In the United States, late in the twentieth century, racial separation prevails in family life, playgrounds, churches, and local community activities. Segregation of housing is a key mechanism for maintaining the subordinate status of blacks. Housing policies and practices have been a leading cause of the nation's decaying central cities and fractured metropolitan communities. This essay discusses the development of racially segregated housing patterns and the nation's limited efforts to achieve open access to quality housing. Starting from the beginnings of black immigration in 1619, the paper sketches housing patterns during the slave years, and reviews the slow pace of change during the first half-century after Emancipation. Black migration accelerated in the years surrounding World War I, and Jim Crow came north in the form of tactics to create and sustain racial residential segregation. During the civil rights era, here identified as 1941-88, efforts to change the segregated character of housing have been few and weak. Opportunity exists for public programs to increase the availability of integrated residential life for all Americans in the future, and thus to transform the race and residence patterns that will prevail in the twenty-first century. Footnotes are included. (Author/BJV)
RESIDENCE AND RACE: 1619 TO 2019

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Abstract

In the United States, late in the twentieth century, racial separation prevails in family life, playgrounds, churches, and local community activities. Segregation of housing is a key mechanism for maintaining the subordinate status of blacks. Housing policies and practices have been a leading cause of the nation's decaying central cities and fractured metropolitan communities. In this essay I discuss the development of racially segregated housing patterns and the nation's limited efforts to achieve open access to quality housing. I look back to the immigration of blacks beginning in 1619, sketch housing patterns during the slave years, and review the slow pace of change during the first half-century after Emancipation. Black migration accelerated in the years surrounding World War I, and Jim Crow came north in the form of tactics to create and sustain racial residential segregation. During the civil rights era, which I identify with the years 1941-1988, efforts to change the segregated character of housing have been few and weak. Peering into the future, I see an opportunity for public programs to increase availability of integrated residential life for all Americans, and thus to transform the race and residence patterns that will prevail in the 21st century.
In the United States today, political rhetoric and many public policies promote racial integration in public settings and in the workplace. But at the end of the day, blacks go home to black neighborhoods and whites go home to white neighborhoods. Late in the twentieth century, racial separation prevails in family life, playgrounds, churches, and local community activities.

Segregation of housing is a key mechanism for maintaining the subordinate status of blacks. Persisting residential segregation is a hindrance to attainment of the educational dreams inspired by the Supreme Court in its 1954 Brown decision. Housing policies and practices have been a leading cause of the nation's decaying central cities and fractured metropolitan communities. Restrictions on residential choice have hampered the efforts of black workers to find accessible and desirable employment, and locked many black children into environs of low opportunity and lost hope.

The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, appointed to examine the racial disorders in American cities in the summer of 1967, reported that "our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal."1 The members of the Commission attracted attention with these blunt words. They intended to. They hoped their cry of warning would be heard: "This deepening racial division is not inevitable. The movement apart can be reversed. Choice is still possible."2

Twenty years after the "disorders" of 1967, race relations in our nation's cities continue to be disorderly. The "long hot summers" of the late 1960's have been
supplanted by attention-gaining episodes occurring sporadically in all seasons. In the Howard Beach incident of winter, 1986, three blacks who chanced to be in a "white neighborhood" in New York City were beaten and one was killed. Similar manifestations of racism and racial conflict repeatedly but irregularly pop into the limelight of the mass media and serve as public symbols of continuing disgruntlement, despair, and disorder.

In this chapter I discuss racial housing patterns and the nation's limited efforts to achieve open access to quality housing. I look back over the route to the present and look forward to the future we are making for ourselves. I focus on racial separateness and togetherness in where people live, and give little attention to the physical character of the housing they occupy. I shall give more attention to looking back than to looking forward, for the past is immanent in the present and is our best guide to the emergent future.

BEGINNINGS: 1619-1863

African Negroes were in servitude in Europe before the exploration and settlement of the New World, and Negroes almost invariably accompanied the explorers. As an arbitrary date for the title of this chapter, I have chosen 1619, when twenty Negro indentured servants were brought to Jamestown. Indenture for blacks was often permanent, and colonial legal codes were gradually amended to provide a formal system of slavery. When the colonies gained independence, slavery continued. The retention and expansion of slavery were debated during the Constitutional Convention, and the final compromise provided for continued
importation of slaves until 1808. After the deadline, slavery continued to be legal and profitable, and some importation occurred illegally. During the entire period from 1619–1863, perhaps half a million blacks entered the American colonies or the new nation as slaves.³

The legal code of slavery designated the children of slaves as property of the mother’s owner. Natural reproduction soon prevailed over importation as the main source of growth of the slave population. At the time of the Civil War, most of the 4 million slaves in the southern states had been born in the United States of parents born in the United States.

In the southern slave society, blacks often lived in close proximity to whites. Whites who held few slaves—one or two and perhaps some children—were in frequent close contact with their chattel. Owners of large numbers of slaves typically employed them in agricultural enterprises. All or most of the slaves lived in separate quarters, often out of daily view of the owner.

Proximity of residence and employment sometimes led to close nurturing relationships between black women and white children, play among young black and white children, daily interaction between white families and black house servants, and sexual liaisons between white men and black women. Contemporary social scientific studies of the nature of prejudice conclude that interracial contact is unlikely to lead to reduction of prejudice unless that contact is equal-status. Personal proximity in a society with rigid racial structures of domination and subordination did not often lead to a decline of prejudice or stereotypical racial thinking. Frequent contact of whites with blacks was hardly likely to subvert the
racist social order.

Colonial settlement and the employment of slaves began in the coastal states. Slaves were moved to the interior as agriculture spread to new crops and new land. Black participation in the settling of new territory depended on the kind of farming and its social and economic organization. The current diversity of racial composition among southern counties, from majority black to overwhelmingly white, often reflects the persistence of patterns established during the ante-bellum decades.

A review of ante-bellum residential patterns must acknowledge this variety of racial settings for whites and for blacks. Images prevalent in the late 20th century feature enormous plantations with aristocratic white families served by hundreds of healthy slaves. These images, gathered from "Uncle Tom’s Cabin," "Gone with the Wind," "Song of the South," and other fictions, invoke a form of agricultural enterprise that was in fact unusual. Large-scale plantations with many slaves probably increased in number with the growth of cotton agriculture during the later stages of slavery, but they were not everywhere suitable and profitable. Plantations never prevailed throughout the south. Racial residential arrangements varied greatly with time and place.

Most southern whites were not slave holders. Many lived in parts of the south where slaves were seldom encountered in the daily routine. Other whites, while not themselves slave holders, regularly hired slave or free Negroes for unskilled or craft jobs. In regions of the south where slave-holding was more common, most of the whites who owned slaves were small-holders. In the white social
structure, the large-scale slave owners struggled to obtain and maintain political and economic power to further their interests, and much of the political and economic history of the south reflects these conflicts among whites.

The demographics of the situation assign a greater role for plantations in the experience of blacks than of whites. Each large slave plantation contained many blacks and few whites. Thus a much higher proportion of the black population than of the white lived on plantations. Southern blacks were concentrated in those geographic regions where slave-based agricultural production prospered. Whether on or off plantations, the majority of blacks were given few opportunities to develop skills, but some were allowed to develop and practice specialized crafts. Skilled black workers were sometimes hired out to other whites for temporary work, and some blacks gained a varied experience of white society. A few were able to keep a portion of their earnings and eventually to purchase freedom, while other Negroes gained freedom by gift or escape.

