Women have been believed to be peacemakers throughout the centuries. Whether this is biologically determined or a socially structured has been a matter of controversy. This study examined gender differences and the social dynamics of peace movement participation. Subjects (N=272) were members of a local nuclear freeze campaign in 1984. Discriminant analysis and difference of means tests were applied to survey data to discern demographic, resource, attitudinal, and ideological characteristics that distinguished female and male participants. Very few differences were found and some were expected due to larger societal differences. However, subtle attitudinal differences revealed that women were less likely to believe in the utility of nuclear weapons and to minimize the strength of the United State's arsenal, demonstrating women's greater likelihood to take more risks than men. It is important to keep these differences in mind in terms of recruitment and education in order to avoid fostering a gender gap within peace movement organizations. To a great degree, differentiation within the movement has already occurred, and some of it can be seen as responding to these gender differences. The organizations most prone to gender differentiation should make special efforts to widen the conceptual framework of their members by explicitly making the other gender's perspective an integral part of their educational program. (ABL)
Gender Differences in Peace Movement Participation

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Gender Differences in Peace Movement Participation

Abstract

Women have been believed to be peacemakers throughout the centuries. Some of the controversy over whether this is biologically determined or socially structured is reviewed in this article. The social characteristics of women peacemakers noted in previous historical analyses are taken as the starting point for the analysis of gender differences in a grassroots nuclear freeze campaign of the 1980s. Discriminant analysis and difference of means tests are applied to survey data from the Cleveland Freeze Campaign to discern the demographic, resource, attitudinal, and ideological characteristics that distinguish female and male participants. Very few differences are found and some—such as occupational and educational background—are to be expected due to larger societal differences. However, subtle attitudinal differences reveal women are less likely to believe in the utility of nuclear weapons and to minimize the strength of the U.S. arsenal, demonstrating women's greater likelihood to take more risks for peace than men. The implications of this difference for peace movement organizations' recruiting and political socialization are discussed in the conclusion.
Gender Differences in Peace Movement Participation

Women have a very important role to play in the world today... using their positive animus to save the children of the country and the world. ...The [anima] must become the guiding moral principle in world politics.

-Helen Caldicott (Caldicott 1984:300)

Hope Springs Maternal (bumper sticker)

-Another Mother For Peace (Larson and Micheels-Cyrus 1987:108)

1969 ... Women at A Quaker Action Group began raising questions about how the [peace] work was organized. We talked about the "shitwork" (the work no one liked to do) and who was doing it (the women)... Why did we have a male boss who hand-wrote letters for the female office manager to type?

-Caroline Wildflower (Wildflower 1982:137)

The thing about peace work is that the hours are long and the pay is really lousy

-Sign at WAND headquarters

Feminist critiques of the arms race are plentiful. Particularly in the last twenty years, numerous analysts, scholars and observers have noted the connections between militarism, the arms race, exploitation, and patriarchy.¹ These analysts differ, however, on the extent to which they attribute men's violent nature to biological or social causes. Conversely, the solution to
this problem of violence is believed to lie in feminine characteristics and feminist principles. As the above quotes illustrate, there is a great deal of disagreement over whether these feminine peacemaking efforts are the result of innate biological processes or social factors. They also indicate the widespread agreement that women's peacemaking efforts are plagued by the larger society's sexism. This paper explores some of the components of peacemaking activities through an analysis of gender differences between women and men in a large community based peace group. I explore the question of how females' and males' participation in the peace movement differs in order to contribute to our better understanding of the social bases of peacemaking.

Before turning to the question of female-male differences in peace movement participation, a brief summary of some of the competing claims and their historical evidence is in order. Although this summary of arguments and selective use of data does little to resolve the nature vs. nurture debate over women's peacemaking proclivity, it does guide us to areas in need of further examination. For the purposes of this paper, I would like to focus the debate on the background characteristics, attitudes and beliefs of those involved in nuclear freeze campaign.

As Carroll cautions us, we must distinguish the concepts of "women and peace" from those of "feminism and pacifism." By making this distinction, we separate the biological and historical conditions implied by the former pair with the political and ideological choices contained in the latter (Carroll 1987:15). Going a step further, these choices are made within a social context, are often enacted in a collective manner, and affect the social structure in a manner constrained by other contextual factors. In other words, the political and ideological constructs of feminism and pacifism are social
facts, both caused by and affecting other social phenomena.

