As a result of social and economic trends of the past decade, public schools in industrialized nations now face severe political problems, manifested by declines in enrollment, budget, public confidence, and legitimacy of administrative authority. As a consequence, a fundamental reassessment of educational policy and management is underway in many settings. The introductory paper in this volume therefore illustrates ways in which political science can illuminate and assist this reassessment. Topics discussed include the context of decline, the relationship between political science and educational administration, the politics and management of decline, and rethinking educational policy and its implementation. The second part of the volume consists of four articles by separate authors on related topics: (1) "Leadership for Cut-back Management: The Use of Corporate Strategy," by R. Behn; (2) "School Administrators Beseiged: A Look at Australian and American Education," by T. Murphy; (3) "Toward A Political Economy of Educational Innovation," by G. J. Papagiannis and others; and (4) "The Politics of Curriculum Change and Stability," by W. L. Boyd. An annotated bibliography completes the volume. (TE)
Political Science and Educational Administration

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Political Science and Educational Administration: Rethinking Educational Policy and Management in the 1980s
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Series Introduction

It is now widely recognised, among theorists and practitioners alike, that the traditions that have informed educational administration as a field of study for several decades are of only limited use in coming to terms with the complexity and value-laden nature of educational practice. The sudden politicisation of the context and conduct of education has raised issues of immediate import that cannot be dealt with adequately by functionalist analysis or behavioural science. The collapse of these theoretical traditions in educational administration has produced a vacuum into which a very haphazard collection of intellectual bric-a-brac has been sucked. As a result, both theorists and the practitioners who look to them for help in an increasingly disordered world are alike in their bewilderment. How can alternative formulations be developed? How can reliable and relevant analyses be made?

The series of books of which this volume is a part is an attempt to explore a variety of intellectual traditions that have, until now, been largely ignored or dismissed by educational administrators. Each of the books is an attempt to bring a particular intellectual perspective to bear on the practical problems of administering education. They are, therefore, diverse in their starting points and in their analysis. What they have in common, however, is a rejection of a purely technical, functionalist approach to educational administration, and a commitment to a critical and reflexive consideration of educational practice.

The ideas presented in the introductory essays are necessarily an encapsulation of arguments that have developed and are developing more fully elsewhere. In order to assist readers to participate in these developments, selected readings are attached to each paper, and an annotated bibliography of key works is provided. We hope that the publication of this series will encourage others to join a necessary exploration of alternative perspectives in educational administration. Such exploration is long overdue.

Course team chairman
Political science and educational administration: rethinking educational policy and management in the 1980s
Introduction

Social and economic trends over the past decade have dramatically accentuated the political problems of public education in industrialised nations. In stark contrast to the period of prosperity, growth, and school system expansion following World War II, educators now are confronted simultaneously with four kinds of decline: declining enrolments, declining economic-budgetary circumstances, declining public confidence in schooling, and a declining legitimacy of administrative authority. In combination, these four developments have transformed and increasingly politicised the environment of education. As a consequence, a fundamental reassessment of educational policy and management is underway in many settings. This paper is intended to illustrate the ways in which political science can illuminate and assist this reassessment process.

The context of decline

The most salient fact of the 1980s, for educators in industrialised nations, is that in most places education is a declining industry due to declining enrolments. 'The combination of a declining birthrate and a growing population of elderly citizens has simultaneously decreased both the demand for public schooling and the political support for its provision' (Kirst and Garms 1980). As if this were not enough, the adverse economic trends of the past decade (e.g. 'stagflation' and soaring energy costs) have slowed budget growth, driven up costs, and intensified competition among the public services for public funds. In this competition, educators no longer occupy the privileged position they held during the baby-boom years following World War II. Rather, they often find themselves in a defensive posture, having to compete aggressively to avoid losing ground.

By itself, the combined effect of the reversals in population growth and economic growth requires a fundamental rethinking of educational policy and management for the 1980s. As argued in the prospectus for a workshop on the subject at the November 1982 meeting of the European Forum on Educational Administration, the combined effect makes for 'a total change in the conditions in which the management of education is worked out':

The time of growth has been that of quantity: demographic pressure and economic expansion both augmented the needs in education. These have been times of plenty, when economic expansion quickly developed the means every state could dedicate to education. A new era has opened, characterized by a lessening of pupils and of educational budgets. It implies other changes in the administration of education, new bearings in education policy and a fundamental change in the mentalities of all partners concerned in the educational systems (European Forum on Educational Administration 1982).

On top of these problems, educators in many settings are also faced with a declining public confidence in schooling and a declining legitimacy of administrative authority. In the United States, the Coleman (1966) and Jencks (1972) reports, along with declining student achievement and disappointing educational reform efforts, have fuelled popular as well as scholarly debate about the weak effects of schooling (see, for example...
Williams et al. 1981). Similar developments have occurred in other industrialised nations such as the United Kingdom, where the Black Papers (Cox and Dyson 1970) and government reports have questioned the effectiveness of education and educators (Watson 1981).

Concerns about the effectiveness of schooling have attracted increasing public attention to the outcomes of schooling, upsetting the traditional 'logic of confidence' in schooling (Meyer and Rowan 1977). This 'logic' focuses on inputs to the schooling process and accepts without question the ceremonial sorting and certification of students. In the absence of a science of education that can guarantee equality of educational results or the maximisation of student achievement, any erosion of the logic of confidence is sure to increase the politicisation of education.

Often closely related to the declining public confidence in schooling has been a general erosion in the legitimacy of administrative authority. Scholars influenced by Habermas (1975) see this latter trend as a larger 'legitimacy crisis' of the State arising from an increasing separation of government bureaucracy and administration from public control (Foster 1980; Weiler 1982a, 1982b). Although authors in this tradition associate the legitimacy crisis of the State with the contradictions inherent in capitalist societies, the performance of Communist States such as Poland, about which they are silent, often provides more dramatic examples of legitimacy crises.

It thus appears that the dynamics of modernisation in complex societies, East or West, lead to an increasing pervasiveness of formal organisations as a means for conducting social life, and the formalization of social control itself through organizational means' (Bidwell 1979, p. 268). How to retain or regain public control of these organisational means is a widespread problem. Demands for increased parental and teacher participation in educational policy-making and greater recognition of student and teacher rights in the United States (Boyd and Crowson 1981, Griffiths 1977, Wirt 1976) have also been echoed in the United Kingdom (Watson 1981). Similarly, in West Germany the Federal Constitutional Court has ruled in favour of greater rights for students and for procedures to democratise the narrowly controlled educational policy-making process (Weiler 1982b). In Australia, Harman (1976, p. 18) reports that 'the movement of effective power from parliaments to the executive, the public service and statutory corporations, has been an important phenomenon in the . . . political system over recent years'. As a consequence, concern has been building up in Australia about the bureaucratic rigidity of the highly centralised State education departments and the need for mechanisms to involve teachers and parents in educational policy-making (Harman 1976, Murphy 1980, Walker 1970).

Declining enrolments and budgets and declining confidence and legitimacy interact to exacerbate the political and management problems of educational administrators. For instance, the provision of equal educational opportunity is made more difficult under these circumstances. In nations such as Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, declining enrolments have been accompanied by increases in the proportion of educationally disadvantaged, minority, or immigrant children in government schools. For equal educational opportunity, these
students need more than equal educational services. Yet their need for extra remedial or compensatory services increases just at a time when public support and resources for education are declining (Salganik 1981). Put another way, in a time of contracting enrolments and revenues, increasing demands for specialise(' educational services (e.g. compensatory, special, and bilingual education) compete with the need to maintain regular educational programs. The consequence is that painful reassessments of educational programs and priorities are necessitated (Mosher, Hastings and Wagoner 1981). In these circumstances, sagging public confidence and legitimacy contribute to a 'credibility gap' as administrators attempt to justify the hard choices to be made. The overall effect of the context of decline is inevitably a scramble for scarce resources, intensifying special-interest-group activity and the politicisation of education.

**Political science and educational administration**

To understand the utility of political science for educational management in the 1980s, it is helpful to trace the relationship of political science to educational administration to date. Beginning with Max Weber’s reflections on the Prussian civil service and the attempt to create an efficient, neutral bureaucracy there has been a quest for what Kaufman (1963) has called technical, nonpartisan competence in government. This quest has resulted in the creation in many nations of a professionally trained civil service that carries out the administrative activities of government in what is supposed to be an efficient and apolitical manner.

In the United States, Woodrow Wilson (1887) argued that a new science of administration could be developed based on a separation of efficient, hierarchically-ordered administration from politics. This view became a central component in the Municipal Reform Movement of the early 1900s, which emphasised ‘scientific management’ and expert, non-partisan public administration (Banfield and Wilson 1963, Callahan 1962). From this perspective there was no partisan way to build streets or schools, only a right way. Consequently, there was no acceptable reason for politics to intrude on the efficient administration of cities or school systems. Through the application of expertise and a rational problem-solving approach, a consensus should emerge about the technically correct policies to pursue.

This approach shows that historically there has been confusion among political scientists, as well as the public at large, regarding the nature of politics. Many people conceive of politics narrowly, as 'something partisan or related to the affairs of political parties, or something improper or even corrupt' (Harman and Selby Smith 1976, p. 2). Political scientists today usually take a much broader view. Politics, they say, is the inevitable and legitimate process of competition for influence and control over governmental and governmental policies. Politics involves 'who gets what, when, and how' (Lasswell 1936). It thus involves the allocation of scarce resources or, put another way, of benefits and burdens. Because few, if any, governmental policies are neutral in their consequences, the prospective winners and losers compete for policies that favour their interests. Technical expertise cannot eliminate scarcity, nor ensure policies that favour
all interests. Nor can experts or public administrators claim they alone know what is in the public interest. In this view, then, there is no way to separate public administration from politics. Public administrators can be guided towards what appear to be neutral and technically correct decisions or policies based on professional norms or standards. But, as Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky (1974) vividly demonstrate in their study of school, street, and library policies in Oakland, California, such decisions or policies may nevertheless have inequitable consequences.

Just as governmental policies are rarely neutral, so also are governmental structures and arrangements. No matter how they are designed, they tend to benefit some groups more than others. Indeed, it has been shown that non-partisan elections themselves have a built-in conservative bias (Hawley 1973). This is not an inconsequential matter since the vast majority of school-board elections in the United States and Canada are conducted on a non-partisan basis (Nielsen and Robinson 1981). In recognition of the political significance of alternative governmental or institutional arrangements, one of the central concerns of both practical politicians and political economists is the choice of decision rules for making future collective decisions (Ostrom and Ostrom 1971).

Because governmental arrangements and policies are seldom neutral in their effects, it is difficult to achieve approaches that remain satisfactory over time. In Western capitalist democracies, such as the United States, there tends to be a continuous effort to adjust the precarious balance between the central competing values of liberty, equality, and efficiency (Garms, Guthrie and Pierce 1978). In American history, for example, there has been a shifting emphasis over time between three objectives in government: representativeness; technical, nonpartisan competence; and centralised executive leadership (Kr Armst 1963). In reaction against the dominance of royal governors in the colonial era, early American governments emphasised representative mechanisms to ensure liberty and, to a degree, equality. Later, the power and corruption of legislatures led to efforts to take administration out of politics by lodging it in independent boards and commissions and by introducing the merit system to break the hold of parties on the bureaucracies. But the resulting fragmentation of government reduced both efficiency and representativeness, and the search for unification led to the popularly elected chief executives (Kaufman 1969, pp. 3-4).

In the field of education, however, the concept of technical, non-partisan competence was particularly attractive and persistent. Indeed, many people still agree that politics has no legitimate place in the sensitive function of educating children. In the early 1900s, it seemed both desirable and possible to engineer an apolitical ‘one best system’ of American education (Tyack 1974). To do this, school systems were rationalised and standardised along bureaucratic and industrial lines and insulated from corrupt politics through the adoption of non-partisan governmental arrangements.

Reformers stressed that ‘politics, rather than being a struggle among partial and private interests, is (or at any rate ought to be) a disinterested effort to discover what is best for the community “as a whole”‘ (Banfield
and Wilson 1963, p. 154). Since, according to this view, there was only one legitimate public interest, it followed that educational programs ought not to be differentiated according to the parochial and, hence, illegitimate desires of various classes, ethnic groups, and subcommunities (Salisbury 1967). On the strength of their expertise as professionally trained educators, school administrators were thought to be far better qualified than lay persons to make what were held to be the essentially technical judgments required to develop a single general and efficient educational program.

By denying social pluralism and elevating technocratic authority, the 'one best system' approach simplified policy making by minimising recognition of competing educational preferences and objectives. With the resurgence of cultural pluralism in the 1960s, however, competing preferences now are not only a fact of life for American educators, but must be accommodated within a context of stable or declining resources. Educators in other Western democracies seem to face similar situations (e.g. Murphy 1980, Watson 1981).

The politics and management of decline

The background of most school administrators has done little to prepare them for the management of decline. Until recently, many were not very used to managing conflict or making hard choices. As outlined above, the lore of public administration and the traditional separation of education from politics, in effect, divided the two main functions of government: the delivery of public services and the political, or conflict management, function (Banfield and Wilson 1963). At the same time, most school administrators were used to conditions of growth and expansion. Where growth was accompanied by increasing resources, there often was little need to make very conscious or systematic choices in resource allocation decisions. However, as Yarmolinsky (1975, p. 61) observed about universities, now that we 'are discovering the limits of growth, we must also learn a good deal more about the art of governance, which ... is the art of choice'.

There is wide agreement among analysts that policy making and conflict management, in decline, differ significantly from their characteristics under growth conditions (Behn 1980a, 1980b; Berman and McLaughlin 1978; Cyert 1978; Levine 1978, 1979). First, resource allocation decisions become far more difficult in decline. The contest, as Behn (1980c, p. 603) notes, is no longer 'over who should get how much of the expansion of the budgetary pie, but over who should be forced to absorb what share of the cuts'. Put another way, there is a fundamental shift from distributive to redistiributive politics: a shrinking budget creates clear winners and losers and no slack resources remain with which to buy off the losers with side payments on secondary issues.

Second, participation is intensified. Consistent with research on decision making showing that humans weight losses more heavily than gains (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), retrenchment activates wide and intense participation as all organisation members and beneficiaries feel a personal stake in the decisions to be made (Behn 1980b, p. 618).

Third, retrenchment decisions are complicated by considerations of
equity and entitlement. The problem here goes beyond the well-known fact that staff layoffs according to seniority tend to conflict with affirmative action objectives. Bardach (1976) argues that a distinguishing feature of the politics of policy termination, particularly where government is involved, lies in the ability of vested interests to advance a powerful moral claim regarding the inequity of changes that would deprive them of arrangements they have learned to rely upon. Thus, what Behn (1980b) calls the 'entitlement ethic' supports the view that government has a responsibility to maintain the facilities and jobs that people have come to count on. Indeed, civil servants with tenure may rightly feel that they are being deprived of a property right when their jobs are abolished.

Fourth, morale plummets in declining organisations. Incentives for performance and promotion and career opportunities all tend to dry up. Talented people, who often are mobile, tend to abandon the organisation for greener pastures (Levine 1978).

Fifth, organisations cannot be cut back simply by reversing the sequence of developments by which they grew (Berman and McLaughlin 1978). Levine (1979) calls this problem the 'paradox of irreducible wholes'.

Finally, while growth can be managed on an ad hoc basis without grave peril, retrenchment cannot. Systematic planning and analysis become essential (Behn 1980b). Yet the ability to do this is frequently challenged by the view that the administrative component in organisations should be cut to the bone before the service delivery component is weakened (cf. Levine 1979).

In combination, these factors have produced a distinctively new politics of education (Boyd 1982). First, the dramatic increase in the frequency of redistributive politics has raised the incidence and intensity of conflict in policy making. Second, declining enrolments and fiscal constraints have forced school officials, and other active participants in the policy-making contest, to learn the challenging dynamics of the unfamiliar process of cut-back management (see Behn 1980b). Third, the redistributive, zero-sum game produced by declining enrolments and retrenchment has not merely activated old cleavages; it has also created new cleavages, such as that alluded to earlier between advocates of special and regular educational services. But the most imposing new cleavage is associated with the demographic and economic trends that have reduced the priority that education can claim on the public purse. Families with children in the public schools are now a bare majority, or even a minority group, in many settings. The newest cleavage thus is between the shrinking group of direct beneficiaries supporting public education and the expanding group of taxpayers and senior citizens who feel that spending for education should be reduced. From the point of view of school governance, this further complicates the already thorny issue of to whom the public school systems should be responsive and accountable.

At the heart of the politics and management of decline is the question of who will bear the immediate and long-term costs of cut-backs. Administrators must worry about both the political, or conflict management, costs of decisions and the costs in terms of maintaining the organisation's ability to perform satisfactorily. If the political costs seem most important, dispersed or across-the-board cuts are quite attractive because they minimise conflict. Concentrated cuts, on the other hand, involve painful sur-
gery and are sure to galvanise vociferous opposition from the affected parties. Unfortunately, however, across-the-board cuts will in time weaken the entire enterprise. As Behn (1980b) has argued persuasively, there are two fundamental stages in retrenchment:

During the first, the small declines in resources combine with the inability (or unwillingness) to recognize the long-run trends to produce short-run solutions: across-the-board cuts and deferred maintenance. Eventually, however, reality is forced upon the organization — either by its leaders who explain it, or by outsiders who place strict conditions upon their continued support. Only once the organization is in this second stage, can the serious business of managing the decline begin. And it is in the interest of the manager (or, at least, in the interest of the manager who plans to stay with the organization over the long-term) to get past the first stage as quickly as possible (Behn 1980b, p. 615).

To get past the first stage of decline Behn (1980b) makes clear that leaders must understand and explain to their constituents and organization members the opportunity cost of not cutting back. Otherwise, everyone will focus on the obvious, immediate costs of the cut-backs themselves. Thus, to create the support for cut-backs necessary to override the inevitable opposition, leaders, first, can dramatise the opportunity costs of not cutting back by making clear the specific consequences for the organization and the individuals and groups associated with it. Second, Behn (1980b) proposes that leaders should articulate a new 'corporate strategy', or organization mission, that shows who will benefit by the transformation and contraction of the organization. By judicious use of these approaches, leaders can both reduce opposition and increase support for necessary cut-backs.

It is, of course, easier to say what should be done than to accomplish it. Indeed, there is some evidence that the 'standard' response to decline in school systems may involve a strong tendency towards organisational rigidity and delay in the initial stages (Berger 1982b) followed by ad hoc, expedient crisis-management later, producing a number of adverse short-term and long-term effects on the educational climate and program (Berger 1982a, Boyd 1982, Crespo and Hache 1982). As Crespo and Haché propose:

The exclusion of long-term considerations in the formulation of strategies to deal with declining enrollments and the almost exclusive preoccupation with the short-term goals of solving the personnel, material, and financial problems associated with this phenomenon may be seen as a displacement of goals and resources from the primary area of student learning and achievement to that of maintaining system equilibrium under conditions of turbulence (Crespo and Haché 1982, p. 92).

Crespo and Haché's (1982) conclusions are based on a study of fifteen school districts in Quebec. They found that administrative roles and duties tended to be expanded as personnel were rehired, but tasks and functions still needed to be accomplished. As administrators accumulated more responsibilities, they tended to attend to the more urgent and expedient tasks and to neglect those associated with instruction and supervision of teaching. Moreover, the specialist roles that were eliminated, and the tasks that were redistributed, were often those related to the pedagogical or cur-
ricular functions of the system [while] functions observed to be of more critical importance in the short-term management of decline, like personnel or finance, usually remained untouched' (Crespo and Haché 1982, p. 90).

These developments not only weakened administrative support of the educational functions of schools, but the overload on administrators 'lowered the administrative responsiveness of the system' (Crespo and Haché 1982, p. 93). Furthermore, administrative overload compounded the problem of declining motivation, energy, and aspirations among tenured, ageing administrators faced with shrinking opportunities for promotion. The result, say Crespo and Haché, was a tendency toward minimal job performance oriented toward routine organisational maintenance rather than innovation and development.

Studies of decline also emphasise the adverse effects on teachers and on the school program (Boyd 1982). The negative effects on the teaching profession include the declining quality of persons entering the profession; the loss of young teachers leaving the profession; the shift of some teachers away from their major areas of competence largely for reasons of job security; the greater possibility of overload and 'burnout' in an ageing teaching force; and a general lowering of morale and job satisfaction. There are also serious implications in the erosion of the school curriculum and associated activities and services. Cut-backs usually come first in what are held to be the 'less essential' subjects and services, such as art, music, counsellors, and extra-curricular activities. Such cut-backs are not to be taken lightly since it has been demonstrated that these 'extras', apart from their intrinsic value, often play a critical role in creating a sense of school spirit, community, and student commitment to schooling (Garbarino 1981). Moreover, they are frequently vital in making schooling palatable for many students, and especially so for the more marginal students (Garbarino 1981). Finally, it is clear that children from less affluent families will suffer more from schooling cut-backs than those from more affluent families. Higher socio-economic status parents are both more able and more inclined than lower status parents to supplement their children's education and compensate for things unavailable or removed from the school's offerings.

Although some school systems have seized the opportunities that decline presents for organisational renewal and mission redefinition, these findings make clear the need for aggressive, far-sighted management of decline. Moreover, they suggest that state and federal authorities need to assist local school administrators by means of financial-aid policies designed to combat these negative tendencies.

Rethinking educational policy

The forces of decline have prompted far more than difficult cut-back decisions. Fundamental policy questions on public education are being subjected to searching re-examination. Changes in the social and economic environment of education have shifted the emphasis among competing values in government and educational policy.

During the period of rapid enrolment growth following World War II, a prime objective was often simply the equal and adequate provision of educational services to children. Just providing space in school for all the
children was frequently a challenge. Now, however, the emphasis is more on quality than quantity. Declining confidence in schooling, and declining enrolments and tight budgets, have created pressures for schooling that is both more effective and more efficient. Rather than focusing merely on the provision of equal educational opportunity (which too often has not been attained), there are now demands for something approximating equal, or at least equitable, educational results. At the same time, because resources are tight, schools need to be more efficient or effective.

If measures that are being adopted to make schools more effective and efficient are successful, this obviously will improve confidence in schooling. But the means being employed in a number of settings could further erode the legitimacy of administrative authority. What is at issue here is the perennial tension between centralisation and decentralisation in government. In pursuit of greater school effectiveness and more accountability and control over school performance, measures which increase standardisation and centralisation are attractive. Yet, the legitimacy and responsiveness of schools and administrators, as well as aspects of their effectiveness, seem to depend upon some degree of decentralisation permitting parental and teaching staff participation in shaping the educational program.

The difficulty, of course, is to achieve and maintain governmental arrangements and policies that strike a desirable balance between the advantages (and disadvantages) of centralisation and decentralisation. The comparison of trends in American and Australian education by Murphy (1980) is instructive here. Murphy notes that although the two nations are moving in opposite directions on the question of centralisation, they are both seeking a better balance between the strengths and weaknesses of centralisation and decentralisation:

Australia's centralized system fostered equality of school funding (more than in America), and professional, efficient, stable, coordinated operations that generally met uniform standards. But it also promoted a closed, insulated, inbred bureaucracy, and it stifled diversity, choice, and responsiveness — thus leading to some of the current pressures for decentralization. America's decentralized system fostered greater diversity, parental involvement, and openness. But it also promoted inequality, parochialism, fragmentation, and segregation, thus leading to some of the pressure for greater centralization. This pattern suggests that no solution is stable over time as long as competing values are at play — which seems even more likely in the future as the proliferation of educational actors and interests continues in both countries (Murphy 1980, pp. 24-5).

The competing values and tensions described above are demonstrated by the fact that there is reaction in both countries against the trends that are occurring. In the United States, centralising actions by state and federal authorities occurred first in the name of greater equality and then in efforts to increase accountability and school achievement. Local educators and, to a lesser extent, citizens have complained loudly about the infringement upon local control and the burdens these efforts have produced in terms of excessive regulations and paperwork. Some scholars add to this the criticism that attempts to 'legislate learning' go beyond our technical ca-
pacity to improve schooling and are likely to simply result in more undesirable bureaucratisation of schools (Wise 1979).

Similarly, there is resistance in Australia to decentralisation, more so in regard to increased involvement of citizens in policy making than to greater involvement of school-level professionals. The resistance, according to Murphy (1980), comes mainly from teacher unions and school administrators. The result so far, he reports, is that devolution has enhanced the influence of school-level administrators, but has barely increased the small voice of parents.

Another basic policy issue receiving attention in the context of decline is the relationship between public and non-public schools. Behind this issue, among other matters, are the questions of how much public spending for education is needed and what is the most efficient way to provide schooling. As enrolments have declined, the costs of schooling have nevertheless increased. This pattern, due largely to the combination of inflation and the labour-intensive character of schooling, seems illogical to the public. It raises anew the question of the optimum level of public spending for education. And, in the context of a sluggish economy, an ageing population, and declining confidence in schooling, this question in turn leads to a re-examination of the extent to which education is a public or a private good. If schooling is mainly a private benefit for children and their families (as many citizens may be inclined to think in the present context), then less public financial support of schools may seem appropriate. This line of thought suggests that public subsidies for privately supported schools would be the most logical and economical way to provide education. The danger here, of course, is that such subsidies may exacerbate existing inequalities.

Again, a comparison of Australia and America is interesting. While they differ dramatically in their policies towards non-public schools, the trend in both nations is consistent with the reasoning above, though more is involved in both settings. In both countries, public sector educators have long felt that government funds for private schools inevitably come at the expense of funds for government schools (e.g. Kitchen 1976). But in Australia, unlike the United States, government funding for private schools is a large, established pattern which in 1981 survived a test of its constitutionality. Begun modestly in 1952, with a law permitting small tax deductions for school fees, federal government aid to private schools in Australia evolved gradually into direct subsidies to private schools to help support their operating costs (Sherman 1982). This trend was not too controversial while the economy was strong, budgets were expanding, and support appeared to be concentrated on impoverished (mainly Catholic) schools. To the dismay of public educators in Australia, however, by the end of the 1970s the non-government school share of federal aid exceeded the government school share and was increasingly available to elite Establishment schools (Sherman 1982). Moreover, there was some perception that federal aid was helping non-government schools expand and increase their enrolments at a time when government schools were losing students. It was no coincidence therefore, that the legal challenge to the constitutionality of this arrangement was brought at this time, and that, 'for the first time in the history of the [Australian] Schools Commission,
the parent and teacher representatives on the Commission filed a minority report, dissenting from the Commission's recommendations on aid to the two school sectors (Sherman 1982, p. 17).

In the United States, where the tradition and law against government aid for non-government schools are stronger, countless efforts to obtain public dollars for non-government schools were defeated throughout the growth period of the 1950s and 1960s. With the onset of decline in the 1970s, however, sentiment in favour of private schools, and public support for them, has grown considerably. After two decades of emphasis on equality in educational policy, concerns for efficiency and liberty, or choice, have come to the forefront. With the growth of a neo-conservative mood among important segments of the population, what were formerly heretical notions have gained a new measure of respectability; in particular, there is a willingness to think anew about what governments and markets (i.e. the public and private sectors) each might best accomplish. In this climate of opinion, the formerly sacrosanct principles and assumptions undergirding the American public schools have been subjected to a searching and extensive critique.

What is new in this latest 'crisis' of American education is the increasing acceptance, particularly among the upper middle class, of the idea that the non-public schools are doing a better job than the public schools, and that there no longer may be any compelling civic reasons to continue to patronise and support the public schools. This viewpoint, popularised in support of policy proposals for tuition tax credits and educational voucher plans, has been bolstered by the publication of James S. Coleman's controversial study, Public and Private Schools (Coleman, Hoffer and Kilgore 1981). Since President Reagan is committed to pursue passage of tuition tax credits, there is the possibility of the adoption of policies that could transform or even dismantle public education. On the other hand, resistance to 'Reaganism' has been stiffening and already there is strong opposition to tuition credits from public educators and many citizens.

Rethinking policy implementation: can schools be changed?

In pursuit of schools that are more equitable, effective, efficient, and responsive, reform-minded educators, politicians, and citizens in the United States have increasingly sought to enact policies that will ensure achievement of these objectives. But the frustrating results of educational and other social reform efforts in the 1960s and early 1970s led to a new recognition of the magnitude of the policy design and implementation problems involved in changing social and organisational behaviour. This recognition gave rise to the policy and implementation analysis movement among scholars, which in many ways is a revitalised study of public administration in new clothes. This concern for careful policy and implementation analysis has been substantially reinforced by the tight budgets and pressures for efficiency produced by the forces of decline.

A great deal of ink has been spilled in attempts to interpret and explain the policy and implementation failures of the past two decades (see Mann 1978a, Elmore 1978). There are, however, three main explanations that capture much of the debate in this literature. In all three, there is a con-
vergence of political and organisational theory; in two, different versions of political economy are used to illuminate implementation problems. Each explanation has implications for the politics of curriculum reform and for what is required for effective schools. Each presents different recommendations regarding what is needed for successful reform. The three explanations will be briefly discussed in order of the increasing magnitude of the changes they recommend.

**Implementation as mutual adaptation**

In the past, the most crippling assumption of reformers was the notion that official adoption of reforms or innovations was tantamount to their implementation. Underlying this assumption was the belief that people usually can be rationally persuaded, or enticed, or compelled, to accept and enact innovations. Today we are sadder but wiser. In the most systematic study of federally supported innovation programs, researchers for the Rand Corporation found—from a survey of 293 innovative projects and a follow-up intensive case analysis of 29 of the projects—that non-implementation was common and that the most that could be hoped for was a process of mutual adaptation in which both the practices in a given school and the innovative project being attempted were modified by one another (Berman and McLaughlin 1976; see also Popkewitz, Whelage and Tabachnik 1982).

