Seventeenth century Jesuit analysis of Indian attitudes toward dreams was largely negative. While Indians looked on their dreams as ordinances and oracles, the Jesuits criticized reliance on such irrational messages. Jesuit critiques fell into three categories: the dream as a sign of diabolical possession, the dream as illusion purporting to be reality, and the dream as a form of madness. Jesuits explained native attitudes toward dreams in terms of their own European epistemology and psychology. To the extent that dreams were not part of a perceptual field, observation and judgment, the Jesuits tended to regard them as unreal. Following an examination of original Jesuit sources, this paper contends that what is offensive about Indian dreams to the Jesuit is not primarily that they are a religious affront to belief and morality, but that their very nature calls into question the rational foundations of belief and morality. To find the basis of truth in dreams is to invert the origin of commonly accepted knowledge, thus questioning the foundations of belief and morality. As a rational critique of dreams, the Jesuit account detached them from their cultural matrix and probed their intent and content. Such a critique was appropriate for Jesuits who saw natives driven to fulfill the barbaric imperatives of those dreams. (DHP)
MODERN RATIO:

THE ULTIMATE ARBITER IN 17th CENTURY NATIVE DREAMS

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INTRODUCTION

The seventeenth century European dialogue with the native North Americans was largely negative. This negative comportment has its basis in Renaissance conceptions of God, nature and reason. Elsewhere I have elaborated on the Jesuit-Indian perspectives on religion. Here I claim that the late Renaissance conception of nature and reason was the measuring stick to judge native comportments to dreams.

I concur with Franz Crahay's argument for a generally coherent philosophical approach during the Renaissance, following the anticipated Hegelian triad of God-Nature-Reason.

Certain works which are already modern, though still dominated by the theocentric perspective inherited from the Middle Ages, display the signs of a displacement of God in favour of this new centre of thought and of action which, in its very imprecision and instability, is constituted by the idea of Nature. The rise of humanism, from this point of view, is subordinated to a more profound cultural transformation. Finally, out of Nature will emerge the long-sought new source of authority—modern ratio.

I maintain that for the Jesuits, while the authority of God and the clergy remain unchallenged, the arbiter in religious problems, in conflicting epistemological claims and in psychological disputes is modern ratio. Modern ratio is the guide in dreams, as it is in visions. The religious experience of visions specifically does not have an authority in its own right; its power is subordinate to external control. Thus after recounting Jean de Brebeuf's visions of Jesus, for example, Paul Ragueneau notes: "... he never guided himself by these visions, although often God had given him to
understand things afar off ("les choses esloignées"). ...But he guided himself solely by the principles of the faith, through the operations of obedience and the lights of reason (emphasis added)" (34:177)\(^5\). The apparitions of Brebeuf himself to Catherine de St. Augustine, according to the printer's addition, are subject to "... the maxims of the Gospel, reason, and the impulse of obedience...." Her counsellors also followed these same directives (52:85).

The arbitration in dreams is self-referential, that is, some rational self is the determiner of the worth of any claim. The phenomena have a subordinate role to the higher authority of man-made reason. The nature of modern ratio and its limitations will become more explicit as I examine the conflicting approaches of Jesuits and Indians with regard to dreams. Through a critique of the limitations of reason I will point to a more appreciative comportment to dreams.

### 1. IMPORTANCE OF DREAMS FOR INDIANS

How did the Jesuits perceive the importance Indians paid to dreams?

After living with and studying the Hurons for five years, Paul Le Jeune writes in 1636:

They look upon their dreams as ordinances and irrevocable decrees, the execution of which it is not permitted without crime to delay....The dream is the oracle that all these poor peoples consult and listen to, the prophet which predicts to them future events, the Cassandra which warns them of misfortunes that threaten them, the usual physician in their sicknesses, the Esculapius and Galen of the whole country,--the most absolute master they have ....It is their Mercury in their journeys, their domestic economy in their families. The dream often presides in their councils; traffic, fishing, and hunting are undertaken usually under its sanction, and almost as if only to satisfy it (10:169-171).
Dreams hold a comprehensive and tenacious grip on natives' lives. Dreams are like life itself (59:229), a constant preoccupation, inborn, imbibed like mother's milk and ineluctably part of oneself (33:75). Dreams are the spiritual basis and completion of natives' religions (2:75). Indeed, dreams are their gods (23:153), the ground, and prop for the maintenance of the Huron's whole economy (17:195-7).

