This paper argues that Dwight Eisenhower's use of television in the political campaign in 1956 helped mark the rise of the centralized presidential campaign strategy. To determine the impact of television on this campaign and describe the campaign's inner workings, the paper recounts (1) the Republican dilemma over the use of television and the electability of Republican candidates across the nation; (2) the vision of the advertising agencies and the key players in the Eisenhower campaign for the role television could play; (3) the development of the advertising strategy; (4) the image blitz; and (5) the lessons to be learned from television's use in a national campaign. The paper concludes that television may not have successfully come to the aid of the Republican party, but the harvest of television thinking and innovation that began then has helped to drive politics and the media ever since. One hundred and twelve notes are included. (MS)
IKE AND THE GOP IN 1956:
MADISON AVENUE COMES TO THE AID OF THE PARTY

by

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Three decades after Dwight Eisenhower's last political campaign, a new campaign shapes up around him by scholars who promote him as the "first" TV president. Steve Barkin used new evidence to argue that Eisenhower's 1952 campaign was the first influenced by TV consultants. Mary MacGregor also examined 1952 to show how Eisenhower's use of TV was noted in the news media. This author has argued that Eisenhower's TV efforts in 1956 helped mark the rise of the centralized presidential campaign strategy.

The 1956 campaign has received little scholarly attention, and the media studies that do exist tend to focus on what the public saw on TV that year, leaving questions about the campaign's inner workings. Important to the fifties was the sudden increase in TV ownership just before 1956; three-fourths of Americans had TV when the campaign began, compared to only 30 percent in 1952. Were the Republicans aware of TV's growth? Did they rise to this occasion, just as they responded to an earlier TV occasion in 1952, the year of the first coast-to-coast TV campaign? Indeed, if Eisenhower is to be considered a "TV president," these questions are important.

Material at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas, and the recollections of several campaign participants, argue the Republicans were not only mindful of TV, they had an important reason for using it in 1956. The story features a party chairman who sang songs for inside information on the opposition, a Hollywood celebrity who charmed his way into an office at the
White House and a TV mastermind who later gave America *The Addams Family*. But mostly it is a sober account of political predicament during the "harmonious" Eisenhower fifties, and how it was the seed of a television campaign far in advance of anything seen up to that time.

Eisenhower swept to victory in 1952, but his party reeled from two decades of dominance by the Democrats. The Republicans struggled to attract new members, were plagued by weak grassroots support, and many candidates who ran under the Republican banner were weak. Getting Republicans elected to offices across the country was a necessity, and the election of 1956 provided a special opportunity for two reasons. One was the tremendous popularity of Eisenhower; the other was the growth of television. In 1956, many believed the power of TV to be immense, and this included Republican planners who had evidence that driving an innovative and centralized party appeal into the living rooms of millions of Americans could stir them to vote Republican at all levels. It was a new kind of political "coattail," in which Eisenhower's public esteem -- and his great TV appeal -- would draw votes for other Republicans. The Republicans learned in the end that the TV strategy, as devised in 1956, was not effective. Yet "coattails" of a different kind, the many lessons and implications of the first large-scale TV campaign, left a trail that was followed by the next two presidential candidates.

I. The Republican Dilemma

The 1956 presidential campaign has been one of the most forgotten in American political history, perhaps because its outcome was so predictable. But inside the Republican party that year uncertainty prevailed. It was well reflected in Leonard Hall, the affable but crafty chairman of the Republican National Committee. In early 1955 Hall should have been confident, with a popular GOP president in the White House and a river of big-money campaign
contributions flowing into the bank. But the party had been confident in 1954, only to see the Democrats dominate off-year voting. It was a sizable disappointment to the Republicans — even though they had many clues that it would happen and why it happened.

What about Eisenhower? In Hall's view, the president had not done all he could for the party. The president refused to insist his cabinet appoint Republicans to scores of departmental positions at regional and local levels, leaving little incentive for grassroots Republicans to remain loyal, especially after two decades of Democratic patronage under Roosevelt and Truman. Hall knew the patronage system intimately. He grew up in Oyster Bay, New York, and his father was appointed White House librarian by neighbor Theodore Roosevelt. Hall himself became party chairman because of favors owed him by 1948 Republican standard-bearer Thomas Dewey. Hall believed many spoils belonged to the Republicans, and Eisenhower did not deliver. Indeed, historian Stephen Ambrose has observed that Eisenhower wanted to reach out to the defeated Democrats after 1952, as he had done with the Germans after 1945.

Yet Hall had other problems. Much has been written of Eisenhower's problems with numerous Republicans in elected positions. Historian Herbert Parmet has argued that Eisenhower's plain vanilla moderation was out of step in a party that was, before he took office, largely shaped by colorful conservatives of the Robert Taft stripe. Writer Paul Hoffman wrote in 1956 of senators who "cling to the label Republican who embrace none or very little of the Eisenhower program." But political figures such as Karl Mundt, William Jenner, Herman Welker, George Malone and Barry Goldwater clamored that the middle-of-the-road Eisenhower was the root of party discord.

By 1956, Chairman Hall was constantly reminded of his party's tremendous strength on Pennsylvania Avenue and its weaknesses almost everywhere else. The coming election promised to be a repeat of 1954, in which complacent local
organizations in many states had attracted, at best, weak Republican contenders in congressional, gubernatorial and other races. Across the nation Republicans were outnumbered by Democrats and independents two to one. Hall sought something that could leap over a thicket of internal problems, something that would allow him to direct a campaign from the White House, where the party was strong, and carry it straight to voters across America, where it counted. If it worked, Republicans at all levels might be swept into office because of Eisenhower's immense popularity.

The idea of using television emerged again and again in Hall's review of the party's TV efforts since 1952. Indeed, a "TV solution" to party problems was discussed in the White House almost immediately after Eisenhower took office. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Eisenhower's U.N. ambassador and 1952 campaign manager, told him he needed to become the "first 'T.V.' president," citing, in letters of October 30 and November 12, 1953, the growth of TV, especially among middle and low-income Democrats. Sherman Adams, assistant to the president, also advanced that idea in late 1953 during the first struggles with Capitol Hill. He ordered his staff to consult state party regulars, and he took note when a report came back November 17, advising him "the president can eliminate many of his troubles with Congress by going to the people." It led to Eisenhower's first "fireside" TV chat that Christmas Eve and the decision to televise his news conferences in 1955.

