The study of literature can be a discipline only insofar as it is capable of the systemization typical of other human sciences. The possibility of system poses two directions of research: (1) exploring what conditions make system possible; and (2) discovering what follows from the fact of system's possibility. Northrop Frye followed the second possibility. More recently, Rene Girard has staked out the first: the origin of all human system—in effect, what makes the human sciences possible. By following Frye's road not taken, the promise of his democratic paideia for all verbal culture is recovered. Literature is not constituted by building blocks called archetypes, but rather "minds" them, as it minds all other human action, but especially imitation, the most fundamental and potent action of all. The study of literature not only minds all rule-governed behavior, but is interested as well in the interference or feedback it produces in its novices, as well as the wish to "be like" other players. Finally, the infinite possibilities of all verbal culture must be reconciled to the specific historical limits and potentials of "English." University and postelementary curricula are based on a canon, even while that canon is being expanded to include the voiceless. The challenge to any model for a progressive education in literature is to unite elementary and postelementary practice across this divide between good imaginative writing and cultural monuments. The answer is to insist on a distinct knowledge base of literary studies—Shakespeare's "King Lear" is fundamental research in the shaping and misshaping of human solidarity. (Thirty-eight notes are attached.) (Author/RAE)
The Center for the Learning and Teaching of Elementary Subjects was awarded to Michigan State University in 1987 after a nationwide competition. Funded by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education, the Elementary Subjects Center is a major project housed in the Institute for Research on Teaching (IRT). The program focuses on conceptual understanding, higher order thinking, and problem solving in elementary school teaching of mathematics, science, social studies, literature, and the arts. Center researchers are identifying exemplary curriculum, instruction, and evaluation practices in the teaching of these school subjects; studying these practices to build new hypotheses about how the effectiveness of elementary schools can be improved; testing these hypotheses through school-based research; and making specific recommendations for the improvement of school policies, instructional materials, assessment procedures, and teaching practices. Research questions include, What content should be taught when teaching for conceptual understanding and higher level learning? How do teachers concentrate their teaching to use their limited resources best? and In what ways is good teaching subject matter-specific?

The work is designed to unfold in three phases, beginning with literature review and interview studies designed to elicit and synthesize the points of view of various stakeholders (representatives of the underlying academic disciplines, intellectual leaders and organizations concerned with curriculum and instruction in school subjects, classroom teachers, state- and district-level policymakers) concerning ideal curriculum, instruction, and evaluation practices in these five content areas at the elementary level. Phase II involves interview and observation methods designed to describe current practice, and in particular, best practice as observed in the classrooms of teachers believed to be outstanding. Phase II also involves analysis of curricula (both widely used curriculum series and distinctive curricula developed with special emphasis on conceptual understanding and higher order applications), as another approach to gathering information about current practices. In Phase III, test models of ideal practice will be developed based on what has been learned and synthesized from the first two phases.

The findings of Center research are published by the IRT in the Elementary Subjects Center Series. Information about the Center is included in the IRT Communication Quarterly (a newsletter for practitioners) and in lists and catalogs of IRT publications. For more information, to receive a list or catalog, or to be placed on the IRT mailing list to receive the newsletter, please write to the Editor, Institute for Research on Teaching, 252 Erickson Hall, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824-1034.

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Abstract

The study of literature can be a discipline only insofar as it is capable of the systemization typical of other human sciences. The possibility of system poses two directions of research: What conditions make system possible? What follows from the fact of system's possibility? Northrop Frye followed the second possibility; more recently, René Girard has staked out the first: the origin of all human system—in effect, what makes the human sciences possible. By following Frye's road not taken, we recover the promise of his democratic paideia for all verbal culture. Literature is not constituted by building blocks called archetypes, but rather "minds" them, as it minds all other human action, but especially imitation, the most fundamental and potent action of all. The study of literature not only minds all rule-governed behavior, but is interested as well in the interference or feedback it produces in its novices, as well as the wish to "be like" other players.

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Introduction

This is one of a series of eight reports being prepared for Study 2 of Phase I of the research agenda of the Center for the Learning and Teaching of Elementary Subjects. Phase I calls for surveying and synthesizing the opinions of various categories of experts concerning the nature of elementary-level instruction in mathematics, science, social studies, literature, and the arts, with particular attention to how teaching for understanding and problem solving should be handled with such instruction. Michigan State University faculty who have made important contributions to their own disciplines were invited to become Board of Discipline members and to prepare papers describing historical developments and current thinking in their respective disciplines concerning what ought to be included in the elementary school curriculum. These papers include a sociohistorical analysis of how the discipline should be represented as an elementary school subject, what content should be taught, and the nature of the higher level thinking and problem solving outcomes that should be assessed. This paper focuses on the discipline of literature; the other seven papers focus on the disciplines of mathematics, science, political science, geography, history, music, and art.

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... the journey toward one's own identity, which literature does so much to help with, has a great deal to do with escaping from the alleged "reality" of what one is reading or looking at, and recognizing the convention behind it. The same process exists in the elementary teaching of literature, or should. The child should not "believe" the story he is told; he should not disbelieve it either, but send out imaginative roots into that mysterious world between the "is" and the "is not" which is where his own ultimate freedom lies.

... education has politicity, the quality of being political. As well, politics has educability, the quality of being educational. Political events are educational and vice versa. Because education is politicity, it is never neutral. When we try to be neutral, like Pilate, we support the dominant ideology. Not being neutral, education must either be liberating or domesticating. (Yet I also recognize that we probably never experience it as purely one or the other but rather a mixture of both.)

The Gap between (1) Elementary "Language Arts" and Postelementary English": (2) "Good Reading" and GREAT BOOKS

To assign the study of literature for the elementary curriculum is to append oneself at the end of hundreds of years worth of choices or selections already imbedded in the history of the word "literature." As Raymond Williams suggests, the term "literature," which once indicated whatever was in letters, then whatever was printed, then whatever was in books, then books of a certain kind, presumably not sworn to be true, and finally, worthy enough of academic study and appreciation, now traces the circumstances of a disabling specialization of literacy in English. As the Teachers Training Teachers (TTT) Program emphasized twenty years ago, when it placed "ordinary" (ordinatus) university faculty in the secondary schools, teacher education is the business of everyone who teaches college students, and literacy is an across the curriculum responsibility. Yet the same bifurcation between pedagogy and disciplinary content at the university level that the TTT Program tried to redress still exists, at least in the experience of most education majors. The university courses they take in literature are content-oriented, attentive to a certain canon of Great Books, even when that canon is being revised. Literature courses are based on the specific, irreplaceable value of these texts--
texts which, for the most part, elementary education majors will never teach themselves.