The fact that the prevailing practices and attitudes of educators at the school-site level usually dominate over the reform or innovation is explained in two ways in this school of thought. First, it is argued that the realities facing public employees who deliver services directly to clients tend to ensure that the objectives of reforms will be substantially compromised. Lipsky (1976) contends that such employees, whom he calls ‘street-level bureaucrats’, face work conditions where they must cope with: one, inadequate resources; two, threats to their authority and person; and three, ambiguous and unrealistic role expectations. The result, within the inherently discretionary nature of their work, is that street-level bureaucrats modify goals, ration services, routinise procedures, assert priorities, and limit and control their clientele. These coping behaviours, on the part of educators faced with the need to implement sweeping and highly specified reforms in special education, are vividly reported in Weatherley’s (1979) study of the experience in Massachusetts.

A second explanation for minimal implementation of reforms involves subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, resistance by educators. As Mann (1978b) demonstrates in his analysis of the Rand data, there is a partisan aspect to the mutual adaptation process. Like people in general, educators are inclined to minimise the personal costs of change by only partial or ‘symbolic’ implementation of innovations. Since numerous studies reveal that those involved in implementation are likely to compromise reforms, either for partisan reasons or because of the practical constraints within which they work, the shaping or making of policy actually continues through the implementation process (Elmore 1978, Lipsky 1976, Sloan 1982).

From their findings, the Rand researchers concluded that traditional approaches to educational innovation were inappropriate for the realities
of professional staff discretion in 'loosely coupled' educational organisations (Weick 1976). 'Bottom up' rather than 'top down' leadership and decision-making approaches appeared more likely to result in successful implementation of reforms. Those who must implement changes need to participate in selecting and planning innovations so that they will identify with, and feel 'ownership' over, the innovations.

If schools are to be reformed, it follows that policies and leadership strategies must be designed with these 'bottom up' realities in mind. Effective schools, in this view, are ones that foster the participation and adaptive abilities of school staff in school improvement (Hawley 1978). Indeed, in the context of decline, which minimises staff turnover and the infusion of new blood and ideas, school improvement can occur only by inducing or persuading the existing school staff to change its behaviour (Mann 1978b). The need to overcome possible staff resistance or 'partisan adaptation' by persuasion or manipulation (cf. Papagiannis, Klees and Bickel 1982) thus injects a pronounced political dimension into this approach. In addition, another political aspect of this approach lies in the recognition of the need to manage the tension that exists in authority relations between public educators and their clients. How are parents and taxpayers to fit into the pursuit of effective schools?

Although many observers argue that school improvement requires substantial parental involvement, the tension in authority relations makes parental participation in school affairs problematic unless it is confined to a minor and purely supportive role. Indeed, the 'street-level bureaucracy' theory suggests that what is needed is not parental participation in schools, but rather lobbying by citizens to ensure that educators are provided with adequate resources to accomplish their mission. Unfortunately, the theory leaves unclear just what would constitute adequate resources. When would street-level bureaucrats have 'enough' resources? For instance, what ratio of teachers to students would be sufficient to ensure effective schools?

**Implementation in non-profit organisations**

Even if 'bottom up' strategies of reform are attempted in public schools, and 'adequate' resources are provided, analysts using the perspective of non-conservative political economy predict that there will be goal displacement undercutting many innovations. Rather than merely supplying more resources and changing policy and leadership strategies, basic structural arrangements must be changed. The fundamental difficulty, they say, is that the non-profit, government-supported character of public schools creates a perverse structure of incentives for employees (Michaelsen 1977). In the quasi-monopolistic, consumer-insensitive setting of public schools, the reward structure is not oriented toward performance.

Analysis of public sector organisations from the point of view of political economy or 'public choice' theory emphasises the profound effects of two features of their structures. First, public managers lack property rights or a profit motive in the successful performance of the organisation. Second, the organisation receives a tax-supplied budget independent of satisfying individual consumers. From these starting points, one can explain much of the behaviour of public-school teachers and administrators which other-
wise might appear irrational or 'loosely coupled'. For instance, since there are no profits in public schools to motivate and reward managers (and teachers' salaries are based on seniority rather than performance), educators — as rational, self-interested persons seeking to maximise their own welfare — will be inclined to maximise their non-pecuniary benefits. This means that in place of profits (which would be dependent upon satisfied consumers), public educators will seek to maximise such things as the size of their budget, the scope of their activities, the ease of their work, and their power and prestige. On the other hand, they will try to minimise their psychic costs by avoiding risks and conflict as far as possible. In brief, the personal goals of employees in public schools will often take precedence over the official goals of the schools because the costs of inefficient behaviour, in terms of the official goals, are low. The discrepancy between personal and official goals that is accentuated by the reward structure in public sector organisations thus creates the basis for the distinctive 'bureaucratic politics' that characterise such organisations and their relationships with clients and sponsors (see Ostrom and Ostrom 1971, Michaelson 1977, Boyd and Crowson 1981).

Unfortunately, there is a good deal of evidence to support this line of analysis (e.g. Boyd 1978, Boyd and Crowson 1981). Usually, the costs of innovation for teachers and administrators seem to outweigh the benefits they stand to gain. Yet, public schools do adopt some innovations. However, as Pincus (1974, p. 119) suggests, 'private firms are more likely to adopt innovations that promote economic efficiency, whereas [public] schools are more likely to adopt innovations that promote bureaucratic and social stability'.

Brought into vogue by the new concern for efficiency and liberty fostered by decline, neo-conservative political economy cautions against simply 'throwing money at schools' (Hanushek 1981). Rather, structural arrangements must be changed to provide performance incentives. Effective schools, in this view, are ones that compete for students and funds and reward 'staff for outstanding performance. Thus, merit pay, tuition tax credits, and educational voucher plans are attractive policies. Without the fundamental kinds of change such policies would introduce, public schools will go on maintaining a status quo that largely benefits the employees within them.

**Implementation in capitalist societies**

From the point of view of radical political economists in the Marxist tradition, neither 'bottom up' strategies and additional resources nor performance incentives will lead to successful school reform. The overarching structures of capitalist societies, they contend, foster maintenance of the status quo, but in the interests of the capitalist system rather than self-serving school employees. As Papagiannis, Klees, and Bickel (1982) put it:

Public and private sector decisionmaking will yield substantial innovative effort, but directed primarily toward increasing capitalist wealth through developments in such areas as new weapon systems and toothpaste, planned obsolescence, and an emphasis on image, generally yielding greater unemployment and a deteriorating environment...
Radical analysis of educational innovations generally stresses the correspondence view that those innovations which basically conform to capitalist system interests (e.g., lower cost, increase cognitive skills, or reinforce attitudes useful to production) will be adopted and implemented, and those that challenge the structure, especially in terms of trying to promote greater equality, will not be. From this perspective it is no surprise that many equality promoting innovations are tried out as pilot projects and after the sponsoring agency leaves, the project is discontinued . Such projects contribute to an image of concern without the necessity of making any significant changes. Even when such an innovation is pursued seriously, like the comprehensive secondary school, the egalitarian dimensions of it are subverted as it becomes implemented with testing, teaching, and counseling systems that yield no improvement in equality, only greater administrative control (Papagiannis, Klees and Bickel 1982, pp. 262, 269).

In the radical view, capitalist arrangements make schools into instruments to reproduce the inegalitarian social stratification system. Schooling maintains inequality by fostering and reinforcing different skills and attitudes that divide people from one another. But because it does this in the name of meritocratic competition among students, the process seems just, thereby mainaining the system and its legitimacy. Both the overt and 'hidden' curriculum of schools are important in this process. Thus, the 'new sociology of education' movement focuses on the role of teachers and administrators in determining the selection, transmission, and evaluation of knowledge in schools. Social class biases, both overt and covert, are suspected of influencing 'what counts for knowledge' in such a way as to disadvantage working-class and lower-class children (Bates 1980, Karabel and Halsey 1977).

From this perspective, reforming public schools is far more difficult than the two previous explanations suggest. One is faced with a need to somehow alter the dynamics in schools that are connected to the workings of the overarching socio-economic system. At the macro level, one can engage in political action in support of socialist reforms. At the school level, one can seek and encourage contradictions in the capitalist system. Indeed, the analysis of Papagiannis, Klees, and Bickel (1982) suggests that effective schools would be ones that emphasise equality and contradict capitalist values. With a fundamentally different curriculum and approach, radicals would argue that such schools would provide settings in which reforms could be implemented that would serve the humanistic needs of children rather than the interests of employees or capitalism.

Conclusion

The fact that socialist nations also have well-known implementation problems (in meeting educational goals, five-year plans, and the like) suggests that radical political economists, like the proponents of other explanations, may not have the last word on this complex subject. Indeed, our earlier discussion of competing values makes clear that a heavy emphasis on one central value, such as equality, is sure to come at some cost in terms of
other key values such as liberty and efficiency. Such seems to be the case in socialist societies no less than in capitalist societies.

Whether in capitalist or socialist societies, or in conditions of growth or decline, administrators are faced with the need to understand and engage in policy and implementation analysis. The conditions of decline, however, increase the premium on efficient and effective analysis and management. In decline, the frequent need to redistribute existing or shrinking resources makes decision making more difficult and controversial. Retrenchment decisions are complicated by considerations of equity and entitlement; participation in decision making is intensified; the organisational environment is politicised; and morale in the organisation is likely to fall. To try to minimise conflict, administrators may be tempted to pursue across-the-board cuts and ad hoc political expediency. But the realities of decline are unforgiving; short-term expediency will exact a high price in the long run.

The central question in retrenchment is 'Who will bear the immediate and long-term burdens of cutbacks?'. Analysis and communication of the opportunity costs of not cutting back will help clarify the choices that need to be made and will assist in the creation of political support for these choices. A key difficulty of cutback management in education, however, is that economic and demographic trends have created a cleavage between the shrinking group of direct beneficiaries supporting government schools and the expanding group of taxpayers and senior citizens who favour reduced spending for schools. In this atmosphere, which has created a 'new politics' of education, both the quality of education in general and the interests of students with special needs could be jeopardised. For example, where minority and disadvantaged groups are now disproportionately represented in government school enrolments, it may be difficult to maintain the political support needed for the full provision of the services they need.

Whereas growth and prosperity often foster an emphasis on equality in the provision of educational services, decline and austerity usually shift the emphasis to efficiency of provision. Concerns for efficiency and effectiveness generally lead to pressures for greater accountability and centralisation of control over education. As part of this trend, there may be efforts to mandate highly specified reforms. As Wise (1979) has put it, there may be attempts to 'legislate learning', thereby increasing the bureaucratisation of the classroom. Yet, as Weatherley (1979) warns about the recent emphasis on implementation analysis, there is a danger that such approaches may be based on questionable assumptions. If one believes that the key problems impeding educational reform are basically administrative in nature, then reorganisation plans and highly specified directives seem called for. But Weatherley's conclusion — from the point of view of street-level bureaucrats trying valiantly to cope with inadequate staff and resources — is that much of the problem is political rather than administrative: basic reform is unlikely to occur because the public services are inadequately funded. This is the case, he argues, because the advantaged sectors of society prefer to overlook or provide only token or symbolic relief for inequalities, thereby perpetuating (whether intentionally or not) the social problems that beset disadvantaged, powerless groups.
Although adequate resources are not a sufficient condition for reform, it is reasonable to assume that at some minimum level they are a necessary condition. In a time of decline, however, it is certain that public resources will be in scarce supply. Fortunately, the one thing we can be certain of is change. Already there are forecasts of improved economic and enrollment trends in the near future. Still, even in more auspicious times in the future, the demographic shape of society will ensure more attention to the needs of senior citizens than in the past. As a result, educators will continue to face more competition for public funds than in the baby-boom years following World War II. Consequently, the lessons we have learned during the current period of decline will remain valuable. Careful policy and implementation analysis will help produce better informed priorities and choices for effective schools for all children.

Notes

1 At the same time that the demand for formal schooling is declining, there is an explosion of interest in computer and high technology training. There thus is a growth field in education, but one located mainly outside conventional elementary and secondary schools.

2 For more comprehensive discussions of the politics of education generally, see Harman 1974, 1979; Iannaccone and Cistone 1974; Peterson 1974; Wirt 1979; and Wirt and Kirst 1982.

3 As Lindblom (1977, p. 8) stresses,

The principal activities of government are heavily economic ... To Thomas Hobbes we owe some confusion on the relation of politics to economics. Since Leviathan, the study of politics has been largely the study of conflict and its resolution. But government is not merely or even primarily a conflict resolver. And when it does attend to conflict, it is not conflict, as Hobbes saw it, over land, wives, and cattle. It is conflict over the control of government itself, over the terms of man’s cooperation in government, and over the purposes of that cooperation. Government engages in vast economic tasks ... That is why there is so much to conflict about and such a great stake in the outcomes.

4 As Kaufman (1963, p. 96) puts it,

No change in organization, no modification of procedure can be instituted without affecting some political participant. Those participants who have established effective lines of access and therefore exercise considerable influence on decisions that impinge on them almost invariably rise to the defense of the status quo. Those who feel excluded or ineffectual strive for revisions that will magnify their influence. If they have electoral strength, they extol the virtues of the ballot. If they are professional or technical specialists, they decry the interference of politicians. Structure and process become implements of political strategy as well as ends in themselves.

5 For example, politicians are inclined to try to alter or ‘gerrymander’ election district boundaries to give their party a political advantage in future elections.
For a more complete discussion of this topic than is possible here, see Behn 1980b, Boyd 1982, Zerchykov 1981, and Zerchykov and Weaver 1983.

Murphy (1980, pp. 9–10) reports that, 'Nongovernment schools, serving 21 percent of Australia's students (11 percent in America), receive about 35 per cent of their operating costs in direct grants from the federal government'. For a review of the details of Australian government support of private education, with implications for the United States, see Sherman 1982.

References


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Readings
Leadership for cut-back management: the use of corporate strategy

R. Behn

For the manager of a governmental agency faced with a real and severe cutback in resources, nothing is more central to the exercise of leadership than the definition and articulation of a new "corporate strategy" for that agency. What, now, are to be the principal purposes of the agency? With what policies and programs should it pursue these new purposes? How can the resources it has, and can expect to have in the future, be best mobilized and organized to achieve these purposes? Answering these questions in a coherent and realistic manner—and explaining the answers to employees, legislators, constituents, and the public—is essential for the public manager who seeks to lead an agency through a series of cutbacks and to emerge with a functioning, energetic and effective organization.

"Corporate Strategy" for Public Organizations

The Concept of Corporate Strategy, to borrow the title of Kenneth R. Andrews' clear discussion of the subject, entails more than is usually implied by the word "strategy"—more than the selection of means to achieve ends. It also includes the definition of these ends. For, clearly, the development of a strategic plan for an organization requires not only the examination of alternatives, but also the examination of the purposes for which these alternatives might be used. To develop a corporate strategy requires an analysis of the resources that the organization can obtain to achieve its objectives. But what objectives it can realistically expect to achieve depends, in turn, upon what resources it can mobilize for the different objectives. And yet, the resources that it can mobilize may depend upon which of the many possible objectives it selects to pursue, as well as upon how it selects to pursue them. Thus, the analysis of corporate strategy requires a series of iterations—from purposes, to plans, to resources, to purposes.—until all three mesh into a coherent whole.

Indeed, the definition of purpose requires analysis. As
Henry S. Rowen has emphasized, the role of policy analysis in governmental decision making is to help develop, clarify, and evaluate not only policy alternatives but also purposes—to “help in the construction of value preferences. . . . [since such value] preferences are generally built through experience, and through learning about facts, about relationships, and about consequences.” Thus, the design of a “corporate strategy” for a governmental agency involves the selection of both purposes and plans.

As the phrase “corporate strategy” itself implies, the concept was developed for application to business firms. But, notes Andrews, managers “of civilian and military agencies of our own and foreign governments and the managers of hospitals, foundations, universities, and other non-profit organizations” have found the concept helpful. “Deciding what an organization should do and getting it done are the universal functions of an organization leader, in business or out.” Thus, only a minor paraphrasing is required to adapt Andrews’ definition to the public sector—to define “corporate strategy” for government agencies or, if you prefer, “organizational strategy” or “agency strategy”:

Corporate strategy is the pattern of major objectives, purposes, or goals and essential policies, programs and plans for achieving those goals, stated in such a way as to define what business the organization is in or is to be in and the kind of organization it is or is to be.

Not an overwhelming concept, perhaps. But, nevertheless, an important one. For if the public manager can establish a clear corporate strategy for his agency, he has created a basis for allocating resources, evaluating performance, resolving conflicts, recruiting support, justifying decisions to legislators, explaining his agency to the public, and performing a wide variety of other managerial chores.

Even entire governments can have corporate strategies, though they will necessarily be more general and sweeping than those for particular agencies or departments. For example, one could say that the corporate strategy for New York City was, in 1970, as follows:

The City of New York seems to be an international center of commerce, industry and finance, a major mecca for the arts and tourism, an enjoyable and exciting place to live, AND a city in which the nation’s poor can find economic security and advancement. It does this by providing basic municipal services for its residents, workers and visitors including: police; fire; sanitation; public hospitals; elementary, secondary and college education; streets, water, sewers and other public works; and a wide variety of welfare and social services. (It delegates to various independent agencies responsibility for the port, airports, and major bridges and parkways.) It finances the programs with a range of local real
The purposes outlined in this corporate strategy were not, however, matched by the resources. New York City simply did not have enough revenue to do all these things. In an attempt to circumvent this difficulty, the city borrowed to cover its operating expenses—issuing tax anticipation notes on outstanding but uncollectable taxes and when these notes came due issuing still more. When this "great ponzi game," as Martin Schefter called it, collapsed, the city was forced to default on its debts. Without the resources to do all the things it wanted, it was forced to cut back.

An alternative interpretation is that the managers of the city—the mayor, borough presidents and city council members—were not willing to impose the taxes necessary to obtain those resources. They saw a contradiction between the objective of being an international business center and the objective of providing social services to the indigent. But whatever the interpretation, the managers of the city did not, in 1970, have an internally consistent corporate strategy for the city, and the inconsistency was large enough to produce financial disaster.

The new managers of the city—the officials of the Municipal Assistance Corporation, the Emergency Financial Control Board, and the state and federal governments—and, of course, have a new corporate strategy for the city. It involved less of everything—including less employees—but most significantly it included less of the social services designed for the poor. And because returning the city to fiscal health required loans from these new, unelected managers, they were able to impose their new, limited corporate strategy upon the elected officials of the city. In trade for the funds necessary to operate even the new slimmed-down New York, these new managers, who did not trust the elected leaders not to continue to pursue larger purposes, imposed restrictions: receipts from the stock-transfer, sales and real estate taxes were earmarked for debt service, thus voiding the ability of the city's elected leaders to allocate these revenues until the cumulative deficit was eliminated, the city's budget in balance, and these loans (to cover operating expenses) no longer needed.

The problem was not that the purposes implicit in New York City's 1970 corporate strategy were too expansive, too ambiguous. The corporate strategy of an agency, department or municipal government can easily be expansive and ambiguous provided that the resources are available to achieve the purposes. New York City's problem was that the resources were not there, and the elected leaders of the
city were unable or unwilling to obtain them. It is the imbalance between the purposes outlined in an organization's corporate strategy and the resources it can mobilize to achieve them that forces retrenchment.

**When Saving the Organization Requires Retrenchment**

The manager of an organization faced with declining resources can do one of two things: eliminate the organization completely; or cut it back. Termination, I have concluded, is the easier task; it requires only that the organization be destroyed. In contrast, retrenchment involves turning the organization into one that is smaller, doing less, consuming fewer resources, but still doing something and doing it well. That is the real managerial challenge—not merely to make the organization smaller but to ensure that while it shrinks it remains functional and effective. And this is even more difficult if the manager also wishes to emerge from the period of retrenchment as an effective leader of the organization.

In his discussion of organizational response to budget decreases, Andrew Glassberg defines three types of leadership styles for handling retrenchment:

1. The "cut-the-fat tough guy . . . attempts to secure organizational survival by drastically paring overhead and holding down labor costs by a combative style in labor relations."

2. The "revitalizing entrepreneur . . . attempts to redirect that organization into a narrower scope of activity in the hope of re-creating an equilibrium between resources and costs."

3. The "receiver in bankruptcy" lacks any "concern for organizational maintenance . . . but, rather, enhances his own status by the smoothness with which he conducts the winding-down process."

Only the "revitalizing entrepreneur" needs to develop a new corporate strategy to do his job.

The "receiver in bankruptcy," or what in the business world would be called a "hatchet man," is of little interest here; his job is strictly to destroy the organization (and, perhaps, to salvage what components can be used elsewhere). The "cut-the-fat tough guy" is, of course, attempting to rescue the organization by making it smaller, but his style is most appropriate when the cuts are marginal—when the necessary retrenchment can be achieved merely by eliminating the "fat" (however that might be defined). It would, of course, be nice if retrench-
ment could be managed by merely cutting the fat. And advocates of budgetary reductions can argue that this is all that is required. Rep. Delbert L. Latta, ranking Republican on the House Budget Committee, recently observed: "If I were president, I'd cut back spending without cutting back services." Wonderful—if it can be done.

In many situations, however, such a miracle is not possible. The budgetary crisis is serious. Real retrenchment is necessary. For whatever reasons (tax cuts; shifting priorities; constant funding combined with inflation), resources are declining significantly so that the agency cannot be saved simply by drawing upon whatever organizational slack is available. Severe budgetary cut-backs are required and cannot be achieved merely by eliminating the fat and holding the line on salary increases. Saving the organization requires retrenchment.

This essay is dedicated to the public manager who, faced with a serious decline in real resources, desires to lead his organization through the decline. That manager needs a basis for getting his organization to accept the discipline necessary to make it through the retrenchment. An explicit corporate strategy provides the basis for that discipline.

**Establishing the Need for Retrenchment**

Before a new corporate strategy can be developed, articulated and accepted, however, the agency's attentive public must be convinced that retrenchment is really required. This is no easy chore. Most people will not believe cutbacks are necessary. We have lived with growth for too long. We have little experience with contraction, and our psychological defense will all work to convince us that, if we are only clever enough, retrenchment can be avoided (at least by us, if not by everyone else).

Even an initial decline in resources will not alter this attitude. People will not believe the decline is permanent. At the beginning stages of retrenchment, everyone will believe that the cuts will be restored in a year or two. Charles H. Levine calls this "The Tooth Fairy Syndrome"—the belief that someone, perhaps someone as imaginary as the tooth fairy, will appear mysteriously at night to remove the painful tooth of budgetary cutbacks from under the pillow and replace it with enough new, shiny quarters to fund an entire mouthful of new programs. (Psychologists call it "cognitive dissonance."

In this political environment, it is in the interest of few leaders to accept the reality of retrenchment, let alone to state that reality publicly. The messenger who attempts to explain that a long-term decline is beginning may be first ridiculed and then shot. The elected leader who reports that
resources will no longer continue to grow and that cutbacks must be made may be voted out of office. The appointed administrator who disrupts his agency with similar news may lose the support of his staff, his effectiveness as an organizational leader, the confidence of his superiors, and finally his position.

To avoid reality, the initial discrepancy between plans and resources can easily be met (if not with the "creative financing" technique of floating bonds to pay for operating expenses) with across-the-board cuts and deferred maintenance. If the problem is, as everyone wants to believe, only temporary, no new corporate strategy is needed. The obvious solution is to share the pain: If the organization loses X percent of its budget, every single component and subcomponent should be required to make an identical X percent sacrifice. And deferring repairs or preventive maintenance for a few years will produce neither short-term hardships nor long-term deterioration. Such an approach is indeed suited to a temporary or minor decline.

It is not at all appropriate, however, when the decline in resources is large and permanent, or equally important to its most central mission. Yet cutting-back any component beyond a certain point—beyond the point where organizational slack can be used to absorb the cuts without reducing output significantly—a budgetary cutback of Y percent will reduce production by more than Y percent. And deferring maintenance will only exacerbate the organization's problems in a few years when the cumulative decline in resources has become truly significant. Thus, the public manager who wishes to manage the retrenchment so as to maintain as productive an organization as possible will want to avoid short-run expediencies and target the cuts.

If he cannot do so, he will lose managerial control. For those measures that are most effective for mitigating small, temporary reductions in resources will only intensify the problems of a significant and permanent decline. The cumulative impact of repeated across-the-board cuts and deferred maintenance become, eventually, so severe as to destroy the organization's physical plant and programmatic vitality, and with them the authority of the organization's leader. Or, if all cuts have been avoided through some financial manipulations, those who are supplying the excess revenues will eventually refuse to continue to do so without, what must now be, major cuts. Unable to make targeted cuts himself, the public manager finds that the necessary budgetary discipline is imposed upon his agency from the outside.

Thus, there are two stages of retrenchment. During the first, the small declines in resources combine with the inability (or willingness) to recognize the long-run trends to
produce short-run solutions: across-the-board cuts and deferred maintenance. Eventually, however, reality is forced upon the organization—either by its leaders who explain it, or by outsiders who place strict conditions upon their continued support. Only once the organization is in this second stage, can the serious business of managing the decline begin. And it is in the interest of the manager (or, at least, in the interest of the manager who plans to stay with the organization over the long-term) to get past the first stage as quickly as possible. The organization’s leader needs to establish on his terms—not only the terms of the bankers—how the reality of declining resources is understood.

Educating the public is an essential element of leadership for cutback management. Before the public manager can act, he must both recognize the impending decline and convince others of this reality. Yet even the initial decline in resources will not, in itself, be sufficient to alter well-established attitudes. The first change in the pattern of growth will be only small and thus easily dismissed as a temporary aberration. To see that major cutbacks are inevitable, the manager must analyze the underlying trends. He must understand the ultimate source of his organization’s resources and examine whether these sources are expanding or contracting. Is the city’s tax base eroding? Has the bureau lost key legislative support? Has the agency’s once glamorous mission become tarnished? Will the college’s competitive position be undermined by overall enrollment declines? Is the department to be more severely affected by overall budgetary contractions? Preparing for cutback management requires analysis: uncovering, recognizing and understanding the fundamental shifts in demographic patterns, economic behavior, social attitudes, or political power that will, sometime in the future, force retrenchment.

Then comes the first requirement of organizational leadership for cutback management: to explain to the organization’s members and constituents—in an unequivocal way—that resources are declining and that major cuts are essential. This does not mean a single statement, but a continuing series of reports, speeches, fact sheets and briefings. Explaining the reality of retrenchment is an intellectual exercise, but accepting the reality of retrenchment is a psychological chore. The manager cannot just give people the facts, for they will initially reject them. The assumptions will be challenged and the dynamics by which the organization obtains its resources will not be understood. Thus the manager must flood people with the facts until they cannot escape.

Cutback management creates conflict—serious acrimonious conflict. The public manager cannot lead his organiza-
On through a major retrenchment without the cooperation of at least some major components of the organization. And that cooperation will never be forthcoming until the reality and inevitability of the decline is clear. Leadership for cutback management requires convincing the members of the agency to accept that unpleasant reality.

The Opportunity Cost of NOT Cutting-Back

Most public policy decisions are made without adequate attention to the opportunity cost of the proposal—with little regard to the alternative uses for the resources to be consumed by the plan. The primary question is whether or not the proposal is a good idea. There may be some discussion, and indeed disagreement, over how much money should be spent out-of-pocket on the proposal; but few people explicitly point out the opportunity cost of the alternative uses to which the resources could be put, either by individuals, corporations or other governmental agencies.14

This precedent for focusing on the obvious, direct costs and ignoring the indirect opportunity costs will be followed when debating proposals for retrenchment. Every cut will hurt someone, and such costs will be quite evident and easily dramatized. Someone will lose an existing benefit or job, and we will all be sympathetic with that loss.15 Closing a school will inconvenience students, teachers, staff and parents—and will cost some people their jobs. Reducing the hours that a welfare office or motor vehicle inspection station is open will hurt others (including those who learned to count on the overtime). To mobilize a political coalition to protest such cutbacks one need only draw upon the passions of those who will pay the direct costs and the sympathy of the general public.

Unfortunately, the opportunity cost of not closing the school or not reducing the hours of operation are not so obvious. To what purpose will the resources saved by closing the school or reducing the hours be put? Someone will benefit from any cutback, be it an agency that gains increased funds, a department that is not forced to close one of its facilities, or the taxpayers who will have a little more cash to spend. But do these people know how they will benefit from the cutbacks? Do they know that they will pay the cost of not cutting back? No—not unless someone tells them. That is another responsibility of the public manager attempting to lead an organization through retrenchment. Leadership involves explaining the opportunity cost of not cutting back.15

For this endeavor, a new corporate strategy can prove invaluable. An explicit statement of purposes, plans and resources will, of course, reveal what part of the organization
will suffer the greatest cutbacks as the organization contracts to match its lower level of resources. But the new corporate strategy will also make it clear what organizational components will benefit—not from the retrenchment, of course, for that will impose some costs on everybody, but from the ability to sustain their operations at levels above those that would result from across-the-board cuts. Those individuals and groups that are most essential to carrying out the new, slimmed-down organizational mission are the beneficiaries of the new, corporate strategy. They will—if they understand their stake—be quite supportive of the organization's cutback managers.

As soon as the manager announces a series of cutbacks, there will be a struggle for the support of those organizational components not affected—directly—by these cuts. Those who have been targeted for major reductions will argue to those who are untouched: “You’re next. The time to stop retrenchment is now, at the beginning.” The organization’s leaders, if they have previously established the necessity of cutting somewhere, can reply: “If not them, you. Some cuts have to be made.” The debate will not be pretty or elegant. The organization’s leaders will have to be constantly explaining the purposes of the cutbacks—the reality of retrenchment and the hopes for a revitalized, if smaller, organization—and the opportunity costs of not making the cuts.

In a recent retrenchment battle with Newark’s police department, Mayor Kenneth A. Gibson was quite effective in dramatizing the opportunity cost of not making the cuts he proposed. In late 1978, constrained by a state-imposed cap on municipal spending and faced with a loss of $10 million in federal counter-cyclical assistance, the mayor announced the layoff of 441 city employees including 200 of the city’s 1,100 policemen. The City Council passed an ordinance mandating a police force of 1,200 officers. Gibson vetoed the proposal and was able to prevent an override by the City Council by threatening to lay off 775 other city employees if forced to obtain the funds necessary to hire the additional 300 police officers. The opportunity cost of not laying off the policemen was quite clear to those 775 other employees.

