This study evaluates the process of desegregation in Buffalo City Public Schools and adds to educational change literature in two ways. First, it analyzes the initiation and implementation phases of school desegregation by describing how the innovation was shaped by participants to fit the system using it. Second, the technique of event analysis shows how the innovation of desegregation polarized Buffalo. Educational change in Buffalo's case not only created conflicts but also the solutions to resolve them. The study concludes that Buffalo has made significant progress in the past 12 years from being a deeply divided city along racial and ethnic lines to becoming genuinely integrated, and it suggests that the desegregation process has been a direct result of school leaders redirecting issues away from cultural perspectives about race to political levels where good education becomes the focus. (JAM)
PUTTING TOGETHER THE PICTURE OF SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT IN BUFFALO

by

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In examining the process of desegregation in the Buffalo City Public Schools, we have found a carefully monitored and well documented instance of educational change which is unusual for a number of reasons. First, this is virtually the only study of school desegregation which tracks the process over a ten to twenty year period (Weinberg, 1987). Second, the way in which desegregation has been implemented and understood in Buffalo is unique. There, desegregation was used specifically as a tool for school improvement and the result has been surprisingly widespread approval throughout the city for what has happened to the schools.

Our study of school desegregation in Buffalo is based on two theoretical assumptions: We conceive of school desegregation as educational change and we conceive of change as a social process that takes place over a period of time and involves negotiation of perspectives on the issues underlying the change.

This paper focuses specifically on the initiation phase of the process of school desegregation in Buffalo for it is during this stage that an innovation is shaped to fit the particular system using it (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978) and that the various participants achieve a common understanding of the innovation. Using the technique of event analysis (Smith & Keith, 1971; Rust, 1984), we show that by the time the suit went to trial in 1974, Buffalo had become a city polarized on the issue of desegregation. We suggest that the highly successful desegregation program which has been
implemented in Buffalo since 1976 emerged because of a radical restructuring of the debate there: The focus of change moved from the emotionally charged issues of race and equity to less sensitive issues of good education and school improvement. The paper suggests that Buffalo has made significant progress in the past twelve years away from being a city deeply divided along racial and ethnic lines to becoming genuinely integrated, and it suggests that this process has been a direct result of what has taken place in the schools. Thus, the study is informative about the process of desegregation in schools. It has relevance, too, for students of educational change particularly in relation to the initiation and implementation phases of the change process (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978).

Review of Literature

Perspectives on change: Increasingly institutional change is understood as a social process in which participants negotiate strategies and outcomes over a period of time (Fullan, 1982; Popkewitz, Tabachnick & Wehlage, 1982; Rust, 1984; Sarason, 1982). In this process, participants' perspectives or understandings of the problem shape their responses both as individuals and as a group (Becker, Geer, & Hughes, 1968; House, 1981; Rust, 1984).

Ernest House (1981) offers three perspectives on change -- technological, political and cultural -- which encompass the
totality of viewpoints on the process of change. House defines perspective as a "'way of seeing' a problem rather than a rigid set of rules and procedures" (p. 20). He suggests that these perspectives "act as interpretive frameworks for understanding the change process (and) . . . may be considered as 'moral' or 'action' paradigms" (p. 19) guiding participants' responses to change.

Underlying the technological perspective is the image of production:

Innovation is conceived as a relatively mechanistic process. The social relationships are based on technological necessity. The concern is economic and the primary value that of efficiency. (p. 18) Technological change is accomplished relatively easily by the adoption of a new system or a new technology. Little effort is expended to change the attitudes or understandings of participants toward the new technology.

Underlying the political perspective is the image of negotiation. Events are explained "as power struggles among individuals" (p. 19) and groups. Political change is time consuming. Participants must find common ground. "From the political perspective, innovation is a matter of conflicts and compromises among factional groups. . . cooperation on an innovation is viewed as problematic rather than automatic. Cooperation must result from negotiation and compromise" (p. 23).
Underlying the cultural perspective is the image of community: "People are bound to one another through shared meanings resting on shared values" (p. 19). Conflicts and misunderstandings which arise in group situations are interpreted from the cultural perspective as conflicts in values. Cultural change involves changing beliefs; it is a long, slow process which can take a generation or more. Many studies of educational change, writes House (1981), "show the subtle ways in which change efforts are absorbed without significant change occurring" (p. 25). This is because the essential, underlying belief structure of the participants has remained intact.

