This paper considers how the Supreme Court used an idealized history of the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to help justify its decision in "New York Times v. Sullivan" in 1963. The first section of the paper discusses the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the second section discusses the Court's use of history in the "New York Times" decision, the third section critiques the Court's history, and the final section considers the implications of this critique. The paper concludes that the Court historically has done little to protect speech and has only gradually come to afford protection to First Amendment freedoms. (One hundred and two notes are included.) (MS)
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN:

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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. SULLIVAN:

The Supreme Court's decision in New York Times v. Sullivan is rightly regarded as a landmark in the development of libel law. For the first time, the Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to criticism of government officials. Moreover, this decision has been interpreted and refined as the courts have addressed questions concerning the distinction between "public officials" and "private figures," the nature of "official conduct," actual malice" and "reckless disregard," and the like. This paper, however, does not address those questions. Rather, as the title suggests, it develops a historical perspective on the decision. Specifically, it considers how the Supreme Court used an idealized history of the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 to help justify its decision in New York Times v. Sullivan. To fully explore this specific application of history, the paper is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, the second section discusses the Court's use of history in the New York Times decision, the third section critiques the Court's history, and the final section considers the implications of this critique.

The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798

Beginning in 1793 with Washington's famous Proclamation of Neutrality, the United States maintained a precarious impartiality in the war between England and Napoleon's France.¹ The situation was difficult because America had been allied with

both belligerents in wars against the other within the past thirty years. While still British colonies, Americans had enthusiastically contributed to France's humiliations in the Seven Years' War (1757-1763). And, of course, the French were strong allies of the colonies during the Revolution--indeed, in British eyes, the Revolutionary War was as much a French as a "colonial" victory. While neutrality seemed preferable to siding with either nation, the result was to earn the enmity of both. France and England both suspected that America was in secret alliance with the other.

England first grew angry when America allowed the French navy to use American ports while conducting raids on British shipping in the West Indies. When "neutral" American vessels began to carry on a trade between the West Indies and France, the English were able to justify seizing American shipping. This aggression against America in 1794 made war seem likely for a time, but Jay's Treaty avoided military hostilities. This success, however, resulted in increased French belligerence. The French Directory viewed Jay's Treaty as increasing American ties with England, so the French retaliated by initiating an aggressive campaign against American shipping. Washington responded by withdrawing pro-French American Ambassador James Monroe and replacing him with the well-known Francophobe, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. The tension escalated when the French refused to recognize Pinckney, thereby severing diplomatic relations with the United States.

By the time news of this diplomatic snub reached the United States, John Adams had replaced Washington as President. Adams responded by calling a special session of Congress. In a speech delivered on 16 May 1797, he urged Congress to prepare for war with France, although he opted to follow Washington's policy of continued negotiations. In an effort to repair relations with France, Adams sent a mission composed of John Marshall, Eldridge Gerry, and Ambassador Pinckney to negotiate. Meanwhile, Congress empowered Adams to raise 80,000 militia troops, fortify vulnerable American harbors, and build frigates to protect American shipping. The Federalists were careful, however, not to initiate actual military hostilities before diplomatic options had been exhausted.
The American emissaries arrived in France in September of 1797. Their initial attempt to negotiate with French Foreign Minister Talleyrand was rebuffed. Shortly thereafter, clandestine French agents offered to start negotiations if America would agree to certain preconditions. These preconditions would require the American government to assume financial responsibility for all claims made by her citizens against France, to finance a sizeable French loan, to apologize publicly for Adam's speech of 16 May, and to give 50,000 pounds to the French Directory as a bribe. Despite considerable pressure from the French, the American envoys refused to meet the conditions without first contacting the President. In a series of coded dispatches to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, they detailed the French demands. While graphically detailing the French position on negotiations, they concluded by noting that they had promised not to disclose the names of the French agents.

Although written in October of 1797, it took months for the dispatches to reach the United States because few friendly ships risked crossing the Atlantic during the winter. Adams finally received the dispatches on 4 March 1798. He promptly notified Congress that war with France was imminent and called for more defensive measures, and on 23 March, he recalled the American mission to France. Adams' opposition, led by Vice-President Thomas Jefferson, thought his bellicose behavior incredible. They demanded that he give the emissaries' correspondence to Congress. On 3 April 1798, Adams obliged, withholding only the names of the French agents whom he identified as W, X, Y, and Z.²

The correspondence was soon made public and revelation of this distressing information shocked even those who already had been openly critical of France.³ The letters dealt a

²The French agents were Nicholas Hubbard, Jean Hotlinger, Pierre Bellamy, and Lucien Hauteval. Because W (Hubbard) was hardly mentioned in the dispatches, the incident became known as the XYZ Affair.

stunning blow to the pro-French faction, which was unprepared for such blatant French venality.  

The American public reacted with outrage as the story spread. Even in the South and other rural areas that had been sympathetic to the French, there was widespread public indignation. Some of this indignation was evident in purely symbolic gestures such as patriotic songs and slogans. Many Americans switched from a colored to a plain black cockade to signify their independence. But some of this indignation was more than symbolic. Eligible males joined to form volunteer militias and in some towns women even formed exclusively female paramilitary organizations. In coastal towns collections were taken to raise money to construct a navy. But perhaps the greatest indicator of public indignation were the hundreds of local meetings throughout America. Such spontaneous meetings were used to formulate and debate resolutions supporting the federal government. Each resolution was, in turn, sent to President Adams. Between April 1798 and March 1799, nearly three hundred such addresses from all parts of the country arrived in Philadelphia. Taken together, these petitions suggest that Americans were unified in support of their government, outraged by the insulting French behavior, and willing to support military measures to deal with this threat. In the words of Rey, "in this rare instance of massive public support for the infant federal government, the American people demonstrated that they were in substantial agreement on Franco-American relations." 