The proportion of free Negroes among the nation’s black population fluctuated around 10% throughout the period from 1790 to 1860. Many free Negroes lived in the north, but a majority remained in the south. Clusters of free blacks grew in several large cities in each region, but because people had to walk to scattered worksites there was no large-scale residential segregation.

BETWEEN the WARS: 1863-1913

The Emancipation Proclamation nominally ended slavery, but it was not self-implementing and its implications took years to evolve. The war years brought
economic difficulties to much southern agriculture, but subordination of blacks was generally maintained. Areas directly affected by battle experienced more severe disruption. Some blacks sought freedom by trying to attach themselves to northern troops. Thousands of black migrants moved to Washington, D.C., and others made their way farther north. Many southern blacks wanted to celebrate their new freedom by moving, but opportunities were severely constrained. In the economically devastated rural south, most blacks faced a struggle to maintain life. Former slaves owned no land, no livestock, no tools. Despite the good intentions of abolitionists, the efforts of many black and white reconstructionists, and the hopes and struggles of the newly freed people, the nation and its states and communities failed to adopt effective programs to enhance economic opportunity. Most black workers had to continue to provide farm labor and menial services to white landowners. Forty acres and a mule were beyond reach. Southern agriculture was not reorganized to make room for blacks as independent farmers, nor were the nation’s frontiers opened to provide blacks a viable chance to gain a livelihood.

As the years and decades went by, forms of tenancy were developed in each southern agricultural region so that blacks could eke out a living and whites could retain control and gain the profit. After Reconstruction and with the development of new patterns of legislated Jim Crow, black tenants were bound ever more tightly to tenancy. Whites maintained strict dominance of credit systems and legal, political, educational, and economic activities. Many of the blacks who were fortunate enough in the Reconstruction years to acquire ownership of
land or to find an economic niche in skilled trades were later displaced by the rampant white supremacy movements.

During the post-bellum years, the rapidly expanding northern industrial economy absorbed millions of white workers from the American and European countryside and from Europe's cities and villages. Blacks were neither sought nor welcomed for most of the burgeoning jobs, but thousands nonetheless made their way north and found laboring and service positions at the bottom of the pay and status scales. Between 1860 and 1910, the black population of the north and west tripled, from 345,000 to 1,078,000. Still, northern migration was the exception. More prevalent was remaining in place. During these fifty years, natural increase brought a gain of 4,652,000 blacks to the southern population. In 1910, 89% of all blacks lived in the south. Fewer than 2% of the northern population were blacks, compared to 36% of the southern population.4

The most striking feature of racial residential patterns of blacks during the five decades following emancipation was persistence. Some changes occurred in southern population distribution, but these changes merely perpetuated traditional racial patterns. As new land was brought into more intense agricultural use, whites and blacks moved west within the southern region and brought along racially discriminatory farm tenancy and labor relations.

The pace of southern urbanization lagged far behind that in the north, where the 1910 census recorded a majority of the population as urban. Rural residence still accounted for four-fifths of southerners of each race. Blacks and whites both participated in the slow expansion of the southern urban economy, but southern
cities, mostly small, were not seedbeds of racial change.

Most blacks, north and south, remained economically dependent on whites and had to live in proximity to their places of employment. In the cities, most blacks served white households or small businesses rather than laboring in factories. Black settlements had to be scattered throughout the urban areas, often in low-valued locations near dumps, rail yards, marshes, or other deterrents to white residential occupancy. In the rural areas also, small settlements for each race were common. Where both races were present in a county, large-scale geographic separation was likely to be economically impractical. Racial propinquity was a practical necessity.

**GREAT MIGRATION and GREAT DEPRESSION: 1914-1941**

The "Great Migration" of blacks from the south to northern cities began during the early years of this period. Like most social transformations, the Great Migration had many causes and its effects cannot be bounded. The boll weevil repeatedly devastated cotton production in portions of the south. Many black tenants lost their livelihoods and had to seek other means of survival. Other agricultural calamities caused local disruptions. Repression of civil liberties and restriction of social and economic opportunities were continuing features of life for southern blacks, but perhaps their intensity increased in some counties and spurred more blacks to seek out the better conditions rumored to be found in the north. Or perhaps it was not so much a worsening of racism as an increasing awareness of the possibility of escape to the north. As any pattern of migration
gathers force, people and information flow in both directions. As migrants return, temporarily or permanently, more information spreads person-to-person in the places of origin. In the early years of this century, without electronic mass media or widespread literacy, personal communication played an essential role. Adventurous early migrants established paths and support systems that made it easier for others to follow.

Events in the north also played a causal role in the Great Migration. Urbanization was proceeding at a rapid pace, and World War I and the 1920s were periods of economic expansion. Although northern blacks had been subject to some of the Jim Crow restrictions and displacements from skilled jobs that occurred in the south, several hundred thousand black workers in the north were filling menial and domestic positions for which there was increasing demand. The European War cut the trans-Atlantic flow of workers to northern industry. Postwar xenophobia against the "new immigration" from southern and eastern Europe spurred tight legal restrictions on the now. Although the prejudices against Italians and Jews, Poles and Greeks, were more than matched by prejudices against blacks, some northern employers in search of strikebreakers or simply a new supply of unskilled workers found that southern blacks could meet their needs. Labor recruiters were sent to the south with train tickets and promises of jobs. Political controversy over the rights of recruiters to "steal" blacks from the south sped to spread the word.

Fifty years after emancipation, the simultaneity of these many causes finally spurred a mass exodus from the south. In large-scale labor migrations, it is
often young adult males who lead the way. Among black men in Georgia who were between the ages of 15 and 34 in 1920, 45% were gone by 1930. (We do not have direct statistical information on the migrations, but we can learn much indirectly; for this datum about Georgia, the numbers aged 15-34 in 1920 were compared to the numbers aged 25-44 in 1930.) In some Georgia counties, nearly all the young men and many of the young women moved north. In Alabama, one-fifth of young black men left during the 1910-20 period, and one-fifth of the oncoming generation left during the 1920-30 period.\textsuperscript{5}

At the northern reception points, the demographic changes were also striking: gains in the numbers of young men of 138% in Michigan, 67% in Illinois, and 54% in New York from 1910-20, and continued large gains during the 1920s.

Conditions in the north proved to be vastly different in many ways, not all of them positive in the view of the migrants. Many blacks found higher wages in the north than were available in the south, and certain kinds of freedoms were more prevalent. Northern blacks also encountered bitter winters, unfamiliar big-city life, expensive tenements, and crowded housing. They found prejudice and restricted opportunities at work, at school, in "public" places and institutions, and in everyday life. Some of the jobs offered them were as replacements for white workers on strike, so that worker prejudice against scabs fueled prejudice against blacks. Many blacks lost their jobs when strikes were settled, when wartime labor shortages eased, and when organized white opposition insisted on restricting competition from blacks. As is the case with every migration stream where return is possible, some unhappy or unsuccessful migrants moved
back. Others maintained ties in north and south and moved repeatedly in both directions.

Housing for blacks in the cities was already a problem before the great migration. Du Bois wrote of the wretched housing conditions facing "The Philadelphia Negro" in the 1890s. The growth of streetcars and public transportation made possible increased separation of residential location from job location. This facilitated racial segregation; new housing developments could be for whites only and previously dispersed blacks could be displaced without losing their access to white employers. Every city developed its sections where Negroes were allowed to live, but in many cases other urban poor of low social status were also housed in these sections. With a rapid influx of newcomers, many of whom were unfamiliar with urban ways and only able to earn low incomes, the situation deteriorated. An increased demand for low-rent housing with access to unskilled work was channeled into the areas that already had blacks.

