A historical report on the development of modern American graduate management education is presented. The central argument is that the period from the late 1940s to the early 1970s witnessed the rise of an unprecedented degree of autonomy in American management education. There are almost no systematically collected and accessible data with which to document how management education assumed its current shape within the academic community. By analyzing the process and pace of reform before and after the famous Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation reports of 1959 (which supposedly had a revolutionary impact on the theory and practice of modern management education), it is possible to provide a new empirical grounding for understanding the change process in management education. Five sections focus on the following: the crisis in business leadership in the postwar decade; varieties of response in the postwar period: 1946-1955 (Michigan State, Northwestern, UCLA); the New Age of reform: 1955-1964 (Michigan State, Northwestern, UCLA); denouement: undergraduate business education and professional ideals; and postscript (brief sketches of broad developmental patterns based on scattered data for Michigan State University, Northwestern, and UCLA). (SM)
The Age of Reform in American Management Education
THE AGE OF REFORM IN AMERICAN MANAGEMENT EDUCATION

Steven Snlossman
Michael Sedlak
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Views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Graduate Management Admission Council.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Management education has been one of the most dynamic elements in the dramatic expansion of graduate and professional schooling since World War II, yet its content, pedagogy, pattern of growth, and place within higher education have received little attention. There are few systematically collected and accessible data with which to document how management education has assumed its current shape within the academic community.

While there is little documentation, there is considerable folklore. The folklore centers on the famous Ford Foundation report (also widely known as the Gordon-Howell Report) and Carnegie Corporation report of 1959 and their impact on the theory and practice of modern management education. Nothing in this study is meant to detract from the importance of these reports. However, by viewing them as the literal origin of the modernist movement in management education, the folklore inevitably slights the diverse sources, different chronologies, variations, and complex processes of innovation that the field experienced in the post-World War II era.

Briefly, our central argument is that the period from the late 1940s to the early 1970s witnessed the rise of an unprecedented degree of autonomy in American management education. The years preceding World War II had seen management education confined by both student and industry pressures to narrowly conceived and highly specialized training in functional areas such as sales, production, personnel, banking, and especially, accounting. Collegiate business schools (with a few obvious exceptions, notably Harvard) provided entry-level vocational education for students of modest talent and aspiration. Beginning in the late 1940s and 1950s, however, management schools gained the pedagogical initiative. With support from independent sources, particularly foundations, they imposed a new, significantly different direction on the field. The new orientation broadened the curriculum and made it more academic, deemphasized functional specialization, legitimized research, and raised student qualifications and expectations. Both the student population and the business community appeared to favor—or at least to acquiesce in—the goals and methods of the modernist movement.

The urgent need for more, and more broadly trained, managers was widely publicized in the business press in the years following World War II. Peter Drucker, the best known of the publicists, spoke for business leaders and scholars alike in proclaiming that modern-day executives were made, not born. America faced a crisis in leadership that firms and business schools had only belatedly recognized. Top management,
Drucker argued, was now older than it had ever been. Moreover, the promotion ladder had become so long that potential leaders were not moving up through corporation bureaucracies fast enough. However, new executives could not simply be pushed up from the lower ranks. The long-term need was for a differently educated executive, one whose specialty training would not hamper his ability to see corporate problems as a whole and whose analytic skills would incorporate new techniques from mathematics and from the social as well as the physical sciences. To meet this need, business leaders turned primarily, and with extraordinary enthusiasm, to graduate business schools.

The decade following World War II was understandably a confusing time for academic administrators of graduate business programs. Having earlier ingratiated themselves with the business community because of their intensely practical, functional orientation (except for Harvard and Chicago), the business schools were now called upon to rapidly and radically transform themselves into producers of executives with wide-ranging technical skills and general problem-solving abilities. However, until the end of the 1940s there was, realistically, little that most business schools could do to respond to pressures for change. Veterans enrolled in business schools in huge numbers following the war. Playing catch-up, they not surprisingly sought skills that would enable them to secure entry-level jobs; their large enrollments and intensely practical orientation precluded serious curricular and pedagogical innovations at the business schools they attended. Once the wave of veterans had graduated, business schools were freer to try to serve the new purposes that corporations and business scholars were urging upon them.

Throughout the 1950s, large segments of the field of business education remained in flux. Most schools spoke about the need for reform, yet no clear model for change existed. Business education became far more diverse in purpose, program and method than ever before; some schools reached out boldly in the direction of experimentation, while others remained much as they always had been.

In the current state of archival disorganization, it is impossible to choose representative institutions for close analysis with any pretense of precision. We chose to investigate two public universities of somewhat different traditions and academic standing, UCLA and Michigan State, and one private university, Northwestern. Patterns of development at these three schools turned out to be both similar and different enough to illuminate a variety of centrifugal and centripetal forces in the process of postwar modernization. These institutions provide a basis for understanding the cutting edge of management education in the post-World War II era.
As the study analyzes in some detail, by the early 1960s the philosophy, organization, content, and pedagogy of undergraduate and graduate business education at Michigan State, Northwestern, and UCLA had been dramatically transformed. The impact of the Gordon-Howell and Carnegie reports on these three institutions was not so much to stimulate change as it was to order, legitimize, and advance momentum for the changes that were already under way. The foundation reports provided the field with a new sense of collective purpose and of professional cohesiveness, bolstering the nascent autonomy of management education on the American academic scene.

While the foundation reports did not actually cause change in postwar business education, they did establish a loose set of criteria by which to gauge an institution's commitment to modernist ideas. The criterion that gave administrators and faculty the greatest anxiety in the early 1960s involved the future of undergraduate business education. It was not that the foundation reports spoke dogmatically on the issue—even Gordon and Howell, who were the most critical, saw a limited future role for a modernized undergraduate curriculum. Still, the foundation reports left little doubt that the future of management as a profession rested almost entirely on the shoulders of graduate programs.

At Michigan State, Dean Seelye had initially entertained hopes of eliminating the undergraduate program entirely. It soon became clear, however, that the program's huge enrollments and the university's historic role as Michigan's premier public service educational institution made abolition politically untenable. Northwestern and UCLA, on the other hand, did abolish their undergraduate programs in business by the end of the 1960s. At Northwestern, the decision was highly controversial and emotion-laden, and symbolized radical new beginnings for the university's graduate business programs. The decision was less overtly painful at UCLA, largely because the dean, Neil Jacoby, had long before set the business school on a modernist path and had made clear his desire to move business education entirely onto the graduate level.

By the early 1960s, Michigan State, Northwestern, and UCLA had all cast their fates—in somewhat different ways, to be sure—with the scientific approach to management as the path to academic legitimacy and to professional relevance. Inherent tensions between these objectives did not give leaders in the field much pause. Only in the early 1970s did the considerable autonomy of academic leadership in management education begin to be seriously challenged—by more assertive and more powerful students, by a business community mired in recession and outpaced by foreign competition, and by a skeptical public. Each group challenged the wisdom of much of what had been done in the name of reform. How much, and how quickly, the early
reform agenda was actually compromised remains uncertain. Clearly, though, the halcyon days of relative autonomy were over. Many in the field perceived a crisis akin to that of the immediate postwar period.

As of the mid-1980s, no consensual paradigm or source of leadership to guide future change has emerged. As time passes, the postwar era stands out with increasing sharpness from both the years that preceded it and the years that have followed it. What remains debatable is whether postwar-era management educators, in equating professional identity with academic legitimacy, triumphed on terms that inevitably sowed the seeds of the present discontent.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Management education has been one of the most dynamic elements in the dramatic expansion of graduate and professional schooling since World War II, yet its content, pedagogy, pattern of growth, and place within higher education have received little systematic attention. The reasons have been diverse but reinforcing. First, academic scholars of management have shown little interest in their field's history. Although highly inter-disciplinary, the aggressively futuristic orientation of the management field appears to have precluded serious historical introspection. Second, while business history has become a vital subspecialty among professional historians, most writers in this field (generally economists and economic historians) show almost no interest in educational matters. Third, historians of the American university have slighted not only management education but the entire subject of professional training in the post-World War II period, a problem that has especially affected relative newcomers to academia like management education (in contrast, for example, to law or medicine). The result is that there are almost no systematically collected and accessible data with which to document how management education assumed its current shape within the academic community.

If there is little systematic documentation, there is considerable folklore. The folklore centers on the famous Ford Foundation and Carnegie Corporation reports of 1959 and their purportedly seminal and revolutionary impact on the theory and practice of modern management education.1 Nothing we say in this study should detract from the importance of these reports. However, by viewing the reports as the literal origin of the modernist movement in management education, the folklore inevitably slights the diverse sources, different chronologies, variations, and complex processes of innovation which the field experienced in the post-World War II era. Change in the direction of educational institutions is rarely simple or rapid. By analyzing the process and pace of reform before and after the foundation reports, we hope to provide a new empirical grounding for understanding the change process in management education.

In the current state of archival disorganization, it is impossible to choose "representative" institutions for close analysis with any pretense of precision. We decided against including such obviously unrepresentative schools as Harvard or Chicago, due to their distinctive pedagogical philosophies, and against others, notably Carnegie Tech, because it was widely viewed as the pioneer innovator in the years surrounding the

Those exclusions, however, still left much room for unintentional distortion. We therefore decided to select three institutions that, on the face of it, seemed both sufficiently similar and different in organization, clientele, aspiration, and status to present interesting comparisons. Ease of data availability and access were, of course, also major considerations. In the end, we chose to investigate two public universities of somewhat different traditions and academic standing, UCLA and Michigan State, and one private university, Northwestern. Patterns of development at these three schools did indeed turn out to be both sufficiently similar and different to illuminate a variety of centrifugal and centripetal forces in the process of postwar modernization. The three institutions provide a basis for understanding the cutting edge of the reform movement in management education in the post-World War II era.

Briefly, our central argument is that the period from the late 1940s to the early 1970s witnessed the rise of an unprecedented degree of autonomy in American management education. The years preceding World War II had seen management (i.e., business) education confined by both student and industry pressures to narrowly conceived and highly specialized training in functional areas such as sales, production, personnel, banking, and especially, accounting. Collegiate business schools (with a few obvious exceptions, notably Harvard) provided entry-level vocational education for students of modest talent and aspiration. Beginning in the late 1940s and 1950s, however, the management schools gained the pedagogical initiative. With support from independent sources, particularly foundations, they imposed a new, significantly different direction on the field. The new orientation broadened the curriculum and made it more academic, deemphasized functional specialization, legitimized research, and raised student qualifications and expectations. Both the student population and the business community appeared to favor—or at least to acquiesce in-- the goals and methods of the modernist movement.

Only in the early 1970s did the considerable autonomy of academic leadership begin to be seriously challenged--by more assertive and powerful students, by a business community mired in recession and outpaced by foreign competition, and by a skeptical public, each challenging the wisdom of much of what had been done in the name of reform. How much, and how quickly, the early reform agenda was actually compromised remains uncertain. Clearly, though, the halcyon days of relative autonomy were over by the mid-1970s. Many in the field perceived a crisis and need for overarching new direction akin to that of the immediate postwar period.

As of the mid-1980s, no consensual paradigm or source of leadership to guide future change has emerged. As time passes, the postwar era stands out with increasing
sharpness from both the years that preceded it and the years that have followed it—an intriguing moment in time that shaped management education indelibly, and set a standard for pedagogical innovation that will be hard for future reformers to match. What remains debatable is whether postwar-era management educators, in equating professional identity with academic legitimacy, triumphed on terms that inevitably sowed the seeds of the present discontent.

II. THE CRISIS IN BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE POSTWAR DECADE

By the end of World War II, it was hard even to imagine what "normal" times for business had once been like. To be sure, change had been pervasive in the conduct of American enterprise since the emergence of industrial capitalism. Moreover, the most distinctive feature of modern enterprise--multiunit organization, each unit administered by a hierarchy of full-time, salaried managers--had only recently become dominant. Nonetheless, the interregnum of the Depression followed by World War II created an enormous gulf between the experiences of two generations of businessmen. Postwar business leaders shared a widespread belief that the truisms and customary management practices of earlier eras, even of the enormously prosperous 1920s, were no longer relevant. Business prosperity on a scale never previously imagined or sustained seemed readily within grasp, buttressed by the federal government's new commitment--represented in the Employment Act of 1946--to maintaining high aggregate demand in peace as well as in wartime. But adaptation of managerial skills to modern-day business realities was imperative to transform possibility into reality.

Commentators on the postwar business environment highlighted a variety of changes in the economy that required more managers and new levels of managerial ability. For one, business was increasingly under the direction of managers. The separation of ownership and management had become the norm of American business life. Second, business firms were growing larger, due mainly to the tendency of large enterprises to integrate production with distribution, and to the adoption of diversification as a basic growth strategy. Growth and expansion inevitably diffused decisionmaking authority, placing a premium on coordination and planning and on the cultivation of administrative talent at top and middle management levels.

Third was the increasing centrality of science and technology to all phases of business enterprise: from research to methods of production to office procedures.

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Wartime demands had accelerated both desire and know-how for putting science to everyday business use. To participate intelligently in planning, to communicate with scientifically-trained employees, and to integrate new technologies into work routines, managers had to upgrade their scientific and technical knowledge at the same time that they honed their general managerial abilities. This required not only specialty training but broad grounding in several scientific and mathematical fields that would allow managers to adapt to the rising tide of scientific and technological innovation.4

A fourth area of concern was ecological—the environment in which managers made key planning and operational decisions impinging on them from more directions than ever before. Both the Depression and the World War had legitimized governmental intervention into business affairs to an extent undreamed of earlier: few executives seriously thought, or even desired, a return to simpler days of "hands off." But government was only one new ecological factor. Organized labor had grown vastly in power and sophistication since the 1920s. Consumers had become more demanding. Markets had become increasingly international. Numerous previously extraneous variables, in short, had become essential components of business decisionmaking. New levels of psychological, social, and political sophistication were essential for managers to deal with them.5

A fifth and final factor concerned the expansion in scientific knowledge about the management process itself. "Management science" had come a long way since the rudimentary production studies of Frederick Taylor and Frank Gilbreth. Drawing upon precedents in wartime weapons development, such pioneers as Russell Ackoff and C. West Churchman trumpeted "operations research" and mathematical modeling as the key to greater efficiency ("optimality") in meeting business objectives. To many in the field, the essence of a true management science lay in the novel applications to operational decisionmaking of such previously esoteric mathematical and statistical techniques as probability theory, queueing theory, game theory, decision trees, and Monte Carlo methods.6

Sophisticated quantitative methods were initially applied primarily to the functional business areas. Equally essential to the progress of a science of management, many business scholars believed, were behavioral and social science research on

organizational structures and managerial processes. Drawing upon the studies of such pioneers as Henry Fayol, Luther Gulick, and Chester Barnard, postwar scholars--led by Robert Gordon, Herbert Simon, Peter Drucker, and Harold Koontz--focused new attention on top management and on what Simon called the "composite," organizational decisionmaking process. To be effective, managers had not only to be technically proficient but to see organizations whole. At the same time, managers had to become more sensitive to the individual in the organization. "Human relations" was no less critical a managerial tool than operations research in securing organizational harmony and higher productivity. In short, management science in the postwar decade became extraordinarily liberal and eclectic in its knowledge bases. The intellectual demands that would be made on future managers required broad grounding in scientific disciplines and high-level, integrative, problem-solving ability that transcended specific business functions.

