This paper discusses "moral imagination" or vision by strong-minded task-oriented contemporary educational leaders like New Jersey's Joe Clark. These are principals and superintendents who will challenge traditional assumptions about the nature of the school's relationships with its internal and external publics in favor of their own "moral" vision about how things ought to be. The paper takes issue with moral imagination as a guide for effective leadership. Rather, it favors such leadership influences as "critical imagination" and "democratic value deliberation." Critical imagination is the notion that managers exercise great caution and reflection when determining policies and goals. Democratic value deliberation is the idea that a school leader's private moral vision should be made public. Once this is done, school and district educational leaders should arrange and engage in participatory and consensual decision-making processes with all constituencies rather than act independently. (JAM)
Moral Imagination and the Philosophy of School Leadership

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Introduction

Time magazine reports of a new breed of baseball bat and bullhorn-wielding school principal in the inner city who advocates authoritarian leadership and harsh discipline for teachers as well as students. Joe Clark, principal of Eastside High in Paterson, New Jersey is featured on a recent cover of the magazine. Clark is quoted as saying "In this building everything emanates and ultimately from me. Nothing happens without me." (p. 52) Faculty members hostile to his vision were dismissed or strongly encouraged to leave. During his six years as principal, some 100 teachers left, including a basketball coach who was hustled out of assembly by security guards for failing to stand at attention when the school song was sung. Clark replied to criticisms of his methods by saying, "I expurgated them through a vast variety of methods." (pp. 52-53)

The argument currently enjoying popularity amongst critics of the schools in America proposes that most, if not all, the problems in public education may be solved by stronger, more imaginative educational leadership, like that evidenced by principal Clark. Such leadership is best seen placed in the hands of school administrators, rather than teachers or parents. To lead effectively, school administrators must have a dedicated following (teachers, parents, children). To gain this following,
the leaders must set forth a vision, or plan invested with commitment, and warranted by 'moral imagination.' Moral imagination yields plans, policies and goals which are beyond reason, and are so compelling subordinates are expected to eagerly follow. Finally, it is argued that principals and superintendents can be taught to be leaders with moral vision by colleges and schools of education. (Greenfield, 1987)

The outer shell of this argument is naively compelling. We do need better schools, and better school administrators, and if leaders help toward this end, they are a good idea. It is further assumed that leaders ought to have programs or plans, and if they are accepted by followers, all the better. Being imaginative, if taken to be inventive and creative with respect to plans and programs, is perfectly acceptable, for we are only interested in results. And finally, injecting morally imaginative visions into our immoral schools is seen as superior to other modes of educational change. But this outer husk obscures a multitude of sins. What is clearly dangerous about proposals for 'moral imagination' and 'school leadership' lies in the assumptions supporting them and the consequences that follow.

In this paper, we wish to trace the discourse of moral imagination, locate its assumptions and presuppositions, and trace the bearings of this kind of imagination on school leadership. We shall hope to show that the notion of morally imaginative school administrators qua leaders, although seemingly beneficial, may have serious and detrimental impacts on the way educational institutions are operated in the future. The present paper will take issue with this vision of 'moral imagination' as
The literature on imagination is abundant and significant. Zolla (1978) distinguishes between day-dreams and imagination, lamenting the loss of the latter and connecting this demise with the decline of the West. It is important to distinguish these two kinds of imagination at the outset: imagination that deals in revery, deja vue, or remembrance; and imagination that is inspirational, creative, innovative and problem-solving in nature. While the first may be made up of memories and earlier impressions, the latter is more fruitful for creative work as it provides visions and images of a changed and improved future condition or situation. We are interested in the inspirational and creative imagination here, because it is this meaning of the term that is implied in most of the talk about 'moral imagination' in the literature of education.

Forrest Williams (1962), in the introduction to his translation of Sarte's 'Imagination', points out that a strict behaviorist rendering of imagination is wrongheaded: The psychology of the imagination must be phenomenological. (p. vii) And it is to Husserl that one must turn for the first work of this sort. As Williams states it: "Only the recognition that there are structures of consciousness which can really be observed, but in reflection alone, rather than by the senses,
permits a phenomenological approach to the nature of imagination." (p. viii) Sarte credits Husserl with providing the first adequate psychology of the imagination with a phenomenological approach to the subject suggested.

