The basic paradox of citizenship education in the United States is that the first steps toward the rational, autonomous, critical-minded citizen required by a democracy are necessarily non-rational and based on an unquestioned deference to authority. The movement from the morality of authority to the morality of principle constitutes the challenge of citizenship education. It is in the period of adolescence that there exists a critical opportunity for the bridging of these two moralities. At some point in the maturation process of the individual, obedience to parent/teacher authority is tempered by the influence of a variety of social groups, and eventually the individual develops a sense of autonomy and allegiance to self-chosen principles. Citizenship education must not teach phoney concepts, or inadequately explain the meanings of terms such as rights. It should not be assumed that the value content of the curriculum is necessarily the value content learned by the students. It is also important to realize that by asking students to critically question society’s realization of democratic values before they have internalized solid foundations for those values, they may cast those values aside when they find they are unable to resolve ambiguous or controversial value problems. A set of core values that are developmentally appropriate and lend themselves to application in concrete situations should rest at the heart of the civic curriculum. This curriculum should demand a high degree of student involvement, with personal significance to the students. It’s extremely important to realize that at the level of the early adolescent, the goal of citizenship education is to assist in that long journey towards citizenship, not to immediately fabricate model citizens. Twenty-two references are included.

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Paradox and Promise in Citizenship Education:
A Reaction to Butts & Hartoonian

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Any thoughtful educational endeavor with children, if it is to be successful involves the consideration of four important questions. First, what is the goal or objective? Second, what content (knowledge, dispositions, values, behaviors, and skills) must be taught to achieve this goal? Third, what is the most effective method to teach this content? And finally, how will we judge if we have achieved our goal? In this paper I will use the papers by Butts (1988) and Hartoonian (1988) as a jumping off point to discuss these questions as they relate to citizenship education during early adolescence. In doing so I will briefly summarize what I see as the papers' contribution the questions above. A paradox at the heart of citizenship education will be presented. Finally, I will attempt to resolve this paradox and in doing so sketch out what I see as criteria necessary for a successful citizenship program for early adolescence.

The papers by Butts and Hartoonian focus primarily on the first two questions presented above; they only touch on the third. The fourth question is not discussed. Both papers argue that the primary goal of citizenship education is to develop an enlightened allegiance to the basic principles of our civic culture. Butts speaks of an "inventory of psychological legitimacy" that involves an understanding, acceptance, and persuasive confidence in the system. At the core of this commitment, he argues, is the value of justice. That is, only when liberties are distributed equally can a common civic culture exist. When liberties are distributed unequally, confidence and
affect toward the culture will be shaken and thus the culture itself be at risk.

Hartoonian discusses the desirability of a sense of loyalty and connectedness among the populace that is based on a shared ethical perspective by which the individual reconciles the gap between self-interest and community welfare. This ethos recognizes that no man is an island into himself but that his welfare and the welfare of others are bound inextricably together. For Hartoonian justice is also an important value that underpins this reconciliation of individual and collective interests. Both Butts and Hartoonian see the core of this enlightened loyalty as resting upon a rational commitment to root democratic values and an understanding of how these values contribute to the maintenance of our civic culture and its reproduction.

As Butts points out, the lists that have been put forth as representing the constellation of democratic values are as varied as the number of lists. Comparing the Butts' Decalogue of Democratic Civic Values with Hartoonian's list of the virtues rooted in capitalism (justice, sobriety, fortitude, benevolence, industry, and temperance) remind us of the wide range of perspectives from which to view the goals of citizenship education. A recent excellent contribution to the practice of citizenship education for early adolescents, Lockwood and Harris's (1985) Reasoning with Democratic Values, list eight democratic values that have come into conflict within the context of U.S. history: authority, equality, liberty, life, loyalty, promise-keeping, property, and truth. While five of Lockwood and Harris's eight values appear on Butts' list, only five of Butts' twelve values appear on Lockwood and Harris's list. Such comparisons could be made ad infinitum within the literature in citizenship education.
Given the diversity of opinion regarding the number and content of a list of basic democratic values, attempts to hierarchically order any such list also reflect a diversity of perspectives. Butts, after Rawls (1971), assigns a superordinate place to justice as at the heart of democracy. While I do not wish to unnecessarily obfuscate the dialogue over the nature of the democratic values to be taught in schools, Gunnar Myrdal's (1944) analysis of the central democratic values in the United States represents a valuable perspective on the issue. His list consists of