The channelling of blacks to selected areas and the growing scale of racial and lower-class enclaves was partially conditioned by the tendency of newcomers to begin their housing search by seeking relatives or acquaintances already in the city. But these relatives and acquaintances were themselves confined by the racial prejudices of the times. The increasing numbers of blacks attracted attention and aroused concern among longer-term residents, black and white. Some established blacks were worried by the newcomers, fearful of an aroused white prejudice that would lead to new racial restrictions and obliterate the special economic and social status they had struggled to attain. Other blacks
sought to help the newcomers, to use their plight to call attention to the need for greater access to jobs and housing and public services. An increasing number of "ghetto histories" are calling attention to the efforts of black lodges, churches, politicians, other groups, and occasional white organizations to combat the forces of discrimination and neglect.

The power, of course, lay predominantly with whites. Their racial prejudices were deep, and many whites profitted from exploiting the new labor force and its need for housing. The real estate industry quickly organized to impose control and predictability. The means chosen were confinement of blacks to housing in "Negro areas." To accommodate increasing black population, limited expansion was channeled into designated blocks being added to the Negro areas. Thus it became unethical for whites in the business to sell or rent housing to blacks outside of the agreed-upon Negro areas. Accompanying this official code was an unwritten grey market, whereby neighboring white areas could selectively be targeted for blockbusting and then become part of the openly marketed Negro area. White and black owners and renters in the transition zones often were especially exploited, with speculators and their financial backers reaping extraordinarily large profits.7

In his famous 1925 article, "The Growth of the City," Burgess describes the concentric changes in urban land use in response to growth at the commercial and industrial center.8He used concepts chosen from studies of plant communities, and made analogies to biotic invasion and succession. Growing urban systems displayed many systematic patterns of structure and of change that could be
described and examined using the insights provided by Burgess and other Chicago school sociologists and their successors in urban planning and urban economics. The idea of "natural areas," whatever its applicability in plant ecology, took on a life of its own far removed from biological analogy. This concept often degenerated into an ahistorical and non-sociological conception of social change. What got lost to view in much of the literature on urban form and structure was the deliberate manipulation of these processes by financiers, politicians, and other human actors.

The idea of natural areas took hold without the juxtaposition of a presumed opposite; there isn't even a term for "unnatural" areas. The assumptions of an unfettered marketplace for urban land, with multiple participants and no monopolies, oligopolies, or other restraints of trade, were accepted with little notice of the role of deliberate human action and embedded racism.

One of the devices used by the real estate industry to regulate the orderly functioning of the real estate market was the racially restrictive covenant. Covenants are an overtly "de jure" device, to use the term made familiar in recent times in policy debates over school segregation. In the school segregation context since 1954, the notion of state action "de jure" is contrasted with the idea of segregation arising "de facto." Many have taken these terms as opposites, without recognizing that governmental action and public policy may influence racial patterns in schools even if there is no state law mandating racial separation. A narrow jurisprudential perspective often obscures the underlying similarities. In the housing segregation context, restrictive covenants illustrate the confounding
of de jure and de facto acts.

Racially restrictive covenants are private actions sanctioned by law. Consider the following examples of restrictions recorded in deeds for residential property:

This land shall never be occupied by or conveyed to a colored person. (1925)

None of the buildings erected upon or in this subdivision shall be used to house either for business purposes or residence purpose any colored persons or other outside the Caucasian race, and the conveyance of any lot or lots in violation of the restriction shall ipso facto constitute a forfeiture. (1927)

At no time shall any portion of said subdivision...be occupied by or sold, conveyed, mortgaged, pledged, rented, or leased... to any persons of Negro or Ethiopian descent, provided however, this is not intended to include or prevent occupancy of such persons as a domestic servant or while actually employed in or about the premises by the owner or occupant thereof. (1928)

At no time shall Lot or any building thereon be purchased, owned, leased, occupied or used by any person other than a citizen of the United States of America, of the White Race. This provision shall not apply to domestic servants.... (1937)

No race other than the Caucasian race shall use or occupy any building or any lot in said subdivision; however, this covenant shall not prevent the occupancy of domestic servants of a different race employed by an owner or tenant. (1945)

No Persons other the white race shall own or occupy.... (1953)

These examples are taken from suburbs around the City of Milwaukee. During the 1920s and 1930s, much of the property in the major subdivisions of many central cities and their suburbs was restricted by such racial covenants. The case of Milwaukee is particularly interesting because there seems to have been no reasonable likelihood of substantial Negro in-movement to any of these subdivisions. Milwaukee was not a major destination for blacks during the great migration; at
the time of the 1920 census, 2,200 blacks lived in the city and fewer than 200 lived in the entire suburban territory. At the time of the 1940 census, the city's black population numbered 8,800. Outside of the city, in the four county area that today comprises the Milwaukee metropolitan area, there were 376 black residents. Milwaukee had yet to experience ghetto expansion pressures and racial succession like those of Chicago and Detroit. No census tract in the city was predominantly black. Black residents were concentrated near downtown, far from the city's borders, in Milwaukee's traditional "inner core" area. Even within this core there were many whites. The "threat" of black invasion of most city and suburban residential sections was nonexistent, yet much of the city and suburbs had long since been protected by these covenants.10

That racially restrictive covenants were written and recorded on such a large scale demonstrates that these clauses were not simply a protective response to reasoned concerns about actual threats to property values. Covenants had become a canon of normal bureaucracy and business practice. Developers and brokers inserted one or another of these racially restrictive clauses in their contracts and deeds, whether or not that language was essential in the particular circumstances.

During the New Deal, President Roosevelt characterized one-third of the nation as ill-housed. The federal government began several programs to increase the supply and reduce the cost of safe and sanitary housing. The Federal Housing Administration, a new agency charged in part with providing mortgage guarantees to home buyers, prepared an Underwriting Manual for its personnel throughout
the country. The FHA wanted to gain the confidence of the public and the housing industry, and to protect its program from excessive losses through defaults. The Manual, modeled on existing texts and practices, promulgated conservative business standards for property evaluation and lending practices. The bound version of the Manual, published in 1938, contains several sections on the need to look beyond the individual house and buyer and assess the economic prospects of the neighborhood. Protection from Adverse Influences is the title of one section, and paragraph 932 identifies this as "one of the most important features" to assess. The Manual identifies zoning and restrictive covenants as techniques that developers and political jurisdictions may use to ensure such protection. Restrictive covenants are said to work best if they cover a broad area, and among the desirable covenants is "Prohibition of the occupancy of properties except by the race for which they are intended" (980.3).

Appraisers were advised to consider the existence of physical or artificial barriers that would help prevent "infiltration of inharmonious racial groups" (935). Surrounding areas were to be examined, and if incompatible racial groups were present, the appraiser was to include in his report a prediction of the probability of "being invaded" (937).

The Code of Ethics of the National Association of Real Estate Boards for many years included the following article:

A Realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood...members of any race...whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in that neighborhood.

In Wisconsin, this Code took on state sanction. The Wisconsin Real Estate
Broker's Board, a state agency responsible for licensing brokers, published the full NAREB Code in its 1940 manual, "A Legal Guide for Wisconsin Real Estate Brokers." There is little evidence on the frequency with which courts or administrative agencies of federal, state, or local governments were asked to enforce racially restrictive covenants. The widespread recording of covenants testifies to their acceptance as sound and conservative business practice, and is symbolic of the prevailing belief that Negroes should not be allowed to live in white neighborhoods. Covenants were not always effective in preventing sales to blacks. Some covenanted areas, especially central city areas close to expanding black neighborhoods, experienced rapid racial turnover.