This analysis of women's participation in the peace movement and the effects it is expected to have are embedded in the larger social system. The gender role socialization of the larger society and the structuring of opportunities and resources influence women's and men's predisposition toward and actual practices of peacemaking. As a social scientist, I believe that it is to the extent that these social factors cannot explain observed differences that we must look to other factors—including biological effects—to explain them. However, as we see from the analysis that follows, there is little left unexplained for which to account.

Historical evidence informs us that women have acted as peace activists dating back to the earliest days of civilization. Carroll reminds us that this coincidence is not accidental, since it was not until early "civilization," rather than early human history, that patriarchy, class society, and warfare appeared (Carroll 1987:10). The common assumption concerning women's peacemaking efforts was that they were derived from their life-creating capacity and maternal instinct. As far back as the Greek classics, we read of Lysistrata's efforts to halt the Peloponnesian War by urging the women of Athens to withhold sex from their husbands until they stop the war.

This call for peace is echoed by the early twentieth century peace activist, Jane Addams, as she called on the United States to avoid entrance into World War I with the following plea:

...millions of American women might be caught up into a great world purpose, that of conservation of life; there might be found an antidote to war in woman's affection and all-embracing pity for helpless children. (Addams 1922:83)
The contemporary equivalent is encapsulated in the bumper sticker cited above, or in the Peace Links brochure which reads, "We hope that the women of the Soviet Union, just as all women of the world, share our concern for the future of our children." (Peace Links n.d.)

A more sophisticated version of the innate pacifism of women's maternal instinct employs psychological factors as intervening variables. These arguments depend on a premise of either women's moral superiority over men or their anima for life-giving. In the quote cited above, Helen Caldicott explains that the positive female anima (a Jungian-developed concept) is derived from women's ability to create life, with the opposing life-destroying animus being a predominantly negative male trait. The moral superiority also derives from women's ability to create life, obligating them to act as its stewards, as indicated by the Woman's Peace Party: "As women, we are especially the custodian of the life of ages. We will not longer consent to its reckless destruction" (Degen 1972:40).

Most contemporary feminists distance themselves from such biologically based arguments because they have been used traditionally to justify women's subordination. Even when the goal is unarguably noble, such biologically based arguments can be turned against women, as Stopper and Johnson warn:

Once women admitted that there was a significant difference between the sexes, the argument could be reversed once more and used against them. Women's uncorrupted nature, it could be argued, might make her too soft in hard negotiations and too naive in policy-making. ...[The claim of moral superiority] has made [women] vulnerable to the charge that being different makes them inferior, has reinforced their traditional roles; and has
saddled them with a self-defeating approach to politics.
(Stoper and Johnson 1977, cited in Carroll 1987:3)

The approach adopted in this analysis is to first look for the social causes that influence women's peacemaking activities rather than assume them to be instinctive or biological. As the analysis shows, gender differences among a group of peacemakers can be explained using patterns of socialization, organizational and resource characteristics without resort to biological traits. Before turning to this analysis, I would like to provide some further illustrative evidence from an earlier incarnation of the peace movement in the United States.

Prior to World War One, the Woman's Peace Party (WPP) was quite active in its opposition to the United States entry into the European war. By 1916, there were large WPP branches in New York, Boston, Washington, D.C., Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco and St. Louis, and its leaders—Jane Addams and Carrie Chapman Catt—were very visible in national politics (Steinson 1982:120). At the time, such peacemaking activity by women (who did not yet have the right to vote) was explained as being due to their biological mothering capabilities. In his history of the American peace movement from 1898 to 1918, Marchand devotes a chapter to "The Maternal Instinct" to describe women's activism (Marchand 1972:Chapter 6). By way of explaining the enormously successful Women's Peace Parade of 29 August 1915 which excluded men, Marchand summarizes the rationale given by the organizers:

The men had not been overlooked; the logic of the women's protest demanded their exclusion. The parade and later the Woman's Peace Party based their protest on one primary article.
of faith—the solidarity of all women in an instinctive but rational opposition to war. (Marchand 1972:184)