- worth and dignity of the individual
- equality
- inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness
- consent of the governed
- majority rule
- rule of law
- due process of law
- community and national welfare
- rights to freedom of speech, press, religion, assembly and private association

Newmann (1970), using Myrdal's creed values as the basis of a curricular approach to the analysis of public issues, argues persuasively, I believe, that although creed values cannot be ordered into a specific hierarchy some values may be considered to be more fundamental than others because their implementation can fulfill a more basic and superordinate value. That superordinate value is individual human dignity. The primary contribution of the creed values to democratic society is that they help define the somewhat general term human dignity and suggest a means for achieving it. The concept of human dignity emphasizes the worth of each person because he/she is a person. The sense of individual worth can, in turn, be defined as a composite of several criteria: the ability to make choices that affect one's life (career, religion, politics or family relations), guarantees of physical...
protection of life and property, equal treatment under the law, ability to defend oneself against prosecution by the state, etc. The discussion above of the creed values of Myrdal, and Newmann's analysis of those values, is not in any way to diminish the insightful contribution of Butts, but rather to point out that there exists a variety of possible ways to depict and order our core values. One of the many challenges of citizenship education is to decide which of these values are to be placed at the heart of the curriculum and if any particular list or organization of these values is preferable to any other. Perhaps, as Hartoonian suggests, an important goal of citizenship is the development of an ethical perspective where one sees his/her relationship clearly between self and society. Simply a list of values, independent of a rationale for their existence will not lead to a complete understanding. From Butts' perspective justice lies at the heart of social cohesion in a democratic society. For Hartoonian democratic values must relate self interest and the public good to each other. For Myrdal and Newmann human dignity is the superordinate value from which other values must be derived and from which patterns of public life must ultimately be judged.

Assuming there is some list, for pedagogical purposes, can be agreed upon and it can be accompanied by, as Hartoonian argues, a social theory that relates these values to social purposes, how then are these values and this perspective to be conveyed to youth? It was not within the scope of the Butts and Hartoonian papers to discuss this question in detail, however, a brief review of their arguments will reveal what I will refer to as the "Paradox of Citizenship Education." This paradox, and the line of argument behind it is not new. I am indebted to R.S. Peters' (1974) analysis of this problem from the perspective of moral education and Gutmann's (1987) recent analysis of the
goals and practice of democratic education for the perspective presented below.

According to Butts (arguing after Kammen, 1973) a stable pluralism in
democratic society requires a strong and lasting inventory of psychological
legitimacy - understanding, acceptance, and pervasive confidence in the
system. At the same time, youth must be prepared to judge the merits of
public policies, that is to judge discrepancies between morality in public
talk and personal practice. This deliberative component of citizenship
education is, according to Butts, not developed by any simple formulas of
preachments or role modeling. Hartoonian, when discussing the need for
developing an ethical perspective as a goal of citizenship education argues
that this is to be accomplished best by means of direct instruction, including
the behavior (modeling) of adults. This ethical perspective, revealed through
the study of history, is the basis on which students develop social theory
statements. These social theory statements are used in turn to evaluate the
extent to which current policy, leaders, and self measure up to democratic
ideals. The inescapable conflict present at the heart of citizenship
education in the Butts and Hartoonian papers centers on the objective to
develop deliberative and critical-minded citizens who at the same time have a
profound and lasting commitment to the root values of democracy. The paradox
of citizenship education is that the independent and autonomous deliberative
perspective of the mature democratic citizen must, if commitment to root
values is present, grow out of the necessarily imposed morality of the adult
world. Gutmann (1987) notes that "moral education begins by winning the
battle against amoralism and egoism. And ends -- if it ends at all -- by
struggling against uncritical acceptance of the moral habits and opinions that
were the spoils of the first victory (p. 62)." Peters (1967) states the paradox with wonderful economy: "The palace of reason must be entered by the courtyard of habit (p. 24)." It is a requirement of the socialization of youth in a democracy that they must come to hold positive feelings to the trappings of life in a democracy before he or she fully understands the nature of that system of government and society. The first steps toward the rational, autonomous, and critically minded citizen required by a democracy are necessarily non-rational and based on an unquestioned deference to authority. It is the movement from what Rawls (1971) refers to as the morality of authority to the morality of principle that constitutes the challenge of citizenship education. It is the period of adolescence in which there exists a critical opportunity for bridging these two moralities and it is to this opportunity that I wish to turn.

