This report outlines alternative directions for urban social planning in Canada, taking into account the growth of the welfare state, alternative economic developments, and urban demographic trends. Based on a theory of increasing social convergence/diversity between the United States and Canada, a proactive model of planning is recommended. Urban demographic and household trends that are considered in planning include the following: (1) growth of the proportion of elderly people within a relatively stable population base; (2) increase in the multicultural composition of neighborhoods; and (3) deinstitutionalization and return to community life of many physically, mentally, and emotionally impaired people. Planning must also include the loss of an urban labor pool as the mobile unemployed move to new locations in search of jobs; and the immobile chronically unemployed, who require social services. Alternative models discussed include the following: (1) proactive; (2) reactive; and (3) conversational. A list of 29 references is included. (FMW)
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR URBAN SOCIAL PLANNING IN CANADA

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Introduction

There is a familiar phrase associated with the future's literature which suggests that a transitional phase of development requires us to think globally and act locally. (Harman, 1980: Amara, 1980). The phrase provides an apt introduction to an article which attempts to outline future directions for urban social planning in Canada, taking into account the growth of the welfare state, alternative economic developments and urban demographic trends.

The potential of social planning is that it provides a means by which the local is linked to the global in a manner which is democratically acceptable. The possible scenarios which we outline depend upon differing perspectives of the future role of the welfare state. Following Ackoff (1969), Trist (1974), and Schon (1980), we refer to the social planning options as reactive, preactive, proactive and conversational. While reactive planning is basically passive in nature, conversational planning engages participants in a dialogical process. Preactive and proactive planning fall somewhere between the two polar positions.

Recent changes in social planning have paralleled the growth of the welfare state. Indeed, in most of the literature by adult educators and social welfare experts, active citizenship was viewed as key to balancing the potential for macro planning by the welfare state with the sensitivity to micro planning by the individual. Furthermore, whether the social planning was bureaucratically structured in departments of government, participatively oriented in health and welfare councils, or politically animated in peace and environmentalist groups, the one common element which united their efforts and rallied their supporters,
was a belief in the capacity of the welfare state to rectify the wrongs of an advanced market economy.

Since assumptions about the welfare state and the market are implicit in our analysis, it is important to state at the outset why we consider them to be crucial to a discussion about the future of urban social planning. Planning of any stripe attempts to influence the allocation of resources (material or otherwise). In a modern mixed economy, the two major means of allocating resources are the welfare state and the market. From the early days of capitalism, the market has been viewed as the primary allocative mechanism of societal goods and services (Culyer, 1973; Gordon, 1985). With time, however, the capacity of the market to achieve a 'just' distribution was challenged and with that challenge the supremacy of the market was undermined (Mishra, 1981). Whether due to market externalities such as environmental pollution, or the need to protect children, such as child welfare, or to assure minimum standards, such as public health, or to replace lost income through social insurance, the state began to regulate the market in ways that were considered acceptable (and desirable) in a democratic society. To the extent that the state increasingly interfered in the market to assure more than law and order or defence of country, it became recognized as a welfare state. Urban social planning was increasingly perceived as an integral part of the process of change associated with the advance of the welfare state.

In reviewing the origins of the welfare state, Saville noted that there were three interrelated strands in the process of change:

The first relates to the political calculations of the ruling groups; the second to the economic and social requirements of an increasingly complex industrial society; and the third to the pressures which have come from the mass of the population as the perceptions of economic and social needs have gradually widened and become more explicit. (Saville, 1983)
In our judgement, there can be little doubt that these three strands of change have shaped public policy in general, and urban social planning in particular. The reason is that the welfare state has solved major social problems by setting up safety nets and defined minimum levels of assistance for a broad range of basic human needs. On the other hand, the dynamics which led to its establishment also remain a major factor in the further development of institutions of social reform. In spite of a general resistance to an expanded role for social planning, ruling groups strike a balance between the acceptance of demands from below and the political consequences of refusing to make concessions from above. In a market society where power, privilege, income, and wealth remain unequally divided, leaders make concessions in order to maintain political stability. Hence, there has been an element of the powerful and privileged who seek to take small steps towards addressing some of the worst excesses. Not surprisingly, conservative and liberal reformers have been among the influential supporters of many local and social planning agencies or related social welfare organizations.

