ABSTRACT

The Office of Censorship's struggle to keep journalists from revealing the development of the first atomic bomb, the sites where the development was taking place, and the fact that the bomb might be available for use in the war, was desperate and in many ways heroic. Soon after it was created on December 19, 1941, the office issued a voluntary wartime code of practices for newspapers, magazines, and periodicals which asked editors to act according to whether they thought the information in their possession was of use to the enemy. For the next three years the appearance of stories on heavy water and atom smashing became a problem which the Office of Censorship had to monitor continually by issuing confidential notes to editors of newspapers and weeklies as well as managers of radio stations. The Office of Censorship also was frantically battling leaks outside of mainstream magazines and newspapers, such as book publishers, "appropriate authorities," and universities. This lasted until the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, at which point the Office of Censorship's Press Division took the view that virtually anything was permissible except a description of how the atom was split or the internal workings of the bomb. Remarkably, throughout the war, the press did bear with the government policy of revealing virtually no technical details about the bomb, primarily because it enthusiastically supported the war. The voluntary form of censorship had worked. (Seventy-three notes are included.) (MS)
THE OFFICE OF CENSORSHIP'S ATTEMPT TO CONTROL PRESS COVERAGE
OF THE ATOMIC BOMB DURING WORLD WAR II

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On August 6, 1945, the first atomic bomb used in warfare exploded on Hiroshima, Japan, with the awesome power of 20,000 tons of TNT and the seeming brilliance of a thousand suns. The explosion resulted immediately in a scramble by the press for one of the great news stories of the 20th century. It also was the long-awaited signal to begin a quiet celebration at the Office of Censorship, the U.S. agency which worked closely with the press in attempting to keep information from being published or broadcast that might hurt the war effort. For almost two and a half years, the Office of Censorship had been struggling, frantically at times and not altogether successfully, to keep journalists from revealing the development of the bomb, the sites where the development was taking place, and the fact that the bomb might be available for use in the war.

This is the story of that struggle at the Office of Censorship. It is an intriguing tale of which only small portions have been told before—and not always accurately. For example, New York Times' science writer William L. Laurence, who was recruited by the government in 1945 to write the press releases about the atomic bomb, claimed that between September 1940 and August 1945 the subject of atomic energy "vanished" from American publications. That is not true. Neither was it true when Editor & Publisher wrote on August 11, 1945, that "hardly a word leaked out" about the atomic bomb in World War II, and what did appear was "of a minor nature." In fact, extensive Office of Censorship records at the National Archives show that while lengthy articles about atomic power disappeared during the war, numerous press leaks occurred,
and some of them were extremely serious.

Thus, all of the elements were present for high adventure: the top-secret race with Germany to develop a super weapon that would guarantee victory; the presence of an American press that did not want to hurt the war effort but had only "voluntary" restrictions on what it could publish; and the existence of a small group of former editors and reporters at the Office of Censorship who were the last hope to stop the press from "breaking" the atomic energy story. It was a desperate struggle and, in many ways, a heroic one.

II

The Office of Censorship was created on December 19, 1941, by an executive order from the White House. Three days before, President Roosevelt had outlined the necessity for censorship in a press release:

All Americans abhor censorship, just as they abhor war. But the experience of this and of all other nations has demonstrated that some degree of censorship is essential in wartime, and we are at war.... It is necessary to the national security that military information which might be of aid to the enemy be scrupulously withheld at the source.... It is necessary that prohibitions against the domestic publication of some types of information, contained in long-existing statutes, be rigidly enforced.3

Bryon Price, executive news editor of the Associated Press, was named director of the Office of Censorship, and he quickly formed a Press Division from editors and reporters on newspapers, trade publications and wire services.4

On January 14, 1942, Price announced a voluntary wartime code of practices for newspapers, magazines and periodicals. Its crux was contained in one sentence: "A maximum of accomplishment will be attained if editors will ask themselves with respect to any given detail, 'Is this information I would like to have if I were the enemy?' and then act
accordingly.5 To help the press decide what could be run under the code, the Office of Censorship was open for inquiries twenty-four hours every day of the year.6