Cutback management, like any other activity of government, is a political endeavor. It requires the mobilization of a political coalition to support the proposed actions. To create an alliance of individuals and groups that actively favors retrenchment—or, at least, the particular proposal for achieving that unpleasant reality—the public manager needs to articulate a new corporate strategy in a manner that makes the opportunity cost of not adopting it very obvious. (This undertaking will not succeed, however,
without a prior campaign to educate the organization to the impossibility of avoiding retrenchment. There is no opportunity cost to rejecting the cutbacks if resources are not really declining.) Defining a new corporate strategy provides the basis for building a coalition that, although unhappy about the reality of declining resources, understands its stake in redefining the purposes and plans of the organization so as to match the new, lower level of resources.

The Long-Term Perspective of Corporate Strategy

Not every organization has a coherent corporate strategy. And during a period of growth, the absence of any clear understanding of purposes, plans, and resources may not threaten the survival of the organization—at least not immediately. Resources are growing. There is no need to deny support to anyone—to force anyone to cut back—and each year's increment of additional resources can be allocated to a variety of undertakings. Some things will work and some things will not, but next year there will be an additional increment of resources which can be used to expand those activities that proved worthwhile without having to eliminate the ones that failed.

Many universities grew that way during the 1960s, adding a research center here and an extension program there without any thought about their relationship to each other or to the whole. Higher education was booming and everyone wanted to be a multi-versity (at least at the regional level), which meant having as many different departments and degree programs as possible. Growing without any overall design, the university became a collection of disconnected parts, sharing only the common assumption that the growth would always continue. But such a "corporate strategy"—which evolved without any thought to the resource constraints and which might be best called "let a thousand flowers bloom"—proved disastrous when the growth stopped. That is when the choices—and the trade-offs—became much more difficult: what parts of the university should continue to grow; what should be cut back; what should be eliminated, and what should be retained? To answer such questions intelligently requires some comprehensive statement about the nature of the university—its purposes, plans, and resources.

Without growth, an organization's leaders cannot afford to "let a thousand flowers bloom." In an era of decline, there are shortages of all the key resources: good soil, water, fertilizer, and even sunlight. The organization's leaders now must consciously decide what to plant, cultivate and nourish. They must also decide what to plow under. Growth can be managed on an ad hoc basis; re-
trenchment cannot. During retrenchment, ad hoc decision making, which is responsive only to crises and pressures, not any overall plan, is dangerous. If the organization's leaders cannot control the retrenchment, the organization will get caught in a self-reinforcing, downward spiral of declining resources and capabilities. An initial decrease in resources forces a first round of programmatic cutbacks; these, in turn, discourage the organization's most talented and productive members who, also being the most mobile, leave; this hurts the organization's productivity and makes it more difficult for the organization to attract resources; the subsequent decrease forces a second round of cutbacks. And so "the vicious circle" that Richard M. Cyert calls "a characteristic of a contracting organization" continues. "The trick of managing the contracting organization," concludes Cyert, "is to break the vicious circle which tends to lead to disintegration." To do this, he argues, the organization's leaders need to define "an equilibrium position at a smaller size," and plan how to get (and stop) there."

To do that, it is necessary to develop a new corporate strategy that defines what the organization will look like at the new equilibrium, what it will be doing, and how it will be doing it. It specifies the organization's purposes, plans, programs, size and resources. It fixes the future balance between resources and programs—how the programs will employ those resources and, in turn, how the resources will be generated by the programs. And the corporate strategy describes how to reach this new equilibrium position.

As resources decline, it is essential that the organization's leaders and members know where they are going and how they will get there. They need to predict where the decline in resources will level off. Or, more realistically, they need to decide and predict at what point they can, with the right strategy, halt the decline and obtain their new equilibrium. For clearly, what the organization does—what purposes and plans it adopts—will influence how far and how fast resources will drop. Thus, the new corporate strategy must evolve from an iterative analysis; this series of comparisons between the resources required to operate proposed programs and a realistic prediction of what resources those programs will generate continues until the two are in balance.

All this cannot be achieved without much debate and disagreement—for retrenchment is not an agreeable undertaking. But once a new corporate strategy is established, it provides the criteria by which cuts can be made. It provides new definitions of success (that no longer are based on growth) and creates new incentives. It provides the means by which the organization's leaders can develop new mea-
sures of performance. It provides the basis for attracting new constituencies and retaining old ones. It provides a framework for creating new organizational arrangements. And, most importantly, the new corporate strategy provides the long-term perspective that is necessary to lead the organization through the decline.

Corporate Strategy and Organizational Morale

Retrenchment invariably erodes an organization’s morale. Not only does the impending decline destroy the assumption of growth upon which individual expectations have been based, but it also threatens each member’s faith in his own personal worth—in the value of his contribution to the organization—and his sense of personal control over his future. If the organization is threatened, its members feel threatened too. Thus, if the organization is to survive and again, someday, prosper, its members must do so too.

“The loss of the capacity to affect oneself or one’s world is probably the single most threatening experience of the contemporary industrial world,” writes Harry Levinson; “the experience of loss drains the energies of people as they fight depression and causes them to lose their positive motivation.” Clearly, the imminence of retrenchment will create that uncertainty, for suddenly an organization with which the individual has closely identified himself and his future is being forced to reverse itself from growth to decline. And if the organization cannot control its own destiny, how can the individual.

Further, organizational retrenchment will create what Levinson calls “the loss of organizational idea.” Cutting back on the scale of the organization necessitates cutting back on the organization’s purposes. It can no longer strive to achieve everything that it once did, and that raises questions about what purposes it should still strive to achieve. It may be psychologically painful to make a conscious and public decision to discard certain of the organization’s purposes (to say nothing of the political problems of doing so), but unless clear signals are given to indicate what purposes will be retained (and thus, implicitly, what purposes will be dropped), all the members of the organization will continue to doubt the value of their contribution.

Moreover, retrenchment requires sacrifice. And, writes Levinson, “Only a sense of purpose makes a sacrifice worthwhile.” Levinson distinguishes between goals and purposes—“goals are subsidiary to purposes”—and emphasizes: “When there are no purposes, people can’t be ‘for’ anything.” Thus the organization’s leaders need to be able to explain what it is that they and the organization’s
members are working "for" while they are retrenching.

Of course, the organization may never have adopted an explicit and widely-accepted corporate strategy before. Such a void just left individuals and groups to define their own purposes. Yet, whatever those purposes were, they are now threatened by retrenchment. The "loss of organizational ideal" may only be the loss of each individual's own perception of that ideal, but it is still a loss. So again, even if the organization has survived during growth without a clear corporate strategy, it needs one for retrenchment.

An explicit corporate strategy can provide a sense that the organization is at least partially controlling its own destiny (if within the constraints that are forcing retrenchment). It can provide a new, if more modest, "organizational ideal," so that the members understand the meaning of their personal contribution. It can give the organization's members an understanding of what the organization (and thus they) are "for," and hence establish a standard from which calls for sacrifices are made. The new corporate strategy will not satisfy those who are committed to purposes that have now been dropped. But it can provide the basis for renewing the dedication of those who are retained and for recruiting new members whose skills better fit the new "organizational ideal."

Leadership and Retrenchment

Cutback management requires leadership. Three characteristics of retrenchment demand that the organization's managers exercise active leadership:

(1) Deadlines exist for bringing the budget into balance. These deadlines are not necessarily defined by specific days—though it may be in the manager's interest to present them as such—since most organizations can usually operate at a deficit for at least a short period of time. But, at some point, the budget must be balanced or authority is lost to those who can do so.

(2) The conflicts that exist over the allocation of resources cannot be resolved without creating some losers. As real resources decline, some people will have to be denied previously existing benefits or jobs. The decline in resources makes it impossible to create "win-win" solutions in which those who lose the primary battle can be bought-off with side payments on secondary issues.

(3) The issue of how, where and when the cuts are to be made is directly important to all the members of the organization. Much of the time, most of the issues confronting an organization are of low salience to
most of its members. Whatever decision is made, they will be hardly affected. Thus, they do not become involved. Not so for retrenchment. Everyone is threatened; so the decisions to be made are of immediate, personal interest to everyone.

These characteristics of retrenchment negate the effectiveness of the traditional, unobtrusive style of organizational leadership. The unobtrusive leader is adept at getting his ideas and plans accepted by focusing on small, apparently "minor" actions that can be adopted and implemented quietly. Meanwhile, more public channels are employed to grapple with—eternally, if necessary—the numerous problems, issues, proposals and complaints forced onto the organization's agenda by its own members and by outside forces. Such conflicts can often be dissipated through the standard tactics of purposeful procrastination: committees, commissions, debates, studies, reports, meetings, and the inevitable demands to broaden the question to include other, dubiously related issues. The standard vagaries of organizational processes combine with the inevitable change in environmental forces to grind many issues down to the point where few people understand or care.

Such is not the case for the problems forced upon the organization by a significant decline in resources. Choices must be made. All of the alternatives have unpleasant outcomes for some parts of the organization. Everyone will have a direct, personal stake in each alternative and will understand that stake. For issues of retrenchment, leaving the organization alone to cope with the problem will not lessen the conflict but intensify it.

The manager can, of course, appoint the traditional study panel and can even delegate to it the responsibility for making the necessary cuts. But this course is dangerous: the committee might recommend cuts which conflict with the manager's corporate strategy; or it might, in an effort to resolve its own internal conflicts, decide that it is most convenient to reject the premise that the cuts are necessary. Moreover, in the end, the manager will have to ratify or reject the proposal of the committee; at that point they become his cuts and he is the target for all the complaints. It is difficult to appeal to a committee or picket their dispersed offices. Protests are most effective when directed at an individual, and thus the manager will remain at the center of the dispute.

Consequently, because of the unusual situation created by declining resources, the manager's style of leadership must be active and intrusive. It can still be subtle, but it must nevertheless bring the key issues to a tolerable resolution without interminable delays. The leader must work
out agreements that impose significant costs upon some without destroying the entire organization.

At this point, the appeal of making across-the-board cuts again emerges. There is a superficial equity to such an approach; everyone will "share the burden" of retrenchment. And it is easy to rationalize that it is best to avoid weakening the organization by circumventing the conflicts that will follow any effort to target the cuts. But unless an X percent decrease in the budget is realized by forcing everyone to take an X percent cut in salary, receive X percent fewer benefits, make X percent fewer phone calls, and purchase X percent fewer materials and supplies, there will be no true sharing of the burden. Why is it more equitable to lay off three people each from 10 departments than to lay off the entire 30 members of one department?

Moreover, although across-the-board cuts might minimize short-term organizational conflict, it may impair long-term organizational effectiveness. Why should each component of the organization be responsible for an equal percentage of the cuts? Why is the existing base, which is the result of a variety of historical pressures, decisions and needs, the one from which current equity calculations should be made? Does each component contribute equally to the organization's overall purpose? Will each component be as important in the future? Is it really better to cripple all components, or to eliminate some so that others might flourish?

A common tactic of unobtrusive leadership is to dispense credit liberally to various individuals and groups. The leader, confident of his own status and concerned most about the substance of decisions and actions, is more than willing to reward others with public recognition for their work or ideas. In trade, the leader gains acceptance and cooperation for his major plans. For making budgetary cutbacks, however, there exists no social approbation. There is no credit to be given, only responsibility to be avoided. Thus, in the case of cutback management, the organization's leaders may be more than happy to accept the heat for making the nasty choices in trade for the grudging acceptance by those who escape the most severe cuts. Everyone will still complain, of course, the acceptance will not be quiet. But the organization's managers will need to recognize and cope calmly with the pro forma complaints raised by the heads of various organizational sub-units as they act out the ritual in which a leader sticks up for his people. Being able to take the, quite predictable, heat is a necessary part of cutback management.

For example, that tactic is quite central to the program of the Department of Defense for closing military bases. Representatives and senators automatically issue press re-
leases and give speeches denouncing the Pentagon whenever a base in their district is targeted for closure. But, unlike so many other agencies that quickly retreat from any cutbacks as soon as they are attacked by a few members of Congress, DoD is not deterred. "The Department of Defense has been willing to stand up and take its political licks," observed one civilian in the office of the Secretary of Defense. This willingness to accept the responsibility for making the decision to close military bases (which, in turn, is derived from a long-term perspective that indicates such actions are essential) is a major factor in the success of the Pentagon's base closing program.

To ensure that the inevitable heat is ritualistic rather than antagonistic, the public manager must educate the leaders of the essential parts of the organization. The cutback decisions must, somehow, be accepted by a controlling coalition within the organization. It must not impose unacceptable losses upon individuals or groups who are willing and able to bring the entire organization down with them. In designing the organization's new corporate strategy, the managers must take into account not only the products and productivity of the units and functions they wish to maintain, but also the potential for political destruction possessed by those who they mark for the most severe cutbacks.

Thus, a new corporate strategy cannot be dictated from the top. It must evolve from the growing realization that resources are declining. To establish the legitimacy of a new definition of organizational mission, the leadership must be subtle but active—continually prodding the organization into a recognition of the realities of retrenchment and, an acceptance of more modest expectations. The new corporate strategy cannot be the product of a formal procedure or vote in which individuals and groups publicly state that they favor the new, limited purposes and the cutbacks they imply, for it is in no one's interest to make such a public declaration. Rather, the new corporate strategy must emerge from a gradual process of discussion and acquiescence.

Retrenchment necessarily centralizes decision making. For a growing organization, decentralization may be satisfactory; the central responsibility for resource allocation can be adequately discharged by simply licensing requests for new endeavors, discriminating between proposals only when necessary to maintain some sense of equity between the growth of various components. For retrenchment, however, allocating resources involves cuts, and the various organizational components cannot be expected to volunteer them. A central decision-making authority must both develop the alternatives and choose between them. It would
be a very unusual organization indeed that generated through a decentralized process enough proposals for self-imposed cutbacks to match a significant decline in resources.

Yet, even if the top manager is the only choice for making the decisions, that does not mean that those decisions will be accepted. Thus, retrenchment necessitates not only centralized decision making but also centralized leadership. Before the decisions are made, the organization's leaders need to create the environment in which these decisions can be accepted. Leadership for cutback management involves establishing the inevitability of resource decline, dramatizing the opportunity costs of not cutting back, and creating a new corporate strategy to match the new realities so as to make acceptance of retrenchment possible.

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**Notes**

4. Andrews' own definition of corporate strategy appears on p. 28. I know of no explicit definition or discussion of public sector organizational strategy though I do know of two courses in public management, taught at graduate schools of public policy, that emphasize this concept.
6. Shelter, ibid., writes: "Retrenchment often occurs at the expense of democracy" (p. 101), "shifting the balance of power to the owners of the public debt" (p. 99). The New York financial crisis enabled the banks owning the city's debt to insist that municipal expenditures be drastically reduced as part of a bailout plan" (p. 102).


14. This phenomenon is what I call the "entitlement ethic": the general acceptance by the public that once an individual or group has begun to receive benefits from the government they are "entitled" to continue to receive them. See Robert D. Belb and Kim Sperduto, "Medical Schools and the Entitlement Ethic," *The Public Interest*, No. 57 (Fall 1979), pp. 48-68.


19. *ibid.*, p. 82.


21. *ibid.*, p. 82.

22. I use the adjective "traditional" here not to describe the conventional perception of leadership—which my colleague Willis D. Hawley calls the "Vince Lombardi model of leadership"—but to describe how it is usually practiced. For a discussion of such "unobtrusive management" see Michael D. Cohen and James G. March, *Leadership and Ambiguity*. *The American College President* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974), pp. 212-214.
23. "Purposeful procrastination" -- James Boren (the author of "When in Doubt, Mumble") would love that phrase.

24. For a discussion of the leadership tactic of exchanging status for substance see "When and March, op. cit., pp. 208-209.


School administrators besieged: a look at Australian and American education

J. T. Murphy

What one thinks depends in part on where one starts. In Australia, many state-level educators are feeling besieged—and that’s bad. Politicians are getting too involved in administrative matters. Parents are challenging professional prerogatives. Militant teachers want autonomy but not responsibility. The federal government is meddling with state priorities. Taxpayers want more education for fewer dollars. In this view, the good old days of unchallenged professional leadership are over, and rough days lie ahead. In fact, the good old days may be over, but if America is the wave of the future, Australian educators haven’t seen anything yet.

In this paper, I compare the operation and control of public schooling in Australia and America. The focus is on the proliferation of new voices in school governance, on the realignment of influence within professional ranks, and on some of the procedures used to monitor and control schooling. I show how the patterns of governance in both countries have changed substantially over the last 10 to 15 years and suggest that one effect is that the influence of those traditionally responsible for running the schools has been eroded—but perhaps too little in Australia and perhaps too much in America. Australia has hardly any mechanisms for public access to school decision making, while America just may be paying a price for widespread, open access—a weakening in school district leadership. Each country has something to learn from the other.

Australia and America are worth comparing because they have much in common. Similar cultures, traditions, languages and approaches to education reflect common roots in Western Europe, mainly Britain. Both operate through a federal system of government with a history of independent states. Both are wealthy, urban, technologically advanced societies, with strong private sectors and growing ethnic communities. Both operate preschools through universities and are grappling with demands for equality of educational opportunity, excellence, and diversity. And educators in both countries are currently feeling the pinch of inflation, cost-conscious governments, increasing competition for resources, an oversupply of teachers, declining or stable enrollments, and more demands for effi-
ciency, effectiveness, and performance, not to mention for literate secondary school graduates.

Of course, there are important differences—some noted here. Australia's entire population is about that of Chicago and New York City combined, and the number of teachers and administrators in America almost equals the number of students in Australia. While America has separation of executive and legislative power, 50 states, and 16,000 school districts, Australia has a parliamentary system, only six states (and two territories), and no school districts.

Moreover, Australia's problems seem more manageable; its people more relaxed, more fun, slower paced. It's been 10 years or so since I boarded a plane without being frisked or whisked through a metal detector. And it's been a long time since I've heard a jovial pilot wish a couple a happy anniversary.

In short, the two countries are different enough that one can examine various approaches to the operation and control of schooling, yet similar enough that the experiences of one might be relevant to the other. ¹

My impressions of Australia are based on observations and interviews during a three-week visit in July and August 1978. I met with educators in three state capitals—Sydney in New South Wales, Adelaide in South Australia, and Perth in Western Australia—and in the country's capital, Canberra. Most of my time was spent with top-level public servants in central headquarters—those responsible for running the government schools and also for arranging my itinerary. In addition, I met with teachers, principals, inspectors, parents, nongovernment school officials, interest-group representatives, ministerial staff, and a minister of education. I visited post-secondary institutions, regional offices, a state parliament, and several schools. I also collected government documents, reports, and books on Australian education.

My impressions are simply that—impressions. I was not an expert on Australian education before my trip and don't pretend to be one now. Nor was my trip's purpose to collect representative data; I spent most of my time answering questions about American education rather than fact-finding. And my impressions may be biased by an oversampling of government officials (my hosts) and by the things they wanted me to see, presumably the best of Australian education. Despite these limitations, my impressions—mistaken ones and all—may help provoke debate about patterns of governance in both countries.

The Principal Actors

Australia and America differ significantly in who operates and influences the schools and in how and to whom the schools are held ac-
countable. In what follows, I explore and contrast the changing roles, concerns, and activities of some of the principal actors—school administrators, the federal government, the courts, elected officials, citizens, pressure groups, and “new breed” professionals. In America, local public school superintendents seem especially pressured by recent developments. In Australia, those especially besieged are state headquarters staff.

**School Administrators**

In both countries, the states have constitutional authority for operating the schools, but that authority traditionally has been exercised by highly centralized systems in the Australian states and by the delegation of most authority to local districts in America (with the exception of Hawaii). Patterns of administration in both countries are in flux, and, curiously, things are becoming more centralized in America while they are becoming more decentralized in Australia.

In America, during the last decade or so, the influence of state-level school administrators has substantially increased. State departments of education have doubled and tripled in size, have become more directly involved in establishing school priorities, and have helped develop a series of reforms in school finance, teacher certification, collective bargaining, compensatory education, desegregation, and programs for the handicapped and the bilingual. The states also have assumed major new responsibility for the implementation of federal priorities with the coming of substantial federal aid in the mid-1960s.

Along with this new legislation has come a marked shift in state-local relations. Prior to the 1960s, the states’ emphasis was on providing school districts with general financial assistance, regulating school “inputs” (e.g., building codes, length of school year), and serving the schools mainly through statistical reports. With few exceptions, school operations were the province of local professionals, chiefly the school superintendent, who was responsible to a local citizen board of education. And most of the money for schooling was raised through local property taxes. Things were never quite this neat, but generally state departments of education were invisible.

Now states are overseeing school management and increasingly acting as administrative courts in the implementation of procedures protecting the rights of individual children. States have also been increasing their share of the costs of public education—now on the average above 50 percent. Local schoolmen now know the states are there.

As the states have become more involved in running and financing the schools, they have become more interested in schemes to check how well they’re working. During the late sixties and early seventies, amid great fanfare, more than 30 states established accountability...
programs which aimed at greater efficiency and effectiveness in the schools through the reporting of test-score data. The programs varied from state to state but assumed that state policymakers could use test-score data to identify good and bad schools, leading to more rational decisions. The programs produced mounds of data and political controversy, but little policy-relevant information. Of their own weight, the programs have quietly sunk from public sight—if not from state bureaucracies.

Enter what some call the "son of accountability," competency testing. In the last few years, at least 34 states have taken action to insure that children graduate from high school with some minimum competencies—that they be literate. Shifting the burden of accountability from the school system to the child, some states say students will not graduate without passing a state exam.

It is too early to tell where these programs are headed—some predict their quick demise, while others think they are the wave of the future. Still others think America is headed toward the European practice of external certification of secondary school graduation. In any case, competency testing has strong public support, even though the tests are increasingly being criticized on technical, conceptual, political, and legal grounds.

Taken as a whole, all this state activity in education—much of it increasing centralization and reducing diversity—was simply unheard of a dozen years ago. Of course, this is not to say that strong decentralizing forces aren't at work: local officials are fighting back, academics are pushing for school-level management, and recent research emphasizes the bottom-up character of change. But it is emphasize that America, the bastion of localism, seems headed toward more centralized power in the states.

In Australia, the bastion of centralism, the drift is toward authority at the periphery. State headquarters staff have been losing authority and are increasingly behaving the way state officials used to behave in America. Local school administrators are growing in influence and autonomy.

In the olden days, the operation of Australian education was highly centralized, reflecting the geography of Australia, its authoritarian convict-camp beginnings in some states, and the absence of local government. Central authorities did the work that has been divided in America between state departments of education and the central offices of local school districts. State officials hired and transferred teachers, appointed administrators (based mainly on seniority), developed curricula, built facilities, established standards, and generally supervised the operation of the schools. In addition, state officials were directly responsible for teacher training.

The old system had a clean, effective mechanism for monitoring local schools and controlling the behavior of teachers and administrators. Each state had a corps of inspectors who would regularly visit
schools, evaluate teachers, and match school operations to their mental images of what schools should be like in that state. The inspectors' reports would provide the director-general—the top state education bureaucrat—with up-to-date information on school and staff functioning. The inspectors—whose word was law—provided the center with the mechanism for controlling the periphery. Public accountability came through the minister of education, who supervised the director-general, who in turn ran each state's schools.

The system was designed to promote uniform standards and equality of funding and services across schools. Teachers, for example, agreed to work anywhere in a state, thus assuring poor, remote areas in the outback of a basic education. In practice, however, well-to-do neighborhoods were able to keep their better teachers. The system also was tight, inflexible, unresponsive to diverse needs, and isolated from community involvement.

This system has loosened up substantially during the last 10 to 15 years, varying from state to state. Increasingly, administrative authority, curricular decision making, and control over limited resources have been delegated to regional offices and principals. School-site management, school-based curriculum, school-controlled evaluation, lump-sum budgeting were constantly discussed during my visit. And, according to one principal, while several years ago he wouldn't even leave his building without getting headquarters' permission, now he is virtually free to run his school without interference. Moreover, teachers are playing—taking—more of a role in decision making, reflecting their emerging professionalism and unionism and their accompanying demands for influence and autonomy.

One casualty of this loosening up has been the inspectors, the key link in the state's monitoring system. In some states, inspectors now enter schools only with the principal's permission, and their role is becoming more that of a consultant—a reminder of the dominant role in U.S. state departments of education 15 years ago. One consequence, according to a memo by an Australian state staffer, is that "the Director-General and ultimately the Minister and the Government are unable to have an adequate knowledge of the current state of affairs within the education system. At present, the authority held by the Director-General is not sufficient . . . ." This breakdown of bureaucratic accountability worries several directors-general who supporters of devolution but who also continue to be responsible for the schools. It also makes me wonder whether ministerial control of the schools in Australia is a myth.

It is easy to exaggerate the extent of administrative decentralization in Australia. State headquarters do remain responsible for staffing assignments and many resource allocation decisions. And if schools deviate too far from the norm, the center can still yank them back into line. Nonetheless, the power of the center seems to be eroding, and,
ironically, Australian teachers and principals in some states may now have more freedom and authority over administrative and curricular matters than their counterparts in America.

The Federal Government

Educational governance in both countries is marked not only by a realignment of professional influence within the states but also by a new and noisy voice at the federal level. The approaches of the two countries differ, as discussed below, but some things seem endemic to having a new kid on the street in a federal system—initial fears of federal domination, concern of national politicians that they're not getting credit, state complaints about federal interference, initial opponents who become strong supporters, and a period of exuberance followed by a period of reexamination.

Until the mid-1960s in America, the U.S. Office of Education was an invisible, backwater agency that collected statistics, provided consultative services to the states, and administered a few small grant programs for the schools. In 1965, all that began to change. After nearly 100 years of futile efforts to pass major federal aid to the schools, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act whipped through the Congress in less than 100 days. This legislation, and its progeny, focused attention on national priorities (disadvantaged children, school innovation) and, later, on other groups shortchanged by the schools (migrant, bilingual, Indian, and handicapped children). With the mid-sixties' burst of legislation, the federal government became an active partner in education.

After 13 years of substantial aid, several observations can be made about the exercise of federal influence on the schools. At least initially, federal clout came through the provision of large sums of new money—ESEA doubled to 8 percent the federal contribution to schooling. Since the mid-sixties, though, federal funding has about kept pace with inflation and state and local increases, falling far short of the hopes of the original reformers and the demands of interest groups.

How the money is delivered—categorical programs—has been a major source of federal influence. Although the Congress and Republican administrations have flirted with reducing federal strings and turning money over to the states, a strong federal focus on special populations has remained the policy—reaffirmed again by the Congress in 1978. While observers continue to debate whether the funds reach and help the children slated for attention, one clear effect has been the institutionalization of federal priorities. Most state and local agencies now have on their staffs paid advocates for special groups (the disadvantaged, handicapped, bilingual) and for innovative programs. If one believes, as I do, that organizational decision making is
affected by internal advocates, this institutionalization seems significant.

Third, and perhaps most visible today, federal officials have attempted to exercise influence through regulations, with the result that federal-state relations have been on a 13-year roller coaster ride. State and local officials, initially fearful of federal control, quickly learned that federal priorities could be ignored. This reduced fears, but it also encouraged federal reformers to resort to more and tighter regulations—a strategy reinforced by the absence of other levers, i.e., increased funding, to influence the schools. Currently, state and local officials are complaining bitterly about the breadth of regulation, particularly the detailed guidelines for serving handicapped children. The Congress has responded more with rhetoric than with reductions in paperwork and rules.

Finally, the federal government has probably influenced public schooling indirectly by its opposition to direct aid to nonpublic schools—this policy has limited competition for scarce resources and perhaps meant more money for the public schools. The church-state issue, long a stumbling block to federal aid, was dealt with in the sixties by providing modest services to private-school children, not aid to the schools themselves. This “child benefit” approach temporarily satisfied the nonpublic-school lobby, while avoiding a battle with opponents of public support of church-related schools. In 1978, the issue erupted again in an attempt to legislate tuition tax credits for the parents of private-school children. The National Coalition to Save Public Education was formed and, with others, managed to kill the proposal, winning the battle if not the war.

In sum, in America in 1979, the federal role is well entrenched with stable funding for public schools, categorical programs, and regulations seemingly here to stay. The private sector for now remains at the back of the line at the public trough.

In Australia, accompanying the drift toward devolution of authority within the states has been a drift toward greater centralization within the country. State officials now look both up and down at influential new actors.

Actually, the federal (commonwealth) government has played an important, indirect role in funding schools for more than 35 years. As a wartime measure in 1942, the central government took over full authority for taxing personal income, leaving the states with a weak tax base. As a consequence, each year the states receive large chunks of unrestricted funds—about 35 percent of their budgets—from the commonwealth and then allocate these funds to various state activities, including the biggest money eater—education. With the current austerity drive at the federal level, some state educators fear that education’s share of this essential indirect funding will be cut.

But the big push for the expansion of direct federal aid came in 1972 with the election of the Labor party (a rough equivalent to the
U.S. Democratic party), which had been out of power for 23 years. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, acting as President Johnson had in the mid-sixties, moved at a frantic pace—while he still had the votes. Whitlam, less than a month after taking office, set up the Karmel Committee (named after its prestigious chairman, Professor Peter Karmel) to study the needs of the schools. Reporting six months later in May 1973, the committee's recommendations led to major new federal initiatives in education and to the establishment of the Australian Schools Commission. The commission, composed of members from the public at large and from education interest groups, administers the new program and reports regularly and publicly on the needs of Australian education—much to the chagrin of the current penny-pinching government.

In Australia, the pattern of federal influence—still in its formative stage—is somewhat different from that in America. The commonwealth government plays a modest role in the support of public schools, but relies much more heavily than in America on the provision of general aid. Practically overnight in the early seventies, the federal contribution jumped from hardly anything to 14 percent, with almost 90 percent of these federal funds flowing to the states through "general recurrent grants" and "capital grants." Designed to bring all schools up to resource standards (defined mainly in terms of teacher-pupil ratios and class size), these programs provided money to the states with virtually no strings attached. Recurrent grants resemble state equalization programs in America.

