By focusing on concepts of power, culture, and ideology in light of new socio-cultural and anthropological interpretations with regard to their use in international, intercultural, and cross-cultural communication research, an outline for the framework of a more hermeneutic-interpretive approach to the study of communication and socio-cultural change can be developed. Culture is not only a visible, non-natural environment of individual and organized subjects, but also and primarily his, her, or their normative context. In the patterning of their social existence, people continually make, principally unconsciously, choices that are directed by the applicable intracultural values and options. The social reality can then be seen as a reality constituted and cultivated on the basis of particular values, a reality in which the value system and the social system are completely interwoven and imbued with the activity of each other. In other words, in the study of concrete cases, it is necessary to be attentive to the following aspects: (1) the characteristics and dimensions of the cultural reference framework (i.e. the world view, the ethos, and their symbolic representation); (2) the interaction and interrelation with the environment of power and interest; and (3) the 'ideological apparatuses' by which the cultural reference framework is produced and through which it is at the same time disseminated. (Sixty-three references and one table of data are attached.) (RAE)
The many faces of power, ideology and culture
In search of a more interpretative communication research

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Although most social scientists reckon that the concepts of power, culture and ideology are essential for the understanding of the social reality, the concepts are often not defined and therefore interpreted in different ways. This is mainly due to the multidimensionality of these concepts. It is the purpose of this paper to focus on these important concepts in light of new socio-cultural and anthropological interpretations with regard to their use in international, intercultural, and cross-cultural communication research. The paper concludes by outlining the framework of a more hermeneutic-interpretative approach for the study of communication and socio-cultural change.

**Power**

The oldest interpretation of the power concept refers to material or immaterial perceived 'possessions' in a narrow as well as a broad meaning, that is, a property or possession that is handled by actors in a mainly intentional, direct or indirect, manner. Max Weber's definition, which describes power as the capability of one individual or social group to impose its will, despite the objections of others, is often quoted in this context. One can find such a static perception in different functionalistic as well as classic-marxist theories. In such definitions, power is one-sidedly situated with the so-called 'powerholders'. Their position of power rests on a conflict relationship that can only be 'resolved' by consensus on one, or by struggle on the other side.

In this interpretation, ideology is perceived as a predominantly class-determined 'state of mind'. However, about how this class determination operates most of these people, including Marx, had relatively little to say. According to this interpretation, it was, and still is, taken for granted that "in a class society, culture reflects its class structure" (Van Dinh, 1987:20).
Critical social-philosophers and post-structuralists, such as Pierre Bourdieu (1979, 1980, 1982), Michel Foucault (1966, 1975, 1977, 1980), Anthony Giddens (1978, 1981, 1984), and Jurgen Habermas (1981, 1985), have been pointing out the limitations of such a power and ideology concept, and consequently have explored new insights and approaches. The relationship between power and conflict is of an accidental nature, they argue. They do not deny the fact that the exercise of power is an assymetrical phenomenon, but believe that power is 'all-embracing' and 'almighty' and has to be coupled with the concept of 'interest'.

The elites or powerholders in society rule by virtue not only of their control over the means of production but also of their ability to create 'legitimation'. Instead of economic preponderance, the dominant classes call upon an ideological and symbolic preponderance not only to maintain their position in the social hierarchy but also to justify it. This symbolic system has a 'symbolic power' because it is capable of contriving reality in a directed manner. This power lies not in the symbolic system itself, but in the social relationship between those who exercise the power and those who are subject to it. As pointed out by Bourdieu every symbolic system is determined in two ways: by the general consistencies of the material production and the class oppositions that are a reflection of it and by the specific interests of those who produce the symbolic system. Symbolic power thus functions 'unconsciously', 'spontaneously' and 'voluntarily' as the legitimation criterion for the existing social and economic power relationships and leads to a hierarchy of cultural 'tastes' and 'ways of life'.

Hegemony and power therefore function in two ways: the economic ability to produce goods and services and the ideological ability to reproduce society as a legitimate entity. Elites decline because they are not longer able to regenerate the sources of their legitimacy.