It was no surprise when Hall made two bold moves a year and a half before the election. He reorganized the Republican National Committee so that all matters pertaining to mass media and television were consolidated under its public relations director. When the 1956 fall campaign began, 45 of the RFC's 130 employees would work under this person. Then, Hall spent his first million dollars on the 1956 campaign, a massive, advance purchase of TV airtime on the three national networks.
Yet in mid-1955, Hall was dogged by an even greater uncertainty: the ticket itself. Even though he was at odds with Eisenhower on many matters, Hall knew that party hopes in 1956 rested on a president who was mum on whether he would run for reelection. Potential replacements were few. Certainly not Vice President Richard Nixon. Hall liked him, but he was aware Nixon would have to fight just to keep his vice presidential spot. Hall had to play it all Eisenhower's way -- and hope he would say "yes.""16

Then, while visiting Denver on September 24, 1955, Eisenhower suffered a heart attack. It created greater worries, but in many ways proved a blessing in disguise to Hall. The outpouring of concern focused attention on the reelection question, forced Eisenhower to contemplate his importance to the party and made him attentive when Hall came to call on November 28, as the president convalesced at his farm at Gettysburg. Reporters converged, but they never found out what happened. It is now known they talked about television. The president was told he did not have to endure a strenuous barnstorming campaign such as the 53,000 miles of speaking tours in 1952. And Hall had some proof: the million dollars of network airtime salted away.16

Eisenhower remained skeptical about TV through the remainder of 1955, but an event the following January 20 removed many doubts. It was a series of RNC fund-raising dinners brought together by TV links, allowing the president to make a personalized 53-city appeal. Three days later, after numerous messages from far-flung people who had been "with" him, Eisenhower told Hall, "You had a grand idea, and you organized its execution perfectly."17

But he was still unsure. On February 7 he laid out his concerns when he again got the TV hard sell. It came from Nixon, who realized his political fortunes rested on Eisenhower's decision to run again -- staying on the ticket was something else. "I think Hall is wearing rose-colored glasses," Eisenhower began. But Nixon insisted "the new medium of television has never been
used up to its potential." Think, he said, "of the tremendous audience you
could reach." But in 1952, contended Eisenhower, the party "got frightened at
the end" and plans broke down. Nixon felt this could be overcome: "We would
have to decide right off the bat you were not going to be pressured into
coming into any state." And he went on, "[This] is the best kind of plan.
Five or six television programs, but I would make [them] spectacular."

Transcripts do not indicate whether Eisenhower was fully swayed at this
meeting, but his exchanges with Nixon show the extent to which his reelection
thinking was guided by television. Ambrose hints that Eisenhower began to see
another dimension to the TV strategy: not having to stump for the several
Republicans who opposed him. The president, suggests Ambrose, actually
favored many Democrats. It seems certain Eisenhower got something valuable
from Nixon that day he had not gotten from Hall -- a reaction to the TV
concept from another politician.

Exactly one week later, a positive medical report was announced publicly,
and Eisenhower made his decision to run again. On February 29 he announced it
to the nation, in a telecast the Republicans scheduled for 10 p.m. Eastern
time, which was prime time throughout the country.

In mid-1956, some of the TV plans were shared with the news media. The
Republicans were not sure how party regulars and the rest of the public would
react in the fall if Eisenhower avoided the campaign trail. It was important
to get people used to the idea. Press Secretary James Hagerty became part of
the softening effort, stressing to reporters on May 13 that "the president
will do little traveling, we are in a new [television] age." The TV
strategy was discussed again when Eisenhower made a "second" announcement to
run, after an ileitis attack in June.

The "dump Nixon" effort did not succeed at the Republican Convention in
San Francisco, and Nixon's renomination delighted Hall. He knew he could
convince the energetic Nixon to engage in nationwide speaking tours, thus deflecting potential criticism away from Eisenhower's stay-at-home campaign. Further, Nixon, like Eisenhower, was considered strong TV material. His Checkers speech of 1952 remained a standard for what political strategists saw as the potential of TV, and through 1956 Eisenhower himself talked positively of Nixon's media appeal.22

The fall TV strategy remained a fuzzy concept. The Republicans held valuable time on fall network schedules, yet in August there were holes to fill. They would not be filled directly by Hall, who wanted the Eisenhower TV campaign to be the work of the best available TV minds. While visible political events took centerstage in the first nine months of 1956, more events behind the scenes allowed Hall's goal to be realized.

II. A Television Vision

As the 1956 campaign began to materialize in mid-1955, Hall was not the only person with a TV vision. Hall's second in command, Campaign Director Robert Humphreys, was largely responsible for spelling out a connection between Eisenhower's warm, human personality and its appeal on TV. Later, this would be a theme of his 46-page preliminary campaign plan,

This campaign calls for maximum utilization of television during the stretch drive. . . . It breaks completely with past experience by placing first importance on effective use of television instead of the traditional emphasis on personal appearances, with broadcast media a supplemental tactic.23

A third figure directly supervised the television activities. This was Richard Guylay, the person Hall put in charge of the reformed public relations operation. "With the advent of network radio and television," Guylay said in a 1967 oral history, "new technical skills were required and the whole public relations activity took on a new importance."24 Guylay, who gave up his own
New York public relations firm to work for the RNC, had a zestful interest in imagery. A study of campaign slogans and symbols he gave as a speech after the 1952 campaign was the basis for Vance Packard's 1957 best seller, The Hidden Persuaders. "I was always fascinated by mass psychology and how to get across an idea to a crowd," he said.25

While Guylay was the catalyst for image concepts in the TV campaign, he spent much of his time in day-to-day organization. He was one of the people, for example, that Hall sent to New York in mid-1955 to arrange the advance purchase of airtime. Another was Carroll Newton of Batten, Barton, Durstine and Osborn, the advertising agency on retainer to the RNC since 1952. Their success eventually saved the Republicans vast amounts of money in preemption fees.26 Out of the negotiations emerged a major innovation in TV campaigning called the "piggyback," a five-minute campaign message attached to the end of shortened prime-time programs. It saved money and avoided tune-out. When one of the five-minute appeals began, Guylay recalled, viewers "had nowhere else to go because the other shows were in progress." Guylay's only regret was that the Democrats, when they finally found out about them, were able to imitate these "piggybacks" after pressuring the networks for equal time.27

As it developed, Guylay's most important role in 1956 was that of mediator. The campaign had two arms: the RNC, which assisted campaigns throughout the country, and the Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon, which concentrated on the national ticket. The party had used this arrangement in the past, each organization having separate jobs. That changed in 1956, though, as roles inevitably became interlocked in the centralized TV plan. Fortunately, the two organizations were not inclined to compete. However, this was not so true of the huge advertising agencies each group brought into the fold. The RNC had a long relationship with BBDO, while Citizens was formed only the previous November, and there was uncertainty in the beginning about its choice of Young
and Rubican. Potential battle lines were drawn that spring when Hall outlined an enlarged role for Citizens and gave it a blank check for its TV functions. It meant that Young and Rubicam would share TV duties with its advertising rival. On July 30, leaders met at the White House to avoid potential turf wars. BBDO would continue to make media buys and supervise all "straight" TV appearances, those primarily involving speeches by Eisenhower and Nixon. Young and Rubicam would spearhead the campaign's creative aspects, the all-important Eisenhower/Republican imagery. Even with the agreement, though, Guylay recalled having to "ride herd" on the two giant agencies for the rest of the year.