One part of the voluntary code requested that nothing be used by the press on "new or secret military weapons [and] ... experiments." This obviously included atomic energy, but the Office of Censorship did not face its first problem in this area until almost fifteen months after the code went into effect. The time lapse resulted from the absence of news sources. In 1939, American scientists involved in nuclear experiments had agreed voluntarily among themselves to stop publishing information that might have possible military usefulness. "Special emphasis" was placed on "uranium work." Then, in 1940, editors of American scientific journals had begun referring any articles that might have military value to a Committee of the National Academy of Sciences for clearance.7 This had been followed shortly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the quiet disappearance of the leading physicists, who began developing the bomb without leaving any forwarding addresses.8 Thus, by May 1942, Time noted that nothing about chemistry or physics was heard at a recent meeting of the American Philosophical Society and reports on explosives were barred from an American Chemical Society gathering. "Such facts as these add up to the biggest scientific news of 1942: that there is less and less scientific news," the magazine said. "... Today's momentous scientific achievements will not be disclosed until the war's end."9

The heavy secrecy surrounding the development of the atomic bomb resulted in the Office of Censorship not being informed about the project until March 30, 1943. And only then was the agency told because the subject could no longer be avoided. An Army officer in the Manhattan...
Engineer District, which was the code name for the atom bomb project, expressed concern over newspaper stories about project construction contracts near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Pasco, Washington. The stories were harmless since they did not mention atomic energy, but the Army wanted a total news blackout on anything relating to the two state sites. On April 1, N.R. Howard, head of the Press Division and a former editor of the Cleveland News, wrote the Army that a blackout was impossible. He pointed out that most of the information being published by the press came from public court records, particularly regarding land acquisitions by the government, and no restrictions could be placed on it.10

Three days later the first alarming leak about the atomic bomb occurred in an Associated Press story from London on page 18 of the New York Times. Under a one-column headline, "Nazi 'Heavy Water' Looms as Weapon," the nine-inch story began: "'Heavy water,' derived by an electro-chemical process from ordinary water, with hidden atomic power that can be used for the deadly purposes of war as well as the happier pursuits of peace, apparently has become a source of anxiety for those Allied leaders who plan attacks against enemy targets." The War Department immediately telephoned the Office of Censorship to say that it, as well as British military officials, were "greatly concerned" about the story and to request the suppression of any future foreign wire copy that dealt with utilizing heavy water for war purposes. Such an order was promptly sent on April 5 to the censorship office in New York City, which oversaw all wire service stories entering the U.S.11 Over the next ten days, an investigation revealed that the AP copy had been sent because the British Ministry of Information had failed to refer it to the technical censors. This brought an apology from the British embassy in
Washington and a promise that such a slip-up would not occur again.  

Over the next two and a half months, the Office of Censorship and the Army conferred frequently on a thorny problem: how to warn editors to not run anything about atomic power without specifically mentioning the Tennessee and Washington projects. Finally, the Office of Censorship, the Office of War Information, and Military Intelligence put together a confidential note to editors, which was issued by Price on June 28, 1943. It asked that nothing be printed or broadcast on wartime experiments involving:

- Production or utilization of atom smashing, atomic energy, atomic fission, atomic splitting, or any of their equivalents.
- The use for military purposes of radium or radioactive materials, heavy water, high voltage discharge equipment, cyclotrons.
- The following elements or any of their compounds: polonium, uranium, ytterbium, hafnium, protactinium, radium, rhenium, thorium, deuterium.

The note was mailed to 2,000 daily newspapers and 11,000 weeklies as well as all radio stations in the U.S. In addition, newspapers and radio stations in Tennessee and Washington received registered letters calling their attention to the note although the two projects were not mentioned.

The confidential note resulted immediately in several newspapers and wire services checking with the Office of Censorship before running stories about the Tennessee and Washington projects. However, problems still occurred. On July 27, the Schenectady (N.Y.) Gazette published a letter to the editor in which a former state assemblyman called U-235 "the most potent stuff on earth." The Office of Censorship complained to the paper and received an assurance that no such letters would be...
published in the future. Then, Business Week referred specifically to Oak Ridge on July 31 as "the Army's most secret project." The Office of Censorship promptly objected, noting that the magazine should have referred merely to "an important war project in Tennessee." At about the same time, Ohio State University published a promotional booklet about its research on atom smashing involving a cyclotron, uranium and heavy water. The Office of Censorship immediately halted the distribution of any further booklets while Military Intelligence cautioned Ohio State scientists to keep their work secret.