Much of the research of the last twenty years, especially in relation to cognitive psychology, has prepared the way for a new synthesis of literacy in all its forms. But an exclusive emphasis on higher order thinking and problem solving, however, is more likely to develop a model of literacy generalizable for any verbal culture, and less likely to treasure the unique resources of specific cultures. Critics of skills approaches like E. D. Hirsch, Jr., have listed such resources for American English, but such lists, by default, argue no purpose for the schools other than "normalization," the school making the student adjust to the society. The first problem facing the systematizing of literary study (the gap between elementary and postelementary practice) involves the second: the present conflict between pedagogical theory for the "language arts" and the disciplinary content of English.

"English" must provide an explanation of the content of literary study in English so clear and compelling that it mediates this gap in the service of all its practitioners. In the following paper, I will propose a defense of literary studies as having a knowledge base of its own, separate from other disciplines, unique to itself. With such an argument in place, the study of literature as a systematic disciplinary practice can better enter into reciprocity with current research in reading, writing, higher order thinking and problem solving, yet maintain its integrity as one of the human sciences. A year's worth of steady reading has convinced me of the conceptual vitality and thoroughness of research in pedagogy for elementary education. It will take at least another four years of preparation to enter the complex negotiations of how literature should be taught at the beginning, in relation and combination with other disciplines and social commitments. But at least without such an argument as I propose to defend literary studies, no one currently responsible
for teaching literature at the elementary level will have any time for any university academic prescribing assignments in fifteen-minute bytes.

There are obvious reasons why locally controlled elementary educational systems may never share a common syllabus, a city-wide, regional, or national canon, until students reach the academic level where expectations set by national college admissions officers make themselves felt. Without a canon in common, literature in elementary education more often focuses on the affective response to literature, in company with reading and writing programs. To put it crudely, any good writing at the appropriate basal level will serve to develop the targeted skills. Within the constraints of the focus on reader-response, there is also real work done in introducing children to an esthetic appreciation of literature (one dominant interest of Patricia Cianciolo’s work over the last twenty years) but aesthetic appreciation by itself cannot bring instructor and students closer to the teaching of literature which follows at the secondary level, insofar as that syllabus, susceptible to college ideas about literature and literary study, focuses on a canon, on literature which has served a specific function, which has a verifiable history of influence in this language and this culture. Taste is clearly a child of history, often a covert expression of social class; there is no native, democratic appetite for Shakespeare, Milton, or Virginia Woolf.

The Fate of Northrop Frye’s Promise of a Democratic Progressive Education in Literary Study

This (empty) bifurcation between literature as a workbook for literacy, and literary study at higher academic levels as a "civilizing" virtue not requiring further, more precise justification, is precisely the problem that Northrop Frye’s theory of literary criticism addressed in 1957. For Frye, literature could be seen as a coherent field composed of typically recurring forms (archetypes) which could be studied systematically. Thus a poetics, grammar,
and a pedagogy of literary study was possible. Frye's work over the next thirty years was to spell out the implications of system across educational practice, from the elementary level to the graduate seminar. An elementary education in typically recurring narrative patterns and a poetic (metaphorical) use of language, while it clearly served the development of advancing literacy, also led systematically into the study of canonical works, exemplary in their consideration of these recurring forms. A predisposition in young readers for popular science and detective fiction, folklore, and television serials could be led, with the proper education, to the recognition of these same patterns comprehended in the great literary monuments.

Frye's influence has waned in the eighties, in precisely the manner that bedevils all attempts at systematic improvement. Objections to the reductive nature of Frye's model, his "regulation" of literary study, fair enough and potentially progressive, were put in the form that suggests (or allows itself to suggest) we need not read him any longer, instead of a form that could suggest how we go forward, to consolidate the ground that he has won for us. Thus the state of literature as a discipline he addressed in the fifties, academic critics piling up "readings" in a vacant lot, hoping they will be of use to someone else; the telling absence of any teachable poetics of literary study accessible to any young intelligent student; and the corresponding influx of other disciplines (history, philosophy, cognitive psychology, and psycholinguistics) into the vacuum caused by literary study having no theory of its own, to tell this discipline what it really does, and what it can know, albeit indirectly, has returned. Following from this, literature in the elementary classroom as a subject is in danger of returning to the up-for-grabs situation of the pre-Frye era.

It is my argument that Frye gave us a shove forward, from kindergarten to the graduate seminar, in the direction of a real understanding of what
disciplinary practice is specific to the study of literature and what social use that practice uniquely serves. The next step in following Frye is to further situate literary theory within a specific language, literature, culture by asking, What is the content of the "English" canon, what has been specifically excluded as well as included by this historical formation? English is a world language and a world literature, to be sure, but not, if one inspects its lexical and narrative assets, the only language and literature in the world.

Where should we start, at the beginning or at advanced literacy? The issue of what the practice of literary study is, and what it practices on--given the realities of how power is distributed in our profession--will, at least in the foreseeable future, be decided and consecrated at the university level. It would seem then, that the way to establish the study of literature in the elementary classroom as a discipline of its own, beyond its assistance to the necessary and valuable training of language arts, is to recover what is essential in Frye, and revise where he himself is still in the midst of revising: the questions of what archetypes are, where do they come from, what role do they play in society, and what pedagogical practice is most appropriate to literary study? Further, this revision must take place within the context of the dominant theories of the language arts, and prove itself more comprehensive than those current theories.

I will approach this task in four stages: the situation of literary studies which Frye addressed, the theory which he offered, the limits of his theory--as they were gradually elaborated by Frye himself as well as his critics--and finally, a revision of Frye by means of the work of René Girard, which coordinates Frye's work to the dominant theories which have outmoded him, from a position which comprehends them all. In each case, I will cite the corresponding practice of literary study at the elementary level, to show how
practice follows theory from above (although I will have little to say, for reasons I will explain, about what should be done minute by minute in elementary English).