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4Jefferson, for example, seems to have convinced himself that no news was good news. His personal correspondence reflects a belief that negotiations would repair relations with France. See Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Ordeal of Liberty, vol. 3, Jefferson and His Times (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962), p. 394.


6Rey, p. 411.
Instead of using this unanimity to heal the nation, the Federalists aggressively exploited this opportunity to solidify their previously precarious hold on the government. The Federalists accomplished this by warning of French treachery while simultaneously launching a direct attack against the political opposition. Throughout their preparations for war with France, Adams and his allies attempted to portray the Republican opposition (Madison, Jefferson and their colleagues) as French sympathizers. Because of their long-standing sympathies toward our Revolutionary War ally, Jefferson and his friends were vulnerable to charges that they were a faction against the Constitution. Moreover, because of their commitment to a decentralized popular government, the Republicans were also vulnerable to criticism for resisting attempts by the national government to increase the capability of America to defend herself. Accordingly, the Republicans were depicted as the champions of French interests. It was argued that no Republican could be a true American. Prominent opponents were identified for suspicion. Those suspected included Swiss-born Congressman Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, Irish Congressman Thomas Lyon of Vermont, and the French economist Du Pont de Nemours. James Monroe was recalled as Ambassador to France because of his French sympathies, Edmund Randolph was forced to resign as Secretary of State, and Jefferson's presidential campaign

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7 Although it adds clarity to this discussion, the use of the terms "Republicans" and "Federalists" in this manner is somewhat misleading. These terms suggest the presence of political parties in the contemporary sense and disguises the fact that seditious libel was one of the issues that led to the formation of parties. Although these parties do not meet William Nisbet Chamber's formal definition of parties as "formations that exhibit developing consciousness and ideology, continuing organization or structure, and active appeals to a substantial electorate"--party labels are used throughout as they do simplify the descriptions and accounts of the events. See William Nisbet Chambers, "Politics in the Early American Republic," Reviews in American History 1 (1973): 499-503.


was beset with charges questioning his loyalty.\textsuperscript{10} At the same time, the Federalists built up George Washington to suggest that an attack on Federalism was an attack on the revered patriarch of the country. The thread tying all of these efforts together was the charge that the opposition was allied with the French against the national interest. In a very short time, the previously innocuous Adams was transformed into a political hero. Even the Republicans admitted that the Federalists were in an ideal position to capitalize on these events. The staunchly Republican \textit{Philadelphia Aurora} admitted to President Adams that "your friends consider, as a matter of triumph, the many addresses from different parts of the union approbating your conduct with respect to the French nation, and promising to support your future measures; while your enemies on the other hand, are for the same reason displeased."\textsuperscript{11} The Federalists effectively parlayed the tension with France into widespread public support for their policies.\textsuperscript{12}

This was not enough, however, for the Federalists. Although they exploited the events to their political advantage, they lived in desperate fear that their "well-intentioned" efforts would go for naught. The Federalists were particularly troubled by vocal opposition to their policies. They believed that the people were easily misled and could be deceived into betraying the Union. In their minds, republican government could work only if administered by a ruling elite, people wealthy enough to be independent and talented enough to govern wisely and creatively. To the Federalists, the situation was clear and unambiguous. Since they were absolutely convinced that their policies were in the best interests of the nation, they saw any opposition as either misguided or self-serving. In

\textsuperscript{10}Randolph was forced to resign when confronted with a memo from the French Minister to the United States intimating that he was receiving payments from the French. Randolph resigned his position to prepare a defense, hopelessly botched the defense, and was forced from public life. See Irving Brant, "Edmund Randolph, Not Guilty!" \textit{William and Mary Quarterly,} 3d ser., 7 (April 1950): 180-198.

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Aurora}, 11 June 1798, quoted in Rey, p. 406.

\textsuperscript{12}See Miller, pp. 4-5.
the words of Fisher Ames, "to make a nation free, the crafty must be kept in awe, and the
violent in restraint." In the eyes of the Federalists, the Republican press was libeling the
government and turning the people against elected leaders. Too much democracy was
literally corrupting the people.

The Federalists rejected the idea that such discussion might lead to better policy
through the marketplace of ideas. Alexander Addison stated the Federalist position when
he said that "truth has but one side: and listening to error and falsehoods is indeed a
strange way to discover truth." Since the Federalists knew the truth, Addison
concluded, public discussion was pointless. Further, the Federalists believed that the
search for truth might actually be dangerous as people could arrive at falsehoods. George
Taylor warned that the people might be seduced into erroneous judgments "before the
truth could arrive to detect and protect." Falsehood, Taylor reasoned, "was light and
volatile" and spread quickly whereas "truth was the child of experience, and the
companion of time; she scarcely ever outstripped, and rarely kept pace" with falsehood.
Worse yet, the marketplace might be exploited by those with malevolent design. "A pen
in the hand of an able and virtuous man may enlighten a whole nation," James Iredell
wrote, but the "same pen in the hands of a man equally able, but with vices as great as the

from His Speeches and Correspondence, vol. 2, ed. Seth Ames (1845; reprint, New York:

14The Federalists fell prey to a sort of "us versus them" mentality which has recurred
throughout American history. As Smelser has observed, "they are different in different
ages, being Popish Plotters, the Elders of Zion, Freemasons, Fascist Warmongers, or
Creeping Socialists, according to the culture and the dominant impressions in the mind of
the persecuted." Smelser, pp. 471-472.