Still another problem surfaced in the Washington Post on August 11 when columnist Ernest Lindley wrote: "A major development, such as a practical means of releasing atomic energy, might suddenly outmode and overwhelm all the weapons of warfare in existence." Lindley was informed by Censorship that this sentence was a "borderline" violation of the June 28 request because of its speculation on the development of an atom bomb.

In early October 1943, the complexity of the censorship problem became apparent in a Westinghouse radio script about peacetime atom smashing. The Office of Censorship's Broadcasting Division uneasily allowed it to be broadcast virtually unchanged because it did not violate the June 28 directive, which dealt only with wartime applications of atom smashing. The decision was reviewed by Jack Lockhart, a former managing editor of the Memphis Commercial Appeal who had replaced Howard as the head of the Press Division in July 1943. He decided that the broadcast should not have been aired because it contained extensive information on Westinghouse's atom smashing research. Thus, he wrote Price on October 20:

I may be scared of this subject by what I have been told by Nat Howard and others, but I feel we have nothing that is
hotter, or more important, than it at present.

If I were the enemy, there would appear to be no more vital target for sabotage in this country than this Westinghouse laboratory and similar atom-smashing equipment elsewhere. I think the broadcast also is a rather apparent indication to the enemy that we are working on and making progress in atom smashing, even though there is no mention of military applications. In view of the importance of this matter as I understand it, I felt it better to lean to the side of extreme caution. We at present are following that leaning in the Press Division, and I would be glad to have a policy decision on whether we are being too extreme.

Lockhart's memo resulted in the problem being discussed on the following day by Office of Censorship and Army officials. J.H. Ryan of the Broadcasting Division had recommended to Price several days before that the problem could be solved easily by altering the June 28 press directive to cover all experiments, not merely those connected with wartime uses. But Price, who throughout the war strove to censor the press as little as possible, simply decided that the agency would be "most cautious" in handling future references to atom smashing.17

Future references appeared quickly. Ten days later, on October 31, 1943, the International News Service ran a story about scientists who had studied atom smashing for two months in the Rocky Mountains. One man said he was "hopeful of important findings which might have a bearing on the war effort." The Office of Censorship complained immediately, and INS sent a bulletin to editors that the story "MUST BE KILLED." The order was successful only because it was Sunday afternoon and no publications were being printed.18

On the same day, the Washington Post had an article on an anonymous scientist who "has been studying much of his life on the matter of blowing up nations with an atom." Lockhart wrote a scathing letter to the Post, noting that such a story would have been disturbing in a
country weekly and was a shock in the Washington paper. Managing Editor Alexander F. Jones replied testily that the Post felt it had done nothing wrong, but he promised the paper would avoid mentioning atom smashing or heavy water in the future. Two weeks later, the Washington Star used a Dorothy Thompson column which said that "atomic disintegration" would be perfected by the time World War IV arrived "so [we] can blow the human race off the earth and give this globe a final, lasting peace." Bell Syndicate, which sent out Thompson's column, was asked by Lockhart to avoid any further mention of atomic power since this might start "a sequence of increasingly dangerous references."

With the continuing appearance of stories on atom smashing, the Office of Censorship was confronted with yet another problem: some journalists began wondering why they could not write such articles when other publications were printing leaks. That was the tough question Lockhart faced when he wrote the managing editor of the Schenectady Gazette on December 13, 1943:

What we really are objecting to is not the general subject of atom smashing but the relating of that subject to U.S. thinking and activity. We are trying to lead the enemy to believe that we never think about such a thing—even though he says he is busy at work on it. Maybe that's silly, but maybe not. If it will help to win the war, we think it is worth trying.

But journalists were not always to blame for the leaks. As the press knew, the code allowed information to be published on any subject if it came from an "appropriate authority," which the Office of Censorship defined as a qualified government source. Brig. Gen. Tom Frazier, Tennessee's Director of Selective Service, was just such an individual. On December 11, in discussing a press release about a new draft appeal board for the eastern part of the state, he said: "Within
the area of the new appeal board is the Clinton Engineer Works, in secret war production of a weapon that possibly might be the one to end this war." The Associated Press moved the story at 12:24 p.m., but the Office of Censorship did not know about it until fifty-nine minutes later when the managing editor of the Memphis News Sentinel asked if it could be used. The AP was contacted and killed the story shortly after 2 p.m., which caused an enormous dilemma at some afternoon papers that had already completed half of their press runs. Even so, most deleted the story at substantial cost, and it went virtually unpublished. This resulted in Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson commending Lockhart for controlling "one of the most serious breeches of security" up to that point in the war.22

