A truly diverse press not only takes seriously its political role of fostering robust debate but stands committed to its cultural role of providing a distinctively local context for the issues and discussions it reports. However, what contributes to the diminution of press diversity remains a controversial question that continues to attract considerable study and debate. The more particular question of the influence of ownership on the uniformity of news has led to inconclusive research. To take a closer look at this question, a study examined and compared the accounts of Gary Hart's involvement with Donna Rice in: (1) 29 newspapers owned by the Knight-Ridder chain; (2) a matched sample of 29 newspapers that were not owned by Knight-Ridder but that subscribed to the Knight-Ridder news service; and (3) a matched sample of 27 newspapers that were neither owned by Knight-Ridder nor subscribers to the Knight-Ridder news service. Results showed that Knight-Ridder (owners of the "Miami-Herald" which first broke the story) newspapers as a group gave more and better play to the Gary Hart story, which points to the subtle influence that chains can exert on their member newspapers. The evidence also calls into question a chain's ability to meet the commitment to press diversity and a distinctly local agenda. (Thirty notes, one figure, and two tables of data are included.) (MS)
THE INFLUENCE OF CHAIN OWNERSHIP ON NEWS PLAY: A CASE STUDY OF KNIGHT-RIDDER NEWSPAPERS

by

Theodore L. Glasser
David S. Allen
S. Elizabeth Blanks

School of Journalism and Mass Communication
University of Minnesota
111 Murphy Hall
206 Church Street, S.E.
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55455-0418

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It is an old and familiar criticism that the American press is not sufficiently diverse to sustain what sociologist Robert Nisbet once described as the conditions necessary for a liberal democracy: "diversity of culture, plurality of association, and division of authority." 1 Or as press critic Ben Bagdikian has argued on more than one occasion, if a unique imperative of the American social system is a steady supply of information designed to accommodate and serve the separate and often different needs of America's great mosaic of communities, then the press has failed to live up to its democratic ideals. 2 And it has failed not because it lacks abundance but because its abundance seldom translates into diversity.

The press diversity issue includes but extends far beyond the traditional concern for an open and unfettered forum for public expression, a concern popularized by Oliver Wendell Holmes' plea for a "marketplace of ideas." 3 The larger and inevitably subtler issue involves the connection between culture and self-governance; it takes as its point of departure John Dewey's admonition that democracy is not merely a form of government but a mode of association: "regarded as an idea, democracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community life itself." 4
From Dewey we might reasonable infer that a truly diverse press not only takes seriously its political role of fostering robust debate but stands committed to its cultural role of providing a distinctively local context for the issues and discussions it reports. That is, a politically and culturally diverse press means not simply locally produced newspapers but, as Carey and Sims point out, locally produced newspapers that exhibit a concern for local understandings, an awareness of the local language, and an appreciation for the integrity of local conditions; its democratic character is derived from "community associations, not from its integrating position in a national society." 5 Journalist-turned-sociologist Robert Park, one of Dewey's students, summed it up best: "[T]here is and there can be no such thing as news, in so far as concerns politics, except in a community in which there is a body of tradition and common understanding in terms of which events are ordinarily interpreted." 6

Not surprisingly, what contributes to the diminution of press diversity remains a controversial question that continues to attract considerable study and debate. And nowhere is the research less conclusive and the disagreements more acrimonious than when the topic turns to the particular question of the influence of ownership on the uniformity of news.

The research and commentary on the relationship between ownership and news homogeneity--an area of inquiry of no small consequence in light of the newspaper industry's rapidly escalating
concentration of ownership--includes several empirical studies, mostly from the 1970s, and a variety of polemics, most recently Bagdikian's *The Media Monopoly*. Taken together, the empirical studies offer at best an ambiguous answer to questions concerning the standardizing influences of newspaper chains and conglomerates. Three of the studies, including one of chain-owned newspapers in Canada, found no remarkable difference between the editorial content of independent versus group-owned dailies. Another study found a reduction in "editorial vigor" among newspapers acquired by chains, but reduced vigor does not speak to the issue of news homogenization. Significantly, only one study presents data in support of the proposition that chains tend to standardize the newspapers they own; in their study of editorial endorsements of presidential candidates during four consecutive elections, Wackman, Gillmor, Gaziano, and Dennis found that "a vast majority of chains exhibited homogeneous endorsement patterns" and, therefore, "[c]hain ownership of newspapers discourages editorial independence."  