Eisenhower had come a long way as a television personality. During the 1956 convention, columnist Drew Pearson claimed the president "hated" the medium when he first took office, but now, "no president, not even the past master Franklin Roosevelt, has become so adroit at press conferences, has used them so skillfully to reflect his personality."

Much of the credit went to Eisenhower's staff. When the "fireside" talks began in 1953, actor Robert Montgomery volunteered to coach the president. Sherman Adams not only accepted, but soon convinced Eisenhower to retain Montgomery as a part-time staff member, the first Hollywood figure to have an office at the White House. Mamie was charmed by Montgomery, and when he left in 1958 he had become one of Eisenhower's closest friends. Adams always believed Montgomery made a valuable contribution, although other members of the inner circle did not necessarily agree. Hagerty had no use for him, and often complained he was taking up good office space.

Other types of television wisdom accumulated in the White House. In 1952, the Republicans established a research arm under Gabriel Hauge, later Eisenhower's chief economic advisor. Some of Hauge's research focused on the
president's use of television. Following a May 1953 study, Hauge told Adams that Eisenhower did not seem to recognize TV as "a medium that provides sight, sound, motion, immediate action, [that] creates great intimacy." A December 1954 report noted that in the just-completed elections, TV gained on the newspaper as the medium most influencing voting decisions, with an improved Eisenhower the only national figure who "impressed" voters on TV. The audience draw of 1954 campaign appearances also was assessed. Eisenhower's kickoff speech drew an impressive 19.3 rating, although he ran second to Our Miss Brooks at 22.8. The research was stepped up in early 1956, and it continued to point to Eisenhower's growing TV appeal.

The TV Plans Board, the "secret" 1952 organization revealed in 1983 by Steve Earkin, continued to meet and offer suggestions. It was a small group of New York-based television employees. In early 1955 it sent a proposal for a 1956 TV campaign to Appointment Secretary Thomas Stephens, but its activities faded as RNC's much-larger TV plans took shape.

Aside from formal research, there was an array of non-empirical evidence in the form of letters. Typical was one from a New York City resident, who "enjoyed [the] frank, honest and convincing heart-to-heart television talks" given by Eisenhower. A Los Angeles supporter wanted to see the president more often. One letter, though, was read differently. It was written in October 1954 by Tony Muto of 20th Century Fox, a noted newsreel director and authority on the visual media. "Television at the White House," he said, could be materially improved if the advertising agency techniques and the phony TV staging were to be given six. The President of the United States is selling soap, beer, cigarettes or motor cars. Advertising agency techniques have him performing automation.

Muto's letter is a revealing reflection of the way Eisenhower had grown with television and how his on-camera form was being shaped by Montgomery and
others in the White House who felt TV was important. It also sounded a warning at an early stage in political image making and one that proved pertinent to 1956 because the advertising agency techniques were not to be abandoned. It would not be the last time such a warning was heard.

III. From the Cow Palace to Ed Sullivan

When David Levy, a 43-year-old creative supervisor at Young and Rubicam, viewed Eisenhower’s reelection speech on February 28, 1956, he saw a major personal opportunity. He knew agency President Sig Larmon was finalizing an agreement with the Citizens for Eisenhower. Larmon and Executive Vice President Harry Harding had made several trips to Denver and Gettysburg, and now they were spending increasing amounts of time in Washington. Levy, as chief of the Treasury Department’s radio section during World War II, had worked with Eisenhower in a 1945 war bond drive. Levy was later active in Young and Rubicam’s Citizens campaign in 1952. On March 7, he received the news from Larmon that “we have been committed,” and as he hoped he was put in charge of the TV project.

Young and Rubicam’s arrangement with Citizens was unusual. The agency had long been opposed to political advertising. However, Larmon, one of Eisenhower’s closest golf and bridge companions, was too close to the White House to keep his giant company out of the picture. Larmon involved Young and Rubicam on a “gratis” basis, taking no commissions with no employees “assigned” to work on the campaign. Instead, he called for volunteers, and each was given a “leave of absence.” They would be able to use, though, all agency facilities and contacts. By asking for volunteers, a spirited and loyal team was formed. They were excited about a presidential campaign and most adored Eisenhower, whose warmth toward Larmon rubbed off on numerous others.
Levy was such a person, and in early 1958 he saw two key responsibilities. One was creative -- the ideas, devices and gimmicks designed for the still-new television medium. It was a task of the mind, and one he relished. The other task came greatly from the heart. It was the substance of the campaign, the conceptual backbone of the TV appeal. Levy was an adman, and he knew he had to have something to "sell." While he believed in Eisenhower politically, the president had not been too helpful. Thus, Levy had to formulate a focused philosophy that would bind the administration to the scattered ambitions of the Republican party.

The challenge of projecting a campaign theme was on the minds of many that spring. A concerned Levy told Citizens on May 11 that steps had to be taken to inject "distinctiveness" into Eisenhower's public statements; he was sounding too much like Adlai Stevenson, the eventual Democratic nominee. Levy said he had an idea after examining an Eisenhower speech delivered a month before. The president had outlined several principals for leadership, stressing the heart and courage of the individual, a government that serves but does not dominate, and a freedom through strength. Levy said he could see these principals as "signposts on the Eisenhower Road." He noted, "You can see the visual application of this for posters, advertisements and television." Out of this evolved the "Peace, Prosperity and Progress" Republican concept of 1956. The importance of a unified theme was explained again in July, in a Young and Rubicam memo emphasizing that "Ike's popularity has not been transferred to the GOP."

Levy wanted to avoid submerging substance and letting the image campaign rest on Eisenhower's popularity, but when he traveled with Larmom to the Republican Convention he saw how great this temptation could be. It was Levy's first opportunity since 1952 to see Eisenhower both in person and on television, and he was struck, as were many others, with the president's
ability to command respect while projecting a warm, personal demeanor. TV history was made in San Francisco as Eisenhower held the first-ever live news conference. His ease in handling the moment made an indelible impression.