Successful instances of change, House (1981) writes, incorporate all three perspectives: There is a new way of doing things; there has been and often continues to be negotiation; and there is a fundamentally different understanding of the innovation on the part of the participants.

The change process: Change of this magnitude does not happen instantly. It takes place over time in a sequence which, like any good story, has a beginning, middle and end (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978; Clark & Guba, 1965; Lewin, 1958). Studies of educational change have taught us that beginnings are extremely important to the entire process (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978; Smith, Prunty et al., 1985) for they have a very powerful shaping effect on future action (Rust, 1984; Smith, Prunty et al., 1985). We have learned, too, that
beginnings can take a very long time (Smith, Prunty et al., 1985).

Like any good story, successful (and unsuccessful) innovations have turning points and key moments which shape future action and which can, in retrospect, shed light on what preceded them as well as what follows (Smith & Keith, 1971; Rust, 1984). These moments are also important for what they tell us about the participants -- who is a central character, who is not; who interacts with whom; etc. (Ianni, 1972).

Studies of educational innovations which explore change as a social process (Rust, 1984; Smith & Keith, 1971; Wolcott, 1977) have shed some light on the types of interaction and qualities of leadership appropriate at various stages of the change process. During the mobilization phase, that period which Lewin (1958) described as "unfreezing," broad based support for the intended change seems essential (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978) and must include the district office (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978).

In summary, the literature on change and innovation in education indicates that change can be viewed as a social process which evolves over time and that it is shaped by the quality of interaction throughout but most especially during the initiation phase of the process. Successful change appears to include the technological, political and cultural perspectives identified by House (1981).
Method:

The data of this study was derived from in depth retrospective interviews conducted by the research team of Miller, Repa and Rust as well as from letters and official papers from the school district, the court, the city government, and the state education department. Contemporary newspaper accounts were used as secondary sources to confirm material provided during the interviews as well as to provide background on Buffalo during the period under study.

Relying on our conception of change as a social process, we began our analysis of this data by developing a time line of the key events (Smith & Keith, 1971; Rust, 1984) that delineated and defined the desegregation process in the Buffalo schools. Key events were identified as those which were mentioned by all of the various participants in the process either in interviews and conversations or in documents such as contemporary newspaper accounts, official papers, and letters. Our first time lines were directly related to the desegregation suit: Arthur vs. Nyquist, 1974, and its aftermath. Rather quickly, we learned that we had barely begun to scratch the surface of this rich and complex story. We had basically begun in the middle of the story (in the context of educational change -- at the implementation phase). To understand the process we were observing, it was essential that we trace its evolution.
We began our time line of key events again placing the desegregation suit at the center of the line as the pivotal event in the desegregation process in Buffalo. With all the materials provided by the school system and the lawyers on both sides of the suit, key events following the suit were easily identified. However, we were still unclear about events leading up to the suit. Using clues provided during our interviews conducted in 1985, we sketched a number of possibilities. Over the next year and a half, we returned to Buffalo many times. We reinterviewed school administrators and some of the teachers and parents with whom we had originally spoken. We followed up on suggestions made about other people we should talk with and things we should read. Out of this investigative work has emerged a chronology of change in Buffalo which appears to have face validity and which has enabled us to develop a theory about how desegregation was transformed there from a bone of contention into a tool for school improvement.
We have identified six key events central to the story of desegregation in the Buffalo City Schools. These are

1. 1954: Brown vs. the Board of Education
2. 1964: Dixon Complaint to New York State Education Commissioner, James Allen
3. 1971-2: Follow-up to Dixon letter
   Suit: Arthur vs. Nyquist
   Trial begins
5. 1976: Court Ordered Desegregation
6. 1976-1988: Desegregation Plan proposed and implemented

Each of these events has two characteristics: It involved all of the major participants in the desegregation process and it is recognized by them as a turning point in the action.