In addition, the commonwealth government influences public schooling through its nongovernment schools' policies—which are very different from America's. Nongovernment schools, serving 21 percent of Australia's students (11 percent in America), receive about 35 percent of their operating costs in direct grants from the federal government. During my visit, a major controversy was brewing over a recent increase in commonwealth funding for nongovernment schools at the cost of reduced funding for the public sector. Indeed, a common view is that the commonwealth minister is becoming the minister for nongovernment schools and the state ministers are becoming the ministers for government schools. How—and how much—the federal government (along with the states) should fund nongovernment schools is likely to remain a controversial issue.

Like America, the Australian commonwealth government also exercises influence through "special purpose" (categorical) programs that were established in the seventies to promote innovation and to meet the needs of the handicapped and the disadvantaged. This focus—Australians call it positive discrimination—was a major change in direction for a country whose schools had traditionally ignored the needy.

In carrying out their categorical policy, however, Australians have differed from Americans. Commonwealth officials have discouraged
multiple fragmented programs imposed from above and separately administered in the schools. Instead, the Australian approach has consistently emphasized school-initiated projects marked by collaborative decision making, in-service training, the discovery of priorities through experience, and schoolwide commitment to dealing with needy children. Australian federal officials, following the dictates of common sense and experience, are convinced that this grass-roots approach to change makes sense. Curiously, American federal officials, seemingly more swayed by science than experience, just recently are coming to the same view, based on the results of multimillion dollar research studies.

Still another source of federal influence in Australia is rules and regulations. In fact, state officials complain that “at times demands and constraints have been placed on the Department [by the Schools Commission] greater than those the Department places on its own agencies.” This may be true, but in Australia there are no equivalents to the strong American regulations on race and sex discrimination or to the multiple prescriptions required in implementing special-population programs. Australian federal officials don’t seem prone to detailed regulations—or at least so far.

Finally, commonwealth officials, like their counterparts in America, exert influence by “jawboning”—using speeches, reports, meetings, conferences to get their message across. Indeed, the sophisticated reports of the Schools Commission (which doesn’t have an equivalent in America)—with their consistent themes of parental involvement, diversity, choice, and equal opportunity—have seemingly had a major impact on the thinking of policymakers about Australian schooling.

Where the federal role is headed in Australia is less clear than in America. The special-purpose grants seem more vulnerable, not yet having established the broad nationwide constituency that exists in America. Although aid to private schools is well established, controversy will continue as competition grows for limited resources. Some worry about the future of the Schools Commission, an outspoken brainchild of the Labor party, which is to the political left of the current conservative government. Whatever happens, an active federal role of one kind or another seems certain for the future. It is a reality that the states will need to learn to deal with.

The Courts

America and Australia may resemble each other in certain aspects of governance, but they clearly diverge on the involvement of the courts in setting school policy and monitoring school behavior.

America has become a superlitigious society, with considerable attention focused on the behavior of public officials. In 1975, for example, the federal secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare faced
some 10,000 lawsuits, many challenging his use of administrative discretion; 20 years earlier, the figure was several hundred.\textsuperscript{7}

In education, during the last 25 years, especially the late sixties and early seventies, suits increasingly have been aimed at individual school administrators and at the constitutionality of various educational practices. Federal and state courts have ruled on school desegregation, nonpublic-school support, the liability of school board members, programs for the handicapped and bilingual, school finance, student free speech, records, and suspension, hiring and firing practices, and more. Court decrees have affected the students served by the schools, how they should be served, the procedures to be followed (e.g., reasonable notice, hearings, and right of appeal), and the responsibilities of administrators and lay board members. Indeed, some strong court decisions have included detailed instructions on the day-to-day operations of the schools.

Some commentators bemoan the encroachment of the courts on the details of school administration. Others argue that court action has been required because of the failure of normal political and professional processes to respond to the legitimate demands of abused groups or to protect their constitutional rights. Still others say that after a period of activism, the courts are now becoming more restrained. And still others point out that we know too little about the consequences, both intended and unintended, of various court decrees on schooling. In any event, the courts in America have been—and continue to be—an active partner in efforts to control schooling and constrain school administrators.

In Australia, reformers as well as the ordinary citizen have virtually ignored the courts as a vehicle for educational change or for seeking redress. In fact, the High Court of Australia has heard only a handful of cases challenging the constitutionality of school-related provisions. One now before the court and brought by the Victorian Council for the Defense of Government Schools (affectionately referred to as DOGS) challenges government support of nongovernment schools but is widely expected to fail.\textsuperscript{8} For whatever reasons—a conservative judiciary, constitutional barriers to citizen suits, public-servant immunity, little tradition of court intervention—Australian educators are virtually free from the threat or reality of court interference.

\textit{Elected Officials}

School administrators are being pressured not only by a realignment of influence within their ranks but also by elected officials at the state and national level. Bent on gaining more control over the direction and operation of various bureaucracies (including the schools), elected officials are becoming more active and are building their capacity to oversee how things work.
At the state level in America, governors in some states have become more heavily involved in school legislation—developing their own proposals for finance and taxation and pushing them through their legislatures. Through the buildup of personal staff and centralized planning and budget offices, governors also are exerting more pressure on state departments of education.

Likewise, state legislatures in the last 20 years have undergone many important changes: streamlining their procedures, attracting more policy-oriented aggressive members, and substantially increasing their staffs. In California, for example, the number of legislative employees grew from about 50 in 1950 to more than 700 in 1974. While most other states have not matched this growth, four out of five have substantially increased their staffing. The days when the legislature would simply rubber-stamp the proposals of the education establishment appear to be over.

At the federal level, similar developments can be identified. Since the Nixon years, the Congress has been acting like an independent branch of government, rejecting executive branch proposals and developing its own. And given the absence of strong loyalty to political parties in America, congressmen and staff frequently intervene in the administration of programs, sometimes even suggesting practices that undermine those of their party leader, the president. This activist stance has been helped by a substantial growth in congressional staff—from 4,300 in 1957 to 10,800 in 1975. It has also been helped by the work of the General Accounting Office, an arm of Congress that has rapidly grown to 5,000 staff members and has moved beyond financial auditing to reviewing the performance of program.

Similarly, in the executive branch the last few presidents have tried to exert more control over their agencies, including education, by building presidential staff, by expanding the central Office of Management and Budget, by establishing staff offices manned by political appointees (typically, sympathetic experts rather than party loyalists), and by infiltrating the bureaucracy with more and more noncareer appointments.

All these attempts to strengthen the hands of elected officials have not been without their problems. For example, legislators discover that large staffs start acting like bureaucracies, need to be managed take on a life of their own, and create problems to be solved. And attempts by the president to control the bureaucracy may have made things worse. Hecko argues: "political appointees may well reduce rather than increase bureaucratic responsiveness ... to the President and department heads: This in turn increases incentives for the White House to politicize the civil service. . . . Protectors of the civil service can react by well-tried techniques . . . [which] will probably only remove self-interested bureaucracies farther from the reach of political leadership." Whether these changes are improvements can be debated, of course, but few would disagree that civil servants, federal
and state educators included, have been increasingly under pressure. Australia presents a very different picture, no doubt reflecting its parliamentary system. Federal and state governments are led by strong centralized cabinets, headed by the prime minister at the federal level and premiers in the states. Cabinet members are all elected members of Parliament, and traditionally have had very small personal staffs. Backbenchers have little influence on policy and generally wouldn’t think of circumventing party policy by pressuring the bureaucracy. The Loyal Opposition, also with very little staff, keeps an eye on the government, hooting and hollering like hockey fans in the hopes of changing government leadership. The postaudit activities of Australian governments are quite modest by American standards.

Government programs are administered by public service departments, led by permanent heads who usually work their way up the bureaucratic ladder. The permanent heads report to their ministers who in turn report to the cabinet and the prime minister (premier).

What is particularly striking about the Australian system is that elected officials have few mechanisms for challenging or changing the leadership of the bureaucracies, for countering bureaucratic suggestions, or for overseeing bureaucratic action. Australia has traditionally acted on the notion that a loyal public service implements the policies of the government of the day—as if public bureaucracies, even loyal ones, don’t have goals and priorities of their own. I’m not suggesting that the public services purposely subvert ministerial policies or that the closed-career system produced unfit leaders: the ones I met were professional, thoughtful, open to new ideas—and some were visionary. But I am suggesting that Australian bureaucracies seem quite powerful with few formal checks on their authority.

In Australia’s system of government, it may be that those checks are neither needed nor desirable. Apparently, though, some Australians think otherwise. There are signs that Australia’s elected officials are adopting what one official called the American presidential model. The prime minister, I was told, has recently expanded his own staff to help in the coordination and oversight of governmentwide policy. In the Australian states, similar moves toward centralized staffs in premiers’ offices have started. And several directors-general expressed concern during my visit that ministers are getting too involved in the details of running the schools.

Which of these developments, if any, represent improvements in Australian governance of schools, I’m not prepared to judge. In America’s different system of government, similar developments have both their supporters and critics. In any case, the public bureaucracies in Australia are now beginning to feel new pressures from elected officials but hardly with the intensity of their counterparts in America.
Both countries have had a history of citizen involvement in the schools, but of quite different kinds. In Australia, parents and citizens have long played an active role in the support of schools, but not in their governance. Local parent and citizen groups ("P and C's") have taken great pride in raising private funds to supplement uniform government funding for neighborhood schools—an idea catching on in California in the wake of Proposition 13. Indeed, this practice sustains inequality: in well-to-do neighborhoods even airplanes have been purchased for extracurricular activities, while in poor areas hardly enough money could be raised for up-to-date textbooks. In addition, parents have been quite active in running school canteens (cafeterias) and in providing other volunteer help. And at the state and federal levels, parents, often working closely with teacher unions, have been quite vocal and reportedly successful in pressing for additional dollars for public schooling.

More recently, though, Australia has been flirting with the idea of parental control of schooling through the creation of parent councils at each and every school. If successful, this would devolve parental control further than has traditionally been the case in America, where local boards operate at the school district level. This push for greater citizen control has come from outspoken parents, from the commonwealth government, and from forward-looking state educationists who believe parents should be heard. Ideally, local parent councils could provide a new accountability device that would compensate for weakening ministerial control.

Efforts to establish local parental control have varied from state to state, but it is my impression that the idea has yet to take hold. "In almost every state school," one principal in a state known for its devolution said, "little more than lip service is paid to the role of parents in deciding educational issues."

The reasons for limited success go beyond the conventional explanation of citizen apathy. For one thing, many local professionals strongly oppose the move. Indeed, the local educators I met, with some notable exceptions, seemed to have a paternalistic attitude toward citizen involvement. Professionals know best, I was told, and they are quite reluctant to let outsiders, particularly those with less education, interfere with professional matters. Some also worried that parents with an ax to grind would dictate school policies.

Second, parental control has also faced organized opposition. In New South Wales, for example, the teacher union played a major role in the defeat of a parent council proposal, and the existing parent organizations raised serious questions, no doubt viewing new parent groups with different goals as a threat.

A third reason for weak parent councils may be that the reformers
overestimated the level of grass-roots parental dissatisfaction with school decision making—as also seems to have been the case in America. Australians love to complain about authority, but they also seem to have an abiding faith in expert knowledge and central control. Unless something is really not working, they say "she'll do" and seem content to leave it alone.

Fourth, even if parents wanted to get more involved in school decision making, they seem awed by the professionals and reluctant to show their ignorance. This timidity no doubt reflects the long tradition in Australia of excluding parents from a significant policymaking role. It also reflects the fact that a high proportion of the potentially least timid parents—the well-to-do and professionals—send their children to private schools. And it might also reflect subtle class distinctions in Australia and the expectation that lower classes know their place.

Finally, the incentives for parental involvement are quite weak. Sitting on a council would take a lot of time and effort, and, sometimes, courage. But participation currently provides few rewards and little control over things that might matter to parents: staffing and the allocation of significant resources. And because schools are not supported by any local taxes, there is no incentive for tax cutters to get involved. (Indeed, the typical Australian doesn't seem to link increased spending for schools with more taxes taken out of his or her pocket.) As long as parents don't influence dollars and staffing, one state official told me, parent councils are a sham.

Whatever the reasons, significant parental involvement in local decision making seems minimal. This means that the decentralization movement in Australia has been translated into a devolution of professional authority but not of lay control. Consequently, local professionals now dominate school decision making. Australian principals feel the pinch of parents only because there has been so little in evidence before.

It may come as a shock to Australian educators that limited lay control has also been a major issue in America during the last decade or so. A shock, because America with its thousands of school boards is seen by many Australians as the land of citizen control—indeed, to a fault. More than once, Australian educators asked me about widespread patronage and revolving-door professional leadership. They didn't seem reassured when I explained that crass patronage—although it exists in some school districts—is not rampant.

The issue of parental control has been extensively debated in academic journals. Some American critics argue that school boards are little more than willing pawns of all-powerful professionals, and school board meetings simply rubber-stamp policy. Others, myself included, argue that school boards continue to exercise a fair amount of control mainly through the raising of money and the hiring of staff. In this view, professionals are constrained by their perceptions of how
their school board might react to their proposals—a not inconsiderable constraint if reputations and jobs are on the line.

While academicians argue, America has been wrestling with increasing citizen control and for many of the same reasons as in Australia. Reformers have pushed for community control, decentralization, and school-level parent councils in an effort to make professionals more responsive. And, as in Australia, the results have been disappointing. Although parent councils have probably created more stir in America, the degree of new citizen participation has frustrated reformers, falling short of expectations.

Many of the reasons may be the same as in Australia—bureaucratic resistance, parent satisfaction, high costs of participation. Cohen suggests a more basic explanation. Such participatory reforms fall short, he says, because they are political responses to things that are not primarily political problems but are part of current social and economic life. That is, parents and citizens in advanced industrial societies—those marked by high mobility, specialization, separation of home and the workplace, competing demands for time, both parents working—willingly cede authority to professionals. The result, Cohen says, is low participation, growing bureaucracy, and a bad name for democratic reform.

Whatever the reasons, the difficulty in expanding direct citizen involvement even in America suggests the magnitude of the undertaking in Australia, given its tradition of little citizen involvement. Reformers are in for a difficult fight, particularly if Australian school councils exercise so little control over staff and dollars—conditions that seem likely to continue. “The defenses which schools have erected against lay interference,” said one principal, “have been a long time in the building and they will not be demolished overnight.”

Pressure Groups

Pressure-group politics is here to stay in both countries, affecting decision making at every level of school government. In America, for example, Bailey has identified 250 to 300 education groups selling their wares at the federal level. While groups represent everyone from guidance counselors to disgruntled taxpayers to equipment manufacturers, here I’ll discuss briefly two particularly important new actors (at least in America)—teacher unions and citizen advocacy groups—whose activities have circumscribed the influence of school administrators.

In America during the last 15 years or so, teacher unions have had a rapid rise to power followed by a leveling off if not a decline in influence, mainly because of a changing political environment. Such ebb and flow are most dramatically illustrated in the state of New York. In 1963, a research study of state education politics didn’t even mention
the teacher union as an influential pressure group. Six years later, another study found that state legislators identified the union as the most powerful education interest group. And in the mid-seventies in New York City, teachers not only weren’t getting raises—13,000 were laid off and the pupil-teacher ratio rose from 20 to one to 25 to one.

School administrators clearly have been constrained by teacher union demands for higher wages, better working conditions, fair grievance procedures, and more control over school operations. In many cases, union demands have created an adversary relationship between managers and teachers. Over time, though, management has become more sophisticated at the bargaining table in limiting union demands. This process has been quickened by fiscal crises and growing concern about taxes, thus reducing teacher influence, at least over wages. Curiously, in the face of new taxpayer revolts, some local teacher unions are now joining forces with administrators to resist taxpayer-led cuts in school funding. Changing climates make for strange new bedfellows.

Citizen advocacy groups, although not new in America, are in full swing today, espousing the causes of groups thought to be underrepresented in government. In education, advocacy groups represent the poor, the disadvantaged, women, blacks, Native Americans, Hispanics, Asians, the handicapped, the gifted, the bilingual, and more. Backed by government funds, donations, and foundation support, these groups are typically staffed by skilled professionals who use information, organization, money, lobbying, and the courts to get their views represented in government policy. Advocacy groups assume that you fight bureaucracy by institutionalizing a counterbureaucracy—an approach to citizen involvement that recognizes the difficulty of achieving direct, volunteer participation of citizens. The result is that school administrators, at various levels of government, must now react to a bevy of new, organized and often strident voices in making and implementing policy.

Australian schoolmen have yet to see the likes of citizen advocacy groups. Citizens and parents are well organized to lobby for more funds for the schools, but pressure from subgroups in the population seems poorly organized. One reason might be that philanthropic support for such activities is not available in Australia. Another might be that members of Parliament, because of strong party loyalty, are less responsive than congressmen to the pleas of organized splinter groups. A third reason is that Australia, until recently, has been a rather homogeneous society and has not been very conscious of its existing diversity.

The same void cannot be identified in the organization of teachers. As in America, teacher unions are quite well organized (representing almost all teachers), well staffed by articulate spokesmen, and, during the last 10 to 15 years, many have become increasingly outspoken and militant. But there are interesting differences between the two coun-
tries. For one thing, job security in Australia is even more important than it is in America. If a future government, facing declining school enrollments, were to suggest a reduction in force in Australian schools, as is now happening in many American communities, the battles in Australia would make American skirmishes look like picnics. For another, the leadership of teacher unions in Australia, at least in New South Wales, is more outspokenly socialistic than in America. Union leaders view their efforts to improve wages and working conditions as part of a movement to redistribute income from the capitalist class to workers. For example, one reason the union opposed parent councils, I was told, was the fear that they would be dominated by executives—members of the capitalist class. This sense of being part of a worldwide movement makes for an articulate, dedicated, intransigent group. It also might explain why militant union organizers have yet to recognize that the interests of teachers and of state school administrators might coincide in coping with taxpayer-led cuts in educational spending.

In Australia, as in America, the pressure that school administrators feel from organized teachers, of course, varies across locality. In one Australian state, union officials referred to themselves as “tame cats,” and they seemed to work cooperatively with government leaders. In New South Wales, by contrast, many state officials focused on little else during my visit than a teacher union attempt—a rather blatant one at that—to take over school governance through a teacher-dominated education commission (somewhat akin to a U.S. state board of education). On the whole, Australian unions, like their American counterparts, are powerful influences on the education scene, but their influence may have stabilized because of an oversupply of teachers and growing concerns about the costs of governmental activity.

“New-Breed” Professionals

Several of the American reforms discussed above would not be possible without a new breed of professionals—lawyers, policy analysts, and social scientists—who are interested in public policy and who are increasingly getting their hands dirty in the practical business of developing and assessing government programs.

In addition to staffing advocacy groups, filing lawsuits, and aiding elected officials, many of these professionals are part of agency-level analytic offices that have grown rapidly during the last dozen years or so. Others work outside of government for universities and private firms and spend their time assessing government programs. In 1974, for example, $146 million was spent by the federal government on nondefense program evaluation, up 500 percent from 1969. And in 1977, the equivalent of 2,100 people worked in the federal govern-
ment on program evaluation. Similar developments, although less dramatic, have also occurred at the state and local levels of government, with education receiving plenty of attention. These new professionals are looking over the shoulders of those responsible for administering programs. And many a school administrator has smarted from the sting of a critical analysis.

In Australia, policy analysts, lawyers, and social scientists are not comparably involved in government. Program evaluation, for example, is a cottage industry. The Schools Commission and some states are promoting it, but much of the effort focuses on helping schools evaluate themselves and helping teachers and parents become evaluators. Australia is just beginning to evaluate national programs and report the results publicly, and analytic offices are in their infancy.

There are several reasons for this low level of analytic activity. Australia’s small number of Ph.D.’s, the absence of philanthropic support, the system of government, the newness of education as “big league ball”—all probably contribute. But three other factors deserve mention. First, Australian universities seem to look down their noses at policy-relevant research; pure research is preferred. Consequently, young, ambitious researchers have few incentives to engage in applied research and there is not much money for it. Second, there seems to be little room in the Australian public services for talented outsiders to enter government for a short period of time and then return to private life. The number of “in andouters” in American government is probably smaller than is commonly believed, but is certainly greater than in Australia.

Finally, the low level of analytic activity in Australia might reflect a healthy skepticism about misguided analyses, especially premature program evaluations. According to the Schools Commission: “The tasks faced by staff in schools in the Disadvantaged Program are often particularly difficult ones which should not be added to by negative external judgements or pressure for quick, objectively measurable results. Supporting them in a continuing commitment to the objectives of the Program while they test feasible means and adjust action towards more successful ones is an important, and often delicate task.” Such reluctance to evaluate success before a program is institutionalized has never been evidenced in America.

For whatever reason, the net effect is that the new-breed professionals identified in America are most notable by their absence in Australia. One result, obvious to me as a policy researcher, is the missed opportunities for applied research in Australia—for example, studying the Schools Commission’s role and strategies in reforming education. For Australian school administrators, it means another area where their discretion is less challenged than in America.
Summary and Conclusions

It is easier to identify new voices than it is to assess their influence. It is also easier to highlight trends than to take the space to grapple with unclear and sometimes contradictory evidence. Nonetheless, it appears that school administrators in both countries are indeed facing growing pressure but at different levels of intensity. In both countries, school administrators who used to possess enormous clout now worry about growing responsibility but diminishing capacity to operate the schools. In both countries, problems of accountability have surfaced but are yet to be solved. In both countries, schoolmen worry about increasing demands, fiscal pressures, and the future of public schooling.

In Australia, school administrators at all levels of government are feeling pressure—much less so than in America—but especially state-level officials who are being squeezed from above, below, and the side. The states continue to exercise major control over government schools—more than in America—but the drift is toward greater professional authority at the school-site level, more influence from the federal government, and continuing pressure from teacher unions. What's missing from the Australian governance scheme, recent efforts notwithstanding, are effective mechanisms for involving citizens in school decision making. The devolution of administrative authority has been accompanied by a weakening of ministerial control and the failure, so far, to substitute functioning lay boards at the local level. The result is that Australia is now uncomfortably caught between the American and Australian models of governance, with continuing professional domination and little visible democratic control. Australia's problem is to figure out how to open up the system, to report better on its performance, to increase access, and to involve citizens in more serious matters (like selecting principals), without undermining the legitimate duties of professionals. All this requires time, experimentation, and room to maneuver—things that an accountability-minded populace just may not support.

In America, many new, often strident voices are constraining school administrators at all levels of government, but it may be school district superintendents, at least in some communities, who are especially feeling the brunt of vocal new actors and the cost-conscious climate. Superintendents continue to play a major leadership role, but the drift in professional authority seems to be toward the center, with weak counterforces arguing for more authority for individual schools. Also, unions, advocacy groups, courts, school boards, parent councils, disgruntled citizens—all are challenging the authority and discretion of superintendents.

Much of this new pressure, in my view, is long overdue—American
schools in the past have not been adequately responsive to a number of needy groups. Moreover, many of the complaints of besieged school administrators reflect little more than their unhappy fall from a privileged place in government—educators can no longer successfully argue that schooling is a unique government function, above politics, and thus entitled to special treatment. Nonetheless, the cumulative impact of these many new pressures, in fact, may be creating a serious problem of district-level executive leadership—it is becoming awfully hard to get things done or to make constructive changes. To be sure, as multiple voices have increasingly equated their narrow interests with the public interest, as dollars have become scarce, and as governments have tightened and multiplied their guidelines, the result has been increasing conflict, fragmentation of power, the capacity of splinter groups to veto decisions, contradictory regulations, a loss of civility, and school systems without a rudder.

The solution, if there is any, is neither to retreat from widespread access to decision making nor to repeat the arguments of earlier school reformers that the professionals know best—a view still prevalent in Australia. Rather, we need to recognize that the skills, attitudes, and governance arrangements that worked in a period of growth and relative stability may not work in a period of retrenchment and for a population increasingly aware of its heterogeneity. New approaches are needed. For example, school superintendents may need to redefine what it means to be an educational leader and to develop skills to mediate conflict, to engender trust, and to achieve cooperation and compromise among single-minded advocates—not just to reduce the noise level but also to promote everyone's self-interest. For without teamwork and mutual accommodation, conflict-ridden schools that just stumble along will lose their constituencies and become easy targets for budget cutters, eventually hurting everyone.

There are some lessons to be learned from all these developments. While it would be foolhardy to try to transport one country's solutions to the other, approaches can be adapted or avoided. For one thing, Australia can look to America for an impressive array of devices, discussed throughout this paper, for opening up the schools and providing greater access and influence, particularly for citizens. Used in moderation, these devices might be appropriate in some Australian jurisdictions.

Australia can also learn from America's experience in training policy analysts and evaluators and employing them in government. As noted earlier, analysts, like all staff, have an annoying habit of creating problems as well as solving them, but they can also generate useful information about alternative government policies and the impact of public programs. Such systematic information is sorely lacking in Australia, and increasing the training and employment opportunities for analysts seems long overdue.
A final lesson for Australia grows out of America's experience with test-based accountability devices. In the absence of visible mechanisms for holding schools accountable in Australia, it would not be surprising if new data-based mechanisms for monitoring performance were established. This seems possible in the current climate even though Australians have a healthy skepticism, born of experience, about the costs and benefits of testing. In my view, the current American drive to tie high school graduation to state competency tests is likely to create more controversy than improvements in the schools. Alternatively, statewide testing for diagnostic purposes, or a nation-wide system that monitors trends (like the National Assessment of Educational Progress) would probably produce more useful information without unfairly harming individual children.

America can learn, too, from Australia. Despite America's reputation for having a highly decentralized educational system, Australia probably has had more experience in devolving administrative responsibility to the principal and in using the federal government to promote grass-roots decision making. A comparative study of decentralized staffing patterns and of federal attempts to improve local practice might be useful as these ideas become more widely discussed in America.

Another lesson from Australia comes from the experience of the Schools Commission. The reports of this diverse group seem to have helped shape the debate on a variety of important school issues. Similar activities might be appropriate for the intergovernmental advisory council of the new U.S. Department of Education.

America can also learn from Australia's years of experience in supplementing public expenditures on the schools with private contributions and volunteer help. In the wake of Proposition 13, of proposed caps on government spending, and of school finance equalization programs, it seems inevitable that well-to-do parents will find ways to raise supplementary resources for their children, if they aren't sent to private schools. A study of Australia's experience with voluntary contributions and services—who benefits?—might be revealing and helpful in America's consideration of the efficiency and justice of such a response.

In addition, America can learn from Australia's experience in promoting diversity and parental choice through its substantial public subsidies for private education. The debate over government funding of nonpublic schools in America is likely to intensify in the 1980s, and it would help to know more about possible effects.

But perhaps the most important lesson grows out of the fact that the two countries in some ways are moving in opposite directions. This seems to illustrate the principle that what governments do is determined by the existing problems of where governments are, not by an analysis of potential problems of proposed alternatives—the grass is greener on the other side of the equator. It seems, though, that
every solution has unintended negative consequences that later demand solution—after the original problems are forgotten.

More than that, however, the drifts in opposite directions in the states probably illustrate the competing values served by different ways of running schools. Australia's centralized system fostered equality of school funding (more than in America), and professional, efficient, stable, coordinated operations that generally met uniform standards. But it also promoted a closed, insulated, inbred bureaucracy, and it stifled diversity, choice, and responsiveness—thus leading to some of the current pressure for decentralization. America's decentralized system fostered greater diversity, parental involvement, and openness. But it also promoted inequality, parochialism, fragmentation, and segregation, thus leading to some of the pressure for greater centralization. This pattern suggests that no solution is stable over time as long as competing values are at play—which seems even more likely in the future as the proliferation of educational actors and interests continues in both countries.

But having said all this about differences in governance, operation, and finance, I'm still left with my recollections of the schools I visited in Australia. Except for the twangy accent (and school uniforms, in some places), I would have thought I was visiting model schools in America—the classrooms looked and felt the same. And despite the absence of formal mechanisms for citizen control in Australia, the schools I visited seemed quite innovative, perhaps reflecting professional values as much as citizen concerns. This is not to say that things can't be different (or that the classroom is the only place to look), but these experiences did leave me with a lingering question, For all the haggling adults do over the operation and control of the schools, just what are the factors that really make a difference in the lives of children?

Notes

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1. For a further elaboration of the differences and similarities between Australia and America and of the opportunities for useful comparative research, see P. D. Tannock, “Education Policy in the United States and Australia: A Proposal for Bi-lateral Research and Consultation,” Xeroxed (Perth: University of Western Australia, June 1977).


5. E.g., see Paul Berman and Milbrey W. McLaughlin, *Federal Progress Supporting Educational Change*, vols. 1 through 8 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 1977-78).


11. Ibid., p. 82.


By innovation I mean the idea of a change in behavior or practice. (Hurst, 1978, p. 14)

An innovation is a technology which improves educational outcomes, improves working relationships or processes within the school system ... or reduces the cost of education without significantly reducing the quantity or quality of desired outcomes or processes. (Pincus, 1974, p. 116)

Innovation, the idea that schools should always be promoting new ideas and programs, has been a major thrust in American education. (Shanker, 1981, p. 9)

Ideology, power, and perceived group self-interest ... are key factors influencing planning and implementation of basic educational reforms. (Paulston, 1978, p. 2)

In other words, can the present educational system, even though fundamentally organized to mesh students into an elitist, class-based, knowledge restricting, highly selective development, contribute to a social and cultural revolution? This defines innovative education in a completely different way. Innovation would mean posing contradictions for the present mode of development. (Carnoy, 1979, pp. 22-23)

Shifting Assessments of Educational Innovation

Until recent years, the social and private worth of imaginative but judicious investment in educational innovation was seldom questioned (Coombs, 1968; Faure et al., 1972; Husen, 1974). During the past decade, however, the relationship between investment in both innovative and conventional educational activities and desired social and economic outcomes has become increasingly ambiguous and complex (Carnoy & Levin, 1976; La Belle, 1976; Weiler, 1978). Even within the dominant perspective shared by most educators, policymakers, and social scientists, assessment of the value of innovative educational change has shifted considerably.