During the 1920s, 30s, and 40s, many public and private agencies thought covenants were important. The propagation of covenants is an example of how private discrimination and public discrimination are historically confounded. Covenants are an object lesson in the difficulties of maintaining a clear distinction between de facto and de jure effects. There is no satisfying way to disentangle the role of law from the role of private action.

The Great Migration and the between-wars period brought rapid change for the nation and for its black population. Rapid change is disruptive and turbulent. The accommodation of northern cities to expanding numbers of blacks was not merely a matter of subtle racism and development of new bureaucratic and legalistic tools of white resistance. There was overt social turmoil and violent upheaval. In 1919 a black youth swimming at a "white beach" on Chicago's
south side was stoned, and a full-scale riot grew out of the incident. A study of
the riot by sociologist Charles S. Johnson documented the scope and depth of
racism and racial conflict in Chicago. Riots and other violent incidents occurred
throughout the nation, with lynchings continuing in the south and the Klan
having a resurgence and spreading to the north. The many books, essays, and
editorials by William E. B. DuBois, historian-scholar, founder of the NAACP,
and editor of its journal, Crisis, exposed the pervasive character of racism in
American society. The Harlem "renaissance" of Negro intellectual, artistic, and
social life produced poetry, drama, novels, and reports on the human condition
in America. Negro newspapers, which chronicled the precarious political and
economic status of Negroes in several major cities, circulated throughout the
country. The Garvey movement is an enduring symbol of the creation of a new
black national consciousness. The evolving debate between accommodationists
such as Booker T. Washington and protestors such as DuBois demonstrates the
intensity of efforts by the subordinated group to combat domination despite their
limited power and the strength and fierceness of the opposition.

In the rural south, which remained the location of most southern blacks,
the spread of commercial agriculture and agricultural credit systems, augmented
in the 1930s by New Deal programs, benefitted the whites, while Jim Crow
retained its strong grip on southern race relations. Anthropological and social
psychological studies document the rigid character of the rural tenancy systems
and the small-town caste systems.

In the mid-1930s, the Carnegie Foundation commissioned a massive social
scientific study of American race relations, with Gunnar Myrdal, Swedish social economist and later winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, as director. The thousand-page book, An American Dilemma, together with other books and reports prepared by the distinguished staff, provides a detailed picture of rural economic stagnation and urban struggle. The study was conducted during the depths of the depression. It provides endless evidence of the web of discrimination, the vicious cycle of multiple causation of the subordinate status of America’s blacks. Yet Myrdal’s text emphasizes his faith in American democracy.

Publication delays caused by the onset of WWII afforded Myrdal opportunity to observe that the nation was finally moving beyond the Depression, that wartime was stimulating an economic revival, a renewed urban migration, and a new political climate. Myrdal’s book offers a meticulous recording of Jim Crow racism, the tight grip of white power, and the Sisyphean burden of the vicious circle. Yet the book attracted attention and became a best seller in part because Myrdal retained an underlying tone of optimism. Whether his faith in American democracy and the efficacy of political change was justified is still being debated, but he was certainly correct that the war was spurring a new cycle of change in American race relations.

CIVIL RIGHTS ERA to the PRESENT: 1941-1988

The nation’s mobilization for World War II accelerated the transformation of American race relations from a regional to a national issue. Changing agricultural policies and economic circumstances pushed millions of blacks out of their
special niche in southern agriculture and into the industries and cities of every region. Major civil rights events occurred with increasing frequency. A. Philip Randolph's threatened march on Washington came early in the war years, and the Fair Employment Practices Commission was created. Pressure increased for putting more equality into "separate but equal" programs such as public and war housing. President Truman's announcement that the armed forces would be desegregated demonstrated that direct attacks on segregation in major organizations and institutions were now politically thinkable. Implementation of new civil rights programs was typically limited and slow, but the very idea of cumulative progress in race relations was a striking change.

The resumption of a great migration to cities was a result not only of war-time industrial expansion, but also of the cessation of immigration of new workers from Europe and the diversion of millions of American men into the military. Blacks participated in this new urbanization to a far greater extent than in the earlier Great Migration. Between 1940 and 1950, nearly one-half of Mississippi's young blacks age 15-34 left the state and moved north. Detroit, New York, and Chicago were again major destinations, but other cities bypassed by the earlier migration, such as Milwaukee and Los Angeles, now attracted thousands of black workers.18

The new migration continued twice as long as the original. During the thirty years from 1940 to 1970, the net migration of blacks from the south to the north and west averaged over 100,000 persons per year. The northern and western share of the nation's total black population jumped from 23 percent in 1940 to 47 percent in 1970. The southern transformation was two-fold. Not only were
millions leaving the region, but the social and economic structure of the south itself was changing. The percentage of southern blacks living in cities rather than in rural areas reached 67% in 1970, nearly double the prewar ratio.

Blacks moving into the cities encountered a variety of discriminatory actions by employers and unions to maintain occupational segregation and keep blacks out of the better-paying sectors. In the housing market, landlords, speculators, financial and insurance agencies, and government officials conspired to contain blacks in traditional residential areas and channel the demand for additional housing into limited ghetto expansion.

Whites were also flocking to the cities, and housing was in short supply. During the depression, housing construction had dropped to very low levels. During the war, military demands on the economy meant shortages in supplies for civilian uses and prolonged restrictions on the supply of new housing. Individuals and families moving to the cities piled up in the existing central city housing stock. The racial dynamics imposed on urban housing during the earlier great migration were revitalized. Access to living quarters was structured as a competition between whites and blacks. The real estate industry, including its financial arms, continued to foster rigid racial residential segregation. To help the nation fill its role as the arsenal for democracy, the federal government launched a new program of war housing for defense workers. Even in this program, customary patterns of racial separation prevailed.

Racial conflict intensified in many cities, with riots and other major disturbances. Negro organizations vigorously publicized the irony of fighting for democ-
racy abroad while racism flourished in the armed forces and on the home front. This perspective meshed perfectly with the overarching theme in Myrdal's study, which carried the subtitle, 'The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy.' Myrdal saw a continuing conflict throughout American history between American ideals and American racial practices. He was optimistic that the war would be a spur to a new cycle of positive social trends. Other studies of the period were more gloomy. "Black Metropolis" portrayed the pervasive racial organization of life in Chicago. "The Negro Ghetto" documented that governmental action was a contributing cause to racial polarization of the nation's cities.

When the war ended, the veterans came home, bringing a temporary worsening of overcrowded housing conditions. A surge in marriages and the beginnings of the baby boom meant that even more families wanted housing of their own. The new VA home mortgage program, together with a growing FHA program, changed the traditional rules for residential mortgage. Young families with little cash could, if their skin color was white, obtain long-term financing. A boom in new housing construction spread single-family homes, duplexes, and garden apartments over the suburban landscape where large tracts of inexpensive land were available.