The Setting:

1954 - Brown Decision: We date the beginning of the desegregation process in the Buffalo City Schools to the 1954 Supreme Court Decision, Brown vs. the Board of Education of Topeka [347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954)]. Clearly, movement toward desegregation began here, as elsewhere in the country, even before the Brown decision, but this first use of a legal remedy to correct racial
segregation in schools had a powerful impact on many in Buffalo's black community giving them courage to begin to develop evidence of segregative intent in the schools (Dixon, 6/5/87) and to press for educational equity (Arthur, 8/18/86; Baugh/Bennett, 6/19/86; Lewis, 1/25/85). Nationally known organizations such as the ACLU and the NAACP became vocal regarding racial imbalance in the city's schools. Local, predominantly black groups such as BUILD (Hesson, 9/19/85; Dixon, 6/5/87), the Civic Betterment League and the Young Dems (Dixon, 6/5/87), and black members of the Board of Education, most notably, Dr. Lydia Wright, became activists in the campaign for educational equity.

1964 - Dixon Complaint: By 1964, there was enough evidence of unequal treatment of the city's black school population to prompt a letter of complaint from Yerbie Dixon and six other black parents to the New York State Commissioner of Education, James Allen (9/4/64). Dixon's appeal to the commissioner was supported by the NAACP and local, black professionals and educators (Dixon, 6/5/87). It provided detailed evidence of racial imbalance in the city's elementary schools and in newly built Woodlawn Junior High and it charged the Buffalo Board of Education with refusing to correct and eliminate racial imbalance.

At the time of the Dixon complaint, there were 72,863 students in the Buffalo schools of whom 25,468 (35%) were non-white (census figures 2/5/66). Woodlawn was built in a
predominantly black neighborhood and was designed by the Board to house a largely black population of students (Challenger, 3/4/64). The Dixon complaint suggested that the attendance pattern of the new school should mirror the demographic makeup of the city and that the Board should act to correct other obvious cases of imbalance such as existed in sixteen of the city's elementary school.

Dixon's appeal further charged discrimination against the hiring of black teachers and characterized the city's predominantly black schools as educationally inferior. The letter warned that contemplated building plans and other proposed Board decisions could further contribute to racial imbalance in Buffalo schools. Years later, Florence Baugh (6/19/86) described that time as "bleak," and the school board's inaction as "immoral." Yerbie Dixon (6/5/87) could still remember the details of the situation and the steps he had taken to try to correct it:

... we were having problems with the Board of Education. I did some research at the NAACP and we found that the Board of Ed was spending 1/3 less money at black schools than they were spending at the white schools. And I wrote a letter to Dr. Manch and also the newspaper but they didn't publish that. They published Dr. Manch's answer to my letter, where he admitted that they were spending 1/3 less money on the black schools and he justified (it) in his letter by saying that was because the more experienced teachers were in white
schools, they had higher salaries, ... he made some excuse about the repairs. ... 

I was on the Education Committee with BUILD. We used to go into the schools. We'd go unannounced. We'd just storm the schools and I'd ask the teachers questions because they didn't want us talking to the teachers. I can recall one teacher in a school that my kid was going to coming out of the room crying saying she was so happy we had come. She said she had 4 math books to teach 32 pupils and she said, "I can't give them work in the class, let alone give them homework." And we went through the schools and in the black schools we'd find books that had gone to 2 or 3 other schools. ... They'd be stamped (with the other school names) in the front of the book. ... they would put the new books in the white schools and the old books in the black school. ... And the teachers were coming to us secretly, letting us know about the conditions in the school and a lot of the teachers were substitutes (they) were just there, or just burned out and putting in time, and they would go into the classes and tell the kids to talk quietly or put your head down on the desk and rest just to keep them quiet. It wasn't a teaching situation, it was a jail house situation. ... 