During the 1960s, conventional wisdom characterized education as a socially powerful, politically feasible means of attacking a broad range of remarkably diverse social and economic problems (Greer, 1972; Nasaw, 1979; Ward, 1974). This popular faith in the diffuse value of innovative educational materials, organizational forms, and practices found sophisticated expression in two complementary academic analogues: human capital theory (Becker, 1962; Blaug, 1970; Schultz, 1962), and the functionalist-modernity perspective on the technocratic inevitability of education's importance (Clark, 1962; Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Papagiannis & Bickel, 1981).
In practical terms, within the United States this view meant changing the educational system to ameliorate social problems such as poverty and unemployment, in large part through the federally sponsored programs of the so-called “War on Poverty.” The education model underlying this thrust was what Havelock (1971) called the research, development, and diffusion (R&D) perspective, embodied in influential works such as that of Clark and Guba (1965). The basic idea was that the educational system could be made more effective through rational planning and scientific development of alternative approaches, which were then disseminated to the local level. Local educational institutions were regarded as largely passive and manipulable, though sometimes perversely resistant to change.

However, the late sixties and early seventies saw a number of challenges to this dominant view. First, widely publicized studies such as those by Coleman et al. (1966) and Jencks et al. (1972) seriously questioned the ability of conventional schooling to yield social or even educational success. Second, the results of the “innovative” educational efforts of the sixties were beginning to be viewed as massive failures (Mann, 1976; McLaughlin, 1975). Third, an accumulation of educational research literature showed no significant difference in learning outcomes among a wide variety of alternative instructional treatments (Averch et al., 1972; Jamison, Suppes, & Wells, 1974).

From within the dominant perspective, the responses to these challenges have varied. In the late sixties, there occurred an outpouring of critical attacks on the schools as bureaucratic, dehumanizing, joyless institutions (Silberman, 1970). However, this critical humanistic movement was shortlived, perhaps due to the economic crunch of the 1970s, which yielded a renewed emphasis on the education-job market linkage and associated competitiveness.

A more enduring reaction is exemplified by Rivlin (1971), who argued that the sixties was an era of “random innovation,” and that its failure is attributable to the lack of good program design and experimentation capable of evaluating the relationship of system inputs to outputs. She argued that it was still possible to achieve the sixties goals through systematic experimentation and use of better effectiveness measures.

This reaction, which maintains faith in the basic R&D model, has been tempered by two trends during the seventies. This first is partly a consequence of the “no significant difference” finding in educational research, the rising costs of education, and the resurgence of attention to productivity in the economy as a whole. The central idea is to use innovative educational technologies to improve the productivity of education (Haggerty, 1973), mainly by reducing its cost. Coupled with the clearer delineation of objectives through such innovations as management by objectives and criterion-referenced testing, the use of improved evaluation tools could yield greater educational efficiency. This became a major focus of the National Institute of Education when it was created. From this perspective, to the extent that equity goals are still important in educational activities, they can best be achieved by designing and testing efficient educational programs to be targeted directly at “disadvantaged” groups.

The second trend that has guided and, to some extent, transformed the R&D model is increasing concern with the implementation of educational innovation. The works of Pincus (1974), Berman and McLaughlin (1974-1978), Fullan and Pomfret (1977), and Hurst (1978) have all stressed that the neglect of implementation issues is perhaps the major cause of the failure of innovative projects. At times there appears
to be an almost Machiavellian orientation to this literature; schools, teachers, and students are often seen as short-sighted, change-resistant forces who have to be co-opted into adopting innovations that will ultimately benefit them. However, despite the persistence of this orientation, there has also appeared a more liberal version of this trend, which emphasizes that local adopters are reasonable and informed people who know their own situation best. What is needed, in this view, are more locally appropriate innovations that can be implemented in a spirit of “mutual adaptation.”

Although this brief summary of recent shifts in the dominant view of educational innovations has focused on the United States, quite similar trends can be seen throughout the industrialized world (Husen, 1972; Weiler, 1973, 1979), as well as in most Third World countries (Hurst, 1978; Paulston, 1978; Weiler, 1978). In fact, these parallels are much broader than a first glance would suggest. For example, the conventional view of the relationship between education and national development has undergone similar shifts (Ashby, Klices, Pachico, & Wells, 1980): from the view that educational expansion by itself will lead to greater development and equity, to the view that any educational changes must be closely evaluated in terms of their efficiency and must be well targeted to the most disadvantaged groups to yield greater equity; from the view that technology transfer from richer to poorer countries will automatically increase well being, to the notion that technologies designed for a specific locale must be developed (Arndt, Dalrymple, & Ruttan, 1977); and from the view that more “modern” individuals will make modern innovations work (Rogers, 1962), to the view that individuals are already “rational” and the most significant barriers to the diffusion of innovations are institutional (Rogers, 1976; Schultz, 1964, 1975; Whyte, 1977).

We emphasize these cross-national and interdisciplinary parallels because the issues we wish to discuss have import beyond educational innovation, in that they affect one’s view of the nature of societal and individual change and progress (as recognized in some discussions of educational innovation (e.g., see Hurst, 1978; La Belle & Verhine, 1975a; Paulston, 1978). We contend that the dominant paradigm outlined above is an inadequate and inaccurate conceptual framework for understanding educational innovations, or social change generally. We will discuss why we believe this and will suggest how an alternative, radical paradigm offers a much better basis for understanding, and even developing, educational and social innovations.

Before beginning our analysis, there are several points we need to make. First, the word paradigm is used intentionally in Kuhn’s (1970) sense, in that we believe that both paradigms are fundamentally normative, that their respective descriptions of the world are inextricably mixed with their ideological view, and therefore neither is provable nor testable by any clear rules of scientific evidence or proof.

Second, the amalgamation of a diverse literature into two contrasting perspectives is clearly a simplification. For example, Paulston (1978), in categorizing the literature on educational reform, distinguishes four different theories within each of these two paradigms (which he calls the equilibrium and conflict paradigms), and certainly even more distinctions could be made. However, we contend that at this juncture it is more useful to integrate than to separate; an examination of the commonalities and complementarities within each perspective is necessary to understand and judge their relative worth.

Third, a comprehensive analysis of the issues we are raising is obviously beyond the scope of a short article. For this reason we will draw extensively on relevant
literature and concentrate on the areas we know best: the economics and sociology of education perspectives that underlie the dominant and radical paradigms.

Fourth, for analytical purposes we choose not to distinguish between educational reform and innovation. However, we acknowledge commonsense differences between reform and innovation; reform connoting a major commitment to alter the scope and direction of education (strategic), and innovation referring to specific changes in programmatic practices (tactical). We maintain that they should be viewed similarly by examining the complex economic, political, and social forces and processes through which they are generated, adopted, and implemented.

Finally, we wish to reemphasize both the scope and limitations of our paper. The scope is considerable: In our view, our social world cannot be well understood analytically without integrating perspectives from all the social and behavioral sciences. We use the term “political economy” as shorthand for this integrated view, but only from the perspective of the radical paradigm. There is the potential for an integrated, cross-disciplinary perspective in the dominant paradigm as well. However, for reasons we will examine, we reject it as applicable to the most important educational questions, and as problematic for even narrower questions. The limitations of this paper follow directly from its scope, and we can sketch only parts of what a “political economy of educational innovation” view would be. However, our task is made easier by what appear to be, for both paradigms, broad and significant similarities among disciplines. We begin by discussing the two perspectives in general, and then analyzing their different views of educational innovation.

The Dominant Paradigm: Human Capital Theory and the Functionalist-Modernity Perspective

Early statements concerning human capital theory typically argued that purposeful employment of well-conceived educational innovations is probably the best means for attaining developmental and egalitarian objectives in efficient and politically practicable ways (Becker, 1962; Schultz, 1962). This once plausible and still appealing contention is premised on the following set of interrelated assumptions.

First, as individuals become better educated, their productive contribution in the workplace typically is enhanced (Becker, 1975; Yotopoulos & Nugent, 1976). Consequently, as more and better educational opportunities are made accessible to a larger number of a nation’s citizens, the productive potential of the entire society is increased (Denison & Poulier, 1972). Thus, investment in education as human capital can be construed as a significant part of the entire capital accumulation process and a powerful determinant of growth.

Second, it is assumed that educational activities and the associated production of human capital are embedded in a basically efficient, competitive market organization of society’s production of goods and services. To the extent that competition is imperfect, or the market mechanism fails in any other way, it is assumed that the public sector corrects prices or production to accurately reflect societal evaluations. Within this neo-classical economics view of the world, individuals and firms, acting in their own best interests, make decisions that maximize society’s efficiency. Efficiency is not conceived of as a narrow technical question of a firm manager producing more “widgets” for less money, but as a broad societal evaluation question, in which all possible alternatives are simultaneously compared and judged according to
consumers' preferences in order to choose those that maximize social value. Within this context, educational innovations can be judged by their contribution to increased social efficiency. Thus, assessing the costs and productive contribution of education through social cost-benefit analysis becomes the *sine qua non* for evaluating the worth of educational innovations.

Finally, although equity considerations from this perspective are generally seen as completely separable from efficiency criteria, it is often held that more equitable access to educational opportunities will result in a more efficient allocation of social resources. That is, the existence of barriers preventing individuals from obtaining sufficient education to allow them to be most productive is inefficient, provided productivity gains are not outweighed by education's costs. Thus, by greater equality in education, we can enhance overall efficiency as well as reduce income inequalities among groups whose characteristics economists would consider irrelevant to productivity, such as race, sex, class, ethnicity, religion, and so forth.

Neo-classical economic theory outlines the processes by which individuals and public and private sector organizations act, interact, and change. The dominant perspectives within sociology offer a complementary fleshing out of this skeleton. While there are divergences, the significant commonalities in the sociology literature form what we shall term the functionalist-modernity perspective, combining theories of structural-functionalism, modernization, and social psychology.

Within the functionalist-modernity perspective, society functions to organize collective action, to maintain and transmit a shared belief system, and to coordinate the various subsystems and manage change. Society is seen as essentially stable and enduring. Dramatic changes can take place but for the most part the tendency is toward equilibrium. Change is viewed as the adaptive differentiation of subsystems to meet the challenges of the environment. Dramatic changes, such as revolutions, are often viewed as results of "breakdowns" or "malfunctions" in the system, and gradual, evolutionary change is typically deemed better.

Modern industrial society when compared to traditional society is viewed in terms of its increasingly elaborate and specialized division of labor, which requires participation by suitably trained and socialized individuals. Invention, technology, and innovation are viewed as the main forces for increasing the economic and social capacity of individuals, which is required for the developmental upgrading of society. The progress from a traditional to a more developed society is gradual but subject to policy efforts that speed the formation of more modern institutions and individuals (Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Kahl, 1968; Lerner, 1958; McClelland, 1961). Therefore, within the functionalist-modernity perspective, an educational system functions to develop the technical skills (Clark, 1962; Levy, 1966, 1972; Parsons, 1960, 1959) and the norms (Dreeben, 1968) necessary to the particular stage of a society's development. As a society becomes more modern, the educational system will reflect and reinforce this progress by modernizing individuals.

The complementary nature of the dominant economics and sociology perspectives have been discussed in many works (Bock, 1981; Gouldner, 1972; Hagen, 1962; Hagen & Velt, 1978; Hurst, 1978; La Belle & Verhine, 1975a; Paulston, 1978; Portes, 1976) and is especially evident in cross-disciplinary fields like communications.
However, it would be premature to view neo-classical economics and functionalist-modernity sociology as an already integrated whole. Inasmuch as the growing specialization of roles and institutions characterizes the modernizing society, so do these disciplines reflect the increasing specialization of most of the major fields of study today. While most sociologists and economists acknowledge the importance of each other's perspectives, little serious integration is evident in their work. Sociologists of economic development have tended to focus on the social correlates of development, while economists either ignore or critique sociological analysis of economic phenomena. Nevertheless, we would argue that the potential for integration is great.

The functionalist-modernity perspective provides a detailed discussion of the characteristics of individuals and institutions and their interactions that elaborates the simple behavioral and institutional assumptions that underlie neoclassical economics. Theories of productivity, economic growth, and general equilibrium fit very well with sociological approaches to modernization, organizational complexity, and social stratification. Moreover, the economics criterion of social system efficiency, and the related emphasis on the advantages of competitive capitalist organization of the private sector, minimally regulated by a neutral public sector, shares with sociology an underlying theoretical structure that emphasizes instrumental rationality and a technocratic ideology (Lenhardt, 1980). This includes a set of background assumptions that determine and direct both forms of inquiry toward technical relations of production, exchange relations, and "functional" interrelationships among discrete social and economic entities.

This complementarity goes one step further, in that we view both perspectives as having the same normative framework, despite frequent claims to a purely positivist stance (Blaug, 1976). Economists explicitly argue that efficiency should guide all organizational decisionmaking, and often sociologists accept this notion, at least implicitly. Societal development, seen as a gradual process of economic growth and modernization, underlies both disciplines' views of rational progress. Although greater equality also may be important, there is a shared assumption that some degree of inequality is both necessary and good for society: Economists argue for unequal social rewards as necessary motivational incentives (Friedman & Friedman, 1980; Gilder, 1981) and sociologists often stress the functional importance of inequality in assuring merit-based selection for positions of leadership and responsibility (Davis, 1949; Davis & Moore, 1945; Parsons, 1960). The most common equity goal for this dominant paradigm perspective is for a fair, meritocratic competition for the unequal social rewards offered.

An examination of educational systems provides a fertile field for the application of an integrated, dominant paradigm view. An educational system is seen as having socializing, integrative, and adaptive functions, which aid in the production of the human capital and in the creation of a social climate necessary to operate the socioeconomic system. Individuals become more productive by learning technical skills and modern attitudes that fit with the social organization of production activities. The educational system as a whole functions as the prime legitimator for the claim of meritocracy because it can provide an equitable and efficient means of allocating individuals to social positions.
From this perspective educational innovations are especially useful, because improving and expanding educational opportunities facilitates modernization and growth. All the most "liberal" trends in the recent innovation literature can be accommodated by the dominant paradigm, including the push toward appropriate technologies, the attention to implementation, and even the related need for the target audience's participation in policymaking. All can be assessed by the criterion of efficiency; even concerns with greater equality of outcomes can be studied by examining the efficiency of alternative programs targeted at disadvantaged groups.

Challenge and Alternative: The Radical Paradigm

Although the paradigm outlined above is dominant in the western world, there have always been challenges to its premises and orientation. Perhaps the most fundamental challenge has arisen out of concern for equality. The explicit efficiency-equity dichotomy of neo-classical economic theory, the ostensibly neutral analysis of stratification and social mobility by sociologists, and the often explicit justification of inequalities among individuals, groups, and countries, has generated growing criticism.

Within the dominant paradigm, the most conservative view is characterized by the dual belief that overall inequalities of rewards are useful to societal development and that individuals, groups, or countries that do not succeed in meritocratic competition have only their own deficits to blame (Gilder, 1981; Jensen, 1969). Liberals, on the other hand, argue that there are system imperfections, in terms of cultural and family norms, that may develop "culturally deprived" or "socially disadvantaged" individuals whose deficits may be ameliorated through the actions of the public sector, especially education.

Although the liberal camp sometimes questions the need for the large observed variance in social rewards (Thurow, 1980), it most often focuses on how the competition for these rewards could be made more meritocratic. There is substantial empirical evidence supporting the liberal view that meritocratic allocation of social rewards is far from the reality in both the developed and the developing world. For example, blacks and females get lower rewards even after controlling for the influence of "relevant" characteristics (Bluestone, Stephenson, & Murphy, 1973; Duncan, 1969; Thurow, 1975; Treiman & Terrell, 1975; Wolf & Fligstein, 1979). The same is true with respect to the socioeconomic class background of an individual (Morganstern, 1973; Wright & Perrone, 1977). Success in educational systems reflects this same race, sex, and class bias (Bowles, 1972; Bowles & Gintis, 1972; Duncan, Featherman, & Duncan, 1972; Featherman & Hauser, 1976; Kerckhoff & Campbell, 1977; Sewell, Hauser, & Featherman, 1976); and even educational reforms targeted at the "disadvantaged" often help the advantaged most (Rogers, 1976; Cook et al., 1975; Donohue, Tichenor, & Olien, 1975).

To the extent that such inequalities exist, the dominant paradigm must view them as irrational because they interfere with the efficient operation of an achievement-based technical division of social labor. This suggests the second major criticism levied against this perspective: It neglects the importance and nature of power differences in society. Neo-classical economists and functionalist-modernity theorists assume a world where there are no durable power imbalances to be exploited by individuals or private organizations. Although the public sector clearly has certain
powers, it is hypothesized to act in a neutral, technocratic manner to perform objectively valuable functions for society as a whole.

The central tenet of the radical paradigm, however, is that present social arrangements reflect historical and continuing conflict between groups with unequal power. The assumptions of neo-classical economics and the functionalist-modernity perspective are seen as almost completely inapplicable to a world dominated by the mechanisms and ideology of a monopoly form of capitalism. The maintenance of class-based power and inequality is seen as eminently functional to a system that is not simply oriented toward increasing production, but also toward the reproduction of inequitable social arrangements over time. Differential social rewards according to race, sex, and ethnicity are quite rational; even when they reduce production, they serve to fragment the working class to further reduce its power (Gintis, 1976).

The central radical question with regard to social organization is: For whom is it efficient or functional? Within this perspective education is still primarily a functional subsystem, but operating to maintain the advantage of the powerful. First, it teaches the skills and attitudes useful to the capitalist organization of production. The importance to production of class-based differences in personality trait formation is stressed. Radicals characterize these differences in a way that clearly emphasizes the negative impact of capitalism: Schooling aids in teaching youngsters to be punctual, respond well to authority, exercise a limited degree of creativity, and work for extrinsically defined rewards (Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Gintis, 1971a). Those who leave school do not find themselves meritocratically competing for places in an efficiently functioning, competitive structure, but struggling in a world of conflict, power, and prejudice (Papagiannis, Fuller, & Bickel, 1981; Willis, 1977). Access to labor market opportunities is segmented by factors unrelated to productivity (Carnoy, 1980b), unemployment levels serve to control workers, and the use of machines is generally favored to the use of labor.

In this radical view, education operates as much or more to reproduce social structure as it does to increase productivity. The educational system is seen as part of both the basic economic production structure and the superstructural institutions, like religion, family, government, and mass media, which aid in the reproduction of a system legitimating ideology. Thus, to maintain inequalities, education creates and reinforces different skills and attitudes among different classes of students: rich versus poor, urban versus rural, men versus women, black versus white, and so on. Yet at the same time, the educational system as a whole acts to maintain the myths of meritocracy and democracy that are so useful to system reproduction.

The radical emphases on power, conflicting interests, and the interaction of production/accumulation and reproduction/legitimacy goals yields an attention to relatively unexamined educational (and other social system) phenomena. For instance, within the dominant paradigm, expertise is a “product” needed for the efficient functioning of even more complex social organizations. However, for radical analysts, expertise is not a neutral, technical requisite of society, but is both a set of competencies, defined in the interests of those with greater power, and a set of social relationships which validates these definitions. All this is intimately linked to the educational system, which creates and legitimates experts (Apple, 1978b, 1979; Bock, 1981).

This view of the ideological nature of what an educational system produces has focused radical attention on the form schooling takes, as well as its overt substance.
The nature of the "hidden" curriculum of schooling is basic to radical analysis of the attitudes formed in schools that are useful to capitalist system production and reproduction (Apple, 1978a; Gintis, 1971a). The rationalistic thrust of the dominant paradigm yields a treatment of forms of social organization as technical, least-cost decision questions necessary to achieve explicit social goals most efficiently. To the contrary, radicals argue that many goals and supporting processes are hidden, and that the rationalistic core of the dominant paradigm itself serves as a legitimating ideology (Papagiannis, Bickel, & Milton, 1981).

Some of the most recent work in this area is especially significant. Apple (1980, 1981), building on more general analyses (Braverman, 1974; Burawoy, 1979; Edwards, 1979; Habermas, 1975; Jameson, 1971), examines changes in the nature of control of the schooling process, whereby control has moved from a relatively simple, direct form to a more technical, bureaucratic form in which power is "made invisible" by incorporating it into the very structure of the work itself" (1980, p. 6).

This concern for form as well as substance makes radical theorists also examine the technical language of the dominant educational paradigm. Habermas (1971) and others have analyzed how the purposive rationality of language reflects and reinforces social structures and individual consciousness based on technical instrumentality. With respect to education, Apple (1978b) argues that:

The language of learning tends to be apolitical and ahistorical, thus hiding the complex nexus of political and economic power and resources that lies behind a considerable amount of curriculum organization and selection. (p. 372)

Levin (1980b) makes a similar point with respect to educational planning:

If planners and reformers use such terminology as change agents, managed change, and planned change, they and their followers tend to believe that the use of the language and the logic of rational change imply a control of the change process itself. In contrast a review of the educational reform and implementation literature suggests that the rhetoric of reform is probably its most important manifestation, rather than the change it claims to produce. (p. 34)

What is contended here is that technicism, which Stanley (1978, p. xiii) defines as the metaphorical misapplication of the assumptions, terms, and linguistic habits of science and technology, obscures our understanding of the social, economic, and political character of education. Only through a careful examination of educational language can we prevent what Stanley aptly describes as "subjugation by metaphor."9

The radical view of the completely mythical nature of "objectivity" and "neutrality" in educational substance and form yields a focus on the nature of contemporary ideology. This attention to how reproduction is accomplished yields a much more complex picture than the dominant paradigm's dismissal of the question through the explanatory mechanisms of socialization and rationality. Critical sociologists have stressed how ideological hegemony depends on control of the cultural apparatus of society (Althusser, 1971; Gramsci, 1971; Habermas, 1976; Offe, 1972). The gatekeeping and legitimating roles of education make it an important cultural apparatus:
Education systems themselves are thus, in a sense, ideologics. They rationalize in modern terms and remove from sacred and primordial explanations the nature and organization of personnel and knowledge in modern society. (Meyer, 1977, p. 66)

From this perspective hegemony is maintained, not by a conspiracy of "ruling interests," but by the very logic of the structure of social institutions (Willis, 1977).

Thus, for radical analysts most educational innovations will reinforce the controlling position of the most privileged and powerful social groups and contribute little or nothing to attaining a more equitable and democratic society (Levin, 1977b).

However, this analysis has been criticized by both dominant and radical theorists, who have emphasized its sometimes deterministic, mechanistic nature, and its view of the hopelessness of accomplishing significant educational changes without first changing the whole societal structure (Anderson, 1981; Apple, 1981). Indeed, this criticism is not completely unfair, in that most radical work in the late sixties and early seventies emphasized the correspondence of school structures to social structures and the need to look outside the schools to understand educational successes and failures. Nonetheless, there is a long history of radical thought that rejects the mechanically deterministic correspondence view, and the past 5 years has seen an increasing emphasis on the role and nature of contradiction and conflict.

Marx emphasized the notion of contradiction as the primary force for social change. Conflict and struggle are not mere reflectors of different individual preferences, but grow out of systemic contradictions, endogenous to the social structure, that are manifest in the functioning of all subsystems and that can be seen both in the abstract and in the concrete reality of our daily lives. Under capitalism there is a basic contradiction between system production and reproduction; the capital accumulation process requires a set of social relations with which labor is treated as an object of profit generation, which inherently conflicts with the need of human beings to have meaningful lives and work. Moreover, contradictions are not only a part of the basic economic structures, but are present in all superstructural institutions, as the Frankfurt school of radical sociologists has long emphasized (Arato & Gebhardt, 1978; Connerton, 1976; this was true even for Marx, see Ollman, 1973).

The attention to the correspondence of subsystems, the contradictions between and within systems, and the dialectical tension between them is at the root of the radical paradigm's explanatory power. The notions of contradiction are becoming more central to radical analysis of education. Under capitalism, the potential for contradiction between production/accumulation and reproduction/legitimacy goals is always there, and becomes more serious in times of structural crisis, which for many radicals characterizes our current historical period (Union for Radical Political Economy, 1975). Education both corresponds to the social organization of capitalism and contradicts it. Radical analyses of education in the late sixties and early seventies often did reflect this duality, but stressed correspondence (Bourdieu, 1973; Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Carnoy, 1974; Ginsburg & Meyenn, 1978; Karier, 1972; Katz, 1968).

criticizes Meyer (1977) on exactly this point: The educational structure does tend to legitimate persons, knowledge, and system ideology, but this always takes place "within the political context of struggle between rival interest groups" (p. 38). The struggle of the working class and the poor has forced the expansion of educational opportunities beyond the ability or desire of capitalist organization to "pay up" on these claims. The resulting educational inflation and credentialism is the result of this contradiction, yielding increased questioning of the legitimating ideology (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979; Collins, 1979; Dore, 1976).

Levin and Carnoy (in press), Bock (1981), Bowles and Gintis (1976), Carnoy and Levin (1976), and many other radical writers consistently have pointed out how the content of education can be contradictory and therefore liberating. The ability of slaves to read was often considered dangerous for this reason; likewise the inculcation of democratic values and critical thinking can challenge a system of economic authoritarianism. Bowles and Gintis (1981), in an article that explicitly criticizes their earlier correspondence emphasis, focus on how the liberal democratic concepts of person rights embodied in educational curricula contradict education's implicit support for the property rights emphasis necessary to capitalism. Apple (1980) similarly points out how "progressive elements within the content of curriculum [can] . . . contradict the messages of the form" (p. 25).

Educational systems, especially within the liberal democratic states, have some degree of autonomy because the state is a primary locus for struggle between conflicting groups (Bowles & Gintis, 1981; Carnoy, 1980a). As Apple (1981, p. 27) argues, "Hegemony isn't an already accomplished social fact," but has to be continuously maintained and created (see also Gittin, 1979). Reproduction is always contested and ideologies are filled with contradictions. They are not coherent sets of beliefs. It is probably wrong to think of them as only beliefs at all. They are instead sets of lived meanings, practices, and social relations that are often internally inconsistent. They have elements within themselves that see through to the heart of the unequal benefits of a society and at one and the same time tend to reproduce the ideological relations and meanings that maintain the hegemony of dominant classes. (Apple, 1981, p. 9)

Thus Apple (1978b) argues that the radical paradigm does not maintain that either culture or consciousness is mechanistically determined (in the strong sense of that term) by economic structure. Rather, it seeks both to bring to a level of awareness and to make historically and empirically problematic the dialectical relationship between cultural control and distribution and economic and political stratification. (p. 377)

Education therefore must be analyzed by combining the correspondence principle with subtle attention to the "contradictions, conflicts, mediations, and especially resistances" (Apple, 1981, p. 19) specific to the educational process. We will try to show how this more sophisticated radical analysis offers a much better explanation of educational innovation processes and products than the dominant paradigm.
Paradigm Conflict and the Stages of Innovation

There is a multitude of possible typologies of educational innovation products and processes (Havelock, 1971; Huberman, 1973; Hurst, 1978; Pincus, 1974; Rogers, 1962; Zaltman, Florio, & Sikorski, 1977). For our exposition of the differences between the dominant and radical paradigms, we have chosen a process typology, but we could also have chosen a product-oriented one. Our categorization, like any other, is relatively arbitrary; we will examine issues concerning the generation, adoption and diffusion, implementation, and evaluation of educational innovations. We do not believe these categories are separate, nor do they necessarily form a sequence. However, they provide a useful rubric to develop a more concrete understanding of the paradigm conflict we have been discussing.

The Generation of Innovation

Within the perspective of the dominant paradigm, innovations are generated through the interaction of creative individuals with a structural system of incentives. As Galbraith (1973) points out, the neo-classical economics view of the structural side is somewhat ambiguous:

One line of argument, descending from the late Joseph A. Schumpeter, holds that oligopoly and monopoly are technically more progressive than competitive enterprise. Because of their monopoly profits they can spend more for technical development; they are encouraged to do so because their monopoly power allows them to keep for themselves the resulting gains. The contrary and more conventional view is that firms with monopoly power are likely to be backward; they use their power to repress or suppress invention. An old economic cliché holds that the monopolist yearns for nothing so much as a quiet life. (p. 26)

Similar reasoning holds that perfectly competitive firms have no incentive to generate innovations, because with free knowledge available to all, they cannot capture any of its benefits; yet at the same time, if an innovation is generated that can increase productivity, they must adopt it to survive (Mansfield, 1963).

Despite this ambiguity, some issues are clear. For Schumpeter the entrepreneur was the prime mover behind economic development, generated by waves of innovation followed by waves of investment. Economists see entrepreneurs as creative individuals who envision new products that the public wants, or new processes to make old products better or more cheaply. This view is complemented by the social psychological work of people like McClelland and Inkeles who see cultural forms and social policies, like "modernity" and the teaching of the drive for achievement, as ways of developing entrepreneurial or change-oriented behavior. The other important component of the dominant perspective is that, in addition to the spontaneous action of individuals, innovations can be generated consciously and rationally, by investment in scientific activities.

This overall outlook pervades most of the literature and practice of educational innovation. The entrepreneurial ability necessary to innovation is seen as encouraged by much of the overt and hidden curriculum of schooling, and served as an important rationale for school expansion and the growing interest in nonformal education (Schultz, 1975). Pincus (1974) analyzes local school systems' inability to generate,
adapt, or implement innovations in terms of the lack of competitive market structure. Specific educational innovations, such as voucher plans or tax schemes to aid private schools, are justified on their ability to generate greater innovative behavior (Friedman, 1962; Levin, 1980a).

Perhaps most important for the generation of innovations, nationally financed and directed educational research occurs on a large scale throughout the world, justified by a large academic literature that appeals to rationality and efficiency (Rivlin, 1971). Given the multitude of educational problems pointed out by Coombs (1968) and others, national and international agencies have spent millions upon millions of dollars in a purposeful effort to generate innovative solutions involving educational television and radio, computer-assisted instruction, packaged curricula, nonformal education, competency-based education, comprehensive secondary schools, and so forth. Through these R&D efforts, it is argued that we can develop new ways of reducing costs and improving the internal and external efficiency of our educational systems.