*Alternative Economic Futures*

Nevertheless, the future of the Welfare State is dependent not only upon the vigilence of citizens and the responsiveness of a democratic society, but also upon the future of market economies. Essentially there are three possibilities. The first, articulated by authors like Kahn (1978), projects a pro-growth future. It assumes that trends of the sixties and seventies (high growth and increasing equality) will continue indefinitely. The optimism stems, not from a lack of awareness of future problems but from an assumption that technological and political problems can be overcome. In this vision of the future, urban social planning would play an important part in developing societies with increased life expectancy, improved quality of life, lower demographic growth, and diminished poverty. According to Kahn,

"By the year 2000 perhaps a quarter of mankind will live in emerging post-industrial societies and more than two thirds will have passed the level of $1000 per capita (product per annum). By the end of the twenty-first century, almost all
societies should have a GNP per capita greater than $2000 and be entering some form of post-industrial culture. The task is not to see that these societies proceed along the same path as Europe, North America and Japan but rather that each should find its own way". (Gribbon, 1979, 31f)

In the Canadian context, special studies which have tended to view the future in the same linear vein have been conducted by Lithwick (1971), Richardson (1972), and Baker (1971). Lithwick and Richardson focus on urban growth and development. Baker takes linear assumptions into account in looking at the future of education in Alberta. He projects that ninety percent of the population will be urban and density will increase. Growth is also projected at 5% per year, new technologies are anticipated to play an increasing part in economic growth, and consensus politics are expected to replace protest politics.

The second view projects "no-growth", or "balanced" growth in the future. It is represented by the authors of The Limits to Growth (Meadows, 1972) and Mankind at the Turning Point (Mesarovic and Pestel, 1975). More familiarly referred to as the Club of Rome report, The Limits to Growth portrays a future in which existing population trends, in combination with limited resources and increased environmental pollution, will lead to a world of short-lived rapid growth followed by dramatic collapse. The principal reason for the collapse is assumed to be a lack of material resources, particularly non-renewable resources, upon which economic growth depends. While Mankind at The Turning Point softens the harsh message of the Club of Rome report, it agrees that the technical and political difficulties ahead are considerable.

Edward Goldsmith (1977, 187ff) outlines a Canadian future based on assumptions of no-growth. He considers first the affluent condition of Canadian society and wonders whether its land mass can accommodate large increases in population growth (mainly through immigration) to offset the pressure in other parts of the world. He concludes that climatic conditions, a fragile environment, energy reserves, limited potential food production, and growth in pollution limit the capacity of Canada to
become the last frontier of world migration and economic consumerism. Instead, he advocates that Canadians change their current lifestyle toward a conserver or an ecological society (no growth, more equality). In this approach, urban social planning could play a role in changing lifestyles in order to reduce the demand on limited resources.

Our own view of the future takes a middle ground between the pro-growth and the no-growth schools of thought. The middle ground is reflected in the work of Clark Kerr (1983, 3) who outlines a theory of future development based on convergence and diversity. By convergence, he refers to the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes, and performances. By diversity he refers to the conditions in any society which promote variety in these elements. While the pursuit of modernization leads to convergence, national institutions and ideologies promote diversity. The consequence, says Kerr, is that while the future for any one country is uncertain, the potential clearly rests with nations that converge on "optimum policies for sustainable growth and the best ways to use the time thus gained to discover how to satisfy the human spirit more effectively than through greater affluence alone" (Kerr, 1983, 126).