In the ten year period between the Brown decision and the Dixon appeal, the New York State Regents and Commissioners of Education had issued numerous policy statements regarding
racial imbalance in the schools. The Dixon appeal, however, provoked the first directive from a Commissioner of Education to the Buffalo Board of Education to develop "a plan for the progressive elimination of racial imbalance" in the schools (2/15/65). In his findings, Commissioner Allen upheld the petitioners' contention of racial imbalance citing enrollments from Woodlawn Junior High and sixteen elementary schools. He also supported the petitioners' charges of Board inaction regarding development of a plan to correct racial imbalance, but he found no proof of Board discrimination against the hiring of black teachers.

1971-72 - Follow-up to Dixon Letter / Suit: It would take eleven years, a new, elected school board, a new superintendent, and a law suit before Buffalo complied with Commissioner Allen's order. During this time, the school superintendent, Joseph Manch, and the Board of Education in an almost routine way managed to avoid implementing a workable plan to address the issue of racial imbalance in the schools. Year after year, they proposed plans; year after year, the State Education Department or the Commissioner of Education or both rejected all or parts of the plans as inadequate and directed the superintendent and Board to develop more comprehensive strategies.

Between 1965 and 1976, Buffalo sustained devastating blows to its economy with the withdrawal of the steel and automobile industries. White flight to the suburbs, growing
militancy in the black community, and general educational decline in the public schools further contributed to the city's troubles. During this time, groups within the white and black communities became increasingly active and vocal about the schools.

In both subtle and overtly hostile ways, members of the white community supported the foot dragging of the Board of Education. White students were routinely directed to all white schools even if they were outside of their neighborhood. A variety of reasons were supplied for these placements including accommodating students' needs for language classes such as Polish or Hebrew (Hesson, 9/19/85; Murray, 7/18/86). Similar obfuscation took place in response to a variety of efforts on the part of the local black community and the State Education Department to correct racial imbalance and improve the schools. Among the most notable of these was the directive to the superintendent by the Board of Education in 1966 to develop a "plan (to address racial imbalance) in a manner that will promote the best interests of all children, provided, however, that such recommendations do not involve transportation of White children into non-white residential areas except by their own choice." This resulted in the Superintendent's 16 point plan which included transportation of "inner-city" pupils to peripheral areas of the city (11/10/66). Essentially, this was a one way/one race bussing proposal. Another noteworthy directive came from the Common Council in 1968 (6/19/68).
first barring the use of portable classrooms, recommended as part of the Quality Integrated Education plan, and then requiring that they architecturally echo the buildings to which they were adjacent (Murray, 6/20/86). In each instance, directives such as these were overturned in the courts or ruled against by the Commissioner of Education, but each battle took time, slowed the pace of desegregation in Buffalo, and increased racial tensions in the city.

By 1972, only 10% (3,000) of Buffalo’s non-white pupils were involved in an integration program and patience had worn thin on both sides of the desegregation issue. The school board appeared increasingly intransigent and the black community was becoming fragmented in its response. One part of the black community regularly commented on and challenged the school board’s actions. These were activists pushing for change. We know about their activities from one of the city’s two major black newspapers, the Challenger, as well as from retrospective interviews. They shared a common bond—a belief that things could not get better without the active involvement of the black community. They used the activist strategies of the times: Demonstrations, marches, rallies, speeches, sit-ins and boycotts. They also tried new answers such as “freedom schools” (Dixon, 6/5/87). In July, 1968, they succeeded in starting BUILD Academy, an all black school brought into being through a memorandum of understanding signed by BUILD, the University of Buffalo and the Buffalo Board of Education. From this group of activists emerged a
number of Buffalo's current black leaders including Arthur Eve, a state senator; Florence Baugh, the president of the Board of Education; and George Arthur, president of the City Council.