The Development of Frye’s Model: The Archetype

It would be difficult to overestimate the effect that Northrop Frye’s first book, Fearful Symmetry (1947), had on the recuperation of William Blake as an intelligible poetic voice in the English tradition. Frye anatomized Blake to register a consistency of poetic attention and method. As he explained in the introduction to Anatomy of Criticism (1957), Frye turned afterwards to Spenser, a different kind of poet, because he wanted to see if the principles of criticism he worked out in defending and clarifying Blake had a wider application. This study soon led him, as he explains, to a larger examination of poetic symbolism, then to a poetics of literature itself.

Frye had insisted on a regular and systematic pattern of recurring forms and symbols in Blake, against the received idea of Blake as a madman, a simple. In the same way, Frye’s attention turned to the typically recurring features of poetic symbolism across specific poets, at first in the English tradition, but soon abroad in what Frye was to call "literature as a whole." Frye argued that it was possible to consolidate individual analysis of individual authors and the study of separate generic or national traditions, into one system and one ensemble of analytical procedures. Thus Frye took his place among the great comparative analytical practitioners of the last two centuries, who inspected languages, religions, cultures, organic systems, even matter itself, for their constituent elements and recurring structures. The Origin of the Species, The Oxford English Dictionary, and the periodic table of the elements are but three examples of the fruits of the comparative method. Frye belongs in particular to the modern generation of comparatists, who enable
their comparisons by putting aside, at least temporarily, the question of origins. (Synchronic linguistics and structural anthropology likewise forego the questions of origins, in order to free themselves to map the typically recurring.) Frye's methods are above all methodologically practical: whatever is interesting enough in literary language to isolate for critical attention, Frye calls a symbol. The units of attention which recur in a significant or recognizable way reflect the structure or tonality of the work. The recurrence of such symbols across works, authors, and traditions, generic and national, Frye calls "archetypes"--expected recurrences. To the question, "What guarantees these recurrences?" the only answer is the imagination or, as in the case of the structuralists themselves, MIND. Thus these recurring elements, symbols, archetypes, themselves reflect or reveal the structure of the imagination.

Transforming the Resistance to Frye into a Revision of Frye

Some of the resistance to Frye was certainly temperamental: Could one actually determine a finite series of recurring patterns in all literature? Could literary study become systematic? The most responsible critical rethinking of Frye's theory has been the attempt to answer the questions he only temporarily set aside: what determines repetition? 10

The symmetry that Frye discovered in Blake was easily accounted for by authorial integrity. But when Frye brought these considerable skills for structural analysis, classification, comparison, and consolidation to bear on literature as a whole, it was less clear what symmetry indicated beyond itself. Recent research in literary study has somewhat left literature as an independent structural entity behind, in favor of various kinds of reader-response criticism, or the historicizing of the text's production. In either case, literary pattern is now understood as working for someone's benefit, never for
itself, by itself. The attention to the politics of reading and interpretation has called into question the possibility of any consensus for the procedures of literary study as one of the human sciences. Yet the role of the reader or History cannot itself explain or account for the independently verifiable symmetry Frye established across what he called "literature as a whole."

The recognition of the typically recurring, which Frye calls the symbol within a particular work, or the archetype (when considering these repetitions within literature as a whole) is an important place to mark the choices Frye foresaw and the decision he made in the face of those choices. Frye, like Levi-Strauss, did not ask what made archetypes possible, but what do archetypes make possible? That is, what followed from the fact that there was an observable and verifiable order in the literary universe? His answer was a whole paideia, when properly presented, intelligible to any intelligent nineteen year-old, as he argues in the "Polemical Introduction" to Anatomy of Criticism (1957). Further, the repeatable, verifiable (and therefore, teachable) recognition of recurring literary structures guarantees that real knowledge is to be gained from literary study, not simply polishing, rounding, or softening its students, or whatever instrument of shaping and ruling a dominant class prefers. Ideally, an education in literary study implies an inclusive interest in all expressions of a verbal culture, instead of the education of a narrow taste for a dominant class. For Frye, liberation, not refinement, is the goal of a liberal education.

Frye, therefore, faced a fundamental choice when he recognized the omnipresence of the archetypes he studied: backwards, towards origins (what guarantees the recurrence of these archetypes?) or forward (what follows from the fact that they are possible?) To go forward promised a comprehensible rationale of literary study as one center of a humanistic education. One can hardly quarrel with one of the most gifted and wide-ranging literary intellectuals of
our time, especially when we consider the influence he achieved throughout the
educational system. The furthest extent of the influence of Frye’s work is
seen, at the level of pedagogy, curriculum, and textbook, primarily in the six-
ties and seventies. Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich published a series of text-
books for middle school, secondary, and undergraduate curricula, which made a
curriculum out of Frye’s insistence that archetypes were themselves the
building blocks of literature, and metaphors the structural unit of literary
composition. These texts have been “outmoded,” ruled to be out-of-fashion
but Frye’s hypothesis of a systematic education in literary study has been ine-
vitably set aside along with Frye himself.

How did this happen? It is fair to point out that going forward from ar-
chetypes, determining a pedagogy by beginning with the founding certitude that
the recognition of these structures is possible, led ultimately to the reifica-
tion of these symbols, significant observable features, as the structure of lit-
erature itself. Despite the disclaimers of nearly every proselyte of Frye, and
Frye himself, the student functions primarily as critic-anatomist, a master of
classifying works of literature according to their “kind,” even in the faithful
and detailed elementary program synthesized by Glenna Sloan. Archetypes ARE
the structure of literature.

The resistance to Frye’s theories came from two directions. From fellow
theorists came the questions, “Where do archetypes come from?” “What control-
ling mechanism guarantees their recurrence?” Secondly, from practitioners—
whether critics writing literary analysis or teachers at every level discussing
literature in class, for whom thinking about literature by means of the typica-
ly recurring, the archetype, became primarily classificatory: “What is this
work before us (primarily) an example of?”