First let me briefly present in some more detail what a number of philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, and political scientists have described as three general stages in the development of the citizen (see e.g. Kohlberg, 1984; Durkheim, 1974; Rawls, 1971; Durio, 1971; Hogan and Mills, 1971; Gutmann, 1987; Peters, 1970). The first of these stages has as its central foci, authority and attunement to rules. The very young child lacks a sense of appropriate behavior in social settings. Only through the exercise of the legitimate authority of the parent and the child's accommodation to that authority does the child internalize standards of appropriate social behavior. If the child loves and trusts the parents, and if the parents communicate clearly and exemplify the rules, the child will subsequently recognize that social life requires obedience to legitimate authority and rules. When the child begins school the social world is expanded beyond the
family, but the message remains the same with the teacher now carrying on the socialization to authority and rules begun in the home.

The second general stage in the development of the citizen I will refer to as the stage of association and sensitivity to social expectations. This stage effectively carries the youth through his/her public or private school years. Gradually the child begins to share, if not supplant entirely, his/her affiliational allegiance to the parent with allegiance to a variety of social groups. At this stage, through the experience of groups, and attachment to these groups, the youth learns to live with others, not just with authority. To live with others requires learning the standards appropriate to the individual's role in these groups. It also involves learning to be sensitive to the social expectations of others. One must accommodate one's desires and interests to group desires and interests. This requires the ability to view things from a variety of points of view, and to think of these variety of perspectives as aspects of cooperation.

The third stage, autonomy and allegiance to self-chosen principles, arises when the individual recognizes that he/she is the beneficiary of a social organization that offers the benefits of social life to us. The realization that social organization is essential and desirable is primarily an intellectual achievement, although it has an affective component. One chooses to abide by society's rules independently, and one's understanding of this commitment is independent of the wishes of peers or parents; popularity recedes into the past as a motive for social behavior. To achieve this autonomous ideological maturity requires three features in the environment. First the youth must have the cognitive maturity to conceptualize the role of principles in regulating complex social life. Second, the youth must have

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adult models on hand as exemplars of how intellectual and behavioral autonomy appears. Finally, the child must have exposure to history, a tradition, a political philosophy, a culturally based ideology on which he/she can draw. The orientations of the two earlier stages are not forgotten or replaced at this last stage, but rather it is at this time that all the earlier learned subordinate ideals are finally understood and organized into a coherent system of principles.

The resolution of the paradox of citizenship education should now be apparent, that is, learning to live with authority and to behave in accordance with authoritative rules is not in fact a point in conflict with the deliberative citizen, but rather is a necessary precursor to the development of the deliberative citizen. The democratic character can only begin by learning respect for authority and rules (law) in the home and school. If this foundation of democratic character is not developed in the child, he/she will become facile at reasoning back lack commitment to democratic ideals. The society will consist of egocentric sophists who do not take moral questions seriously and use argument only to further their own interests. On the other hand, if democratic education ends with the first stage we have citizens who subordinate themselves to authority regardless of its espousal of causes, no matter how unjust. As Gutmann (1987) argues the goal of democratic education is "... deliberative citizens... committed, at least partially through inculcation of habit, to living up to the routine demands of democratic life and at the same time committed to questioning those demands whenever they appear to threaten the foundational ideals of democratic sovereignty, such as respect for persons (p. 52)."
Before concluding with some suggestions for the planning of citizenship education programs for early adolescents, let me discuss three common errors associated with citizenship education. First, we should refrain from teaching what Ausubel (1968) has referred to as "phony concepts" -- concepts that are used in writing or speaking without an understanding of their basic meaning. Much of what passes as citizenship education teaches phony concepts. On the September 3, 1987 ABC news program 20/20 Betty Bao Lord, the Chinese wife of our ambassador to China recounts how back in her old grammar school, P.S. 8 in Brooklyn, she and her classmates would pledge the oath of allegiance to the flag: "For at the start of every school day, I would proudly salute the flag by saying 'I pledge a lesson to the flag of the United States of America and to the we puppets for witches' hands, one Asian, in the vestibule, with little tea and just rice for all.'" The teaching of phoney concepts may be due in part to poor instructional planning and inadequate preparation on the part of teachers. however, this gap between the intended meaning of the instructor and the meaning as understood by the student may also be the result of differences in level of cognitive development. Take for example some of the uses of the word "right" I have heard in my roles as a parent and teacher of early adolescents:

"He has no right to call me that name."