There was another equally strong voice in the black community -- a voice of moderation and perspective. It was heard through the city's second major black newspaper, the Criterion. At the time and even in retrospect, the Criterion seemed conservative: School board decisions and activist activities reported in the Challenger often went unreported. Editorials urged restraint and black pride. What the Criterion did was to remind the black community that there was need for scepticism and caution toward the desegregation movement. It asked the hard questions -- Who would benefit from desegregation? Would education for black children really improve simply by mixing the races? Might it not be easier to discriminate against black children in an integrated setting? (Sims, 8/87) The editorship of the Criterion saw the courts as "the bottom line in desegregation" (Sims, 8/87).

For black educators in the Buffalo system, the years following the Dixon complaint were an especially difficult time since they had to balance their desire to improve the schools from within with the frustration and anger of having to cope with discrimination in the workplace. Claud Clapp, James Heck, and others took leadership roles during this
period keeping racial equity in the forefront of the schools' agenda.

On December 13, 1971, Commissioner Nyquist received a letter from the Citizens Committee for Human Relations (CCHR) and the NAACP which was essentially a follow-up on the Dixon complaint of 1964. It presented a terse summary of the board's non-compliance with Commissioner Allen's (1965) directive and used these facts as evidence of the existence of a de jure segregated public school system in Buffalo in violation of the 14th amendment rights of minority students. This follow-up on the Dixon complaint was the result of a sustained, collaborative effort between members of the black and white communities to effect school desegregation and was preliminary to a suit.

On January 20, the Board of Education received Commissioner Nyquist's reply. In it he
- acknowledged Buffalo's efforts but held that "the problem of racial imbalance in the Buffalo schools is still a long way from solution;"
- asked that the Board develop a new plan which would "eliminate segregation in the early grades where integration is most easily achieved and most effective in the lives of children;"
- maintained his continuing jurisdiction over the Yerbie Dixon appeal;
- asked for a new desegregation plan by April 1, 1972
  "under which every school would substantially reflect
  the racial composition of the entire district;"
- and requested a progress report by February 15, 1972.

True to form, the Board of Education stalled. In early
April, Commissioner Nyquist appointed a task force to work
with the Buffalo Board on development of a plan. On July 10,
members of the CCHR: Arthur, Goldfarb, Seales, and Medige and
the NAACP filed a complaint in U.S. District Court citing
14th amendment violations and naming as defendants, the
Buffalo Board of Education, Superintendent of Schools,
Regents of the University of the State of New York and the
Commissioner. The complaint was later amended to include the
Common Council and the Mayor.

1974 - Suit / Elected School Board: In 1974, the case went
to trial. On April 30, 1976, Judge Curtain ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs.

Simultaneous with the suit was a strong, almost relentless
drive for an elected school board in Buffalo. As early as
1966, there had been calls for an elected board (Buffalo
Evening News, 5/1/74; Challenger, 12/15/66) and, from the
beginning, its champions were whites concerned about the
growing press for integration. Camille Curro, a newspaper
columnist at the time wrote:

(Integration) is significantly the single most important
reason behind the current drive for an elected school
board in Buffalo. ... However illogical the thinking might be, it is evident that the current popularity of the changeover from an appointed to an elected board hinges on "the people's thinking" that an elected board would not dare to integrate the schools against the wishes of the voters who put them into (and out of) office. (Courier Express, 4/29/73)

White support of this type was sufficient to cause opposition to the idea of an elected board throughout the black community (Challenger, 12/15/66; Arthur, 8/18/66). It was opposed by the black members of both the City Council and the Board of Education (Arthur, 8/18/66; Buffalo Evening News, 3/23/73, 4/29/73; Courier Express, 3/23/73, 4/29/73). George Arthur (8/18/66) described his resistance to it as being motivated by fear that it would erode the power base of the black community by diminishing its representation on the school board. It was opposed by State Senator Arthur Eve who tried to push for a decentralized system of community school boards. And it was opposed by the CCHR and others who shared the viewpoint of the plaintiffs.