Federal and private financing encouraged new developments of economically homogeneous housing. Conflict over racial discrimination in the housing programs of the federal government was endemic. The executive branch had shown itself susceptible to pressure. In the federal judiciary, educational desegregation cases were being pursued and won, laying the foundations for the 1954 Brown
decision. In 1948, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was improper. But, in a reflection of the Court's persisting caution on racial matters, the covenants themselves were ruled to be mere private agreements and not illegal. One of the Milwaukee-area covenants quoted earlier was first recorded in 1953. Most of the covenants specified a duration during which they would be in force, often 25 years, but many had provision for renewal. Racially restrictive covenants are still recorded in the registries of deeds in county offices throughout the nation, and public figures are periodically embarrassed by revelations that they own racially covenanted property. More than 60 years after covenants came into widespread use, and 40 years after their judicial enforcement was ruled illegal, debate continues about their symbolic meaning, the likelihood that homeowners ever read the fine print in their deeds, and the costs and benefits of purging covenants from the cumbersome files.

By the mid-1950s, the FHA Underwriting Manual had been revised to exclude explicit reference to racial groups as being undesirable or inharmonious, but the rest of the language about the desirability of protecting neighborhoods from adverse influences remained. Social and economic similarity was explicitly mandated. Everyone knew, though it was less commonly written on official documents or spoken at public meetings, that intrusion of blacks into white neighborhoods was to be avoided.

Chicago stands as the prototypical city for vigorously maintained racial residential separation during a period of rapid black population growth. Chicago's segregation was not unique, but it was extensively documented. Despite high
demand by blacks for housing, and higher rents offered by blacks than by whites, most housing remained closed to blacks. "Block-busting" was a prime technique for opening new residences to blacks. Although it offered enormous profits to speculators willing to violate the public norms against letting blacks into housing designated for whites, block-busting was only in part a free-market response to an artificially restricted market. It was never completely unfettered, but operated as a socially constrained process. It served as a market pressure valve, a mechanism for selecting some of the areas adjacent to currently existing ghetto boundaries as the ones to be turned over to blacks. Other border areas, and housing farther from the ghetto, were highly desirable to blacks and in a freely functioning market would have brought profit to anyone willing to sell or rent to them. But these areas were not targets for block-busting; ghetto expansion continued through the 1940s and 1950s as a highly structured process. The "invasion" of a "white neighborhood" by a few blacks led inexorably to succession of whites by blacks, to consolidation as a predominantly black area, and eventually to solidification of new "established Negro areas." The overcrowding and high costs of housing in Negro areas were repeatedly documented in Chicago and many other cities with growing Negro population.

In Chicago, even during the periods of extreme restriction of housing supply, there was a strong pattern of social and economic differentiation within the ghetto. Blacks with education, better jobs and stable incomes continually sought to improve their housing by moving away from the central areas of older and poorer quality units. Their efforts were repeatedly frustrated by their in-
ability to obtain decent housing except in invasion areas, which were subject to rapid transition from racially mixed to solidly black. Areas in racial transition often experienced rapid decline in neighborhood quality of life. Popular culture blamed the victims for the declines, overlooking that city services were cut back as neighborhoods shifted from white to black, that subdivision of units and high prices contributed to overcrowding, that owners of homes and apartments cut back on maintenance in a speculative grab for short-term profits. As a neighborhood became increasingly black, the initial in-movers and other upwardly mobile blacks launched a new search for better housing.

Residential segregation became a defining feature of American society in the postwar period. The white population embarked on a surge of family formation, childbearing, improvement of housing, a shift from renting to owning, and relocation to the suburbs. For blacks, urban migration and the baby boom replenished the demand for housing, but most cities ardently emulated the constraining tactics that had succeeded so well in creating and maintaining racial segregation in Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, and elsewhere during the 1940s. Public housing programs were launched to help cities deal with burgeoning numbers of poor, but these, like the war housing programs, reinforced racial segregation. Massive urban renewal programs cleared many slums, but inadequate aid was offered to those displaced and the consequence was usually to intensify concentration of the minority poor elsewhere.

The growing civil rights movement achieved gradual gains in expanding public housing for blacks and improving relocation programs, but desegregative housing
policies were vigorously and effectively resisted at all levels of government and the shelter industry. Not until deep into President Kennedy's term did the federal government renounce discrimination in federal housing programs. Even then, change was slow and administrative actions did little to foster desegregation. Legislative approaches were similarly resisted. The 1964 Civil Rights Act did not include fair housing provisions. Dr. King's open housing marches in Chicago were generally regarded as failures. Through the mid-1960s, only a few state and local legislatures were able to pass any kind of open housing laws.

The urban racial disorders of the last half of the 1960s called dramatic attention to the nation's segregated cities. The 1968 report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders stands as the clarion call to the nation to become aware of the underlying issues. Those who interpret the Commission's two-societies imagery as a call for change rather than a prophesy of perpetual segregation can find support in the ensuing history. Within months, Congress incorporated prohibitions against housing discrimination into the body of civil rights laws, and the Supreme Court held that all racial discrimination in housing was illegal. The national government's efforts to overcome institutionalized discrimination in federal housing programs showed occasional activist sparks, even after the Nixon administration succeeded the Johnson administration. Sporadic attacks were made against racial discrimination in home insurance and financing, and suits alleging patterns of discrimination were prosecuted successfully against private sales and rental companies. Many state and local governments and private agencies launched their own fair housing programs.
A decade after the Commission proclaimed a nation of two societies, Wilson proclaimed "the declining significance of race". He claimed that the economic status of blacks had become less attributable to blatant racial discrimination and increasingly attributable to transformations in economic structure. Differential opportunities, he said, are now based on class more than on race.

To apply this perspective to racial housing patterns, attention has to be directed to patterns of change rather than current levels of segregation. It would be simplistic to suggest that racial residential segregation has already been eliminated from American society; obviously it has not. What should be apparent, if class and economic status rather than race are becoming prime determinants of residential location, is a slowing pace of transition of racially mixed neighborhoods to all-black. Neighborhood population composition should shift toward increasing class homogeneity and racial heterogeneity. A significant increase should occur in the scattering of black families in predominantly white neighborhoods. Neighborhoods that were all black should be attracting whites of similar economic level.

Is there evidence that these patterns of change have a reality beyond abstract sociological theory? Attitude surveys report declining levels of racial prejudice, specifically with respect to a question on the willingness of whites to accept a black neighbor of similar economic status. If these data are taken at face value, and if post-1968 legal challenges to housing discrimination have had significant effect, I would expect to find a reduction in the white violence and panic selling that was once so commonplace a response to the appearance of a few black
families in a neighborhood. News media still report sporadic incidents of violence against black households moving into white neighborhoods, and panic selling occurs often enough that there are continuing legislative efforts to prohibit or regulate it. Still, many observers of the housing scene report that traditional modes of intimidation and induced racial turnover are less common than two or three decades ago. These pieces of evidence, and many others, make it necessary to give serious attention to the declining racism perspective, particularly when trying to peer into the future.

A persistence-of-racism perspective leads to different expectations about recent and future trends in racial residential segregation. Many observers believe the proclamation of the nation’s drift into “two societies” was an insightful forecast. They believe the Commission’s call to action was ineffective. Actions such as the 1968 fair housing law are seen as symbolic rather than practical. For twenty years, efforts to amend the 1968 law to add meaningful enforcement powers and accessible remedies have repeatedly failed. During most of the time since 1968, the federal government has been controlled by administrations viewed by activists as hostile to civil rights. Rapid white departure from central cities to suburbs has continued. Blacks remain concentrated in the central cities. Institutional forces that promote and maintain racial segregation in housing may have become better hidden, but subtlety and sophistication only mask, not replace, institutional racism. The attitudinal studies are a case in point. Public expressions of racial tolerance are belied by numerous studies that include careful testing of the behavior of real estate personnel. Overt prejudice is less likely
to be manifest in direct statements, but testers encounter racially differential treatment. Discriminatory outcomes continue.