According to the Relations, native dreams always have a forceful effect, whether positive or negative: dreams whether good or bad are welcome, for they give a privileged access to reality wherein the genii speak (58:51). Natives accord to dreams no less respect than the missionaries accord to holy objects (51-125). Dreamers act in a superior fashion to non-dreamers (15:99); tribes give a preferential place to a dreamer in ceremonies (10:189). For natives, dreams are generally salutary. The fulfillment of a dream ensures benefits and a prolonged life (60:183). The dream is the best medicine to heal ailments (47:181), to restore health (17:153) and to bestow happiness (28:53). Dreams effect good fortune (23:29), and success in business (17:153). Dreams also provide a tribunal in which some resolution is envisioned for clashes (19:197).

At other times, dreams anticipate or predict the future. In one instance, dreams anticipated the actual events by 14 months (21:1-1). Le Jeur. notes that natives identify dreams with really seeing what is there (5:133); on another occasion, dreams, contrasted with sense experience, bear a kinship to the Christian faith's non-visual reality (6:183).

Despite the clearly beneficial aspects of dreams in a native life-world, the Jesuits regard them, on the whole, negatively. Native dreams are mendacious (7:169), deceitful and false (11:203). Jesuits play on words to bring home this latter point: "Les songes ne sont rien que mensonges" (7:169, 33:197).
II. CRITIQUES OF DREAMS

Such a negative critique of dreams falls into three categories: 1) A dream is a sign of diabolical possession which undermines the wholeness of the individual, the tribe and religion, out is predominantly an affront to European Christianity. 2) A dream is an illusion which purports to be the standard for reality. 3) A dream is a form of madness.

1. Dreams as diabolical possession

According to Charles Lalemant's 1626 account, dreams are simply intercourse ("parler") with the devil (4:219), or with diabolical interventions (19:197). The devil speaks in many spectacular and prosaic forms, including the soft seductive sighs of a nude femme (24:251). What is so sinister about his/her message is its content and its commanding and beguiling nature. The devilish dreams recounted in the Relations run the gamut of a relatively harmless imperative to pilfer a missionary's black cassock to effect a cure (43:273), to the serious apparition announcing that the Jesuits are carriers of smallpox (20:27-29). The devil assails the dreamer (22:103), frightens and troubles him (23:13; 26:25) while commanding him to have recourse to old superstitions (23:169). The devil brooks no hesitation or delay and enslaves the dreamer to respond (22:289), threatening death if no response is made (5:161; 66:181).

For the Jesuits, then, dreams are diabolical not merely because they engender immoral acts (15:177) or because they disturb the dreamer's psychological and physical equilibrium, but primarily because they compel an acquiescent response. To pay such an obsessive attention to dreams and to be so overpowered by them attests to demonic possession. In truth, dreams impair the proper use of reason, and render their subjects inflexible to consider alternative perspectives.

The Jesuits, however, qualify the notion that all dreams are diabolical in origin. If the goal of the dream is a virtuous deed or an action of good fortune (33:21; 10:61), the vision of virtue must emanate from a good uki dwelling in them (39:21). God can make use of such a dream to help natives
embrace the faith (43:287). A dream can also be the medium through which
natives become imbued with the sign of baptism or the cross (53:161; 15:73).

The compulsive connection between the dream and the act to be
performed is not always so rigorous either. Natives have a healthy
suspicion about the whole dream process, including its interpretation. The
Relations of 1668-69 about the Onondagas states: “The more enlightened
among them see clearly that the greater part of these dreams are invented
[in the telling]; yet they do not cease to act, upon occasion, as if they
believed them true” (52:155). The Jesuits therefore note an ambiguity about
dreams in the minds of the natives: while dreams can be spiritually based,
there is a lot of chicanery possible in their narration and interpretation. To
overcome some of this suspicion and possibility of self-deceit but also to
gain access to hidden desires (33:191), natives trust the interpretative
powers of the shaman (sorcerer) (12:9; 15:179).

Although the shaman is known to abuse the trust bestowed on him for
displays of power and for self-aggrandizement, natives, nevertheless, feel
it necessary to confide in another to understand their dreams. The dream-
work, then, is not merely private but requires communal wisdom both to
understand its import and to adapt it to circumstances (10:173). It is also
possible for a shaman to counteract and neutralize a harmful negative dream
(52:155). Dream desires can also harness collective efforts to ensure a
cure (17:179).