"I have a right to play my stereo as loud as I want."

"Any nation that's strong enough has the right to do whatever it wants in foreign policy."

"If she hits me, I have a right to hit her back."

"The Supreme Court has no right to legalize the murder of unborn children."

"Atheists have no right to go on TV and preach against Christianity."
These interpretations of "rights" are not exactly what the framers of the Constitution had in mind, nor do they reflect the conception of rights that many parents and teachers wish for youth to hold.

In addition to the concept of a right, also at the heart of citizenship in a democracy, as Butts and Hartoonian remind us, is the ideal of justice. Justice too takes on many interpretations during the development of youth. For the very young what is right is what is in accordance with the dictates of a significant authority figure. Later justice is defined as the rules of the game as determined by social groups. At a more principled level Rawls (1971) defines justice as embodying two principles: "First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others. Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offers open to all (p. 60)."

Clearly many youth lack the intellectual abilities required to internalize the Rawls' conception of justice. It is the failure to recognize this inherent developmental gap between the mature form of democratic ideals and intellectual maturity of youth that in some cases results in the teaching of phony concepts.

A second and somewhat related mistake made in the planning of citizenship education programs is the assumption that the value content of the curriculum and texts will be the value content learned by the students. This error is based on the hypodermic model of learning that assumes that when the curriculum contains reference to values and students are required to learn it, those values will be internalized. It is also assumed that if there is a problem with students acquiring values from the curriculum, then the solution
is increase the value content -- a suggestion that is enjoying a degree of popularity recently. The existing research on the influence of biased materials on children is informative regarding the possible efficacy of whether the values in text material influence youth. Tibbetts (1973) in a review of studies on the effects of sexist reading material on youth, concludes that the effects are "extremely individual, personal, varied, and unpredictable" (p. 167). Guthrie (1983), in reviewing the literature on learning values from textbooks, finds that the tone surrounding the theme and the mindset of the reader are the determinants of value formation. How the theme is handled by the author, how the values of the learners are related to the theme of the text, and the teaching strategies of educators, all operate together to determine student evaluations of the reading materials and eventually whether the material will reinforce or change an individual's values. Grueneich (1982) likewise eschews simple claims for the effects of biased materials on children's attitudes or values. Her review of the literature indicates that "Children virtually never form an internal representation of the story which is identical to the explicit content of the story, and furthermore, children of different ages may form different interpretations (p. 41)." As strange as it may sound, and as counter-to-common knowledge as it is, there is a real paucity of evidence to indicate that biased materials (either pro or anti contemporary values) leads to biased students. The reason why curricula does not have the simple linear effect that many assume is that it ignores the fact that the experience of curricula and texts by the learner is a two way street. That is, curriculum may impact on students, but at the same time students are impacting on the curricula. Individuals, as they think about and act in the world, construct
meaning for themselves; as they interact with the world they construct and reconstrcut reality.

In a review of the literature I completed three years ago (Leming, 1985) I attempted to examine the extant literature of the effect of social students curricula on students values (social, moral, and political). While most of the studies were attempting to examine the effect of innovative curricula on youth, almost all of the studies used traditional social studies curricula as the control group. In the well over 100 studies reviewed not a single case was identified in the traditional (control group) classes where there was a statistically significant gain pre to post test on the dependent variables. The traditional text, curricula and method of instruction in social studies appear to not have a discernible impact on student values. The hypodermic hypothesis is not supported by the evidence and attempts to increase the dosage, in my judgment will not yield different results. The reason for this pattern of results is the overly simple assumption about learning that fails to take into account the learners response to the material. Of course, other criticisms such as insipid texts and dull and uninspired instruction may also contribute.

The third potential mistake that citizenship education should avoid is the elevation of a critical reflective perspective on society as the central objective of citizenship education for early adolescents. It is at this point that I have a disagreement with the Butts and Hartoonian papers. Hartoonian advocates that students be encouraged to develop social theory statements and assess current social and personal circumstances and develop policy statements that can bring social theory and practice closer. Butts also sees the central task as to prepare citizens to judge the merits of public policies -- to judge
discrepancies between morality in public talk and personal practice. I do not wish to question, even for a moment, that this is not an important characteristic for mature citizens to possess, but rather I wish to question that if this is a capability that should be the central focus of citizenship education for early adolescents.

