A dangerously simplistic reductionistic movement, with a stress on the teacher as a technician, operating increasingly in a mechanistic way, is evolving in teacher preparation programs. This paper is constructed in light of the distorted consciousness likely to be acquired by prospective teachers as a result of this constraining movement. It has three purposes: (1) to stipulate clear definitions of "education", "liberal education", and "educology" as they are employed in this paper; (2) to identify two examples of conceptual thought derived from the philosophy of education which are clear examples of conceptual substance appropriate to liberal education; and (3) to argue that "educology" be employed as an additional category name, along with "pedagogy," within the component of teacher preparation traditionally referred to as professional education. This category would consist of those areas of study traditionally associated with the foundations, areas which would stress those intellectual and moral characteristics of a liberally educated person. (JD)
FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES AS A NEW LIBERAL ART: EDUCOLOGY

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INTRODUCTION

When the writer first began his career in teacher preparation three languages were employed by his colleagues to describe the curriculum of prospective teachers, general education, specialized education and professional education. As a teacher educator one was responsible for developing and implementing programs and courses within the realm of professional education. During the thirty-one years since then much of our system of public schooling, particularly the teachers, administrators and policy-makers responsible in one way or another for it, has been immersed in one reform movement after another. Despite this persistent three-decade stress on reform this tripartite vision of the total teacher education curriculum has remained largely intact.

During the current reform movement, however, a new language has developed. It is the language of 'pedagogy', a language not encountered in any significant way during the 50's and 60's. It emerged during the 70's with the work of B.O.Smith, and it has been dominating the thinking of teacher educators ever since. One needs only refer to the reports of commissions and task forces which have emerged during the past five years to observe the frequent use being made of this language. In everyone of these publications stress is placed almost entirely on the need to improve the teaching skills of inservice and prospective teachers. The assumption is accepted without question that if one knows subject matter and possesses some methods for transmitting that subject matter to learners then the learning of students will be thereby improved, and the standards of schools will have been raised. All sorts of efforts have been forthcoming as a consequence to convince teachers and teacher educators of the value of this sort of transmission model. As a result, the large array of knowledge traditionally associated with the subdisciplines ordinarily associated with the foundations of education has been
increasingly neglected, even removed entirely from preparatory programs. Today the traditional tripartite division of the teacher preparation curriculum is seen increasingly as consisting of the general and specialized categories, but with a unidimensional translation of the professional category into a single category labelled 'pedagogy'. This paper has emerged out of a deep concern about the unrelenting, dogmatic emphasis which is being placed on this pedagogical realm, a narrowly conceived, reductionistic realm, grounded on an exceptionally mechanical, almost theoryless view of the notion of 'education.'

Because of this intellectually crippling view, a large measure of what Lucas describes as a "reservoir of resources for tacit knowing," and what Broudy claims to be a valid goal of liberal education, namely "to study and teach the sciences and the humanities so that their noetic and normative structures become available for tacit knowing, for concept building, for imagination, and for understanding ...." increasingly is being eliminated from the preparatory programs of educators. A very real and a dangerously simplistic, reductionistic movement, with a stress on the teacher as a technician, operating increasingly in a mechanistic way, is evolving in our preparatory programs. Students are coming away with narrowly conceived, input-process-output codes, almost entirely industrial and reproductive in nature, clearly confining and hegemonizing in terms of the intellectual power they acquire to reflect upon optional possibilities which could open up new vistas, new ways of doing things.

PURPOSES

This paper has been constructed in light of the distorted consciousness likely to be acquired by prospective teachers as a result of this constraining movement. It has three purposes: (1) to stipulate clear definitions of 'education', 'liberal education', and 'educology' as they are employed in this paper; (2) to identify two examples of conceptual thought derived from the philosophy of education which are clear examples of conceptual substance appropriate for a liberal education; and (3) to argue that 'educology' be employed as an additional category name, along with 'pedagogy', within which this intellectual substance may be housed in that component of teacher preparation traditionally referred to as professional education.