The urgent need for more, and more broadly trained, managers was widely publicized in the business press. Peter Drucker, the best known of the publicists, spoke for business leaders and scholars alike in proclaiming that modern-day executives were made, not born. America faced a crisis in leadership that firms and business schools had only belatedly recognized. Top management, Drucker argued, was now older than it had ever been; the average age of corporate presidents and vice-presidents was around sixty. Moreover, the promotion ladder had become so long that potential leaders were not moving up through corporation bureaucracies fast enough. However, new executives could not simply be pushed up from the lower ranks, for top management jobs had become increasingly complex. "The analytical and theoretical knowledge which, in an earlier generation was possessed by only a few 'scholars' in management, is a 'must' today.... Yet, this knowledge and understanding are not normally acquired in the work through which the executive tends to come up as production man, salesman, accountant, or engineer."9

The most immediate need, all commentators felt, was to transform in-house specialists into generalists via intensive executive development programs. In the early 1950s, corporations throughout the nation created such programs in droves, either by themselves or in tandem with nearby schools of business. The long-term need, though, was for a differently educated executive, one whose specialty training would not hamper his ability to see corporate problems as a whole, and whose analytic skills would

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7 Ibid., pp. 340-341.
9 Peter Drucker, "Executives are Made...Not Born," Nation's Business, 40 (October 1952): 36.
incorporate new techniques from mathematics and from the social as well as the physical sciences. To meet this need, business leaders turned primarily, and with extraordinary enthusiasm, to graduate business schools.

"The day of the truly professional general management man isn't here yet, but it is not far away," proclaimed a Business Week writer in 1952, regarding the philosophy behind the soon-to-be-opened Sloan School at M.I.T. "That man will be trained for management in general, rather than in any one phase of business. He'll learn his technique in school, rather than on the job." Peter Drucker read the trend the same way. After decades of viewing most business schools as training grounds for entry-level functional specialists, the business community had finally accepted the graduate business school "as its own professional school." Even the railroad and automobile industries, which previously had not recruited many M.B.A.s, were beginning to search for future executives in graduate business schools. Only one major problem remained, Drucker forewarned: having quickly won the hearts and minds of the business community, it was not clear that business schools "know what to do with their victory."

The decade following World War II was understandably a confusing time for academic administrators of graduate business programs. Having earlier ingratiated themselves with the business community because of their intensely practical, functional orientation (save for Harvard and Chicago), the business schools were now called upon to rapidly and radically transform themselves into producers of executives with wide-ranging technical skills and general problem-solving abilities. However, until the end of the 1940s there was, realistically, little that most business schools could do to respond to pressures for change. Veterans enrolled in business schools in huge numbers following the war. Playing catchup, they not surprisingly sought skills that would enable them to secure entry-level jobs; their large enrollments and intensely practical orientation precluded serious curricular and pedagogical innovations at the business schools they attended. Once the wave of veterans had graduated, business schools were freer to try to serve the new purposes that corporations and business scholars were urging upon them. Throughout the 1950s, large segments of the field of business education remained in flux. Most schools spoke about the need for reform, yet no clear model for change existed. Business education became far more diverse in purpose, program and method than ever before; some schools reached out boldly in the direction of experimentation, while others remained much as they always had been.

III. VARIETIES OF RESPONSE IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD: 1946-1955

Michigan State, Northwestern, and UCLA illustrated some common responses by business educators to calls for reform in the late 1940s and early 1950s. At Michigan State, it was largely business-as-usual, whereas at Northwestern and UCLA there was significant and rapid change.

Michigan State

The business administration program at Michigan State closely resembled that at other land grant universities with broad public service missions. Founded during the late 1920s, by the postwar period the business program was part of the College of Business and Public Service. With over 4,000 students, the College enrolled more than one-quarter of the university's entire student body. While the College offered a master's level program in business, it was miniscule in comparison to the undergraduate program and had no special sense of purpose or, indeed, of curriculum. At both the undergraduate and graduate levels, the program was highly specialized and devoted to preparing students for entry into a narrow range of occupations.

Undergraduates in business administration earned approximately three-quarters of their credits in economics, in general business, and in major field courses. The College offered a long list of vocational concentrations, and placed few restrictions on the number of specialized courses a student could take. Major fields included accounting, commercial teaching, food distribution, industrial management, industrial personnel, insurance, marketing, purchasing, real estate, retail administration, secretarial administration, and transportation. Course content was overwhelmingly descriptive rather than analytic. All students learned basic principles in the functional fields of accounting, finance, marketing, and personnel. The subject matter in major field courses was generally limited to descriptions of prevailing business practices; for example, procuring appropriate forms, office arrangement, sales techniques, shorthand, typing, transcribing dictation, assessing property, conducting credit searches, and business and real estate law. The only course that pushed students in a more general executive direction was a senior-level required seminar in business policy. Both the content and pedagogy of this course were significantly different. The focus was on actual business problems involving "the formulation of consistent business policies and...the maintenance of efficient organization." The course relied on Harvard-type
business cases and required students to prepare regular "reports which call for the exercise of executive decisions."\textsuperscript{12}

Michigan State's strong commitment to specialization was reflected in the fact that it offered only a M.A. rather than an M.B.A. degree. The M.A. in business was entirely a specialty degree. "There was no core curriculum, no attempt to develop a distinct managerial perspective or to teach relevant scientific knowledge that transcended functional business areas, and no concern about cultivating among graduate students a special esprit de corps or socialization experience. Indeed, the graduate program offered few courses of its own. Students mainly took advanced undergraduate courses in their area(s) of technical specialization. After one year of additional coursework, they received the M.A. degree.

In 1953, Michigan State added a Ph.D. program that attracted a few candidates in marketing and general business. In 1954, it hired a new faculty member from M.I.T., Tom Stout, who was committed to developing a managerial approach to marketing. Searches were also launched for new faculty in behavioral and social sciences. Thus, the postwar ferment in higher education for business did not entirely pass by Michigan State. Nonetheless, during the early 1950s its program more closely reflected the thinking of business educators two generations earlier than it did that of leading management scholars and practitioners.

Northwestern

At mid-century, Northwestern's business school (the School of Commerce) embodied a study in contrasts, its philosophy and program committed equally to older and newer visions of managerial education. The four-year undergraduate program, although demanding less concentration in business courses than did Michigan State, still required majors to devote approximately half of their time to business and another ten percent to economics. The great majority of coursework, as at Michigan State, was narrowly-conceived, technical, and descriptive in functional business areas. Such large major fields as home economics, retail sales, and secretarial studies attested to the program's low-level, specialized, entry-level orientation. Indeed, the "secretarial science" program actually expanded substantially during the 1950s with the acquisition of Gregg College, a previously private trade school for secretaries, where studies included proper posture and good grooming in addition to typing, shorthand, and filing. Finally, the coherence of the undergraduate program was compromised by the dominance of part-
time students (enrolled primarily at the School's Chicago campus, Wieboldt Hall), very few of whom graduated with valid bachelor's degrees.

At the same time, there was evidence of reform at Northwestern. In fact, the modernist movement in managerial education had begun with the hiring of Homer Vanderblue as dean in 1937. A scholar in transportation and finance with a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard, Vanderblue had previously taught at Northwestern and Harvard and served as vice-president for one of the nation's leading investment firms. Upon assuming the deanship, Vanderblue had strongly criticized the School's technical, specialized curriculum. "The mere providing of routine tools, however important these may be in the early years of apprenticeship," were inappropriate and unnecessary at the undergraduate level, he argued, and should be postponed, if possible, to the graduate level. The accounting program illustrated the School's general problem. Designed solely to train professional accountants, it focused entirely on the "mechanics of recordkeeping and auditing rather than with the use of essential control figures in the difficult task of business administration," and so failed to prepare managers to appreciate the centrality of accounting information to all aspects of business operations.13

Vanderblue's ability to effect curricular change was seriously hampered by the war, which placed economic survival concerns foremost, and by the postwar crush of returning veterans. Nonetheless, during his administration (which ended in 1949) there were several notable reforms. First, he succeeded in establishing a sixteen course, comprehensive, sequential "core" curriculum for undergraduate business majors. This reduced the number of courses students could take in a single specialty, forced them to become familiar with all the fundamental areas of business enterprise (plus business law and business writing), and required them to undertake theoretical work in statistics and economics. Second, Vanderblue introduced new required courses in business policy and business history in order to provide students with a broader outlook on the environment in which business operated. Third, Vanderblue reduced the number of part-time faculty drawn from Chicago area businesses, and increased the full-time faculty, whom he recruited overwhelmingly from Harvard. This helped move the program further from narrow specialization and also integrated the Harvard problem-solving, case pedagogy more centrally into the curriculum. Fourth, under Vanderblue's leadership the predominance of part-time to full-time undergraduate students declined, from a ratio of nearly 12:1 in 1938 to less than 4:1 ten years later.

Fifth and finally, although Vanderblue’s main concern at Northwestern (despite his own background) was in undergraduate rather than graduate business education, he supported major changes in the M.B.A. program. Northwestern had first offered the M.B.A. and Ph.D. degrees in the early 1920s; yearly graduates from both programs had averaged around 30 in the 1930s but had more than doubled by the end of the 1940s. Much like Michigan State’s M.A. in business, Northwestern’s M.B.A. resembled a typical master’s program in liberal arts. In addition to writing a thesis, students (almost entirely undergraduate business and economics majors) took one year of additional courses in their area(s) of functional specialization. The bulk of their program was comprised of advanced undergraduate rather than distinct, graduate-level classes. Under the guidance of Professor Richard Donham, Vanderblue transformed the M.B.A. program substantially. Lengthy core requirements were instituted in the functional business areas (eight courses) and in analysis and policy formation (seven courses), plus four additional course requirements in operations and control and reappraisal. By reducing electives, requiring a sequence of high-level analytic courses, and broadening student exposure to a wide range of functional areas taught increasingly by the case method, Vanderblue sharply differentiated the M.B.A. from the B.A. as a professional degree. Essentially he did everything he could to re-create Northwestern’s M.B.A. program on the Harvard model.

Following Vanderblue’s retirement, a power vacuum existed for several years at the School of Commerce. During the interregnum, Richard Donham became a major force in furthering the modernization trend. Son of Wallace Donham, who as dean at Harvard in the 1920s had introduced the case method to managerial education, Richard Donham (B.A., M.B.A. and D.S.C. from Harvard) was committed to replicating the Cambridge experience. This meant especially placing more School resources in the M.B.A. program, establishing closer ties with the surrounding business community, and developing a true "professional management atmosphere."

As head of the graduate division, Donham was the key advocate behind the transfer in 1950 of the graduate program from Northwestern’s Evanston to its Chicago campus. His objective was to segregate graduate studies structurally from the much larger undergraduate program in order to promote a distinct professional identity for full-time M.B.A. students. The twelve miles between the two campuses, he hoped, would serve as Northwestern’s "Charles River" for building esprit de corps and intensifying the socialization of students as future managers. Donham was also the prime mover behind the creation of the Institute for Management the following year. Reflecting nationwide concern over the lack of competent executive personnel, the Institute was a four-week, residential program in executive education. Obviously a
modified version of the thirteen-week Advanced Management Program that Harvard had pioneered several years earlier, the Institute was immediately successful in attracting high-level midwestern executives. Instruction centered primarily on cases that illustrated problems in top management policy and administration, and the ways in which the external environment impinged on business decisionmaking.

Finally, Donham succeeded in raising admission standards for both part-time and full-time students, and led an extensive recruiting campaign among liberal arts majors at elite colleges for full-time, residential M.B.A. candidates. The result was a dramatic decline (by three-quarters) in the traditionally huge part-time M.B.A. program, an increase in full-time M.B.A. students, and a corresponding increase in the number of M.B.A. degrees yearly awarded (around 150 by mid-decade, or twice the number as at the end of the Vanderblue administration).

In sum, by the early 1950s, Northwestern had taken several major steps toward modernizing its undergraduate and graduate programs. Given the strong surrogate leadership that Richard Donham had provided in planning and successfully implementing these innovations during the interregnum period, it was no surprise when he was named dean of the School of Commerce in 1953.

UCLA

While the pace of reform at UCLA was as rapid as at Northwestern, the directions were somewhat different. UCLA’s College of Business Administration (founded in 1935) had never required as much specialization in business and economics; students devoted approximately half of their course work to the liberal arts. Even in their junior and senior years, business majors were required to commit around one-third of their time to courses in other departments, primarily political science, history, psychology, and anthropology.

The College offered six major fields for the B.S. degree: accounting, banking and finance, marketing, management and industry, office management, and general business. Accounting dominated the program (the dean, Howard Noble, taught accounting), with office management (which featured courses in typing, shorthand, and filing) a close second. A special program was available to undergraduates desiring to teach business education in the secondary schools (recall that UCLA had begun as a normal school). In addition to secretarial subjects, this program included a two-course sequence on penmanship.
Since 1939, the College had sponsored an M.B.A. program. Although small, it was more elaborate and less specialized than those at Michigan State and Northwestern in the 1940s. For undergraduate majors in business, the program lasted one year; for nonmajors, there was a two-year M.B.A., with the first year devoted to a wide array of elementary business subjects. Nine graduate level courses, mainly seminars, were available; students had to take at least half of their coursework from among them. Although students technically had the freedom to concentrate three-fourths of their program in their majors, few probably did so because all M.B.A. candidates had to pass a comprehensive examination in four fields. While the student could designate a field of specialization, it was not necessary for him to do so. In addition, the student had to take one-quarter of his coursework outside the College of Business Administration. Thus, although accounting predominated, the M.B.A. program at UCLA was, as a whole, more academic and less vocational than those at Michigan State and Northwestern.

Nonetheless, UCLA's central administration, aggressively seeking ways to rival Berkeley in academic stature, considered the business administration program too narrowly conceived to bring eminence to the campus. In 1947 Dean Noble resigned and UCLA Provost Clarence Dykstra, a former city manager (Cincinnati) and university president (Wisconsin) himself, sought a replacement who could build a prestigious graduate business school that would "train the future business leaders of Southern California," and that would be based on the premise that management was a discipline, whether applied to government or business operations. He chose Neil Jacoby, professor of finance and vice-president under Robert Hutchins of the University of Chicago. A renowned public speaker and prolific scholar, Jacoby also had considerable practical work experience in business and government. He and Dykstra were intent on developing a much different image and purpose for business administration at UCLA. As surely as Donham would try to imprint the stamp of Harvard on Northwestern, Jacoby would strive for greatness by imprinting the stamp of Chicago on UCLA.

One of Jacoby's highest priorities was to rid the curriculum of course content inappropriate to a prestigious university program. Office management was his main concern. While the field remained for several years as an undergraduate specialization, Jacoby eliminated it quickly from the M.B.A. program. Even at the undergraduate level,

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he managed to contain the program and its professors in a separate Department of Business Communication and Office Management. The move had the effect—consistent with the overt efforts of Harvard and other leading business schools at the time—of reducing the number of women in the business administration program.