But if statistically generalizable studies of media content yield little in the way of incontrovertible evidence about the deleterious effects of group ownership, there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence that documents in dramatic detail a distant owner's egregious abuse of a local newspaper's independence and autonomy. Writing in the tradition of the Progressive reformers of the turn-of-the-century, Bagdikian transforms many of these abuses into what is fairly but immodestly
described as a "startling report on the 50 corporations that control what America sees, hears and reads." Like many of the Progressives before him, Bagdikian steers clear of the larger question of capitalism and its political economy and instead travels the familiar path to the excesses of the affluent and the powerful; his is not a critique of free enterprise but an indictment of bigness:

Commercial control of the mass media is not inherently bad. It is far from perfect, but it is less bad than any other system. But narrow control, whether by governments or corporations, is inherently bad. In the end, no small group, certainly no group with as much uniformity of outlook as large corporations, can be sufficiently open and flexible to reflect the fullness of society's values and wishes. 10

Apparently sensitive to the big-is-bad argument, what were once publicly docile corporations have become visible champions of an independent and autonomous press, which, they argue, underscores their commitment to press diversity. Gannett, the largest newspaper chain as measured by circulation and the number of newspapers it owns, expresses its support for local autonomy and thus press diversity with its familiar slogan, which appeared in ads that ran frequently in both trade and commercial publications: "Gannett--A World of Different Voices Where Freedom Speaks." No doubt the slogan alluded to what in 1979 Allen Neuharth, then Gannett's CEO, made abundantly clear: "Diversity of news and views and quality journalism has been greatly enhanced in this
decade by growth in newspaper chains." 11 More recently Knight-Ridder, the second-largest newspaper chain as measured by total circulation of the newspapers it owns, introduced a slogan with a familiar theme; in ads welcoming recently purchased dailies to its "worldwide communications company," Knight-Ridder announced: "We Bought Them. But We Don't Own Them." The text of the ad elaborates:

We don't own their opinions. We don't own their news columns. And quite frankly, we don't want to.

We welcome the six fine daily newspapers of the State-Record Company to our organization.

And we join with them in a continuing commitment to excellent journalism, sound management and strong independent editorial policy attuned to the special needs of each community we serve.

Because as fellow journalists, we realize that some things should never be for sale. 12

Whether in fact chains exert little or no control over their newspapers' editorial decisions came to mind a year or so ago when the daily newspapers in the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul—the Minneapolis Star and Tribune and the St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch—ran their respective stories on the Miami Herald's account of Gary Hart's presumably illicit "involvement" with a woman named Donna Rice. 13 In contrast to what we would have expected from newspapers increasingly in competition with each other, 14 the Star and Tribune and the Pioneer Press Dispatch played the story very differently: The latter ran it big on page one while the former relegated it to the back page of an inside
section. We wondered whether the St. Paul newspaper's play of the story had anything to do with its relationship with the Miami Herald--both papers being members of the Knight-Ridder chain. Specifically, we wondered whether the St. Paul paper's play of the story provided evidence of what Warren Breed long ago called an "arterial effect," one of several "standardizing processes" he discerned in his study of some 120 editors and reporters working for East Coast dailies. 15

Briefly, Breed observed that journalists are "great readers of newspapers," and that the influence newspapers exert is demonstrably arterial. 16 Breed's point was not that editors literally copied news agendas from the bigger and arguably better papers they regularly read but that over time they were influenced by them. Accordingly, the smaller papers in Breed's study tended to yield to the larger papers when matters of judgment were in question:

Following the news judgment of larger papers furnishes the newsman on the smaller paper a feeling of satisfaction, or a rationalization, that he has performed his job adequately. An eastern staffer said that the wire editor of his paper compared his own news decisions with those of the Times as "proof he's ok." The staffer then asked, "Is this why the front pages all over the country look the same?" A second staffer noted that if an editor questions a newsman's judgment, the latter can point to a larger (and thus prestigeful) paper and show that the big-town editor "agreed with him." 17

From the perspective of occupational and organizational sociology, Breed's arterial effect appears to be a variation on a phenomenon common
to many systems of ranked groups and perhaps can be better understood in terms of what Becker calls a "hierarchy of credibility." Within many organizations, especially organizations in which there is a clear ranking of groups, credibility is differentially distributed such that the highest groups have the "right" to impose their judgments on subordinate groups: "from the point of view of a well socialized participant in the system," Becker explains, "any tale told by those at the top intrinsically deserves to be regarded as the most credible account obtainable."18

It follows, then, that the Miami Herald, long recognized as one of the nation's best newspapers 19 and arguably one of the most prestigious newspapers in the Knight-Ridder chain, may well have been in a position to influence other Knight-Ridder newspapers, especially under the particular confluence of circumstances surrounding the Gary Hart story. For here was a story that not only appeared first in one of the chain's premier newspapers but appeared with the byline of two award-winning investigative reporters. Additionally, the fact of the story's existence--as well as the story itself--was disseminated via the Knight-Ridder news service, which all Knight-Ridder newspapers receive. That the Associated Press distributed its own version of the story, based largely on the Herald's account, may have served well to reinforce the perception among Knight-Ridder editors that this was truly a big story.

That news or wire services can play an important role in influencing editors' news judgments has been amply documented by dozens of "gatekeeper" studies.20 When combined with the credibility of
the Miami Herald, particularly among Knight-Ridder newspapers—a credibility important to management, and what is important to management tends to be known among subordinates 21—we would expect the independence of news judgment to be noticeably diminished. Our first hypothesis, then, concerns the newspapers in the Knight-Ridder chain and their play of the Gary Hart story:

H1--Knight-Ridder-owned newspapers will give more and better play to the Gary Hart story than non-Knight-Ridder-owned newspapers that do not subscribe to the Knight-Ridder news service.

Assuming that non-Knight-Ridder newspapers that subscribe to the Knight-Ridder news service are also aware of the prestige of the Miami Herald and have at least some vested interest in that prestige (which, in turn, contributes to the prestige of the news service), we would suppose that subscribers as well will play the story up, though perhaps not to the same extent as newspapers owned by Knight-Ridder; hence, our second hypothesis:

H2--Non-Knight-Ridder-owned newspapers subscribing to the Knight-Ridder news service will give more and better play to the Gary Hart story than newspapers that do not subscribe to the news service.
Method

To test our hypotheses, we obtained first-time coverage of the Gary Hart story from the newspapers in the Knight-Ridder chain along with first-time coverage from two samples of non-Knight-Ridder newspapers. More precisely, we obtained coverage from one population (Knight-Ridder newspapers) and two matched samples—non-Knight-Ridder newspapers that subscribe to the Knight-Ridder news service and non-Knight Ridder newspapers that do not subscribe to the Knight-Ridder news service. The two samples were matched with Knight-Ridder newspapers on the basis of circulation, geographical location and metropolitan area size; because we wanted to compare story play between groups of matched newspapers, these criteria seemed to be a reasonable means to achieve distinguishable but broadly comparable categories of newspapers. Except for the newspapers in the Knight-Ridder chain, we did not note a newspaper's ownership.