From a radical perspective it is also true that innovations are generated by the interaction of individuals with societal structures. However, individual consciousness is formed through social processes specific to a given historical situation, and innovations must be analyzed within these historically determined structures. This is not to deny the role of individual creativity and genius in generating innovations, but this creativity and genius takes place within a socially defined and quite limited context. Thus, radicals see most innovation as generated within the overall structure and constraints of monopoly/corporate capitalism. There is little discussion of whether competitive structures would foster more innovation because this view of social reality argues that true competition is wanted by neither business nor government and rarely exists (although some radicals do support calls for an educational voucher system).

Most important, in a system organized to accumulate and maintain private wealth for an elite, innovation has nothing to do with social efficiency or development. As Galbraith (1973) argues, many of society's most creative individuals are generating innovations to make a sweeter smelling deodorant or a better advertisement for toothpaste. Their work is oriented to anything that will promote sales, which often includes rendering previous products (even their own) obsolete. Little attention is given to product quality, while much attention is given to ways to tie emotions to products and to promote a culture idolizing "newness" for its own sake.

Innovations to reduce costs also are promoted, especially if they are directed toward replacing labor with capital. This capital-intensive bias is useful to individual firms in that labor is the main "difficulty" in organizing production, and fewer workers means easier roll. At a systemic level it is useful in that it keeps wage demands down and discourages unionization through the generation of a body of under- and unemployed labor. Even in a dominant paradigm sense, this is far from efficient. Efficiency is further undermined by the almost complete lack of attention of these cost-reducing innovations to the social costs of the environmental damage they create.

Within the public sector much of the generation of innovations is also directed toward selling an image. There, too, cost-reducing innovations, especially to the extent that they result from interaction with the private sector, have a capital intensive
bias. Galbraith (1973) describes how the mutuality of public and private sector interests yields a government-sponsored innovation process that

is highly organized and wholly deliberate. The purpose of a given innovation is, overtly, to render obsolete the preceding product and thus to create a demand for the newly developed product. Work then proceeds (or frequently will be already in progress) on the next innovation with a view to rendering the new one obsolete and thus providing a market for the next product. The procedure here described reaches its full perfection in the case of weapons and weapon systems. (p. 152)

Apple (1980) describes how similar processes are operating as business moves into the educational field. Packaged curricula are developed by the private sector for the same reason textbooks are: Schools are a lucrative market. They are marketed aggressively in the same way as cameras and razors are: By selling you one, you become a lifetime purchaser of film or razor blades. As Apple says,

In the curricular systems we are considering here, the purchase of the modules (though certainly not cheap by any stretch of the imagination) with their sets of standardized disposable material means the same thing. One “needs” to continue to purchase the work and test sheets, the chemicals, the correctly colored and shaped paper, the publishers’ replacement of outmoded material and lessons. (p. 16)

From the radical perspective the generation of many educational innovations is directly influenced by corporate interests. This is perhaps clearest in the development of “new” educational technologies using satellites, communications, computers, television, and radio. Even when capital is not directly substituted for labor, the idea of control of the worker and workplace can be important. Apple (1981, p. 31) argues that especially important is the shift in the control of knowledge yielded by the “divorce of conception from execution” that “tends to guide the corporate production process,” increasingly evidenced in the workplace (Edwards, 1975) and the schools. The result can be a “deskilling” of teachers, for example, by the use of prepackaged curriculums, touted as “teacher-proof,” with almost complete specification of a teacher’s every move in the classroom, and then “reskilling” the teacher into a less autonomous classroom manager, using techniques of behavioral modification (Apple & Feinberg, 1980).

Most educational innovations generated by the public sector are seen as directed toward creating an image consonant with the dominant paradigm “ideology of accountability, cost-effectiveness, and meeting ‘industrial needs’” (Apple, 1981, p. 33). This is not to deny that contradiction also plays a part: Innovations aimed at expanding formal schooling, the development of nonformal alternatives, the comprehensive secondary school, or the “free” school movement all reflect the outcome of contradictory forces. Actually, the political power of the poorer classes has grown to such an extent that generating greater equality has served as the ideology justifying many educational innovations. However, far from being the net technical search for efficient and equitable innovations that yield stable progress, as the dominant paradigm sees it, the entire process of innovation is carefully controlled, in overt and
covert ways. Despite the struggles arising from systemic contradictions and the surface progressiveness of many of these innovations, the control operates mostly in the interests of the privileged, as we will discuss.

**Innovation Adoption and Diffusion**

We consider the issues of initial innovation adoption together with the issues of widespread diffusion of particular innovations because both are treated similarly within both paradigms. Moreover, because it is difficult to separate some adoption and diffusion issues from implementation issues, many factors relevant to the next section will be introduced here.

In general, within the dominant paradigm much more attention is paid to innovation adoption, implementation, and evaluation than to the generation of innovations. The dominant ideology argues that innovations will develop "naturally" from the private sector's creative search for profits and the public sector's rationality, and therefore, most attention should be paid to removing any barriers to getting those adopted that are evaluated as good.

Nevertheless, mainstream economics has paid little attention to the adoption, diffusion, or implementation of innovations. This is primarily because competitive market theory explicitly assumes that these are not issues: the assumptions of perfect knowledge of all alternative technologies by a private sector forced (by perfect competition) to use efficient innovations in order to survive, and of a public sector guided by social rationality, makes the adoption and implementation of any demonstrably beneficial innovation immediate and total.

Neo-classical economists do point out that some sectors of the economy will feel increasing pressures to adopt more efficient technologies due to the dynamics of the market system. Baumol (1967), with specific reference to education, examines how technologically "progressive" sectors, which usually refers to capital-intensive ones like manufacturing, drive up the wages paid to labor, not only for themselves, but for technologically "unprogressive" sectors that are mainly labor-intensive, like service industries. Thus the real costs of education and other labor-intensive systems are constantly rising, driving educators to search for innovations that move education beyond the "handicraft stage" (Coombs, 1968, p. 7; see also Haggerty, 1973).

A quite complementary focus is offered by sociologists, communications theorists, social psychologists, and geographers, who dispense with the perfect knowledge and rationality assumptions of economists, and who attempt to study how the real world processes of adoption and diffusion take place (Brown, 1968a, 1968b; Cohen & Garet, 1975; Hagerstrand, 1967; House, 1974; McClelland, 1961; Rogers & Shoemaker, 1971). Everett Rogers' work has been particularly influential and has served as the model for much work on the adoption of educational innovations.

While educational policies in the fifties and early sixties suffered from the belief that adoption was not an issue, in that exemplary, model programs were seen as "naturally" transferable (Bowers, 1978; House, 1974), more recent work has recognized that there are barriers to the adoption of educational innovations. Perhaps the most comprehensive examination of the dominant paradigm view of educational innovation adoption and diffusion is provided by Hurst (1978) and Pincus (1974). Although both discussions are oriented toward implementation, they are equally relevant to adoption. Hurst (1978) frames the basic questions asked from this perspective:
How do potential adopters decide whether to adopt or reject a particular innovation, and how is it that they sometimes make adaptive and sometimes maladaptive decisions? How do the different contexts in which potential adopters find themselves influence the outcome of the decision process? (p. 46)

In about a hundred pages Hurst discusses the literature concerning almost every type of factor that can be related to innovation adoption (and implementation). He begins by examining the "doctrines of innate and inbred conservatism" (p. 27) and rejecting them, as has the dominant paradigm generally. Adopters (farmers, tribesmen, urban dwellers, teachers, schools, etc.) are no longer viewed as ignorant, tradition-bound, lazy, and irrational, but are seen as reasonable and rational, even if often risk-averse (Andreski, 1972; Schultz, 1964). Hurst then goes on to discuss a broad range of variables associated with potential adopters, their environments, and the nature of the innovation, such as the following:

- Psychocultural characteristics: sex, authoritarianism, ambition, independence, McClelland's need for achievement, status, religion, education, trust, and risk-aversion.
- Social structure and organizational characteristics: leadership, hierarchy, the nature of the reward system, mechanistic vs. organic organizations, static vs. dynamic organizational styles, centralization, complexity, formalization, and organizational climate in general.
- Economic and environmental characteristics: technical and financial problems, geography, climate, and perspectives on benefits vs. costs.
- Characteristics of innovations: familiarity, relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability.

Although there are many dominant paradigm theorists who overwork one or two variables and ignore all others, as Hurst justifiably criticizes, the prevailing opinion is that we must combine all the relevant variables into a model of general or specific innovation adoption behavior. Hurst concludes by examining a number of more comprehensive approaches, such as those offered by Rogers and Shoemaker (1971), Havelock et al. (1969), Zaltman et al. (1977), Berman and McLaughlin (1974-78), Downs and Mohr (1976), Louck and Hall (1977), and his own orientation toward a decision analysis approach. There have been some generally accepted empirical results from this literature (such as the characteristics of early adopters, see LaBelle & Verhine, 1975a, pp. 14-15), but, for the most part, the dominant paradigm issues of to what extent which variables are significant in which situations remain as questions to be researched, as Hurst and others recommend.

From a more critical perspective, yet still within the dominant paradigm, Pincus (1974) concentrates on the implications of the market and bureaucratic structures that form the context for innovation adoption decisionmaking. Local school systems in the United States are characterized as bureaucratically organized monopolies of a peculiar nature: They are not market oriented; they have public sector protection and a captive clientele; they are subject to public scrutiny; and neither goals nor the means to attain them are clear (also see Levin, 1976a). Thus, the adoption of
educational innovations in this context will have little, if anything, to do with improving efficiency. Pincus argues that adoption will be based primarily on the promotion of bureaucratic stability and safety, on the need to respond to external pressure, and on the approval of bureaucratic peers. Often this will lead to the adoption of innovations that raise costs, but that appear progressive and thus improve the image of the school system. Faddism, the constant search for newness with no attempt at evaluation, will be common. However, schools will resist innovations unpopular with any major constituency, radical changes in educational institutions, or attempts at genuine collaboration on policymaking with new social groups, or efforts to bring about major changes in instructional methods or organizational structure.

The early view that adoption of “sound” educational innovations would be immediate and total prevailed for many years and still characterizes many projects. Televisions or computers are put in the classroom, new curricula materials are produced, duplicated, and distributed, school buildings are constructed, all with the assumption that once they are in place they will be used. Baumol’s logic appears so compelling that economists still find it difficult to understand why, given the relative decline in the prices of hardware compared to teachers over the last few decades, the substitution of teachers with other educational technologies has not become more widespread (Jamison, Klees, & Wells, 1978).

The more recent recognition that adoption is problematic has led to more careful attention to the many factors, mentioned above, that can influence adoption. For example, educational television and radio projects now look more closely at problems like material delivery, clear signals, pacing of the content, and equipment maintenance. Initial diffusion efforts are often specifically targeted at those opinion leaders or more “modern” individuals who decisionmakers hope will adopt innovations more quickly, serving as an example to others. Finally, the increasing recognition of the pervasive barriers to some types of innovation that are rooted in the nature of educational organizations has led to interest in changing these structures; for example, through more modern training of teachers and administrators, the introduction of an educational reform, sometimes supported by a “catalyst” like educational television, or, more radically, through a voucher plan.

From the perspective of the radical paradigm, innovation adoption decisions do not reflect any valid conception of “social rationality” or “consumer sovereignty,” but result from the logic of unequal power relations within capitalism. Public and private sector decisionmaking will yield substantial innovative effort, but directed primarily toward increasing capitalist wealth through developments in such areas as new weapon systems and toothpaste, planned obsolescence, and an emphasis on image, generally yielding greater unemployment and a deteriorating environment (Galbraith, 1973; Sweezy, 1958).

With respect to education innovations, radicals view the dominant approach to understanding adoption (and implementation) as based on individual-level psychological reductionism (Bock, 1981). Characteristics of individual actors are emphasized and the structural properties of the social system are neglected. When structure is considered, it is usually looked at as simply another set of variables to be codified, completely devoid of its social system context (e.g., Hurst, 1978, pp. 46-47).

While Pincus’ (1974) attention to structural influences is more satisfying, it stops far short of the radical view. Pincus concludes by acknowledging the radical para-
digm, characterizes it as saying that schools cannot be changed without revolutionizing society, and then goes on to make a series of recommendations about how, by changing incentive structures, R&, and evaluation, we can make schools "become more open to a variety of innovations" (p. 128).

The basic problem with Pincus is the one Gintis (1971b) analyzed so well with reference to Charles Silberman's Crisis in the Classroom (1970).

Turning to the causes of unequal and repressive education and the reasons for the failure of reform, however, Silberman betrays the basic weakness of the liberal educational theorist: a consistent and thorough refusal to analyze the links between the educational system and the relations of capitalist economic organization. (pp. 41-42)

The question for Pincus, prior to making recommendations, should be why is education organized so that it responds mainly to external pressure, threats to safety or image, and peer approval? As Gintis says about Silberman, this blindness leads him to attribute the problems observed to errors, irrationality, and mindlessness.

Thus Silberman [and Pincus] finds himself in the unenviable position, having described all previous attempts at reform as failures, of entertaining the most positive enthusiasm for future attempts at reform. (p. 43)

From the radical perspective the problems seen by Silberman and Pincus are not system imperfections or failures, but function logically, albeit sometimes contradictorily, in the interests of the more powerful societal classes. The dominant paradigm's decontextualized examination of the characteristics of adopters, innovations, and environments that make for successful use of innovations will tell us little about why educational innovations will not do much about low achievement, poverty, sexism, racism, or inequality in general. Nor will it tell us why certain innovations are promoted, legitimated, funded, and disseminated.

Thus radical historians have been revising our view of why past educational innovations, like the common school movement in the United States, have been adopted (Karier, 1972; Katz, 1968). The issue of who adopts first and how the innovation spreads is not seen as important as why a particular innovation becomes a focus of educational interest. To understand why international agencies are promoting the use of capital intensive educational technologies (e.g., Henry Kissinger, while Secretary of State, did a lot to sell the idea of communications satellites' utility for rural development in the Third World), it is necessary to understand the relationship of these agencies to capitalist interests (Lappé, Collins, & Fowler, 1978). To understand why competency-based education, education by objectives, and packaged curricula are currently in vogue, Apple (forthcoming) examines why technical knowledge is given high status and why there is a tendency for greater control through the stress on teachable and testable knowledge. From a radical perspective it is these structural issues that should be the subject of study, not the characteristics of individual adopters.

The Implementation of Innovations

As we said at the beginning of the previous section, it is difficult to separate adoption of innovation issues from those of implementation. The current focus on
implementation in the dominant paradigm literature reflects a limited definition of adoption that has grown mostly out of empirical observation. Individuals or groups often say they are adopting or have adopted an innovation when observation shows that they have not or that they have implemented it in a form quite different than intended. The source of concern is that “we cannot conclude that an innovation is ineffective ... if it has not been effectively ‘implemented’” (Hurst, 1978, p. 3).

The general dominant paradigm approach to the implementation of innovations is again based on the interaction of structural incentives with individual actions. It is either assumed that society as a whole and its institutions are efficiently and rationally organized or that the “imperfections” that yield inefficiency must be removed. Given a basically rational social structure, individuals can be taught the technical and social skills necessary to formulate and implement efficient policies. This orientation, buttressed by economic, sociological, and political science theories, forms the core of the implementation training—the curriculum of modern schools of management and administration.

Business school curricula and the professional literature on administration are based most heavily on the efficiency/rationality theories and methods of neoclassical economics. Typically, these are coupled with complementary sociological perspectives that reflect over-simplifications and misinterpretations of Weber's work on organization and rationality.15 The issues discussed are directly related to those being examined in the educational innovation implementation literature today, such as the nature of efficient organizational structures; how decentralization can lead to optimization; the criteria and methods for selecting the most appropriate technologies; the management of workers, with the explicit contrast between the Theory X/ Taylorism/scientific management school and the Theory Y/McGregor-Likert-Argyris/humanist school; and the associated discussions of the strategy of participative management. From this perspective, “optimal” innovation implementation is brought about by rational, knowledgeable administrators, who work to maximize profits or net social benefits, and to change structural imperfections.

In education, this same perspective is reflected in the view of barriers to the implementation of innovations as “intervening variables,” coming between adoption and the attainment of desired outcomes (e.g., Fullan, 1978, p. 135). Thus we need to change incentive structures and management strategies to remove these barriers. The main objectives of this literature have been to conceptualize and empirically test theories of implementation (Downs & Mohr, 1976; Fullan, 1978; Fullan & Hmft, 1977; Hurst, 1978; Pincus, 1974). There are two general negative conclusions from this literature:

- that the basic implementation strategies of using rewards and punishments, of communicating new ideas for innovation, and of employing “change agents” to promote the process have had quite limited success (Hurst, 1978; La Belle & Verhine, 1975a); and
- that we are only beginning to formulate a theory of the complex set of interrelated factors that affect innovation (the same interminable list as those cited above in the adoption section), for both developed and developing countries.16

Despite the general agreement on the lack of an adequate theory and the multitude of potentially relevant implementation variables, there have been two main reactions...
within the dominant paradigm to the failures or innovations. The conservative reaction, that potential adopters are irrational, tradition bound, and lazy, seems to be waning, at least in the professional literature, although our research and evaluation work in this country and many others suggests that this opinion is still quite common.

The liberal reaction sees the failure of innovative efforts as predominantly due to imperfections of two kinds. The first we examined in the adoption section, focusing on structural problems that do not yield sufficient incentives to innovate, or that furnish incentives that yield the "wrong kinds of innovations" (e.g., faddishness, attention to image, etc.). From this perspective, adopters are resistant to many changes, not because they are irrational or lazy, but because structural imperfections cause them to have different motivations and goals than those promoting the innovation.

The second liberal reaction is that a primary reason innovations are not implemented is not because of divergence of incentives, but because the innovations are often "inappropriate." This growing literature can be characterized by two complementary assumptions: that researchers are too far removed from innovation applications to develop good ones, and that local potential adopters know most about their own situation. The first has led to general calls for regional and local R&D centers to develop relevant technologies or to modify those being transferred (Arndt et al., 1977). Within education, Pincus (1974) argues that:

"R&D organizations should clearly do their best to work closely with school administrators ... considering the characteristic remoteness from the client ... it can also serve as a form of reality therapy for the researcher." (p. 123)

The second assumption has changed the whole tenor of the implementation literature, moving from a view that demanded fidelity to the original innovative idea to a "mutual adaptation" perspective, through which the innovation disseminators, adopters, and the innovation itself all change in mutually beneficial ways (Berman & McLaughlin, 1974-78; Fullan & Pomfret, 1977; Hurst, 1978; Pincus, 1974). Although these authors cite many possible strategies that may be used to facilitate this adaptation, perhaps those most currently "fashionable" (Hurst, 1978) go under the rubric of "participation in decision making" (p. 22).

What is meant by participation varies considerably. For some, an increasing emphasis on needs assessment is sufficient. Hurst (1978), reviewing the participation literature, concludes "What appears to be desirable is that decision makers should encourage subordinate involvement in innovation appraisal of innovations, and take note of the judgments that are formed" (pp. 24-25). Somewhat less limited is Pincus' (1974) closing recommendation that "widespread dissemination of information" related to innovation experiments can yield greater "public participation in an informal decision-making process" (p. 139). Of greater substance is growing interest in more complete participation, in which potential innovation adopters/users decide or co-decide about implementation, planning, management, and even development (Erasme & Dubell, 1980; Fullan & Pomfret, 1977; Hall, 1975, 1978; House, 1978; Weiler, 1978).

In practice, this concern with implementation has stimulated various efforts. Educational administration programs have been revamped to parallel those of business schools which, along with the establishment of a growing number of joint...
programs between schools of education and business, is designed to promote greater rationality and intelligence in institutionalizing educational innovations over the long run. Most innovation projects funded by national and international agencies now explicitly discuss the need for attention to implementation strategies and issues, and often require at least an initial needs assessment of the target groups so that appropriate innovations will be developed. And sometimes participation takes a more substantial form in terms of parent involvement in school system decisionmaking or small farmers working with agricultural R&D centers.

From the perspective of the radical paradigm, the major criticism of the dominant view of innovation implementation again centers on the lack of "neutrality" in decisionmaking. The concept of structural "imperfection" masks the fact that most of those imperfections are quite useful for some societal groups; "imperfections" that make it unlikely that schooling becomes more equal or liberating serve dominant class interests. The whole idea of restructuring education so that it is more "socially efficient" is impossible because social efficiency is a false concept. There is no overarching consensus of societal well being, despite what neo-classical economists profess to believe, in a world in which classes of people's interests are directly contradictory. From this perspective, what is taught in programs of public and private organization management is an ideology useful to system production and reproduction.

The explanation that innovations have failed because adopters are traditionally or inherently resistant to change is seen as a piece of "self-interested self-deception" (Hurst, 1978, p. 34; see also Frank, 1971) and part of the "blame the victim" myth propagated to justify inequality. The more recent dominant paradigm explanations offer little improvement. The rekindling of interest in the transfer of technology, this time as so-called "appropriate" technology, ignores the likelihood that the central question "appropriate for whom?" will be answered in favor of those already privileged. Moreover, the problems facing the world's poor, including those who are classified as educational failures, are not due to inappropriate technology but to an inequitable distribution of power and resources.

For example, one of the authors recently worked on a project in Guatemala aimed at improved agricultural education and information for poor, rural farmers (Klees & Wells, in press). The idea of recommending technologies appropriate to the availability of credit and inputs was paramount, but results did not indicate any clear improvement, perhaps because the time period of the experiment was too short or because variations in microclimate and other local conditions made many recommendations dysfunctional. But more important, it was clear to everyone that the problems facing these poor Latino and Indian farmers stemmed from their being crowded on a few hectares per family of the poorest farmland in the country, and no program to improve their productivity was going to make much of a difference (see also Whyte, 1977).

Dominant paradigm strategies promoting greater participation in decisionmaking are also viewed quite skeptically. The weaker versions of participation, such as needs assessment or consultation with the target audience, suffer from the false assumption of the socially rational decisionmaker. Again, it is not that some decisionmakers are not well intentioned, but that there is no such thing as social rationality. Within the dominant paradigm, the legitimacy of the decisionmaking structure is basically taken as given.
The call for a more complete participatory strategy, while being a major part of radical policy recommendations (Levin, 1980c), is basically viewed as a deception. What happens in practice is either token participation or a management "sham" to co-opt others into believing they are participating, when in fact they have little or no power. Moreover, the calls for full participation are not very strong. Fullan and Pomfret (1977) say:

Let us be clear that we are not suggesting that local users determine all innovation decisions. In fact, national social mandates may require strong federal initiative. (p. 393)

House (1974) argues that while lip service is paid to greater interaction, all new directions in U.S. education R&D "serve to enhance the ties between researchers, developers, and practitioners without shifting any initiatory power from the planner's to the practitioner's side of the spectrum" (p. 241). Perhaps Hurst (1978) is most representative of the majority view within the dominant paradigm when he unabashedly criticizes full participation strategies:

If we mean "power equalization" [by participation] ... then there is little evidence to suggest that this helps implementation, and it may even hinder it. (p. 24)

He approvingly quotes two studies that supposedly suggest that "democratic managerial methods ... are inefficient because they are excessively time-consuming, and also socially divisive because they exacerbate and polarize differences of opinion" (p. 23). He then adds:

In fact, if people are genuinely allowed to participate in decisions concerning innovations, they may use this opportunity to express and win support for their opposition to the change, or even to veto it. (p. 23)

"Efficiency for whom?!" is again the question to ask. Although Hurst may be an extreme example, his paper is an explicit statement of what is implicit in most of the dominant paradigm literature: Despite much lip service to mutual adaptation, the orientation seems overwhelmingly Machiavellian; the presumption is that innovation is good, the innovators are basically well intentioned, and the goal is to get individuals and organizations to adopt innovations much as prescribed. The entire emphasis is on developing reliable theories and strategies for implementation (Hurst, 1978, p. 51). Even Pincus (1974) wants "to identify ways that R&D products can be oriented in order to gain acceptance" (p. 121).

Participation is by no means an easy strategy to follow seriously. Perhaps the most widespread effort in U.S. education concerns the participation of parents in local school district management. Generated by community pressure, with the idea that greater community control will yield more appropriate educational strategies, there are indications that in practice parents have had little real involvement in decision-making (Davies et al., 1973; Gittel, Hoffacker, Rollins, & Foster, 1979; Stearns, Peterson, Rosenfeld, & Robinson, 1973). Huguenin (1978) points out that there are certain conditions under which parents can have parity in decisionmaking (when they are given significant control over budget allocations, when teachers and admin-
istrators support these efforts, when all parties receive training), but that these conditions rarely exist because they require others to relinquish power. This was most evident in the Oceanhill/Browsville confrontation in New York City, where a bitter conflict ensued between the community, administrators, and the teachers' union (Levin, 1970; Levine & Cohen, 1969). From a radical perspective this history of participation illustrates both the deception underlying most dominant paradigm interest in participation and the conflict that can be engendered by real progress toward self-management.

All these issues relating to the implementation of innovations are significant in two ways. First, they can be thought of as a "last ditch" attempt to save the basic claims of the dominant paradigm. That is, the assumptions of a rational, consensus-directed, harmonized society are challenged when individuals and organizations do not respond to what a technically neutral, efficiency-seeking structure develops for their supposed best interests. The failure to adopt so many educational innovations and the adoption of so many failures has led to the formation (in Kuhn's terms) of a set of auxiliary hypotheses aimed at saving the dominant paradigm's "hard core" assumptions. Perhaps when and if it is seen that implementation "barriers" are not explanations either, the dominant paradigm will finally have to confront all that it takes as given.

Radical analysis of educational innovations generally stress the correspondence view that those which basically conform to capitalist system interests (e.g., lower cost, increase cognitive skills, or reinforce attitudes useful to production) will be adopted and implemented, and those that challenge the structure, especially in terms of trying to promote greater equality, will not be (Levin, 1980b). From this perspective it is no surprise that many equality promoting innovations are tried out as pilot projects and after the sponsoring agency leaves, the project is discontinued (for this reason many potential sites are reluctant to start pilot projects, despite the short-term inflow of funds). Such projects contribute to an image of concern without the necessity of making any significant changes. Even when such an innovation is pursued seriously, like the comprehensive secondary school, the egalitarian dimensions of it are subverted as it becomes implemented with testing, teaching, and counseling systems that yield no improvement in equality, only greater administrative control (Levin, 1978).

Finally, the implementation of innovations is of key interest to radicals because it often forms the locus of conflict, resulting not from system imperfection but from system contradictions. It is never quite clear where these contradictions will lead. In the Ivory Coast, a nationwide project using television for nonformal adult education presented programs on the usual subjects of health, agriculture, citizenship, and so forth (Klees, 1977). However, the programs were broadcast between the national news and imports—programs like Batman—what will the impact of glittering State banquets in Abidjan and masked crusaders be on villagers who live in mud huts, with no electricity (the TVs were hooked up to 32 batteries), and no contact with the outside world? Many radicals are arguing that even failed innovations can have unanticipated progressive consequences. For example, Levin (1978) believes that the "dashed expectations" induced by the comprehensive school movement and the expansion of higher education will increase the level of class consciousness among such students with respect to where the inequalities originate. Instead of focusing on unequal
schools, the culprit begins to appear to be the unequal relations of monopoly capitalism and its supportive state bureaucracies. (p. 450)

On the other hand, some resistances seem to reinforce the status quo. Willis (1977) examines how working class youth resist the achievement orientation and culture of the comprehensive school, knowing that it has little to offer them, yielding a reanimation of working class values.

Apple (1980) argues that an important part of the radical orientation is not only to study these contradictions and resistances, but to do something about them:

The fact that individual teachers like most other workers may develop patterns of resistance to these patterns of technical control at the informal cultural level alters these messages. The contradictory ideologies of individualism and cooperativeness that are naturally generated out of the crowded conditions of many classrooms ... also provide countervailing possibilities. And lastly, just as blue and white collar workers have constantly found ways to retain their humanity and continually struggle to integrate conception and execution in their work (if only to relieve boredom) so too will teachers and students find ways, in the cracks so to speak, to do the same things. The real question is not whether such resistances exist ... but whether they are contradictory themselves, whether they lead anywhere beyond the reproduction of the ideological hegemony of the most powerful classes in our society, whether they can be employed for political education and intervention .... Our task is first to find them. We need somehow to give life to the resistances, the struggles. (pp. 26-27)

The Evaluation of Innovations

This topic is the most difficult to treat because what we wish to argue is not easily accomplished in an article or even a book. Nonetheless, the issue is quite important to viewing educational innovation, and therefore we will sketch out our analysis, supplementing the sketch with substantial references to a growing literature.

Although we will maintain the dominant/radical paradigm dichotomy for thinking about these issues, it is important to point out that the methods is not always along the same lines as the split in theory and policy analysis discussed so far. In particular, this is true of our critique of quantitative analysis, designed to separate the causal impact of different variables. For example, Apple (1978b, p. 381) seems to believe that theoretical claims are empirically falsifiable, despite his criticism of evaluation as ideology. And BowI, Carnoy, Gintis, and Levin all use regression analysis to study the impact of social class and education on societal rewards. It may be that radical theorists use these due to the impetus of their initial training, the reward structure of the academic world, and the necessity of using the dominant methodology to have their argument receive attention, but the point is that they do use them.22

On the other hand, many dominant paradigm theorists are becoming increasingly skeptical of the value of such quantitative analyses. Hurst (1978) argues that in his view, much of the literature on implementation is "ultimately untestable," (p. 51) although in conclusion he does come up with a model that he says needs testing.

Mohr (1978) argues that it may be impossible to come up with a general theory of innovation
because the kinds of things that affect whether people innovate may possibly be ephemeral and changeable enough, without a basis in anything stable or durable, that you can’t have a general theory. Every situation is different. (p. 35)

Pincus (1974) similarly argues that

We now have no satisfactory way of measuring many of the multiple outcomes of schooling, nor of adjusting for differences in teacher and student quality, nor for taking account of the interaction among teachers, students, and curricula, which introduces systematic bias into empirical estimates of educational production functions. (p. 114)

Finally, one of the “deans” of educational evaluation, Lee Cronbach (see Cronbach, 1975; Cronbach et al., 1980), has practically said, as Mohr (1978) paraphrases him,

I give up! There is no possibility of developing a theory of learning. I used to think that introducing some interaction terms would do it but now I see that it is still insufficient even to go to 7th and 8th order interaction and my conclusion is that such complexity is impossible to deal with.23 (p. 31)

Despite the qualifications above, we do think that the most important evaluation methods controversies are still split along dominant/radical paradigm lines. This split reflects the latter’s preoccupation with historical, structural, and dialectical analysis, and the former’s concern with better measures, experiments, and statistical methods to obtain “optimal” decisions. The remainder of the section proceeds along these lines.