Jacoby also moved quickly to transform the accounting program, which was as narrow and technical in orientation as at other business schools. Aimed exclusively at preparing future C.P.A.s, the program ignored accounting as a critical instrument of upper management information gathering and control. Unable to persuade the tenured accounting faculty to change their approach, Jacoby hired other, more theoretically-oriented faculty to develop a new "managerial accounting" perspective. Traditional academic constraints prevented Jacoby from transforming the accounting program as quickly or as thoroughly as he would have preferred. But by offering students different approaches to accounting and building up other fields at a faster rate, he subordinated accounting to a less prominent position than it had previously enjoyed.16

Eliminating curricular fluff and broadening the scope and purpose of narrow, vocational programs were essential first steps in Jacoby's strategy for rebuilding business administration at UCLA. Another possibility—and one to which Jacoby was personally inclined—was to eliminate the undergraduate business program entirely, as Chicago (and Columbia) had done a few years earlier. But, as Jacoby fully understood, the academic environment at UCLA was very different from that at Chicago. Unlike Chicago, UCLA had a large undergraduate program; indeed, the College of Business Administration housed the small graduate program. In the postwar decade, it was simply inconceivable for UCLA, a public university and former normal school without high academic status, to get permission from the State Board of Regents to terminate a popular undergraduate program in order to concentrate resources on graduate, professional education. Within the framework of the values and mores of the University of California, Jacoby did what he could to infuse the business administration program with the Chicago academic spirit.

One of Jacoby's first steps was to rewrite the university catalogue introduction for incoming undergraduate business majors. The College of Business Administration, he emphasized, was a "professional college" that sought to prepare students for "positions in business at the management and administrative levels." The object of course requirements was not to grease the path toward functional specialization and entry-level positions but, rather, "to furnish a broad preparation for careers of management, rather than a highly specialized proficiency in particular occupations." Advanced

16 Ibid, pp. 71ff.
undergraduate courses attempted to "create an understanding of the operation of the business enterprise within the whole economy; to develop proficiency in the use of such tools of management as accounting, business law, statistical and economic analysis; and to provide knowledge of the principles of management in several functional fields."\(^{17}\)

As Vanderblue and Donham had done at Northwestern, Jacoby attempted to build greater professional coherence around managerial goals by expanding the number and kinds of core course requirements. From eight under Noble in 1947, required courses expanded to eleven under Jacoby in 1949. The core included new courses on The Enterprise in an Unstable Economy, a course on production (a functional area Noble had neglected), a course on personnel management, and a course on organization and management policy (which utilized cases and replaced a more traditional, descriptive course in business organization). Jacoby did not go as far as Vanderblue at Northwestern in mandating comprehensive core requirements for all students, in emphasizing the case method, or in requiring students to study business history and business policy (although he did introduce and teach himself a sequence of business policy courses that focused on the external environment). Clearly, though, both Jacoby and Vanderblue moved in similar directions in transforming their undergraduate programs to encourage students to think of themselves more as future managers than as functional specialists.

Jacoby's most decisive early step in upgrading the stature of business administration at UCLA was to eliminate the College entirely in 1950. In its place, he created a new School of Business Administration that incorporated only the junior and senior undergraduate years and the M.B.A. program. Lower division undergraduates who expected to major in business now became the responsibility of the College of Liberal Arts. This new administrative arrangement had several goals. For one, it obviously simplified Jacoby's administrative tasks by removing less career-oriented freshmen and sophomores from his concern. Second, it eliminated the administrative peculiarity of having a "college" offer an M.B.A. degree. By integrating graduate studies into a new School of Business Administration, the M.B.A. program, he anticipated, would become more appealing to ambitious Los Angeles students who customarily went east for their graduate education. The change would also facilitate the hiring of distinguished faculty from eastern universities who preferred to teach graduate students. Third, Jacoby hoped that the new administrative arrangement would enhance the reputation of business studies as a distinctly professional program in which the M.B.A., not the B.S., represented a logical culmination of the School's educational mission. In

short, the creation of the School of Business Administration was motivated primarily by Jacoby's goal of expanding the size and status of graduate studies. He politely ignored older members of his faculty who charged that the change would reduce the number of undergraduate business majors.\textsuperscript{18}

While Jacoby tried to upgrade undergraduate business education, the vision he and Provost Dykstra shared of a great graduate program took priority and largely determined the shape of undergraduate studies. The first requisite was to hire a large, first-rate, and, most importantly, a research-oriented faculty. When Jacoby arrived at UCLA in 1948, eleven faculty were struggling to satisfy the demands of 1,300 undergraduates (mainly veterans). By 1952, he had quadrupled faculty size despite a decline in student enrollments (following the departure of the veterans and the elimination of freshmen and sophomores with the founding of the School). This remarkable achievement appears even more spectacular because the salary scale at UCLA was relatively low, because many liberal arts faculty (who controlled appointments via the Academic Senate) were openly suspicious of business as a legitimate academic field, because the Economics Department was wary of Jacoby's allegedly imperialist ambitions, and because University of California President Robert Sproul (who then had to approve all faculty appointments) was a jealous guardian of Berkeley's academic prerogatives vis-à-vis UCLA.\textsuperscript{19} Jacoby's new faculty came highly disproportionately from the University of Chicago. They included many new Ph.D.s who had studied either with Jacoby himself or with his mentors in Chicago's Economics Department and Business School. In contrast to Donham of Northwestern, whose vision of a first-rate graduate program did not include basic academic research, very few of Jacoby's recruits came from Harvard. The imperatives of original scholarship, not the case method, would drive the philosophy and pedagogy of management as a discipline at UCLA.

Expansion of graduate studies emerged in several quick, major stages. To create any new Ph.D. program at UCLA was a highly political and sensitive step, given President Sproul's commitment to maintaining Berkeley's supremacy in the state's higher education hierarchy. Recruitment of a large, distinguished, or at least potentially distinguished, young faculty had first to become a reality. With that preliminary process underway, Jacoby began concentrating faculty resource on the M.B.A. program. During his first year as dean, the number of separate graduate level courses increased from nine to sixteen. Two years later, with the opening of the new School, graduate course offerings jumped to twenty-one, all designed as small seminars. At the same time,

\textsuperscript{18} Jacoby, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 66-67.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Ibid}, passim.
Jacoby gave the program greater coherence by reducing the number of permissible specialty fields from eight to five. M.B.A. candidates still had to take one-quarter of their coursework outside of the School, and at least half of their credits in graduate-level classes.

The only significant change Jacoby made in program requirements was to cut back the number of courses students could take in their area of specialization. Previously, students could take as much as three-quarters of their coursework in their majors (although, as suggested earlier, it seems doubtful that many did so, since they had to pass exams covering four functional fields). Under the new requirements, M.B.A. candidates had to take at least three courses in two fields beyond their specialty. As a result, students could take no more than half of their coursework in a specialty, and as little as one-quarter if they so chose. The comprehensive exam remained in effect, although it was now tailored to the student's individual program. Thus, in revising its M.B.A. program, UCLA, unlike Northwestern, continued to give its students great freedom in determining the substance of their education. At the same time, both institutions placed sharp limits on the opportunity for specialization. In sum, UCLA and Northwestern took both similar and different routes toward providing students with the skills and outlooks deemed essential for future managers.

Beyond the rapid addition of new graduate courses, Jacoby sought to imbue the M.B.A. program with a new philosophy. The prime objectives, he stated, were "(1) integration of knowledge of business administration at a policymaking level; (2) more comprehensive and intensive penetration of a major field of business administration than is possible at the undergraduate level; and (3) development in the student of competence in the performance of independent investigative work on problems of business administration." Well before the Ph.D. program became a reality, Jacoby was letting incoming M.B.A. candidates know that they would be expected to learn the spirit and techniques of original research at the master's level. Whatever else the UCLA M.B.A. graduate became, he would be first and foremost academically respectable.

With a faculty of nearly four dozen, featuring such pioneer and emerging academic stars as Ralph Barnes, Ralph Cassady, Harold Koontz, Cyril O'Donnell, Robert Tannenbaum, J. Frederick Weston, Robert Williams, Fred Case, James Gillies, and Jacoby, the School of Business Administration opened its Ph.D. program in 1953. The program was emphatically oriented toward research. Its objective was "to produce teachers and research personnel of university calibre, able to contribute to the body of

20 UCLA, Graduate Division, Announcement, 1950-1951, p. 37.
organized knowledge of business management." Reflecting the School's new diverse strengths, the fields of concentration offered to both M.B.A. and Ph.D. students were increased from five to nine. In addition to the functional areas, the fields were business economics, business statistics, business organization and policy (which Jacoby taught with Koontz), and real estate and urban land economics (which Jacoby worked hard to build in order to meet special opportunities in Southern California). In size and stature, UCLA's School of Business Administration had matured with remarkable speed to become one of the nation's more academically-distinguished business schools by the mid-1950s.

At President Eisenhower's request, Jacoby went on leave in 1953 for two years to serve on the Council of Economic Advisors. His accomplishments, already extraordinary, were extended the following year when another program he had initiated was opened. Like Northwestern, and in accordance with Provost Dykstra's original charge to him, Jacoby was anxious to include executive education as part of his graduate program. Having participated in Chicago in the nation's most ambitious business education program for practicing executives (the first Executive M.B.A. program, begun in 1935), he initially intended to recreate that program at UCLA. Eventually, however, he decided to substitute a "Certificate" program that only required attendance during one afternoon and one evening per week for one year. With support from such corporations as the Bank of America, North American Aviation, Lockheed, and United California Bank, UCLA's executive education program accepted fifty students per year and soon had many more applicants than space would allow. Class sessions focused more on company-wide, general management issues and encouraged more sharing of actual managerial experiences and the decisionmaking process than would have been possible with relatively inexperienced M.B.A. candidates. Unlike Northwestern's Institute of Management, Jacoby did not attempt to develop a dramatic new pedagogical approach to executive education.

Although tempted by the prospect of replacing Arthur Burns as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, Jacoby returned to Westwood in 1955 with strong promises from the central administration that they would continue to support his efforts to build a great graduate school of business. The future at UCLA looked bright indeed.

22 In this way, he could avoid the hassle of pleading his case before the Academic Senate, in addition, it seemed to him that Chicago executives had experienced great personal strain due to the program's additional demands on their time and intellect. Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 140-141.
IV. THE NEW AGE OF REFORM: 1955–1964

By 1955, when the Ford Foundation asked Robert Gordon and James Howell to assess the state of American business education and recommend areas needing reform, the field was already in ferment. The need for change had been widely recognized and publicized in the business press. Executive education programs, run by corporations and universities alike, were springing up everywhere. What remained uncertain was how quickly and how thoroughly individual schools of business would accommodate to reform pressures.

Each of the universities under investigation here had reacted differently. In 1945, their philosophies and programs in business education were far more similar than different; a decade later, they were highly divergent. Michigan State had mainly stood in place, despite the creation of a modest doctoral program. Northwestern had significantly reoriented its specialized program at both the graduate and undergraduate levels, by modeling itself on Harvard. UCLA had reoriented its program equally dramatically by making research imperatives the determinant of programmatic innovation and faculty hiring. At Michigan State, the B.A. had remained the preeminent focus of faculty concern; at Northwestern, the M.B.A. had rivaled the B.A. as a target of innovation; at UCLA, the Ph.D. and M.B.A. had supplanted the B.A. as primary objects of faculty interest. By the mid-1950s, in short, the process of change—at least at the three institutions under investigation here—was uneven and disorderly. With leadership provided by the Ford Foundation, the next decade would witness strong efforts to both quicken the pace and standardize the direction of reform in American business education.

Michigan State

In the mid-1950s, Michigan State University President John Hannah began a concerted effort to upgrade the campus’s academic reputation by modernizing its numerous graduate and professional school programs, i.e., bringing them into line with the most advanced pedagogical thinking in their respective fields. Business administration came under especially close scrutiny. Graduate studies at the master’s and doctorate levels were dwarfed by the huge undergraduate program, the graduate program had little separate curriculum or identity, and did not even include a professional degree (the M.B.A.). The only serious effort at self-improvement had been the hiring of a few young faculty with behavioral science backgrounds, and the development of a revised "managerial marketing" sequence that was "decision and problem-solving" oriented, "sacrificing a high degree of specialization in the elements of marketing in favor of
broader managerial issues." The new approach had been presented at a number of national and regional conferences, including the American Marketing Association, where it was "applauded as an outstanding contribution to the educational field."23

The new managerial marketing curriculum pointed in the right direction but, in Hannah's judgment, it only partially embraced the vision and imagination that were necessary to change radically the nature of business education at Michigan State. In 1957 the university named a new dean, Alfred Seelye, to head the School with the express purpose of building a strong, separate graduate program with a distinct identity of its own. A marketing specialist with a doctorate from Indiana, Seelye had served with the Office of Price Stabilization during World War II. He had become known for his reformist views on the future of business education as dean of the Business School at the University of Texas. Immediately upon his arrival, Seelye appointed a committee to lay the intellectual and institutional groundwork for a managerially rather than a functionally oriented M.B.A. program. Seelye, like Jacoby at UCLA nine years earlier, would enjoy powerful central administration support for transforming a small, narrow, and traditional graduate business program as part of a larger strategy to raise the academic status of the entire university.

To fulfill its intellectual mission, the Committee (called the "Core Curriculum Study Committee"--this at a time when the master's program had no core requirements) visited several business schools in the east and midwest, where they witnessed much "ferment" regarding the future of business education. The Committee (largely guided by marketing Professor John Hazard, whom Seelye had brought from Texas) reported its findings and conclusions in February, 1958. Acknowledging that Michigan State would experience tremendous competition from other universities (as well as corporations and professional associations) which had already or were in the process of reshaping graduate programs, they concluded that change was nonetheless imperative: "The choice may well be between becoming truly professional or passively accepting a vocational role."24

Much like Gordon and Howell would do for a wider audience the following year, the Committee's report epitomized modern thinking in managerial education. Rather than preparing students for specialized, entry-level positions, the Committee argued, business schools should provide an intellectual base for continual, on-the-job, self-renewal by developing "habits of thought and spirit of inquiry." The Committee

continued, "the point may have been reached in the development of business as a field of study where the body of knowledge is so immense that it cannot possibly all be taught in a year or two of graduate study. A professional education in our field is really the product of a lifetime of study, reflection, and personal development."25

How could a foundation for lifelong career learning be laid and still be immediately useful? Five elements were critical. First, the program should emphasize "basic concepts and analytic tools rather than descriptive information and techniques." Students must develop the ability to make "skilled observations, multidimensional analyses, and integrated action-decisions about complex business situations." Second, students should be "inculcated with a sense of awareness of the wider realm of responsibilities of business and an appreciation of the social, economic, and political environment in which business decisions are made." Third, students must be taught to appreciate the "close ties which business has with the established social sciences." A sound M.B.A. program had to demonstrate the applicability to managerial decisionmaking of insights from sociology, anthropology, psychology, and history, as well as from economics. Fourth, students should leave the program fully and equally literate in both the "written and spoken language and quantitative method." Finally, the committee acknowledged the need for students to specialize in a particular field in order to "obtain a satisfactory placement and progress to management levels," and to "apply basic conceptual and analytic skills to specific aspects of business organization and practice."26

In determining how to implement this philosophy in a distinctive core curriculum of their own, the Committee considered the pros and cons of the best known business schools. Inescapably, they had to assess the merits of Harvard versus Chicago as potential models. Harvard, they acknowledged, had pioneered a bold and imaginative approach to defining "the nature of professional education in business." They agreed with the Harvard faculty that "the fundamental abilities of the business executive are skilled observation, integrative thinking about multidimensional, action-situations, and extensive situational knowledge," and that the case method was excellent for "simulating experiences that enhanced students' ability to perceive problems, see the interconnectedness of events, and project the consequences of different managerial decisions." What concerned them, however, was whether the case method represented "the only way or even the most useful way" to develop these conceptual and analytic abilities. Immersion in cases tended to leave substantive learning largely to chance. The

26 Ibid, pp. 3-4.
Committee feared that pedagogical reliance on cases would diminish students' interest in broader generalizations and hypotheses, upon which, they believed, "a distinct applied science in business administration can be founded."27

The Committee was even more critical of the pedagogy at Chicago (as well as at M.I.T.). The Committee had nothing in theory against Chicago's "interdisciplinary" approach and the broadly applicable training it provided in sophisticated analytic concepts and skills. This had "sound, academic appeal," something which the program at Michigan State badly needed. However, in practice, the Chicago program was, at best, multi- rather than truly interdisciplinary. It "tended to place on the student the problem of integrating materials which the faculty itself was unwilling to organize," and was "not really much more interdisciplinary than schools which place little or no emphasis on this characteristic." Moreover, the Committee challenged the tendency at Chicago (and even more so at M.I.T.) to value quantitative over qualitative tools of analysis, and to stress basic concepts and analytic skills to the point of abstract sterility regarding potential managerial applications. Such an approach in English literature, they cautioned, would produce grammarians rather than artists. In business, it had the potential to turn out "researchers rather than potential executives," an inappropriate prime goal, in the Committee's view, of a professional business curriculum. The Chicago approach, in short, failed (unlike Harvard's) to grapple with the "fundamental question of the nature of business education and research. Without answers to this question," the Committee warned, "there could be no effective integration of the social sciences--only a chance conglomeration at best or a lopsided distribution at worst."28

While not entirely satisfied with the pedagogy of any of the schools they visited, the Core Curriculum Study Committee found the programs at the Carnegie Institute of Technology and Indiana University most congenial. These institutions, in the Committee's terms, employed the "administrative approach." They viewed the business school as a "professional institution specializing in the development of administrative knowledge and the education of business administrators." To be sure, the "administrative approach" was not without its crude applications. At some institutions the Committee had visited, it was "hardly more than a chronology of decision and action to which is appended a variety of so-called principles, usually of dubious scientific validity." The approach all too easily deteriorated into a collection of "folklore, truisms, and descriptions of existing practice," or into a narrow quest for "strictly rational principles of administration" that resulted in a "static conception of the business executive."