However, Marchand and other historians do not stop their analysis at that point. For example, the involvement of many of the principle activists in the early peace movement are traced to other reform movements of the time, such as the sufferance movement, temperance movement, antivice and purity leagues, charities, and anti-child labor advocacy groups (Marchand 1972:185-188). He also notes that their shared "Victorian" ideology with mainstream culture—emphasizing values such as domesticity, sentimentality, and purity—was used as a justification for their actions (Marchand 1972:184). Wittner, in Rebels Against War (1984) emphasizes the more egalitarian role of women in the traditional peace churches as an important factor in preparing women for leadership in the peace movement. Stephenson (1982:7) stresses the shared leadership of the suffragist movement and the peace movement. All of these authors have noted the upper middle class status (i.e. well-educated and professional occupational status) of the women leaders of various reform movements of the early twentieth century. They also note the manner in which the leaders jumped from one issue to another in order to exploit whatever political opportunities were available. Steinson discusses the WPP's organizing strategy of obtaining endorsements from local women's clubs as a means of recruiting support (1982:140-141).

All of these characteristics should sound familiar to anyone who has given serious consideration to the contemporary social movement industries of the liberal and progressive left. In their analyses, these historians have noted many of the factors that contemporary resource mobilization, collective behavior, symbolic interactionist, and new social movement theorists would use
to explain social movements—their resources, values, beliefs, networks, and social background. My purpose here is not to provide a historical reinterpretation of this earlier wave of the peace movement, but to illustrate the social dynamics underlying them that have typically gone unexamined or attributed to instinct. We now turn to the 1980s peace movement to examine the gender differences among freeze campaign members.

Methodology and Background

The bulk of the data presented in this analysis is from a survey of 325 members of a local freeze campaign taken in 1984. Respondents were randomly chosen from a 5000 name mailing list of the Greater Cleveland Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and sent a mail questionnaire. The return rate for completing the eight page questionnaire was 35%.

This survey was part of a larger, ongoing study I was conducting of the local freeze campaign. In this larger study I also used document analysis, interviews, and participant observation methods of gathering data. I draw on these here to make a few descriptive comments about the local freeze campaign.2

The Greater Cleveland Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (GC) was a federation of primarily community based freeze groups. Roughly one dozen freeze community action groups, or CAGs as they were called, participated in this confederation, sending representatives to a metropolitan-wide steering body. The steering body was incorporated as a nonprofit organization with officers elected from and by the steering committee members. During 1984, the GC had two full time paid staff members.

The CAGs comprising the GC were typical of the several thousand local freeze groups that sprang to life more or less independently throughout the
United States during the early 1980s (Fine and Steven 1984; Forsberg and Connnettta 1988; Topsfield 1984). The idea of the freeze captured the imagination of hundreds of thousands of middle class individuals through the organizations and networks to which they already belonged. They came together in their communities, their churches, or in some instances through their professional associations, to create peace or freeze groups to lobby for an end to the nuclear arms race (Boulding 1990). The average life span of these CAGs was three to five years, but the GC remained active throughout the 1980s as the confederation of a slowly changing mix of freeze and peace groups.

The steering committee of the GC was comprised of roughly 60-65% females. The executive director at the time was female, as were both her predecessor and successor. Over two-thirds of the regular office volunteers were female, and nearly the same proportion of committee chairs were female. Of the entire membership, roughly 65% were females, as was the purposive sample of leaders used in analysis described elsewhere (Marullo 1988). The freeze campaign both locally and nationally was not targeted toward either gender, but there was a slight prominence of females amongst both the leadership and membership.

The meetings of the local CAGs and the GC steering committee were typically run by consensus, although majority rule decisionmaking was stipulated in their by-laws and occasionally utilized. Although the groups varied in their particular emphasis—some focusing more on direct action and others more on legislative lobbying—they all tended to operate with a blend of expressive and instrumental norms. That is, even though the group leaders were concerned with working through business agenda items of upcoming events and actions, there was considerable attention paid to the interpersonal dynamics of the meetings and providing nurturance, support, and empowerment for members.
The groups were not explicitly feminist organizations, but they were influenced by the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s in many ways: many of the leaders were involved in feminist groups, nearly all of the organizers would define themselves as feminists, and the organizational operations emphasized non-hierarchical and egalitarian principles.