Discrimination is lessening; discrimination persists. The cup is half-full and half-empty. In every domain of American race relations, the observer may choose to emphasize progress or deterioration. The scholar who marshals objective evidence is not freed of this choice. Evidence doesn’t speak out; it must be interpreted.

Considerable empirical evidence on segregation trends has accumulated in scholarly studies that use the highly detailed geographic data provided by the decennial censuses. Several kinds of analyses have been undertaken, for various inter-censal periods. In a study of neighborhood racial change in the period 1940-60, we found that the prototypical racial succession process was not the result of some unbreakable law of race relations, but was very much affected by demographic circumstances. Census tracts are geographically contiguous areas of about 4,000 population delineated by the Census Bureau to facilitate study of change in small sub-areas of cities. We examined census tract data for ten cities with large black populations. Taking each city and each decade as a separate observation, we had 10 observations for 1950-60, 10 for 1940-50, and 7 for earlier decades. Of this set of 27 city-decades, 20 were characterized by low or negative rates of white population growth and high rates of black population growth. For these 20 observations, there was much invasion of white residential tracts by blacks and rapid residential succession toward the end-point of establishment as all-black neighborhoods.
In the other seven city-decade observations, black population growth did not exceed white population growth. In cities experiencing these circumstances, instances occurred of whites displacing blacks as well as blacks displacing whites. Census tracts that began a decade with mixed racial composition often retained their racial diversity through the decade without movement toward all-black. Prototypical racial succession, Chicago-style, was infrequent.

These data demonstrate the dependence of the racial-invasion and succession process on a central city experiencing rapidly increasing black population and declining white population. This demographic pattern was more likely in cities that lacked available land for residential development. In some northern cities before World War II and in some southern cities even in the postwar period, the sheer demographic demands on the housing market were less intense, new housing developments were still being located within the central city, and racial succession did not become the dominant mode of accommodation.

These historical observations provide an insight that I will use for projection of trends into the next century. I believe the future is likely to bring a prevalence of slow growth for black and white populations in most urban areas. In such demographic circumstances, the prototypical Chicago model of racial succession may be an inappropriate guide.

In another phase of our comparative study of residential segregation, we assessed trends using a segregation index. This segregation index is technically an index of dissimilarity. The more dissimilar the distribution of black households is from the distribution of nonblack households, the higher the index. These in-
dex values are calculated using the smallest available geographic area, individual city blocks. If all city blocks are occupied only by black households or only by nonblack households, the index value would be at its maximum, 100. If every city block has the same ratio of black to nonblack households as every other city block (the ratio that characterizes the entire city population), the index value would be at its minimum, zero. Scores between zero and 100 can be interpreted as the percentage of either race that would need to move to obtain a zero score.

In 1940, the first census year for which the necessary data were available, the mean segregation score for a group of 109 large cities was 85. This is near the high end of the scale, indicative of the prevailing pattern of racial residential separation. In 1950, segregation scores for most cities were about what they had been in 1940. The mean score increased to 87, largely because of increasing scores in many southern cities. During the 1950s, segregation scores again increased in many southern cities, but in other regions declining scores prevailed. During the 1960s and 1970s, declining scores were common for cities in all parts of the country. It became clear that these declines represented a genuine and persistent change from the upward trend in residential segregation that prevailed in the first half of this century. These declines were too consistent to be attributable to the temporary racial mixture that occurs at the ghetto periphery as succession is occurring. Yet the data remain open to interpretation. Those of the half-full persuasion can focus on the remarkably broad character of the declines from the peak levels of segregation around 1950 or 1960. Those of the half-empty persuasion can rest assured that index values for most cities remain very high on
the scale.

The distinctive trend for southern cities provides another instructive note for anyone who wishes to peer into the future. Social and economic patterns are in continual flux, and no pattern or trend persists forever. In older southern cities, those which had a sizable black population early in the 20th century, blacks originally lived in most areas of the city, close to their places of employment as domestic servants and casual laborers. These cities grew up with a strong "etiquette of race relations" and a racial economy that did not depend on residential separation. Racial propinquity, persisting from an earlier period and only gradually declining as transportation systems grew, did not entail blacks living in the same kinds of housing or acquiring the social status that a neighborhood conferred on its white residents. As these southern cities became more tightly integrated into the national industrial economy, as they grew and entered the suburban era, they rid themselves of the scattered racial pockets, developed large-scale concentrations of blacks, and increased their racial residential segregation.

Many crucial questions about segregation pertain to patterns of suburbanization and the metropolitan racial structure. The trend analysis of segregation indexes, 1940-80, was based on city block data and excluded the suburbs. The kinds of census data available do not permit such a long series of segregation indexes using data for suburbs as well as cities. Using data for census tracts rather than city blocks, similar analyses can be undertaken for metropolitan areas beginning with the year 1960.
Two studies reported on trends in racial residential segregation in metropolitan areas for the decade 1960-1970. According to one, average segregation levels changed little. The other concluded that metropolitan segregation levels increased during the 1960s. The two studies used different indexes of segregation, and calculated their averages over different groups of metropolitan areas. Despite these differences, the two studies are in agreement in failing to find for metropolitan areas evidence of the pervasive declines in segregation that characterized large central cities during the 1960s.

Prior to analysis of 1980 census data, social scientists had contrary perspectives on the 1970s trend in metropolitan racial residential segregation. Those who emphasize the persistence of racism and the maintenance of barriers to integration could point to the increasingly metropolitan basis of social organization of urban territory, the continuing predominance of whites in the suburban migration flows, and the prevailing "lily-white" character of most suburban communities. Those who emphasize the decline of racism and the opening up of opportunity for a growing middle class black population could point to the declining central city segregation indexes and to new highly visible suburban movements of blacks in metropolitan areas such as Washington, D.C., Atlanta, New York, and Los Angeles.

We calculated segregation scores (indexes of dissimilarity) from 1980 census data for the 38 metropolitan areas with populations of one million or more. For 36 of these, comparable scores for 1970 were available from the prior studies. The empirical evidence for the 1970-80 period shows pervasive decline in metropolitan
racial residential segregation. Every one of 36 large metropolitan areas had a lower segregation score in 1980 than in 1970. The average decline was nine points; 25 of 36 declined by at least five points. Declines were especially great in metropolitan areas in the west and south. But the evidence, as usual, is not uniform. In Chicago and several other large northern metropolitan areas with high black percentages, the declines were small.

Suburbanization of metropolitan populations proceeded at a rapid pace during most of this century, spurred first by trolleys and systems of mass transportation and more recently by widespread car ownership and expanding commuter highway networks. Throughout most of this period, suburbanization was more rapid for whites than for blacks, but the pattern changed during the 1970s. Numerically, whites continued to be far more numerous than blacks, but the rate of black suburban population increase was well above the rate of white suburban population increase. The aggregate number of suburban blacks grew by nearly 50% in the ten years from 1970 to 1980. The ratio of black to total suburban population increased from 4.8% in 1970 to 6.1% in 1980.

Suburbanization of black population has been quite varied. It is occurring rapidly in some metropolitan areas, but is still outpaced by white suburbanization in others. In earlier decades, much of the black movement to suburbs was restricted to three types of suburb: older suburbs with their own industrial and "central city" character, lower-cost residential suburbs whose attractiveness to whites had declined, and new developments marketed originally to blacks. Still, the census data demonstrate a new pattern in the 1970s of black migration spread
widely into many suburbs that had formerly been almost exclusively occupied by whites. The suburbs were opening up racially on an unprecedented scale.