The implications for Canada are two-fold. Convergence will likely work itself out in terms of increasing linkages with the United States in areas of trade, technology, work patterns, and lifestyles. Diversity will continue to be manifest, at least to the year 2000, in a range of institutional and political differences. The reason why we see increasing convergence with the U.S. on the economic front is not only because of the push toward free trade recently advocated by the federal government, but also because it is consistent with past practice. Canada's dependency on the U.S. is well-known. The traditional position of Canada as a trading nation relies mainly on the export of primary products (wheat, lumber, minerals, fish) and semi-fabricated goods. The bulk of the trade is with the United States. In the two export areas where manufactured goods, rather than primary products, account for growth in Canadian exports, the dependency on the U.S. is almost total. The two
are automotive parts and defense equipment. As a consequence, Canada is not only the United States' largest trading partner, it is practically an extension of the American industrial market. (Rostein, 1984).

At the same time, there is little reason to assume that Canadian institutions, political patterns, or social policies will automatically converge with those of the U.S. - at least in the short run. Canadians seem to be convinced of the merit of their political institutions, partly because they provide some measure of difference with the U.S, partly because they benefit a wide cross section of people and assure universal entitlement. They are, in a sense, at the heart of what makes Canada distinct from the U.S. This becomes particularly apparent when we look at Canadian cities. They tend to be safer and cleaner than their American counterparts. Property tax is not as regressively distributed as in the U.S. Regional government is more established. The inner city is residentially more viable. Racial tensions are less extreme. Public transit is more widely supported, and social services are offered within a universal infrastructure.

**Urban Trends**

In the future, we assume that Canadians will continue to have an opportunity to influence their urban future in a way which is different from Americans. One possibility is the participation of residents in urban social planning. Because social planning is an area where forces for convergence and diversity are likely to intensify, and because the city is likely to play a central role in economic development, the rise or fall of urban social planning may well be a weather-bell of the Canadian future.

There are several clearly identifiable trends affecting urban areas which we can either passively ignore or begin incorporating into the planning process. By ignoring the trends, we may be forced to react to resulting dislocations and problems in an ad hoc and piecemeal manner. By recognizing them, we can view the changes as an opportunity for
addressing current as well as potential future community challenges in a thoughtful, co-ordinated fashion.

The major demographic and household trends which influence Canada's major urban areas can be briefly summarized as follows: a growing proportion of elderly people within a relatively stable population base; smaller size households reflecting more and more people living alone; an increasing number of single parent families; a growing mixture of people from different ethnic backgrounds settling in neighbourhoods throughout urban regions; and a process of deinstitutionalization which is returning many people to community life who were previously rejected because of physical, mental or emotional impairment. A recent task force on neighbourhood support services in Metropolitan Toronto noted that these trends are occurring at a time when the traditional support systems, such as family and friends, are becoming less common place and depressed economic conditions are adding to the need (Social Planning Council, 1983).

With the erosion of the extended family and the aging of our population base, elderly people constitute a significant proportion of people living alone in the community. Infirmity, restricted mobility, inflation-ravaged savings and fixed pension incomes place elderly people at great risk of isolation within the community. The unavailability of very practical everyday assistance such as home maintenance, delivered hot meals, transportation, and community-based health supports can place elderly people in jeopardy of being up-rooted for institutional placement. As one recent study points out: "It is ironic and unfair that people who have worked hard for many years, purchased homes, paid taxes, raised families and established many of our neighbourhoods are being alienated from the mainstream of community life and are even threatened with physical removal to institutional settings" (Social Planning Council, 1983, 13).

The rise of the single person household will also continue. In recent decades, single person households have emerged as a dominant social unit. Persons living alone made up nearly 40% of all households in the City of
Toronto in 1981. Over a ten year period the number of single person households grew by 38,000 in the central city, 63,000 in the rest of Metro and 31,000 on the fringe. (City of Toronto, 1982, 2). Though these single person households are drawn from the entire age distribution of the adult population, there is a concentration of the young and the elderly. In social planning terms, this points to increasing social isolation and alienation. A related type of household also facing isolation and alienation is the single parent household (Klodawsky, 1985). In addition to the responsibility of raising children, a fact often overlooked is that the single parent is a solitary adult in the household. Most lone parents are mothers who have the added disadvantage of lower earning power in the labour force.

