversity. See Hulmes, E. (1989), *Education and Cultural Diversity*. London: Longman.
words, which can serve to liberate the human spirit rather than find new means to enslave it. But before we continue, let me first pick up the meaning of some of the terms that are often misunderstood and misused in current discussions of cultural diversity.

What do we mean by cultural diversity?

In my work, I have used the term cultural diversity to describe the presence within one geographical area of a number of different cultural dimensions: linguistic, creetal, racial etc. Looked at against these and similar factors the composition or cultural profile of individual towns, villages, districts and regions of the United Kingdom varies very considerably, the one from the other. Sometimes the term cultural pluralism is used to describe what I am calling cultural diversity. As Bullivant points out, there is a huge literature on cultural pluralism, drawn from many different disciplines and intellectual traditions. Many models of cultural pluralism have been devised, all of them resting on implicit or explicit ideological assumptions, often expressive of contemporary fashions of their time in the social sciences. All seek, however, to develop a definition of pluralism according to major referents or descriptors. These referents, or an amalgam of such cultural referents, such as race and religion, class and gender, language and race, are used by groups as what Bullivant calls, boundary markers for inclusion in, or exclusion from, the group and to advance the claims to rewards and resources of that group, as also its claims to justice and to representation for its value positions. But, individuals each have a unique cultural biography, which comprises several different cultural referents, predisposes them to pre-judge members of other groups according to that cultural biography, and leads them to believe that their values are correct, when in reality they are contested positions within socio-cultural political arenas. Not only cultural, but also social and economic demands may be levied by individuals and groups on the basis of their value positions.

Cultural pluralism is often confused with structural pluralism, which refers to what is made of cultural pluralism, so to speak, in structural or social terms; how we as social beings organize the cultural raw materials and fashion them into the shapes, that we call institutions, organizations and societies. This is not a fact or a given in the way that cultural pluralism is. In other words, we are speaking of the social stratification of a society, which is partly planned, partly historically determined, and partly culturally located. It is the way that we organize our culture, including values and meanings to build our social and physical environment. The shape of our schools, for example, reflects - rather expresses - the educational epistemology of its time. Stratification may be on the basis of such

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11 I have argued elsewhere that it should be the role of the school par excellence in a pluralist society to combat those predispositions and prejudices, which are incompatible with creative membership of a democratic, pluralist society. See Lynch, J. (1987), Prejudice Reduction and the Schools. London: Cassell.
referents as caste or socio-economic status, or, as in the United Kingdom, on the basis of birth into self perpetuating monarchic, aristocratic or other elite groups. It does not necessarily imply that there is a different set of vertical structures in society for each group, for example, armies, financial structures, currencies, legal systems, to match the horizontal structure, although social and economic stratification are normally closely related and the allocation of life chances, jobs and economic and other rewards usually takes place on the basis of that stratification. Not many members of the aristocracy are to be found in the ranks of private soldiers in the army, and not many working class people become generals. Social stratification is, however, a universal phenomenon, and it should not be assumed that it is found solely in western societies.

How far can the needs of minority communities be accommodated?

So, in practice, individuals occupy several different kinds of groupings in society with overlapping membership, using them as means of advancing their claims to the satisfaction of their economic, political, cultural and other needs and demands. Such strivings, however, take place in the context of, one might almost say under the umbrella of, fairly constant elites, supporting and dominating the existing social order and exercising hegemonic social, and to a less extent cultural, control, sorting out and influencing life chances and the distribution of rewards and resources, as well as excluding or including different values and expressions of social reality, allocating high status to certain aspects of culture and not to others. In some culturally diverse societies, political stability may rely on a delicate but implicit social contract, under which certain groups are granted economic power, provided that they do not compete for political power, or under which they may mimic, but not threaten, the existing political structure.

Of course, each structure has its own distinctive culture, including the shared norms, values, ideologies, assumptions, symbols, meanings, language and other cultural capital, which hold it together and enable it to function as a coherent unit, without disintegrating. Groups then compete with each other, using ideologies as the means whereby groups exercise leverage on each other and on the composite of all groups and individuals that we call society. Ideologies take the place of coercion as the means, in democratic societies, of persuading people to undertake particular courses of action. Groups or individuals have to be appealed to on the basis of overlap with their ideology, or they will not accept the arguments and will remain unmotivated. So the 'trick' for the would-be social reformer is to marshall arguments and evidence that play maximally on the espoused values and ideologies of the groups or societies to be changed.