One consequence of these arguments has been that cultural and ideological crises can occur independently from crises of the economic base. John Girling (1981, 1984), for instance, who applied the Gramscian hegemony principle to the Thai society, comes to the conclusion that the production basis is integrated in and determined
by the culture-ideological superstructure of the civil society: "The result, in Thai terms, is the 'bureaucratic policy', or what Gramsci calls 'transformism': a ruling class that grows ever more extensive by absorbing elements from other social groups who then operate within the established framework" (Girling, 1984:445) (for more details about the case of Thailand, see Servaes, 1987b).

Another consequence is the already implied new perspective on power. As argued by Foucault, and others, power has to be seen as the form of a subjectification and objectification. Power is a matter of domination over others, instead of a capacity to control things. As coercion implies freedom, power is only exercised over free subjects and only insofar as they are free. Not only is power ubiquitous, it is also anonymous and comprehensive. Therefore, it both 'produces' and 'represses'. Though power and conflict often go together, this is not because one logically implies the other, but because power has to be seen in cohesion with the pursuit of interest. While power is a characteristic of every form of human interaction, contrapositions of interests are not. Therefore, according to Foucault, the role of the intellectual is no longer to provide theory for the enlightenment of the masses, but to struggle against the forms of power they are involved with: knowledge, truth, discourse.

In this respect, however, I would like to join Habermas where he criticizes Foucault for replacing the repression/emancipation model (as formulated by Marx and Freud, and further explored by the Frankfurt School) by the analysis of a plurality of discursive and power formations which dovetail and follow each other but which, unlike the meaning structures dealt with by critical theory, cannot be differentiated according to their validity. Moreover, Habermas claims, demystifying power only makes sense if we preserve a standard of 'truth' capable of distinguishing theory from ideology, knowledge from mystification. Otherwise the Enlightenment's ideal of a 'rational critique of existing institutions' would have to be dropped; and this would imply the abandonment of the principle of a universal reason. In other words, power is a dual concept that can be interpreted in two ways. Looking at it in a static way there are those who have
power and those that endure power. But interpreted in a dynamic way one could say that even the powerless exercise power over the powerful. In other words, to exercise power is not the same as suppression. Consequently, the functioning of ideologies should be perceived as ongoing social processes in the organization and maintenance of power.

**Ideology**

The reproduction of any social organization entails a basic correspondence between processes of 'subjection' and 'qualification'. This basic social functioning of subjection/qualification involves three fundamental modes of ideological interpellation. Ideologies subject and qualify subjects by telling them, relating them to, and making them recognize: (a) what exists and what does not exist (i.e., a sense of identity), (b) what is good and bad (i.e., normalization), and (c) what is possible and impossible (i.e., a logic of conservation versus a logic of change). These three modes of interpellation have important temporal and spatial dimensions and form a logical chain of significance. The traditional concern with ideology has tended to focus exclusively on the first two aspects, neglecting the third. If we want to understand the relationship between power and ideology, we therefore must try to draw a structural map of the universe of ideologies as a whole. Among those scholars who undertook such an enterprise (see, e.g., Hanninen, 1983; Thompson, 1984 for an overview), I would like to elaborate on Goran Therborn's (1978, 1980) views on ideology.

Building on Althusser's Ideological State Apparatuses' concept, Poulantzas' economic-political-ideological class- and state-concept, the Gramscian study of historical social formations and his focus on hegemony, the Lukacsian problematic of revolutionary class consciousness as the key to social change, Foucault's theses on the order of discourse in society, and the Weberian view on legitimation, Therborn defines the operation of ideology in terms of the constitution of human subjectivity. To search for the structure of the
ideological universe is to seek the dimensions of human subjectivity. At the most general level, it appears that two such dimensions of man's being-in-the-world as a conscious subject can be distinguished: one referring to 'being', the other to 'in-the-world'. Thus 'being' a human subject is something existential and historical, being 'in-the-world' is both inclusive (being a member of a meaningful world) and positional (having a particular place in the world in relation to other members of it).