My reasons for questioning this goal is my concern that there may well be collateral learnings associated with this approach which result in a negative contribution to citizenship. My first fear is that if this critical perspective is developed before the solid foundation of commitment to democratic values is developed it may result in a tendency toward sophistry among students. Benjamin Franklin (1981) has a delightful quote that illustrates the point: "So convenient a thing it is to be a reasonable creature since it enables one to find or make a reason for everything one has a mind to do (p. 42)." It is important that before students are asked to critically question society's realization of democratic values that the foundation for these values be solid enough so the student won't cast those values aside when unable to make sense of or resolve ambiguous situations.

My second and more serious concern in this regard is the possibility that students may develop cynicism, mistrust and a diminished sense of efficacy regarding the political system. Even adults sometimes suffer feelings of political impotence, anger, despair, frustration, and outrage. The adult citizen's values however are typically resilient because his/her years of experience with our political system has enabled him to, from experience, roll with the punches and accept the system "warts and all." Youth however tend to be more impressionable and lack the capacity to view things from a tempered perspective. My concern is that a steady diet of the conflicts between
democratic ideals and reality may result in despair and fatalism rather than optimism and faith.

The final mistake commonly made in citizenship education is the opposite extreme of a focus on critical rationality. It is the attempt to develop citizenship through unrelenting authority. The early adolescent is beginning to take notice of contradiction and inconsistency around him/her and is increasingly aware of the political world. The school must begin to take cognizance that the child is increasingly forming their own judgment about the nature of social reality. This evolving independence of judgment should not be stifled or ignored. The result of persisting dogmatic authority at this point, if successful, would likely result in a rigid unthinking citizenry. Here like above, the influence might be somewhat iatrogenic. Mereleman (1980) has suggested that the effect of successive exposure to strident and incompetent authority in schools does more to teach students to question authority than any curricula could ever do.

In early adolescence youth move from a world dominated by authority to a world composed of social cooperation and organization. Egoism and power begin to recede as the dynamics of social life, others' interests, and collective experience rise in importance. Rules that previously had been followed blindly are now seen as sensible as the need for social regularity becomes apparent to the child. It is this evolving social perspective that suggests a promising perspective on citizenship education for this age group. The patterns of social, political, and economic organization as they have developed in this nation have been a unique response to problems faced by any social group. This framework for the study of civic life is potentially consistent with students' developmental perspective. Three central questions
lie at the heart of this perspective: (1) What problem did/does society face? (2) What is the response(s)? (3) What principles or values are embodied by this response? The content for this last question will come from the U.S. Constitution and the American Creed values. Given that at any point in time societies only approximate their ideals, it is important that students not just see how we may have come short or failed, for example, to achieve equal opportunity for all peoples, but also where we are relative to past societies and in comparison to other societies. Thus a strong historical and comparative component is essential in citizenship education.

A set of core values should rest at the heart of the civics curriculum. These values should be defined in a manner that is developmentally appropriate and lend themselves to application in concrete situations. The curriculum should require that the student repeatedly identify the role of these values in contemporary life and apply these values to the understanding of contemporary issues. As the year progresses the range of activities for students should require increasing breadth and depth of understanding.

In addition to a focus on values and their role in maintaining the infrastructure of society, the curriculum should demand a high degree of student engagement and involvement. This requires a curriculum and activities that the student finds personally significant. To have curricula that focuses on problems and issues that students find interesting and challenging is not to trivialize the topic if the serious study of relevant history and social sciences is essential to the students involvement with that problem. One problem with achieving engagement in the past has been the breadth versus depth question (Newmann, 1986). Far too often student interest has been
sacrificed to covering the material. Hard and courageous decisions will need to be made if the situation of where "more is less" is to be avoided.

Educating early adolescents on their path to mature citizenship requires restraint. Assuming that the attributes of the ideal mature citizen should comprise the content and goals of the curricula would, from my perspective, be a mistake. It is the case in planning for citizenship education at this age that "less is more." The task for citizenship education with early adolescents is to assist in the journey toward mature citizens; to keep the ship on course, but realize that the end is many years in the future and cannot be accelerated beyond the individual's capacity.
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