15Alexander Addison, Reports of Cases in the County Courts of the Fifth Circuit, and in
the High Court of Errors and Appeals, of the State of Pennsylvania (Washington: Colerick,


17Taylor, p. 135.
other's virtues, may, by arts of sophistry easily attainable, and inflaming the passions of weak minds delude many into opinions the most dangerous, and conduct them to actions the most criminal.\textsuperscript{18}

These concerns culminated in 1798 with the adoption of four distinct pieces of legislation intended to legislate national unity. The first was a law that increased the period of residence required for an alien to be eligible for citizenship from five to fourteen years.\textsuperscript{19} The second was the Alien Friends Act which authorized the President to deport any and all aliens whom he regarded as "dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States."\textsuperscript{20} It was a temporary measure that expired two years after its adoption. The third was entitled "An Act Respecting Alien Enemies" and has come to be known as the "Alien Act." It authorized the President to apprehend, restrain, secure, or deport any citizens of countries at war with the United States.\textsuperscript{21} As adopted, it was a wartime measure which could be invoked by the President only during a real or threatened invasion or a congressionally declared war. The fourth, and most important of the laws, was the Sedition Act, comprised of four sections.\textsuperscript{22} The first of these sections provided a mechanism for punishing any group of people who combined to oppose the law of the United States.\textsuperscript{23} The fourth section was a sunset provision which limited the duration of the Act until 3 March 1801, the day before the inauguration of the next President of the


\textsuperscript{19}See 1 \textit{United States Statutes at Large} 566 (1798).

\textsuperscript{20}1 \textit{United States Statutes at Large} 570 (1798).

\textsuperscript{21}See 1 \textit{United States Statutes at Large} 577 (1798).

\textsuperscript{22}See 1 \textit{United States Statutes at Large} 596 (1798).

\textsuperscript{23}1 \textit{United States Statutes at Large} 596 (1798).
The second and third sections carry the real force of the Sedition Act. The second section imposed penalties on any person that "shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing . . . (of) any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or disrepute."25 Those found guilty of violating this mandate were to be "punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by imprisonment not exceeding two years."26 The third section outlined the rights of any individual tried under the second section of the Sedition Act. It stipulated that any person prosecuted under this act for the writing or publishing of any libel aforesaid, would be allowed to use "the truth of the matter contained in the publication charged" as a defense.27 The jury impaneled to hear the case would have the "right to determine the law and the fact" under the direction of the court.28 Under the Act, suggests Stevens, "a political party, a petitioner, or even a legislator who voted 'wrong' might have been fined and imprisoned."29 It allowed the Federalists to prosecute all political dissent as criminal action.

24 1 United States Statutes at Large 596 (1798).
25 1 United States Statutes at Large 596 (1798).
26 1 United States Statutes at Large 596 (1798).
27 1 United States Statutes at Large 596 (1798).
28 1 United States Statutes at Large 596 (1798).

As one would expect, anyone who questioned the Federalists' leadership or policies was compelled to speak out against the Sedition Act. Led by Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina and Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania, the Republicans mounted a vicious attack on the merit and constitutionality of the Act. The nature of this opposition, however, has been the source of considerable historical controversy. Despite their vehement opposition to the Sedition Act, the Republicans were simply outnumbered. In a series of votes, decided largely along party lines, the Sedition Act passed the Senate by a vote of eighteen to six on 5 July 1798 and passed the House by a vote of 44 to 41 on 10 July 1798. Two days later Congress enacted a supplemental provision modifying the Sedition Act. This legislation empowered judges to require anyone who had been convicted to post bond prior to release at the completion of the sentence. This bond was forfeited if the individual continued to criticize the government, thereby creating an economic deterrent to speech critical of the government. The presiding judge was given complete discretion over the amount of the bond and the length it was binding. President Adams signed the statute on 14 July 1798.

The adoption of the Sedition Act did not end national debate on the matter. A series of resolutions condemning and condoning the Acts were adopted by state legislatures. The most famous of these resolutions, covertly authored by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, were adopted by the outraged legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia. The Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions contained a bitter attack on the
Historical Perspectives, p. 11

constitutionality and the desirability of the Sedition Act. Ironically, Madison and Jefferson kept their involvement in drafting these resolutions secret for fear of being indicted under the very Act that they were protesting. Although Republican strength was rising south of the Potomac, it was not yet strong enough to secure formal expressions of approval in other states for the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. The states north of the Potomac, firmly under Federalist control, emphatically denied the resolutions either by legislative reply or by enacting new state legislation restricting seditious expression.