Another demographic factor which Canadian urban social planning must recognize is the ethno-cultural diversity of our cities. Most of Canada's urban areas are cosmopolitan communities. The population with a mother tongue other than English is usually very large. Immigrants to our metropolitan community bring many hopes for successful settlement. Community understanding and acceptance are always a challenge. Mechanisms are needed to help create cross-cultural understanding and harmonious relationships within an ethnically mixed community. Ethnic minorities also require very practical supports such as language related programs.

Demographic, household and minority trends cannot be treated in isolation of employment trends. Household income determines the ability of people to participate fully in the normal activities of daily life in society. It is likely that current trends in unemployment and underemployment, as well as shifts in the type and quality of jobs available, will continue. These trends will affect the nature and scope of issues with which urban social planners deal, pushing them increasingly into economic development issues. Though we tend to view unemployment in aggregate statistical terms, always citing, for example, the official national unemployment rate, the real impact is local. It is the personal and community impact of aggregate statistics that social planning seeks to disaggregate, by
identifying the nature and scope of the problem on people and communities.

It is now recognized that there are two kinds of unemployed in an urban economy. One group is comprised of the mobile unemployed. These are people who can move to a new location in the country if jobs are not available locally. Many urban areas have seen a great deal of out-migration of the 25 to 40 year old group, typically family age adults. While some out-migration may not be a major problem for the larger metropolitan areas of our country and indeed may help local employment conditions, it is a very serious concern to smaller cities in regions where there is a great deal of chronic unemployment. The community can lose the heart of its labour pool to other regions thereby feeding a downward spiral. The second group is the chronic unemployed, people without mobility potential. They are, in a sense, captive within the urban community. Today the chronic urban unemployed are increasingly comprised of three groups: the young, single parents, usually women, and the older workers displaced from the labour force. While the chronically unemployed present a major challenge to all our institutions, it is our urban social planning institutions which are on the front line. National and provincial social welfare nets have been slow to adjust to the new realities in the changing scope and nature of the urban unemployed.

The municipal stake in employment will likely grow in the future due to the impact on the government's revenue base and the potential for social instability in the urban environment. Concern over the revenue base relates to the loss of jobs among the mobile age group. These lost jobs affect the local economy in general thereby undercutting the financing of public services (Novick, 1981, 39). Social instability arises because despair breeds discontent and crime, leading to an increased reliance on protective services. Novick refers to the rise of "the fortress community" producing a new form of urban social apartheid in Canada. Though such an outcome is not inevitable, the pattern of increased public expenditures on police services and stable or decreased expenditures on social services is characteristic of many municipalities. The issue is
not simply jobs, but what kind of jobs we are getting and should be getting in the municipal economy. "Good jobs" are generally defined as those with pay and protective benefits that would enable a worker to raise children and "poor jobs" as those which might be sufficient to either supplement a primary wage earner or maintain some kind of solitary living. In recent years, the trend has been towards the creation of poor jobs. From 1973 to 1983, almost all of the 2 million new jobs created by Canada's economy were in the service sector, many of them part-time or temporary (Economic Council of Canada, 1984, 67).

Because of these changes, social planners are likely to be paying increasing attention to community economic development issues and be involved in the process of designing community employment strategies. Much emphasis has been placed on attracting or creating any kind of job with public subsidies without thinking through the longer term ramifications. The local business community is currently dominant in most community economic development commissions and they frequently come up with similar "solutions": boost tourism and attract high tech jobs. One is based on low-paying, seasonal, often part-time employment, the other is a fantasy. High tech manufacturing jobs require low wage labour and Canada simply cannot compete with third world countries. Even the silicon valleys of the U.S. are in decline (Business Week, 1985, 56).