Certainly the freeze campaign nationally and locally could not be said to represent a cross-section of the country. Its members were more highly educated, more affluent, overwhelmingly white, more likely to be professional, and drawn from the liberal half of the political spectrum. On the other hand, it was internally heterogeneous, consisting of all age groups, containing a wide range of incomes and religious backgrounds, and a diversity of political opinions and ideologies.

Analysis

The analysis presented here focuses on the differences between female and male members of the local freeze campaign. The factors used to explain these differences are: background characteristics, general political opinions and beliefs, attitudes about nuclear weapons and the arms race, and their expectations concerning the effects of the freeze campaign. A discriminant analysis is used to differentiate the two groups and to identify how these characteristics distinguish them. After an overall summary of the discriminant analysis is presented, the effects of the specific factors are examined more closely.

The results from the discriminant analysis (Table 1) indicate an overall moderately good ability to distinguish females and males (F=2.12, prob F<.001). The squared canonical correlation of predicted and actual gender groups is .20,
with 87% of the cases accurately predicted. The errors in prediction are not random, but systematically overpredict males as females. That is, one third of the males give responses such that the discriminant function predicts that they are females. In contrast, only three percent of the females responses leads to a discriminant function prediction that they are male. This provides some empirical support that the peace movement has a "feminist appearance"—a large number of the males’ characteristics closely resemble those of the females.

(Table 1 about here)

Demographic and Social Background

Some of the background characteristics of the female and male participants of the Cleveland Freeze Campaign help to differentiate the two sexes. Before turning to these, let me summarize the variables on which there are no gender differences. The age distributions are quite similar—even when we look at specific cohorts such as the Vietnam era or seniors categories there are no differences between the women and men (see Table 2). Similarly, there are no differences in household income or religious background. There are educational and occupational differences, but they reflect larger societal differences. The males are more likely to have select professional positions, whereas the females are more likely to not be part of the paid labor force. Over twenty percent of the men but only ten percent of the women were professionals, while nearly forty percent of the women but less than twenty percent of the men were not part of the labor force. These results are not surprising, however, given the heavily skewed distributions of these labor force statuses in the population as a whole. In fact, the female freeze members were more likely to
be professional women and to be in the paid labor force than the overall population figures would suggest.

(Table 2 about here)

Although the difference is not statistically significant, the women were more likely to identify with the Roman Catholic and Jewish faiths, giving them a slightly higher overall religious identification rate. Related to this finding, but also not significant in itself, is the greater likelihood of women to be more involved in other voluntary groups. Overall, the Catholic women were somewhat less likely to work in the paid labor force than the other women, providing them with somewhat greater opportunity to do more volunteer work. Furthermore, their participation in other voluntary groups provided them with somewhat greater information about or access to the freeze campaign's activities. For example, one clique of five women became actively involved in the freeze campaign as a result of a peace fair jointly sponsored by the GC and a particular Roman Catholic parish. After the fair, the women remained active with the freeze campaign and helped organize several other events. It is a rather straightforward inference to see how the combination of lower participation rates in the paid labor force and more active involvement in other voluntary groups, especially active church groups, would contribute to women's greater likelihood of participating in the movement. This is particularly applicable if we recall that one of the freeze messages was an appeal to parents—especially mothers—which was carried via supportive organizations' communication networks (often churches), and consciously sought to involve newcomers into freeze activities.

General Attitudes and Beliefs
In terms of political beliefs, there were no significant differences in females' and males' political party affiliation, nor did they identify themselves differently along a left-right political spectrum (see Table 3). In terms of their respect for authority and the right to disobey, there was equal skepticism among them, with similar proportions of females and males distrusting authority and reserving the right to disobey.⁴ There were also no differences in a life-lovingness scale or a feminism scale.⁵