Meanwhile, Levy became ill and had to watch much of the convention on TV from a hospital bed. As he did, he started to conceive parts of the fall TV campaign. It was all there at the Cow Palace: average people happy and strong in a powerful and secure nation, under a president who was a mixture of the common and the great. Levy notified Preston Wood, his chief assistant in New York, that he was coming home with a plan and "the important thing now is speed." Both Young and Rubicam and BBDO presented their formal campaign plans in early September, and they had many similarities. BBDO President Bernard C. Duffy spoke for his agency, which had the task of setting up TV pickup of speeches in selected cities around the country. In each speech, Eisenhower would emphasize the need to send Republicans to Congress. Duffy insisted the audience must see more than speeches. "The President should stop, talk, and then go to the main stage. The whole idea here is to bring the President's conversation a little closer to the public. . . . When he is doing this he is at his best." The BBDO plan detailed another important consideration: Eisenhower's health. According to Duffy, voters sworn to Eisenhower were understandably concerned, and they were greatly moved by the simple assurance he "felt fine." Eisenhower would state this many times on TV, with producers instructed to project an active and robust president. BBDO recommended that "thirty-minute talks were okay at times, but not as a steady diet." Levy's Young and Rubicam plan used bolder terms. Its programs would be "rousing and entertaining" Eisenhower salutes, with "atmosphere, color [and] authenticity," using high "emotional appeal," and "the greatest production control." Levy told his assistants to find locations in Washington suited
for television and experts who could rehearse him. One thing bothering him was makeup. "To improve the President's TV appearance, which has never reflected his own health and vigorous look, find a stand-in, a man whose skin texture is like the President's." Stand-ins were indeed used to experiment with different types of makeup, lighting and camera angles prior to several telecasts. Levy submitted a number of working titles for actual programs including "Wide World U.S.A." and "Talent Scouts." By no coincidence they resembled titles of existing TV shows.

On September 19, Larmon and Levy met personally with Eisenhower, showing him mockups of sample appeals on a film projector set up in the Oval Office by the Army Signal Corps. Levy recalled that Eisenhower had no objections to the specific appeals and liked the overall concept of connecting everyday people to his goals and those of the party.

At RNC headquarters, the work of the two agencies began to please Guylay, a main reason he would recall that the campaign was the best organized up to 1967. The campaign concept, generated by television requirements, helped crystallize other parts of the Citizens strategy, which included local dinners, news publicity, circulation of films and speakers and six roving "bandwagons." The latter traveled the country with Eisenhower war memorabilia carrying the "Peace, Prosperity and Progress" message.

Nevertheless, another internal concern had not escaped the Republican planners. The result was an unofficial "intelligence" function, designed to learn as much as possible about forces that might influence the campaign's success. Hall revealed in his 1975 oral history that he hired a detective agency to do "research" on the "dump Nixon" movement that spring. Guylay, in his oral history, revealed even more. On several occasions he and the chairman held highly informal receptions for the Washington press corps, in which Hall would tell stories, make jokes and sing songs, loosening up the
reporters, who often supplied information on the Democrats in return. "I don't think I was clandestine about it," said Guylay. "I think the press volunteered information they thought I ought to have."\(^7\)

One prominent member of the press corps recalls it differently, however. Bob Donovan, who covered Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations for the New York Herald-Tribune, said in 1988 he never attended one of Hall's soirees, stressing "it wouldn't have done any good, anyway." Nevertheless, he remembers Hall as "very approachable" and very close to the reporters. "It wouldn't be surprising," said Donovan, "if that is what he had in mind."\(^8\)

There also was considerable interest in what the Democrats were doing. The Young and Rubicam staff, besides wanting to support a winner, wanted to be first in the creative TV battle. The agency of Norman, Craig and Kummel was the competition, and every Democratic TV appearance was monitored and analyzed, often with notes on whether different elements had been known in advance by the Republicans.\(^9\)

It motivated Young and Rubicam staffers, who had a huge creative task before them. Based on the July "summit" with BBDO, the agency was responsible for 10 polished five-minute appeals, four innovative extended productions and some short 60-second spots. On September 6, Levy set up his "television department" at Young and Rubicam, with Preston Wood, Dick Dana, Eugene Brim and Terry Lewis the creative supervisors; Mildred Fox, Dana, Azimat Guirney and Howard Eaton assigned to talent procurement; Joseph Mego the talent coordinator and Walter Burke the Hollywood supervisor.\(^10\) The long-form programs became the immediate priority, in part because many of BBDO's live TV speeches came early in the campaign. After overcoming hurdles in the longer programs, resources would still be available for the rest, especially the five-minute spots packed at the end of the campaign.
There was one "resource" Young and Rubicam sought above all others in the beginning, driving the TV group into a fever throughout September. It was Levy's scheme to enlist Hollywood celebrities. To Levy, there was no better way, in an image campaign, to draw masses of Democratic and independent voters than placing the "stars" on TV with the GOP standard bearers. Although he calculated correctly that Stevenson would resist this tactic in his campaign, Levy took no chances. It started with Levy's "Ed Sullivan project." Sullivan hosted a top-rated TV variety show on CBS, and Levy had him penciled in to emcee one of the Eisenhower programs. Levy told his assistants to "impress on Mr. Sullivan the very high [need] of having him participate." If he said "no," Levy said he would settle for Bob Hope as an alternate. While neither was used, a "star committee" was formed, and the Hollywood office worked up a list of 85 celebrities, 47 of whom agreed to work for Eisenhower. One was Irving Berlin, who composed them music for some of the appeals. Others who later appeared with the president were James Stewart, Helen Hayes, Nat (King) Cole, Jane Powell, Irene Dunne, Gordon McRae and Eddie Fisher.

By late September the campaign was in full public view. Stevenson had completed a large part of what would become a 75,000-mile "barnstorming" effort, and the Republican plan of having Nixon bear the travel duties fell into place. On September 18, Eisenhower appeared at Washington National Airport to see Nixon off, telling him to "Give 'em Heaven," a swipe at Harry Truman's 1948 "Give 'em Hell." In the beginning, the Eisenhower end of the campaign stayed close to plans. On September 25 he made a one-day trip into Illinois, capped by a live nationwide TV speech that night in Peoria set up by BBDO. He appeared in Lexington, Kentucky on October 1 and in Pittsburgh on October 9, each time with BBDO cameras ready for a national TV pickup and each time back in Washington for the start of the next business day. His only
extended trip was a three-day swing down the West Coast, making national BBDO-engineered speeches in Portland on October 19 and Los Angeles on October 20.