A focus of concern over employment in the future also will go beyond the current assumption that the municipal role in employment generation is only that of a host — to create the environment attractive to private sector investment. This limited, passive role has thus far failed and will likely continue to fail. Community economic development plans will have to look increasingly at options for municipal enterprise as well as new labour intensive employment opportunities from community based cooperative enterprises which build on the existing economic strengths of the community. Many local industries have closed simply because the national or multinational corporate owners decided to consolidate production elsewhere or found profit levels too low relative to other investment options. Neither of these decisions means that such enterprises are
not viable. Current economic development plans are also influenced and constrained by the self-serving ideology of business people and some economists who claim that only private sector jobs are "productive" jobs. As Novick points out, public initiative has historically played and can continue to play a leading role in generating economic growth and prosperity (Novick, 1981, 40).

There is, however, a serious constraint on the ability of urban social planners in effectively addressing the issues and problems presented by major demographic, household formation and employment trends. The constraint is the present institutional structure of local government in Canada. Municipal boundaries are the result of decisions made in the distant past. Yet many of our municipalities are adjacent to other municipalities, comprising huge, complex, late twentieth century metropolitan communities. Municipal jurisdiction and revenues are also the result of decisions made a long time ago, essentially when the original British North America Act was drafted last century. Municipalities only have the jurisdictional authority and revenue base provided to them by the provinces. Both are very limited, and both have been declining throughout this century. "As cities and towns grew in number, size, power, and complexity in twentieth century Canada," notes historian John Taylor, "they lost control of their affairs and became increasingly subject to senior levels of government" (Taylor, 1984, 478).

The issues urban social planning addresses are metropolitan-wide. The lines drawn on maps indicating municipal boundaries are not. Attempts at metropolitan and regional government have thus far been few and limited. They have been associated with matters related to physical development, such as arterial roads, trunk sewer water facilities and police services, rather than social services. An artificial yet politically real split between the urban and suburban municipalities in our large metropolitan areas has developed. The split reflects the fact that, for a while at least, there were clear social as well as land use distinctions between the city and suburbs. The suburban municipalities were largely middle class homeowners in single family houses with little rental housing, or
commercial and industrial development. The social and economic trends of recent decades have changed all this. The perceptions of the issues and the fragmented nature of local government in metropolitan areas, however, have not changed. Metropolitan management is most certainly one of the major issues social planners will have to address along with demographic and employment trends.

Future Social Planning Alternatives

Given the potential convergence of Canada with the U.S., the diversity of national institutions, and the urban trends just described, what future social planning alternatives are likely?

Up to the present, social planning has been practised in different ways but there are essentially two approaches which have become established in Canadian cities, one which is voluntaristic in nature and the other which is government-based. The latter approach is typically associated with services of government which are directly funded, such as multiculturalism, personal social services, housing, or health. Increasingly this type of social planning involves implementation and evaluation rather than policy development. For that reason, it is sometimes called program planning. The extent to which program planning becomes a 'social' rather than a bureaucratic affair depends upon the extent to which citizens or residents of a community participate in the process. In the early seventies, many government-initiated programs such as the B.C. Resource Boards or the Local Community Social Service Centres of Quebec had a strong planning function (Clague et al, 1984; Commission d'enquete, 1967). With the advent of the recession in the latter part of the seventies and the early eighties, government sometimes curtailed the planning activities. Their rise and fall were closely tied to changes in the welfare state.

The voluntaristic approach to urban social planning is both more diversified and widely known than government-based social planning. It is initiated in three ways: community councils like the Social Planning and Research Council of B.C. or the Social Planning Council of Metro Toronto; locality planning, such as neighbourhood or community health councils,
and citizen coalitions like anti-poverty leagues or environmentalist groups (Wharf, 1979). Sometimes voluntary social planning bodies receive government funds and are hardly distinguishable from government-based planning initiatives but more frequently they receive only partial funding or no funding at all. Unlike the government-based programs, therefore, voluntary social planning is not necessarily tied to the welfare state.