Even as the Congress and the various states debated the merits of the Sedition Act, the Federalists launched common law proceedings against two Republican newspapers. The Federalists singled out Benjamin Franklin Bache's *Aurora*, the leading Republican newspaper, and John Daly Burk's *Time Piece*, a thriving Republican journal. During his tenure at the *Aurora*, Bache had managed to alienate virtually every Federalist. As a defender of the French Revolution, he had opposed Washington's foreign policy with vigor and had argued for a diplomatic response to the French problem. His continued criticism culminated in his indictment on 26 June 1798 for libeling the President. Released on bail pending trial, he continued his critical stance. While on bail he contracted yellow fever on 5 September and died five days later, before his case was tried. Like Bache, Burk was indicted for libeling the President. Dr. James Smith, co-proprietor of the *Time Piece*, was arrested along with Burk and charged with defamatory libel on 6 July 1798. Also like

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Bache, Burk continued to publish his critical commentary while out on bail. The conciliatory Dr. Smith, however, soon became disenchanted with Burk and dissolved their partnership, thereby destroying the Time Piece. Eventually, Republican Aaron Burr managed to negotiate a deal by which Burk would be released in exchange for his pledge to leave the country. Upon his release, Burk went into hiding and reappeared in Virginia after Jefferson's election. While the efforts against Bache and Burk did not result in convictions, it is important to understand the Federalists' motive in proceeding against these two publishers. Both Bache and Burk were singled out because they published prominent newspapers critical of the government.

When it was apparent that the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions could not rally enough opposition to nullify the Sedition Act, the Federalists began prosecuting under the Act; a much more potent weapon than the common law. Under the direction of Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, prominent Federalists began monitoring Republican newspapers for seditious expression. When the evidence seemed to warrant a charge, local Federalists proceeded to seek indictments. There is some ambiguity as to the actual number of individuals charged and convicted under the Sedition Act. Anderson's survey, perhaps the most comprehensive, found 24 or 25 arrests, fifteen and possibly more indictments, ten trials and ten convictions. Dorsen, Bender, and Neuborne identify


38 See Miller, pp. 72-73.

39 In large part, this difficulty flows from the fact that only four trials were fully reported. Information on the other trials must come from newspapers, letters, and other accounts of the events. The four trials that are fully reported are United States v. Lyon, Wharton's State Trials 333 (1800); United States v. Haswell, Wharton's State Trials 684 (1800); United States v. Cooper, Wharton's State Trials 659 (1800); and United States v. Callender, Wharton's State Trials 688 (1800).

40 See Anderson, "Enforcement," p. 120.
twenty-five arrests, fifteen indictments, and ten convictions.41 Mott and Emery both say there were fifteen indictments, eleven trials, and ten convictions under the Sedition Act.42 Burns documents sixteen prosecutions and fifteen convictions.43 Page Smith counts fourteen indictments under the Sedition Act and three more under the common law.44

While the Federalists did not bring a plethora of indictments under the Sedition Act, it is important to consider three mitigating factors before dismissing the Sedition Act as an inconsequential episode in American history. First, and foremost, each of the prosecutions under the Sedition Act singled out a leading Republican editor or writer. So while the aggregate number of cases might not be large, the impact of the Act should not be underestimated because of the prominence of the individuals indicted. Second, the Federalists only brought one prosecution in the Republican-dominated southern states.45 By concentrating all of the prosecutions in the predominantly Federalist northern states, the Federalists were able to protect their political power base from challenge. Finally, the Federalist's ability to invoke the Sedition Act was limited by a judicial system which was ill-equipped to handle a substantial number of cases. Since the Sedition Act was a federal law, prosecutions could only be initiated in federal court. At that time, each state had but one federal circuit or superior court. Moreover, each court was in session for only a portion of any year as the six justices of the United States Supreme Court presided over


43See Burns, p. 123.

44See Page Smith, pp. 185-186.

45The only prosecution in a southern state was brought personally by Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase in Virginia. See United States v. Callender, Wharton's State Trials 688 (1800).
these lower federal courts. The structure of the federal court system was a significant barrier to more widespread use of the Sedition Act.46

The Judicial History of Sedition Libel

The constitutional issues raised by the Alien and Sedition Acts never reached the Supreme Court of that era.47 The Court nonetheless has often implied that the founders of the Republic would have rejected federal government restrictions on seditious libel. In Abrams v. United States, for example, Justices Holmes and Brandeis rejected the claim "that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force."48 Justice Black claimed that American history was consistently against such a notion. At one point he noted that "there are no contrary implications in any part of the history of the period in which the First Amendment was framed and adopted."49 In a later case, Justices Black and Douglas boldly concluded that "the First Amendment repudiated seditious libel for this country."50 If this assertion is true, then the Court would have concluded that the Sedition Act was blatantly unconstitutional had it ever considered a case brought under the Act.

Indeed, the legal scholars seem to imply that the Sedition Act was immediately repudiated by the legal community. Schofield's famed essay on freedom of the press

46See Miller, p. 138.


48Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). It seems that Holmes is closer to the mark twelve years earlier where he writes: "The main purpose of such constitutional provisions is to prevent all such previous restraints as had been practised by other governments, and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare." Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).


argues that the Constitution repudiated the English common law tradition of sanctioning seditious libel.\textsuperscript{51} The legal reference treatise, \textit{American Jurisprudence}, claims that the Sedition Act was "vigorously attacked as unconstitutional."\textsuperscript{52} Chafee, the foremost legal commentator on the First Amendment, claimed that the "First Amendment was written by men . . . who intended to wipe out the common law crime of sedition, and make further prosecutions for criticism of the government, without any incitement to law-breaking, forever impossible in the United States of America."\textsuperscript{53} He continues, claiming that "the framers of the First Amendment sought to preserve the fruits of the old victory abolishing the censorship, and to achieve a new victory abolishing sedition prosecutions."\textsuperscript{54}

While such legal accounts are ideologically comforting, they are nonetheless largely inaccurate. Had the Supreme Court ruled on the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798, there is reason to believe that the Court would have found the Act to be constitutional. Moreover, it is highly probable that the Act would have been found to be constitutional by Supreme Court until mid-way through the twentieth century. To believe that the Court would have done otherwise is wishful thinking. It was not until one hundred and sixty-three years after the Act had expired, in \textit{New York Times Co. v. Sullivan}, that the Court held that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional in its opinion striking down an Alabama law that imposed stiff fines on anyone who criticized the behavior of public

\textsuperscript{51} According to Schofield, the American Revolution was intended to abolish the English common law governing freedom of expression. He concluded that the First Amendment obliterated the English common-law test of bad tendency and adopted the truth standard on all matters of public concern. See Henry Schofield, "Freedom of the Press in the United States," \textit{Proceedings of the American Sociological Society} 11 (1914): 67-116.

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{American Jurisprudence} 2d \textit{Seditious Libel} 11 (1973).


\textsuperscript{54} Chafee, \textit{Free Speech in the United States}, p. 22.
officials. Justice Brennan begins the majority opinion by arguing that government restrictions on seditious expression would discourage speakers from making such utterances. He argues it was precisely this sort of seditious speech which the First Amendment was intended to protect. According to Brennan, "it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions." Brennan attempted to establish this claim by referring to a larger historical context in which, while he freely admitted that "the Sedition Act was never tested in Court," he claimed that the "attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history." For example, Brennan made reference to the historical fact that founders of the Republic like Jefferson and Madison had "vigorously attacked" the Act as being "unconstitutional." To support this point Brennan quoted from the Virginia Resolution which:

resolved that it 'doth particularly protest against the palpable and alarming infractions of the Constitution, in the two late cases of the 'Alien and Sedition Acts,' passed at the last session of Congress . . . . (The Sedition Act) exercises . . . a power not delegated by the Constitution, but, on the contrary, expressly and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto—a power which, more than any other, ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled against the right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon, which has even been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right.

Brennan went on to quote at length from the Report on the Virginia Resolution as further evidence that the Act was an unconstitutional limitation on expression. As conclusive evidence that the founding fathers opposed the Sedition Act, Brennan observed that


"Jefferson, as President, pardoned those who had been convicted and sentenced under the Act and remitted their fines," declaring: "I discharge every person under punishment or prosecution under the sedition law, because I considered and now consider, that law to be a nullity, as absolute and as palpable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image."\(^{59}\) The opinion went on to note that "fines levied in its prosecution were repaid by Congress on the ground that it was unconstitutional."\(^{60}\)

Having established that the framers of the Constitution believed the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional, Brennan observed that the "invalidity of the Act has also been assumed by Justices of this Court."\(^{61}\) To support this sweeping generalization Brennan referred to dissenting opinions by Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Abrams,\(^{62}\) and Justice Jackson in Beauharnais.\(^{63}\) In Abrams, Holmes and Brandeis had specifically rejected the claim that the First Amendment left the common law as to seditious libel in force.\(^{64}\) Jackson's dissent in Beauharnais had argued that "criminal libel laws are consistent with the concept of ordered liberty only when applied with safeguards evolved to prevent their invasion of freedom of expression."\(^{65}\) The fact that previous decisions had assumed the was law unconstitutional was proof enough, in Brennan's reasoning, that the Court would surely have ruled the law unconstitutional if they had reviewed it. By referring to the founding fathers and judicial history, Brennan tries to demonstrate that the "court of history" established that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional.


\(^{62}\) See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).


\(^{64}\) Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).

And since the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional, the Alabama law at issue in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* was also necessarily unconstitutional.

*New York Times v. Sullivan: Justice Brennan's Beautiful Lie*

Justice Brennan's majority opinion in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* tries to create the impression that the Court would have declared the Sedition Act unconstitutional had it ever been reviewed. Although it is impossible to prove, there is reason to believe that the Court would have upheld the constitutionality of the Act. The Sedition Act was upheld by the lower federal courts and by three Supreme Court justices presiding over circuit courts. Given the fact that three of the seven justices upheld the act, and given that all of the Justices had been appointed by Federalist presidents, it seems likely that the Supreme Court would have upheld the validity of the Sedition Act. Indeed, the Court accepted more stringent limitations on expression.

Regardless of Brennan's mistaken postdiction regarding what the court of 1798 might have ruled, a close examination reveals that Brennan's reasoning is suspect. While the Court is correct to say that Jefferson and Madison objected to the law, their analysis is incomplete for it does not acknowledge that the founders of the Republic supported state regulation of seditious libel. The Court incorrectly represents the partiality of their reading of history. Given the facts of the case at bar, this could be a decisive error. Since the law being tested in *New York Times Co. v. Sullivan* was an Alabama state law, it seems likely

66 These decisions relied on a "bad tendency" doctrine which allowed the suppression of speech that could lead to an undesirable end. See Dorsen, Bender, and Neuborne, p. 27.

67 There is no judicial record of any of the Justices being consistently opposed to the application of a federal common law in seditious libel prosecutions.