An area in which there was a significant difference was their beliefs about political efficacy. In terms of overall beliefs about the efficacy of individual’s participating in the political system, Table 3 shows that males and females scored equally highly on an efficacy index, indicating strong beliefs that individuals can and should have a say in making political decisions.⁶ Where they differed was in their expectations about the specific impact that the freeze campaign would have. Three broad types of answers were commonly expressed to the open-ended question, "what do you think are the most likely effects of the freeze campaign?" Responses indicating that politicians would change their votes, that parties would adopt the freeze as a platform plank, or that election outcomes would be influenced by it were categorized as indicating political efficacy. If the respondent indicated that the freeze would be successful in achieving its goal of stopping the arms race, blocking particular weapons systems, easing superpower rivalry, or bringing about disarmament, the response was scored as indicating efficacy toward stopping the arms race. If the response focused on educating individuals, making people more aware of the threat, or increasing "brotherhood" or promoting harmony, the response was coded as having symbolic efficacy.⁷
Although only a small portion of either gender claimed the freeze would be effective at stopping the arms race, twice as many women gave this response as men (15% to 7%). The most commonly cited consequence for women (given by 45%) was that the freeze would have symbolic or expressive effects. For example, in response to the open-ended question of what the most likely effect of the freeze would be, some typical responses were:

"Education of the public with the desired effect of causing change in government policies."

"Increased awareness. Eventual change in consciousness"

"Some day there will be a world where we will all live together in peace."

In contrast, men cited these symbolic reasons less often (33% of the time), offering political effects most frequently as the likely consequence (48% of their responses). Some typical male responses reflecting political efficacy were:

"Electing government officials who will work seriously for a freeze."

"Cutting federal expenditures on the MX, etc."

"To change U.S. nuclear policy as a result of widespread national dialog on this issue."

Perhaps the greatest significance of these results is the large amount of overlap in the responses of female and male participants—one-third to one half of each gender cite political and symbolic effects for the freeze. However, to the extent they differ, they do so in socially constructed ways. The women’s responses are somewhat more concerned with the expressive and interpersonal issues of education and cooperation, whereas the men’s responses are somewhat more instrumental in their focus on effecting change in the political system.
The women's responses were more likely to cite lofty ideals such as brotherhood, world peace, and enlightenment, whereas men sought more narrow and pragmatic consequences of changing players or positions within the political arena. Even the language differed to some degree, as evidenced in the quotes selected above, in that the women's responses were more likely to adopt a passive sentence structure in contrast to the men's more active construction. Sociolinguist Carol Cohn (1987), in her examination of the language of the arms race used by the "experts," points out the sexist and male-dominant characteristics of the language used inside the military-industrial complex. Although these distinctions are not nearly as great within the peace movement, we can still see gender differences in the expected outcomes of the movement's actions and the language used to describe them. Although the gender distinctions are somewhat modest, they occur in the direction that the larger social structure and socialization processes would predict they would, with females being somewhat more expressive and passive in their articulation of expected outcomes of the freeze campaign's activities.

Attitudes regarding nuclear weapons issues

There are several issues on which there are significant differences between women and men and, apart from the background items, they comprise the variables that do the most to distinguish the two genders. Again, the reader should be cautioned that many of the differences cited here are fairly small ones in substantive terms, even though they are statistically significant in terms of difference of means tests and the discriminant analysis. However, these observed differences do correspond to somewhat stereotypical gender role socialization, so they are worth commenting on here. More importantly, they
suggest a slight difference in perception between women and men regarding the bases for peace. Such differences, if significant in the population as a whole, would be important to keep in mind for recruiting new participants and educating members into the peace movement. Before examining these differences, it is worth a brief note to identify the several arms race attitudes and beliefs on which there are no gender differences.

There were no differences between women’s and men’s opinions about what the United States’ foreign policy goals should be, with both groups overwhelmingly endorsing providing humanitarian aid and resolving conflict nonviolently and rejecting the global policeman and interventionist roles (results not shown). Similarly, there were no differences in the perception of technological or nonhuman causes underlying the arms race (also not shown). There were subtle differences in beliefs regarding the United States and Soviet Union’s role in continuing the arms race, which are discussed below, but in broad terms, both women and men were highly critical of the political, economic and social forces that propel the arms race in both countries. The globalism index indicating the level of active progressive international actions was equally high for both women and men (see Table 5). Finally, neither group was more likely to feel the urgency of a nuclear war breaking out in the near future.