However, much more was ahead. The bulk of the network time purchased the year before was concentrated in the last three weeks of the campaign. This airtime would be devoted to the "soft sell" image campaign, designed to convince each viewer that a vote for Eisenhower's America required a vote for other Republicans on the local slates. It was "Peace, Prosperity and Progress" set in a different tune. Up to now, Young and Rubicam worked behind the scenes, brainstorming, planning and testing. In mid-October, it was heard from at last.

IV. The Image Blitz

Levy had liked the BBDO efforts. Each live appearance had been well orchestrated and timed, and Duffy's staff had succeeded in showing Eisenhower interacting with the people. The Peoria speech was particularly pleasing as a national audience saw Midwest farmers warmly greeting the president. If there was one place Eisenhower's popularity sagged, it was in the farm belt.66

Still, Levy kept anticipating some type of splash by the Democrats. The only "creative" device seemed to be a series they called "The Man From Libertyville," which was described in Young and Rubicam monitoring reports as mixtures of canned informality and remarks "of a rambling nature."67 Was this the best the competition could do, Levy wondered? With the 1956 TV audience having seen mainly the traditional political message, Levy and his associates felt they could cut a wide swath if their first TV image appeal succeeded.68 It came the night of October 12.

The program was a "news conference." The public was familiar with these, but this one was different. Instead of appearing before reporters, Eisenhower fielded questions from 108 "every day" citizens who were actually handpicked
from Citizens groups across the country. Young and Rubicam was kept busy filing hometown newspaper clippings telling the "king/queen for a day" story of each city's delegate to the affair. Levy could not wait to attempt this, after watching Eisenhower's live news conference at the Convention. Eisenhower blamed many of his problems on the Democratic Congress and Levy knew the president would emphasize this in his impromptu remarks. Because it was a paid political event, he would have no qualms about relating America's need to elect more Republicans. Prior to the Friday prime time NBC telecast, Levy met with Hagerty, coordinator of the "real" news conferences. The objective was controlled spontaneity. Eisenhower selected questioners at random, and none of the questions were programmed. Yet before the show, "warm up" meetings were held and information was passed on to Eisenhower before airtime.

The morning after the event, Peter Lisagor wrote in the Chicago Daily News, "President Eisenhower look(ed) as pleased as a kid at a candy counter." Russell Baker of the New York Times commented, "The President's answers seemed as spontaneous as they normally do in his regular news conferences." The Washington Post reported Eisenhower had a "good time, saying that night, "I just feel swell." Eisenhower was exuberant. He wrote a congratulatory letter to Larmon, sending a sheaf of praiseworthy telegrams. That night he went before live cameras again, in a Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon gala TV birthday party on CBS, with some of the celebrities rounded up by the agency.

The same week the first group of five-minute "piggyback" appeals hit the air. The Young and Rubicam appeals, all filmed, carried the titles of "Person to Person," "Ike as Hero," and "Voice of the People." One popular spot was dubbed "Mamie." A housewife, busy in the kitchen, complained, "Stevenson is too smug. He'd rather make a speech with a lot of big words." She dissolved to Mamie in a similar domestic setting inside the White House. "Ike's beloved Mamie," the announcer chimed in, "Let's keep a 'first lady' in the White House
for four more years." The last line was intended to be more than catchy. Stevenson had been divorced several years before, and when the spot came out of the cutting room Larmor was flabbergasted at its supposed "bad taste." It got on the air, though, when an unaware Eisenhower suggested the very idea a few days later.

Young and Rubicam's next long-form appeal was carried on CBS on the night of October 16. It was a half-hour film documentary similar to a travelogue, but laced with an underlying message. Levy wanted the program to be a "swiftly moving cavalcade . . . designed to make an emotional appeal." It was aimed at Democrats and independents, showing average Americans contented and unconcerned about world uncertainties. What the typical American was pausing to consider in 1956 was the inspiration of Judy Garland's comeback, the spectacle of a Mickey Mantle home run and the delight of Mary Martin's Peter Pan, each visually stitched into the film. From coast to coast, Americans felt good about America, and Republican votes in November would keep it that way.

That week, with two 30-minute successes and the five-minute appeals on the air, the Young and Rubicam image makers had reason to glow. But not for long. Stevenson's campaign was gaining strength, as he finally forged a pact with labor while Eisenhower's popularity was again sliding in the Midwest. Stevenson, meanwhile, had found a new issue that struck a nerve at the White House: his call for a halt to nuclear testing. Eisenhower wanted this unmentioned during the campaign, and he read in dismay numerous letters from citizens urging a test ban treaty. To Eisenhower, military affairs were sacred home turf, and now Stevenson was trespassing. As the test ban controversy developed, a crisis had erupted in the Middle East and Eisenhower's efforts to avoid a war were unraveling. Egypt wrested control of the Suez Canal from Great Britain and France, and on October 13, as the Soviets vetoed an American
peace plan at the U.N., Eisenhower was informed the British and French would invade the Egyptians. Through October, there were uprisings in Poland and a revolution brewing in Hungary.

The Citizens "news conference" and birthday party of October 12-13 had relaxed Eisenhower, but back in the Oval Office on the following Monday, tensions caught up with him. He wanted to see Hall that day. Eisenhower would not have minded getting out and beating back Stevenson, but with events overseas he was convinced he could not make any extended trips except for one that week on the West Coast, which had been long planned by the RNC. Eisenhower later wrote of his deep concerns about a potential world war, labeling those weeks in late October as the most demanding of his entire presidency.

At the same time, though, he was also remembering 1952, when the party got "frightened" at the end of the campaign. He wanted to know if Hall's TV strategy would hold. Hall said it would; the president's popularity was stable. They met again when Eisenhower returned from the West. At that meeting on October 22, Hall had BBDO's Duffy at his side, again assuring the president there would be no major last-minute demands.

Still, the mounting worries in Washington quickly found their way to Madison Avenue. Young and Rubicam had two live programs left, both big ones. One was a TV rally at New York's Madison Square Garden on October 25, the other an appeal on November 5, the night before the election. For these, Levy had developed his best plans, especially for the election eve show when he wanted to showcase his stable of stars and celebrities. Now, new plans were needed. Voters would ask on election day, with war breaking out abroad, if Eisenhower was keeping the nation secure. Thus, with the campaign boiling down to one issue, a new campaign orientation was cast, one toning down the "Prosperity and Progress" and sharpening the "Peace."
Young and Rubicam played it masterfully. Walter Winchell and Fred Waring appeared at the October 25 NBC appeal, but Eisenhower was the "star," the commander in chief speaking forthrightly on peace through strength. He was interrupted 48 times by applause. By that night, the stretch-run barrage of five-minute appeals had been unleashed. In the final ten days, 17 of these spots hit the network air, all but two in the peak period between 8 and 9:30 p.m., and only one on the weak ABC. In them, the contented American of two weeks before was replaced by the secure American. In one spot, a man walked his dog in front of the White House at night. As foreboding music swelled in the background, he spied a single lighted window and pondered out loud, "A neighbor of mine lives there. Yep, Dwight Eisenhower, a man with the most important job in the world today. What do you suppose he's doing tonight?"