By the beginning of 1944, the existence of the Tennessee and Washington plants was known by hundreds of nearby journalists. Consequently, the Office of Censorship was faced with an escalating number of inquiries about whether stories could be run on them. The most serious threat came from radio commentator Walter Winchell, who warned the Army in a national broadcast early in the year that he would "expose the whole business" if he was not given information about the projects. This, in turn, caused western journalists to go after the story because they did not want to get beaten on it. The Broadcast Division promptly called the Blue Network in New York City, requesting to see any of Winchell's material dealing with atomic energy before it was aired. The network promised to cooperate.23

But it was impossible to halt all of the leaks or "busts," as they were sometimes labeled. In the first two months of 1944, the Office of Censorship complained about atomic energy stories in the
New York Journal-American, AP's house magazine and the Atlanta Constitution. Then, on March 15, the Cleveland Press became the first publication to write about the atomic bomb project at Los Alamos, N.M. Under the headline, "Forbidden City," the paper called the project near Santa Fe "Uncle Sam's mystery town directed by scientist Einstein." The Scripps-Howard Newspaper Alliance was promptly contacted and asked not to move the story to any other newspaper, the Army interviewed the reporter about the sources of his information, and the editor of the Press visited the Office of Censorship to discuss the problem. As a result of the article, Time began developing a story on atom smashing on the West Coast, but agreed to abandon it when the government expressed alarm.

The Office of Censorship also was frantically battling leaks outside of mainstream magazines and newspapers. On April 11, the Army asked the agency whether The Last Secret, a book published by Dial Press in 1943, had violated the voluntary code. Upon being contacted, the publisher claimed the book was a fictional detective story containing nothing "about atom smashing or atomic energy." However, the Army quickly pointed out an atomic energy reference in the first chapter "which was not very good," and this resulted in the publisher being rebuked. "Ordinarily we do not have any interest in fiction," wrote Lockhart. "But when fiction incorporates factual information dealing with restricted subjects, it can give information to the enemy as readily as any other form of published material." He concluded by asking Dial to be more careful in the future. At the same time, postal censors halted export outside of the U.S. of the annual report of the Morrison-Madsen Company, a construction contractor on the Washington project,
because of information it contained about the site. Then, when it was discovered that the company's house organ was even more detailed, the Office of Censorship contacted the Army and Navy, which moved in on the company for violating secrecy clauses in its construction contract.27

Making the Office of Censorship's job tougher were remarks from "appropriate authorities" that could not be controlled. On April 27, 1944, Rep. Homer D. Angell of Oregon spoke in Congress about an anonymous western project requiring large amounts of electricity. While he refused to discuss it in detail because of military secrecy, he added: "I think I can say with propriety that it represents a new weapon of warfare, developed by new manufacturing processes that will turn large volumes of electricity into the most important projectile yet developed." All three national press services picked up Angell's remarks from the Congressional Record and queried the Office of Censorship on what they could write. They were told that information in the Congressional Record was not prohibited by the code, but they should go no further and not link the remarks in any way with the Washington project. As a result of the wire service stories, numerous newspaper headlines appeared such as, "Powerful Projectile Bared as Newest Secret Weapon."28

Meanwhile, problems surfaced with three universities. Ohio State, which had had problems the previous summer over a research promotional booklet, put out a similar booklet in 1944 to raise money. Included in it was material about atom smashing, a radiation laboratory, a cyclotron, and a betatron. The Army complained on April 26 to the Office of Censorship, which promptly asked the university if the booklet had been cleared with military authorities. Admitting that it had not done so, the university promised to cooperate in the future because withholding
information about atomic energy "is sound national policy with which we
are in entire accord." A month later, the University of Illinois put
out a press release on atom smashing that referred to campus war
experiments that could not be discussed because of the secrecy
surrounding them. Told by Lockhart that the Office of Censorship was
"disturbed" because the release might encourage a spy to seek more
information, Illinois apologized and admitted it was "embarrassed" over
the incident.

At the same time, the Army discovered that S.C. Lind, dean of the
Institute of Technology at the University of Minnesota, had given three
talks in three months on atomic power and wanted to publish an article on
the topic. The Office of Censorship asked the dean to halt his talks as
well as not publish an article, and it applied further pressure by
going another scientist to caution Lind about his activities. Lind
wrote Lockhart that he felt the government was overreacting to his
lectures:

You do me too much honor in believing that the lecture
would be helpful to the enemy. I regret that one in authority
in this country should so underestimate the enemy. You are
probably aware that atomic fission was discovered in Germany .
. about the beginning of the war and sometime before we entered
it . . .