27 Ibid, pp. 7-8.
28 Ibid, pp. 6-7.
Nonetheless, the "administrative approach," organized around a "framework of common administrative problems in policy determination, programming, organizing, executing, and controlling," held great promise for developing "a distinct science of administration." The Core Curriculum Study Committee adopted it with great enthusiasm as the philosophical foundation for Michigan State's M.B.A. program.29

The Committee proposed a 51 credit program—roughly four or five quarters, as compared to the three previously required for Michigan State's M.A. degree. Rather than unlimited specialization, candidates for the new M.B.A. degree could take no more than 18 credits in a specialty. The Committee recommended elimination of several highly specialized, academically suspect majors, and also expected students to take several new specialty courses that incorporated substantial behavioral science content. The bulk of the proposed program was comprised of 24 required core credits (six courses) and an elective core of three courses (chosen from a group of five) devoted to the environmental context of business operations. The core and elective core were organized in a careful pedagogical sequence of "progressive immersion." Students would first study administration at the relatively uncomplicated level of individual decisionmaking and action, while simultaneously acquiring necessary quantitative tools and data. Then the students would be "immersed in the analysis of complex dynamic systems of both technical and human character."30

Reflecting the Core Curriculum Study Committee's concern for balancing instruction in quantitative and qualitative analytic tools, the core courses were about equally divided between the two, although all were taught from the managerial (administrative) perspective. The primarily quantitative sequence included Economics of the Firm, essentially microeconomics at the firm level and directed toward issues involved in internal decisionmaking; Administrative Control, which essentially synthesized managerial accounting and finance and emphasized case problems over technical complexities; and Administrative Research Methods, designed to enhance students' ability to utilize and assess the validity of select quantitative techniques in diverse business applications.

The qualitative core sequence drew heavily on both the social sciences and the case method to teach administration as a distinct body of theory and practice. The concept of administration, the Committee emphasized, was generic: it applied to "administrative thought and action in a variety of institutional settings, business as well

30 Ibid, p. 11.
as other organized activities in modern society." Moreover, the Committee asserted, "the basic elements of administration remain the same at the various levels of analysis," hence, one could begin instruction at "the level of the individual...where the control of resources is relatively complete and where the data utilized is [sic] concrete, tangible, and largely quantitative," and progress logically "to cover complex, organized action systems where the control over resources is more difficult and the data utilized is [sic] both quantitative and qualitative."31

The three primarily qualitative courses were Administration: Theory and Action, I and II, and Administrative Policy. The administrative theory and action courses, which defined administration as "goal-directed human action which involves the development and maintenance of cooperative systems of complex technical and human character," essentially introduced students to organization theory and systems analysis and their concrete business applications.32 The object was to teach "the rationale of executive action." Administrative Policy was to be taken during the student's final quarter. Designed to "develop an integrated approach to decisionmaking in complex situations," the course relied entirely on cases designed to test students' command of both quantitative and qualitative analytic tools, and their ability to apply them to "problems facing executives at the general management level." The course was conceived as the "intellectual capstone of the curriculum."33

The elective core represented an equally bold departure from Michigan State's traditional curriculum. Only one of the elective core choices, Foundations of Industry, dealt even remotely with a functional area (production) by examining the "materials foundation of the industrial economy" from both scientific and social scientific perspectives.34 The other four choices in the elective core were all designed to increase students' awareness of forces external rather than internal to the firm. The American Economy examined economic issues "from a policy standpoint"-- what ought to be as well as what was.35 The Frontiers of Business was conceived as a research course focusing on a single topic of current debate in management circles, such as the consumer orientation in business, or profit sharing. Business and Public Policy focused on legal issues surrounding governmental regulations, and sensitized students to the need for "understanding and adjusting to a political and social environment which is constantly

31 Ibid, p. 15.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid, p. 20.
growing and changing and which vitally influences business decisions and actions."\textsuperscript{36} Finally, International Business taught (partially by case study) "the place and role of the United States in the world political economy" and "the necessity for adaptation of traditional administrative approaches to new and foreign conditions."\textsuperscript{37} The subject matter in the elective core further revealed the Committee's determination not to sacrifice qualitative for quantitative training in the education of future managers, to integrate social science insights into the curriculum (although always tied to a direct business application), and to lean more strongly toward the Harvard, action-oriented rather than the Chicago, discipline-based approach to understanding the decisionmaking process.

The Core Curriculum Study Committee's proposals for drastic redesign of master's level business education won full and quick approval from Dean Seelye and the central administration. A wholly new graduate program, featuring the M.B.A., D.B.A., and Ph.D. degrees, was put in place for the 1959-1960 academic year. Equally significant, the trustees of Michigan State authorized establishment of a separate Graduate School of Business Administration to administer the new programs, thereby giving graduate instruction distinct identity from the College of Business and Public Service. The Eugene C. Eppley Foundation of Omaha, Nebraska, soon thereafter gave $1.5 million for the construction of a modern faculty center for the business school. Graduate business education at Michigan State had been modernized with a vengeance. From just a handful of advanced students of generally low academic quality in the 1950s, the new Graduate School enrolled some six hundred M.B.A. candidates with good to excellent academic credentials, and nearly one hundred doctoral candidates with respectable academic credentials by the mid-1960s.

Although the faculty--which had to do a dramatic intellectual turn-around to teach in the new M.B.A. program--remained far more oriented toward teaching than research, Seelye took several steps to integrate research into the graduate school's future mission. He established two major research centers (the Institute of Business Management Studies and the Institute of Public Utilities, the latter subsidized largely by the power and communications industries), secured university funds to support graduate research assistantships, and gained financial support from the central administration to recruit new research-oriented faculty. By the mid-1960s Michigan State boasted one of the largest doctoral programs in the nation, with nearly one hundred candidates.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, pp. 23-24.
Michigan State President John Hannah had hired Seelye primarily to revolutionize the graduate business program and put it on the academic map in professional education. Seelye, however, had hopes of carrying the revolution one step farther than Hannah or the university trustees were ready to accept, namely, by eliminating the undergraduate program entirely. His ambitions in this direction were consistently thwarted because of the political support at the state level for undergraduate professional education at Michigan State, the nation’s pioneer land-grant, public service institution. Not only were 25 percent of the university’s undergraduates enrolled in the business school, a situation that would pose major financial obstacles to its termination, but the University of Michigan was unwilling to maintain more than a token undergraduate school of business. In the state’s higher education hierarchy, that left Michigan State with principal responsibility for offering a large undergraduate program to satisfy public demand.

As it became apparent that he could not eliminate the program, Seelye pushed his faculty to reform undergraduate business studies along lines consistent with the new graduate curriculum. By 1962 the undergraduate program was radically revised. Freshmen and sophomores were prohibited from beginning functional area specialization (except for one required course in accounting). The remaining few lower-division requirements for business majors were in quantitative skills, including a fairly demanding sequence in statistics. Otherwise, lower-division business majors were required to enroll (as had always been the case at UCLA) in the same natural science, social science, and humanities classes as liberal arts students. At the junior and senior levels, students were prohibited from much specialization. They had to take a set of core courses that consumed nearly three-quarters of their business and economics course allotments, and that, as in the graduate program (though on a lower level), was heavily infused with social and behavioral science content, and, to a lesser extent, with quantitative methods. Business majors could take no more than 21 credits (out of a total of 192) in their areas of specialization (27 if they were accounting majors).

The new undergraduate program’s stiff quantitative and core requirements quickly improved the composition of the student body. In particular, the statistics sequence served as a “heavy screen” within the business program, and was largely responsible for causing undergraduate enrollments to decline by nearly 30 percent in two years (from 3600 in 1961 to 2600 in 1963).\textsuperscript{38} Enrollment climbed slowly following the initial shock; by 1965, the undergraduate program once again enrolled 3000 students. If Seelye was unable to eliminate business as an undergraduate major, he at least succeeded

\textsuperscript{38} Michigan State University, College of Business and Public Service, Annual Report, 1963, passim.
in raising standards, lowering student enrollments, and transforming the curriculum to be intellectually consistent with the modernized graduate program. The new undergraduate program, in fact, seemed better geared to prepare students for advanced business studies than to equip them, as in the past, for entry-level positions in functional business areas. From Seelye’s point of view, this was all to the good.

In the early 1960s, Seelye turned his attention to another major facet of business education that had received considerable attention, the need for executive education. Michigan State already offered an array of extension programs in business throughout the state, and Seelye did what he could to maintain them. But these popular programs were not academically prestigious, rarely reached top- and mid-management personnel, and did little to build Michigan State’s reputation within the state’s corporate community. In the early 1960s, Seelye therefore created several regional centers that offered part-time, two-year, evening M.B.A. programs taught by regular Michigan State faculty. These were immediately successful and enrolled around 500 students from industries centered in western Michigan and northern Indiana.

Seelye’s most significant innovation in executive education, though, was the creation in 1964 of the Advanced Management Program in the Detroit area--the nation’s second formal executive M.B.A. program. Despite its proximity to Detroit, the University of Michigan had never ventured into the E.M.B.A. field. Seelye was convinced that if Michigan State could cultivate close relationships with leading members of Detroit’s industrial and manufacturing community, the Graduate School’s reputation would be boosted enormously. The A.M.P. was a select, two-year course aimed at around 50 mid-career (at least 10 years experience), mid-management executives, drawn overwhelmingly at first from the auto industries. Students met two evenings per week, including dinner before and informal discussion after the regular classes. The program was entirely common: all students enrolled in the same classes, and there were no opportunities to specialize. The program attempted to develop a top management perspective: students were drawn principally from the functional fields and needed exposure to enterprise-wide issues in order to advance in the corporate hierarchy. The program was taught by Michigan State's regular senior faculty; junior faculty were rarely involved, as many of the students had substantial functional field experience and an "unseasoned" teacher, it was felt, could easily make mistakes that would humiliate him and lower the program’s credibility. The A.M.P. broadened its constituency over the decade, drawing more from other private firms (e.g., General Electric) and from health and public sector agencies in the Detroit area.
By the mid-1960s, Seelye had substantially transformed the organizational structure and content of business education at Michigan State. He had gone well beyond the reform efforts of Donham and especially of Jacoby in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Michigan State had moved from rearguard to aspiring front-runner. It provided a living example that the process of self-renewal and modernization championed by Gordon and Howell in their 1959 report was within reach, even for second-tier public universities. Michigan State, however, had started its reform process virtually from scratch. Radical change was perhaps easier when there was little vested interest in earlier reform ventures. Having pioneered in the modernization process in the postwar decade, Northwestern and UCLA would have to decide whether to transform themselves once again.

Northwestern

Even before he became dean in 1953, Richard Donham had been instrumental in modernizing Northwestern's business education program, particularly at the graduate and executive education levels. As dean, he continued to nurture and publicize the achievements of these advanced programs. In the late 1950s, however, Donham's main energies went into the revision of the School's undergraduate business major. The sixteen-course core sequence and other reforms introduced earlier by Vanderblue did not go far enough, Donham believed, toward reducing premature specialization, interpreting the role of business in society, integrating mathematics and social science into analysis of business operations, or cultivating a diagnostic, corporate-wide managerial perspective. Donham took several steps to rectify these deficiencies and, essentially, to translate the Harvard Business School curriculum for undergraduate use. He expanded the range of liberal arts courses permissible for undergraduate business majors, pushed his faculty to utilize Harvard-type cases more frequently, and introduced several new required courses that aimed at a high level of synthesis. Quantitative Controls in Business attempted to teach students to integrate and apply accounting, statistics, and finance techniques to planning and control operations. Human Problems in Business applied behavioral science knowledge to issues in personnel and business-society relations. Competition of Ideas in Industrial Society—a senior-level capstone course—examined managerial responsibilities vis-a-vis the external environment, and raised hard questions regarding business ethics. These courses attested to Donham's strong commitment toward liberalizing undergraduate business education and integrating analysis of functional business areas that were traditionally separate intellectual fiefdoms within business schools.

Donham's pedagogical reforms marked Northwestern as among the most innovative private universities in the nation in undergraduate business education. The
reforms provided a solid precedent for him to appeal to the Ford Foundation— which had heretofore staked out graduate rather than undergraduate business education as its primary beneficiary—for a grant to further the reform process. The object, Donham argued, was to build a program that would integrate "general education in the arts and sciences with general and indepth education in business subjects." Ford responded with a grant of $500,000 between 1957 and 1961 to further liberalize the undergraduate business curriculum. Indeed, the purpose was to make business less and less distinguishable as an organized course of studies. Northwestern eliminated several highly specialized majors entirely (advertising, real estate, hospital administration, secretarial science), and so liberalized requirements for business students that they could actually major outside of business—in liberal arts fields such as history or political science. Donham made strenuous efforts, in addition, to develop interdisciplinary courses with faculty from other liberal arts departments. However, these efforts largely failed due to indifference on the part of nonbusiness faculty, who looked down upon business majors and who had nothing to gain professionally from such interdisciplinary innovation.

Northwestern, in short, carried the modernization process begun in the late 1940s several decisive steps farther in the late 1950s. It drastically reduced the level of specialization, increased liberal arts requirements and electives, integrated functional fields, incorporated mathematical and social science tools into business analysis, and rooted instruction firmly in cases to develop "gnostic skills and foster a managerial viewpoint. By the early 1960s, the main question that remained, and one that some began to ask insistently, was whether the business program had become so liberal and divorced from its roots that it had lost its distinctive vocational identity.

Large grants often determine, if they do not already reflect, educational priorities. Soon after the Gordon-Howell report appeared, Donham and the faculty became concerned that the nationwide ferment in graduate business instruction was passing Northwestern by, and that the School would soon lose its competitive advantage.