Current research into imagination has taken a decidedly phenomenological turn. However, it is the phenomenological interpretation of imagination that poses the most threat to mainstream educational research in general and administrative research in particular. Most studies of administrative leadership eschew talk of 'imagination' because the concept fails to be substantiated by traditional scientific procedures. On the other hand, since imagination is not subject to such verification or validation procedures, it has come to serve as a unique warrant for educational proposals as these are linked to "qualitative" or "naturalistic" inquiry. (D.C. Phillips, 1987 in passim; Eisner, 1979)

At the interface of education and imagination, Harold Rugg (1963) provided a Jamesian account of imagination occurring at "a critical threshold of the conscious-nonconscious continuum on which all life is lived." (p. 39) Rugg attempts to provide a theory of the creative imagination which warrants a new approach in education, one in which teachers are taught to teach creative discovery. (pp. 310-314) Hullfish and Smith (1961) argued that imagination was an important part of reflective thinking and that teachers ought to provide time for students to engage in imaginative thought. (pp. 141-143) They suggest a strong tie between morals and imagination, where imagining is seen as exploring choices. They propose a more narrow definition of
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imagination when they write; "Imagination is nothing more or less than the ability to make the absent present, and it is this ability that leads men to the stage of the hypothesis in their acts of thought." (p. 141) Here 'moral imagination' functions as a kind of logic of discovery and precedes inductive and deductive reasoning. One of the primary assumptions in current theories of moral imagination in school administration is that imagination is as legitimate a mechanism for hypothesis formation as any scientific procedure. We find the work of Rugg and Hullfish and Smith important, but overlooked by contemporary writers in discussions of moral imagination.

The prospect of transforming administrators and teachers into morally imaginative leaders is not a recent notion. John Dewey was not free from this sweeping kind of social rhetoric. He wrote in the pages of The Social Frontier in 1935 of the school administrator, that "...His leadership will be that of intellectual stimulation and direction, through give-and-take with others, not that of an aloof official imposing, authoritatively, educational ends and methods. He will be on the lookout for ways to give others intellectual and moral responsibilities, not just for ways of setting tasks for them..." (p. 10) [emphasis added]. The view that school administrators could provide moral leadership and that this role was superior to routine decision-making has deep roots in the literature of school reform.

Russell Kirk (1978) popularized a conservative conception of moral imagination which linked educational leadership to the humanities tradition. For Kirk, moral imagination was to be
located in the "great ethical poet" (e.g., Homer, Plato, Dante, Shakespeare and Cervantes) (p.270). Kirk distinguished three kinds of imagination: moral, idyllic, and diabolic. He wrote:

The moral imagination is informed by the great ethical poets. The idyllic imagination responds to primitivistic fantasies—to the notions of Rousseau, for instance; it roused the radical emotions of young people in the 'Sixties, even though they knew Rousseau only at third hand, if at all. The diabolic imagination loves the violent and the perverse; one need not go so far as Sade to find it; it runs through D.H. Lawrence, for one. (Kirk, 1978, p. 271)

Following this interest in literary moral imagination, the administrative theorist William Foster (1986) applies a hermeneutical approach to the study of educational administration, focusing on the school leadership as text. Foster proposes that: "A school administrator should look to a literary, rather than scientific, model to guide his or her work in part because literature deals with human events, with tragedy and comedy." (p. 29) Like Kirk, Foster supports a literary approach heavily invested with moral value: "Morality...belongs in the center of work; and it can get there only if social scientists are morally alive and make themselves vulnerable to moral concerns—then they will produce morally significant works, consciously or otherwise." (p.32)

The poetic voice in moral imagination is highlighted by T.F. Green (1985) when he writes: "For our moral education, all of us need—in addition to the conscience of skill, membership, and sacrifice—the formation of conscience by prophets, that is, by poets and by the literary giants of our experience...." (p. 22)
The moral significance of the conscience of imagination, Green points out, "...is nurtured in conversation with the great writers of imaginative literature." (p. 24)

Writing in The Closing of the American Mind (1987), Allan Bloom argues that a liberal education develops imagination. (p. 79) The writer's muse is an imaginative conscience that reaches for moral standards. The literary mind, Bloom demonstrates, is in the business of moralizing about human life and society, providing mirrors and images for the reader to ponder.