The Jesuits exhibit a further ambiguity toward dreams. On the one hand,
they acknowledge the reality of dreams by noting the compulsively cruel
conduct they engender and by exorcising their demonic authorship (14:209-
11). Beyond merely acknowledging the demonic in dreams, the Jesuits take
steps to eradicate this cultural heritage.10

On the other hand, the Jesuits relativize the importance of dreams. The
Relation of 1642 from Tadoussac makes the contrast that while for natives
dreams are “an article of faith,” “in France, a dream is only a dream”
There is nothing inherently religious in a dream, nothing peculiar according to Ragueneau, nothing devilish, wonderful, prophetic, unnatural (33:197). Dreams are not the authentic language of the soul. If dreams are neutral, Jesuits can use them for beneficial purposes, especially if natives dream that they will be converted (11:203; 43:287)!

Generally, the Jesuits regard dreams as the denizen of the demonic which engenders a compulsion for completion. While dreams should be feared and eradicated from culture, they possess an even more sinister quality: they present a threat to reasonable, analytic minds and overpower and trample on common sense.

In employing reason and sense experience as the arbiters of reality, the Jesuits are not able to engage in an impartial dialogue with native dreams. In their partial approach, Jesuits also bypass the full impact of the Judeo-Christian tradition's approach to dreams. In that tradition until at least the fifth century A.D., dreams, especially memorable ones, are a privileged and direct access to the divine. Dreams have an authority akin to visions and natural perceptions. They are not regarded as nocturnal niches for devils nor as fanciful curiosities, but as a source of insight, inspiration and wisdom for practical action. The Jesuits, however, are reluctant to affirm a more positive perspective about dreams in general, a perspective that would enable them to develop cross-cultural ties with natives.

2. Dreams as Illusions

The Jesuits explain native comportments to dreams in terms of their own European epistemology and psychology. If dreams purport to circumvent conscious representations, they are judged to be illusory. The native counterargument, Le Jeune states, is that dreams are no more illusory than the pictorial representations whites have. A picture is not the reality itself, but represents and thereby participates in that reality. A dream is a picture of reality (5:161). According to other references in the Relations, however, this analogy makes a minimalist claim for dreams. Arguments along Le Jeune's lines make too easy a case for the illusory nature of
dreams, for natives hold that dreams are more than images or pictures of reality—they are reality, par excellence.

The Jesuit missionary, Estienne de Carheil, who studied at La Fleche, Amiens and Bourges, France, in the mid-sixteenth century, gives a sketchy theory of the foundations of the dream process which elaborates Le Jeune's position. Carheil's theory, while exposing the illusory character of Cayugan dreams, also serves to dethrone the mastery that dreams claim in Cayugan lives, and to state the true function of the soul in this process. Dreams are formed, he writes, when "... images of what we perceive through the senses are impressed upon our imaginations, and are represented to our minds (esprit) during sleep" (54:69). There are two mental steps in the dream process. The first involves the content of dreams: images received through sense experience are retained in the memory, and varied in the imagination. In the second internal step, the representation of these images, presumably both the original image and its variations, become present to the mind during sleep.

For Carheil it seems logical that the images represented to the mind during waking hours have a greater credibility than those represented to the mind during sleep. It makes sense to entrust waking, verifiable and controllable representations, rather than the unverifiable and uncontrollable variations of dreams (54:71), with providing a direction to life. For natives, however, there are several presuppositions in Carheil's logic, and this becomes more evident in the natives' variant psychological perspective. Carheil's presuppositions are: 1. The same soul receives both the wakeful and the sleeping representations; 2. The wakeful is the most important time for the individual and the group; 3. Conscious representations are the necessary and sufficient condition for dreaming.

Carheil's culture-specific presuppositions are really founded on the first one: each person has one soul which unifies that person. The Cayugan view, however, is that each person has at least two souls, a body-soul and a ghostly or free one. The body-soul performs the conscious imaging and representing, Carheil notes; the ghostly one leaves the body at dream time.
to garner its own representations. The one soul alone is sufficient, however, Carheil argues from his Aristotelian-Thomistic perspective, to represent past and distant events during both wakeful and dream times. That unifying soul's imaging, retaining and representing powers are the basis for the claim that unless a person has experienced something during wakeful hours, that person would not be able to dream. If there is no sensing and representing, there are no representations to form the content for dreams.