39 Richard Donham, "The Ford Foundation: Summary of Proposal," March 27, 1956, pp. 1-2, School of Business Records, Northwestern University Archives. After Ford denied Northwestern’s application for support for its noncompetitive graduate program, a candid discussion with Harvard’s Dean Donald David and representatives from the foundation led Donham to submit another proposal that capitalized on the stronger appeal of Northwestern’s celebrated undergraduate program.

40 About the only pedagogical effort subsidized by Ford that went strictly to business was the development of new case materials, an expensive undertaking. In the early 1960s, Northwestern rivaled Harvard as a producer of cases.
over more innovative institutions. Several faculty members had been discussing possible designs for a new M.B.A. program since 1957, quite aware that they "had done little to alter the focus of our present curriculum over the years" and that "several of the better graduate schools had or were in the process of developing substantially changed curricula." With the specific recommendations of Gordon and Howell before him, Donham urged fundamental reform along all the lines they suggested. Mere tinkering with the curriculum revised a decade earlier was not enough, Donham insisted. The need for high order, quantitative and scientific skills by managers had grown tremendously since then, as had the influence of external forces on business decisions. To train managers to cope with this new business world, it was essential to recruit students with broad liberal arts rather than narrow business backgrounds, to force them to spend two full years in advanced study, and to indoctrinate them into a managerial or "whole seeing" perspective that went "from the general to the particular" by "introducing the student to the position of the competitive firm as a whole before dealing with the particulars of the intracompany operations and activities."41

Northwestern's new M.B.A. program was introduced in the 1961-1962 academic year. Although less ideologically committed to management (or administration) as a distinct science, it strongly paralleled the curriculum introduced two years earlier at Michigan State. Northwestern's three-quarter sequence of Management of an Enterprise, I and II, and Business Policy and Administrative Action, were strikingly similar in conception and sequence to Michigan State's core requirement of Administration: Theory and Action, I and II, and Administration Policy. Both schools placed heavy stress on broadening students' understanding of environmental constraints on business options. Both placed considerable restrictions on course choice and limited specialization to approximately one-third of the curriculum, largely confined to the second study year (at Michigan State, the fourth or fifth quarter). Northwestern's program was more traditional than Michigan State's in requiring students to take formal introductory courses in all of the functional specialties, and to take separate courses in quantitative methods and business statistics (however, these were taught from a managerial perspective and utilized case materials). Northwestern's program, on the other hand, was more modern (i.e., more like what Gordon and Howell recommended) than Michigan State's in requiring two full years for the M.B.A., in stressing the importance of a cohort socialization experience (as at Harvard; Michigan State students could enter any quarter), and in recruiting the bulk of its students from the liberal arts (three-quarters of Michigan State's M.B.A. students continued to be undergraduate business majors).

All in all, though, the new M.B.A. programs at Northwestern and Michigan State were very close to one another in philosophy and design. This was also true, to a lesser extent, of the undergraduate programs, where the prerogatives of a private over a public university were more manifest. At the graduate level, Northwestern had to catch up to Michigan State, whereas at the undergraduate level, the positions were reversed. But the key point was the actual convergence of program philosophy and design in the early 1960s of institutions that had been very different from one another a decade earlier.

UCLA

Neil Jacoby returned to UCLA in 1955 from his leave at the Council of Economic Advisors with strong assurances from new UCLA Chancellor Raymond Allen that he would receive full support in expanding the graduate-level programs in business administration. Within months of Jacoby’s return, the Regents authorized creation of an entirely separate Graduate School of Business Administration, responsible only for the M.B.A., Ph.D., and executive programs. Plans were soon initiated to house the Graduate School separately and thereby further accentuate its identity as a graduate professional school. The old School of Business Administration remained responsible for the upper-division undergraduate program which, with well over 1,000 students, still dwarfed the new Graduate School in size. Nonetheless, Jacoby made it known immediately after his return that he intended to seek numerical parity for the graduate and undergraduate programs, to be achieved by quadrupling the graduate students and cutting back undergraduates by one-third. Jacoby’s proposal soon became enmeshed in complex negotiations and conflict with the School of Business at Berkeley and among the Regents; the outcome helped lay a groundwork for the famous California Master Plan in 1960. Suffice it to say that Jacoby eventually got his way: the principles of numerical parity and of administrative superordination of graduate over undergraduate business studies, were firmly established and institutionalized at UCLA by the end of the 1950s.

With the battles for status and separate structural identity won, Jacoby set out to realize fully his vision of a great business school. UCLA would become first and foremost an interdisciplinary, research-oriented professional school. Faculty would be

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42 See “A Comparison of the Long-Range Plans of Development of the Graduate Schools of Business Administration at Berkeley and Los Angeles,” Appendix B (“Significant Differences in Berkeley’s Ten Year Plan”), December 1, 1956, Archives, Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
hired and promoted less for their pedagogical skills than for their scholarly productivity in academic disciplines or functional business areas, and for their ability to guide Ph.D. students in original research. The individual professor would reign as king in his classroom; no one would tell him how or what to teach. While M.B.A. students would invariably outnumber Ph.D. students, the content of the M.B.A. program itself would devolve naturally from the Graduate School's research priorities.

None of this is to deny Jacoby's prime commitment to business administration as an *applied* discipline, or to the training of capable practitioners as the Graduate School's main goal. "The central aim of a graduate business school is the improvement of the management of the economy," Jacoby wrote. "In a free, competitive, enterprise society, the combined judgments of business managers probably constitute the greatest single influence upon the economic welfare of society." However, he argued, the nature of business problems had grown enormously complex in recent years, requiring

a variety of intellectual disciplines...to explain the efficient performance of the enterprise, its external administration as a human organization, and its role in the society of which it is a part.... Success in business is increasingly the result of risk-taking enterprise and innovation, backed by systematic intelligence about available technology, markets, finance, and people. The faculty of the Graduate School of Business Administration strives to understand and to influence these changes, and to transmit to mature students a systematic approach to business problem solving.⁴⁴

What the future business manager needed most, Jacoby believed, was precisely the kind of advanced training and orientation--"intellectual and personal attributes," he called them—that only a faculty that kept pushing back the boundaries of knowledge could provide.⁴⁵ In Jacoby's view, the nature of business administration as an applied discipline was such that, if pursued with intellectual rigor and kept up-to-date, academic and professional objectives were far more consonant than dissonant.

Jacoby's commitment in the late 1950s and early 1960s to accelerating the growth of a preeminent, research-oriented business school was reflected in his relative inattention to the structure of the B.S. and M.B.A. programs. During this period, both the undergraduate and master's level programs at Michigan State and Northwestern were thoroughly reformed. Specialization at both undergraduate and graduate levels was

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severely cut back, areas of specialization were reduced, core requirements were substantially increased, new synthetic courses became the centerpieces of the curriculum, and new pedagogical methods (especially cases and simulations) were systematically integrated into classroom presentations.

At UCLA, by contrast, the organization and pedagogy of undergraduate and master's level instruction remained quite traditional, although the substantive content changed significantly to incorporate the research interests of the faculty. Consider the M.B.A. program which, if anything, went in precisely the opposite direction from the programs at Michigan State and Northwestern. Michigan State and Northwestern sharply reduced the undergraduate business courses required to enter the M.B.A. program, required students to stay in the program either two or just under two years, and structured their programs primarily around elaborate core requirements rather than specialties. UCLA, on the other hand, still allowed students great freedom to specialize (twice as much as at Michigan State and Northwestern), readily accepted undergraduate business majors (much more than at Northwestern) and required only one year of advanced study for them, required students who were not undergraduate business majors to take fully ten introductory business courses during their first year of study, required no core courses until 1959, and limited the core (business economics and management, rather than new courses aimed at integration of skills and disciplines) to only one-quarter of the program. Moreover, the number of specialty fields at UCLA increased rather than decreased over time (reaching twelve in 1964). By then, students took their comprehensive exams only in their specialty fields rather than, as in earlier years, in several separate fields. In fact, M.B.A. candidates actually could specialize more in the early 1960s than they could under Jacoby's first curriculum revision in 1950.

Structural continuity, however, did not imply curricular stagnation. Far from it: Jacoby infused a managerial perspective and theoretical concerns into all of the traditional functional disciplines. He also added new fields as specialties that represented the most avant-garde thinking on how the social sciences and mathematics could be applied to solve business problems. So long as courses incorporated a sophisticated, up-to-date combination of theory and practice and were taught by accomplished scholars with solid disciplinary backgrounds (whether in academic or functional business areas), Jacoby was content to allow students considerable freedom to specialize according to their own lights, and not to impose upon them an elaborate core that synthesized vast bodies of knowledge into compact intellectual packages.

To the extent there was structural reform in business administration at UCLA, it centered on the elaboration of a research apparatus that would attract first-rate faculty,
nurture their creativity, and sustain and be sustained by an extensive doctoral program. Between 1956 and 1960, Jacoby advanced research possibilities for faculty and doctoral students in several critical ways. He built the doctoral program from a handful of students in the mid-1950s to well over one hundred by the mid-1960s, making it one of the largest doctoral programs in the country. He attracted such distinguished new senior faculty to UCLA as Jacob Marschak, George Steiner, and Leo Grebler. Jacoby set his priorities plainly and, as he had between 1945 and 1953, reached most goals with remarkable speed.

A foundation for business research at UCLA had preceded Jacoby's arrival. Following substantial labor violence during World War II, the California state legislature in 1945 had established the Institute of Industrial Relations at both the Berkeley and Los Angeles campuses. Devoted to "advancement of the public interest through objective study" and to "amicable relations among business managements, employees, and labor organizations," the Institute primarily provided graduate student support for research in personnel management and industrial relations (it also popularized the results of research via a pamphlet series). Research centered on such issues as labor market movement, union management relations, and labor law. Limited financially and in scope, the Institute did not allow Jacoby sufficient influence over its policies to serve as a model for expanding the research capacity of the Graduate Business School.

Somewhat similar, although larger in finances and scope, was the Bureau of Business and Economic Research (Southern Section), established by the Board of Regents at Jacoby's request in 1949 (the Northern Section at Berkeley had opened in 1941). Although Jacoby was instrumental in its founding, the Bureau was an independent agency run by an independent director (Professor Ralph Cassady of the Business School), who was responsible to the president of the university, and so was not under Jacoby's direct control. Jacoby also had to share general supervisory responsibilities over the Bureau with the Economics Department, which further diminished his influence. Like the Institute, the Bureau mainly provided funds for research assistants and covered related travel and statistical expenses. The modest budget supported research primarily on California and the Pacific area; typical publications dealt with such subjects as competition in retail gas distribution, the Pacific Coast maritime shipping industry, and the role of mergers in the growth of large firms. While the Bureau had freedom to seek outside funding to support research, Cassady was unsuccessful in doing so. Had Jacoby been able to gain complete administrative control over the Bureau, he would probably

46 Ibid, pp. 16-17.
47 Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 88, 148-149.
have been happy to work within the structural framework it provided to seek his own, more ambitious ends. As this was impossible, he felt compelled to develop another institutional base, running parallel to and overlapping the activities of the Bureau, in order to gain larger amounts of funding for faculty and students.

During his first few years at UCLA, Jacoby was also instrumental in convincing the legislature to support a program of real estate research subsidized by license fees paid by real estate brokers. This program would eventually become a major source of original scholarship as the Southern California land market boomed in the 1950s and 1960s. Of a different nature but equally important in providing precedents for later expansion, Jacoby gained substantial financial support from the Navy, which established the Management Sciences Research Project in 1951. The project conducted basic research on production scheduling, dealing with such subjects as electronic simulation of production systems, applications of linear programming, and the mathematical theory of job-shop production scheduling. During this time period, Jacoby worked closely with The Rand Corporation to advance theoretical understanding of management processes in defense organizations. Thus, well before he returned from Washington and established a separate Graduate School, Jacoby had worked diligently to give business research a solid institutional base at UCLA. He could cite a long list of publications to demonstrate his faculty's commitment and skill at basic and applied business research.

By the time Jacoby returned to UCLA from the Council of Economic Advisors in 1955, the Ford Foundation's plan to transform American management education was well underway. Ford had already contributed more money to sustain business faculty research at UCLA than at any other public university, although the amount would appear to be relatively modest in retrospect. Jacoby had been close personal friends for years with the key administrator of Ford's program--Thomas Carroll. It was hardly surprising, then--given foundations' inclination to build on strength, and the fact that Ford was then "shopping" for innovative business programs to serve as nationwide exemplars--that Ford asked Jacoby late in 1955 to submit a proposal to advance UCLA's graduate program in business. Jacoby responded in February, 1956, by asking for $615,000 to establish a fluid research fund to support the research of doctoral students and to allow faculty to hire them as research assistants, to begin a summer research program to bring in innovative junior faculty from other campuses, and to expand the management science research which the Business School had been conducting for the Navy. Ford approved the fluid research fund ($150,000) and the summer research program (amount uncertain), but rejected the suggestion for merely expanding ongoing, Navy-supported research. UCLA was not planning boldly enough, Ford told Jacoby, in seeking to develop mathematical and statistical methods to apply to all variety of
business problems. 48 Ford made known its readiness to support a more elaborate and expensive program at UCLA, in part because of a major new development in 1956 that transpired during the course of its deliberations on Jacoby’s initial proposal.

Shortly after Jacoby’s return to UCLA, IBM began to discreetly publicize its intention to establish two major data processing centers at universities in the west and east (recall that although still rudimentary by today’s standards, computers were then enormous in size and very expensive). IBM’s prime objective was to train an elite corps of young people who could use electronic data processing and demonstrate its potential to employers. IBM quickly chose M.I.T. as its east coast site, with the emphasis on cultivating budding young scientists. On the west coast, a scramble soon ensued among leading universities to house the proposed data processing center. Stanford and USC fought hard for the center, arguing in part that a private corporation was obliged to support private rather than public institutions of higher education. But Jacoby succeeded in gaining the personal confidence of Thomas Watson, Jr., son of IBM’s founder, and was successful in getting the center placed at the Graduate School of Business in order to cultivate budding young executives. 49

The financial package was quite attractive. IBM agreed to pay half the cost of erecting a new building to house the center ($800,000), to furnish the building, to install the most advanced computing equipment available (Type 709 Data Processing System), and to provide complete maintenance—a several million dollar offer for the price of one half of a new building. UCLA was suddenly thrust into preeminence for its potential for developing management as a quantitative science. The Ford Foundation, observing these developments in mid-1956, decided that UCLA’s initial proposal failed to capitalize on its new quantitative potential, and consequently asked Jacoby to elaborate his proposal accordingly.

With the fluid research funds from Ford in house and the promise of dramatic expansion of the School’s already considerable research capacity, Jacoby decided to create his own research unit with a director responsible only to him. 50 In July, 1956, he created (with a modest grant from the Board of Regents) the Division of Research and appointed George Steiner as its director. Its principal object, Jacoby unabashedly

48 Ibid, pp. 156, 183.
49 Ibid., pp. 150-155. Interestingly, one member of the Board of Regents objected to IBM’s offer on the grounds that it would give IBM unfair competitive advantage over other computer manufacturers. Jacoby responded that he would be happy to accept comparable offers from any and all computer manufacturers.
50 Ibid, pp. 148-149.
declared, was "to remove restraints upon and expand the opportunities for the fullest expression of research which the interests and time of the faculty permit." More specifically, the Division of Research aimed "to acquire the resources necessary to permit the faculty...to devote one-quarter of its time to full-time research in addition to the part-time research carried over jointly with teaching activities.... This means that the goal is to permit each member of the faculty to spend every fourth year—or fourth semester—solely on research. The Division would only sponsor research that was of a "basic and developmental nature," and would invest much of its resources in providing research assistants for faculty. The Division assumed responsibility for the initial $150,000 grant from Ford, and had transferred to it the Navy-supported Management Sciences Research Project. Soon after, the real estate research program was turned over to it. The Division became the base for all future research-related initiatives at the Graduate School, and would soon regularly garner several hundred thousand dollars per year.