From the general perspective of the dominant paradigm, evaluation is the ongoing activity that is necessary to a rational society, as is perhaps most explicitly evident in economics. It is assumed that consumers and private sector firms continuously evaluate which available choices will maximize their satisfaction and their profits respectively. The technique of cost-benefit analysis was developed as a tool for public sector organizations so that they can correct market imperfections in the interest of social efficiency. Although some economists argue for tempering the efficiency criterion with considerations of equality, and many educators are uneasy about its use, efficiency, in the form of cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit comparisons, predominates in evaluation because it is almost as difficult to be against efficiency as it is to be against freedom or motherhood.24

Cost-benefit analysis asks the question, “how do we value an educational innovation?” In order to answer that question, we must answer the prior one: “What impact does a particular educational innovation have?” Questions of causal impact form the focus of much of the evaluation literature, as well as being central to research activities examining, for example, the factors affecting innovative adoption and implementation.

The classical scientific response to questions of causal impact is the experiment, and in education the call for experimentation has been strong (Crain & York, 1976; Pincus, 1974; Rivlin, 1971). Nonetheless, there is growing recognition that both the practical and moral difficulties with controlled experimentation with regard to most significant social science questions make it either impossible to do, or invalidate its
results in terms of their application to policy in an uncontrolled world (Cohen & Garet, 1975; Gadlin & Ingle, 1975; Levin, 1975; Weiler, 1979; Weiss & Rein, 1972).

The general response of social science researchers has been to stress theoretical and statistical modeling techniques, mainly regression analysis and related methods, as a means of uncovering causal impact. This is the basis for the mountain of research that has accumulated on the effects of education on achievement, abilities, attitudes, occupational choices, incomes, health, productivity, and so on. It also forms the basis of much of the work concerning adoption and implementation of innovations.

Generally, dominant paradigm researchers agree that research and evaluation activities analyzing educational innovations have not told us much (House, 1978; Hurst, 1978; McLaughlin, 1975). Researchers have found a multitude of correlations, but that has contributed little to identifying and separating causes. The basic problem is that without experimentation, one needs to specify accurately a complete causal model in order to determine accurately the impact of separate variables. Like all social processes, the innovation process is extremely complex, and, in practice, our ideas about their relationships, operationalizations, and data are poor. Mohr (1978) argues analogously to Cronbach: “The attempts to construct a theory using five ad hoc variables and somebody’s Thursday definition of innovation have not gotten us anywhere” (p. 34). Nonetheless, despite theoretical problems combined with the small variance explained by, and the persistent instability of, empirical results, most dominant paradigm researchers remain optimistic about the utility of future research, and continue to develop new models to evaluate innovations (e.g., Downs & Mohr, 1976).

From the perspective of the radical paradigm, evaluation is also an ongoing activity, undertaken in some form by all individuals and organizations. Thus radicals acknowledge that individuals may try to maximize their satisfaction, that some firms try to maximize their profits, and even that some public sector decisionmakers try to act on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. However, the result has nothing to do with “social efficiency.” The neo-classical economics idea of social efficiency under capitalism depends on a perfect form of competition, and the real world is so far from the assumptions of perfect competition, that even in neo-classical terms the concept is empty (Ashby et al., 1980). In particular, the prices of goods, services, and resources, which are supposed to act as guides to “social” values (in terms of profits, benefits, and costs), are reflections of the same power struggle that characterizes all social phenomena. The invisible hand of theory bears no relation to the invisible boot of reality. If efficiency is rejected as even a partially relevant goal, because there is no usable concept of efficiency, the criteria for evaluation are far from clear.

Thus in the evaluation of educational innovations, cost-benefit analysis only has meaning to evaluate some aspects of system equity by comparing the monetary returns to different groups, not to some nonexistent consensus of social efficiency. This implies that even cost analysis has a very limited meaning from a social point of view. There is no societal reason for choosing a lowest cost alternative if cost is not a measure of social value. What is relegated to a technical question in the perfect world of neo-classical economics becomes a complex evaluative question in the real world, as cost considerations become inextricably tied with those of who is benefitting. Radical paradigm evaluations of innovations must look not only at who benefits from an innovation and how much it costs, but at who is paying the costs and who is benefitting (individuals, firms, countries, etc.) from organizing and supplying inputs to the project (Klees & Wells, 1981).
The choice of any evaluation criteria (like “social efficiency” or equity) reflects the outcomes of the sometimes conscious and sometimes unconscious struggle between those who have much power and those who have little. In this sense evaluation is an ideology that functions mainly to give legitimacy to the interests of the privileged, making it a technical procedure, consigned to the domain of “objective experts” (Apple, 1978b; Wexler, 1981).

With respect to the approaches taken to the study of innovation impact, radicals (and even many liberals) argue that experimentation and, by extension, nonexperimental studies, mostly perform the same function. Weller (1979) states the radical view:

that the notion of reform through experimentation has a certain ideological quality which is deliberately used by dominant economic and political groups in the society to facilitate “pseudo-reforms” and to oppose those reforms which might effectively affect the status quo;

that experimentation in the context of educational reform does not serve the provision of scientific information on the advantages and disadvantages of alternative educational arrangements, but rather the legitimation of existing processes of educational decision making and/or the management of social conflict in the design and implementation of reforms. (p. 43)

Albert Shanker (1981) restates the point much more directly: “In educational circles, it is well known that every educational experiment is doomed to succeed” (p. 9).

The empirical analysis of causal impact within the dominant paradigm is criticized as paying little or no attention to the nature of systemic, structural interactions. When structural variables are used they are not thought of in the capitalist context in which they operate, but as either given “exogenously” or as constructs manipulable in the interests of social rationality.

A related and quite significant criticism, developing from both outside and within the dominant paradigm is that quantitative methods are inherently incapable of doing what is desired: separating out the respective influence of a complex set of factors affecting outcomes of interest. We have argued elsewhere (Ashby et al., 1980; Klees & Wells, 1981) that the assumptions of causal modeling are akin to those of perfect competition, in that they cannot hold in practice, and the theory is such that one does not know what effect even small deviations in the assumptions have on the results. Our contention is supported by a growing critical literature,26 the absence of consistent empirical results on any issues of social interest,27 and the tendency of dominant paradigm researchers to place faith in the sign of a regression coefficient rather than its magnitude, when it is the latter that is needed for evaluation.

Given the indeterminacy of quantitative methods and their assumptions as to the nature of the social world, radicals argue that the evaluation process almost always exhibits a dominant paradigm bias (Paulston, 1980). Carnoy and Levin (1975, pp. 386-387) in an article looking at the evaluation of educational technologies, point out that many authors of evaluations have close contact with the funding agencies supporting such projects, and “often their evaluations have been sponsored directly by the agencies and personnel who have planned, funded, and implemented the particular educational technology that is being reviewed.” It is not that these evaluators are “overtly partisan,” but that their implicitly favorable attitude toward
the technology causes them to deal with potential sources of error in such a way as to give the benefit of the doubt to the project.28

For most radicals, the dominant paradigm is significantly flawed because of its focus on a linear analysis of individual characteristics, instead of the dialectical relations among and between individuals and social structures.29 The increasing interest in more qualitative approaches, such as ethnographic and historical methods, reflects this criticism (Guba & Lincoln, 1981; Harris, 1979; Mishler, 1979; Reichardt & Cook, 1979). Moreover, even the results of dominant paradigm research suggest the necessity of focusing on structure and process. For example, in reviewing millions of dollars of research monies spent on curriculum evaluations, Walker and Schaffranzick (1974) conclude that what has been “learned” is that if a topic is included in a curriculum students will learn it better than if it were not, and that if it is emphasized they will learn it even better. These commonsense results indicate the waste involved in much dominant paradigm research and suggest the importance of the radical paradigm approach. The more interesting question is not why different individuals learn differentially (which perhaps we can never answer clearly), but why curricula have the form and content they do (Apple, 1981).30

Finally, we should note that, from the radical perspective, evaluation processes also contain contradictions. Evaluations can both develop and focus conflict. For example, one of the authors worked on a 3-year study of a cost-saving educational television system in Mexico whose favorable evaluation contributed to a strike by the teachers for more pay (Klees, 1979; Mayo, McAnany & Klees, 1975). Moreover, given the indeterminancy of quantitative methods, the anomalous results often generated may undermine confidence in the dominant paradigm and stimulate thinking along alternative lines.

Conclusions

Throughout this paper we have contrasted two views of social reality, mostly in terms of their perspectives on education and innovation. The conventional response of science, faced with alternative theories, is to choose between them on the basis of carefully done, replicable, quantitative, empirical analysis. In the previous section we have tried to suggest why we believe this to be a forlorn hope: Empirical analysis will never refute either paradigm.

A strong source of support for this position is the pervasive inconsistency of results among studies of the same issue, or even among reanalyses of the same data, for any issue we can think of in the economics and the sociology of education. The only consistent results are quite general; for example, education is positively associated with earnings, but this tells us no more than a gross correlation, is subject to a myriad of interpretations, and provides no guide to policy. Another source of support is experiential. If one thinks about the reasons certain levels of educational achievement, career path, income, and so on, were attained, the myriad of interacting personal and social factors related to these attainments, and how these vary in subtle and complex ways, the inability of quantitative causal modeling to capture this richness becomes clear. Thus, we would agree that even the call for quite narrow falsifiable hypotheses in the human sciences is impossible to achieve.31

With such difficulties facing even relatively minute auxiliary hypotheses, it is absurd to believe that we can use empirical analysis to choose between the well insulated “hard cores” of these competing paradigms. Lakatos’ more sophisticated
Popperian perspective, which argues that paradigms may be evaluated by an overall objective "logic of appraisal" that scientifically assesses the relative explanatory power of the rival views is faulty for the same reasons: If we cannot even assess auxiliary hypotheses scientifically, how can we judge the hard core (Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970)?

The alternative argument made by Kuhn (1970), that it is the general social temper of the times that influences paradigm choice, is extremely threatening to the positivist stance. Blaug (1975) concludes his paper on the Kuhn versus Lakatos debate applied to economics by rejecting Kuhn's view, because to be valid there must be instances of

(1) internally consistent, well corroborated, fruitful, and powerful scientific ideas which were rejected at specific dates in the history of a science because of specific external factors, or (2) incoherent, poorly corroborated, weak scientific ideas which were in fact accepted for specific external reasons. (p. 431)

While he can think of "no unambiguous examples of either (1) or (2) in the history of economics," a radical theorist's response would be obvious: The best example of (1) is the general rejection of the radical paradigm due to the domination of a capitalist world view; and the best example of (2) is the acceptance of the completely unrealistic framework of perfect competition and social efficiency because it conforms to capitalist ideology.

In sum, we view the dominant and radical paradigms as two coherent and internally consistent alternative perspectives for examining social phenomena. To choose between them by the empirical approach of scientific research seems impossible for three reasons: (1) because of the problems with such methods, (2) because such methods are not necessarily agreed upon as reasonable rules for selection by those who hold different paradigmatic perspectives, and (3) because the ultimate basis for each paradigm is ideological. The choice between them, therefore, reflects value and belief systems and associated training and experience, all of which are influenced to a great degree by prevailing structures of power.

As we said in the introduction, we basically agree with the perspective of the radical paradigm. It accords well with the real world associations we observe and with our experience, but of course we do not claim that our choice is in any manner "objective," because objectivity is always problematic in a socially constructed world. It is not that the dominant paradigm does not explain many associations well; it does. For example, the dominant approaches to schooling as skills training and socialization have some obvious "face validity" (Bock, 1981, p. 17), "and have in the past contributed to our understanding of schools as cultural and social mechanisms, though perhaps not always in the way the approaches intended" (Apple, 1978b, p. 373).

Actually, in some superficial ways the approach of McClelland is not so different from that of Freire (La Belle & Verhine, 1975a, pp. 36-43). Individuals with greater exposure to education and mass media do develop more "modern" attitudes (Holsinger, 1972; Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Papagiannis, 1977) and greater drive for success, in terms of income and consumption. Behavioral modification, a la Skinner, does work. But for whom and for what is the question that radicals persistently ask. And this is perhaps the greatest failure of the dominant paradigm, that it takes the structure
within which these relations occur as given, or simply assumes that these structures are operating in the interests of some abstract, unreal notion of society as a whole.

This is best illustrated in the general dominant paradigm vision of the sources of our educational problems today:

- the ignorance or lack of motivation of the populace;
- the ignorance or lack of motivation of public sector bureaucrats;
- the intervention of the government in matters that should be left to the private sector; and
- the lack of sufficient resources.

In order to accept this view it seems necessary to us to forget completely about many aspects of our social reality, for example:

- that, throughout the world, poorly educated and cheap labor is quite useful to maintain capitalist profits;
- that even rich countries, with a well-educated populace, face most of the same social problems as poor countries;
- that motivation signifies little without power;
- that an economic policy of laissez-faire in today's world does not lead to the efficiency of competition, but to the greater concentration of power; and
- that the lack of resources devoted to solving social problems represents a political choice.

Given this view of the world, the dominant paradigm is not only inapplicable, but dangerous. This is clearest in the conservative notions of individual blame for failure and serious policy discussions of concepts like "triage." But this is true of even the new, most liberal, version of the dominant paradigm, with its emphasis on rural development, greater equality, appropriate technology, and participation. This merely takes attention away from the reasons there are problems, accepts as given the underlying social structural logic that makes these issues problems, and falsely implies that good intentions can correct what are viewed as the "imperfections" of past approaches. As Bock (1981) argues, it is well-constructed ideology in that it provides for a model of indirect change (such as through education) that is highly marketable, has legitimacy, is relatively cheap, and "does not necessitate sweeping changes in the entire structure of society" (p. 2).

The prognosis for the future appears worse. There is a growing literature predicting and calling for a new postindustrial era, in which knowledge and expertise will be both our most important resource and the source of governance (Bell, 1973; Drucker, 1978; Tinbergen, 1976). It ignores the fact that experts cannot resolve social problems that are based on conflicting values, ideologies, and interests. Perhaps the strongest objection to this new order is that it is a form of social control with no concomitant social responsibility. The idea that social arrangements and products reflect our choices, combined with the blame-the-individual (or imperfections)-for-failure doctrine, allows those who are privileged and powerful to escape any responsibility for their actions, the legitimacy of the public and private decisionmaking structures are left unquestioned.

All the above is not meant to suggest that the radical paradigm is without problems. We agree with Boulding's (1966) statement that "it represents what I would describe as a premature synthesis of the social sciences into a total vision of society" (p. 33). Although we consider "premature" to be less a criticism and more an unavoidable reality at present and a challenge to the future, there is a need for more sophisticated
work. We have already mentioned the growing internal criticism by radicals of the overly deterministic, correspondence principle views and the need for better development of the dialectical interaction of correspondence and contradiction in the context of specific analyses of concrete problems, policies, and projects. The necessity for true interdisciplinary collaboration is paramount, and radical theorists unfortunately seem just as lacking as dominant theorists in this regard. We would also criticize the perennial tendency of radicals to regard capitalism as always in serious structural crisis; in our view, this is far from clear and such an orientation can distort our attempts at understanding.

With respect to methods of analysis, there are also serious problems within the radical paradigm. The rejection of dominant social science methodology and our belief that there is no objective way to view social reality does not mean that empirical observation (though necessarily theory laden) is irrelevant. We believe it quite relevant; what we were challenging is what counts as evidence and what can be expected from quantitative causal modeling. Radical analysis is often accused of being tautological, and although we reject its unthinking dismissal by dominant theorists (Poirier, 1977), there is some truth to the charge that the paradigm can explain *every* phenomena in its own terms. How one goes about analyzing history, contradictions, and correspondence in a sensible manner is by no means obvious.

Finally, we wish to emphasize a serious problem with radical analysis receiving recent attention, and that is the tendency to dismiss or ignore liberalism. The liberal tradition has serious problems that have been justifiably criticized: it is a primary source for the individualistic ethic so useful to capitalism and so inappropriate to our current set of societal problems. Moreover, the notion of freedom of choice has been perverted so that it focuses almost exclusively on consumer goods. However, also out of liberalism comes the basis for personal rights, many of which are being increasingly threatened, and radical analysis must come to grips with these issues (Bowles & Gintis, 1981; Gintis, 1980; Wexler, 1981).

Returning to our specific topic, what we have tried to show is how these general issues are reflected in the examination of every facet of educational innovation. What the dominant paradigm takes as given has many harmful results: the separate and unconnected analysis of the generation, adoption, implementation, and evaluation of educational innovations, with little understanding of the political, social, and economic connections among them and with the socioeconomic system as a whole; a lack of real understanding of the systemic connections between educational fads and educational reforms; a glossing over of the "technology push" associated with many innovations; and, in practice, the "targeting" of marginal help to the marginalized, without any understanding of why they are marginalized.

The dominant paradigm calls for more and better R&D, experimentation, evaluation, appropriate technology, local cooperation and participation, or else even changed incentive structures will not achieve the desired goals. The type of reasoning Pincus (1974) concludes with is fundamentally flawed:

In private markets when consumers want different things, the response is to provide a variety of alternatives, allowing each consumer to choose the particular kind of housing, insurance, or toothbrush that comes closest to meeting his preferences in light of his means. (p. 139)
Rational changes of educational structures can yield similar diversity in education according to Pincus, although he admits "the task will be long, costly, difficult." What he fails to realize is that the resulting diversity in education of his strategies will have the same superficiality that we see with respect to automobiles and toothbrushes.

What the radical paradigm offers is a much better understanding of the nature of our socioeconomic system and its relationship to specific areas of interest, like educational innovation. This perspective does not say that progressive changes are impossible, but does argue that the effect of educational innovations "is complex, unpredictable, largely unmanageable, and is not the result of manifest and explicit social engineering" (Bock, 1981, p. 57).

Nonetheless, recent radical works, which stress the potentially progressive role of system contradictions, are more hopeful about the potential for positive educational impacts. Levin (1978) argues that the conflict generated by the failure of educational innovations will have an impact:

Political demands for worker control of enterprises and nationalization of industry as well as increased public employment are likely to besiege both firms and governments .... The ultimate result of the educational reforms is the rapid formation of a new and highly conscious class with great potential for forcing social change. (p. 450)

However, he cautions that such forces "could stimulate a victory of the right as easily as the one of the left" because the potential for political repression is great. While the future is unclear, we basically agree with Apple's (1980) assessment:

I have noted that the real lived conditions of men and women in our factories, stores, and offices—and, I have strongly suggested, more and more in our schools—provide distinct opportunities for winning people over to a concern for widespread social and economic justice. The processes involved in the control of culture and labor and the resistance this engenders, the contested reproduction shown by many workers, teachers, students and others, the opposition practices that emerge when one looks carefully at day to day life, all of these mean that pessimism need not dominate our outlook. (p. 40)

The results of attempts at educational and other innovations will depend on the struggle in which, in one way or another, all of us are engaged.

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Footnotes
1 Paradigm naming selects a few characteristics to stress (as does ail labeling). The equilibrium and conflict labels have the advantage of stressing one of the key concepts of each, but by so doing misses many of the other substantive dichotomies that, in part, reflect their respective emphases (e.g., historical/ahistorical, functionalism/contradiction, individualistic/structural,
Dominant and radical labels stress their political position in the social world, which prevents the labeling from caricaturing the substance to some extent.

Obviously, we consider the existing reviews of educational innovations incomplete or inadequate, or we would not be writing this article. Most of the literature is written from the point of view of the dominant paradigm (e.g., Fullan & Pomfret, 1977, Pincus, 1974). Hurst (1978), who at times is quite critical, ends up with a purely instrumentalist technocratic view, as we will discuss. Paulston (1978) is excellent as an annotated bibliography, but his 30-page introduction did not integrate or evaluate each paradigm very deeply. House (1974) is interesting, but is inconsistent in first recommending new policies based on his critical analysis of past innovations and then concluding with a discussion of the radical view which seems to negate most of his previous recommendations. Carnoy and Levin (1976) collect some interesting pieces they had done in the early seventies, but they necessarily miss the significantly greater depth and subtlety that has been developed in subsequent radical analyses.

Not all the influence of these characteristics can be considered irrelevant, because they may foster individual preferences and traits that relate to productivity.

See Paulston (1978, pp. 11-17) for a more detailed overview. As Paulston discusses, some work in general systems theory refines the structural functionalist perspective in ways that allow it to include some understanding of "unstable" systems.

As an example, see Blaug's (1972) rejection of sociological theories of labor market processes. However, more recently, brought on in part by "screening" hypothesis challenges to human capital theories (e.g., Arrow, 1973; Spence, 1973), economists are beginning to treat sociological conceptions of labor markets more seriously (e.g., Piore, 1973).

The idea that inequality is beneficial to everyone had enjoyed a resurgence in the United States with the election of President Reagan, although the "trickle down effect" has long been touted. Rawls (1971) even raised it to his leading principle of social justice.

Sociologists have already incorporated economic variables into much of their research (Jencks et al., 1972) while human capital theorists are just beginning to incorporate attitudinal and occupational variables into their theoretical and empirical work, such as in the determinant of earnings (e.g., Sobel, in press; Psacharopoulos & Tinbergen, 1978).

The radical economist's use of the terms production and reproduction and the radical sociologist's use of accumulation and legitimacy are similar; both can be used in a relatively simplistic, deterministic way and both can be used in a more sophisticated, dialectical manner, as we will discuss.

In a number of recent works, radical theorists are consequently paying more attention to their use of language, as evidenced especially by Michael Apple. For example, his use of the term "unpacking" to describe explanatory efforts seems to be a reaction to the relatively deterministic causal modeling language of dominant (and some radical) social science. Education is both a "cause" and "effect" on many levels (Apple, 1978b, p. 386) and there is a need to think relationally and dialectically within the radical paradigm. Apple (1978b, pp. 378-379) is thus careful to examine how his own language represents a dangerous simplification in treating knowledge as a "thing" without including its sense as a set of social relations. Also see Gintis' (1980) very interesting discussion of language and forms of liberal discourse.

Joachim Israel (1971) shows clearly that Marx himself did not view social and historical events in the over-determined way that many of his followers have. He quotes an 1890 letter from Engels to J. Bloch emphasizing the following points: "According to the materialist conceptions of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if anybody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure... also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggle and in many cases preponderate in determining their form. There is an interaction of all these elements in which... the economic
movement finally asserts itself as necessary." Neo-Marxists such as Althusser (1971) and Poulantzas (1978a, 1978b) have continued in this more dynamic and dialectical tradition.

It is doubtful that even neo-classical economists want competition if we judge by the rarity of their calls for anti-trust legislation.

Welter (1979) adds innovation process variables to the list such as the degree of planning, external interaction, experimentation, and evaluation present. Also see Merritt and Coombs, 1977, Zaltman et al., 1977, Downs and Mohr, 1976, for further discussion of all these variables. La Belle and Verhine, 1975a, do a very good job of examining these issues in the context of alternative social change theories.

Although Hurst provides a good review of these variables and their limitations, he takes the quite peculiar position of criticizing each and every one of them as not being able to explain completely the adoption decision. In this strange version of determinism, he essentially argues that if one variable cannot explain everything, it is worthless. Hurst seems to treat any counter instances as falsifying the relevance of that variable (p. 36). For example, he rejects authoritarianism as a variable, citing how studies of two nonauthoritarian African tribes exhibit different responses to innovation (p. 39); and need achievement because it may be a necessary condition, but is not a sufficient one (p. 39); and leadership because some leaders oppose and others favor change (p. 43). He seems to have no awareness of the probabilistic nature of social science explanation or how one variable may interact with others, as when he says: "Centralization, then, and similar structural variables, may be both positively and negatively associated with rejection of innovations, in which case they cannot be said to cause or explain it. An explanation would involve saying why the sign of the relationship (+ or -) varies in the said manner" (p. 46). He even goes on to argue that all these hypotheses of variable influences are untestable (with which we agree, for different reasons, as we will discuss in the evaluation section) because any test assumes "that a given sample of innovations is representative of all innovations (including, if one is making predictions, future innovations)," and this is "logically impossible" (p. 51). Then, a few pages later (p. 57), he rejects most comprehensive models on the grounds that they include too many variables and we must try to distinguish causation from correlation!

This does not mean elimination of teachers necessarily, but the use of lower qualified and lower paid teachers in conjunction with TV, radio, programmed instruction, in order to get equal or greater impact for lower cost.

Political science also plays a part, but more minor, with some attention paid to the works of people like Lindblom (1965). Also see Pressman and Wildavsky (1979) for a political science treatment of implementation issues.

Hurst (1978) argues that what we do know for education is mostly for industrialized countries, that the developing country literature is morly related to agriculture and health and may not be transferable to education, and that the latter work, like that of Rogers, has almost exclusively focused on adoption and not implementation.

It still exists in the professional literature as well. For example, Husen (1974, p. 150) refers to how teachers are still characterized as "reactionary," and House (1974, p. 223) argues that the dominant paradigm still views teachers as at least "slightly resistant" to change and "perhaps a little simple-minded." Of course, this "resistance to change" view does have some validity—it is just that there is nothing irrational about it, but reflects conflicting interests as we will discuss.

These are not completely assumptions, because there does exist a reasonable amount of empirical evidence supporting them (in education, see Fullan & Pomfret, 1977, and House, 1974, and for an excellent piece on agriculture in the Third World, see Whyte, 1977). For example, as Hurst (1978, p. 20) recognizes, the whole tenor of the organizational behavior literature is to find techniques "aimed at harmonizing conflict." The radical question is in whose interests is this "harmony"? (For an excellent critique of administrative theory in the U.S., see Foster, 1980.)

This was the case with the famous pajama factory case (Coch & French, 1948) that initiated
the consideration of participatory "strategies" by managers (Hurst, 1978; Gross, Giacquinta, & Bernstein, 1971).

21 In concluding, Hurst (1978) begins by arguing for a "non-directive strategy" (p. 68) for innovation implementation, but ends with a relativity that is so incredible and potentially manipulative that it must be quoted at length. "Many innovations (though not all) imply a change in values for their acceptance, because their outcomes—being new—do not fit in with current norms. One technique in this situation is to offer an extrinsic reward for adoption in the hope that a shift in values to accommodate the innovation will occur of its own accord. But I think this is too hit-and-miss. An effort to persuade the target population to change its values tackles this cause more directly. In plain terms, the equivalent of an advertising campaign of an appropriate sort is required, provided that the 'advertising' is honest and explains why, in the advocates' opinion, the outcomes of adoption should be considered valuable. This is certainly not necessarily easy to accomplish, and it may be time-consuming and expensive. If it is a case of perceived inequity of distribution, then the appropriate corrective is either to adjust the distribution appropriately, or to try to persuade the potential adopter that the proposed distribution is an equitable one. Again, this may be very difficult to accomplish" (p. 72, emphasis added).

22 Some radicals also, of course, criticize these methods (Levin, 1977a, 1975). We have also faced this dilemma in our own work, with no clear resolution.

23 It is interesting to note that many economists have dealt with seventh and eighth order interactions or more for a long time through the use of multiplicative models, especially of industrial and agricultural production processes (and use them to calculate the impact of educational innovations). The difference is that they think they have a reasonable a priori theory which makes specification and interpretation relatively easy. However, closer analysis of their theory, applications, and results calls that confidence into considerable doubt (Ashby et al., 1980).

24 Context and process evaluations tend to exhibit an instrumentalist rationality in that the interest in understanding the process and the context is to improve system efficiency.

25 Even for neo-classical economists, efficiency is not producing more computers or more education for fewer dollars, even if the dollar value of the computers or education is greater than the production costs, unless all prices are determined under the assumptions of perfect competition. A firm that is efficient in some narrow technical sense of using the latest technology and producing at a lower cost than its competitors is not in any way "socially efficient" in the real world. Neo-classical economists explicitly recognize this in their search for "shadow" prices given the obvious imperfection of market prices (Squire & Van der Tak, 1975), but to calculate shadow prices requires heroic assumptions. Moreover, from a radical perspective, the idea of efficiency in neo-classical economics makes the false and harmful assumption that labor can be theoretically viewed like any other commodity, and practically manipulated to suit any available production process (Gintis & Bowles, 1981).

26 For discussions of some of these issues see Phillips (1973, 1974), Gandy (1975), Cohen and Garet (1975), Luecke and McGinn (1975), Starr (1974), and Barton (1968).

27 Although relatively consistent associations, at least in direction, are found between some variables, such as between education and production, status, or income in regression analysis, these results have told us nothing more than could be inferred from gross correlations. Thus there is an endless debate on any issue of social interest, within education (e.g., the impact of busing or Head Start, the relation of educational and other inputs to school achievement, and the effects of education on status, income, and productivity) or other areas (e.g., the causes of inflation, unemployment, modernity, agricultural productivity, organizational success, job dissatisfaction, etc.).

28 Witness, for example, the consistent and significant underestimate of system costs in educational and other technology projects (Jamison, Klees, & Wells, 1978).

29 Even structural functionalism in sociology stresses the characteristics of individual actors in analyzing social systems. The idea of "methodological individualism" is emphasized throughout the social sciences (from the perspective of the dominant paradigm), that is, "the view that
all social phenomena should be traced back to their foundation in individual behavior” (Blaug, 1976, p. 830).

30 This same twist can be applied to countless areas. The enormous literature that only shows that students learn more from smart teachers who know their subject area (Averch et al., 1972; Husen, Saha, & Noonan, 1978; Jamison, Suppes, & Wells, 1974) implies that one should pay more attention to the structural processes that select, form, and allocate teachers and other educational resources. Similarly, to understand the impact of television on society, one should not be studying audience reactions to different programs, but the structural relationship between television and capitalist organization that determines the overall television “curriculum” (Clawson, 1981).