Carheil focuses on the primordiality of conscious representations. He tries to explain to natives that the only difference between remembrances and dreams is that remembrances take place in a wakeful state and dreams in a sleeping one. Both make present past conscious images (54:71). Natives, although confessedly reasonable (54:73), do not quickly relinquish the hegemony they accord dreams to such a reductive position. The stuff of dreams is more than the residue of conscious life. A conscious life is not the necessary and/or sufficient cause for dreaming. The converse is true for natives: dreaming is the necessary and sufficient cause for conscious life. Conscious life is secondary to and derivative of oneiric experiences.

Carheil also tries to dethrone the spirit-mastership evident in dreams and the slavish adherence to the imperatives presented therein, and enthrone instead a more credible guide—conscious waking life. He uses a subtle argument to show that if the unborn child has no conscious experiences, he is unable to have dreams. If he has no dreams, then no master spirit can reside in him and guide his life. Again natives do not capitulate to this hypothetical syllogism, because they do not grant the reliability of the first hypothesis—the causal connection between conscious representations and dreams.

Europeans explain the new native perspective on dreams in terms of their known image of human beings. One soul unifies human faculties and actions, and dreams fit into that schema. Elsewhere I have shown the thinking of natives on souls and the rationale underlying this.
From the Cayugan perspective, however, the dream world cannot so readily be explained by this cognitive theory. Dreams are transports beyond the physical and conscious; they are “other-worldly” experiences while being at the same time tied to the everyday one.

Paul Ragueneau tries to find a middle ground between the native transcendent approach to dreams and Carheil’s consciousness theory. He denies that dreams are extraordinary as we noted above; they play a superstitious role in native lives but in reality they are not the supernatural abode of devils or gods. The origin of dreams, however, is not limited to conscious life alone. In delineating his middle position, Ragueneau analyzes the powers of the soul which make the native dreaming process possible (33:189f).

There are two types of desires which arise in human nature: 13 Ragueneau states:

1. Those which “arise from a previous knowledge of some goodness that we imagine to exist in the thing desired”, (desideria elicita), but which can be freely chosen or rejected and,

2. “Other desires” which are for the Hurons inborn (“naturels”) and hidden (desideria innata) (33:189). These desires which well up from the depths of the soul fixate blindly on certain objects.

The consciously acquired desires are founded on experiential objects or events; they are freely chosen under the control of reason. The inborn desires are involuntary, being controlled from within (33:195). This is the animal dimension of man, undetermined and unruly. To follow these passions is to follow the path of deceit and folly, for these desires, while part of man, are not of his most noble mettle.

Dreams are the mouthpiece through which the latent desires speak, Ragueneau recounts; dreams are the latent desires’ language; they are the language of the irrational soul. The language they speak is that of caprice, petulancy and the demand for immediate gratification (33:189).

The natives do not inquire deeply into the source of this dream power and the contradictory nature of the soul as the embodiment of the elicited and
innate desires, Ragueneau states (33:189-191). Instead, the two-soul theory again provides the basis for an explanation.

Ragueneau extends the field of the dream beyond conscious representations. Although he distrusts the innate desires, he sees them as part of a human being and disclosive of a dimension of his being. Ragueneau's conception also expands the one-soul approach and harmonizes it with the two-soul theory. Waking time is lived generally on the conscious, one-soul level. Dream time permits another dimension of the self (another soul) to well up and intermix with images from waking time. The dream images are a mixture of the residue of conscious images and the inborn blind passions.

To the extent that dreams are not part of a perceptual field, that is, part of observation and judgment, the Jesuits tend to regard them as unreal. To the extent that seventeenth century European language bears a rational perspective, that language resists transcending that perspective. The words, then, that refer to the dream world—medicine men, spirits, magic, vision, superstition, ritual—are generally judged to partake of that unreality.

The native dream experience is an experience, nevertheless, but not one which is limited to the perceptual alone. The language of the native dream experience, then, embodies the transcendence beyond the perceptual. And that language does make a distinction between waking and dreaming life, shown in the actions and rituals performed to avert the ill effects of bad dreams.

While our present-day analytic approach to dreams often serves to re-integrate the individual in society, the native represents an even more positive and far-reaching approach: dreams and the so-called vision-quest provide a leit-motif of and inspiration for a life-long commitment (1:287); dreams also provide an unlimited access to involuntary and unconscious human realities.