Therborn's thesis is that these four dimensions make up the fundamental forms of human subjectivity, namely (a) the inclusive-historical, (b) the inclusive-existential, (c) the positional-historical, and (d) the positional-existential. Each form implies different types of ideological discourses. Inclusive ideologies are ideologies of exclusion; they draw a line of demarcation between membership and non-membership. Through inclusive-historical ideologies human beings are constituted as conscious members of historical entities. These social worlds are indefinite in number and variety (e.g., tribe, village, ethnicity, state, nation, church). Inclusive-existential ideologies provide meanings related to being a member of the world, i.e. the meaning of life, suffering, death, the cosmos, and the natural order. The most common forms of discourse treating these questions are mythologies, religions and morality. On the other hand, through positional ideologies human beings occupy a position in the world of which one is a member. Positional-historical ideologies form the members of a family in a structure of families and lineages, the occupants of a particular educational status, the incumbents of positions of political power, the members of different classes, etc. Positions may be differentiated and linked in terms of difference only, in terms of hierarchical grading along a single continuum of criteria, of complementarity, competition, and frontal conflict. Positional-existential ideologies subject one to, and qualify one for, a particular position in the world. They tell one who one is in contrast with others, they constitute subject-forms of individuality, (fe)maleness, of age and ageing. In other words, positional ideologies have an intrinsically dual character: in one's subjection-to-and-qualification-for a particular position, one becomes aware of the
difference between oneself and the others. This distinction is particularly relevant insofar as power and identity is concerned, since it designates precisely a particular and crucial relationship to the other. The ideology of a ruling class, for instance, should be analysed both as an ego-ideology, forming the subjects of the bourgeoisie itself, and an alter-ideology, dominating or striving to dominate the formation of other class subjects.

The above distinctions are made for analytical purposes only. They do not represent ideologies as they appear and are labelled in everyday life. Furthermore, these ideological discourses are not exhaustive or irreducible. The multidimensionality of ideologies implies that a crucial aspect of ideological struggles and of ideological power relations is the 'articulation' of a given type of ideology with others. This also means that all ideologies exist only in historical forms, in historical degrees of salience and modes of articulation with other ideologies.

A basic question therefore is: where do ideologies come from? In this respect, building on Therborn, I would like to formulate eight propositions about the generation of ideologies: (a) The generation of ideologies in human societies is always, from the point of view of social science and historiography, a process of change of pre-existing ideologies; (b) Ideological change, and the question of ideologies, is always related to non-ideological, material change; (c) The most important material change is constituted by the internal social dynamics of societies and of their modes of production; (d) Every mode of production requires specific positional ideologies; (e) Every new mode of production will generate new socio-economic and socio-cultural positional ideologies; (f) All human societies exhibit existential- and historical-inclusive as well as historical-positional ideologies; (g) The concrete forms of existential, historical-inclusive and historical-positional ideologies other than the economic are not directly determined by the mode of production and therefore enjoy a certain 'relative autonomy', but changes in the former are 'articulated' by the latter; and (h) New modes of production will
generate new or adjust existing forms of existential, historical-inclusive and other historical-positional ideologies. The analysis of the generation of ideologies will have to start from processes of change in the structure of a given society and in its relationships to its natural environment and to other societies (for more details, see Servaes, 1981a; 1981b).

**Culture**

In this sense, cultures can be defined as social settings in which a certain reference framework has taken concrete form or has been 'institutionalized' and orient and structures the interaction and communication of people within this historical context. Therefore, the classic distinction between structure and culture as an empirical duality becomes meaningless. All structures are cultural products and all culture gives structure. This intrinsic bond with a society which actions are full of value makes all social facts, cultural goods. For social facts like institutions, behavioral patterns, norm systems, and societal models are construed and cultivated in light of certain values, preferences or options that have developed in a society in response to certain common needs or problems. Those who are familiar with newer culturalistic approaches may observe that I heavily build upon the views of people like Peter Berger (1967), Clifford Geertz (1973, 1980), Marshall Sahlins (1976), and Raymond Williams (1980, 1981), to which I refer for more details.

The concept of culture implies material and immaterial aspects of a certain way of life, past on and corroborated via socialization processes (e.g., school, media, church) to the members of that society. Ideological interpellations are made all the time, everywhere and by everybody. However, even though ideological interpellations occur everywhere, they tend to cluster at nodal points in the ongoing social process, which one could call ideological institutions or apparatuses, and which are both discursive and non-discursive.

This process is never linear. It is linked to power in conscious and unconscious ways; it is sporadic and ubiquitous and transcends
national and 'cultural' boundaries. It not only concerns decisions about good and evil etc., but also the way we eat, live, or dress. In this sense, culture can be defined as a social setting in which a certain reference framework has found its basis or is 'institutionalised' and which orientates and structures the interaction and communication of the people within that context. Three empirical dimensions can be distinguished in such reference frameworks: a world view (Weltanschauung), a value system, and a symbolic representation.