ASSUMPTIONS
Two assumptions undergird this paper. One, disciplines contained within Artes Liberales and the Foundations of Education serve parallel functions. That is, the Liberal Arts are to general education and specialized education what Foundational Knowledge is to professional education. Two, Foundational Knowledge is not situation-specific knowledge but rather knowledge which will extend one's scope and depth of comprehension, sharpen one's interpretative powers and enable a person to achieve a measure of tacit, transcendent intellectual freedom. Growth in this regard means the acquisition of an increasing degree of intellectual power to separate one's responses from the immediate nature of one's stimuli.

DEFINITIONS

Education

The concept of 'education' can be understood to mean a number of things. As Veblen pointed out in 1918 "... American state universities ... have been founded, commonly, with a professed utilitarian purpose, and have started out with professional training as their chief avowed aim. The purpose made most of in their establishment has commonly been to train young men for proficiency in some gainful occupation." There is little doubt that the emergence of normal schools, followed by their development as teachers colleges and then as state universities or units of such universities, has adhered, in terms of teacher preparation, to the utilitarian purpose which he pointed out. During this evolution the languages associated with the field of 'Education' have acquired, through what Bowers refers to as the "... intersubjective self, which takes account of language as a carrier of the culture's deep assumptions and categories ...," a formulation which perceives persons associated with the field of education as the activity carried on by professors in schools, colleges and departments of education in preparing people to teach. Very rarely are people sensitive to the variety of additional meanings of education which transcend this narrowly conceived notion.

The ambiguity of the term 'education' which has emerged through this evolutionary process has made it rare, for instance, for people to understand education to be the process by which learning is taking place within a student or the actual result of this process. Still
less do they perceive education to be, as Frankena has so clearly observed, “the discipline or field of enquiry that studies or reflects on ... (the activity of teaching, the process of learning, the result of teaching) and is taught in schools of education.”

Gradually, however, we seem to be acquiring an understanding of the need to consider this latter function which takes one away from the crass stress on narrow, utilitarian activity in the preparation of professional personnel and gradually moves us toward a higher level of thinking, one in which we are acquiring a more academic, non-utilitarian character, a character which sees disciplined inquiry into the nature of education increasingly similar to the emphasis placed on disciplined inquiry in the more established university disciplines. I am not so sanguine as to believe this to be the case in large numbers of institutions. But I suspect that in many, where the appropriate intellectual training, experience and the dispositions reside, there is a growing awareness that the study of education constitutes a realm of inquiry in its own right, one which has a number of sub-disciplines within which systematic scholarly queries can be conducted, and which can be studied and mastered just as any of the other disciplines housed within a typical college or university curriculum.

**Liberal Education**

A fine recent analysis of the idea of 'liberal education' is Kimball's work entitled *Orators & philosophers*, the basic thrust of which is that liberal education encompasses two distinct traditions, that of the philosophers and that of the orators. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle were the original advocates of the view of the philosophers, a view which stresses inquiry, rational thought, the pursuit of truth. Isocrates, Cicero and Quintillian constituted the original group of thinkers who advocated the oratorical pursuit of learning, a view which stressed language, the use of texts and the development of oral discourse to facilitate the development of one's intellect. Professor Kimball reveals in his work a clear recognition of the sharp, irreconcilable opposition between these two opposing ideals of liberal education when he points out that "these ideals are sui generis, consistent within themselves and immune to challenge, except at the level of their epistemological assumptions, and each ideal offers tremendous advantages. Those of the philosophical view and liberal-free ideal - academic freedom, scholarly
autonomy, specialized research, and so on - scarcely need to be repeated because they are preeminent today and constitute the bill of rights of contemporary academe. Their codification resulted from the revitalization of the universitas, the professional guild of the moderni, over the last 150 years. On the other hand, the oratorical mind and artes liberales ideal emphasize the investigation of the best of tradition and the public expression of what is good and true, rather than the discovery of new knowledge."\(^8\)