I assure you that there is nothing in my lecture of which the
Germans were not well aware, at least three years ago . . .
There is no use in burying the head of an ostrich in censorship
[sic] and imagining the enemy knows nothing of what we are
doing. If Germany does not know far more about it than I or any
other scientist in this country except those who are actually
engaged on the project, I would be very pleased to think that
their Intelligence Service had completely broken down.

Lockhart replied that the government was not about to underestimate the
enemy's interest in atomic power and that was why it was trying to "dry
up" all information about the subject. "We . . . not want to hand the enemy
anything on a platter; we want to make it as hard as possible for him to get," he concluded. Lockhart sent a copy of this letter to the Bulletin of the Minnesota Federation of Engineering Societies, which agreed to not publish Lind's article until the war ended.31

Still another problem popped up in late May regarding an "appropriate authority." Science Service, which provided science news to publications, sought clearance on a story about a cyclotron engaged in military experiments at George Washington University. The Office of Censorship objected to the story, but then Science Service obtained permission to use it from the Navy, which was overseeing the project. This infuriated the Office of Censorship, not only because Science Service had circumvented the voluntary censorship code by finding an "appropriate authority," but Lockhart feared this would encourage other journalists to write about cyclotrons. He contacted the Army, which agreed to speak to the Navy about not clearing any other similar stories.32

On June 26, 1944, Steel magazine became the first publication to link the code name "Manhattan" with any of the atomic bomb projects. Referring to the work at Pasco, Washington, it said: "While news dispatches from Europe have referred to a number of secret weapons already in use in the invasion, there is nothing to indicate field use of the highly secret Manhattan development, whatever it may be." This was followed five days later by a column in New Leader, a liberal labor weekly, which noted that the Manhattan Engineer District was "one of the most amazingly kept secrets of the war." In both instances, the Office of Censorship received immediate promises that no further mention of the Manhattan project would occur.33
Over the next two months, more leaks about atomic power occurred in the Indianapolis News, New York Herald-Tribune, Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, and Minneapolis Tribune. The latter was easily the most troublesome. Not only was it from a paper that had two former employees of the Office of Censorship, Bill Steven and William Mylander, but it showed the problem that publications had in determining what could be printed even when they were extremely familiar with the atomic power directive of June 28, 1943. An August 24 editorial-page column in the Tribune, which was bylined by five staff members including Mylander, noted that the government's War Production Board had announced that it was imposing controls on the sale of uranium. It continued:

To the average citizen this fact is neither interesting nor important. To physicists it's a scalp tingler. The uranium atom has shown more promise than any other of yielding to science's quest for a key to release sub-atomic energy. A race was on between Axis and United Nations scientists before war broke, and success had rewarded British-American efforts on a highly experimental basis. All known explosives are popgun affairs compared to the dreadful power sub-atomic energy might loose.

When the Army pointed out the column two days later, the Office of Censorship immediately ordered postal censors to not export that issue of the Tribune outside of the United States. Price, who only rarely became involved in the day-to-day press censorship problems, wanted to "climb them hard" for what he considered a bad "bust," and the Army offered to send an officer to the paper to "put the fear of God" into the editors. Instead, the Press Division's Frank Clough called the Cowles Newspapers' Washington bureau and spoke to Mylander, who said he found nothing wrong with the item because war experiments were not mentioned. Clough admitted such experiments did not appear, but he claimed that a reader could see the word "war" between "every word and every line" and that
definitely made it a violation. Mylander still disagreed.

Therefore, Clough wrote Steven, the managing editor of the Tribune, and demanded to know why the short piece was published and asked for an assurance that such a "slip-up" would not reoccur. Steven's reply, in which he refused to make any promises, was testy. Like Mylander, he found nothing wrong with the item because it referred to pre-war matters and war experiments were not mentioned. Then, he said:

But I dislike arguing the matter on a basis like this. Censorship is not a science of semantics; it is a serious matter of keeping key facts from the enemy. The special requests, as I understand them, are designed to indicate areas in which special danger may exist in publication of information. ... I cannot believe that the war is better served, the enemy unenlightened, or the general cause of voluntary censorship strengthened by insisting that newspapers shall not mention the element uranium or pre-war experiments involving it. ... Now maybe we've blundered .... Admittedly, we were in a field posted by censorship with signs of "Proceed With Care." But it is my contention we did so proceed; that nothing of value to the enemy was published.