(Table 5 about here)

One of the most important attitudinal variables distinguishing females from males is their greater likelihood to agree with the statement that it doesn’t matter who is ahead in the arms race because both sides have enough to destroy the other no matter who attacks first (95% females and 86% males agree). Women were more likely to think that the Soviet Union and the United

15
States were even in the arms race, whereas men were considerably more likely to claim that the United States was ahead. The next strongest attitudinal difference is in the area of rejecting nuclear weapons and deterrence policy on moral grounds.\textsuperscript{11} This index indicates the level of acceptability of nuclear weapons—from their mere possession to their use for retaliatory purposes, U.S. reliance on a policy of deterrence, and the acceptability of threatening to use nuclear weapons. On average, women have a greater tendency to reject all uses, threatened uses and even the possession of nuclear weapons than do men. Overwhelming majorities of both sexes reject the retaliatory and threatened first use of nuclear weapons, but women tend to have a lower tolerance for even the mere possession of them.

Two other differences indicate modest differences but are not statistically significant. One question asks whether any use of nuclear weapons is likely to escalate into all-out nuclear war. Although more than three out of four females and males agreed with this statement, more than half of the women (54\%) but only 39\% of the men agreed strongly with it. Another index assesses the level of fear and distrust of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{12} Women were more distrustful than men, being more likely to believe that the Russians would cheat on agreements, were out to conquer the world, and would not abide by a freeze agreement.

These findings are consistent with gender role socialization in the sense that women tend to be somewhat more fearful of enemies because they are unempowered to respond to the threat; they are more fearful of the dangers posed by even the mere possession of nuclear weapons, and they are more disdainful of our reliance on nuclear weapons. In contrast, men were slightly more likely to believe that nuclear war can be controlled and that nuclear
weapons do serve some purpose—this in the context that they were more likely to believe the United States to be ahead in the arms race. I say these are consistent with traditional gender role socialization in that it is more likely for males to have learned to adopt a more instrumentalist view of employing technology to achieve desired (in this case politico-military) ends, whereas females are more likely to be concerned with the impact the technology is having on its users. Traditionally men have been in control of the use of force and are more likely to see it as a tool, whereas women have lacked control over its use, occupying a "disarmed" status throughout most of civilization's history (Carroll 1987:10). Furthermore, to the extent that the male role continues to be more macho oriented, more readily relying on force and hiding ones fears, even the more peace-loving men in the freeze movement show less fear of the Russians and less fear of nuclear war.  

Conclusions

This social structuring of responses has important implications for the future of peace movement recruiting and educating of members. Again, these gender differences are only slight, but they are consistent among this whole set of attitudes. What they show is that despite women's greater fear of the Soviet Union and lesser faith in nuclear weapons technology for security, they are still willing to work for peace and disarmament. Indeed, these factors make them more likely to conclude that war is more likely and, given its total destructiveness, all the more necessary to prevent. On the other hand, men's efforts to work for peace and disarmament are somewhat bolstered by the belief in U.S. military superiority and the interim value of relying on nuclear weapons as a deterrent. In a sense, women are willing to take greater risks
for peace, since they do not believe in our current superiority and they are less willing to rely on MAD-based deterrence as we work toward disarmament. The men showed a somewhat greater likelihood to accept the arms controllers' premises that the weapons can be controlled for rational purposes. The pursuit of peace is possible for them based on the balance (or even U.S. superiority) of forces as we work toward disarmament. For women, the pursuit of peace is necessary and more urgent regardless of the balance because of the high force levels.

It is important to keep these differences in mind in terms of recruitment and education in order to avoid fostering a gender gap within organizations. For men, the successful recruiting appeal can be based on summary "bean counts" of the arsenals showing U.S. advantages, but must quickly move to the illogic of deterrence based on MAD and demonstrate how drastic force reductions can lead to greater security. As the focus of the peace movement shifts more toward common security measures, its hardware, technology, and policy demands must be laid out in such a way as to make sense militarily. For women, the care tactics of the bombing run have worked well and may continue to do so for initial recruiting purposes, but the educational process has to improve their technological and hardware sophistication. Women cannot simply dismiss nuclear weapons as useless and a roadblock to peace created by overly macho men. Both genders have to understand fully the technology and its political applications, and both have to consider the broader definitions of security and consider the values and purposes the military should be (limited to) serving. The recruiting and educational messages of the movement must keep this in mind.