Other spots were less subtle. The film people at the agency came up with Korean War combat footage and edited it to music of a sinister key: "Four years ago many of our young men were on Heartbreak Ridge in Korea. What do you say? Are you willing to bet everything you love and hold so dear that Stevenson can keep us out of war?"

Material from some of the five-minute spots was condensed into 30- and 60-second commercials, a concept BBDO pioneered in 1952 under Rosser Reeves. In 1956, Young and Rubicam produced seven such spots and BBDO prepared many more. The BBDO short-form spots contained some of the most pointed messages regarding Eisenhower's unity with other party candidates. One series focused on an average family of four, with soft music in the background and a narrator told viewers they could contribute to good times by casting votes for Eisenhower, Nixon and other Republicans on their ballot. A related series featured Eisenhower and Mamie singing "God Bless America"; during the duet the viewer saw filmed montages of more everyday people. One version ended with a narrator
pleading "Give Ike a Republican Congress." Another version was introduced by Eisenhower with a similar appeal.

Meanwhile, BBDO was taking strides in its long-form image appeals. Following the success of the "news conference," the agency scraped a Nixon speech October 16 at Cornell University and placed the vice president in an informal setting with college students. On October 28, there was another innovation, a "klatsch" in which the Eisenhowers exchanged coffee and White House wisdom with women during daytime TV on CBS.

Young and Rubicam's election eve telecast was the most important single component of the TV campaign. Not only was it the only 60-minute appeal, it was carried on all three networks beginning at 11 p.m. Eastern time. Levy cherished the assignment, originally to be the Ed Sullivan-type variety show. "By putting on a star-studded thematic show," he said in September, "we will still have the opportunity to get across, for the final time, many reasons why all kinds of people are voting for Eisenhower-Nixon. By November 5, television will have been flooded with oratory." When November 5 arrived he felt less sure he was right. The more-sober peace/security thrust of the past week and a half was barely keeping up with world events. War was on in the Suez, and on that day 200,000 Soviet troops were storming into Hungary. The election eve program loomed large, and it was no place for Ed Sullivan.

It opened on a coast-to-coast panorama with music and NBC news anchor John Cameron Swayze announcing, "Tomorrow is V-E Day 1956. Victory day for Eisenhower for four more years." It cut to Eisenhower and Nixon, and their wives, sitting informally in the White House library. They "hosted" the show, talking of America's leadership in the world and introducing film segments the agency had prepared in advance. The most notable feature was a series of live remote TV hookups, allowing conversations between the White House and women, blacks, young people and others in cities from Boston to San Francisco. The
program, directed by Levy from the first-floor White House ladies room, may have represented the most elaborate mixture of film and live television up to that time. For the final time voters were asked to support Eisenhower and their local Republican candidates.

Exactly 24 hours later the Eisenhowers and Nixons met again at Washington's Sheraton Park Hotel to take in one of the most stunning presidential landslides ever. Hall, Humphreys and Guylay were at the party, as was Larmon. Levy watched from his home in Connecticut. No presidential candidate had ever received as many popular votes as Eisenhower received that night. He carried 42 of 48 states, and his electoral margin was the third-largest in U.S. history. Eisenhower appeared on the platform, joining with others in his familiar raised-arms victory salute, offering to work for "168 million Americans here at home." Yet that night the smiles were forced. A morning after had already begun.

V. "We Still Have Much to Learn . . ."

Did the 1956 TV strategy work? Television may not have been decisive in the Eisenhower landslide -- he led in the polls all year and benefitted even more by international developments, which took critical turns right before election day. However, there is evidence TV helped. In a final BBDO survey, voters overwhelmingly named television as the media source most influencing their voting decisions, which was important because TV trailed the newspaper in 1954. Further, the all-important Democratic voter relied on TV more than the Republican. The part of the TV strategy drawing the most comment after the election concerned Eisenhower's health. Eisenhower had spent three of the previous 12 months in the hospital or in convalescence, and yet it never became a big issue in the campaign. It has been argued the Democrats were blocked because, as Newsweek noted, Eisenhower was seen again and again on TV.
as vigorous and healthy. If nothing else, the TV strategy both convinced and riled the victim of the worst Democratic defeat in 84 years. Adlai Stevenson, in his own words, had been cut down by the "Lords of Madison Avenue."

Nevertheless, the Eisenhower landslide was not the only outcome in 1956, and it may not be the best measuring stick of the TV effort. The TV strategy began with party motives, and the election night jubilance at the Sheraton Park ballroom was quite unlike the scene upstairs, where Eisenhower and party leaders followed other races. It began when Pennsylvania voters ousted Republican Senator James Duff, an Eisenhower ally. Soon afterward, Kansas elected its first Democratic governor, and conservative Utah chose a Democrat to the Senate. Colorado voters turned out Governor Dan Thorntcn, while another Eisenhower stalwart, Arthur Langlie, was rejected in Washington. Douglas McKay had left his post as Interior Secretary to run for governor in Oregon, only to be stunned by his Democratic opponent. In the same state, Wayne Morse, once a liberal Republican who jostled with Eisenhower, jumped parties and won election to the Senate as a Democrat. When it was over, the Democrats had 29 of 48 governorships, with a 231-201 advantage in the House and a 49-47 margin in the Senate. It was the first time since Zachary Taylor squeaked by Lewis Cass in 1848 that a winning president lost both houses of Congress, and in 1956 the winner had not merely squeaked by.

If the election was a setback for the Republicans in general, it was particularly depressing for those at headquarters who had predicted victory by going to the people instead of the party. In this important aspect of the 1956 effort, the TV strategy had not worked.

It was not a complete surprise. According to a Burns W. Roper poll a week before the voting, the Republicans, near the height of the TV blitz, had scarcely made a dent in Democratic sentiment. Newspapers such as the Washington Post had followed the situation closely and on October 14 Execut
Editor J.R. Wiggins offered a lengthy analysis which concluded, "The Democrats have been increasing their hold on local state and congressional offices to the point where something like a trend toward domination of this area of politics seems to be underway." Even so, Chairman Hall was perplexed.