In 1958, Jacoby sought further to legitimize and publicize his faculty's work by creating a professional journal. The initiative for the California Management Review was entirely Jacoby's, although to be politic he gained concurrence and joint oversight from the Business School at Berkeley. At the time, there were no professional journals in management, economics, or industrial relations published on the west coast. Jacoby resented the fact that Californians had always to send their research east for publication. Moreover, he freely observed, "there was the more practical consideration that many able young men in our faculty were producing good papers that didn't find an outlet. We should have our own journal so that the world could know more about the work that was going on here." The California Management Review premiered in 1958 and soon became, as Jacoby anticipated, a journal of national reputation that particularly spotlighted the original work of his own faculty.

After extensive reconsideration and planning, Jacoby and his faculty resubmitted their proposal to Ford to establish a Western Management Science Institute at UCLA. Ford had been consistently generous to Jacoby, replenishing the original fluid research fund and expanding the number of doctoral fellowships UCLA could offer to attract first-rate students. But Ford had also been generous to others, notably Stanford, and it was clear that Stanford would be competing for the same Ford money. With the opening of the Western Data Processing Center, however, Jacoby had good cause for confidence. In 1959, Ford awarded the Institute to UCLA and provided $1.6 million (Jacoby had

51 UCLA, Graduate School of Business Administration, Announcements, 1957-1958, p. 15.
52 Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 171-172.
requested only $1.3 million) for its operation. As with the IBM gift, UCLA had certain responsibilities to business schools elsewhere in California and the west, but leadership and the vast majority of monies were UCLA's alone to distribute. Housed in the Division of Research, the Western Management Science Institute was designed to support basic research by business faculty and graduate students (at other campuses as well as UCLA), to offer short courses to increase understanding of computers, to facilitate the use of the Western Data Processing Center by other campuses, to bring in distinguished visiting professors on a regular basis, and to operate scholarly seminars and conferences. The only constraint Jacoby faced in accepting the Institute was his promise to Ford to appoint a suitably distinguished person to direct it (to be paid out of UCLA rather than Ford funds). This Jacoby did by attracting the world-famous econometrician, Jacob Marschak, to UCLA from Yale.

The Marschak appointment in 1961 culminated the extraordinarily successful effort Jacoby had launched in 1955 to build up the graduate program in business administration. As in his initial tenure as dean between 1948 and 1953, he moved UCLA a quantum leap forward in academic prestige and research capability. By the early 1960s he had more than doubled his tenured faculty from a decade earlier, through promotion and distinguished acquisitions; he had more than tripled his full professors, nearly all of whom were brought in or promoted for their ability as disciplinary-based researchers rather than as teachers. An ample supply of assistantships were available from the various research institutes to support doctoral students, plus a variety of outright fellowships. Jacoby, in sum, had taken a very different but no less successful path from Seelye and Donham to achieve high academic status for business education. At both Michigan State and Northwestern, the reform emphasis was on curriculum and pedagogy per se, whereas at UCLA, the emphasis was on building faculty and allowing curricula mostly to care for themselves. Said another way: at UCLA, curriculum innovation was primarily derivative from research rather than a separately-conceived undertaking. Jacoby was doubtless confident that course content at UCLA met the spirit of the Gordon-Howell report, even if the organization of the undergraduate and M.B.A. programs did not conform precisely to their ideal.

V. DENOUEMENT: UNDERGRADUATE BUSINESS EDUCATION
AND PROFESSIONAL IDEALS

By the early 1960s, the philosophy, organization, content, and pedagogy of undergraduate and graduate business education at Michigan State, Northwestern, and

53 UCLA, Graduate School of Business Administration, Announcement, 1960-1961, pp. 18-19.
UCLA had been dramatically transformed. The impact of the Gordon-Howell and Pie:son reports on these three institutions was not so much to stimulate change as it was to order, legitimate, and advance momentum for the changes that were already underway. The foundation reports provided the field with a new sense of collective purpose and of professional cohesiveness, bolstering the nascent autonomy of management education on the American academic scene.

While the foundation reports did not actually cause change in postwar business education, they did establish a loose set of criteria by which to gauge an institution's commitment to modernist ideas. The criterion that gave administrators and faculty the greatest anxiety in the early 1960s involved the future of undergraduate business education. It was not that the foundation reports spoke dogmatically on the issue—even Gordon and Howell, who were the most critical, saw a limited future role for a modernized undergraduate curriculum. Still, the foundation reports left little doubt that the future of management as a profession rested almost entirely on the shoulders of graduate programs. Energy and resources devoted to undergraduates would add nothing to the profession's academic credibility or practical utility.

At Michigan State, as explained earlier, Dean Seelye had initially entertained hopes of eliminating the undergraduate program entirely. It soon became clear, however, that the program's huge enrollments and the university's historic role as Michigan's premier public service educational institution made abolition politically untenable. By the mid-1960s, despite the stiffening of program requirements, undergraduate business enrollments began to climb steadily. Within a few years, they reached new peaks. This development went in precisely the opposite direction from the recommendation of the foundation reports. It also threatened to sap reserves from the fledgling graduate program, and heightened fears that the university's public service traditions might prove incompatible with a professional curriculum that eschewed vocationalism in favor of "administrative science."

The educational reform process at Northwestern and UCLA had been more gradual than at Michigan State. Deans Donham and Jacoby had had time to test the degree of central administration support for their ongoing efforts at self-transformation. When the foundation reports appeared, Donham was in the midst of revamping and investing substantial faculty resources in the undergraduate curriculum. Jacoby, on the other hand, was seeking to reduce undergraduate enrollments and redirect faculty resources toward graduate education and research. Events in the early 1960s that spelled disappointment for Donham at Northwestern marked the culmination of Jacoby's long-term reform agenda at UCLA.
Between 1956, when Donham submitted a $500,000 grant application to the Ford Foundation to develop Northwestern as an exemplar of undergraduate business education, and 1960, when the grant ran out, undergraduate enrollments dropped from 889 to 686, a decline of 23 percent. Two years later, enrollments fell to 637. However hard the faculty worked to modernize the program, Northwestern's undergraduates were choosing to delay professional education in business until their post-baccalaureate years. Donham supported various promotional strategies to stem the decline; none worked. Donham nonetheless pleaded in 1963 that the program be retained, especially in light of the School's recent large investment of time and resources in it.\(^{54}\)

Donham resigned the deanship in 1964. The future of the undergraduate program remained unresolved until his successor, John Barr, former CEO of Montgomery Ward, took over in June, 1965. Barr wanted the issue quickly resolved. The key question, he argued, was "whether Northwestern's School of Business can make its greatest contribution to the profession of business management by continuing to divide its efforts between undergraduate and graduate work, or whether we should concentrate all the talent and resources we can muster at the graduate level with the objective of achieving outstanding excellence as a graduate school of business administration." Barr concluded that despite faculty loyalty to the tradition of a strong undergraduate business school, "this was a practical, hard-headed educational-business question, not an emotional issue."\(^{55}\) It was not difficult to infer that the new dean was more favorably disposed to terminating the undergraduate program than his predecessor.

In the Fall, Barr took two key steps to speed the decisionmaking process. First, he appointed a faculty committee to consider the status of the undergraduate program, and assigned Ralph Westfall, a champion of graduate business education, to head it. Second, he organized a Business Advisory Council composed of leading Chicago executives (chaired by James L. Allen of Booz-Allen and Hamilton) and asked them to judge the advisability of abolishing the undergraduate program.

Both groups reported the following Spring and strongly advised discontinuing undergraduate studies. Northwestern was not alone among private universities in experiencing enrollment decline, the Business Advisory Council explained. To keep pace with national trends, the School of Business had little choice but to concentrate its energies and resources on graduate education. The Westfall committee acknowledged

\(^{54}\) Faculty Minutes, School of Business, Northwestern University, January 16, 1963.

\(^{55}\) Ibid, June 2, 1965.
that Northwestern’s withdrawal would harm the national standing of undergraduate business programs. Nonetheless, it saw

no compelling reason why the undergraduate program must be continued beyond that of continuing an illustrious tradition. Change is the major characteristic of the times, and the School of Business must be prepared to change to keep up with developments in the field. If Northwestern is to maintain the same position of leadership in business education in the future that it has in the past, the Committee believes it must move aggressively to strengthen its graduate program and its research activity. This is a challenge that can be met only with a major effort. To fail in it could well mean to slip into the mass of mediocre business schools.56

Moreover, the committee added,

Northwestern University is now generally putting more emphasis on graduate education and pioneering research. Similar emphasis on the part of the School of Business will apparently be viewed with favor by the University Administration, making it more feasible for the School to operate effectively within the University environment.57

The undergraduate program had many staunch defenders among faculty and alumni. "Why throw out a good program to ‘try a pig in a poke?’" queried one skeptic. Unlike the students portrayed in the Gordon and Howell report, undergraduate business majors at Northwestern were excellent, argued another. Their average math scores were only second to students at Northwestern’s Technological Institute, and their verbal scores ranked third in the university. If the School of Business was undistinguished for its research, it was because of heavy teaching loads and inadequate research facilities, rather than an undergraduate program per se. Along similar lines, other faculty members asked whether the central administration really believed that undergraduate studies were to blame for the Business School’s modest research record. "If emphasis is to be on research," observed one professor (perhaps facetiously), "why not discard the Professional

56 Ad Hoc Committee on Undergraduate Program, "Future of Undergraduate Program," School of Business, Northwestern University, March 23, 1966, p. 5.
57 Ibid.
M.B.A. degree (since the professional objective is not compatible with research) and keep the U.G. and Ph.D.?"58

In May, 1966, in secret ballot, the faculty voted two-to-one to abolish undergraduate business education at Northwestern. Dean Barr expressed pleasure in the decision, observing that "the growing complexities of business management and the changing environment of business operations are increasing the importance of business education at the graduate level.... We can undoubtedly do a better educational job and make a greater contribution to business education and to all of society by concentrating our limited resources on one program rather than spreading them over two programs."59

Beyond these instrumental considerations, though, lay the symbolic importance of the decision. Northwestern's administration, faculty, and executive advisors believed that the sacrifice of the undergraduate program was an essential preliminary step to launching Northwestern into the top rank of graduate business schools. "With very few exceptions, the prestige schools of business are graduate schools," observed the Westfall committee. "Rightly or wrongly, there is a prestige that goes with a graduate school of business and an assumption, probably correct, that the average graduate student is a better student than the average undergraduate."60 A bright future required a sharp break with the past, Northwestern's leadership believed, and a bold statement for all in the field to see that Northwestern had committed itself wholly to the modern mode in business education.

If the abolition of Northwestern's undergraduate program was a controversial, emotion-laden decision that symbolized new beginnings, UCLA's decision to abolish its undergraduate program was a death knell for a foregone conclusion. From the beginning of his tenure as dean in the 1940s, Neil Jacoby had worked steadily to subordinate undergraduate to graduate studies. First, in 1950 he had integrated the undergraduate College of Business into a new School of Business with professional study at B.A. and M.B.A. levels, and had limited the undergraduate program to upperclassmen. Then, in 1955 he had isolated undergraduates entirely from graduate students by creating a separate Graduate School of Business. During the late 1950s, his energies went primarily into refashioning the M.B.A., Ph.D., and executive programs, and into building the Graduate School's research capacity. He frankly expressed his intention to cut back undergraduate enrollments so that they would not sap resources from the Graduate

58 Faculty Meeting, April 13, 1966, "Undergraduate Division," Notes by H.B. Rogers, p. 2.
59 John A. Barr to All Alumni of the School of Business, June 10, 1966.
60 Ad Hoc Committee, op. cit., p. 4.
School. If the state of California wanted to offer business education to undergraduates, he argued, it should do so at the state colleges rather than at the universities. With his associate dean, George Robbins, Jacoby believed that "The prestige and influence of the University are generated mainly by the number of M.B.A. and Ph.D. graduate students it sends both to top managerial positions in California business and to the faculties of the state and private colleges of California. It is not to an important extent correlated with the number of alumni holding bachelor's degrees."61

While Jacoby felt that undergraduate business education could no longer be conducted at a high enough level to meet the needs of modern-day business executives, he, like Seelye at Michigan State, was constrained by the university's public service traditions from proposing its outright abolition. Nor could Jacoby afford to be cavalier about the needs of UCLA undergraduates who chose to major in business. Until the Graduate School became sufficiently recognized that it could draw from a large national pool of applicants, it would continue to recruit disproportionately from UCLA (although not only from business majors). Jacoby also knew that undergraduates provided income and teaching experience for his growing cadre of doctoral students (particularly important before the infusion of fellowships and research assistantships in the late 1950s and early 1960s), and that the undergraduate program subsidized the more expensive graduate offerings.62 Throughout the 1950s, Jacoby consequently upgraded entrance and graduation requirements (including high-level mathematical skills), integrated new management concepts and methods into coursework, eliminated or transformed largely vocational courses (especially in accounting), and, to a limited extent, sponsored development of cases for undergraduate use.