I am sending a copy of this to Bill Mylander, and I will ask him to take not more than two of you guys to lunch on the expense account and you tell him if we published something that really helped the Nazis.34

The matter ended with the head of the Manhattan Engineer District, Gen. Leslie Groves, visiting John Cowles, one of the owners of the Cowles newspaper chain, to try to convince him of the seriousness of the paper's story. His visit was effective. No more such articles appeared in any of the Cowles' papers for the remainder of the war.35

Meanwhile, the leaks continued. On September 12, 1944, the New York Post ran an Elsa Maxwell column that mentioned atomic power, U-235 and an isotope of uranium. Quick action by the Office of Censorship resulted in the Post deleting the troublesome portions of the column from later editions, and Maxwell's press service got other papers to kill the material.36
Equally troublesome was a continuing attempt by *Time* to obtain an interview with Danish physicist Niels Bohr, who had escaped from the Germans in 1943 and secretly come to the U.S. to help with the atomic bomb project. On September 16, Lockhart wrote Eric Hodgins, *Time's* editorial vice president, and, without mentioning Bohr's name, asked that the magazine not interview or run a story on "a famous foreign scientist, noted in a special field, who extricated himself from Nazi control."

"The achievements in a specialized field of this scientist make him an important person and would set up as a target for enemy intelligence any project or institution with which he is connected," Lockhart explained. Hodgins replied that all of *Time's* bureaus had been instructed to avoid the subject. However, he pointed out that the magazine apparently was one of the few publications that knew about the story, and he hoped the Office of Censorship would alert *Time* in advance when it could be broken.

"Otherwise, my life would not be worth a nickel in the eyes of the *TIME* News Bureau," he concluded. Lockhart informed Hodgins that he was wrong in assuming that no other journalists had asked about the story. In fact, he continued, there had been numerous inquiries. "I certainly do not want *TIME*, or any other publication, to be penalized for its patriotism and I will do what I can to see that does not happen," was all that he could promise Hodgins concerning his request to be tipped off when the story broke.37

By this time, Groves' staff was alarmed at the continuous leaks about atomic energy in American publications. To emphasize that a problem existed, it compiled 104 press references to the Manhattan project or related subjects and sent them to the Office of Censorship in September 1944. Five of the leaks had occurred from November 1939 until
the U.S. entered the war, another twenty two had taken place between December 7, 1941, and the issuance of the June 28, 1943, confidential note, and the remaining seventy seven had come afterwards. The only promising note was that none of the references specifically linked atomic energy with the projects in Tennessee, Washington, and New Mexico. In response, Lockhart agreed that 104 references over fifty-eight months was more than should have occurred, but he pointed out that the press had had "thousands" of opportunities to write about atomic energy. "That these references have not been made is a tribute to the patriotic cooperation of the press and radio industry in voluntary censorship," he concluded.38

But leaks kept occurring—and in its zeal to stop them, the government occasionally erred itself. In late September, for example, the Office of Censorship was told by the Army that an article titled "U-235, Symbol of Destruction" had appeared in The Tool Engineer. It issued an immediate complaint only to find out, to its chagrin, that the Detroit magazine had not run the story. Further checking by the Army revealed it had appeared instead in Cuttings, and the government's mistake had been made because of an erroneous line in the magazine claiming the article was reprinted from The Tool Engineer. Thus, Lockhart had to apologize to the latter.39

Further minor leaks occurred in October 1944 in the Washington Star and Popular Science. But the month's final leak, on October 25, was not minor and was not the press' fault. Brig. Gen. Frederick H. Smith Jr., speaking to Washington correspondents at a weekly Pentagon press conference, noted that the Germans probably were working on an "atomic explosive," which he did not expect them to perfect. "Nearly anything is in the realm of possibility, of course," continued Smith, "and I'm not
long haired enough to know exactly where we stand in working on atomic explosive force, but I believe there are many technical difficulties to overcome." The press immediately assumed Smith's remarks could be used. Not only was he an "appropriate authority," but his comments were not put "off the record" by Army officers who screened what he said.