As argued above, ideological institutions or apparatuses fulfill a key role here. They are forms of behaviour that are crystalized on the basis of social acceptance into more or less standardized and self-evident routines and which can work both negative-repressive as well as positive-liberating. They consist of power-related strategies, supporting and supported by types of knowledge which are both discursive and non-discursive. They form clusters of institutions that have an impact on and influence each other and that are distinct from others by their own identity. The term 'cultural identity' refers to two complementary phenomena: on the one hand an inward sense of association or identification with a specific culture or subculture, on the other hand an outward tendency within a specific culture to share a sense of what it has in common with other cultures and of what distinguishes it from other cultures.

However, since the needs and values that various cultural communities develop in divergent situations and environments are not the same, the various cultures also manifest a varying 'identity'. Moreover, like all social processes, this process is not purely rational or a pre-planned event. Therefore, culture must be seen as the unintended result of an interweaving of the behavior of a group of people who interrelate and interact with each other.

In other words, culture is a phenomenon whose content differs from community to community, generally because the living conditions of these societies differ. Consequently, each culture has to be analysed on the basis of its own 'logical' structure. Each culture operates out of its own logic. In each culture one must therefore
focus on the so-called archetypes rather than on the formal and often officially propagated manifestations of a culture. More than in the West, and in a way because of the Western influences, one can observe in Asia a pronounced difference between the so-called 'written' and 'unwritten' culture (Terwiel, 1984). All Asian governments underwrite, for example, to the so-called universal UN-declarations which in fact were issued after the Second World War by Western governments and were mainly based on Western ideas and philosophies. However, the reality in many of these countries is often completely different. Confucianistic concepts such as harmony and hierarchy are in blazing contrast to the Western principles of conflict and democracy. Also the three basic principles of Buddhism, such as 'Anijjang' (everything is perpetually changing), 'Dukhkang' (life is full of suffering) and 'Anatta' (everything is relative, certainty does not exist) (Rajavaramuni, 1983), differ greatly from the static, optimistic and 'ideal-utopian' principles on which the Western way of thinking is built. Therefore, cross cultural and intercultural communication are only successful when these logical foundations are understood and accepted as equal by the people concerned.

Furthermore, as for example Geert Hofstede (1980) and Peter Kloos (1984) eloquently pointed out, there are different kinds of knowledge: some regularities in human behaviour are explainable on the basis of culture-specific laws, others on the basis of generally valid laws. Because their epistemological status differs, these two kinds of knowledge also imply two kinds of rules. In the case of culture-specific rules, one speaks of moral rules that have a normative character; the generally applicable laws have a more 'natural-scientific' character. The laws of the forms of production, for example, cannot be changed; the laws that underlie the production relationships, however, may well be changed.

Another essential feature of culture is its dynamic character. Edward Hall (1973, 1983) distinguishes between three states which together constitute processes of cultural change, i.e. a formal, an informal and a technical state. "These states are constantly fluid, shifting one into
the other - formal activity tends to become informal, informal tends toward the technical, and very often the technical will take on the trappings of a new formal system" (Hall, 1973:90). As a classical example of these constantly shifting formal, informal and technical states one often refers to the concept of time in different cultures.

This dynamic character of a culture finds a good expression in a historical analysis. Such a study has been undertaken by Edward Said (1985). His captivating overview of the way in which Asian societies and philosophies throughout the ages were perceived by the West starts from the thesis "that the essential aspects of modern Orientalist theory and praxis (from which present-day Orientalism derives) can be understood, not as a sudden access of objective knowledge about the Orient, but as a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian supernaturalism. In the form of new texts and ideas, the East was accommodated to these structures" (Said, 1985:122).