68 For example, the "clear and present danger" test constructed to determine the constitutionality of restrictions under the Espionage and Smith Acts could have been cited as a precedent to uphold the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts. See for example *Schenck v. United States*, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); *Debs v. United States*, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); and *Abrams v. United States*, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
that the law would have been upheld by justices representing the legal and political values of the early 19th century. One could make a strong case, for example, that Jefferson and Madison would have supported the constitutionality of the Alabama law, if only because it was consistent with the state laws defended by the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and with the New York law used to convict Croswell. The same criticism could be advanced against the Court's claim that Jefferson suspended prosecutions, released those imprisoned, and repaid fines. While it is true that Jefferson did terminate Sedition Act prosecutions, he also initiated some prosecutions at the state level. Such behavior hardly proves that he believed in a right of political criticism. Rather, it suggests that he only found the Sedition Act offensive because it was a federal law.

The real error in Brennan's reasoning is not that he misrepresents historical events, but that he closes the circle of historical interpretation into a logical tautology, always subject to refutation precisely because it begs the question at bar. Brennan first injects a modern conception of his understanding of a previous era. He then brings this necessarily confused interpretation back to the present as proof of what he had already decided to do about the Alabama law. Brennan's decision was arbitrary, and his proofs reveal that. He takes little from the facts of the Alabama case, and what he takes from history is nothing but a form from which to hang his personal prejudices.

Early American law drew heavily on English common law, which recognized no right to criticize the monarch. Such seditious expression was first prohibited in Great Britain by statute in 1275, when Parliament made it illegal to communicate "any false news or tales whereby discord of occasion or discord of slander may grow between the king and

69 "Contrary to secondary sources, the Republican-dominated Congress during Jefferson's terms never made a general refund of fines to victims of the sedition law." Stevens, p. 225.
This statute was reenacted in 1379 to prevent the "subversion and destruction" of the realm.71

While such measures may seem extreme, it should be remembered that England had a very different conception of government in that era than at present. In modern England the royalty is largely symbolic and the English Parliament derives its power from the people. Simply put, the people delegate some of their power to Parliament so that the government can function. However, in England of old a very different set of principles were in operation. The King was seen as a divine ruler. The monarch's power came not from the people, but from God. According to Filmer's Patriarcha, since the power of Kings "is by the law of God . . . it hath no inferior law to limit it. The Father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will, not by the laws or wills of his sons or servants."72 Under such a conception of government, the people had no claim on the monarch. Moreover, to criticize the monarch was to criticize God. In the words of James I, "as to dispute what God may do is blasphemy . . . so it is sedition in subjects to dispute what a King may do in the height of his power."73 Given this conception of the King, it is not surprising that such criticism was not tolerated, as is evidenced by the early English laws against seditious expression.

During this era the printing press was viewed primarily as a means by which seditious expression might be more widely disseminated. As a means to control the press the Crown claimed a royal prerogative to regulate all printing. A system was developed in

71 Levy, Legacy of Suppression, p. 7.
which individuals had to submit a manuscript to the government for review prior to publication. Only after the government had purged objectionable material was a license granted to publish the work. Anything published without an official imprimatur was criminal expression. At the height of its infamy this system was composed of three independent but reinforcing agents. The Court of the High Commission was charged with the actual review and licensing of publications. The Stationers Company, a group of printers, was granted a government monopoly over all printing. For enforcement the system relied on the Court of the Star Chamber, so named because it met in a room decorated with stars. The Star Chamber was especially infamous because it usually tried and convicted without a jury. Torture was used to extract confessions and those who confessed to sedition were often sentenced to death.

While the Star Chamber was eventually abolished by the Long Parliament in 1641 the individual speaker was still without any substantive protection. The government used seditious libel prosecutions in the common law courts as a means to control the press. According to Siebert, "convictions for seditious libel ran into the hundreds" in both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{74} Even if an individual was not convicted, the threat of prosecution served as a potent deterrent to critical expression.\textsuperscript{75} In developing such cases the secretary of state had the authority to issue general warrants authorizing office searches. The attorney general could use bills of information to circumvent the grand jury proceeding. When an individual was charged with seditious libel, the truth of his or her expression could not be used as a defense. Moreover, at the trial the jury was charged with determining only the facts of publication. The trial judge, who was appointed by the Crown, had the authority to determine the dangerousness of the


\textsuperscript{75}See Levy, \textit{Legacy of Suppression}, p. 13.
publication, answer all questions of law, and then determine the appropriate penalty.\(^76\) Throughout this period, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen has observed that the practical enforcement of the laws of seditious libel in England "was wholly inconsistent with any serious public discussion of political affairs."\(^77\)

English political thought, even in the age of the Puritan Revolution, recognized only a very limited conception of freedom of speech. This is exemplified in the political philosophy of John Milton and John Locke. While many contemporary scholars have read Milton's *Areopagitica* as a bold libertarian statement, it should be remembered that Milton's argument was against prior restraint and not post publication prosecution. In his words, "those which otherwise come forth, if they be found mischievous and libelous, the fire and the executioner will be the timeliest and the most effectual remedy that man's prevent can use."\(^78\) Toward that end, Milton would have allowed the state to repress speech that challenged the common good. Most notably, Milton would have suppressed the speech of Catholics since their speech challenged conventional religious beliefs. Milton would have allowed the state to treat seditious expression as a capital crime.\(^79\)