Yet to turn away from Frye’s verifiable results because they seem me-
chanical would only be an exercise in bad temper. Frye first consolidated

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the systematic observations of other theorists into a system of systems; then he foreshortened this system into an intelligible paideia. He did not invent the archetypal plots of comedy and tragedy, although he helped us see their common base. To redefine archetypes, without denying the coherency and promise of Frye's system, is to get beyond this problem, in order to recover for the educational system the most ambitiously systematic, progressive, and humane version of literary study in this century.

The first step of this revision is fairly obvious: literary thinking is never simply thinking "in" archetypes. Even in the most programmatic imitation, thinking "in" is also thinking "about" archetypes as well. Every human imitation necessarily fails at perfect repetition, swerving a distance, a potentially critical distance away from its progenitor. It is this recognizable combination of imitation and variation or even mimetic interference and resistance that characterizes all composition, all learning, probably all cultural exchange.

Literature Researches Imitation. Which Is at once the Founding Skill of All Cultures, as well as their Greatest Threat

To turn to the idea that these literary structures can themselves be the content, and not the final, irreducible building blocks of a literary work, we need to "mimeticize" Frye in the light of the theory of René Girard. I have written about the consequences of this revision in greater detail elsewhere; here, I will limit myself to the more general claim that the pedagogical practice specific to literary study as a discipline is the self-critical consideration of imitation as both method and theme, form as well as content. Literature does not simply give us examples of bourgeois sensibility, genres, historical events, and economic class formations, but mimics them. What we must teach, (and we must begin with teachers-who-teach-teachers), is the specific intellectual potential of higher order thinking and problem solving opened up
through literature's "minding" of (thinking about, caring for, attending to, being critical of) psychological, social, political, and scientific structures or "schema", especially its minding of the consequences of mimicry itself. Literature is both imitation and—in certain canonical works which we have never been able to put aside (above all, Shakespeare), even when our theoretical reasons for studying them were especially impoverished or confused—a meditation on the individual, dyadic, and collective consequences of imitation. Literature "minds" things like genres and canons—thinks them, simulates, attends to them, but also "mimics," even resists them, interferes with their (often covert) ideological purposes. Imitation is the sine qua non of all biological order. To be part of any order, biological and/or social, the "aspirant" must be able to mimic, to mind, and the order must be susceptible to mimicking and minding. Imitation is the most fundamental activity of all culture, whether human or animal, at the macrolevel of the group or herd, or even at the level of the single cell, which mimics or communicates with other cells; from single cell mimickry to the social dynamics on the playground, cells and kids aspire to being like and being with others.

All research depends on controlled simulation, representation. Literary re-presentation is a form of research whose results, real results, are retrievable through the study of literature. The ultimate social value of the study of literature, as a systematic pedagogical practice throughout the curriculum, is its fundamental contribution to understanding what causes societies to band and disband. If one were to continue here, at this level of generalization, one might argue that the primary lesson plan for literary study at all levels is learning how to turn imitation away from catastrophic, violent rivalry (imitating the desires of others), towards nonviolent identification. Imitation, the oldest subject of literary criticism, is also the most necessary, the
most vital subject of study, THE founding skill of all higher order thinking and problem solving.

Our Literature Is in English

Before we continue with this necessary reconsideration of Frye, we will look selectively at current theories which influence the language arts. In particular, we will try to fashion the consensus between formalism and content E. D. Hirsch, Jr., has called for in Cultural Literacy. But I will not be arguing that we simply turn literary study altogether over to Frye, Girard, and critical theory. The study of literature, like other disciplines, depends on specific observation as well as theory. Girard’s theory is even more ambitious than Frye’s, a model, finally, for all cultures, animal as well as human. English teachers must recover the specific history of mimetic entanglements. By mimetic entanglements I mean all the "things" that can go wrong when people in a society of necessity imitate each other, as well as the attempts they make to explain and resolve these entanglements). For English teachers in Western culture, this recovery of entanglements will occur primarily in "English Studies." Literary study in English that pays specific attention to its unique assets (in the form of its Great Books) can help us begin to see that (unlike the consensus in the social sciences) all cultures are not the same, equally ethnocentric, sexist, racist. In particular, within Western culture, literary study can help us specify and understand this peculiar nonculture of our own we call modern, that has produced, at great cost, this precious critical vocabulary of antisemitism, sexism, racism, even when this critical vocabulary uneasily or hypocritically coexists with the violence it would explain.
Post-Sputnik English: Putting Aside "Discipline" in Favor of "Development"

Researchers generally agree that the situation of the study of literature in American elementary classrooms in the sixties was profoundly affected by the "Sputnik Reforms,"

... which led ultimately to the organization of the national research and development project called Project English, to the inclusion of English (including institutes for teachers) in the National Defense Education Act, and to support such influential elementary school studies as Ruth Strickland's *The Contributions of Structural Linguistics to the Teaching of Reading, Writing, and Grammar in the Elementary School*, Walter Loban's influential *The Language of Development of Children*, and the cluster of projects which became known as First Grade Reading Studies.

One effect observable even in the paragraph above is the disappearance of literature from immediate association with English, in favor of the language of skills and development. This preference was given particular authority by the extraordinarily influential month-long Anglo-American Seminar at Dartmouth in 1966.

Both Arthur Applebee and Edmund J. Farrell have written that the British participants effectively turned aside an American interest in the demands of the discipline, to model English instruction rather on the psychological and intellectual development of the child. Nancy L. Roser, however, sees the preference of process over content developing over a longer time frame than the politicized context of the sixties: "... beginning about 1920, books for teachers seemed much less concerned with what to read and much more concerned with transmitting the how to teach." Daisy M. Jones's survey of language art curriculum guides current during the sixties, however, found little attention given to appreciation, attitudes, and values, and less attention to procedures likely to educate them, and few recommendations for content or technique. Norine Odland's review in 1969 of resources and research, *Teaching Literature in the Elementary School* says flatly that "the preparation of teachers in the
area of teaching literature in the elementary school is not clearly defined or described."²²

According to "Developmentalists," Literature Tells Us What We Already Know

A good example of the kind of defense of literary study at the elementary level turned aside by such influences as the Dartmouth Seminar, was the survey by Jean Shaw of children's literature from 1850 to 1964. Shaw found that six themes recurred throughout children's fiction, reflecting the contemporaneous social and political thought in America.²³ Shaw's work is like Frye's, in that she discovers literary forms repeating themselves, and takes this repetition as the sign of a coherent field of study. Her argument also reveals what prevailing objections to literary study needed answering in the sixties. Literature is defended by Shaw as valuable because it does not make up imaginary patterns, but follows "real" thought, reflecting (but not "minding") reality. Thus literature's coherence can be explained by the same procedures as history—it has no knowledge base of its own. To explain the recurrence of literary pattern, we must turn to history.