However, instead of starting a discussion about the positive or negative, objective or subjective interpretation of a culture, in anthropology one usually distinguishes between an 'emic' and an 'etic' approach: "Emic operations have as their hallmark the elevation of the native informant to the status of the ultimate judge of the adequacy of the observer's descriptions and analyses. The test of the adequacy of emic analyses is their ability to generate statements the native accepts as real, meaningful, or appropriate. In carrying out research in the emic mode, the observer attempts to acquire a knowledge of the categories and rules one must know in order to think and act as a native... Etic operations have as their hallmark the elevation of observers to the status of ultimate judges and concepts used in descriptions and analyses. The test of adequacy of etic accounts is simply their ability to generate scientifically productive theories about the causes of sociocultural differences and similarities. Rather than employ concepts that are necessarily real, meaningful, and appropriate from the native point of view, the observer is free to
use alien categories and rules derived from the date language of science. Frequently, etic operations involve the measurement and juxtaposition of activities and events that native informants may find inappropriate or meaningless" (Harris, 1980:32).

In this context I would like to plead for an 'emic' position. However, as Clifford Geertz (1973:15) warns, this is an extremely difficult approach to accomplish: "We begin with our interpretations of what our informants are up to, or think they are up to, and then systematize ..." Geertz therefore prefers the notions of experience-near and 'experience-far' above the 'emic' and 'etic' concepts. The former are internal to a language or culture and are derived from the latter which are posed as universal or scientific.

Moreover, human behavior can be analyzed on a number of levels. In Servaes (1987a), for example, I have attempted to point out a few characteristics of what can be called a Western versus an Asiatic mode of communication. Such an attempt, however, cannot be undertaken without an explicite warning. As has been argued by many scholars, to bring Western and Asian culture face to face is not only ambitious, but can also give a very simplistic impression. With regard to the Western and Asian concept of Self, for instance, Frank Johnson (1985) summarizes the problems inherent in attempting systematic comparisons between 'east' and 'west'. False antitheses and monolithic comparisons can easily slip into the cliche generalization and overstatement of the obvious. He, therefore, cautions: "First, generalizations stressing differences between east and west gloss over the diversity within both eastern and western traditions themselves - over different eras, among different cultures, and as these traditions are differentially experienced by individuals. Second, such comparisons between east and west necessarily set aside civilizations and nations whose traditions have not been recorded in a manner permitting 'equivalent representation" (Johnson, 1985:91-92). These risks are particularly high in condensed versions of cross-cultural comparison, as is the case in the above mentioned example. Therefore, such exercises should be perceived as idealtypical cases of which the extremes are underlined
in order to accentuate the typicalness of each culture or mode of communication. To better locate the modes of analysis from an etic versus emic point of view, Anthony Marsella (1985:4) distinguishes in TABLE 1 the various levels of approach on which contemporary social science takes place and the focus of attention on the self in a given culture.

(For more general assessments, see e.g., Abdel-Malek, 1984; Barley, 1986; Dissanayake, 1983; Eilers, 1986; Glenn, 1981; Gudykunst, 1983, 1985, 1986; Kim, 1984; Samovar, 1981; Servaes, in press; Van Nieuwenhuyze, 1984; Wuthow, 1984).

A plea for more interpretative communication research

The traditional positivist-functionalist approach implicitly still starts from the assumptions that all knowledge is based on an observable reality on the one hand, and that social phenomena can be studied on the basis of methodologies and techniques adopted from the natural sciences on the other hand. However, as for example Giddens (1976) eloquently has pointed out, the social sciences differ from the natural sciences in at least four respects: with regard to the study domain the social sciences are, contrary to the natural sciences, in a subject-subject relationship; they are dealing with a pre-interpreted world in which the meanings developed by the active subjects form part of the production of that world; the construction of a theory of society therefore necessitates a double hermeneutics; and lastly the logical status of generalizations in the social sciences differs from natural scientific generalizations. Therefore, in my opinion, the social sciences are hermeneutic and nomological in nature, and need to be approached from a critical perspective (Ricoeur, 1981).

Furthermore, as has been argued above, the classic materialist-idealist distinction between political-economy and interpretative approaches has become outdated. Therefore, I would like to advocate the relative autonomy of a cultural analysis. In general, one can distinguish between two basic types of cultural critique. The first is of a philosophical nature, posing as an epistemological critique of
analytical reason, of the Enlightenment faith in pure reason and in
the social progress that rationality is supposed to engender. The
purpose of this type of critique is an attempt to demystify power and
ideology. The second approach is using more empirical and therefore
more conventional social science techniques to analyse social
institutions, cultural forms, and the modes of discourse in social life.