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\(^79\) In fact, Milton served for a time as an official government censor. He defended this as consistent with the stance taken in *Areopagitica* by arguing that he was unwilling to extend any protection to printing on contemporary events. William M. Clyde, *The Struggle for Freedom of the Press from Caxton to Cromwell* (1934; reprint, New York: Franklin, 1970), pp. 172-173.
Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* is often hailed as a libertarian statement in defense of freedom of expression. But upon closer examination it suffers from similar limitations. While Locke recognized that a diversity of opinions was necessary to arrive at the truth, he was unwilling to extend protection to all opinions. Rather, Locke believed that certain expression could be suppressed if it failed to add to human understanding. At best, this works out to be a claim for academic freedom. In the practical world, Locke would have allowed the suppression of all speech which challenged existing religious and political norms—unless of course, seditionists were successful in an appeal to God through that trial-by-combat we have come to call "revolution." In *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, Locke warned that "no opinions contrary to human Society, or to those moral Rules which are necessary to the preservation of Civil Society, are to be tolerated by the Magistrate." But perhaps the most cutting indictment of all can be found in the reason Locke opposed licensing laws: While Milton objected in principle, Locke objected on purely economic grounds, afraid lest the state lose an important source of revenue.

Taken together, the works of Milton and Locke reflect a surprising lack of commitment to unfettered political expression. They are primarily concerned with the prevailing system for licensing publication. Milton worries that such a system limits expression, and Locke complains that licensing has created a monopoly to the economic

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81 While Locke saw expression as a means to knowledge, he also realized that certain expression failed to contribute to knowledge. Maurice Cranston, *John Locke* (London: Longmans, Green, 1961), pp. 19-28.


deprivation of the people. But despite this opposition to licensing, neither of these political thinkers is committed to any concept of protecting expression. In particular, both are willing to sanction the suppression of significant segments of unpopular thought.

While this may seem like an extremely narrow conception of freedom of expression, it was not until 1689 that the English Bill of Rights even recognized a legislative privilege for members of Parliament. Indeed, the very phrase "freedom of speech" in this age referred to a parliamentary and not a civil right. In this era the individual citizen spoke entirely at his/her own risk. Even the demise of licensing in 1694 did not protect speech. While an individual could publish without government approval, they could be prosecuted after publication if the government disapproved of the publication's content.

It was not until the end of the eighteenth century that even a limited right of free speech developed. In 1792, the legislators approved Fox's Libel Act, which established truth as a defense and charged the jury instead of the judge with determining whether the material was seditious. While this made conviction more difficult, the government still used prosecutions to control the press. The jury only protected expression when public opinion ran against the government. In the three decades immediately prior to the adoption of the First Amendment in America, the English government initiated seventy sedition prosecutions resulting in fifty convictions. Such prosecutions were common until the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832.

84 See Siebert, pp. 275-276.


86 See Dorsen, Bender, and Neuborne, p. 21. These prosecutions included John Wilkes and the publishers of Junius' Letter to the King.

87 See Chafee, Free Speech in the United States, p. 27.
This English tradition must be taken into account when one assesses the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts. The common law concept of freedom of speech was simply the absence of prior restraint. But while the absence of prior restraint meant that an individual could publish whatever he or she wished, punishment after the fact was permissible. In the words of Blackstone,

"The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity..."

Such a conception of free press allowed individuals to speak freely only at their own risk and the discretion of the government.

This English common law of seditious libel was adopted in America. At first, the English used the doctrine of seditious libel against Americans who were critical of the Crown. Perhaps the most famous of these attempts was the trial of newspaper publisher John Peter Zenger in New York in 1735 for printing attacks on representatives of the King. Zenger had criticized British Governor Cosby for being both incompetent and corrupt. It is important to recognize that the trial judge instructed the jury only to consider the facts of publication. He claimed that he alone would determine whether or not the material was seditious. Fortunately for Zenger, the jury ignored the judge's instructions and accepted Andrew Hamilton's argument that truth was a defense and voted for acquittal. This outcome notwithstanding, the prevailing law of the land was the English common law. Had Zenger attacked the popular New York Assembly instead of the unpopular royal governor, it is likely that he would have been convicted.

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89 See *The Trial of John Peter Zenger*, 17 Howell's State Trials 675 (1735).
It should also be remembered that the Zenger prosecution was not an isolated occurrence. Most of the American colonies had laws against seditious libel in effect throughout this period. Levy identifies a host of prosecutions for seditious expression initiated against revolutionary critics of England.\footnote{See Levy, \textit{Emergence of a Free Press}, pp. 16-88.} Even after the American revolution, the seditious libel doctrine was used to silence critics of the fledgling American government. Smith identifies the trial of Congressman Samuel Cabell for seditious libel in 1798, and prosecutions against Benjamin Bache and John Daly Burke in 1798 prior to the passage of the Sedition Act.\footnote{See Smith, pp. 95, 183-184, and 188-220.} Commenting on precisely this period, Levy concludes, "freedom of speech and press was so little known that even libertarian theory regarded the right to express seditious sentiments as an intolerable indulgence in licentiousness."\footnote{Levy, \textit{Legacy of Suppression}, p. 17.} When considered against this background, there is good reason to believe that the Supreme Court may have upheld the constitutionality of the Sedition Act. There was a long and established tradition of seditious libel prosecutions. At best, the common law tradition was only beginning to recognize certain procedural guarantees, as evidenced by Fox's Libel Law. So while there was some impetus toward increased protection for expression, there was no recognized right to criticize the government. The common law tradition grew to afford the critic a right to a jury trial and a truth defense. The Sedition Act of 1798 was consistent with this tradition.