Kimball clearly outlines the opposing forces of a common logos which guides the thinking of university faculty, those who would engage in sustained, systematic inquiry in the search for truth or meaning and those who would engage in forming communities of discourse, very much like the transformative communities suggested by Giroux,\(^9\) not to deny the investigative bent of the liberal-free orientation toward learning, but rather, as Featherstone argues, "to engage it in a debate that will in itself be crucial for our students' education."\(^10\)

The purpose of liberal education, then, is not to teach vocational skills and forms of making a living, but rather to broaden and deepen one's insight into life, to open up the riches of human endeavor, including the sciences, the arts, religion, philosophy, and human relations, including man's educational experiences, so that life may be fuller in content, so that humans will have the capacity to engage in critical thought, so that human agency may make defensible judgements about matters of significance in every realm of human activity.

**Educology**

The term 'educology' has an interesting and provocative history to it. My initial exposure to the term came when I encountered the work of Christiansen and Fischer in which they argued that educology was the "... discipline which is used to study any and all aspects of the educational process. Thus, educology as a discipline," according to these scholars, "includes the sub-disciplines of praxiology of education (including the technology of education, the science of education (including the psychology, sociology, economics, anthropology, political science of education, and all other scientific studies about the educational process), the normative philosophy of education, the jurisprudence of education, the history of education and the analytic philsohy of education."\(^11\) It is worth
noting that within the array of disciplines they identify none are of the sort we ordinarily associate with pedagogy, that is, the actual practice of teaching in the classroom.

Since then I have encountered the thought of Steiner who has done challenging and enlarging work on the nature of education and the possibility of acquiring knowledge about education, and of George Maccia who has developed the genesis of the notion of educology.¹²

Educology has been a term employed by a number of scholars dating back to the mid-50s. In all of its uses, save for its initial used by a professor at Ohio State University who, according to Christensen,¹³ employed it in a lighter vein, it seems to have been developed as the name for a disciplined scientific method of thinking about educational experience, as a means for acquiring certain knowledge about educational phenomena.

Two senses of meaning, then, have been associated with the term 'educology, (a) the early, probably original, lighter sense of meaning identified by Christensen and (b) the more profound and significant sense of meaning developed by Steiner. While I recognize their uses of the term as legitimate, they are not appropriate for my purposes. Indeed, I believe they make a category error when they suggest (1) that there is a single way in which inquiry goes on within the field of education, or any field of endeavor,¹⁴ rather than recognizing that inquiry varies with the nature of the sub-discipline being pursued; and (2) that, in accord with Dewey, "since the practice of progressive education differs from that of the traditional schools, it would be absurd to suppose that the intellectual formulation and organization which fits one type will hold for the other. To be genuine," Dewey argued, "the science which springs from schools of the older and traditional type, must work upon that foundation, and endeavor to reduce its subject-matter and methods to principles such that their adoption will eliminate waste, conserve resources, and render the existing type of practice more effective. In the degree in which progressive schools mark a departure in their emphasis from old standards, as they do in freedom, individuality, activity, and a cooperative social medium the intellectual organization, the body of facts and principles which they may contribute must of necessity be different. At most they can only occasionally borrow from the "science" that is evolved on the basis of a different type of practice, and they can even then,"
Dewey cautioned, "borrow only what is appropriate to their own special aims and processes. To discover how much is relevant is of course a real problem. But this is a very different thing from assuming that the methods and results obtained under traditional scholastic conditions form the standard of science to which progressive schools must conform."  

In effect, what I am suggesting is that a third sense of the meaning of 'educology' can and ought to be employed, a sense of meaning which makes it comparable to the category term 'liberal arts.' In the case of the latter term we ordinarily imagine it to consist of specific disciplines, each of which has its own factual base, its means of conceptualizing these facts, of engaging in systematic inquiry regarding these facts, of saying things about these facts, and of assessing the quality of what is being said about these facts. The same thing can be said about educology. It can be sub-divided into a number of specific disciplines, each of which has its own interest in a particular array of facts, its own ways of conceptualizing those facts, and of making claims about them. One thinks of such disciplines as those identified by Christensen, but also including such disciplines as curriculum theory, critical theory, and comparative education. Employed in this way it becomes the home of a number of sub-disciplines much like biology is the home of such sub-disciplines as genetics, invertebrate biology, evolutionary biology, cell biology, human biology, immunology, biochemistry, animal physiology, wildlife conservation, etc. Within educology one would find such realms of thought as philosophy of education, history of education, learning theory, curriculum theory and the host of other realms of educational study identified by Christensen and Fisher. Taken collectively, as branches of educology, these realms of intellectual activity possess the potential for becoming a recognized and respected realm of the liberal arts.