The declines in metropolitan segregation indexes and the surge of black suburbanization seem consistent with the view that the nation is on a path of residential desegregation. But not all the evidence points in this direction. The persistence of many instances of extreme racial segregation is an indication of an inertia in the residential system. A decade or two of desegregative trends has not sufficed to transform the essentially segregated character of housing. At the time of the 1980 census, the suburbs of Gary-Hammond-East Chicago were more than 99.75% white, while the Milwaukee suburbs were more than 99.5% white. In those metropolitan areas where blacks were suburbanizing in large numbers, the opening up of formerly all-white suburbs was accompanied by growth in predominantly black suburbs and rapid racial succession in other suburbs. The possibility exists that the metropolitan index declines result from temporary features of an underlying process that is still segregative. Data for a single decade are insufficient to permit a judgment whether the increased integration is a transitional situation. Perhaps the 1980 census happened to catch the process at a middle stage that gives the appearance of integration. Many racially mixed suburbs may be on the way from predominantly white to predominantly black.

Evidence on black suburbanization during the 1970s in more than 1,000 individual suburbs can be interpreted to give support to either perspective. Of suburbs less than 0.5% black in 1970, about 40% were more than 0.5% black in 1980. If that pace of removal of suburbs from the ranks of "lily white" continues,
there will soon be few remaining white havens. The initial opening up of the suburbs to the first few black families may be well advanced by the late 1980s and nearly complete in another decade. Among those suburbs with black percentages in the above-zero but low range in 1970, increases in black population and percentage were common, but most were still less than 10% black in 1980. The number of suburbs experiencing pronounced racial succession, with black percentages moving sharply upward to 50% or higher, was small. Predominantly black suburbs exist, but their number is not yet large.

This examination of suburban places provides clear evidence of widespread decline in the practice of complete exclusion of blacks. Although many of the newly open suburbs have only token numbers of blacks, the number of suburbs with 3 percent, 10 percent, and 20 percent black has also increased. There is little indication, so far, that large numbers of suburbs will repeat the prototypical central city pattern of racial succession proceeding through the full sequence from the first black family to the last white family.

The same data on suburban population trends, 1970-1980, give a different impression when assessed from the perspective of black persons rather than individual suburbs. Many suburbs moved upward in black percentage within the range from 0 to 10%, but each such suburb accomplished this without taking in very many black residents. A few suburbs with large black populations and high black percentages absorbed large numbers of the newly suburbanizing blacks. These two groups of suburbs accounted for roughly similar numbers of suburbanizing blacks during the 1970s. The ongoing suburbanization process includes
components of desegregation and components of relocation of the ghetto. Which of these is likely to prevail in coming decades?

BACK to the FUTURE: 1989-2019

If the beginnings of Afro-America are identified with the landing at Jamestown in 1619, only three decades remain to the 400th anniversary of that event. Whether or not 1619 is the appropriate date of origin, I find 2019 a convenient date for ending this account. It is far enough in the future to suit the theme of "21st Century Prognosis," yet close enough to the present that some of its features and possibilities are discernible. Peering into the distant future requires science fiction or prophecy, but visions of the near future come to us through extrapolation. The future is emergent, and I begin the task of prognosis with a backward look.

With the segregation index scores for 1940-1970, we attempted a statistical projection. Recall that the average score for our set of 109 cities was 85 in 1940, 87 in 1950, 86 in 1960, and 82 in 1970. We constructed a simple demographic model based on findings of previous studies that black and white population growth and racial composition were key determinants of change in segregation. We had three observations of change over ten-year periods. The initial question we tried to answer, with help from the model, was whether the changes observed for 1960-70 were compatible with the changes 1940-50 and 1950-60, or whether the evidence supported the idea of a fundamental shift in the process of change.36

We have presumed that the equilibrium state of American cities is one of nearly complete segregation....Our paper suggests that the
environment in which that process...operates is changing. Segregation has been going down. A projection of segregation using our second order model suggests a value of about 75 by 1980. Further, if our interpretation of the data is correct, then consolidation is proceeding more slowly and many neighborhoods are remaining desegregated for longer periods of time. If whatever process is operating has high values of segregation as a stable equilibrium, then the change will be only temporary....If the process has high levels of segregation as an unstable equilibrium—a saddle point if you will—then the trends presently under way may move segregation far enough away from their high values to start them on a new trajectory of change. The process under way in the 1960s, then, may foretell more dramatic changes in the future....

Based only on the statistical model and census data for 1970 and earlier years, we projected that the mean segregation index for the 109 cities would decline from 82 in 1970 to 75 in 1980. Eight years later, when the appropriate data from the 1980 census had been put through the computer, the mean index was 76.

Accuracy of projection lends credence to a model, but no model should be presumed to be a true rendition of the actual causation. Many other models might also yield accurate projections. Our model used only demographic data for 1970 and earlier dates. It did not take into explicit account the various social, economic, and political changes that contributed to intensified or diminished racial residential segregation. Despite all these qualifications, I take the results of the model as additional evidence for the perspective that things are changing, that old patterns of segregation don't persist forever.

In the late 1970s, the nation experienced a "nonmetropolitan turnaround." Many counties beyond the suburban zone of our big cities reversed a long trend
of population decline, while growth in metropolitan counties slowed and in many cases turned negative. A century-long pattern of continual massive concentration in metropolitan areas came to an end. In the 1980s the turnaround itself turned around and metropolitan growth resumed, but the rate of growth is slow and is unlikely to return to high levels. The nonmetropolitan areas of the country no longer have the population numbers and the high fertility required to fuel sustained rapid increases in the metropolitan portion of the population. The numerical role of the central cities in metropolitan patterns has also diminished. Many cities which lost white population for decades have recently begun to lose black population.

Racial patterns occur in social, economic, and demographic contexts, and there is no way to be sure of the underlying causes of change. Reductions in the rapidity of racial succession were interpreted earlier as consistent with the declining racism perspective. Other explanations are available that don't depend on the two racial perspectives I've been playing against each other. For example, in many cities the pent-up demand for housing caused by rapid black urbanization and the slow pace of housing construction in the 1930s and 1940s was finally satisfied during the 1960s (at least with respect to simple quantity, ignoring quality and location). Contributing to lessened black demand for additional housing were the demographic transition to lower fertility and the near-completion of the migration flows from country to city. As the decades-long pressures for additional housing finally abated among urban blacks, the conditions for rapid racial succession diminished. Thus whatever perspective I take on racism, I should
avoid projecting into the future the 1940s-style Chicago racial succession model.

The connection between processes of racial segregation and of class segrega-
tion must also be assessed by the seer. Consider the regional difference we noted
for the 1940s and 1950s.³⁷

In southern cities...there is little relationship between the char-
acteristics of whites and Negroes living in the same neighborhood-
high-status Negroes are as likely to live near low-status whites as near
high-status whites. Furthermore, there is a tendency for high-status
Negroes to live in predominantly Negro areas, whereas in the North
high-status Negroes are more likely to live outside of the core of the
ghetto.

These regional differences, like the others previously discussed, have been
in transition. Older southern cities are moving from their traditional functions
as southern regional trade centers and becoming integrated, demographically as
well as economically, into the national urban system. "New" southern cities
have emerged, such as Houston and Dallas, whose main growth has occurred in
the contemporary period. Older northern cities are now adapting to growing
second- and third-generation urban black populations. Cities in every region are
experiencing rapid growth of first- and second-generation Hispanic and Asian im-
migrants. The residential sorting out of this new melange of classes and minority
groups defies easy analysis or projection into the future.