The Office of Censorship learned about Smith's remarks, and the fact that they had appeared on the wires, from Mylander at a party early that evening. Lockhart realized it was a major leak and immediately called the Army, assuming that the general's comments were off the record and this was yet another example of a press slip-up. After an Army check indicated otherwise, it insisted that the Office of Censorship ask the wire services to kill their stories "for security reasons," but Lockhart refused. He pointed out that the information had not only come from an "appropriate authority," but it was too late since the stories had been on the wires for over four and a half hours. Therefore, all the Office of Censorship could halt were press accounts of Smith's remarks being exported outside of the U.S.

As it turned out, both the Washington Post and the New York Times used the story, but few others did. The reason was because Smith's remarks occurred fortuitously on the same day that President Roosevelt announced a major American naval victory in the second battle of the Philippine Sea. The importance of that event limited wire space enormously and crowded Smith's atomic power remarks off of both the Associated Press and International News Service wires. Thus, United Press was the only wire service that sent out a story and most of the papers that received the three paragraphs overlooked them in their excitement over the president's announcement.
The incident concluded with the War Department issuing a confidential note to editors and broadcasters on the day after Smith's comments. It said:

The War Department states that the inference drawn from the remarks of a high Air Forces officer that the United States is working on atomic explosives is in error. He meant in effect to state his ignorance of that matter. It is requested that no further inference along that line be reported and that the occasion not be used as appropriate authority to discuss possible United States activity in atomic explosives. This in line with the special request of the Office of Censorship of 28 June 1943. It is requested that no further mention or reference be made to this incident.

Even before the statement was issued, Lockhart criticized the Army for unfairly claiming the press drew an incorrect inference from Smith's comments. Thus, he called the statement "weasel worded" and "silly," predicted that it would cause problems with the press, and said it would be better for the Army to admit it had made a mistake and to ask for assistance in controlling further distribution of the leak. But Lockhart was told that various generals refused to make such an admission. Although Lockhart's prediction was incorrect about the statement causing problems, the confidential note did nothing to foster better relations between the press and the military. UP complained to Lockhart about it, and Mylander called it the "god damndest" thing he had ever seen. Lockhart's response to UP summed up his feelings: he "endorsed the purpose of the note, regretted the necessity, and deplored the means."

The leaks continued unabated in November. The Office of Censorship began the month by complaining to the McClure Newspaper Syndicate about a "National Whirligig" column that mentioned atom smashing. Then, two weeks later, it became concerned about a scientific book's promotional literature, which noted that American scientists were developing weapons that utilized atom smashing. Wm. H. Wise & Co., the book's publisher,
pointed out, however, that 3,565,000 copies of the promotional literature had been distributed in the past four years, making it inconceivable that it contained any military secrets. Upon learning this, Lockhart said he had no objection to Wise continuing to send out the material.\textsuperscript{42}

Then, in the "Science" section of \textit{Time} on November 27, 1944, a problem with foreign news resurfaced. The section's lead article, based on a report passed by British censors, speculated that the Germans were close to having an atomic bomb with a demolition charge that exploded inward instead of outward, resulting in an explosion of "unheard-of violence at the point of impact." The Army immediately condemned the story as "one of the worst security breaches" of the war and asked the Office of Censorship to talk to \textit{Time} publisher Henry Luce. Lockhart refused, pointing out that the story was merely a rewrite of what had been legitimately approved by the censors. To appease the Army, however, he wrote the magazine's vice president and general manager that the government was "greatly disturbed" over the story. "We have alerted \textit{Time} to the importance of this subject so often that we are unable to understand why this article was not discussed with us prior to publication," Lockhart concluded. Meanwhile, the Army promptly sent an officer to London to tighten up censorship.\textsuperscript{43}

A related problem over which the Office of Censorship could exercise no control was news picked up by the American media from foreign print or broadcast sources. On December 27, 1944, for example, the Associated Press carried a two-paragraph story noting that a German radio station claimed Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt's army had just used an atomic bomb in its Belgium offensive. It quoted the station as saying: "This is the type of bomb on which the Allies had claimed to have a monopoly. The
Germans used it at St. Vith. Huge areas of land are scorched, woods are consumed, and any human being caught in the hurricane is shattered to smithereens."