Secretary of Education William Bennett argues that teachers and principals must not only "articulate ideals and convictions to students," but must also "live the difference [between right and wrong, good and bad] in front of pupils." (Gutmann, 1987, p. 57) Here Bennett is calling for not indoctrination of moral views, but setting moral examples to follow through moral discipleship.

School administrators utilizing "value leadership" resting upon "moral imagination," ought to "...raise teachers' consciousness regarding the connections between their personal motives, needs, and values and the collective interests and welfare of the school's community," William D. Greenfield (1987, p.1) proposes. He goes on to say: "Value leadership rests upon the exercise of moral imagination and interpersonal competence and is viewed as integral to the principal's ability to administer the school in a distinctly moral manner." (p. 1)

J. Smith and J. Blase (1987) take issue with Greenfield's notion that educational administrators be viewed as experts who use teachers to accomplish their ends. They write: "Leadership
MORAL IMAGINATION is...much more than a strategic planning which calls upon the supposed law-like generalizations of empirical inquiry; leadership is rather an openness to issues of human significance." (p. 36) Contrasting their view of leadership with that warranted by empirical science and traditional notions of educational administration as expertise, Smith and Blase argue for a human relationships view. Leaders function morally by treating teachers and others as parts of a moral community, and as ends in themselves and not means to a scientifically determined end. (Smith & Blase, pp. 36-37) As a solution, the writers propose what they call a "significance view" of individuals, which "demands that people see each other as ends in themselves" and accept the fact that administrators and teachers inhabit a "community of moral discourse." (pp. 17, 36).

The unifying link between all of these authors is the importance that they all place on the centrality of morality and imagination in education. However, lurking within their various conceptions of moral imagination are four different, but related conceptions of moral imagination. Each has its failings, and individually or together they may lead to a number of abuses in the hands of school leaders.

The Models of Moral Imagination

Four distinct meanings of 'moral imagination' are to be found operative in the literature of education:

(1) Moral Imagination as Discovery
'Moral imagination' is often touted as a superior method of arriving at plans and policies. (Greenfield, 1987) Comparable to intuition, moral imagination, in the hands of the school administrator is a method of discovery of hypothetical states-of-affairs that stand as "visions" of the future.

One of the difficulties with moral imagination as an engine of discovery is that it must compete with other, rational procedures, for arriving at a policy or plan. This is to say that in any situation, the leader must accept the notion that were a competing rationally deduced plan to present itself that was fundamentally different from the imagined one, the former would have to be rejected on the simple ground that visions are better than reasons. Now this kind of argument is likely to lead to all sorts of irrationalities in education. Given this view, (imagining first, critical thinking second) the situation could emerge in which the valid, justified, true belief in science, was rejected in favor of what the imagined vision tells us. Running the school from behind a crystal ball is not a new idea, but it pales in comparison to the proposed model of moral imagination as discovery.

It is also important to point out that imaginative visions are not contestable. Imagination has attached to it a radical personal relativism that excludes it from the normal processes of rational discussion. Your image is as good as mine. If images were subject to the same rational procedures of criticism as logically derived plans, there would be less need to twist followers into acceptance. We find the heavy-handed need to make
followers accept the image as proof of the shaky grounds upon which this method of discovery rests.

And, against Bloom (1987), T.F. Green (1985), Foster (1986), Kirk (1978), and Bennett (1978), it is important to see a literary moral imagination yielding fictional value-laden images. That the literary version has invaded talk about moral imagination for administrators is all the more dangerous for its hidden alliance with literary classicism. We would like to argue that literature-driven moral imagination is not a reliable tool for developing plans and policies owing to the fact that - a) such images are derived from fiction and are more likely to result in unanticipated outcomes; and, b) such fantastic imaginings are seen to be above the level of critical and openly discursive scrutiny. Plato ejected the poets from his republic because they distorted the truth, so too should we vanquish fantasy and prophetic vision from the school policy process.

(2) Moral Imagination as Moral Authority

Moral imagination may mean moral authority. Dewey (1935), Hullfish & Smith (1962) and W.D. Greenfield (1987) propose that school administrators function as moral models for teachers and students. Here there is a subtle move from seeing the school administrator as being in authority to viewing him/her as an expert authority. School principals exercising moral imagination possess superior moral knowledge and certitude.