A common pattern for black middle class families has been to seek housing
away from the core of the ghetto. They were not always successful, especially
in the 1960s and earlier, in obtaining homogeneous middle class neighborhoods.
Because of the relatively small size of the black middle classes and the constraints
of segregation, their residential neighborhoods had far greater proportions of lower class neighbors than were found in white middle class neighborhoods. If there is future growth in the size of the black middle classes, their ability to dominate entire neighborhoods will increase.

Metropolitan areas differ in the rate of growth of the black middle classes and in the degree to which outlying city and suburban neighborhoods have become open to blacks. There are wide variations among metropolitan areas in the degree to which the pattern observed by Erbe is true of places other than Chicago and times other than 1970. Because today's metropolitan landscape is variegated, it is plausible to envision a future in which metropolitan areas are not all alike. As the north-south differences of the past are dissipating, a diversity of patterns is emerging. My crystal ball is too dim to discern a single new pattern.

If class will increasingly prevail over race in determining residential location, continued and even accelerated metropolitan desegregation may be in store. The complexities of personal choice may confound such an easy extrapolation. Inertia and vested interests help maintain the ghetto. The new political power recently gained by blacks in many central cities may facilitate retention of middle class blacks. Historical traditions in particular cities may explain distinctive patterns of racial location that then persist for decades into the future.

Many of the blacks moving to "black suburbs" rather than "white suburbs" are making a deliberate choice to live with plenty of black neighbors. This choice may be viewed in light of America's tradition of racism or in light of America's cultural pluralism. In any case, an opening up of suburban choice for
blacks does not necessarily lead to lessened segregation. It may lead to a much greater freedom of choice of locations, kinds of housing, and racial compositions. I certainly don't foresee in the next three decades that race will lose all of its influence on residential location. It may operate as much less of a barrier.

Racial housing patterns are potentially affected by any policies and trends that affect household location decisions and restrictions. Many of these cannot be projected confidently into the future. Consider school desegregation, which has occurred in most cities during recent years. Research attention to the residential effects of school desegregation has so far focused on the segregative effects of white flight, but a few studies suggest other possibilities. In Louisville, the metropolitan school desegregation plan included specific incentives for families to seek racially integrated housing. School desegregation programs elsewhere may also have been conducive to housing desegregation. A recent study suggests that the metropolitan school desegregation plans implemented in some localities have already had strong desegregative effects on housing.

As a demographer, I am well aware of my profession's history of failing to predict the baby boom, failure to recognize it after it was well under way, failure to foresee the baby bust, and repeatedly failing to have actual census results fall within the wide intervals projected in the most careful forecasts. I readily plead professional incompetence to project or predict the future. What I have tried to do is review the past and identify some changes that may prove important.

In this discussion I seem to be emphasizing social forces that have reduced the intensity of racial residential segregation and that are likely to facilitate
a degree of desegregation. In the process I may have exaggerated the significance of the statistical evidence of scattered residential integration occurring in many urban and suburban neighborhoods, underemphasized the formation of new racial concentrations in the suburbs, downplayed the overwhelming inertial forces perpetuating ghetto-maintenance and residential segregation, and avoided the complications imposed by the changing numbers and character of America’s other minority groups.

Occurrences of desegregation may be epiphenomenal rather than forerunners of a coming era. Persistence of racist structures is emphasized in a recent history of the civil rights movement:42

Perhaps the least change of all since Brown came in residential segregation. Despite court rulings and legislation outlawing discrimination in housing, such discrimination persisted....Whites of every class continued to resist housing integration if it involved anything other than token numbers of blacks....The majority of America’s 25 million blacks in 1980 had been confined to the inner cities of a score of metropolitan areas...fulfilling the prophesy, and not heeding the warning, of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in 1968.

But let me not yield too much. Persistence is only part of history. Old trends never go on forever; they have to fade away. The period of rapid metropolitanization of the U.S. population is over. It has been completed for blacks as it was earlier for whites. Many central cities have lost so much population, black and white, that they are far below their peak numbers and their residential character has changed. No substantial migration continues long without changing the conditions that gave rise to it at place of origin and the conditions that promoted
it at places of destination. The energy shocks of the 1970s made us aware of the possibility of renewed population centralization, and gentrification of declining neighborhoods alerts us to the fact that neighborhoods aren’t forever. You can go home again, but home won’t be the same.

During the last fifty years, blacks have played the active role in the desegregation that has occurred. More blacks have moved to predominantly white and racially mixed areas. Whites have played a limited role, increasingly receiving some blacks as neighbors and showing a lessened tendency to flee or avoid small numbers of black families. But there has been little active white movement into predominantly black areas. Gentrification has so far been of modest statistical dimensions, and has oftentimes been resegregative rather than integrative.

Without change in the all-black character of the central city ghettos, desegregation can proceed only slowly. Perhaps such change will occur. A recent news item reported “Ambitious Plan to Break Up Dallas Housing Project Begun.” Similar reports have come from other cities. If more aging and decaying public housing projects are blown up or converted to other use, opportunity is created for transformation of portions of the central city landscapes. During the urban renewal and highway construction programs of the 1930s through 1960s, large-scale remaking of the central city landscape was common. Those efforts were notable for preserving and intensifying the racial residential pattern. The lesson, however, is that change is possible. Central city black ghettos were created over many decades, and their dismantlement, if it happens, is also likely to take many decades. If they are undone, will it occur while new suburban ghettos
are growing to massive scale?

The dual perspectives on suburbanization (most suburbs desegregating but the few heavily black suburbs absorbing much of the black population) lead to an indeterminancy about the future. In the jargon of high politics, we may be confronting a window of opportunity. Thousands of urban and suburban neighborhoods have moved or will soon move into the token integration stage. If they continue to receive black families and to move steadily toward proportional racial representation, the movement of a few hundred suburbs toward all-black status will be slowed. But if suburban ghettoization becomes the norm during the rest of this century and the early years of the next, the opportunity will have been lost. If racial concentration persists in the central cities and increases in the suburbs, the pattern for the 21st century may be gilded, but it will still be segregated. A few blacks and many whites will be able to live in neighborhoods with a token degree of integration, those blacks who prefer black neighborhoods will have more choice than in the past, and those whites and blacks who would like racially diverse neighborhoods will be as frustrated as in the 20th century.

My emphasis on altered processes of racial change and the feasibility of declining racial residential segregation is in part a research strategy, for I am more comfortable as a researcher than as a seer. Alertness to the possibility of change can be a warning against careless application of generalizations and models from the past and a spur to thoughtful and thorough analysis from new perspectives. Whatever the speculations and hypotheses, it is the data as they unfold that will let us know what has happened. I know the answers will continually be
surprising to social scientists, and thus satisfy our urge to ask more questions, seek better data, and increase understanding.

I also have a political strategy. I take seriously the notion of a window of opportunity. It is not too late for public programs to influence the race and residence patterns that will prevail in the 21st century. We are in a crucial stage of transition from old patterns to new. Once the new patterns are set, inducing change will be much more difficult. I hope the opportunity will be seized to increase availability of integrated residential life for all Americans. To accommodate only those who cherish neighborhood racial purity would be to prolong America’s persisting dilemma.
NOTES


2Ibid.


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31 Ibid., Ch. 3.


34 Karl E. Taeuber, et al., "The Trend in Metropolitan Residential Segregation," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Asso-
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