Voluntary social planning bodies gain public legitimation, less through legislative mandate of the government than by the active involvement of citizens in social or political action. Planning councils also rely heavily upon research, fact gathering, and consensus building to achieve desirable ends. Neighbourhood councils which are engaged in locality development rely on strategies as diverse as self-help and confrontation. Coalitions usually gain legitimation by consensus building, particularly among their supporters; hence they spend a great deal of time on coalition development, adult education, and lobbying.

For different social planning approaches, the social context varies, not only in terms of the financial resources available to the organizations but also as a result of political responses to planning initiatives. Voluntary social planning councils, for example, continue to play an active role in some cities (e.g. Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton, Vancouver) but their comprehensiveness may set severe limits upon the intensity of their political influence as Clague and Seebarran noted in the previous chapter. Coalitions have wide public support (e.g. environmentalist groups or native groups) and consequently more political influence than councils, but frequently suffer from limited financial resources. Neighbourhood councils also can have considerable political influence but do not necessarily have solid financial support. In addition, issues they address may be short-term rather than long-term leading to a mercurical rise and fall of their influence.

In many respects, the current models of urban social planning assume, directly or indirectly, continuation of the welfare state. They involve
a normative approach to planning which, according to Trist (1974), takes a pre-active or pro-active stance. Pre-active initiatives, as in the case of some government-based social planning, involve predictions of the future but proceed "with the art of the calculable". They tend to be technically oriented and involve citizens in rational-comprehensive approaches to social change. Pro-active planning, by contrast, attempts to influence a "willed future" and opts for greater exploration in the face of environmental uncertainties. It is, by implication, more innovative in approach and lays less claim to predictability. Citizens are perceived as active participants but unlike pre-active planning, they are perceived as agents of change rather than mere advisors or consultants.

In our opinion, the pro-active model of planning is consistent with liberal democracy as defined by Mason (1982, 40f). It represents one scenario for future development. It presupposes the continuance of a mixed economy and the necessity of the welfare state in order to assure equity in society as well as peace, order, and good government. Within this perspective, government-based and voluntary social planning are not only likely to continue but even essential if representative democracy is to prevail. Pro-active planning implies that participation will be widespread but that it will be subordinate to the electoral process. Opportunities to participate will be primarily in relation to distributional concerns (i.e. income, housing) associated with the welfare state, and the degree of involvement will be determined by community organizations and leaders. It, in turn, implies a pattern of urban social planning in which opportunities for participation will be extensive but where the numbers of participants will be limited. Decision making will likely remain centralized, economic and social questions will remain in relative isolation (the latter typically reacting to changes in the former), and planning will continue to play a watch-dog role relying heavily on monitoring, research, information sharing, and public education.

Reactive planning, a second alternative, is more circumscribed than pro-active planning. It is more constitutional in nature (Buchanan, 1962). A reactive mode of planning presupposes that the market provides an
adequate base for directing future resources. If the market fails, reactive planning may be necessary to put "right a state of affairs which has already gone wrong" (Trist, 1974, 11). For this reason, a minimalist role of government is considered appropriate. In this model, the current welfare state could be stripped of many of its distributional and regulatory responsibilities. A limited involvement of government in peoples' lives means, in turn, little support for social planning bodies which either look to government for financial support or view the welfare state as a major partner in the resolution of societal problems. Voluntary social planning, on the other hand, would be quite acceptable. In fact, urban social planning would likely be fostered to the extent it encouraged self-help or initiatives which minimized demands on government. It would have as a principal function the education of the public rather than the lobbying of government. Corrective measures would occur as a consequence of consumers being fully informed about market choices. Participation, according to this scenario, leads to informed consumption and an enlightened electorate.

A third possible scenario for urban social planning is one which presupposes the further evolution of the welfare state rather than its demise. On the other hand, unlike the pro-active or reactive planning model, it is based on a qualitatively different level of participation which integrates the social and the economic, the collective and the individual. Mason (1982, 140f) refers to it as participatory democratic; Schon (1980) calls it conversational planning. Participatory or conversational planning not only improves government decision making and strengthens accountability, it is a condition for the legitimization of democracy and improvements in quality of life. Conversational planning is more than instrumental, it is developmental as well.