**EXAMPLES OF CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT**

In a very real sense our panel of speakers today consists of excellent examples of the sort of conceptual thought which constitutes the material which would be appropriate for inclusion within the category of educology and hence qualify as components for the liberal art conception of this category of intellectual activity which I am advocating. Each of our contributors has a particular sub-discipline of
the foundations in mind. One is concerned with policy studies, the other with analytical thought. Each of these concerns constitute what I suggest are sub-disciplines within the category of liberal study I would like us to adopt, 'educology'.

Consider 'analysis' first. As it is considered in its usual guise within the foundations it is a systematic effort to examine the senses of meanings associated with terms, with propositions and with arguments. In the pursuit of its aims it generally is perceived as a neutral way of thinking, designed very much to 'unpack' significant educational terms, and to reveal the nature of meaning associated with these terms. Let me employ an example to make my point. Take the term 'professional', a term which seems to be on the lips of many teacher educators at the present time. One could examine this term by considering its uses along a continuum, from highly accepted uses to less well accepted uses. When considered as a label for such activities as medical and legal practice, one would most likely get many people to agree with its use. These are, of course, among those professional occupations most likely to be governed by a set of criteria to which many have agreed, including such attributes as a code of ethics, a definite social function or service, a high level of status, a high degree of conceptual complexity, a long period of time required to master its requirements and a fairly high income. When other occupations are considered, for instance, classroom teaching, plumbing, and barbering, the clarity and acceptance of the usage of the term becomes a bit less acceptable to some. Clearly there is a social service provided, particularly in the case of teaching, but there is also a lack of recognition, at least at the explicit level, of a code of ethics, the amount of remuneration is decidedly less, the length of time required to master its entry-level conceptual complexities is markedly less, as is the time to master the skills which are a part of its ordinary practice, and the degree of status of the person within the occupation is perceived to be at a lower level. Finally, consider the occupation of garbage collecting. Clearly, this occupation lacks a code of ethics, can be learned within minutes, requires only a small amount, if any, of conceptual complexity, can be mastered very easily, and provides one with very little social status. Use of the term 'profession' to describe this form of occupation, despite the fact that it provides a necessary social service, would not be a satisfactory usage of the term to many persons.

Analytical thought of this sort could be applied to a
significant number of educational concepts, propositions or arguments. Its purpose would not be to suggest that a particular way of employing a concept is best, but rather to enable one to perceive the various ways in which educational concepts have been and can be used, to open up spaces, as Maxine Greene argues, for people to see new options, new possibilities, new futures. Judging from the stress on the ability to "be able to think and write clearly and effectively ... (and) to communicate with precision, cogency, and force" which defined the nature of one of six requirements of a good liberal education suggested by Dean Henry Rosovksy of Harvard University, the skill of analytical thinking about educational phenomena could be easily justified as a component of a liberal program of studies.

Take as another example, this time a form of thinking which is particularly appropriate in the field of policy-studies, the method of thinking which has been described as normative thought. This form of thought is clearly different from that of analytical thought because it is connected with the realm of practical. When this form of thought is applied to educational phenomena one engages in asking a number of significant and related questions. Frankena argues "that there are three questions for any normative philosophy of education: (1) What dispositions are to be cultivated? Which dispositions are excellences? (2) Why are these dispositions to be regarded as excellences and cultivated? What are the aims or principles of education that require their cultivation? (3) How or by what methods or processes are they to be cultivated?"