Despite all the attempts to link Eisenhower with the party, the content of the TV appeals was criticized for too much Eisenhower orientation. John Schneider asserted in The Nation, "When you have a hot showcase item, you use it to help sell the rest of your line; you tie it in with the slower moving, less glamorous products." Representative Richard Simpson of Pennsylvania, head of the Republican Congressional Committee, complained, "We 'Iked' the American people and neglected to include the Republican label."

Hall did not have second thoughts about the TV appeals, but he did question one thing underpinning the TV strategy, the concept of having Eisenhower at home during most of the campaign. Requests had poured in from foundering organizations in virtually every state -- they wanted Eisenhower in person. From Missouri: "I am pleading with you to please come to St. Louis." From Arizona: "We cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of having President Eisenhower stop at Phoenix." From Louisiana: "We have worked with all our hearts [and] respectfully request you appear no matter how briefly." From South Carolina: "We are still part of the United States."

Three years later, Hall concluded of television, "We still have much to learn about how best to use it in a national campaign." Hall told Life that TV at that time was "no substitute for doorbell ringing and shoe leather."

Could the Republicans have shored up the fortunes of its local candidates by placing Eisenhower in a more active position? The question has keen political implications. Many have argued these 1956 defeats cleared the way for the 1958 Republican debacle, in which it lost 15 more seats in the Senate and 49 in the House and placed itself at a disadvantage of which it would not
begin to emerge until the Ronald Reagan sweep three decades later.97 One view
depicts Eisenhower as eager to hit the campaign trail, but unable to do so
because of crisis abroad.98 Yet, there is contrary evidence. Guylay relates
an incident after the Lexington appearance, three weeks before the Suez
outbreak, in which Eisenhower complained of being overworked. It was a clear
message of Eisenhower's campaign intentions that was fully understood by party
leaders. There would be no insubordination.99

Perhaps better insights are found in Hall, who did not insist that
Eisenhower take a more active role. Hall demonstrated continual conciliation
toward Eisenhower, doing what he would publicly say was best for the party.
Privately, he may have had other ideas. Hall could not have been pleased when
Eisenhower told him on February 10 he might be happier running for president
as Democrat.100 Or on election night when Eisenhower talked of forming a
third party.101 They saw little of each other immediately after the election,
and later, as Eisenhower prepared for his second inaugural, Hall began
cleaning out his desk. The man James Reston compared to Milton Berle in terms
of TV savvy102 quit as Republican National Chairman January 7. Guylay had
already resigned. Eisenhower praised Hall for battling "headaches and
heartaches,"103 yet his replacement, Meade Alcorn, offers clues as to what was
left unsaid. Eisenhower was much more active in screening Alcorn than he had
been with Hall in 1953, and, according to Herbert Parmet, Hall's departure
left the president feeling "liberated" from the party's old guard.104

On Madison Avenue, 1956 also left mixed feelings. Stevenson's attacks on
Republican TV tactics were furthered by journalists and commentators. New
York Times TV critic Jack Gould declared in late October, "Selling a new
product and a 'new America' requires different techniques." John Schneider
wrote in The Nation of potential dangers lurking in this polygamous marriage
of politics with public relations, advertising and sales promotion.105
criticism did not go unheeded. Harry Harding of Young and Rubicam recalls vividly, "They chastised us over and over for trying to sell the president like corn flakes." Due in part to the 1956 cross fire, Young and Rubicam not only refrained from future political activity, crusaded to restrict political advertising. BBDO felt the controversy as well, not only in 1956 but also in 1960, when Richard Nixon had the RNC cut off the account and form an advertising consortium in order to avoid a Madison Avenue stigma.

Meanwhile, Young and Rubicam's David Levy joined Hall and Guylay as political TV "refugees." After 21 years at the agency he went to NBC in 1958, then two years later moved to the West Coast to begin a new career as a TV producer. The man who created "Mamie" and "V-E Day 1956" went on to mastermind The Addams Family, The Double Life of Henry Phyfe and The Pruitts of Southampton, which were hit TV comedy series in the sixties. He also created game shows, including Face the Music, published several novels and wrote poetry.

When Levy left Young and Rubicam, he carried some ill feeling about the Eisenhower TV campaign. It was personal to him, but it contains some important insights. Why was the 1956 TV effort forgotten? Why would Levy's successors in the 1960 campaign get credit for beginning the "TV era" in politics, when some of the tactics that year were arguably less advanced than those of 1956? One reason was the obscurity in which those behind the scenes had worked. Over $3 million was spent by the party on TV in 1956, twice as much as it spent on other media put together. Yet there was a sense that television was a sideshow rather than at the center of the campaign; journalists, pundits and observers -- and the hundreds of active Republicans not part of the TV planning -- failed to recognize at the time the metamorphosis in the way Americans selected presidents.

It was recognized, though, by the small numbers who were part of the planning. In March 1957, the Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon released its final
report, a book-length document containing but one brief section on television. An incensed Tony Zaghi, a Young and Rubicam executive, told Sig Larmon, "Our people worked day and night. Reading this report one cannot help get the impression that they agency's contribution amounted to nothing." Levy was equally baffled: "The report was designed [as] a 'blueprint for future activity.' An objective analysis of the effectiveness of all the techniques and media employed could have been a useful part of the record."109

In 1988, having gained fame in other fields, Levy was philosophic about the unsung accomplishments of 1956. "Much of it," he said, had to do with Larmon. Larmon always believed in anonymity. Larmon was a sensitive man who had lofty ideals for the agency, and I'm not sure he really liked what we were doing. . . . We did not view ourselves as people who made policy; we were not writing the Gettysburg Address. Eisenhower was always in control, and we were anonymous.110

The record of the 1956 TV effort may not have been fully written at the time, but the campaign was studied immediately afterward. There is considerable evidence of this in the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon campaign. A rich historical glimpse into Kennedy's thinking is found in a little-known article he wrote for TV Guide in 1959. He noted Eisenhower's TV appeal but claimed TV was an "asset" to younger candidates handicapped by old-style politics.111 Nixon, in a 1987 letter to the author, said many of the TV appearances he was told to make in 1956 were valuable confidence-building lessons. He does not regret his decision to debate Kennedy on TV in 1960, something many feel cost him the election, and he attributes part of his victory in 1968 to telethons and "man-in-the-arena" events, which "were a direct result of the 1956 question and answer session with college students."112 In those 1968 affairs, popular football coach and sports commentator Bud Wilkinson was host, part of a "star operation" not unlike that of 1956. A fuller accounting of the ways 1956 later weaved itself into TV politics beckons media and political scholars.
But as we view 1956 today, television remains a footnote in a campaign that is itself a footnote in the nation's political history. This view obscures the contribution made to a changing tide in American politics by those behind the scenes that year, such as the Halls and Guylays, the Larmons, Levys and Duffys. It also hides the pivotal role of Eisenhower himself, who grew with the medium and established an environment in which the medium could be used creatively. These people made the big leap from the stark, straight, "hammer it home" campaign tradition visible through 1952 to the imaginative, multi-dimensional and scientific approaches characteristic of today. They advanced the TV appeal from something relatively unknown to the kind of thing inspiring next-day conversation, and election-day voting decisions. And, as noted, these people had to answer the first major wave of criticism about reducing a presidential campaign to short TV spots.