31 Furthermore, despite the overwhelmingly positivist rhetoric of the dominant paradigm, there is surprisingly little practical attention given to falsification. Even Blaug (1975) says that “much empirical work in economics is like playing tennis with the net down: instead of attempting to refute testable predictions, economists spend much of their time showing that the real world bears out their predictions, thus replacing falsification, which is difficult, with confirmation, which is easy” (p. 425).

32 There is almost a mystical, magical quality to this overall view; as House (1978) indicates, for a time it seemed that the efficiency orientation of “McNamarism was almost a religion” (p. 391). We would argue that it still is, in that it serves as a relatively unquestioned ideological base for teaching our youth, from the public schools all the way to the business schools.

33 An interesting and relevant story concerns what happened several years ago when the United Nations put together various task forces to study the many possible components of a “new international economic order.” Each task force had economist representatives from capitalist, socialist, and Third World countries, making it difficult to see what they could possibly agree on. One of us, who was privy to some of the early reports that came out, found that the basic conclusion was that given the complexities of the modern world, it would be best if economists (and other “experts”) move from their present advising role to a more direct decisionmaking role!

34 A particularly outrageous example, reported recently in the press (e.g., Tallahassee Democrat, June 11, 1981), is that the American Medical Association has millions of dollars invested in the tobacco industry, and supports this investment by arguing that they have no control over it because they set up a “blind” trust (in order to avoid being regulated as an investment company).

35 Radicals recognize this problem, as in Gitlin’s (1979) discussion of the concept of hegemony. Also, we should point out that the dominant paradigm suffers from the same fault because no observation can really challenge its hard core.

36 There is a growing radical literature that reflects this analysis of almost any specific educational innovation. For example see Bock and Papagiannis (in press) and La Belle and Verhine (1975b) on nonformal education, Klees and Wells (1981) on educational television, Levin (1980a; 1976b) on voucher plans and competency based education, Levin (1978) and Kallos and Lundgren (1977) on comprehensive schools, and Apple (1980) on curriculum reform.

The politics of curriculum change and stability

W. L. Boyd

The business of trying to change or reform the public schools of America has become just that: from a hobby for "do-gooders" and a vocation for muckraking journalists, the pursuit of educational innovation and reform has emerged as a big business involving a broad array of public and private foundations and R&D organizations. Yet, after more than two decades of systematic efforts—reform—from the new curriculum materials of the 1960's to more recent federally sponsored innovation projects—recent research (e.g., Goodlad et al., 1970; Berman & McLaughlin, 1976) has revealed that, contrary to numerous claims, little really has changed. We thus are left with the problem of understanding the paradox of how there could be so little change when there seemed to be so much evidence of momentous change.

The most succinct explanation is that it turns out that all too often innovative policies which were enacted were only partially implemented at best. As we shall see, this fact has profound implications for curriculum policy-making, innovation strategies, and the "business" of reform. But the vitally important distinction between policy-making and policy-implementation does not tell the whole story. Inherent in the educational policy-making process itself are contradictory pressures which restrained educational change. Indeed, policy-makers are confronted with the dilemma of the schools being asked to simultaneously preserve and to change society. And whether they attempt to preserve or reshape society, curriculum policy-makers are inescapably involved in a political act, for their positions will have some bearing upon "who gets what, when, and how" now and in the future.

Currently, the accelerated pace of social change has exacerbated the tension between pressures for societal maintenance and for societal change, and, with the upsurge of ethnic and minority consciousness and the pursuit of equality, curriculum policy-making has been dramatically politicized. In this context, we clearly need a better understanding of the character of curriculum policy-making and the circumstances under which the curriculum changes or remains constant.

Social Change and Incremental and Nonincremental Curriculum Policy-Making

If there is one proposition about curriculum politics that is clear, it is that the school curriculum becomes an issue in communities and societies that are undergoing significant change (Iannaccone, 1967; Coleman, 1965). Such change calls into question the
adequacy or appropriateness of existing curricula. For example, as Kirst and Walker (1971) note, national political tensions, generally arising from one or another kind of change, inevitably seem to make themselves felt in curriculum policy debates. Yet, if the most notable and spectacular curriculum politics are associated with crisis and the problems of managing change, Kirst and Walker suggest that curriculum policy-making usually proceeds quietly and incrementally, with value conflicts "resolved through low profile politics." In other words, curriculum policy-making, rather than being characterized by dramatic crisis policy-making, or by the often prescribed but seldom realized model of rational decision-making, generally is characterized by the modest and mundane strategy of disjoined incrementalism, e.g., acceptance of the broad outlines of the existing situation with only marginal changes contemplated and serial analysis and piecemeal alterations rather than a single comprehensive attack on the policy problem (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963).

However, this aspect of Kirst and Walker's (1971) analysis becomes confusing when they later say that:

Crises occur at such short intervals in the history of American education—immigration, the great Red scare, war, depression, war again, Sputnik, racial violence, war again—that crisis policy-making is normal and normal policy-making exceptional. (p. 498, emphasis added.)

This observation is striking and insightful, but where does it leave us in terms of understanding the curriculum policy-making process?

The conventional, informed view of educational policy-making—curricular or otherwise—is that it is characterized by incrementalism, perhaps even more so than policy-making in most other organizations and institutions (Elboim-Dror, 1970). The strong tendency toward incrementalism in educational policy-making can be seen to have a number of sources. Many analysts have called attention to the fact that education's dependence upon, and vulnerability to, its societal environment causes the public schools to have to serve multiple and sometimes conflicting goals. New goals are acquired even while the established goals are retained. Expectations for the role of the schools seem to expand continuously. The school is asked to be an engine for progress and reform, but at the same time is always expected to maintain society. Thus, by a process of accretion, goals proliferate and increasingly compete with one another for scarce resources. The result is an ever more cumbersome context and structure for decision-making, making incremental policy-making increasingly likely.

Yet, nonincremental or innovative curriculum policies nevertheless emerge with surprising frequency. Kirst and Walker imply that innovative policies have emerged frequently because they have been elicited by the surprisingly frequent crises our nation has experienced. In turn, this suggests that the key curriculum politics we need to understand are those surrounding crisis policy-making, for the curriculum policy decisions made then presumably will be only incrementally modified until the next crisis.

However, this is a troublesome conclusion. As Elboim-Dror (1970) notes, the incrementalism of educational policy-making might be satisfactory for an organization that only tries to adjust itself to a stable and slowly changing environment, but it does not suit a.
rapidly changing and demanding environment pressing for innovation and change from within. If education is to meet successfully its many demanding tasks and missions, it will have to find new and more dynamic decision strategies. (p. 247)

And so it has: education in fact has found such a strategy, and this strategy, which has been called the "professionalization of reform," has contributed substantially to the increased complexity and politicization of curriculum policy-making. But, at the same time that the "professionalization of reform" fosters nonincremental policy-making, a number of significant restraints upon policy innovation impede and transform innovative policy initiatives. Thus, to understand contemporary curriculum politics one must look beyond crisis policy-making, for a focus upon it alone is incomplete and misleading.

The Professionalization of Reform

Significantly, the nationally sponsored curriculum reform movement was underway before the Sputnik crisis lent a sense of urgency to the venture. Indeed, it is characteristic of the evolving policy-making process that many innovative policies have emerged under noncrisis conditions. Contrary to the theory of incrementalism, Moynihan (1973) suggests that some innovative policies arise through the recognition that existing policies are failing, that "marginal changes, 'tireless tinkering,' will no longer do." This kind of recognition may also be tied, Moynihan proposes, to the "institutionalization" in and about the federal government of the use of social scientists as professional policy advisors. However, given the extreme modesty of the analytical and predictive capabilities of contemporary social scientists, in the face of the awesome complexities of social policy problems, the most intriguing explanation Moynihan (1969, pp. 21-37) offers for the increasing emergence of innovative policies in noncrisis situations is what he calls "the professionalization of reform."

Moynihan (1969) argues that whereas in the past efforts to reform societal institutions generally arose due to discontent and pressures which had built up in the public external to the institutions, by mid-century the process of reform had acquired a degree of institutionalization and expertise such that it began to take on the characteristics of an enterprise with "a self-starting capacity of its own."

"Increasingly, efforts to change the American social system for the better arose from initiatives undertaken by persons whose profession was to do just that: ' (Moynihan, 1969, p. 23). Moynihan (1969) says that this development first became evident when President Kennedy's election brought to Washington as office-holders, or consultants, or just friends, a striking echelon of persons whose profession might justifiably be described as knowing what ails societies and whose art is to get treatment underway before the patient is especially aware of anything noteworthy taking place. (p. 23)

Thus, with the professionalization of reform came a cadre of full-time social critics and advocates for change, devoted to raising or creating issues and sometimes, according to Moynihan, succeeding in creating crises as well, as in the case of the urban unrest brought on (aggravated?) by the strategy of maximum feasible participation of the poor in federally sponsored reform programs. While a more complete, and charitable, interpretation of the professionalization of reform would acknowledge that professionals positioned in national organizations and agencies have an important responsibility to attend to,
and anticipate, national needs—and may have accomplished much good (as well as some ill) in so doing—it nevertheless is hard to deny that the generally liberal-activist ideology of these professionals, in combination with their self-interest in career advancement and the maintenance and enhancement needs of their organizations, must influence their policy recommendations. Indeed, as Moynihan (1973) notes, speaking of the various councils of advisors serving the President, they “tend to measure their success by the number of things they get started” (p. 546).

The “professionalization of reform” helps us to understand the growth and nature of the national network concerned with the “business” of curriculum reform, as well as its penchant for policy innovations, many of which become controversial. Thus, just as Moynihan (1969) proposes that “the war on poverty was not declared at the behest of the poor; it was declared in their interest by persons confident of their own judgment in such matters” (p. 25), so too, Hottois and Milner (1975) find evidence that the initiative for introducing sex education in most instances came from educators, contrary to educators’ claims that such instruction was being added to the curriculum in response to public demands. In turn, the origin of the whole national movement came from a professional sex education “establishment,” which was convinced that such instruction was needed, and which actively propagated the idea and showed local educators how to “finesse” the public relations problems involved in introducing it. For example, just as Moynihan spoke of “getting the treatment underway before the patient is especially aware,”

Hottois and Milner (1975) note that:

Some proponents argued that since sex education occurred in classrooms in most schools prior to the existence of any formal program, it was educationally sound, completely honest, and politically astute to claim that the programs were not really new. Thus, the proper strategy was to emphasize that sex education was really being expanded and improved rather than initiated. (p. 40)

While the introduction of sex education frequently may have constituted a particularly blatant example of the professionalization of curriculum reform, there are other interesting and provocative examples worth noting. For instance, it is unlikely that public school educators often began teaching the scientific theory of evolution due to popular demand for it. In fact, just the opposite frequently has been the case, with the only visible public opinion on the matter running strongly against the teaching of the theory, due to fundamentalist religious objections to it. Of course, as Nelkin (1976) notes, most scientists scarcely would think that the question of whether to teach evolution is a matter to be decided on religious or democratic grounds. From their point of view, evolution is a scientifically validated theory and its inclusion in biology courses is both imperative and a matter only to be decided on the basis of scientific evidence and expertise. Just as the professionals generally have taken the lead in adding evolution to the curriculum, it also is likely that they usually have taken the initiative in introducing the new social studies, including the controversial Man: A Course of Study (MACOS) (Nelkin, 1976).

In short, the professionalization of reform has introduced an extraordinary, dynamic, and controversial new force into the social and educational policy-making process. Convinced of
their expertise and prerogatives, armed with "solutions' looking for' problems," supported by federal and foundation funding, and stimulated by the discovery, as a result of the civil rights movement, of whole new classes of disadvantaged students and forms of discrimination (e.g., non-English speaking students, handicapped students, sex discrimination), the professional reformers energetically pursue their visions of equal educational opportunity and a better and more just society. A key means of this pursuit, and one of the most important aspects of this development, clearly is the "litigation explosion." Although not confined to educational affairs, this phenomenon has been extraordinarily salient and influential in these affairs, frequently and heavily affecting the nature of the public school curriculum (cf. van Geel, 1976).

While it is likely that much good has come out of these efforts, the discussion so far should be sufficient to suggest why from some points of view the professionalization of reform is a mixed blessing. Not only has it increased the pace of disturbing changes, but, with the assistance of the law, it increasingly has imposed the cosmopolitan and secular values of the professional reformers upon the people of "middle America."

Constraints Upon Policy Innovation

On the other side of the coin are the various constraints upon policy innovation which inhibit change or even the consideration of certain kinds of alternatives. The importance of these constraints is such that they require a search well beyond the dramatic domain of crisis policy-making in our quest for a complete understanding of curriculum politics.

Viewed as a group, all of the constraints upon policy innovation can be seen to be related to the maintenance needs of society, communities, organizations, and individuals. While the literature on the subject tends to focus on either the institutional level or on the individual level, in reality, individuals make choices with regard to innovations in the context of the structure of incentives created by the institutions within which they find themselves. Thus, "professional reformers" housed in action/innovation-oriented organizations maximize their advancement by being innovative. But within the perverse structure of incentives in the quasi-monopolistic, nonprofit bureaucracy of the public schools, the costs of innovation for administrators and teachers often, or even generally, appear to outweigh the benefits (Michaelson, 1977). Yet, public schools do adopt innovations. However, as Pincus (1974) suggests, "private firms are more likely to adopt innovations that promote economic efficiency, whereas [public] schools are more likely to adopt innovations that promote bureaucratic and social stability" (p. 119).

Nondecision-Making

Some of the most potent of these constraints upon policy innovation emanate from the fascinating realm of nondecision-making. In an oft-cited article, Bachrach and Baratz (1962) argue that there are two faces of power—one manifest in actual political disputes and their resolution, and the other expressed covertly through the ability of powerful interests to control the agenda of decision-making and prevent the discussion of "unsafe" or "undesirable" issues. The suppression of possible issues or alternatives can result from them actually being vetoed in nonpublic deliberations or, even more effectively, by the creation by powerful interests (past and present) of a "mobilization of bias" in terms of widespread and pervasive values and beliefs—
throughout an organization, community, region, or society—which delimits what it is "safe" to do and what "should not" be done.

Nondecision-making and the mobilization of bias, by keeping potential issues and alternatives from being discussed or, in some cases, even recognized, are formidable barriers to change. The strength of local, regional, and ethnocultural mobilizations of bias mandate that professional reformers often have to work hard at "consciousness raising" to get their reform proposals taken seriously. For example, as Tyler (1974) notes in reviewing the educational issues attacked by the federal government during the 1960s, such as segregation and the problems of the disadvantaged: "... in most cases, they were not even recognized as problems on the local level until the Congressional debates and the availability of federal funds brought them to local attention" (p. 185). In matters such as the segregation issue, it took years of effort to get the initial federal action started.

A graphic example of the problems associated with the mobilization of bias—in terms of the WASPish myth of the culturally homogeneous, unitary community and its educational corollary that all students should be treated alike—is found in the frequent "invisibility" of culturally different students (Waserstein, 1975). A similar kind of problem has often existed in regard to the various classes of students with special physical, emotional, or learning problems, whose needs sometimes are ignored or who sometimes are misclassified and then effectively consigned to oblivion. Budoff (1975), for example, describes the extraordinary efforts that were required by a coalition of concerned citizens and child advocates to get the Boston Public Schools to treat these kinds of students properly. A conclusion which emerges time and again from accounts such as this is that, because of the combination of cultural blinders and insufficient educational resources, special classes of students, whose needs are expensive and troublesome to meet, are likely to remain neglected in many school systems unless the systems are compelled, by some legal means, to behave otherwise. Thus, a substantial part of the litigation explosion in education has been necessitated by this cold reality.

The Zone of Tolerance, Vulnerability, and Conflict Avoidance

Within the boundaries set by the mobilization of bias in a given community, and the predominant community values and expectations concerning the public schools, there exists a "zone of tolerance" within which local educators are free to exercise professional leadership. When educators exceed the boundaries of the zone of tolerance (which may be broad or narrow and clearly or poorly defined) they come into conflict with values dear to the particular community and face the likelihood of controversy and opposition. However, educators are strongly inclined to avoid conflict and hence are cautious about testing the boundaries of the zone of tolerance. Thus, this cautiousness inhibits innovation in the curriculum as well as in other aspects of the educational enterprise.

Conflict avoidance tends to be a salient orientation in the minds of school administrators because it is a leading theme in the ideology of their profession, because it is reinforced through the nature of the typical recruitment and socialization process they go through, and because of their frequently keen sense of political vulnerability (Boyd, 1976). This sense of vulnerability, along with the paucity of incentives for risk-taking within the nonprofit, quasi-monopolistic structure of the public schools, tends
to make school administrators and teachers reluctant to incur the psychic costs and risks of innovation and possible controversy.

Research indicates that the latitude or discretion granted to local educators varies primarily according to the type of community and, even within communities, according to the type of issue or policy question that is faced (Boyd, 1976). For instance, speaking in broad generalities, rural school districts and districts located in the "sun belt" of the United States tend to have relatively conservative constituencies. These conservative constituencies are more sensitive and restrictive about the content of courses, such as social studies, literature, and biology, which touch core cultural values; but in all but the most cosmopolitan districts, educators have less freedom of action in these kinds of courses than in the more abstract and value-free subjects such as mathematics. At the same time, however, the method of teaching abstract skills such as mathematics and reading is sometimes a matter of public controversy, especially in conservative communities.

Noninstruction

There is evidence that community socioeconomic status may influence the content and mode of instruction of politically and culturally sensitive courses. In a study of high school civic education in three Boston suburban communities—one upper-middle class, one lower-middle class, and one working class—Litt (1963) found differences among political themes in civics texts, attitudes of community leaders concerning the proper orientation of the community school's civic education program, and in the effects of the civics courses on student political attitudes. Significantly, the differences in political themes emphasized were nearly identical with the preferences of the community leaders.

In an interesting article which relates to Litt's research, Zeigler and Peak (1970) have discussed the political significance of unrealistic civic education, i.e., instruction which de-emphasizes or neglects the central role of conflict and its resolution in the political process. They contend that such apolitical civic education is common, cite considerable research to support this contention, and argue that unrealistic civic education fosters a conservative orientation in the public which contributes to the maintenance of the status quo. Building on the notion of nondecision-making, they propose that high school civic education is unrealistic due to noninstruction, i.e., "not because of what is said, but more because of what is not said" (p. 126). However, contrary to Litt's findings, they suspect that the cause of unrealistic civic education is less the result of the influence of community elites than it is of the conservative characteristics of the recruitment and socialization processes of the education professions.

The Politics of Controversy and Nonpublication

Teachers have long recognized that educators can get into a great deal of trouble by teaching controversial matters. But even when educators have substantial public support and are willing to take the "heat" which may be generated by venturing into sensitive areas, those who are offended, even if only a small minority, sometimes can exploit the situation to gain their ends through a "politics of controversy." In other words, as Block and Van Geel (1975) put it, "... if one can merely make the program 'controversial' there is a good chance both
politicians and bureaucrats will back off from it."

The politics of controversy has perhaps its greatest impact on education by causing textbook publishers to go to great lengths to try to avoid inclusion of potentially controversial material in their publications. With very large investments at stake in the production of new textbooks, most publishers feel they cannot take the risks of controversy (Broudy, 1975).

The effects of overt censorship and prior censorship, or nonpublication, on the curriculum might not be quite so bad if teachers and school systems commonly produced their own basic or supplementary curriculum materials. Sadly, as Kirst and Walker (1971) have noted, the vast majority of teachers and systems are almost entirely dependent upon the available published materials. The consequence is that although most curriculum decisions ultimately are made at the local school district level, the choices usually are restricted to the available alternatives prepared, and generally precensored by external groups.

To make matters worse, the problems of censorship and nonpublication are exacerbated by the understandable inclination of publishers to design their products to fare well in the large market controlled by the state textbook adoption agencies. The problems here are aggravated to start with by the fact that most of the twenty some adoption states are located in the south, which tends to be more conservative than the rest of the country. Moreover, both Texas and California, the two largest adoption states, have engaged in textbook censorship which, because publishers find it less costly to issue a single, nationwide edition, has affected the content of texts distributed nationally.

Given the numerous disincentives to innovation and risk-taking faced by publishers, it appears that only the federal government can command or bring into play the resources—dollars, authority, prestige—to overcome these barriers and launch and legitimate curriculum innovations that local educators and textbook publishers by themselves would be unable or unwilling to attempt. In other words, without federally supported curriculum development efforts it is quite likely that most published curriculum materials would only evolve incrementally and conservatively because of the market conditions publishers face. One example of this can be found in the fact that few biology textbooks even mentioned evolution until the publication in 1963 of the Biological Science Curriculum Study (BSCS), which was supported by the National Science Foundation.

Noncompliance and Nonimplementation

Unhappily, for reformers, it turns out that it is one thing to get innovative schemes accepted and launched and quite another to get them implemented successfully. Though this might seem obvious, it really was not until the generally meager results of the "Great Society" and "War on Poverty" reform efforts of the 1960s prompted a close examination of what was actually going on at the sites of innovative projects that the full and extraordinary significance of the implementation problem became clear.

One of the best documented examples we have of the complex politics of implementation is found in studies of Title I of ESEA (e.g., Murphy, 1971; Hughes & Hughes, 1972). As
van Geel (1976) has noted, if all the statutory requirements, regulations, and guidelines of Title I had been fully enforced, it would have resulted in a virtual revolution in educational programming at the local level. But, a host of political and organizational problems blunted the intent of Title I.

Of course, depending upon one's point of view and the issue at hand, the looseness in the federal system that enables evasion and noncompliance may be a good thing. One of the goals of our founding fathers, of course, was to build into our governmental structure "checks and balances" that would prevent the abuse of centralized authority and promote the need for persuasion, cooperation, and compromise. The structured necessity for this kind of dialogue, though it may prolong the agony of change on one level, on another level ameliorates possible destructive tensions and facilitates meeting the simultaneous need to maintain society while changing it. The difficulty for educational reformers, however, is that they sometimes wonder if they are succeeding in changing schooling at all, for the problem of the looseness of the federal system is exacerbated by the peculiar "loose coupling" of ends, means, and authority in the educational system. This state of affairs makes enforcement, supervision and evaluation of educational programs, whether traditional or innovative, quite difficult and obscures accountability for educational outcomes.

But the failures of public schooling, and efforts to reform it in the 1960s, increasingly have led to calls for accountability. However, there are a host of technical and political problems inherent in all educational accountability schemes so far devised. Indeed, the magnitude of these problems is such that it ironically is proving quite difficult to implement the very schemes designed in part to circumvent the implementation problem.

Perhaps the most disturbing of a great many disturbing revelations to educational reformers in the past decade has been the discovery of the extent to which nonimplementation of educational innovations occurs even when local school district authorities and teachers seem favorably disposed toward them. In other words, beyond active and conscious noncompliance, there is the equally important problem of how to successfully and fully translate innovative ideas into practice among nominally compliant educators who, nevertheless, normally have few tangible incentives for innovative behavior. As the authors of Behind the Classroom Door concluded, on the basis of observations in 158 classrooms in 67 schools:

...some of the highly recommended and publicized innovations of the past decade or so were dimly conceived and, at best, partially implemented in the schools claiming them. The novel features seemed to be blunted in the effort to twist the innovation into familiar conceptual frames or established patterns of schooling. (Goodlad et al., p. 72)

These conclusions have been substantiated by the large, systematic study of federally supported innovation programs conducted by the Rand Corporation. The Rand researchers found that nonimplementation was common and that the most that could be hoped for was a process of mutual adaptation in which both the practices in a given school and the innovative project being attempted were modified by one another (Berman & McLaughlin, 1976).

Conclusion

Having briefly surveyed the ethereal world of the "professional
reformers” and the subterranean world of “nondecision-making” and its cousins, we are now in a better position to assess the extent to which curriculum policy-making is characterized by incrementalism—or, alternatively, the extent to which “crisis policy-making is normal and normal policy-making exceptional.” Although analysts typically have concluded that educational policy-making is preponderantly incremental, there is a very real sense in which the ambivalence that Kirst and Walker (1971) display on the subject is justified. When one examines the nature of curriculum policy-making closely there is a paradoxical appearance of incremental and nonincremental policy-making going on simultaneously. Beyond the frequency with which nonincremental policy-making occurs due to closely spaced national crises, the “professionalization of reform” and the growth of the business sector concerned with this enterprise have greatly increased the incidence of innovative policy-making. But the paradoxical simultaneity of incremental and nonincremental policy-making also is the result of the complexity of policy-making within our federal system. Thus, we often have both kinds of policy-making going on simultaneously, with local policy-makers usually maintaining the status quo or slowly deciding to adopt innovative curriculum ideas developed and advocated at higher levels.

Yet, since many of the curriculum policy decisions at higher levels come down in the form of mandates, the local policy-makers—and ultimately the teaching personnel delivering the educational services—also are occupied with deciding the extent to which, and the speed with which, they will comply with these mandates. Thus, the impact of nonincremental policy-making, whether due to the stimulation of crises or the efforts of professional reformers, is heavily tempered by the numerous constraints upon policy innovation. Indeed, nonincremental policy thrusts are far more than incrementally modified by the snares and hazards of the implementation process. This process amounts to a continuation of the policy-making process through the politics of administration.

In sum, the puzzling simultaneity of incrementalism and nonincrementalism in the policy-making process can be seen as two sides of the same coin. On one side is the complex apparatus of organizations and agencies involved with curriculum policy-making at the national level, a set of machines lubricated by professionals attentive to potential crises and devoted to heroic visions, nonincremental reform, and their own career advancement. On the other side is the labyrinthine, “loosely coupled” system by which education is governed at the subnational levels and ultimately delivered at the local level. The extraordinary complexity and massive inertia of this loosely linked system easily can transform heroic ventures into pedestrian projects. Thus, along with the high human and monetary costs of curriculum change, these characteristics—in part reflecting societal, organizational, and individual maintenance needs—insure that real change will take place slowly.³

Moreover, it is essential to note that recent far-reaching changes in the structure of authority over curriculum policy-making seem likely to increase the probability of incremental, rather than nonincremental, policy-making. In his comprehensive treatment of this subject, van Geel (1976) calls attention to the increased involvement in policy-making of the courts, state and federal agencies, and teachers’ unions. He concludes that the curriculum policy-making system is now more complex, legalized, centralized
and bureaucratized and includes more veto points. These characteristics, plus their tendency to become more pronounced and to reinforce one another, seem likely to make nonincremental curriculum policymaking increasingly difficult. While we can expect the professional reformers to continue their valiant efforts in behalf of innovative policy-making, they increasingly may become entrapped in the very machinery they helped to create.

It is hard to escape the conclusion that the "business" of reform has grown and proceeded according to a principle of "top-down," externally imposed innovation that is sadly out of tune with the realities involved in changing American public education. If the public were not now demanding results it might be possible for the professional reformers to continue "business as usual," as Lalloue (1971) has noted, by an "educational research establishment, with its built-in incentive to discover failure which justifies ever more research" (p. 305). But, the public is now far less tolerant of this sort of thing, though this is what the public may continue to get, like it or not. However, if we are really serious about reforming public education it appears that we must strike at the heart of the problem, namely, the perverse structure of incentives that discourages innovation and provides few rewards for excellence within the nonprofit, monopolistic milieu of the public schools (cf., Michaelsen, 1976). Assured of a captive clientele—at least insofar as the birth rate permits—and utilizing a "lockstep" reward system based upon seniority rather than merit, the public schools scarcely provide a climate conducive to risk-taking, experimentation, and responsiveness to consumers. Indeed, it is remarkable that many public schools perform as well as they do, considering their basic reward structure.4

The most promising way out of this insulated morass appears to be some variant of the voucher plan with adequate safeguards against racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic discrimination. A voucher scheme would not only introduce competition for students and a consequent strong incentive to satisfy consumers, but it would free schools of the necessity of trying to be "all things to all men." Social and political realities are inclined to compel the public schools to offer a "neutral" program which accords with the perceived preferences of "average" citizens. But along with these pressures for a "common denominator" approach, the public schools also must engage in activities which at least symbolize responsiveness to the wishes of powerful special interest groups. The result is that the public schools are forced to pursue multiple and sometimes conflicting goals, with the consequence that their effectiveness is diluted and no one is entirely satisfied. A voucher plan would enable schools and people to sort themselves out according to their philosophical and pedagogical preferences and the result would be reasonably focused institutions capable of pursuing consistent educational programs.

It is a great tribute, however, to the almost blind belief in the unmitigated virtues of the public schools—as well as to the power of the vested interests which have developed among employee groups in the perpetuation of the public system as it stands—that the voucher plan has not yet been tried on even an experimental basis. The organized resistance to the idea has been so formidable that even the
much touted Alum Rock demonstration was so diluted as to scarcely approximate the essential principles of the notion (Michaelsen, 1978). The issues raised by the voucher idea, of course, are complex and this complexity in fact is one of the obstacles to gaining support for the idea (van Geel, 1978). But the policy question we are left with, then, is, "If some variant of the voucher plan cannot be made digestible in the present environment, what can be done about the incentive system of public education that might facilitate reform?" This is indeed a troublesome question, but it is one that seems inescapable.5

Notes


2The quotation is Lasswell's (1936) succinct statement of the focus of political science.

3For insightful discussions amplifying these problems in curriculum change, see Cuban (1976) and McKinney & Westbury (1975).

4Research is needed on what might be called the "secondary" reward structure of public schools, i.e., the extent to which and circumstances under which quasi-intrinsic motivations, flowing, for example, from school or community traditions, skilled leadership, or the "professionalism" of educators, produce a level of faculty performance beyond what might be expected simply from the basic "lockstep" reward structure.

5On the theoretical and practical problems confronting voucher plans, see Cohen and Farrar (1977), Michaelson (1978), and van Geel (1979). For a provocative proposal for reform that is related to the voucher idea, see Garms, Guthrie, and Pierce (1978). For a voucher-related "new public school compruise" that for some reason leaves the "lockstep reward structure in place, see Swanson (1977).

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