A form of social planning which corresponds to this model extends beyond the welfare state to the work place. It involves production politics as well as distributional politics. It affects issues of investment as well as social welfare. It incorporates management and labour as well as government. It implies direction rather than consultation, is less a
technique for problem solving than a process of involvement in which the participants see themselves as part of the problem as well as part of the solution. "The context of planning is one in which planners and planned for might literally talk with one another. . . concerning the meanings they have formed for their own and others (Schon, 1980, 5).

Our own view is that the most likely form of social planning in the immediate future is the pro-active model rather than the narrowly defined reactive model or the more expansive conversational model. Its continuation is likely for two essential reasons. The first is that it conforms with the 'congruence/diversity' thesis which we described earlier. Given the dominant influence of the U.S., there is little likelihood of a conversational model which transcends the parameters of limited welfare state intervention. Equally we see little likelihood that the Canadian welfare state, and its corollary planning mechanisms will wither away, although some of its activities and structures are likely to change between now and the year 2000. Our reason for postulating this assumption is that, unlike the U.S., the Canadian welfare state is essential to Canadian identity. In countries as divergent as Japan and Sweden, the welfare state has become a purveyor of culture and a promotor of social solidarity as much as it has assisted with economic growth and development. The Japanese and Swedish welfare states are, in fact, so interwoven with their respective national identities that it is difficult to tell where the market leaves off and the state begins. If Canada is to survive as a nation, we anticipate no less.

The second reason why we expect the pro-active model of social planning to continue relates to the stage of development of Canadian cities. Canada, at present, has no urban region which exceeds 3,000,000. By the year 2000, none is projected to exceed 5,000,000. Hence, by world standards, Canadian cities are modest in size and reasonably governable. In comparison with some countries where urban regions may exceed 75,000,000, the challenges of maintaining a livable urban environment also are relatively modest by world standards. Pro-active urban social planning mechanisms have helped, in the past, to make Canadian cities
what they are today. They are likely to be as effective in the future. The modifications which will be necessary to sustain urban planning in the future have been described by Raymond Williams (1985, 261). He believes that the further development of liberal democracy presupposes the extension of participation. However, he does not believe that such a development can be based on an extension of the welfare state. Neither does he see it necessarily coming from class struggle (along traditional lines), nor from a highly stratified labor movement. Rather he concludes that a new consciousness is required based on three changes of mind. The first is that the connection between the forces and relations of economic production has to be re-analyzed in a way that modifies the "continuing appropriateness and exploitation of the world as raw material". The second is the replacement of a narrow concept of production by a new orientation to livelihood which is self-managing and self-renewing. The third is the integration of a social order in which rational intelligence and emotion are equally valued. In all three areas, the urban community, and in particular urban social planning, will have an important role to play if democracy is to survive.

CONCLUSION
The major future challenge for urban social planning movements will be to redefine the bounds and the "terms of reference," in which public policy options are currently debated. From our point of view, urban social planning must be able to extend the public policy debate beyond the narrow logic of market economics and market democracy which tends to dominate the national policy debate. The challenge is not one of simple economics and markets, but, as Waligorski (1984, 113) argues, it is a challenge over the scope and guiding philosophy of a democratic system and choosing the shape, direction, and beneficiaries of public policy". To be effective in the future, urban social planning increasingly will have to focus on two very fundamental and interrelated sets of policies: redistributive policies, and policies which identify and secure certain goods or services as developmental rights. The latter are frequently ignored by conventional approaches to public policy. However, they are the policies which provide the starting point for the range of complex
issues urban social planning seeks to address. In contrast, current policy making often assumes that the existing pattern of distribution is a natural and intractable state of affairs while preference is usually given to individual choice -- the freedom to choose in the market place. Markets ask what people want and how much of it they want. Those able to pay have their needs met. Urban social planning, by contrast, defines a certain set of needs as "basic", making access a right and the democratic process a necessity.
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