A fine example of the implementation of normative thinking in the realm of policy making can be observed in a very recent publication related to the reform movement in education, entitled "A Blueprint for the Professsionalization of Teaching." All but one of the seven chapters in this publication are devoted to a brief descriptive statement about a particular segment of thinking related to 'professionalizing teaching,' followed by recommendations and rationale (Italics mine). Sample normative claims, representative of the form developed by Frankena, include: (1) The Legislature should establish a professional board of teaching. (2) The proposed State Board of Teaching should recommend professional standards for teaching, the violation of which would constitute professional misconduct, which would be enforced in professional disciplinary proceedings. (3) The State Education Department should require continuing education to maintain teacher licensure in New
York. Following each of the normative claims in the publication an argument is developed to support the claim being considered. Within the argument advanced for establishing a professional board one finds the reason given to be "... the belief that our proposed state board will attract and retain better teachers, while at the same time encouraging a degree of accountability previously unattainable in the teaching profession." Clearly public policy making is a realm in which normative thinking plays a vital part. The intellectual discipline one acquires from this form of thinking constitutes a dimension of liberal education which can be solidly justified, particularly because of its intellectually liberating effect, and because of its value in every dimension of human endeavor, especially during periods of rapid and significant social change.

EDUCOLOGY - A NEW DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

As I indicated in my opening remarks, the category of 'professional education' has been used by the field of teacher education, as well as by other fields, throughout its history. However, when this category name has been employed, it has almost always been affiliated with the skills related to classroom teaching, with what is referred to today as 'pedagogy.' Rarely has the term been employed to designate a category of intellectual substance separate and different from that of the methodology of teaching.

A good example of the problem created by this blending together of different categories of intellectual preparation within 'professional education' was revealed recently in remarks made by Arthur Wise of the Rand Corporation while he spoke as a part of a conference which was addressing the problem of teacher education during April, 1988. Mr. Wise repeatedly referred to the need for teachers to have a sound background of knowledge, excellent technical skills of teaching, and 'professional knowledge.' His remarks mixed categories in such a way that it was difficult for most of those present to perceive the conceptual distinctions to which he was alluding. When queried about what he meant by his use of 'professional knowledge' he responded by saying that this would include knowledges derived from the study of the history and philosophy of education, the sociology of education, the politics of education, the anthropology of education, the economics of education and comparative education, to mention but a few of the areas which he identified. Had he not been pressed to clarify his remarks about the
professional component of education the nature of these knowledges would not have been recognized by most of those present to hear him.

What Mr. Wise points up, however, is not the need to be articulate about the subjects to include within professional education, but rather the need to recognize the abstract character of the category 'professional education.' One must recognize that it consists of three subordinate levels: the first of these levels consists of two categories, pedagogy and educology. Educology includes within the second subordinate level, a number of sub-disciplines, for instance, the discipline of the philosophy of education, and others alluded to earlier in this paper. These disciplines must be viewed as sub-divided further into a third subordinate level. This level, for instance, in the case of the philosophy of education, would include such areas as analytical philosophy, normative philosophy, and systems theory. The same sort of approach to the category of pedagogy could be taken for dimensions of that realm of study and practice which I have developed for educology. By subdividing 'professional education' in this manner we would achieve a far more precise way of describing and treating the field of educational studies than we now have.

There is another reason for considering 'educology' as an appropriate name for these sub-disciplines. That reason is derived from the work of Jhristensen and well as from Steiner and is based on their stress of educology as a discipline in its own right. In the case of each of these scholars educology is perceived as that discipline within which we employ the scientific method of inquiry and acquire knowledge of a particular sort. Each perceives educology as such a method of inquiry. This orientation fails to take into account the development in our understanding about the nature of science which has emerged during the twentieth century. Indeed, as Phillips has recently stressed, "the structure of theories, the relation between theory and evidence, the role of observation, and the processes by which science changes or develops," have all been issues which have produced "dramatic insight" during the recent past.

Just as one can pursue a program of study within the liberal arts, one which often entails 30-40 or more hours of study within a discipline in order to gain an acceptable degree of mastery of that discipline, so too, could one pursue a program of study within educology,
acquire a significant mastery of facts, concepts, language, and methodologies and become thereby a disciplined person in understanding, interpreting and choosing within the field of educational phenomena.