In 1959, UCLA's Academic Senate Committee on Educational Policy was asked to evaluate specific charges (source unknown) that the undergraduate business program suffered from undue course proliferation and excessive occupational curricula. The Committee's evaluation was highly positive. Undergraduate course requirements, it concluded, stood up quite well in comparison to other business schools and other university divisions.63 "Curricula which have intellectual substance and educational

61 George Robbins to Chancellor Raymond B. Allen, April 11, 1957.
62 "Educational Policy and Program Report for the Graduate and Undergraduate Schools of Business Administration, Los Angeles," May 21, 1957.
63 "Report of the Committee on Educational Policy, Southern Section, on the School of Business Administration on the Los Angeles Campus," January 19, 1959.
breadth do not become illegitimate merely because they prepare students for business careers.\textsuperscript{64}

This praise notwithstanding, Jacoby still saw no future for the undergraduate program. In the late 1950s, two new developments held out potential for making the abolition of undergraduate business education politically feasible. First, in 1958 two members of the Board of Regents expressed to Jacoby their willingness to support exclusive attention to graduate-level business education at UCLA. Second, the publication in 1960 of the California Master Plan for Higher Education placed high priority on graduate business education at UCLA, and none on the undergraduate program.\textsuperscript{65} Prospects for abolition were further enhanced by a significant and surprising decline in undergraduate business enrollments, from 1,060 in 1957 to 674 in 1961.\textsuperscript{66} The sharp enrollment decrease (similar to that occurring at Northwestern at the same time) had the effect—in order to assure minimal staffing of courses—of retaining a disproportionate share of faculty resources in undergraduate education at a time when Jacoby, the central administration, and the Regents all desired the opposite result.\textsuperscript{67}

In 1962, Jacoby established a Planning Committee to examine recent enrollment trends and recommend appropriate changes in undergraduate course offerings. The Committee surveyed current and recent students and found that the undergraduate program served a local clientele composed mainly of junior college transfers. Oriented primarily to accounting, few continued their education beyond the bachelor’s degree. The Planning Committee also noted that several nearby colleges offered AACSB accredited business programs, and that recently-imposed Academic Senate constraints on graduate student teaching reduced the undergraduate program’s teaching laboratory function. Before the Committee even finished its deliberations, Jacoby decided that the time was ripe to abolish an anachronism. "After long consideration," he wrote to UCLA Chancellor Franklin Murphy, "I have come to the conclusion, reached by the [Planning] Committee, that it will be in the best interests of the Graduate School to terminate the Undergraduate Program.... I now believe that more is to be gained than lost by confining our activities to graduate instruction (including executive education) and

\textsuperscript{64} "Planning Paper #2," 1962, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{65} "Planning Paper #1, 1962, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{66} It was suggested at the time that this precipitous drop in enrollment derived in large measure from rumors that the undergraduate program would soon be abolished. The decline was unusual among public universities
\textsuperscript{67} UCLA, Graduate School of Business Administration, Annual Report, 1962-63, Section IV, p. 5.
research, provided that the administration and the Board of Regents will not reduce its budgetary support of our operations as a result of the change.\footnote{George Robbins to Planning Development Committee July 2, 1962, "Planning and Development Committee Report," Extra Cc-ies, #13-14.}

Some faculty were apprehensive about the change, mainly because they feared loss of revenue. The great majority, however, were strongly supportive, as were other faculties on the UCLA campus. Before the Board of Regents voted on Jacoby's proposal, he decided to support a compromise to satisfy those who felt that future businessmen ought to have an appropriate undergraduate curriculum of their own. He suggested conversion of business studies from a professional to a liberal arts curriculum, with the focus on business as a key social institution of Western society. A faculty committee formulated a "business institutions" undergraduate major, much like other UCLA majors in "social institutions" and "political institutions." However, UCLA's College of Letters and Sciences rejected Jacoby's proposition outright. Jacoby felt he now had no choice but to abandon undergraduates entirely (save for offering a few basic courses in accounting and statistics to graduate students in which undergraduates could also enroll). After obtaining assurances from Chancellor Murphy that his budget would not be reduced, Jacoby announced the abolition of the undergraduate School of Business Administration in 1965.\footnote{"Planning Paper #3," 1962, pp. 2, 4; Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 223-226.} It had taken 17 years, but he had at last achieved what few other spokespersons for reform had thought was possible within the parameters of a public university.

VI. POSTSCRIPT

NOTE TO THE READER

The data currently available to us for charting patterns of development at Michigan State, Northwestern, and UCLA from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s are not nearly comparable to those for earlier time periods. Before we can seriously continue this line of research, we will need to obtain substantial new documentation and supplement archival data with oral history interviews with key participants. What follows are brief sketches of broad developmental patterns based on scattered data. Although presented in narrative format, the sketches are better understood as a series of working hypotheses that may well need substantial revision after more thorough research. Their primary purpose is to indicate potentially fruitful lines of inquiry for extending the analysis to the present.
Dramatic changes in the purpose and organization of American business education in the 1950s and early 1960s had proceeded on two key, largely implicit assumptions. First was the belief that the development of management as a scholarly discipline would almost invariably benefit business practice. Second was the belief that the scientific study of management could be effectively taught in business schools. Neither of these assumptions had been seriously challenged or tested prior to widespread implementation. Both exemplified the euphoria which accompanied the reform movement in the postwar era. Business schools were freer than they had ever been to set their own education agendas and to court academic legitimacy.

Autonomy in graduate professional education has, historically, often carried a price. "Almost every professional program seems to want to establish itself as a graduate specialty," observe Christopher Jencks and David Riesman in their classic analysis of American higher education, *The Academic Revolution* (1968). "This enhances the status of the program and those who teach in it, and it also makes the profession as a whole more exclusive and prestigious." However, they note, the pursuit of academic legitimacy can endanger professional allegiance and vocational relevance. As administrators of professional schools "look across the street instead of into their students' futures, they become more concerned with the 'broad' academic and quasi-academic skills they all value in common, less concerned with the 'narrow' professional skills that set them apart from one another and from the university as a whole."70

By the early 1960s, Michigan State, Northwestern, and UCLA had all cast their fates—in somewhat different ways, to be sure—with the scientific approach to management as the path to academic legitimacy and to professional relevance. Inherent tensions between these objectives, of the kind observed by Jencks and Riesman, did not give leaders in the field much pause in the 1950s and early 1960s. It remained to be seen whether experience in the classroom would temper the enthusiasm, or add new momentum to the reform movement in management education.

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MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

In a series of bold strokes, Dean Alfred Seelye and his faculty had modernized management education at Michigan State. Purely descriptive coursework in specific industries and business functions had given way to highly conceptual, analytic, action-oriented pedagogy, and to elaborate consideration of environmental influences on business operations. Unregulated specialization had been replaced by comprehensive core curriculum requirements. Although still substantially outnumbered by the huge undergraduate program, graduate studies had acquired distinct identity, academic legitimacy, and national recognition. Particularly among public universities, Michigan State was a bold exemplar of the modernist ideas sanctioned by the Gordon-Howell report.

It proved more difficult, however, to sustain than to introduce a radical new program, particularly at the M.B.A. level, where the changes had been most dramatic. Not that the program lacked clientele: full-time M.B.A. candidates more than tripled from under 200 in the early 1960s to over 600 by 1967. But as the program expanded in size, so too did pressure to reintroduce a vocational orientation and to soften curricular commitment to "administrative science" and the ecological context.

Our data are inadequate to locate precise sources of discontent—whether from students, faculty, central university administration, employers, or some other source or combination of sources—or to say whether discontent centered mainly on matters of design or of implementation. Only four years after Seelye’s initial curricular innovations, though, major changes occurred which placed obstacles before those seeking to protect and extend the revisionist movement.

By 1965, four of the five "elective core" courses (students had to take three) were eliminated as requirements. Included among these were Frontiers of Business, Business and Public Policy, and International Business. The result was to downgrade the modernist notion that to be effective, future managers had to become far more sensitive than in the past to factors external to plant operations. At the same time, the opportunity for major field specialization was expanded 25 percent (to 24 credits out of a total of 53). We do not mean to exaggerate the significance of these changes. Curriculum innovations always require fine-tuning, and Michigan State's M.B.A. program was obviously very different from the entirely specialized, three-quarters long M.A. program Seelye had inherited upon assuming the deanship. Still, in the changes of 1965 two key components of the modernist philosophy—curtailing specialization and incorporating concern for ecological factors—were seriously compromised.
That dissatisfaction and disagreement regarding Michigan State's M.B.A. program ran deep became increasingly evident toward the end of the 1960s, as the faculty once again contemplated major changes. At the request of a standing policy review committee, Dean Seelye appointed a special Ad Hoc Committee in 1967 to reevaluate the entire M.B.A. program. The review, which took two full years to complete, was extraordinarily detailed and comprehensive. Committee members met extensively with faculty, with current students, recent graduates and older alumni, with large employers of the School's M.B.A.s, and with local executives who served on the School's recently-appointed Business Advisory Council. They also visited Harvard, M.I.T., Columbia, Carnegie Tech, Michigan, Purdue, Indiana, Chicago, Stanford, and UCLA to compare experiences with faculties of other leading business schools. By the time the Committee reported its recommendations for program change in 1969, Dean Seelye had decided to leave Michigan State to enter private business. Kullervo Louhi, head of the School's accounting department, replaced him as dean.

What perhaps most distinguished the Ad Hoc Committee's report in 1969 from the report of the Core Curriculum Study Committee in 1958 was the absence of systematic attention to "administrative science" as the theoretical foundationstone of M.B.A. studies. To be sure, the Committee stated that "the major locus of the program should be administrative decisionmaking"--a goal quite consistent with the original Seelye design--and emphasized the program's intent to "prepare students for future leadership roles rather than for immediate jobs." Still, the entire flavor of the report was different. The Committee strove less to provide an innovative and integrative curriculum philosophy than to accommodate different departmental interest groups and overcome problems in implementation that had seriously compromised the program's workability, coherence, and rationale.

Two implementation problems stood out. First was that the new, expanded M.B.A. program was drawing (by design) more students who had not majored in business or economics as undergraduates, and who therefore lacked basic tools and concepts to function at an advanced level in the core curriculum. The Committee met this problem by developing (under Graduate School auspices) an accelerated eight course, two-quarter, "precore" sequence to acquaint liberal arts students with basics in accounting, quantitative methods, management theory, marketing, and economics so that they could fairly compete with undergraduate business majors. The "precore" would extend the customary time for completing the M.B.A. program to two years, although

students who could demonstrate by prior coursework or examination competence in any or all of the "precore" could still earn their degree in four quarters.

The second implementation problem was of a different order. Not only was it less easily resolvable, but it raised issues that went to the heart of the program's philosophy. In centering the M.B.A. on a core curriculum grounded in "administrative science," Seelye had presumed that it was possible to transcend the departmental organization of subject matter in order to achieve broader pedagogical objectives. Such innovative courses as Administration: Theory and Action, I and II, Administrative Research Methods, or even Administrative Control had no obvious or single departmental home. But the realities of curriculum implementation required that the core (as well as the original "elective core") courses have individual departmental bases. The result, according to the Ad Hoc Committee, was that broad pedagogical objectives had been sacrificed to existing departmental needs, abilities, and prerogatives. "Coordinating course offerings across departmental lines" had proved very difficult, the Committee observed. "Some of the core courses, since they are housed in departments, were inverted to meet departmental capabilities and focuses [sic] rather than being taught according [sic] to serve the total M.B.A. program." New means had to be developed, the Committee urged, to integrate and coordinate core courses "to insure methods of maintaining the integrity of courses that cut across departmental lines," and to sequence coursework so as to make the program more intellectually coherent.72

The new M.B.A. program recommended by the Ad Hoc Committee represented an intriguing effort to revitalize portions of Seelye's original vision regarding the business-society interface, while sacrificing other elements regarding the integration of subject matter. The Committee called for a three-course requirement dealing with business-society relations. One course would examine private pressure groups (like labor unions), a second would study government-corporate relations, and a third would explore the international context of modern business operations. This recommendation would predictably prove controversial, as the faculty had voted in 1965 to eliminate a similar required course sequence.

Several of the Committee's other recommendations went in directions significantly different from the M.B.A.'s initial design. Most importantly, the Committee recommended separate required courses in marketing and finance. This represented a sharp break from the original effort to submerge instruction in traditional business functions into integrative, general courses in "administrative science." The

72 Ibid, pp. 4-5.
Committee also eliminated the intellectual lynchpin of the M.B.A. core—the two-course sequence in administrative theory and practice—and replaced it with two separately organized courses on executive behavior and organizational theory.

All in all, the Committee's recommendations—which also called for reducing credits devoted to specialization from 24 to 20—represented a compromise between modernist and traditionalist views on management education. Clearly, no one was advocating a return to the program of the pre-Seelye era. Equally clearly, though, the great enthusiasm that had surrounded the introduction of the original M.B.A. program was very much on the wane.

The Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations for curricular reform were acted upon in time for the 1971 school year. The one significant change in implementation was telling: rather than a required three-course sequence on the business-society interface, students were required to take only one of six possible "elective core" courses dealing with ecological factors. Concern for the environment in which business operated remained almost as tangential to the M.B.A. curriculum in 1971 as it had been before Seelye arrived in the late 1950s. And the new core, while featuring several interdisciplinary and case-oriented courses, was far more rooted in traditional business functions than it had been initially. At a time when other business schools were expanding their commitment to modernist ideas in management education, Michigan State appears to have chosen to consolidate recent innovations and, to some extent, to retrench.73

NORTHWESTERN

Northwestern's decision in 1966 to eliminate its undergraduate program left scars that would take time to heal. Protest meetings and petitions to the faculty deplored the "assassination of the undergraduate program." The editor of the Business School newspaper wryly noted that "a defunct school is not exactly a good recommendation for the education we received."74 Dean Barr sent a lengthy letter to alumni, many of whom had expressed concern about rumors that the undergraduate program might be eliminated. Elaborating the chronology and reasoning behind the decision, Barr assured them that

73 On the basis of the minimal data currently available to us, we are unable to discern significant additional changes in Michigan State's program or philosophy until the very end of the 1970s, although pressures for further vocationalization of the curriculum appear to have been considerable.
the School of Business is not being discontinued. To the contrary, the sole objective is to maintain and strengthen the School's position of leadership in business education over the years ahead. You are Alumni of the School of Business, not of a particular program within the School.... If we are correct in our opinion that this decision will permit the School to improve its position of leadership in business education, then the prestige of your degree will continue to increase in the years to come.\footnote{John A. Barr to All Alumni, op. cit.}

In turning his exclusive attention to the graduate program, Barr took seriously the admonition of James L. Allen and the Business Advisory Council that Northwestern plan boldly for the future. "To establish just another graduate school of business mirroring efforts already in existence," the Council had forewarned, would hardly justify the enormous intellectual and financial commitments involved in implementing this decision. We, therefore, would urge the University to accept the challenge to use this opportunity for creating a concept of education for management, for the development of teachers of management, and for the conduct of worthwhile research in management disciplines, not necessarily limited to business management, worthy of a great institution of higher learning.\footnote{Ibid.}

The Council's recommendation became the starting point of intense deliberations during the late 1960s. The concept of broadening the Business School's scope to include management in general was certainly not alien to Northwestern. Indeed, it represented a logical extension of the Gordon-Howell report and of the premises that underlay Northwestern's major revision of the M.B.A. curriculum in 1961. Certainly Dean Donham would have agreed with the conclusion, reached by an Educational Planning Committee appointed by Dean Barr in 1967, that "management has now become something of a science of its own," with identifiable analytic techniques for setting goals, planning missions, conducting operations, and controlling resources and results in a wide variety of complex organizations.\footnote{Educational Planning Committee, op. cit., p. 2.}
What separated the thinking of Barr and the Business Advisory Council in the late 1960s from that of Donham a decade earlier were, first, a confident, widely-shared belief that a scientific approach to management had progressed farther in business schools than in other academic departments or professional schools; second, a recognition that public demand for trained managers in nonbusiness as well as business settings was on the rise and would surely expand in the future; and third, a desire to tap large amounts of newly-available federal research and training grants in education, social work, health, public administration, and other fields for which faculty submitting applications from a narrowly-focused business school would not be competitive.

The factors boded well for the academic credibility, marketability, and financial viability of the management school concept. Having terminated its undergraduate program, Northwestern was in a propitious position to move rapidly toward the creation of such a school. The university, moreover, had no existing programs in health or public administration whose vested interests might interfere with the creation of similar programs in a separate school of management.

While generally enthusiastic, the Business School faculty acknowledged the existence of likely implementation problems in converting a school of business into a school of management. First, even if one gained consensus from all participating business and nonbusiness fields that certain generic principles underlay management of all types, the construction and integration of a single curriculum to produce omnicompetent managers would inevitably occasion considerable debate. Second, nonbusiness faculties would surely be suspicious of the imperialist ambitions of the larger, dominant business school group. At Northwestern this problem seemed most likely to arise in education, whose faculty would be wary of the threat posed to their own independent programs and research prospects in areas of overlapping interest. Third, there was no established clientele for a management, as opposed to a business, school. Northwestern ran the risk of alienating traditional business students without knowing whether prospective managers for the nonbusiness sector might prefer other, less generically-conceived career paths.