The mid-fifties are vital in understanding television, and in 1956 politicians had reasons for using the medium beyond the fact it was "there." TV may not have successfully come to the aid of the Republican party, but the harvest of television thinking and innovation that began then has helped to drive politics and the media ever since.
NOTES


2 See Eisenhower Records as President, The Official File, Box 714. Eisenhower Library.


9 Ambrose, Nixon, p. 353.


12 The thesis the administration sought to "reach out to the nation" by TV is also advanced in Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, see pp. 52-53. Ambrose details the early conflicts Eisenhower had with Congress, including his opposition to the Bricker Amendment designed to repudiate the Yalta agreements. See pp. 66-71.

13 Guylay oral history, p. 85.


15 Leonard Hall oral history, by David Horrocks, Eisenhower Library, May 19, 1975, p. 34. Eisenhower Library.


RNC Preliminary Campaign Plan, 1956, Robert Humphreys Papers, Box 11. Eisenhower Library.

Guylay oral history, p. 85.

Ibid., p. 9.

The Republicans had paid $400,000 in preemption fees in 1952.

Guylay oral history, pp. 84-85.


Minutes of meeting July 30, 1956, Young and Rubicam Papers, Box 6. Eisenhower Library.

Guylay oral history, p. 78.


36 Contained in a summary of the 1956 election appearing in a workbook provided at the 1958 Republican "Campaign School," Robert Humphreys Papers, Box 2. Eisenhower Library.


41 Sig Larmon to David Levy, Mar. 7, 1956, Young and Rubicam Papers, Box 5. Eisenhower Library.

42 Harding interview and Joan Hafey, public relations director, Young and Rubicam, telephone interview, New York City, Jan. 20, 1988.

43 Levy to Mr. Lapham, May 11, 1956, Young and Rubicam Papers, Box 6. Eisenhower Library.

44 Ibid.

45 Young and Rubicam memo to Citizens for Eisenhower, July, 1956, Young and Rubicam Papers, Box 6. Eisenhower Library.

46 Levy interview.

47 Levy to Preston Wood, Aug. 26, 1956, Young and Rubicam Papers, Box 1. Eisenhower Library.

48 The BBDO campaign plan was summarized in a letter from Bernard C. Duffy to Sherman Adams, Sept. 21, 1956, Eisenhower Records as President, The Official File, Box 714. Eisenhower Library.


50 Levy memo to Young and Rubicam television organization, Aug. 28, 1956, Young and Rubicam Papers, Box 6. Eisenhower Library.

51 Ibid.

Levy interview.
Guylay oral history, p. 83.
Hall oral history, p. 34.
Guylay oral history, pp. 69-70.

The Young and Rubicam monitoring reports are included in the Young and Rubicam Papers, Box 6. Eisenhower Library. Also see a note addressed to Appointment Secretary Thomas Stephens about the plans of Democratic campaign organizer James Finnegan, Oct. 5, 1956, Thomas Stephens Papers, Box 30. Eisenhower Library.

Organizational Chart, Young and Rubicam Television Organization, Sept. 6, 1956, Young and Rubicam Papers, Box 6. Eisenhower Library.

Young and Rubicam Campaign Plan.

See Telex sent to Preston Wood, Sept. 12, 1956, Young and Rubicam Papers, Box 9. Eisenhower Library.


Ambrose, Nixon, pp. 410-11.
Parmet, p. 460.


Levy interview.

Many of these letters appear in the Young and Rubicam Papers, Box 6. Eisenhower Library.

See letters from Levy to Larmon, Oct. 9, 1956, and Levy to White House staff, Sept. 27, 1956, Young and Rubicam Papers, Box 5. Eisenhower Library.


74 Young and Rubicam Campaign Plan.

75 Transcript of "Mamie," Thomas Stephens Papers, Box 31. Eisenhower Library.

76 Levy interview.

77 Young and Rubicam Campaign Plan.

78 Although Eisenhower was angry, the test ban issue helped him. When it was first raised by Stevenson, BBDO research indicated the public had no idea when he was talking about. See 1958 RNC "Campaign School" handbook, Robert Humphreys Papers, Box 2. Later, when Soviet Premier Bulganain sent a letter to Eisenhower urging a test ban, it was viewed as Russian endorsement of the Stevenson candidacy. See Ambrose, Nixon, p. 419.

79 Parmet, p. 470-71.


82 Parmet, p. 472.


85 Young and Rubicam Campaign Plan.

86 Transcript, Election Eve broadcast, Nov. 5, 1956, Young and Rubicam Papers, Box 7. Eisenhower Library.


88 Results of this Oct., 1956 survey appear in the 1958 RNC "Campaign School" handbook Robert Humphreys Papers, Box 2. In 1954, 48 percent said they relied on newspapers compared to 37 percent for TV. In 1956, 50 percent relied on TV. By party, 52 percent of Democrats and 46 percent of Republicans said they relied on TV.


90 See several post election letters written by Stevenson in Johnson, ed., The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson.


94 Parmet, p. 486.

95 See Thomas Stephens Papers, Box 29. Eisenhower Library.

96 Hall, Life.

97 In Waging Peace, Eisenhower said his 1956 election night expression of "modern" Republicanism was taken as a signal of a deepening party "schism" that led to the 1958 setbacks. Eisenhower said the idea was an "exaggeration," and he blamed the poor Republican showing on the 1958 recession, a lack of support from organized labor and the resounding defeat in five states of right-to-work legislation which key Republicans had supported. See pp. 374-76.


99 Guylay oral history, p. 55.


101 Ambrose, Nixon, p. 422.


104 Parmet, p. 495-96.


106 Harding interview.

107 Hafey interview. See also Edward Ney, Young and Rubicam Issues 9 (pamphlet), Young and Rubicam International, 1976.


Levy interview.