Thus, democratic pluralism is an essentially political concept, relating in particular to western democratic societies, and expressive of the existence within one nation state of several political parties and many political ideologies. The term, however, is not an absolute, but only one varying point on a continuum. One might argue that democratic centralism, as practiced until recently by all socialist countries, is at the opposite end of a continuum. Often democratic pluralism is accompanied by economic pluralism, along a continuum from market to centralized economies, but the correspondence between cultural and economic location is by no means simple and direct. Thus
members of minorities may define their social location along both cultural and economic dimensions. They may wish to retain as much of their own values and ideologies as are compatible with a democratic pluralism, but may wish to integrate politically and economically to maximize their access to rewards and resources. Groups and individuals use the gap between the espoused and declared values in a democratic society to gain purchase on change in the direction which they wish.

So, when we speak of structural pluralism, we are describing the extent to which the pluralism of different value positions can be accommodated in any the social, economic and political make-up of any society. Too much accommodation and society disintegrates; too little and it cannot legitimate itself and violent eruption or even revolution occurs. That is, at the same time, the fulcrum for creative social change and the dilemma for social policy makers. How much, of what kind, to what extent can the cultural interests of minorities be expressed in structural terms. Should each have its own police force, or army, or schools, or legal system? This dilemma is subject to continual re-resolution, with different parties making different cultural, social and political accommodations, majorities as well as minorities, in different constellations of groupings. In some cases, the aim may be social, political and economic inclusion, as in the claim for equal pay for equal work; in some cases it may be greater independence, as in the demand for separate schools. So, we are not faced with an either/or situation, but one of continual rebalancing and social accommodation, between the poles of unity and diversity, homogeneity and heterogeneity, cohesion and fragmentation.

I have always found the distinction made by Gordon to be helpful\(^\text{12}\), when he writes of liberal and corporate forms of cultural pluralism. By the first, he means a society where diversity is tolerated, but not officially recognized. By the second, he means a society where there is explicit recognition of cultural groups as a basis for the allocation of social and political power and economic resources. We might call the one passive cultural pluralism and the other active cultural pluralism, where there is a continuum between the one and the other. So the decision which has to be made is what are those cultural characteristics which should be included as criteria for power and resources and which should not. Clearly, an infinite number of groups may exist in a situation of passive cultural pluralism, without any detriment to society, but there is a limit to the number which can be recognized for purposes of political and economic power without total balkanization and disintegration. Each group cannot really have its own legislation, or courts or police force, or army with no central control and co-ordination. That would be unworkable.

So, once again we are faced with the need for an accommodation between total cultural pluralism across all social structures, at one extreme and, at the other, exclusion of all cultural characteristics from all social structures, such as was tried until the recent past in the Soviet Union and to a greater extent in North Korea. Let us call these two poles total cultural and social heterogeneity and total cultural and social homogeneity. There are a number of forms of democratic structural pluralism, expressing the resolution of social tensions and dilemmas, towards unity and towards

diversity. The big question we must face today is which form of democratic social pluralism we would prefer to advocate. Which strategies for social inclusion and social differentiation can enable us to achieve that goal, bearing in mind the need to utilize appropriate ideologies to mobilize and convince the bulk of the population, ie to legitimate those policies. Revolution is out within a society, where democratic values are espoused or convincingly legitimated with the majority of the population.

Thus, the answer to the question of how far British society can accommodate the needs of minority communities, is that amount of structural pluralism, expressive of the needs of minorities, which can be legitimated by reference to democratic ideologies with a majority of the population, including the powerful hegemonic groups in society. In effect, the options for action available to both minorities and societies are very limited. Each has the choice of engaging in discourse by reference to shared ideologies, making technical accommodations to buy time or seeking to adopt coercive measures. A combination is also possible, but to the extent that either party adopts policies inclusive of the last option, it risks endangering its objectives, because its actions conflict with one of the major legitimating ideology of democratic society.

What happens in other countries?