Again, these differences are small, but my point is to encourage development of recruitment and educational programs that lead to an expansion
of females' and males' thinking about these issues in order to counteract societal differences in gender role socialization. This is important for the movement in the long run so that it does not become internally segregated on the basis of sex. It is important for the larger society in that it considers the arms race in a larger, more fully human context—nuclear weapons and policy are not merely technological devices designed to serve instrumental purposes, nor are they totally absurd creations without any purpose. To a great degree, differentiation within the movement has already occurred, and some of it can be seen as responding to these gender differences. One need only contrast the organizational goals and memberships of Mothers Embracing Nuclear Disarmament (MEND) and the Center for Defense Information (CDI) for a clearcut example. Such differentiation and specialization in itself is not bad, in fact I have argued earlier that the peace movement continue along this path. My concern here is that the groups do not differentiate themselves in such a way as to become sex segregated organizations and that they do not lose sight of the other gender's framework. Quite the contrary, what I am calling for here is that the organizations most prone to such gender differentiation should make special efforts to widen the conceptual framework of its members by explicitly making the other gender's perspective an integral part of its educational program.
Notes


2. More details about the survey data may be found in Marullo (1988, 1990).

3. These professional occupations are: physician, dentist, lawyer, scientist, artist, social worker, and engineer.

4. These are both indexes of several items. The disobedience index combines the responses of the following three questions and ranges from three to six, with six being the highly disobedient sentiment: disagrees that things are good in the U.S. and that we should not try to change them; agrees that sometimes disobedience to government is justified; and agrees that it is important for children to learn when to disobey authority. The authority index combines the following four questions, ranging from four to twenty, with twenty being the high trust in authority sentiment: agrees that Ronald Reagan can be trusted to make the right kind of decisions about nuclear weapons; agrees that we should leave it to the Pentagon to make weapons decisions; and disagrees that Americans rely too much on either the military or the president (two separate questions) on foreign affairs matters.

5. These two attitudes were also measured via indexes. The life-lovingness scale is adapted from Maccoby (1972) and contains the following five items, ranging from five to ten with ten being the high life-loving score: has given no thought on how to be buried; would do nothing to stop a burglar from running away with one's valuables; disagrees that the death penalty is appropriate for some crimes; disagrees that cleanliness is next to godliness; and disagrees that it is irresponsible not to save money. The feminism index consists of four items, ranging from four to eight with a high score representing the most feminist response: agrees that women should have virtually unlimited rights to abortion; agrees that the equal rights amendment is a necessary part of women's struggle for equality; disagrees that a mother's place is with her children; and disagrees that women's participation in the paid labor force has undermined the family.

6. The efficacy index consisted of the following three items, ranging from three to fifteen with a score of fifteen reflecting a high degree of political efficacy: disagreeing that there is nothing regular people can do to solve our major problems; disagreeing that the weapons acquisition process is too complex for ordinary citizens to understand; and disagreeing that the peace movement has little influence on the government.

7. The other major types of responses to this question were either that the freeze would have no effect or that it would have a negative or counter effect by causing greater government repression or a Right wing backlash.
8. Totals exceed 100% because some respondents offered more than one "most likely" effect.

9. I would argue that such differences are probably greater in the population as a whole, considering the marked liberal and feminist bias of the men in the survey.

10. The globalism index ranges from four to twenty, twenty being the most globalistic view, consisting of the following four items: agreeing that strengthening the U.N. should be of highest importance as a U.S. foreign policy goal; agreeing that improving living conditions in less developed countries should be of highest importance as a U.S. foreign policy goal; agreeing that combating world hunger should be of highest importance as a U.S. foreign policy goal; and agreeing that it is vital to enlist the cooperation of the U.N. in settling international disputes.

11. The immorality of nuclear weapons index consisted of the following five items, ranging from five to twenty-five with twenty-five representing the strongest moral condemnation: agreeing that it is morally unacceptable to actually use nuclear weapons in a war; agreeing that the strategy of deterrence is immoral; agreeing that it is unacceptable for the U.S. to threaten nuclear retaliation against a Soviet non-nuclear attack on western Europe; agreeing that it is morally unacceptable to possess nuclear weapons; and disagreeing that it was necessary and proper for the United States to use atomic bombs on Japan during World War II.

12. The trust of Soviets index contained the following five items, ranging from five to twenty-five with twenty-five being the highest trust: agreeing that the Russians can be trusted to live up to agreements; agreeing that the United States should not produce new weapons even if the Russians continue; agreeing that "third world" revolutions are nationalistic rather than Soviet controlled; believing that Russia's primary objective in world affairs is to protect itself rather than to seek global domination by any means necessary; and disagreeing that the Soviet Union would cheat on a freeze agreement.