If dreams are accorded a framework of reality beyond the perceptual,
then they will have a disclosive power of the self and society. Dreams will be perceived as tied to life and not merely as an unruly and involuntary facet of life on which no one can act responsibly.14

3. Dreams as madness

The most severe indictment the Jesuits propose of dreams is that they are a form of madness. They are not part of conscious life; they are not sensed as ordinary phenomena are sensed. Dreams are another world beyond sanity. To assert that dreams are the norm for judging everything else is madness multiplied. In the face of the unreason of dreams, reason must uncover the falsehood embodied therein.

The following syllogism clarifies Jesuitical perceptions on dreams as madness: Dreams are madness; Indians put great trust in dreams. So, Indians trust madness, or, they are mad. We have examined the minor premise—Indians put great trust in dreams. What reasons are there for asserting the major—dreams are madness?

Early in his Canadian missionary career, when he strove valiantly to maintain an objective stance towards natives (6:26; 5:86, 92, passim), Le Jeune already dubbed dreams as folly (5:159). In large part, dreams bear offensive quasi-religious trappings and an irradicable superstition (8:121); they are nonsense (23:29) in the face of European religious and moral perspectives. In the words of missionary, Claude Dablon, they are "one of the chief hindrances to their [natives'] conversion" (42:135).

My contention is that what is offensive about Indian dreams, according to the Jesuit accounts, is not primarily that they are a religious affront to belief and morality, but that their very nature calls into question the rational foundations of belief and morality. To find the basis of truth in dreams is to invert the origin of commonly accepted knowledge and call into question such time-honored foundations for and interpretations of belief and morality as: faith builds on (rational) nature, grace perfects nature.

One pole of madness, according to Foucault, is the abolition of man as reason.15 With this the Jesuits concur, for dreams are an acute obstacle to
being in touch with reality since they "upset the brain" (23:53; 10:175). Collectively, obeying dreams results in a great madness for all (20:39).\textsuperscript{16}

Another pole of madness, according to Foucault, is its disclosive power, in this case, opening up truth for the native. Although for Europeans unreason is unnerving, Foucault maintains that unreason can become revelatory of hidden human possibilities: "... all it [unreason] embodies of the impossible, the fantastic, the inhuman, all that suggests the unnatural, the writhing of an insane presence on the earth's surface—all this is precisely what gives the gryllus its strange power."\textsuperscript{17}

For the Jesuit missionaries, however, dreams as madness lack any positive civilization-enhancing qualities. They are a threat to what grace, nobility and progress have achieved. They are a revolt against the structure of the city, of cultivated land., of order, of reason. Those who cling to dreams so tenaciously are indeed "les sauvages" in the root sense of the word, before it received its pejorative meaning of ferocious and barbarian, namely, "silvicola"—those who inhabit the woods, versus the "agricola"—those who cultivate the soil. Etymologically, the word "sauvage" is from the Old Latin, "salvaticus/silvaticus," one who can survive in the forest, one who is free, not socialized, without ambition or dishonesty, uncorrupted by civilization.\textsuperscript{18}

On the one hand, the dream as madness is repugnant to the Jesuits for it reveals the dark rage of animality. On the other hand, the dream as madness has some fascination, although this is not expressly articulated in the Relations. As disclosive of, and an uncontrolled aspect of one's existence, the dream is a form of knowing, a knowing other than through the senses and perception, a knowing which is direct and whole, not fragmentary.\textsuperscript{19} The dream is also fascinating because its source, although explainable in part, is largely mysterious. This mysterious dimension was taken seriously in earlier centuries in the Judeo-Christian past as noted previously. There indeed it was a privileged moment for divine accessibility.

The task in the Relations is to bind the dream to reason, to confine its
meanderings, to submit it to order and regulation and, ultimately, to moral systems. Thus, this attitude to dreams became the pattern adopted for natives as individuals and tribes: they were to submit to rational pedagogy, to a mastery by discipline so that their animality be tamed and they become docile. The indeterminism of dream-madness must be determined. In the definition of man as rational animal, the rational must be the positive evolutionary form.

While the Jesuits had a privileged access to understanding the native people through the rethinking patterns of native converts and through sacramental confession, they judged the unreason manifest in dreams to have little instructive value. Instead, they prescribed wakefulness as the therapy for both madness and dreams. The erroneous non-being of madness must cede to conscious truth; the illusory dream forms need the conscious interpretations of reality. Thus the Jesuitical dialectic with natives centers on the pedagogical and on conversion curatives for dreams. These curatives are an ordered physical and moral life, and the instituting of a proper form of imagination tied to reality.