It is questionable whether moral imagination conceived of as setting forth moral traits of leaders is appropriate for the
moral education of youth. Having children model the moral imagination (read moral authority) of the teacher or administrator may lead to children mimicking a conservative set of notions none of which may be fruitful for new situations they face. Kirk (1978) for example, argues for the teaching of dogmatic truths to students in schools. (p. 255)

The literature on moral education is extensive and John Wilson is an articulate spokesman for a view we would suggest here. For Wilson (1961) it is far wiser to teach children to reason morally than to indoctrinate them into some moral viewpoint. Leaders as moral authorities are apt to dictate a kind of morality that serves their purposes, and not necessarily those of teachers, students or parents.

We would suggest, following Wilson (1961), that moral reasoning as a process to be learned seems to be superior to the induction of the young into one leader's moral vision.

We would also take issue with the notion that anyone may be an expert in morality, in the sense of having more or superior moral knowledge than anyone else. And it is clearly not going to follow that if I know the good: a) I will know how to induct others into it; or b) that they ought to follow my lead anyway. There is a Pied Piper notion of moral leadership operative in tandem with W.D. Greenfield's view (1987) of "value leadership" that is highly suspect along these lines.

There is an additional danger in posing the school leader as moral expert: Were the school leader to adopt a moral absolutist view (e.g. often displayed by religious fundamentalists), there is no guarantee against religious dogma invading the public
schools. One of the authors was told by a fundamentalist school administrator of a public elementary school that he had designed the perfect personnel handbook for his teachers: it was copied from the ten commandments. The length to which moral imagination can be taken given this sort of misappropriation would be curious to say the least. Any school policy could be taken to be a moral edict of God (or Allah, etc.,) as delivered by the school principal. Moral imagination as moral expertise in this way would take on an irrefutable source for policies of the most parochial sort. There would be no way the administrator could err; no caution against moral school administrator leaders operating as dogmatic ideologues; nor any room allowed for conflicting moral visions in the school.

Finally, the notion of moral expertise of school leaders must be seen as overlooking the gap between moral thought and moral behavior. The claim upon the school administrator as moral expert, following this sorting, finds a principal a moral expert in theory rather than in practice. Here the leader may be seen as an expert in talking about morals rather than a superior practitioner. However, moral character would have to be demonstrated as well as talked about by teacher or administrator. On the other hand, this call for moral action may lead to a new difficulty: i.e. how would morality be demonstrated by the leader? For example, would the moral leader have to have had a religious conversion experience - to have been "saved" - in order to qualify for a post in the public schools? Or, would some other moral test be administered to school leaders?

Moral imagination as moral authority fits with modern views
of school administration as deeply affected by the current psychic troubles visited upon our culture. There is a very real danger that moral imagination qua authority may become the narcissistic vision of 'inspired' leaders, unchecked by democratic consensus or external criteria of rationality. We would caution against viewing moral imagination in education as moral authority of school leaders.

Thus, moral imagination taken as moral authority cuts off the pedagogical possibilities of teachers and students growing as moral agents, involved in selecting options and making decisions about educational futures. While moral reasoning, following Wilson (1961), enhances this end.

(3) Moral Imagination as a Faculty of Mind

It is possible to see moral imagination, as a mental faculty. This psychological category of mind (moral imagination) would have all the trappings of any other faculty, but would be invested with moral certitude. The exercise of the moral faculty would lead to the discovery, through imagining, of the proper moral course of action to take. Thus, imagination rather than being playful or deceptive, is a psychological category in action, under proper incentive and freedom. Like intuition, it functions without our full willfulness or intent. Moral imagination is a kind of sixth sense that is profound and beyond rational monitoring or correction. We either get the vision right or we do not. The error is not in the moral image, but in the cognitive effort to understand it.
This kind of reasoning about moral mind invests it with a profound and primitive wisdom, much like mythic mind. Irrational or super-rational, moral imagination produces extraordinary visions which are profound and illuminating. Like myths, such images may be primordial (Jungian) reaching down into the deep recesses of the collective psyche. As an alternative and in many ways superior rendering of reality, moral imagination like myth is to be looked to as the trusted, "true" view. In some versions of the moral imagination argument (e.g., W.D. Greenfield's view), it is implied that moral imagination renders a more truthful and adequate account than do other means of inquiry.