The power of the anti-desegregation forces in Buffalo in the early 1970s showed most clearly in their successful drive for an elected board. They effectively blocked all legal and legislative attempts to stop it. Board members were no longer to be appointed by the City Council; they were to be elected as representatives of six new districts two of which were largely black areas. Board membership was increased
from seven to nine. Three "at large" seats were added. One of these was won by a black, Mrs. Florence Baugh, who garnered the majority of votes for the at-large position and who has continued to win this position in all subsequent elections. And, a group of "young Turks" (Baugh, 6/19/86) was elected from across the city who shared a commitment to responsive leadership from the school board and good education for all the city's children. Within a year of their election, the new board had forced the resignation of the superintendent and had begun an active and earnest effort to discern the will of the Buffalo populace regarding education.

Analysis

Drawing on the Rand Study's (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978) delineation of the change process, one can view the period between the Brown Decision (1954) and Judge Curtain's decision (1976) as the initiation stage of school desegregation in Buffalo since this was the period during which attitudes toward the issue of school desegregation crystallized and during which the desegregation program was designed. In Buffalo, the initiation stage of change appears to have encompassed two distinct periods: one in which understandings of the innovation were shaped and one in which commitment to the innovation was made and actual plans were developed.
The first period lasted roughly twenty years (1954 - 1974). During this time, both the white and black communities' perspectives on the issue of school desegregation were shaped and refined as a kind of "unfreezing" (Lewin, 1958). Leadership was broadly disbursed among pro- and anti-desegregationists.

Using House's (1981) perspectives on change as a guide, it seems obvious now that the old school board (prior to 1974) in Buffalo was bent on technological change: the gradual imposition of a plan, one which would probably involve one-way busing of black students to predominantly white schools. To them, the issue of school desegregation was not open for negotiation. It encompassed a conflict of values. Its resolution would require changing the beliefs of one or more of the parties involved.

The second stage of initiation lasted only two years (1974 - 1976). During this time, the focus of educational change altered. Leadership coalesced and mobilized to develop a desegregation plan which was more than a token measure to correct racial imbalance in the schools. This change in focus and attitude appears to have been a direct by-product of the elected school board and of the suit's going to trial. The elected board brought pro- and anti-desegregationists together as defendants in the suit. Like it or not, they had to develop a response to the suit which would please their constituents and meet the requirements defined by the court. This brought about a redefinition of the problem. It changed
the focus of the board's interaction from school desegregation to school improvement and, thus, altered the quality of the discussion of change removing it from the cultural perspective and placing it solidly within the context of the political perspective. What emerged from this short period of reassessment became the linchpin of the successful school desegregation program which has evolved in Buffalo over the past twelve years.

Conclusion

There are aspects of this story which are instructive about successful change. The most obvious are that change takes time, that it is messy, that it is hard to plan, and that its outcomes are never clear. This is especially true of the initiation phase. The Buffalo story also offers new insights into the change process -- insights which are particularly relevant for innovations involving emotionally charged issues such as desegregation.

This study suggests that "unfreezing" and mobilization for change may actually be two distinct phases of the initiation stage of innovation. The "unfreezing" phase is the period in which leadership may be broadly disbursed among competing interests as understandings of key issues are developed; the mobilization phase is the period in which leadership coalesces and commitment to a common goal is formed. This coalescence of leadership, our study suggests, is directly
related to participants' perspectives on the innovation: When the discussion of change occurs at the political level, it is possible for participants to negotiate and to compromise.

From the time of the elected school board to the present, the level of discourse in Buffalo changed dramatically and irrevocably from what it had been. There was still acrimony and disagreement; there is still disagreement today. This has not been an easy implementation process, but progress has been steady and desegregation is a fact of life in the Buffalo schools. Not only that, the schools are vastly improved.

What happened in Buffalo with the advent of the elected school board was a substantive restructuring of the issues: The debate was moved from the cultural perspective where beliefs about race were the focus to the political level where good education became the focus. There is room for discussion, negotiation and compromise on the issue of good education. It is almost impossible to compromise on one's beliefs about equality and equity.

Because school desegregation in Buffalo has by all accounts been successful, this story has much to teach us about this issue in particular and about educational change in general.
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