Fourth, there was potential conflict in mixing students with different career motivations. Would students preparing for business careers be willing to study general management problems in the context of government, health, or educational problems? Would students imbued with self-sacrificing, public service ideals feel comfortable with those stimulated mainly by prospects of pecuniary gain? Fifth, there was concern that professional traditions in nonbusiness areas might impede the hiring of students trained in a generic management program. This was of particular concern in education where,
in the past, advancement to top managerial posts had proved almost impossible without a doctoral degree and vertical career movement through the K-12 school system.

Sixth and finally, it was unknown whether a graduate program in management could build loyalty to the field of management per se. "No field has such allegiance until it has become established and shown itself to be of significance," Dean Barr's Educational Planning Committee observed. "If the field of management is becoming a science in itself, there would seem to be no reason that loyalty to it could not be developed in the future. On the other hand, it can be argued that loyalty tends to be associated with institutions as much as with concepts, and that a manager's loyalty is going to tend to relate to the institution in which he is working and not to his area of expertise."

Potential problems notwithstanding, Northwestern’s Graduate School of Business was converted into the Graduate School of Management in September, 1969. New degree programs were created in hospital and health services management, public management, and educational management, and the Master of Management degree replaced the M.B.A. Implementation of the three new programs, however, proved far more difficult than anticipated. Staffing moved slowly; qualified personnel had to be recruited to assist in the planning and administration of fields unfamiliar to most members of the faculty. Further, the specter raised by some faculty about lack of cooperation from other parts of the university materialized; faculty in the social sciences, the medical school, the engineering departments, and other disciplines indeed felt threatened and had to be assured that the management school was not attempting to intrude and weaken their domains. As Vice-President Payson Wild cautioned Dean Barr, "Alarm bells will be ringing all over the place" if the management faculty were given too much autonomy and discretion in the development of courses historically unrelated to business administration. Only by carefully cultivating the support of faculty in related disciplines and by arranging a number of joint appointments, was Barr able to prevent what might have become a serious imbroglio. Not until Fall, 1971, though, did the hospital and health services and the public management programs become operational, and the education management program did not begin until Fall, 1973.

For the School of Management concept to become something more than a new tag for an old program, Barr and the faculty were obliged to develop a curriculum that would orient students with divergent career goals to a common managerial philosophy.

78 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
79 Payson Wild to John A. Barr, December 19, 1968, Payson Wild Papers, Northwestern University Archives.
and teach management as a unified body of knowledge. To provide orientation, the School of Management required all beginning students to appear on campus a week before regular classes began in order to take an intensive course entitled "Conceptual Issues in Management." The primary purpose of C.I.M. was to introduce students to the school's overall educational objectives and to put the master's program into proper perspective through a series of lectures and seminars and a computer simulation game. Sections into which the first-year students were divided at the beginning of the session remained intact when formal coursework began in September. This mode of orientation was designed to create a spirit of group cooperation and teamwork which the faculty believed would enable students to function successfully in all collective decisionmaking environments.

Revising the curriculum to teach management generically was, in one sense, a relatively simple matter. In 1961, under Donham's leadership, the curriculum had been revised with precisely this goal in mind, although the focus of managerial concern was then assumed to be limited to the business world. It required only modest alteration to transform Management of an Enterprise (1961) into Management of Organizations (1969), Business Statistics (1961) into Statistical Methods (1969), and Quantitative Methods in Business Decisions (1961) into simply Quantitative Methods (1969).

In another sense, however, the issue of how to teach management generically, while greasing the different career paths of students intending to work in business, hospitals, government, and education, was highly problematic. This was particularly the case at a self-consciously modern institution like Northwestern where core requirements were already substantial. In the end, Barr and the faculty made what appears, in retrospect, an ironic choice. At a time when they were nominally increasing the School's commitment to management as a unified body of knowledge, they decreased core course requirements and increased opportunities for specialization. Students at the new School of Management who intended to go into business could devote 9 of their 24 courses to electives, whereas at the old School of Business they could only devote 7. At the same time, however, core requirements in quantitative analytic techniques were increased. In addition to the substantial quantitative course load that had been required since 1961, students at the School of Management also had to take new courses in Mathematical Methods and Management and the Computer.

In essence, then, Northwestern's new commitment to a generic managerial pedagogy translated more into a matter of curriculum fine-tuning and reemphasis, than of radical revision and rejection of the past. Northwestern remained an experimenter par excellence in the modern mode.
By the time of Dean Barr’s retirement in 1975, the School of Management at Northwestern enjoyed a far more prestigious national reputation than had the graduate program of the School of Business ten years earlier. Attracting students proved to be no problem. Full-time M.B.A. candidates more than doubled, and their grades and GMAT scores were notably higher. The School of Management attracted a more diverse, and a more research-oriented, faculty who both published widely and attracted substantial funding from foundation and government agencies. As anticipated, faculty succeeded in gaining research sponsorship from such nontraditional agencies as the National Science Foundation, the U.S. Public Health Service, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

The most problematic issue facing Barr’s successor was how, or whether, to further implement the School’s philosophical commitment to management as a unified body of knowledge suitable for future executives in all walks of life. While the admissions office stressed the School’s dedication to this principle, the fact was that students majoring in business management overwhelmed those in the hospital and health services, education, and public management programs combined, by a margin of over four to one. Unless greater parity could be achieved, the educational significance of Northwestern’s transformation from a School of Business into a School of Management would remain somewhat in doubt.

UCLA

By the mid-1960s, UCLA had become one of the nation’s premier research-oriented business schools. It rivaled Berkeley and Michigan in the public sector and was only a notch below Stanford, M.I.T., and Carnegie Tech in the originality and productivity of faculty research, and in the marketability of its doctoral candidates for academic positions. While the content of coursework changed to reflect new faculty capabilities and research interests, the M.B.A. program’s organization and pedagogy remained highly traditional. In comparison to Michigan State and Northwestern, the M.B.A. degree at UCLA took less time to complete, allowed more specialization, stipulated few core requirements, and limited the core to conventional subject areas. Jacoby’s main concern in the 1950s had been to expand the knowledge base, not to rearrange the curricular packaging, of management as a scholarly discipline. Having rebuilt the Graduate School’s intellectual superstructure, it remained to be seen whether he would reorganize the M.B.A. program and, if so, whether he would seek to move beyond the highly academic, disciplinary, research-based traditions he had nurtured at both Chicago and UCLA.
In yet another series of bold, quick changes, Jacoby transformed the organization and pedagogy of master's-level business education at UCLA in the mid- to late-1960s. First, he devised several new areas of specialization—Behavioral Science for Management, Quantitative Methods, International and Comparative Management Studies, Socio-Technical Systems Studies—that incorporated recent trends in management scholarship and took full advantage of his diverse faculty. "The emerging science of management is based upon broader and deeper intellectual foundations than the traditional curricula of university schools of business," he observed (apparently including his own program at UCLA).

New branches of mathematics, statistical decision theory, information theory, and data processing systems have been combined with modern behavioral science to add exciting new dimensions to curricula that were formerly based mainly upon economics and accounting. Concurrently, there is sharper attention to those forces whose understanding is essential to the contemporary architects and operators of formal organizations. In addition, the study of comparative management under various politico-economic cultures, and of the special managerial problems of international businesses, has become important in a world shrunk by the jet airplane and the communications satellite. The curricula of our School embody these changes.80

These innovations brought UCLA into the vanguard of nationwide curricular experimentation in business education, and enhanced the Business School's reputation on campus as a pioneer in the development of socially sensitive, interdisciplinary fields of professional study.

More dramatic were the changes Jacoby introduced into the formal structure of the master's program, which had been fairly stable since 1949. Over a three-year period, he reorganized the traditional M.B.A. program into three distinct master's level curricula. Each was different from the previous M.B.A. program, and each had a different mission and pedagogy. First came the M.B.A. Plan A, generally known as the Integrated M.B.A. This represented the most radical departure from the traditional master's degree. Designed especially for liberal arts majors with little or no background in business subjects, the Integrated M.B.A. required two full years to complete. Students were admitted to the program as a class and took the identical courses; no substitutions or electives were allowed. Small groups of coordinated faculty teams taught the entire

80 UCLA, Graduate School of Business Administration, Annual Report, 1965-1966, p. 2.
curriculum. The program was "designed as a total learning unit in which each course of study is a building block leading to a comprehensive professional educational experience in the field of business management. Every effort is made to reflect in the learning activities the flexibility and need for initiative and self-direction which is essential for successful management."  

Additional innovative features of the Integrated M.B.A. included use of intensive learning units modeled on the pedagogy of executive programs; stress on oral communication and the use of videotapes and communication specialists to improve oral presentations; articulation in writing of a personal philosophy of management; and, the feature of the program that gained the most nationwide attention, dispatch of student consulting teams (unpaid) in participating companies to explore specific problems and make policy recommendations to top management. Jacoby cited one example in which students were brought in to advise a rapidly growing, medium-sized manufacturing company about its need for funds over a ten-year horizon. The students studied the company's operations at length, developed and plotted curves showing sales growth and working capital requirements, estimated future sales and cash needs to finance growth, and created a computer model of the firm's cash flow. The students formally presented their findings to the company president, who was then able to approach his bankers with a sophisticated explanation of the company's financial needs.

Commenting on his experience in the Integrated M.B.A., one former student nicely captured its goals and the philosophic links between it and the M.B.A. programs introduced several years earlier at Michigan State and Northwestern. "We all seem to be finding," he wrote, "that companies are particularly interested in just those things which have been central to the Plan A Program—an ability to work with other people, an ability to express ourselves verbally and in writing, and an ability to look at the company as a whole."

Jacoby believed that the Integrated M.B.A. would become a major component of the School's revised master's level programs. Although he felt that the Integrated M.B.A. could never become the sole program option at a public university, where many students had to work part-time, he expected that by 1970 it would enroll one-third of the

master's level students. However, by 1970 the program enrolled only around 15 percent of master's degree candidates.\textsuperscript{84}

While the Integrated M.B.A. was the most thorough of Jacoby's pedagogical reforms, the innovations that affected the most students occurred in the traditional M.B.A. curriculum, renamed the M.B.A. Plan B Program. Students who had majored in business as undergraduates could still move directly into the second program year, but new course requirements made it somewhat more difficult for them to do so. Whereas they were previously required to show competence almost exclusively in specific business functions and industries, they now had to demonstrate more general ability (by prior coursework or examination) in mathematics, economics, and the behavioral sciences. They also had to demonstrate skill in a newly-developed accounting and computing laboratory, and to pass a communications course which stressed written report skills. Even for undergraduate business majors, then, the new M.B.A. Plan B was likely, in practice, to extend into a four-quarter program, much like the program at Michigan State.

More radical were the alterations in the second program year, where all the courses were new "and designed especially for the generalized professional objective of the M.B.A. degree."\textsuperscript{85} Prior to 1966, the prime objective of the M.B.A. was to encourage "depth of study in an area of greatest personal interest."\textsuperscript{86} Students could take over three-fifths of their coursework in their area of specialization; core requirements formed only one-quarter of the curriculum. In the M.B.A. Plan B, the opportunity to specialize was reduced to one-third of total coursework, and the core was expanded to two-thirds. Core requirements were broadly conceived and managerially-oriented, although less infused by theoretical and mathematically-based precepts in managerial science than at Michigan State and Northwestern. Instead, the core—reflecting the emerging new intellectual interests of Jacoby, George Steiner, and other key faculty in the 1960s—focused more on policy issues and the business-society interface (Business, Labor, and Management; Economic Policy; Business and Society). The capstone of the curriculum was a new, case-based, double course in Business Policy—the first time Jacoby had made cases central to UCLA's program. During the Business Policy courses, students were required to pass a comprehensive examination rather than, as in the older M.B.A. program, an examination that dealt solely with their area of specialization.

\textsuperscript{84} Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 227-228.
\textsuperscript{85} UCLA, Graduate School of Business Administration, Annual Report, 1965-1966, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{86} UCLA, Graduate School of Business Administration, Announcement, 1964-1965, p. 30.
Less specialized, less focused on specific business functions, more case-oriented, and deeply concerned with policy and ecological issues, the M.B.A. Plan B represented a pedagogical middle-ground between UCLA's older M.B.A. program and the more radical innovations represented by the Integrated M.B.A. The two M.B.A. options brought UCLA squarely into the mainstream of pedagogical modernism in business education in the 1960s. For the first time, moreover, Jacoby had sharply distinguished the design and requirements for the M.B.A. as a professional degree from the Ph.D.

While Jacoby brought the M.B.A. at UCLA pedagogically up-to-date, he still felt that there was a place at the master's level for a high degree of concentration in traditional business functions or in other special fields. He had always insisted that management as a discipline merited intellectual parity with other academic endeavors. Just as master's degree candidates in English could specialize in poetry, master's degree candidates in business ought legitimately to be able to pursue study of finance, management theory, or other business subjects. He therefore created yet a third new master's program, the M.S. degree, for students who preferred to enter the business world as staff specialists, or who wanted to earn a master's degree preliminary to the Ph.D. M.S. candidates could take up to three-quarters of their coursework in their major fields. In addition, they had to complete a formal thesis just like master's candidates in academic departments. "The thesis must be a student's report of the results of original investigation of a problem in his major field," Jacoby stressed. "Although the problem for the master's thesis is of limited scope, it must be attacked in the same systematic and scholarly way as problems of greater magnitude instigated by candidates for the Doctor's dissertation."87 Jacoby never expected the M.S. program to draw many students, and it never did. Aside from the thesis requirement, the M.S. program was very similar to the old M.B.A. Its principal purpose may well have been symbolic: to retain UCLA's commitment to specialized, disciplinary-based master's level study at a time when the organization and pedagogy of the new M.B.A. programs had moved far away from the traditional academic mold.

Having overhauled UCLA's M.B.A. program, and having at last discarded the undergraduate program, Jacoby decided in 1967 to restate for entering students the mission of the Graduate School. One might have anticipated that he would stress the importance and distinct character of the new professional programs, to which he had committed the bulk of his administrative energies during the previous several years. On the contrary, and more forthrightly than ever before, Jacoby described the School's professional goals as wholly derivative from its academic research. Jacoby hammered

87 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
home the point. "The mission of the UCLA Graduate School of Business Administration," he wrote,

is to advance the science of management of formally organized enterprises; to derive valid principles and devise useful techniques for the management of such enterprises; and to prepare students for careers as professional managers, as specialist contributors to management, and as research scholars.

As part of a University devoted to discovering and disseminating knowledge, the School is deeply committed to research.... The knowledge, principles, and techniques needed by both manager and specialist are discovered, improved, explained, and validated by research. Research thus provides the substance of management education.88

After two decades of innovative leadership, Neil Jacoby resigned the deanship in 1968 to devote himself fully to scholarship. A two-year search for a replacement ensued, during which time Jacoby's chief aide, George Robbins, served as acting dean. In the interim, a number of new programs (M.B.A.-Vista Program) and special fields (Arts Administration and Operations Research) were instituted, which reflected main currents of thought within both business education and the larger society. These interim years were ones of great turmoil in the Graduate School. With Jacoby no longer at the helm, latent internal dissatisfaction regarding the School's future direction, especially among younger faculty, began to emerge to the surface.89 Once Harold Williams, a Harvard-trained lawyer and former chairman of the board of directors of Norton Simon, Inc., was selected as new dean in 1970, the full extent of dissatisfaction became clear.90 During Williams' administration, the relation between professional and academic objectives in graduate business education would become more problematic than at any time since World War II, and the content, organization, and pedagogy of the M.B.A. program at UCLA would once again be radically reformed.91

88 UCLA, Graduate School of Business Administration, Announcement, 1967-1968, p. 10.
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