Arguing that an image or vision is moral owing to its source (imaginative mind) may lead to the acceptance of any normative claim regardless of its impacts. A moral imagination in this view is moral precisely because it functions as part of moral mental entities. We wish to argue that elevating mind to a moral entity slights the role of judgment in morality. Minds of themselves are neither moral nor immoral; judgment makes them so.

(4) Moral Imagination as Super Science

One way to interpret the current demand for a morally based administrative program (search for a morally justified basis for social policy) is to see the effort arising from a frustration resulting from the inability to ground public administration on some natural or social science base. Criticisms of positivism and logical empiricism in educational research have provided a fund of support for alternative views of research called
"naturalistic" or "qualitative." And these new research efforts seek to base their work on the realm of human values, moral and ethical in part. Moral philosophy has come to replace science as the foundation for educational research and practice. We find difficulties with this trend.

The argument seems to run something like this: Since there are no law-like generalizations in administrative "science," and since we cannot predict the outcomes of particular educational policies, strategies, etc., there is little prospect that we can scientifically intervene to shape or mold the instructional process; and since we cannot scientifically master the technical process, the image of the educational leader as a technical or scientific expert is to be rejected. (Smith & Blase, 1987) The difficulty with this argument is that it rests on the effort to discredit naive empiricism and simplistic positivism, only to substitute a naive notion of moral philosophy.

As Phillips (1987) has argued, there are a number of notions of empiricism and positivism that currently underwrite educational research. Most researchers do not hold to the Smith and Blase version of positivism. Despite Smith and Blase protesting to the contrary, most educational researchers do not search for "law-like generalizations," and few see predictability as their goal. On the other hand, it seems hardly advisable to seek to ground educational administration on moral philosophy (although this may add an heretofore overlooked dimension). Moral theory cannot replace administrative theory. What is needed is not a softer science, but a firmer one. Following Phillips, we would argue that the essential need is for
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educational research to look to successful long term research programs for warrants for administrative conduct, not to some value image that eschews efforts at either confirmation or refutation.

We wish to argue that what positive science has failed to deliver to educational administrative praxis, moral philosophy need not provide.

School Leadership

W.D. Greenfield (1987) writes of the need for 'value leadership' in today's schools. Greenfield argues: "Leading a school requires that the principal deliberately influence teachers and others to adopt the principal's vision as their own, and this should be a distinctly moral act guided by moral principles." (Greenfield, 1987 p. 28) We are led to believe that the principal can justify almost any action provided that his decisions are based on 'moral principles.' For as Greenfield puts it, an action is justifiable if "it is perceived by others as grounded in deliberate reflection guided not by the principal's personal preferences, but by moral principles..." (Greenfield, 1987, p. 2) Greenfield shifts his definition of 'moral imagination' later when he adds: "[imagination]...is 'moral' in that it is the application of some standard of goodness that illuminates the discrepancy between the present and what is possible, and better." (1987b, p. 62)

The difficulty with this view is that we are not any further out of the woods if the principal grounds his vision on his
personal moral principles or perceived "standard of goodness."
There are countless codes of moral principles, any one of which
may used to warrant administrative decisions. Again, there seems
to be little protection afforded teachers and pupils who face an
administrative policy authorized by a fundamentalist religious
moral code, a Nazi set of moral principles, etc. Furthermore, W.
Greenfield's notion of moral imagination as resting on moral
principles, fails to address the issue of the relativity of moral
principles and the likelihood of administrative intolerance
toward competing moral principles.

On Greenfield's account school leaders should "influence
others to adopt their vision," and thus tacitly approve the
moral code that underlies them. (Greenfield, 1987, p. 10) Hence
a double claim is made: teachers and students must accept not
only the administrator's vision of how the school should
eventually evolve, but the principal's theory of morality as
well. There are several problems with this notion, not the least
of which is the assumption that the principal is somehow invested
with a moral superiority by virtue of his/her position as
principal.