Of the 32 newspapers owned by Knight-Ridder at the time of this study, 29 were deemed appropriate for our study. Accordingly, we identified an additional 58 newspapers for our two matched samples. Of the 87 newspapers we contacted, 85 sent us a copy of their first-time coverage of the Gary Hart story; our response rate was 97.7 percent. Both newspapers that did not respond to our request were neither members of the chain nor subscribers to the wire. In sum, we ended up with (i) a population of 29 newspapers owned by Knight-Ridder, (ii) a matched
sample of 29 newspapers that were not owned by Knight-Ridder but that subscribed to the Knight-Ridder news service, and (iii) a matched sample of 27 newspapers that were neither owned by Knight-Ridder nor subscribers to the Knight-Ridder news service.

To compare the story play between the three categories of newspapers, we used a modified version of a coding scheme developed and tested by Budd. Essentially, each newspaper was coded from 0 for no coverage at all to 7 for a front-page, above-the-fold story with a banner headline accompanied by a companion story. From these individual play scores we were able to compute mean play scores for each of the three categories of newspapers.

Most of the 85 newspapers ran their initial story on Monday, May 4, 1987, the day after the Miami Herald ran its story. A few newspapers, however, managed to publish a story on the same day as the Herald's story and several newspapers decided to wait until Tuesday or later; one newspaper did not run its story until the following Friday when Hart announced he was dropping out of the presidential race. Because we were interested in testing hypotheses concerning the influence of a newspaper chain and its news service on story play, we decided that any story published after Monday, May 4, would be scored zero. Editors who decided to wait until Tuesday or later before publishing their story, we reasoned, did not constitute evidence of the kind of influence we sought to identify; by Tuesday, May 5, it could be argued, the story had shifted from the
Hart-Rice relationship to a somewhat different concern for the viability of Hart's candidacy.

**Results**

As Figure 1 shows, the direction of the mean play scores of the three categories of newspapers tends to support our hypotheses. The mean play score for the Knight-Ridder newspapers (4.6) was higher than the mean play score for the non-Knight-Ridder newspapers that subscribed to the Knight-Ridder news service (4.3), which in turn was higher than the mean play score for newspapers neither owned by Knight-Ridder nor subscribers to the Knight-Ridder news service (3.8). However, appropriate t-tests show a statistically significant difference (at the .05 level) only between the newspapers owned by Knight-Ridder and the newspapers with no affiliation with Knight-Ridder.25 Conservatively reported, then, the data support our first hypothesis, which predicted that newspapers owned by the Knight-Ridder chain would give more and better play to the Gary Hart story than newspapers with no affiliation with the Knight-Ridder chain. The absence of a statistically significant difference between newspapers subscribing to the Knight-Ridder news service and non-subscribing newspaper means we cannot confidently claim support for our second hypothesis.

A closer examination of the data underscores the differences between the three newspaper categories, particularly the difference between Knight-Ridder newspapers and newspapers with no affiliation.
with Knight-Ridder. As Table 1 shows, 82% of the Knight-Ridder newspaper had play scores between 4 and 7; indeed, roughly 31% had scored a 6 or 7 on the play scale. In contrast, 67% of the newspapers with no affiliation with Knight-Ridder had play scores between 0 and 4; significantly, less than 8% had play scores of 6 or 7. Of the five newspapers that received a play score of 7, four were Knight-Ridder newspapers; the fifth was a subscriber to the Knight-Ridder news service.

Discussion

That Knight-Ridder newspapers as a group gave more and better play to the Gary Hart story points to the subtle influence that chains can exert on their member newspapers. We say "subtle" influence because we have no reason to believe that Knight-Ridder management had at any time instructed its newspapers, directly or otherwise, on what to do with or about the Gary Hart story. Like the indirect influences Soloski found in his case study of a Gannett-owned newspaper, the influence we posit here involves an organizational arrangement that impinges on the news judgments of individual editors.