One of the most influential texts for elementary English over the last ten years, Coody and Nelson's Teaching Elementary Language Arts, is subtitled "A Literature Approach," but its defense of literature dismisses content altogether in favor of skills:

Unlike other subject areas, language arts does not have an inherent content. It provides the means to encode language, to translate thought into speech and reading, and to decode, to transform language into meaning and thought. The process of encoding draws on the expressive language arts skills-speaking and writing. Decoding, on the other hand, draws on the receptive skills—reading and listening.²⁴

Coody and Nelson follow the acceptance of myth as (just) another legitimate literature for study, an acceptance which Frye among others helped to prepare, but the recurrence of certain forms in myth across cultures is given three
alternative explanations—in effect, no real explanation at all: migration of 
a common ancestor, borrowing and exchanging between cultures, and "... the 
commonly held belief that peoples in different parts of the world and in differ-
ent eras posed the same basic questions about life and came up with similar an-
wers" (350). Myth offers no reward to serious intellectual effort—at best, 
it contains what everybody already knows, in whatever culture. In no way does 
myth serve to educate the reader into systematic literary study, which, in 
turn, can deliver the specific content that literature's special kind of re-
search offers.

The most interesting recent arguments for the study of literature have 
come as attempts to reconcile developmental, student-centered, and content-
centered approaches (although content may only mean "real" nonbasal literature, 
which provides better workbooks for literacy skills than linguists and reading 
specialists do).

Children learn to read, Meek's argument runs, by interaction with 
"what they find to be significant texts" (141). The contribution of 
structuralist theory could be in considering what constitutes "sig-
nificant text." Importantly, I believe, this is what the researchers 
into the reading process do not do—what even the psycholinguists 
lack is deep consideration of the quality of the text itself, an an-
swer to the question, "What difference does the kind of story and 
form of discourse make?" Can basal readers ever possibly teach the 
same reading lessons as "real" literature, or what the child consid-
ers "significant text"?

Sawyer argues that children's lives are too complex to be interested in the 
simple plots of basal readers. For them, only a narrative as complicated as 
the life they see around them is a "significant text." Significance here seems 
to mean that the children see corroborated in school literature what they al-
ready know from life outside—narrative complexity is symbolic for these chil-
dren in Frye's sense of a recurrence worthy of attention. Yet Sawyer has only 
gone far enough to suggest that literature can be significant in corroborating 
what children already know, instead of teaching them what they don't know.
However, Sawyer’s sense of the interactive relation of literature and society is one I wish to take up later, when we consider Paulo Freire, but first we must turn to the matter of how student-centered or developmental theories, in isolation from content-centered approaches to English studies, in fact reinforce Sawyer’s upper limit of learning what you already know in literature. In particular, a consideration of recent approaches to the study of literature as a rule-governed behavior will lead us back to considering the method as well as the content of literature.

**Literature as Just Another Example of What We Already Know about Rule-Governed Behavior**

James Britton has been one of the most influential "developmental" theorists in English Education in the post-Sputnick era. In some ways, Britton’s more recent comments on literary study remarkably recall Frye’s.

... by taking part in the rule-governed behaviors of listening to stories, enacting them in a make-believe play, and reading and writing them, young writers pick up the forms appropriate to a range of narrative purposes. And they do so in ways that are indistinguishable from the ways in which the genres first evolved. Children make narratives, like all writers, from models at hand. Frye has named these models or forms archetypes, expected sequences of events. Frye’s work can never be set aside because he has given us the most comprehensive anatomy of the rules and models of literary production, especially in the English tradition. Britton’s formulation makes clearer the way both Britton and Frye can be inserted within what Hirsch has popularized as "schema theory" (although Marilyn Wilson is surely right to argue that schema theory itself goes back at least to Edmund Huey). For Britton, the operative phrase in the quote above is "rule-governed behavior." What Britton sees at work in literary production is really no different from any other game, and a child or novice now is in the same situation, for all we know, as the first person who ever used the form.
In taking part in rule-governed behavior, individuals may internalize implicit rules by modes that are indistinguishable from the modes in which those rules were socially generated in the first place—and the modes by which they continue, by social consensus, to be adjusted or amended. In taking part in rule-governed behavior—and that might be a wine-and-cheese party, a debate, a game of volley-ball—the novice, the individual learner, picks up the rules by responding to the behavior of others, a process precisely parallel to the mode by which the rules first came into existence. (74)

The theory that Britton follows above has two, wide-ranging premises: the learning process of all rule-governed behavior is the same, and rules for learning rules follow the same model which determined the origin of these rules. Rule-governed behavior is common, and the model for its origin is common as well. There is both a social psychology and an anthropology behind Britton's comments on rules. Both are indifferent, like structuralism, to the specific density and evolution of particular cultures, and particular historical moments within each culture. Sooner or later one must ask, "where does the first rule first come from"? Later I will try to suggest, partly arguing from my essay on Girard published separately, how literature as a discipline and a content researches the answer to this question of origins. The short form of Britton's answer would be: "Vygotsky."