Greenfield speaks of "raising teachers' moral consciousness"
as a central duty of "value leadership." (Greenfield, p. 17)
This kind of talk is typical of reformers and change agents,
however, it is not clear that educational leaders need to be
reformers to properly administer. And he argues that a
successful principal is one who "taps latent levels of motivation
and morality among teachers..." (Greenfield, p. 16) Raising
moral consciousness and taping moral latency are functions better
It is a serious question whether school administrators ought to be cast in the role of spiritual leader.

Another suspicious claim in the W.D. Greenfield position is that the "principal as leader is operating at a broader level of understanding and motivation than teachers." Smith and Blase criticize Greenfield for discounting the professional expertise of teachers. (Smith & Blase, 1987, p. 39)

They caution against the pretense that school administrators are instructional experts, "...in the sense of knowing precisely definable ways (based on research findings) to more effectively and efficiently teach." (p. 39)

We would argue, following Smith and Blase, that school leaders, to exercise "value leadership," need not be subject matter experts.

Another dangerous notion proposed here is that value leadership includes "rewarding and reinforcing...those orientations which are consonant with the goals represented in one's [the principal's] vision." (Greenfield, 1987, p. 18)

The implication is subtle but clear: those faculty members who, for one reason or another, choose not to share in the principal's moral vision will be discriminated against in one fashion or another.

We have seen a national growth in dictatorial school principals as reported in Time and elsewhere.

The grand irony of it all is that Greenfield places the whole issue of value leadership and moral imagination in the same context as "the pursuit of democratic and universal values." (Greenfield, p. 21)

The 'democratic' and 'universal' dimension in Greenfield's position seems to evaporate upon closer examination, for teachers and...
pupils play a role only so long as they agree with the leader's moral image: when they disagree they have no standing.

The entire administrative agenda of value leadership and moral imagination rests upon the assumption of a subordinate/superordinate relationship between teachers and principals, and this implies among other things that somehow principals "know what is best" in instructional and other matters owing to their position. Smith and Blase (1987) correctly identify the failure of W. Greenfield to provide a sound human relationship model which sees teachers treated as ends in themselves rather than the means for administrator-generated visions. We are in agreement with Smith and Blase that what is required is to reconstruct the role of administrator by viewing leadership as a compliment rather than a right of office. On this account, educational administrators would be leaders only insofar as they 1) exercise self-restraint in using power to obligate followers, (Here we see a Machiavellian dimension to Greenfield's position in which the value leader could exercise any means to his/her end, talk of reason and moral principles notwithstanding) and, 2) give up the warrant of supposed scientific expertise, which Smith and Blase see as seeking the status of a god. With this latter point we disagree. While it is one thing to criticize administrators who posture as experts in the teaching fields, it is quite another to discount the entire body of research regarding educational administration. What is needed is a proper filtering of educational administrative knowledge by the school principal, not the total rejection of every piece of research done.
There is, in Greenfield's view, a naive assumption that somehow values are matters of personal preference and intuitive understanding and are not subject to any kind of rigorous scientific scrutiny. We wish to argue that if imagination and leadership are to be accepted dimensions of school administration then they must be subject to rational discourse and open to test and refutation: the canons of critical reflective thought are no less required here than they are in reading, math instruction, or social studies teaching.

Studies of leadership in education have revealed a hydra-like concept that resists all efforts at analysis (Maxcy, 1983; 1984; 1985). The concept of 'leadership' may be ill-fitted to the discourse of educational administration, owing to the fact that it is not clear that when administrators direct subordinates that they 'lead' them in any clear sense; and, proposals that administrators become leaders (secure training in leadership, model leading behaviors, or adopt certain traits or techniques of leaders in other fields (military, politics, etc.)) fundamentally confuses the task nature of leadership with achievement desires.

Just as the failures of research programs in cognitive science often throw researchers into metaphysical justifications for continuing inquiry, so educational administration researchers are beginning to turn to moral/ethical discourse to warrant praxis. The difficulty is that we are no better off in jettisoning insufficient canons of scientific rationality, by adopting insufficient cannons of moral philosophy. Morality may be a port in the storm, but it is not a safe one -- not safe from serious criticisms.
Critical Imagination and Democratic Value Deliberation

(1) Critical Imagination

Because we live in a democracy and because we must of necessity deliberate about choices, it would appear that any effort at moral leadership in the schools ought to be sensitive to democratic processes. Rather than the conception of moral imagination, we would suggest critical imagination -- by which we mean the use of creative imagination tempered by reflection to determine ends-in-view. This is not to argue that imagination is a) a special mode of discovery; or, b) moral authority; or, c) a psychological faculty; or, d) a super science. As we have tried to demonstrate, imagination is neither moral or immoral. Following Hullfish and Smith (1961), imagination may be seen as leading to hypotheses, however it is not, we believe, morally separate or superior to other modes of thought. Like intuition, imagination is a process of thought and not thought itself.