While we may wish that our founding fathers had a more liberal conception of free speech, there is little to suggest that they had moved significantly away from the common law by 1798. The evidence in the years from 1776 to the adoption of the Sedition Act seems to suggest that our founding fathers were hardly as committed to free expression as the modern Court suggests in \textit{New York Times Co. v. Sullivan}. Thus, despite Brennan's masterful use of rhetoric in drafting the majority opinion, there is reason to believe that

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\footnote{See Levy, \textit{Emergence of a Free Press}, pp. 16-88.}

\footnote{See Smith, pp. 95, 183-184, and 188-220.}

\footnote{Levy, \textit{Legacy of Suppression}, p. 17.}
the Supreme Court would have upheld convictions brought under the Sedition Act. The Court had a long history of tolerating the suppression of seditious expression. Moreover, such suppression was consistent with the prevailing common law tradition in operation at that time.

Such a reading of events turns the traditional legal account on its head. Rather than being a force defending the right to seditious expression, the Court functioned as a tool of repression. In the early years of the Republic, the Court simply ignored government efforts to repress seditious expression. In the early twentieth century, the Court invoked the phrase "clear and present danger" to justify the repression of such speech. It is only in the past three decades that the Court has begun to extend constitutional protection to speech critical of the government. This was allowed by the Court's subtle alteration in the application of "clear and present danger" test, thereby creating a more rigorous test. The Court has now overcome its own legacy and simply declares that seditious libel has always been protected. In the end, the Court has arrived at the principle that seditious libel should be protected unless it is intended to, and successful in, instigating imminent lawless action. The point is that this is not an initial premise that the Court has steadfastly applied throughout American history, but rather a conclusion that the Court has arrived at relatively recently.

The Judicial System and the First Amendment

The fact that the contemporary Supreme Court makes significant constitutional claims by presuming how previous Courts would have interpreted the same issues is significant for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that the Court is not the great champion of rights it is purported to be. Second, it illustrates how the judicial system is able to construct constitutional rights. A detailed account of the Court's treatment of seditious libel reveals that the Court can hardly be praised for leading the nation to a new

understanding of constitutional rights. Despite the portentous tone of Supreme Court opinions it is not readily apparent that significant threats to an open society were present in any of the sedition cases upheld by the Court, nor that the legal rules adopted by the Court in those cases could have had any useful systemic consequences even if such threats had been present. Judicial review does not address the causes of intolerance and censorship, nor does it constitute a meaningful check on legislative or public repression.

Such a conclusion directly challenges the traditional role of protector of rights commonly ascribed to the Court. With respect to the First Amendment, this role has been championed by numerous commentators.94 Chafee believed that the Court could broadly interpret the First Amendment to protect speech.95 Emerson has argued that "we have come to depend upon legal institutions and legal doctrines as a major technique for maintaining our system of free expression."96 Commager claims that the Court could play "an active, even a decisive, part in the preservation of liberty."97 Blasi has argued that the courts can protect the First Amendment during pathological periods during which the tendency toward suppression is pronounced.98 Indeed, Baum has gone so far as to conclude that "the Court has been far more supportive of the First Amendment rights than the other branches of government, whose policies frequently have been antagonistic


96Emerson, p. 5.


to these rights." Even those who recognize the Court's erratic record on free speech have been quick to offer a defense for its actions. Bork claims that the Court has made fundamental errors in interpreting the First Amendment and then goes on to assign the courts the responsibility of protecting the public's "freedom to discuss government and its policies." Abraham worries that the Court may not have done enough to protect "The Precious Freedom of Expression," yet concludes that "in the final analysis we must confidently look to the Court to draw a line based on constitutional common sense." Cox summarily dismisses decisions restricting First Amendment freedoms as "minor blemishes."

A more accurate conclusion would be that the Court historically has done little to protect speech and has only gradually come to afford protection to First Amendment freedoms. It was not until 1963, and a case involving an attack on a public person by The New York Times, that the Court finally declared that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional. The Alien and Sedition Acts posed a difficult problem for the Court as there was no convenient way to reconcile the conspicuous non-decision regarding the Alien and Sedition Acts with decisions protecting seditious libel. To overcome this deficiency, Justice Brennan simply created a fictional account of legal history in which the founders of the Republic and framers of the Constitution created a right to criticize the government; popular champions such as Jefferson and Madison zealously protected free and robust political debate against legislative excess; and the Court righteously protected the integrity of this commitment. The result is a "beautiful lie;" a rhetorical fiction that creates a desired and desirable reality which could not otherwise exist. By an objective


101Abraham, p. 219.

102Cox, p. 49.
standard, such as consistency with the documentary evidence, the lie fails badly. Yet, in this instance "false" history serves Brennan well as it squares the past with the present, provides a perfect warrant for dismissing an Alabama law repressing speech, and allows punishment for seditious libel to be declared unconstitutional. That this is a "beautiful" lie can be easily demonstrated in that the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan decision has been used as a premise in later decisions affording additional protections to speech and that the decision has been heartily praised.