One of the major problems, facing societies in almost all parts of the world is the inadequate accommodation of social to cultural systems. We can see the crisis emanating from this neglect in societies as different and wide apart as the Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, the United States, and, of course, the United Kingdom. The lack of discourse between the two systems, cultural and social means that there are fewer shared ideologies, on the basis of which accommodations could be negotiated and introduced, for ideologies themselves are not static, and the very process of discourse generates a greater overlap. But, I do not wish to sound unduly pessimistic, for there are some markers to our aspirations and endeavours.

Some countries have tried to enter the problem through the language issue, including national language, mother tongue and bilingual approaches. Some have tried curricular apartheid. Some have attempted a 'trinkets and tokens' approach to curricular adornment. More realistically, others have sought to gain purchase on it through the human rights dimension, including women's rights and those of the child. Some have begun to use the regional or international covenants, to which they are signatory, as the spur to social change. Some have secured the rights to be different of significant old-established minorities in their constitutions and legislation. Some have tried through curricular initiatives, backed up with cash to support developments. Some have established separate school systems.

A few countries have taken their minorities into partnership in the design of their broader social and narrower educational strategies. Few, if any, have tried a co-ordinated, global set of initiatives to achieve systematic and deliberate change towards agreed goals, based on a national covenant of acceptable norms and values. Yet such codifications are available to us in the many international agreements and conventions, to which most western countries are signatory. This stricture applies less to the 'newer'
migrant countries, and more to the older eurocentric countries, still
imprisoned by their perceptions of immigrants rather than fellow citizens and
by the impedimenta of their 19th Century values and a consequent outdated
calibration of human beings and their worth.

In some countries, such as Canada, a backcloth of instrumental
regulation has been deliberately set, which in turn has resulted in progress
in achieving greater normative regulation of human behaviour. A Charter of
Rights and Freedoms was attached to the Constitution, when it was patriated to
Canada, which affords all citizens defence and redress against the
infringement of their rights by other citizens or the state. Accompanying
this has been the development of a national strategy on multiculturalism,
including race relations, and an Act of Parliament, recognizing and endorsing
the multiculturalism of Canada as one of its basic norm-generating
characteristics. In turn, this has been linked with the further development
of human rights legislation13 and structures, including educational and
curricular initiatives. It is such a composite approach, representing a broad
social coalition, addressing many structures in society simultaneously,
building on a broad ideological consensus, which I should like to see in the
UK.

Now, of course, I am not saying that these countries have solved all
their problems. Or that they have the ultimate answer. Manifestly, they do
not. Moreover, it is more difficult to achieve both the consensus and the
legitimation here, not because the United Kingdom is more culturally diverse
than Canada, but because we are laboured by archaic values and structures,
which get in the way of legitimation. Our language hierarchies, our outdated
Parliament; the only one in the European Community with an hereditary, non-
elective upper chamber; our system of Public Schools, expressive of privilege
by birth; our spoiled and exclusive universities, taking a smaller portion of
the age cohort than almost any other country in Europe; our exclusive and
socially narrow judiciary; our socially and intellectually skewed civil
service; our precious view of the creation of wealth and fatuous snobbery.
All of these and many other factors make it difficult to legitimate
participation and action, because people can see that they live in a rigged
society, and one which is increasingly driven by economic considerations,
rather than the engagement of political or social creativity! Why should they
care, or strive or change?

In the United States, a massive study, released this Summer14, for all
its criticism of the slowing in movement to greater equity for Blacks in
American society, which has taken place in the 1980s, charts the progress
which can be made by a mixture of legislative and structural strategies,
including both educational and economic initiatives. In 1940, 77% of Blacks
lived in the South, socially segregated and legally discriminated against.

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13 Some of the human rights legislation in Canada pre-dates the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. I have summarized some of the main initiatives in
Routledge/New York: Methuen, although at that time the Multiculturalism Act had
not yet been passed.