We can have morality only when we have others. Shared imagination of course involves others. We take it that current conceptions of moral leadership arising out of imaginative skills stress the private and personal character of discovery, not the public and democratic side. The prime necessity of the public school administrator arriving at policy from a open and rational path rather than a personal course is overlooked in most views of moral imagination.

Following T.F. Green (1985) we find imagination to be linked
to conscience, in part moral, but as - a) rooted in membership in a group (in this case the school); b) carrying a critical tone; and, c) proposing new possibilities for the future. (pp. 22-24)

Unlike Green, we do not see the necessity of deriving critical imagination from poetic or literary writings. It is entirely conceivable to exercise imaginative thinking without lapsing into prophesy or parable. In school administration, we would argue that what is required is a rootedness and connectedness in the school community (teachers, students, parents, bus drivers, etc.). And, the school leader ought to allow for criticism (by self and others) of policy images. As Green states it: "It is only imagination that allows us to speak to other members about the chasm that exists between the hopes and fair expectations of the community and the failures of our lived lives." (p. 23) And finally, we would find inspiration for dreams and visions stemming from all kinds of everyday experience, not just literary writings.

2) Democratic Value Deliberation

We prefer to see morals as one species of value and imagination as being moral only in part with such morality arising from judgment. A wide variety of preferences, desires, interests, and goods play upon our minds. However, it is important to see discussion and deliberation about the importance of such values as a vital part of what we are calling "critical imagination." Moreover, such value deliberation in schools should be public rather private. Leadership, whatever else it
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may mean, should be lodged in the collective deliberations of those most affected by the choices under consideration. The locus of control is not in a remote authority, but in the collective consciousness of users. Rather than an unconscious prototypical intuitive source of moral ideals, we would have the moral component emerge in the active deliberation of the publics involved. In practical affairs, the teachers and students affected by policy ought to be empowered and have a say in the source and content of such policy.

While schools may be seen as moral institutions, they are only partially so. The duty of the school administrator or teacher is not to introduce private and personal imaginative moral propositions into the school social world. Rather it is the requirement of the enlightened school officer to be value deliberative. Rather than a single morally imaginative leader directing schooling, we wish a collective of value (and here we mean ethics, morals, wishes and desires, etc.) deliberative teachers, students and administrators.

The difficulty is furthermore seen in the fact that if the moral school leader is the only one invested with moral authority, then it is difficult to see how children or teachers will develop moral leadership. Children need moral skills if they are to operate as successful adults, parents and citizens; teachers need moral skills if they are to instill them in children. The point is that we are advocating morality as responsible value-rational deliberation here.

An analog to the present argument is found in Pratte (1987), following T.F. Green (1985), for the development of a public as
opposed to a private conscience. Pratte points out that although a conscience is uniquely private in the fact that it speaks for a single individual, it may be "...formed for participation in the public sphere. Thus a public conscience refers to an inner voice formed for telling us what to do in a situation having consequences which go far beyond the individual, what are called public acts." (Pratte, 1987, p. 214) Imagination, we wish to argue, is like conscience in the fact that it refers to a private enterprise. However, when it is adopted for the purpose of informing policy, we wish to argue it must be formed for the public and institutional administrative purpose. Pratte and Green argue for moral education of the private/public conscience: We wish to add a moral education for administrators for the purpose of reshaping the private resources of the so-called "moral imagination" into the public democratic critical imagination.

Interestingly, W.D. Greenfield (1987b) seems to have been influenced by T.F. Green's concept of 'conscience' in the formation of his own notion of 'moral imagination.' However, we believe Greenfield mistakenly elevates the authoritarian and inspirational component of imagination in the name of morality, while overlooking the need for the imagination to be rooted in school membership and open to criticism by participants in that community. Greenfield's moral imagination is incapable of moving from a private to a public conscience.