Whether the data we report here are in fact evidence of Breed's arterial effect is, of course, a matter of some interpretation. It is certainly possible, though probably less plausible, that Knight-Ridder
newspapers gave more and better play to the Gary Hart story because the Knight-Ridder chain tends to hire editors who are more likely to give greater play to certain kinds of stories. But while it is true, as Bagdikian reminds us, that a chain's "most powerful influence . . . is the power to appoint media leaders," the "like-minded editors" argument does not adequately account for the pattern of data that shows not only differences between one chain's newspapers and other newspapers but between newspapers subscribing to the chain's news service and newspapers that do not subscribe.

If Breed's arterial effect—or, alternatively, Becker's hierarchy of credibility—seems to provide a logical explanation for why Knight-Ridder newspapers played the Gary Hart story differently than non-Knight-Ridder newspapers, it apparently does not account for why newspapers selected one version of the story over another. Curiously, of the 58 newspapers that had access to the Knight-Ridder news service, only 14 used the Knight-Ridder version of the story (see Table 2); of those 14, nine were newspapers owned by Knight-Ridder. In fact, that so many Knight-Ridder newspapers and an even larger number of subscribers to the Knight-Ridder news service chose not to use the Knight-Ridder version of the story may be entirely unrelated to the influences that account for story play. It may be, for example, that editors simply did not like the Knight-Ridder version. More likely, however, it may be, as we learned from an editor who opted for the AP version, that a decision not to use the Knight-Ridder news service may have been a function of the
inefficiencies of the Knight-Ridder news service--it tends to be slow, its copy tends to be long, and the AP has a better reputation for updating its material. ²⁸

Moreover, the idea that chains influence their editors' news judgments does not mean that each and every editor experiences a loss of autonomy; it does mean, however, that autonomy is more difficult to maintain and, therefore, more likely to be diminished. At the level of the individual, autonomy is usually a choice; and by choice a number of Knight-Ridder editors ran editorials critical of the Herald's story and the methods used to get it. One Knight-Ridder editor went so far as to conclude that if the late John S. Knight, a former owner of the Herald and the founder of the Knight chain (later merged with the Ridder chain), things would have been different: "If somebody now gives the Herald a Pulitzer," he concluded, "it will be the living end." ²⁹

But expressions of defiance--even defiant editorial policies--only serve to confirm the subtlety of the control a chain exerts over its newspapers. To borrow an important distinction from Murdock and Gallagher, ³⁰ chains may extend to their newspapers a considerable degree of tactical autonomy when it comes to operational control over the day-to-day production of news, but individual newspapers often experience little if any strategic autonomy when it comes to the kind of allocative control that determines basic policies, long-term goals, and the general disposition of resources. Breed's arterial effect, it follows, accounts for
a kind of allocative, not operational, control; it illustrates the kind of pressure that can be at times resisted but seldom ignored.

While the evidence we present here cannot speak to a chain’s commitment to press diversity and a distinctly local agenda, it does call into question a chain’s ability to meet that commitment. All editors, engage in what Gallagher appropriately calls “the politics of accommodation”—the constant negotiation with all the various interests that can and often do impinge on editorial judgment and newsroom discretion. But chain editors must contend with an additional burden, for they must accommodate as well the allocative interests of the chain.
NOTES


5 James W. Carey and Norman Sims, "The Telegraph and the News Report," a paper presented to the History Division of the Association for Education in Journalism, University of Maryland, August 1976, p. 3.


9 Daniel B. Wackman, Donald M. Gillmor, Cecilie Gaziano, and Everett E. Dennis, "Chain Newspaper Autonomy as Reflected in Presidential Campaign Endorsements," *Journalism Quarterly*, 52 (Autumn 1975): 411-420. But see also William T. Benham, John Finnegan Jr. and Patrick Parsons, "The Chain-Independent Debate Reassessed: Some New Evidence and an Interpretation," unpublished manuscript (University of Minnesota, February 1982), who point out that Wackman et al. may be overstating the homogenizing influence of chains because they "failed to compare their results on homogeneity with measures from any randomly selected group of independent papers. Therefore, it was impossible to determine whether the high level of agreement was the result of chain ownership or simply a characteristic of daily newspapers in general" (p. 19).