CONCLUSION

There is more of Renaissance Athens (France) than Jerusalem in the Jesuit approaches to native dreams. In their interpretation of dreams, the Jesuits are truer to Renaissance ratio than to the Judeo-Christian tradition. If the general thrust of Athens is thought and the perspective of Jerusalem is life, dreams readily fit into life’s seamless garment. An exclusively rational critique of dreams, then, detaches them from their cultural matrix, and prejudges their intent and content.

A more holistic approach to dreams acknowledges the limits of modern ratio since the inner life that dreams portray is only partly conceptualizable. In other words, dreams depict a reality greater than reason alone can encompass.

The critique of dreams as the denizen of demons is accurate to Jesuits who see natives driven to fulfill the barbaric imperatives of those dreams.
An analysis of good works emanating from dreams, however, does not change Jesuit negative approaches unless conversions result therefrom.

If the criterion for truth is observation and understanding alone, then dreams provide no new vistas of reality. They must then be illusory. But if the criterion for truth relies more on the phenomenon at hand than on a prejudgment, then the dream is disclosive of realities beyond observation and reason.

There is a similarity but not an identity between dreams and madness. If the boundaries for both reality and sanity, however, are the orderly, the wakeful and comprehensible, then a too restricted framework is created which may exclude the divine. Such a consequence, while obviously not the Jesuits' intent, demonstrates the problems inherent in judging what is devilish, illusory, insane or divine from too narrow a base.

The native attitude to dreams broadens rather than constricts rational approaches to reality; it includes rather than excludes. While native dreams need a critique, the critique should acknowledge the expansiveness and priority of the given.
NOTES


3. For a consideration of discontinuity during the Renaissance, see Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, a History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, New York: Random, 1975.

4. "Perspective(s)," 677.


6. Joseph-François Lafitau states that it is difficult to exaggerate natives' obstinate adherence to dreams; Customs of the American Indians compared with the Customs of Primitive Times, Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1974, 1:231.


8. The example given in this context is that a sick old man recalled his dream of heaven as a pitiful place for prisoners. An elder immediately offered a counter dream—heaven is the blissful abode where all desires are fulfilled (52:155). In this recounting and re-interpretation, many aspects of dreams can be recognized: their inventive nature, their flexible interpretation (10:173) and counter interpretation, and their enduring truth value nevertheless!

9. The cure is effected by a process of imagining whereby many visit a sick person and give an image of/or from dreams. The communal guessing of the dream image and the granting of the dream's desire presumably help the sick person's recovery (17:177-179).
10. Some steps to eradicate dreams include: ridiculing them (15:81 125, 133); inventing a counterpart to diffuse them (52:155); using inductive methods (54:101); making a promise not to dream (57:137); giving a religious interpretation to the cause of events (61:25). In one of the earliest illustrated books of the New World, published in 1557, Franciscan André Thevez, makes claims about the good-evil nature of native dreams; Paul Gaffare (ed.), Les Singularitez de la France Antarctique, Paris: Maisonneuve, 1878, 177-8.


13. Ragueneau is unclear whether the irrational desires are peculiar to the Hurons as opposed to Europeans.

14. For a perceptive critique of mid-twentieth century anthropologists’ assessments of native dreams from exclusively western perspectives,

15. *Madness*, 82.

16. On the other hand, in the Renaissance period dreams and madness were thought to have the same physiological origin: as one falls asleep, the vapors arise in the body, ascend to the head in a dense and turbulent form. Imageless, the vapors gyrate chaotically in the nerves and muscles. As sleep progresses, the vapors around the brain are clarified, their movement organized. Dreams are then born; according to Foucault, "one sees miracles, a thousand impossible things." Later, things are even clearer with a correspondence to and recollection of physical phenomena. In both dreams and madness there are confusions and illusions. In madness, however, there is ultimately a conscious judgment made: the illusions are real. Such an erroneous judgment is not made, however, in the case of dreams; dreams exist prior to an affirmative or negative predication. *Madness*, 102.

17. *Madness*, 20. A gryllos is a comic combination of animals or of animal and human forms in Greco-Roman art, portrayed in sunk relief.

18. See Remi Cadieux, "Qui sont les Amerindiens?" *Kerygma* 12 (1978) 173-4. Foucault recounts several imperatives that civilized reason gave to cope with mad people: 1. Ship the fools away; 2. Sequester them in institutions where they can be viewed at a distance, as in the Middle Ages; 3. Send them to hospitals, thereby either safeguarding the populace from contamination, or effecting cures for them. *Madness*, 35, 63-4, 68-71.