Administrative imagination should be of a public and open nature. Because there are impacts on students, teachers and parents owing to visions and goals implemented, it is reasonable to expect the institution's participants to share in deliberation
regarding these images. As Pratte argues: "The public good cannot best be served by the inherent confidentiality of private conscience." (p. 215) We wish to add that the public good cannot be served by private moral visions. We believe that moral imagination is too similar to religious conscience, seen as "...moral principles informing conduct that is confidential, particular, intimate, sectarian, offering not only guidance but hope, faith, and so on." (Pratte, 215) Rather, the school leader, having decided not to give a moral patina to images of what the school and its inhabitants ought to be, must now turn to the more rigorous judgmental facility. Moreover, it is the practical turn of judgment that is important here. For the school administrator must make decisions resting on judgments that are informed by reason. With the current craze for "naturalistic" inquiry in the social sciences, it is not surprising that such a rational twist may be suspect. We are not advocating that moral or ethical values be stripped from the schools. On the contrary, the argument we wish to support calls for the proper identification and treatment of value positions in education. To identify moral values with some privileged position owing to their method or source, however, is tantamount to grounding administrative praxis on metaphysics. We wish to suggest that whatever the source or method of derivation of administrative plans or policies, it is vital to evaluate them on rational grounds -- grounds that are not undercut by the irrational authoritarianism of origins, whether they be imagined or dreamed. To further assert that moral imaginings must be acceded to by others owing to their source, is the worst form of
authoritarianism. Educational administration, if it is to survive the current crises of confidence, had best turn away from occult or super-psychic groundings to democratically discursive phronesis.

It has been argued previously (Maxcy, 1985) that administrative leadership changes its meaning relative to the type of political culture it operates in, and the kind of notion of expertise (narrowly intellectual vs. philosophic-minded) adopted by the leader. If we are to have reflective leaders, then a knowledge of critical thinking methods (some of which are democratic in nature) would be helpful. It has been cautioned that the current penchant for expert authority does not free administration from moral-ethical concerns. We find ourselves in agreement with Greenfield (1987), Smith and Blase (1987) and others on the importance of moral-ethical values in doing good administering. We wish to caution that educational leaders have no monopoly on values and leadership. Here we see democracy as the most congenial social arrangement.

It is our suggestion that leadership be reconstituted to reveal the pluralistic meanings currently displayed by that concept; to recognize that leadership may be shared; and that leadership in a democratic society requires followers be treated as ends in themselves, rather than as means. We do not see schools as special domains where autocracy is acceptable. Despite the serious problems schools face, the answer is not in suspending human rights and establishing Machiavellian dictators. The solution is to be found in moving beyond dictatorship on the one hand and laissez faire naturalism on the other. "Value
leadership," whatever else it may mean, is no different than rational leadership in its demands upon us: that values that are irrational and nondiscursible are totalitarian and to be rejected. The plea is one for the "open society" of open institutions with options openly arrived at: we can only see privileged access to visions and forced compliance with images as undemocratic, unethical, and vicious.

The British "headmaster" solution to governance seems superior to the principalship idea favored in the United States. The administrative functions are taken to be additional duties assumed by one of the teachers in the school. Educational administration and leadership are not elevated to the status of a special role in the schooling process. Since the headmasters teach and share responsibilities with other teachers, they tend to respect teachers and students as persons, become involved in deliberative discussion with all involved in the institution of school, and they exercise restraint in the use of power. The redefinition of the notion of 'principal' would thus eliminate all need for talk of 'moral imagination' in school governance.

We distance ourselves from Smith and Blase (1987) regarding the role of research in informing administrative action. We find Smith and Blase overreacting to narrow notions of educational research as positivistic inquiry. To argue, as Smith and Blase do that "...a moral leader refuses to allow discussions of major pedagogical issues to be dominated by what the research supposedly demonstrates...," seems to disenfranchise rational dialogue. (p. 39)
Conclusion

We have sought to illustrate the difficulties in the concept of 'moral imagination' and related notions of 'leadership.' We wish to suggest that 'moral imagination' and 'school leadership' need to be replaced by 'critical imagination' and 'democratic value deliberation.'

Sources