. . . human consciousness results from the transformation of forms of shared social behavior into derived forms of inner or mental behavior on the part of the individual alone. In Vygotsky's own words: "An interpersonal process is transformed into an intrapersonal one. Every function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first, on the social level and later on the individual level. . . . All the higher functions originate as actual relations between human individuals (1978, p.57)." The primary example of this process is that of the internalization of speech, which is first manifested as conversation, to create the post-language symbols that are the units of thinking, the means by which we make and exchange meanings. Vygotsky similarly sees make-believe play as the precursor of imagination; it is more accurate, he claims, to call "imagination" in the adolescent (or the adult) "make-believe play without action" than it is to call young children's make-believe play "imagination in action." The internalization of the ground rules picked up in the course of adult-child co-operation—education as an effect of family community—forms a main theme of this part of Vygotsky's work. (76)
There are two situations "indistinguishable" in Britton's thinking (and perhaps Vygotsky's, although we must remember that we are not reading his "own words"): reinforcing and originating rules; rule-governed behavior and imitation. If we were to try to distinguish the following from the formation of rules in the social order (the dynamic which serves as the prior model for the individual's internalized rule-governed behavior), we must come to the institution of prohibition and taboo as the earliest forms of rules in any group recognizable as a society. Can we take the next step, scandalous to contemporary sociology, anthropology, and cognitive psychology, and theorize the origin of prohibition, taboo, and totem?

What Literature Knows about the Origins and Anxieties of Rule-Governed Behavior

Girard helps us see that Sophocles and Shakespeare took the next step. What I am arguing for, in general, is a quasi-theoretical knowledge in literature accessible through the kind of study that does not assume from the beginning that it will explain literature from some superior already finalized understanding grounded in another discipline. In this particular case, I wish to suggest a model for rule-governed behavior based on Frye and Girard (and their basis in literary study) consistent with but more comprehensive than the current models available in reading research, cognitive psychology, and psycholinguistics.

The following discussion is necessarily and unapologetically theoretical and specialized. Let us not be disingenuous about the necessity of persuading first those who are best positioned to change or freeze elementary English. For such an audience, the only "disciplined" response to an inadequate theory is a more comprehensive one. Yet I also wish for this argument to become, as I wish also for my teaching to become, simple enough to explain it in any class, to any audience willing to consider literary study. The more accessible future
of this theorizing about rule-governed behavior enabled by the study of literature could be anticipated by two deceptively simple questions, posed dramatically by King Lear: Why are there rules? What do people want?

The first rules in any culture are sacred prohibitions, taboos. Where do they come from? According to myth, a god tells us we cannot do whatever we want; that is, we cannot follow our instinctive desires, which are seen as prior to legislation against them. Surely this mythical explanation of the originating situation of rule-governed behavior is different from the novice or child (like Oedipus), who enters a world already legislated against him, before he can have any desires at all. The rules tell him what desires have been attributed to him. Rules are granted sacred prescience—they blame the accused for harboring transgressive desires and perhaps, even lead the unwary, the novice/student, the child—that is, those most given to mimetic entanglements, resentment, and rebellion—to see their deliverance from bondage only in satisfying "forbidden" desires. But literature, especially the Western literature which we have preserved as canonical, and above all Shakespeare, is fundamental research (according to the standards of theorizing, model building, and the production of hypotheses appropriate to the human sciences) in the consequences of imitation and prohibition as the two poles of the social order. Literature alone shows us that children (like Oedipus) are the last to know that what they desire is the mother and the throne; it is the hypocritical adults (like Laios or Lear) who enlighten them on this matter. Prohibition blames mimetic, that is, contagious violence on the other's desires. Don't let "the other" do whatever he wants, which always leads to violence. Rite simply confirms and coordinates this observation, by making one person the rival of all, forced to commit crimes of rivalry against everyone, the whole social order.

The difference between Girard's hypothesis about rule-governed behavior, (fully supported by Shakespeare's quasi-theoretical research), and James
Britton's, is the fundamentally different understanding of the originating function of rules, how rules are passed on or internalized, and their capacity to scandalize (that is, throw into a double bind of enslavement and rebellion) their "victims." For all who read Vygotsky, at least as James Britton does (and, of course, there are other ways to read Vygotsky), conventions are inherited by the user, especially the child, in the same way they were generated. In effect, writers like James Britton forego the question of origins, leaving in place, as myth itself does, the idea of an original transgressor with the same (mythic) desires as we have, provoking the same rules to restrain these desires. It is this question, once it is properly understood, which helps to explain the issues of mimickry and mob action always lurking behind rule-governed behavior, that is, all human behavior, and why literature has been so preoccupied, historically, with the connections between mimesis and violence.

Girard's explanation of myth is a radical demythologization. The similarity of myth across cultures (to which Coody and Nelson are indifferent) testifies to a common origin for all cultures, not in a single Ur-culture, but in the only historically successful answer to the problem of breakaway violence: unite everyone in opposition to a single person blameable for all violence, all disorder. Find a "scapegoat." Myths resemble each other because each refers, within the protective aura of slightly different but necessary misunderstandings, to the putting of the blame for violence against a single antagonist. For example, a group of hunters or of foodgatherers (unlike other theories, Girard's model works equally well for agricultural and hunting societies) have circled round their food. One or more visibly restrain themselves from being the first to reach for the food, the prize, remembering times when this gesture encounters or even provokes the other's extended hand, and the other's violence. (One can see this caution even in the "dominance patterns" of
rudimentary animal cultures, whenever the subject visibly "presses" a gesture of appropriation in the presence of a superior.) This caution becomes customary, the rule, because it works, it keeps the peace. Everyone imitates everyone else's caution about provoking the transgressive desires of others. Rules enact this model of caution to govern the (transgressive) desires of others. Myth incorporates a narrative which justifies these rules by characterizing more elaborately the motivations attributed to all these violent "others."

Literature knows better than cognitive psychology that there is a radical gap of misunderstanding between learning and internalizing this "rule-governed behavior," and the dynamic which formed the rules--especially rules from the point of view of their victims--above all, children. One consequence of the rules as they are presented by society is to believe, and even create a certain authority or evidence, for transgressive desire as natural desire. A work of literature like *King Lear* is a profound piece of research capable of telling us something we can hardly know by any other means: whatever the conventional expectations or suspicions about what elders or youth want, represented in the archetypal schemes or machinations of comedy and tragedy, children/students do not want to usurp their parents/teachers, and adults do not want to arbitrarily disown their children. The true function of rules is hidden in the language of the divinity, in mythology, which misrepresents their ultimately comprehensible and human motivation: to keep the peace that the "other" always breaks. Everyone wants peace, according to our most thoughtful, that is, theoretical works. Literature of a certain conceptual power subverts the taking of sides--"none does offend, I say, none." Insofar as critical thinking and higher order problem solving is still explainable from the model of rule-governed behavior, the alternative model proposed by our finest literary works has a theoretical power superior to cognitive psychology. Literature does not simply enact, reflect, or imitate higher order thinking, a skill one could otherwise teach in a purer
form, going to writers only as historians do, for examples. Literature
situates higher order thinking, minds its worldly circumstances, especially
those which shape and misshape the social order.