11 Quoted in Bagdikian, ibid., p. 82.

12 *Columbia Journalism Review*, March/April 1987, p. 17. While the Knight-Ridder advertisement carried the slogan that "Some things should never be for sale," within two years the chain sold or closed three of the six newspapers mentioned in the advertisement.


worthwhile review of some of the more recent literature, see Stephen Lacy, "The Effects of Intracity Competition On Daily Newspaper Competition," Journalism Quarterly, 64 (Summer-Autumn 1987): 281-290.


16 Breed uses the word "arterial" in reference to the "pattern of influence [that] seems to assume an 'arterial' form, analogous (although in reverse) to the dendritic geological pattern by which rills, runnels and freshlets flow into brooks and streams which in turn join the great river" (p. 279).

17 Breed, p. 282.


20 For a worthwhile review of the gatekeeper literature, particularly as it bears on the influence of wire services, see D. Charles Whitney and Lee B. Becker, "Keeping the Gates on Gatekeepers: The Effect of Wire News," Journalism Quarterly, 59 (Spring 1982): 60-65.

21 See for example, John Soloski, "Economics and Management: The Real Influence of Newspaper Groups," Newspaper Research Journal,
19


22 Information on circulation, ownership and wire services received was taken from the 1987 edition of Editor and Publisher Yearbook, while metropolitan area size was taken from the Editor and Publisher Market Guide, 1987. With one exception, matched newspapers were not located in the same city. The exception involved Los Angeles; however, the two newspapers were non-competing dailies from opposite ends of the metropolitan area.

23 Of the 32 papers owned by the Knight-Ridder chain at that time, three were not used in the study. The first, the Milledgeville (Georgia) Union Recorder, did not publish on Monday. The second, the Philadelphia Daily News, is published in tabloid form, which could not be coded on the same scale of news play as the other newspapers in the study, and the third, the Journal of Commerce, is a specialty newspaper.


25 The one-way analysis of variance test was deemed inappropriate, since the study contained the population, as opposed to a sample, of Knight-Ridder-owned, non-tabloid newspapers.

26 Soloski, op. cit.


28 Interview with Tom Burton, copy editor, Madison, Wisconsin State Journal. Burton was the paper's night slot person for the May 4, 1987, edition of the State Journal in charge of deciding where and how to play wire stories.

FIGURE 1
PLAY SCORE BY GROUP

Knight-Ridder*
x=4.6
(N=28)
KR wire
x=4.3
(N=28)
Non-KR wire*
x=3.8
(N=26)

*Statistically significant at p<.05.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Knight-Rider</th>
<th>KR Wire</th>
<th>Non-KR Wire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.9% (N=2)</td>
<td>0.0% (N=0)</td>
<td>7.4% (N=2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
<td>7.4% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.5% (3)</td>
<td>24.1% (7)</td>
<td>14.8% (4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>31.0% (9)</td>
<td>34.5% (10)</td>
<td>37.0% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.7% (6)</td>
<td>34.5% (10)</td>
<td>25.9% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>17.2% (5)</td>
<td>3.4% (1)</td>
<td>7.4% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>13.8% (4)</td>
<td>3.4% (1)</td>
<td>0.0% (0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|       | 100.00%* (N=29) | 100.00% (N=29) | 100.00% (N=27) |

*Due to rounding percentages may not equal 100.00%
### TABLE 2
SOURCE BY GROUP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Knight-Ridder</th>
<th>KR Wire</th>
<th>Non-KR Wire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knight-Ridder Wire Service</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=9)</td>
<td>(N=5)</td>
<td>(N=0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated Press</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times Wire Service</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined News Services</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post Wire Service</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP/Knight-Ridder Combination</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>6.9%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not use story on Monday</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*(N=29)</td>
<td>*(N=29)</td>
<td><em>(N=27)</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Due to rounding percentages may not equal 100.00%