13. This should not be read as an endorsement of traditional gender role socialization, but merely a statement of current reality. All studies of socialization, even the most recent, still show distinctions between the way boys and girls are raised. Given this sample's age distribution, there would be a great deal of very traditional gender role socialization found among the older respondents.

Whether the males are merely hiding their fears better, or are actually less fearful because they have more faith in our military technology to protect us does not matter. It is precisely the point that both of these responses are appropriate to the male gender role.

14. In an unpublished manuscript that received limited circulation within the peace movement (Marullo, 1985), I called for a greater desplintering of the peace movement. By this I meant the greater coordination of specialized groups and further differentiation of tasks within the movement. This would have required some mechanism for interorganizational coordination, such as an expanded "Directors Forum" or an operational coalition steering committee.
Some of this did occur, in a fairly ad hoc manner, but much of it did not. Groups were too reluctant to relinquish turf and expend resources for such coordination unless it served some immediate, short term purpose. As both Healey (1989) and Lofland, Colwell, and Johnson (1990) note (using different language), the various organizations did not share the same models or visions of change, which also prevented their cooperation.
References


Cohn, C. 1987. "Nuclear language and how we learned to pat the bomb." *Bulletin*


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_______. 1988. "Leadership and membership in the nuclear freeze campaign."

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Steinson, B. 1982. American Women's Activism in World War II. New York:
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Stoper, E. and R. Johnson. 1977. "The weaker sex and the better half: the
idea of women's moral superiority in the American feminist movement."


Table 1: Overall Goodness of Fit of Discriminant Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of Respondent</th>
<th>Classified into</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>272</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Likelihood Ratio = .80

F = 2.12

Prob F < .001

Squared Canonical Correlation = .20
Table 2: Gender Differences in Background Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Standardized Canonical Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age mean</td>
<td>44.2 years</td>
<td>42.6 years</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education mean</td>
<td>16.1 years*a</td>
<td>19.5 years*a</td>
<td>.20*b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income mean</td>
<td>$34,000</td>
<td>$37,000</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% in Professional Occupations</td>
<td>10.0*</td>
<td>21 %*</td>
<td>.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% not in Paid Labor Force</td>
<td>38.9*</td>
<td>17.6*</td>
<td>-.48*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Roman Catholic</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Protestant</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Jewish</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Voluntary Groups mean</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>-.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a T-test significant at .05 level
b F for partial canonical correlation coefficient significant at .05 level; controlling for all variables on first four tables. Group mean for females is -.36, for males .67.
Table 3: Gender Differences in General Attitudes and Beliefs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Standardized Canonical Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Democratic party</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>-.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Liberal or left party</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political spectrum--</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% liberal or leftist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect for Authority (4-low to 20-high)</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept Disobedience (3-obey to 6-disobey)</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life-lovingness (4-low to 8-high)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminism (4-low to 8-high)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a T-test significant at .05 level
b F for partial canonical correlation coefficient significant at .05 level; controlling for all variables on first four tables. Group mean for females is -.36, for males .67.
Table 4: Gender Differences in Political Efficacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Standardized Canonical Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Efficacy (3-low to 15-high)</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeze will have political effects</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeze will have effect on arms race</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-.82*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freeze will have symbolic effects</td>
<td>45%*</td>
<td>33%*</td>
<td>-.54*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a T-test significant at .05 level  
b F for partial canonical correlation coefficient significant at .05 level; controlling for all variables on first four tables. Group mean for females is -.36, for males .67.
Table 5: Gender Differences on Attitudes about the Arms Race and Nuclear Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Standardized Canonical Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Globalism</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4-low to 20-high)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World war 3 likely</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>within next 20 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-agree 5-disagree)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both sides have enough</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.41*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to blow up other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-agree 5-disagree)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who's ahead in arms race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>28.5%*</td>
<td>43.1%*</td>
<td>-0.26*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immorality of weapons</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>-0.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5-low to 25-high)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any use will lead to</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>all out war</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1-agree 5-disagree)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust of Soviets</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5-distrust to 25-trust)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a T-test significant at .05 level
b F for partial canonical correlation coefficient significant at .05 level; controlling for all variables on first four tables. Group mean for females is -.36, for males .67.