An Authentic Discipline Teaches You How to Find Out
What (Both of) You Don't Already Know

Let me summarize my argument: Frye gives us the requisite pedagogical
model for a progressive introduction to literary study, based on its typically
recurring forms, from kindergarten to the graduate seminar, from primitive and
popular myths to the monuments of the tradition. In effect, Frye gives us a
paideia for all verbal culture. But the study of literature is not only
capable of becoming systematic disciplinary practice. When we see through
Girard that patterns repeat themselves because literature mimics all human
action, we begin to see that literature "minds" all rule-governed behavior and
its consequences--in effect, conducts research in every feature of mimetic
behavior, towards a critical understanding of "discipline" in all its forms.

Hirsch has argued that content must be stressed in literary study because
it represents what the novice/proletariat needs for empowerment: whatever the
dominant culture, or the dominant class already knows. Hirsch has little to
say (and literary study has a great deal to say) about what kinds of resistance
are provoked by rules, and those who appear to stand for them. Students as
educational proletariats or novices must be forgiven if they do not immediately
credit Shakespeare (much less any academic intellectual) because he is a sign
of what the dominant culture already knows. Returning to Wayne Sawyer's argu-
ment, the best way to point up the "significance" of Shakespeare is not as a
sign of what we as educators already know, but as a source for what we don't
already know, but need to know. If he taught us what we already know, he
hasn't yet taught us everything he knew.
In William Bennett's grammar school curriculum, the student reads Charles and Mary Lamb's *Tales From Shakespeare* before s/he reads or sees Shakespeare. It is likewise probable that students will know Cinderella before either. There is nothing unusual or sinister in accepting this progression, but it needs to become something more than merely following out the education of the current bearers of literacy for the sake of the novice's "normalization." "Cinderella" is a powerfully seductive and accurate representation of the mythic certitude that our desires are thwarted by step-relations always guilty of the first provocation. The Lambs read *King Lear* within the same "scheme." In the difference between these tales and Shakespeare we have the very model of a progressive and systematic education in literary study that delivers on its promise of a separate knowledge base. Literature is not made up of mythic building-blocks; work like Shakespeare's "minds" myth, as it minds all human action.

I have already argued, in "Myth, Ritual, and Literature After Girard" that Shakespeare "reveals the codes" of mimetic rivalry, the conflicts that follow rule-governed behavior just as surely as adjustment does. The next step in arguing for a content in English studies would be to spell out in detail how myth, whether in the Lambs or in Cinderella, only reflects what Shakespeare reveals. Such a discussion would follow the work of folklorist scholarship that already sees a family resemblance between the tales of Cordelia and Cinderella. Those necessary steps of demonstration, even proof, back towards the earliest texts of the elementary curriculum must be left to the future. But let me at least suggest what the next step in this defense of content in English studies might be.

A careful comparison of the Lambs's version of Act II, scene 1 with Shakespeare shows that the Lambs are certain who is guilty--these mean
stepsisters, fundamentally, ontologically different from a good daughter like Cordelia.

Cordelia was no sooner gone, than the devilish dispositions of her sisters began to show themselves in their true colours. Even before the expiration of the first month, which Lear was to spend by agreement with his eldest daughter Goneril, the old king began to find out the difference between promises and performances. This wretch having got from her father all that he had to bestow, even to the giving away of the crown from off his head, began to grudge even those small remnants of royalty which the old man had reserved to himself, to please his fancy with the idea of being still a king. She could not bear to see him and his hundred knights. Every time she met her father, she put on a frowning countenance; and when the old man wanted to speak with her, she would feign sickness, or anything to be rid of the sight of him; for it was plain that she esteemed his old age a useless burden, and his attendants an unnecessary expense: not only she herself slackened in her expressions of duty to the king, but by her example, and (it is to be feared) not without her private instructions, her very servants affected to treat him with neglect, and would either refuse to obey his orders, or still more contemptuously pretend not to hear them. Lear could not but perceive this alteration in the behaviour of his daughter but he shut his eyes against it as long as he could, as people commonly are unwilling to believe the unpleasant consequences which their own mistakes and obstinacy have brought upon them.

The Lambs take Lear's side: it is tragic that this poor father is betrayed by an ungrateful daughter. In fact, the "agreement" about Lear's lodgings was set unilaterally by Lear's own fiat. Here, Goneril is seen as ontologically opposed to Lear, unable to "bear him." Because of her aversion, according to the Lambs, she encourages her servants to follow suit. Yet Shakespeare's play makes clear that Goneril is frightened by Lear's mercurial temper, and is fearful, as Regan herself is fearful, that Lear (like many of the father-figures in Shakespeare's plays), could take back what he has given. In Shakespeare, as I have argued in my essay on Girard, it is useless to take sides, to determine who struck the first blow, except to say, in general, that parents have prior responsibility for the world into which their children are born.

We all understand, I think, why Bennett's choice of Lamb before Shakespeare is unexceptional. It is easier to read. But what makes it easier is not simply the language, for, as the Lambs themselves explain, they use
Shakespeare's words wherever possible. The "Tale" is easier because it obeys, without dissent or modification, the popular, mythic form of finding someone to blame. Goneril and Regan are hardly human. The Lambs's generation were more likely to take Lear's side, while perhaps ours will eventually see the case for Goneril and Regan as well as Cordelia. We could provisionally and usefully identify these interpretations, respectively, (thinking of Frye's schema), as tragedy and comedy, but if we are serious about literary study's intellectual potential, we must proceed as other disciplines do, by proposing a more comprehensive reading that includes these more partial readings. To take the side of age (according to tragedy) or youth (according to comedy) is to reimpose the very myths that Shakespeare is "minding." Shakespeare comes much closer to the "narrative complexity" of the lives of his audience: who can ever say who is the elder, the step-sister or brother who struck the first blow? Let s/he in any class who is without sin cast the first stone. 36

Such knowledge addresses the complexity of the lives of students and teachers who take it to heart and is significant in showing them something they can hardly know from any other source. Such work proposes interaction between curricula inside and outside of class, the systems of suspicions/expectations of the "other" which can baffle not only the novice, but also the veteran standing at the front of the class.