14 National Research Council (1989), A Common Destiny: Blacks and American
Three quarters of the few Blacks who attended college, went into the professions of cleric or teaching. In 1940, there were 300 Black engineers, by 1980 there were 36,019. The proportion of Black families with incomes above $35,000 per annum was 13.1% in 1967 and 22.3% in 1987. Of course, poverty has not been erased and economically induced housing segregation remains in many areas. The civil rights era certainly did not remove all barriers to equality. Gains have been made, however, by a combination of legislation, political pressure, educational initiative, economic investment and financial incentive, and the vast majority of Whites now support racial equality in the polls. The point that I am making is that it was a combination of initiatives, sometimes fought out over years in courts, from the highest to the lowest, which achieved the impressive gains. It was neither single factor analyses nor single factor initiatives, that achieved those modest social changes. Nor would such analyses continue to secure, let alone advance, the fragile gains already made.

So, where does that leave us in our consideration of what we can learn from others? Firstly, the need to encourage constructive adaptation in those sectors where we propose action, rather than the destructive criticism which has characterized much work thus far. We must strive to achieve the maximum possible consensus, through debate, discussion, joint political action, publicity for a composite plan, with the widest possible social support, aiming at new 'laicized' paradigms of understanding, capable of being shared with the general public and above all involving an iterative process of learning from each other; interlearning I call it.

Secondly, and at the macro level, we urgently need a Charter of Human Rights and Liberties for all citizens, with codicils enhancing the rights of women and children; political change to share power and encourage participation and commitment and to combat the creeping anomy of almost all sections of British society; legislative tightening to eradicate loopholes and facilitate rapid and affordable recourse to law on issues of discrimination and infringement of human rights and freedoms, including those perpetrated by the state against the individual; more effective community policing under greater democratic control; educational progress to change values and attitudes and reflect creative diversity within a revised national curriculum for all schools, private as well as public; a recognition of teaching as reflective practice and of teachers as 'transformative intellectuals'; economic investment to sponsor and encourage cultural enlightenment through

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15 I agree with Cummins, when he argues that political and legislative reforms are a necessary but insufficient condition for effective change. What is needed, in addition, to supplement and amplify those reforms is further social strategies, including a redefinition and 'repowering' of the role of the teacher. See Cummins, J. (1986), 'Empowering minority students: a framework for intervention', Harvard Educational Review. 56(1), 18-36.

16 I have taken this term from the work of Aronowitz and Giroux. See, for example, Aronowitz, S. and Giroux, H. A. (1985), 'Radical education and transformative intellectuals', Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory. 39(3), 48-63.
the media and education, financial incentives, not least to 'sweeten' the implementation of appropriate policies and for targeted initiatives to overcome deprivation, to achieve contract compliance, for affirmative action and or special programmes for those of visible minorities who are hardest hit economically, and especially women and children: all woven together into a composite national renewal strategy, which is, above all, politically and socially creative, and not simply economics-driven.

Thirdly and at the micro level, such composite strategies need to build the policies, severally but coordinated, into the standard operating procedures of the individuals and institutions involved, in order to secure the normal commitment of all involved in personally satisfying, and non-threatening ways. We know, for example, that one of the most potent ways of changing attitudes is to get people to work together on common tasks, which stand a good chance of success. Thus the focal principles of procedure, that guide our work, should be networking, coalitioning, cooperating, marshalling people, resources and goodwill, securing participation, establishing good working relationships, maintaining awareness of common interests, encouraging constructive resolution of conflicts and de-emphasizing difference and inspiring enthusiasm for common goals. More specifically, there is now an extensive literature, succinctly and helpfully summarized by Fullan\textsuperscript{17}, which sets out the nature of change, what causes it, how it occurs and what to do about facilitating it. More, we now have over a decade of experience of planning and implementing strategies for effective schools, including the distinguishing school process factors, which influence and determine their effectiveness\textsuperscript{18}. If we really believe in the possibility and desirability of change to eradicate racism, sexism, religious and linguistic bigotry, and other forms of unhealthy social prejudices, we need to weave the findings of such fields of intellectual endeavour into the initiation, implementation and institutionalization of the very strategies, which we propose.

Well, that is my initial 'shopping list' for responding to cultural and structural diversity. What is yours?

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\textsuperscript{19} This paper has been prepared by the author, writing in his personal capacity, and the views expressed here are those of the author and should not be taken as representing, in any way, an institutional viewpoint, support or policy vis a vis the opinions expressed on the part of the World Bank.