What I have in mind is a text that takes as its subject not a
concentrated group of people in a community, affected in one way or
another by politico-economic forces, but the 'system' itself - the
political and economic processes, encompassing different locales, or
even different continents. Analysis should also involve the relative
power-linked articulation and conflict over ideologies, world views,
moral codes, and the locally bounded conditions of knowledge and
competence. Although all social research presumes a hermeneutic
moment, often it remains latent because researcher and research
inhibit a common cultural milieu.

Moreover, it is in the study of the unintended consequences of
action and the creation of meaning that some of the most distinctive
tasks of the social sciences in general and communication studies in
particular are to be found. At least two types of unintended
influences can be distinguished: firstly the unconscious ones, and
secondly influences conditioned by the context in which the different
forms of social action take place.

Without disqualifying and underestimating the significance of other
research contributions I would like to advocate the following
research design. This research project must be centred around two
problem areas. First, it must be determined what actors or interest
groups on the one hand, and what factors or structural constraints on the
other hand, exercise influence from above. These influences can
transform, reinforce or weaken each other. What is required is a
much more precise analysis of influence patterns that function from
top down by means of power in the broad sense. With this, the role
of the state also becomes more central. The second problem area is
the grass-roots reaction to this influence. Research must be focused
on the rational objectives of target groups and social movements. The
difference from traditional anthropological research should be that the choice of the symbolic order for the research is determined by key concepts such as reproduction and labour. It is no more or less chance differences in rational objectives that are interesting, but the systematic tendencies and the thereby generalizable differences. This implies that the choice of the place and the context of research cannot be at random but must be based on macro-structural insights. There is the danger that the research area will be selected on the basis of practical reasons rather than theoretical considerations.

This research can be performed on small-scale, large-scale as well as integrated levels. In all cases one needs to break through artificial boundaries of distinct media and communication systems, in search of those elements that constitute the ideological order of power/empowerment and domination/emancipation, which is the historical outcome of (class) struggle.

The main target of this new approach are social groups or movements with a concern for public issues like ecology, social justice, peace, education, human rights, civic action, etc. This type of social groupings transcends the notion of political parties or interest groups as traditionally understood and conceived. The guiding principle of these groups is to proceed from a bottom-up perspective, rather than from the top downwards as is the case in the classic power structure which disregards the views of the masses and is therefore elite-oriented. The most effective forms of mobilization of these social groups and movements are rooted in popular cultural and ideological expressions in both interpersonal and mass communication. Their greatest ontological challenge is the political rationality of traditional knowledge, or, as Orlando Fals Borda (1985b:2) calls it: "the rediscovery of forms of wisdom which have become obscured or discarded by Cartesian methods and Kantian empirical presuppositions". In other words, the goal of these social movements is political in the old sense of the word.

Therefore, in Servaes (1986, 1987c) I have advocated a more dialectic and multi-centered perception of power and cultural factors in the context of communication and development in which I
distinguished between three problem areas: the mutual dependency between the macro-level of the society or a given structure, and the micro-level of the social actions involved; the position and the autonomy of organized subjects; and the relationship of domination, dependency and subordination versus liberation, selective participation and emancipation of power and interest contrapositions. (More accounts and elaborations of this approach can be found in Fals Borda, 1985a; Kronenburg, 1987; Leman, 1987; Marcus, 1986; or Wang, 1984)

By way of conclusion

To summarize I would like to emphasize once again that culture is not only the visible, non-natural environment of individual and organized subjects, but also and primarily his/her/their normative context. In the patterning of their social existence, people continually make, principally unconsciously, choices that are directed by the applicable intracultural values and options. The social reality can then be seen as a reality constituted and cultivated on the basis of particular values, a reality in which the value system and the social system are completely interwoven and imbued with the activity of each other. Cultures derive an 'identity' from the fact that a common world view and ethos is active in the network of institutions or apparatuses of which they consist. In other words, in the study of concrete cases, one must be attentive to the following aspects: (a) the characteristics and dimensions of the cultural reference framework (i.e. the world view, the ethos, and their symbolic representation); (b) the interaction and interrelation with the environment of power and interest; and (c) the 'ideological apparatuses' by which the cultural reference framework is produced and through which it is at the same time disseminated.
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