Thus, we see how reading is a matter of studying reality that is alive, reality that we are living inside of, reality as history being made and also making us. We can also see how it is impossible to read texts without reading the context of the text, without establishing the relationships between the discourse and the reality which shapes the discourse. This emphasizes, I believe, the responsibility which reading a text implies. We must try to read the context of a text and also relate it to the context in which we are reading the text. And so reading is not so simple. Reading mediates knowing and is also knowing, because language is knowledge and not just mediation of knowledge. (18-19)

Literature minds the context of the learner because we are always in a pedagogical mode, presenting ourselves for imitation and/or rivalry as we express or
resist some convention or rule. The emphasis on English studies I have made is an attempt to underline the irreducible specificity of context. It is in this sense that Freire is right to insist on the politicity of education in the quote with which I began. Students can learn to play the necessarily dialectical, that is, political role required in a democratic, rule-governed society by means of the irreplaceable knowledge of the shaping and misshaping of all human bonds gained through literary study.

If the society of the schools is susceptible to the same mimetic interferences described in literature, (see, for example, the opening pages of Madame Bovary) it is our experience that the guild of teachers from kindergarten to the graduate seminar has been no exception. I would not willingly repeat the mistakes of TTT, which degraded its chartered mission of training teacher-trainers, to sending university disciplinary specialists into the schools to tell elementary and secondary teachers how to do their job. I have argued for the irreplaceable knowledge value of literary studies, but the day-to-day practice of elementary English as it negotiates disciplinary demands with everything else English is supposed to be good for, must still be worked out with experts in the field.
Footnotes


4 During recent decades Americans have hesitated to make a decision about the specific knowledge that children need to learn in school. Our elementary schools are not only dominated by the content-neutral ideas of Rousseau and Dewey, they are also governed by approximately sixteen thousand independent school districts. We have viewed this dispersion of educational authority as an insurmountable obstacle to altering the fragmentation of the school curriculum even when we have questioned that fragmentation. We have permitted school policies that have shrunk the body of information that Americans share, and these policies have caused our national literacy to decline. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., *Cultural Literacy* (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), 19.


For years, teachers have used literature to teach something else—to motivate reading; to enrich the social studies; to increase children's vocabularies; to inculcate manners, morals, and safety rules. An examination of the curriculum guides for many elementary schools reveals very few devoted to literature, although there may be a section on literature within the language-arts guide or the reading-guide. Not until students reach junior high school or, more frequently, high school does literature receive much attention. The majority of the elementary schools have no planned literature programs. (700)

6 See, for example, "Responding to Literature as a Work of Art--An Aesthetic Literary Experience," *Language Arts*, Volume 59, Number 3 (March 1982), 259-264.

7 A subsidiary benefit, interesting to me as a researcher in literary modernism and the processes of modernization, would be learning how to resist the fashion dynamics which structures intellectual influence in postcapital societies.


10 Much of this work has been done by Frye himself. See especially *The Secular Scripture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).
I am thinking first of all, of course, of Werner Jaeger's magisterial three-volume study, *Paideia, The Ideals of Greek Culture*, tr. Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), essential reading for anyone licensed to use the term "pedagogy." Jaeger's culture-specific study of Greek "education" is especially valuable as a counterforce against the pressure in current pedagogical theory for a transcultural, ahistorical model. I can do no better than quote Jaeger's gloss on the term:

*Paideia*, the title of this work, is not merely a symbolic name, but the only exact designation of the actual historical subject presented in it. Indeed it is a difficult thing to define; like other broad comprehensive concepts (philosophy, for instance, or culture) it refuses to be confined within an abstract formula. Its full content and meaning become clear to us only when we read its history and follow its attempts to realize itself. By using a Greek word for a Greek thing, I intend to imply that it is seen with the eyes, not of modern men, but of the Greeks. It is impossible to avoid bringing in modern expressions like civilization, culture, tradition, literature, or education. But none of them really covers what the Greeks meant by paideia. Each of them is confined to one aspect of it: they cannot take in the same field as the Greek concept unless we employ all of them together. Yet the very essence of scholarship and scholarly activity is based on the original unity of all these aspects—the unity which is expressed in the Greek word, not the diversity emphasized and completed by modern developments. The ancients were persuaded that education and culture are not a formal art or an abstract theory, distinct from the objective historical structure of a nation's spiritual life. They held them to be embodied in literature, which is the real expression of all higher culture. (v)

To inventory Frye's influence, see Robert Denham's fine annotated bibliography on Frye: *Northrop Frye* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).


For a more thoughtful recent assessment of Frye, see *Centre and Labyrinth: in Honour of Northrop Frye*, eds. Eleanor Cook, Chaviva Hošek, Jay Macpherson, Patricia Parker, and Julian Patrick (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), especially the essay by Paul Ricoeur.


For an important rapprochement between literary, economic, biological, and cultural schema, see the papers from the 1981 conference at Stanford University on disorder and order, collected in *Disorder and Order: Proceedings of the Stanford International Symposium* (Sept. 14-16, 1981), ed. Paisley


34 In effect, three essays are probably needed: a separate essay on King Lear, following from this essay and my essay on Girard; an essay on the Lambs's Tales From Shakespeare; and an essay on Cinderella. Each would need to be self-contained, so that each could make the argument for real knowledge developing out of literary study.


36 When I teach King Lear, I find that my students immediately identify with Cordelia, seeing themselves surrounded by hypocritical sisters and mercurial parents. Initially, they will only allow that Cordelia's "Nothing" is a little provocative. Minding the effects of cultural discipline within the dialectics of class discussion is difficult, satisfying human work.

37 "Reading the World and Reading the Word: An Interview with Paulo Freire," Language Arts, Volume 62, Number 1 (January 1985).