**LIKELY CONSEQUENCES**

Three significant consequences would be likely to emerge if 'educology' were adopted as the category label within which would be housed those disciplines the tutored among us ordinarily associate with the 'foundations of education.'

First, our identity as intellectual specialists would be more sharply enunciated and communicated. Just as those who labor within the field of biology or of psychology acquire a clear identity, regardless of the particular sub-areas of these disciplines with which they are concerned, so too would foundational scholars would acquire such an identity. This is lacking in large measure at the present time. Inform a colleague outside of teacher preparation, for instance, that you are engaged in teaching educational foundations and you are very likely going to receive a blank 'just what is that?' sort of reaction. Indeed, because of the dominance of the reductionistic tendencies in thought about teacher preparation which have emerged during the past fifteen years, one will also find this sort of reaction emanating from younger faculty entering the ranks of teacher preparation at the present time, particularly those who have been prepared within the recently emerging pedagogical orientation. Many have little or no understanding, and even less appreciation, for the substance of foundational study.

Closely related would be the likely need to reconsider the labels we employ to describe our professional associations. Currently we refer to AESA or, in New York, to the New York State Foundations of Education Association (NYSFEA), a 'moul.iful' to say the least. This designation is unnecessarily vague to anyone but those of us immersed in the field. One can easily imagine a move to rename our organization as, for instance, the Society of Educologists, or the American Educoiogy Association.

2. Educoiogy, as a new liberal art, would be formally recognized as a significant field of knowledge, one in which a college student could achieve a depth of understanding, one which could offer its
own major and minor. It would acquire departmental status, be separated from the category of professional education, and be seen as an area of study comparable in significance to any of the other social sciences. Students from an entire campus would have the option of choosing this realm of study as a major. While this might not occur rapidly, students would gradually become aware of the values associated with the intellectual understandings they could acquire from the educological areas and would very likely consider them as either significant courses from which to select their electives, or with which to build an outside minor. A particular sequence of courses within this field would be a required sequence for anyone preparing to become a teacher or an administrator.

3. Those engaged in teaching courses within the category of 'pedagogy,' courses we associate with practical, hands-on, classroom experiences, would increasingly find themselves engaged in doing their teaching within the framework of area elementary and secondary schools. Where 'lead teachers' emerge as part of the career development movement, such personnel would increasingly be involved in this pedagogical instruction. Teacher centers would play an increasingly significant role in the formal classroom preparation of prospective teachers. The number of faculty in the pedagogical realm who would remain engaged in teaching on campus would be sharply reduced. Schools, colleges and departments of education as we traditionally conceive them would be drastically curtailed in size, with much of the methodological content currently taught within the university setting moved to the far more appropriate setting of the lower schools. This would be especially valuable if the lower schools in a region identified one of their schools as what Holmes referred to as 'developmental schools.' Such schools would be admirable locations for the sort of cognitive and skill development emphasized within the pedagogical realm.

SUMMARY

I have suggested that the category label of 'foundations of education' is no longer adequate as a descriptor of the intellectual expertise of those connected with the disciplines associated with this field. In its place an argument has been developed which advocates the adoption of a new category label for our field, 'educology.' This category would consist of those areas of study we traditionally associate with the
foundations, areas which would stress those intellectual and moral characteristics of a liberally educated person which Dressel identifies as:

1. "knowing how to acquire knowledge and how to use it;"
2. "possessing a high level of mastery of the skills of communication;"
3. "awareness of personal values and value commitments;"
4. "cooperative and collaborative tendencies in working with others;"
5. "awareness of, concern about, and willingness to accept a measure of responsibility for, contemporary events;"
6. "disposition to seek coherence and unity in accumulating knowledge and experience along with a desire to use insights derived from their study to fulfill their obligations as responsible citizens in a democratic society." 21
Reading Notes


8. IBID., 237.


13. Christensen and Fischer, op. cit.


20. Phillips, op. cit. 5.