The Army immediately wanted the Office of Censorship to request that AP, UP, INS, Time, Life, and the broadcasting networks not carry any enemy statements about atomic bombs. Lockhart refused. He said it would be difficult to get them to comply because of a long-standing policy that news from foreign media sources was acceptable. The only reason he could see for altering the policy was that the information stirred up comment and interest in atomic bombs, and he did not consider that "a very good or reasonable basis" to ask for a change. Groves agreed, but stressed that the American media should not be allowed to use stories from foreign sources as an excuse to write about the development of the atomic bomb in the U.S.\textsuperscript{44}

By January 1945, it was becoming increasingly difficult to control press leaks about atomic energy as shown by the number that occurred in widely varying publications. In that month, the Office of Censorship complained about articles to the Detroit News, New York Post, American Freeman, Atlanta Constitution, World, Power Plant Engineering, and New York Journal American. While none of the "busts" were serious, the Office of Censorship found the story in the Atlanta paper noteworthy because of who wrote it. On January 3, the Constitution carried a column by one of the South's most respected journalists, Ralph McGill, that said: "Atomic energy bombs are just around the corner. God help us all if Germany comes up with this one. If she really should be first with controlled energy she can conquer the world in two weeks." In complaining about the column on January 15, Lockhart wrote the paper's
managing editor:

The Germans may well assume that so informed a person as Mr. McGill was speaking from knowledge of our own progress when he said that atomic energy bombs are "just around the corner." The "if she really should be first" clearly indicates that a race is on and that we, too, are engaged in a driving effort to beat the Germans in this special field of research.

No doubt the Germans know that we are devoting some attention to this matter—but by not spotlighting our undertakings we hope we can keep them from learning how extensive our efforts are. Certainly we do not want them to learn, if it is indeed true, that we have progressed to the point where it can be said that the achievement is close at hand.

In February and March, the number of leaks declined and were minor in nature. Thus, the Office of Censorship only wrote the Ann Arbor (Mich.) News, Grand Rapids (Mich.) Herald, Boston Herald, and Atlanta Constitution. Then, on April 14, the most bizarre leak of the war occurred. A national newspaper comic strip, ''Superman,'' showed the star in a physics lab containing a cyclotron, which the strip noted was more popularly called an "atom smasher." According to the narrative, he was about to be "bombarded with electrons at a speed of 100 million miles per hour and charged with three million volts."

Other comic strips had occasionally made passing references to atom smashing, but neither the Office of Censorship nor the Army had complained. The strips had been far fetched, and it was felt to show concern might focus more attention on atomic energy than by not saying anything. But the "Superman" strip was too close to reality. Therefore, Lockhart wrote the McClure Newspaper Syndicate, which distributed the comic strip, and said that while the government was not "in the business of censoring fiction or comic strips . . . considerable caution is needed in any discussion of this topic for the duration of the war." McClure quickly changed the "Superman" plot line to eliminate atom smashing for
the remainder of the war.\textsuperscript{47}

The Office of Censorship also complained about three more leaks during April 1945. It wrote the \textit{Media (Pa.) News} on April 16 after the paper ran a lengthy front-page article noting U.S. military authorities were "acutely aware" of atomic weapons, which the writer deduced after he unsuccessfully attempted to interview some of them on the subject. That was followed by letters to the \textit{New York Herald Tribune} and the University of Chicago's student newspaper, \textit{The Maroon}. In the latter case, the Army also was reprimanded for jeopardizing "the structure and operation of voluntary censorship" by visiting the newspaper's editor, without the approval of the Office of Censorship, to impress upon him the seriousness of the leak.\textsuperscript{48}

In early May, the Office of Censorship wired the \textit{Cleveland Press} about a column that claimed the U.S. was two weeks behind the Germans in the development of the atomic bomb. The complaint was so prompt that the paper was able to delete the material from later editions and also keep it off of the Scripps-Howard wire service. Louis B. Seltzer, the paper's editor, apologized for the slip. He said the writer told him: "I thought that the entire story had blown up long ago because nothing more had been heard of this matter since last fall."\textsuperscript{49}

With the surrender of the Germans and the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, the government feared that the press might begin avidly seeking atomic bomb information. Therefore, the Office of Censorship mailed confidential letters in mid-May to editors in Tennessee, Washington, and the adjoining states urging them to preserve the secrecy of the Tennessee and Washington projects until Japan was defeated. At the same time, many of the censorship restrictions were relaxed in a
revised Code of Wartime Practices on May 15, but a confidential insert to editors noted that the secret provision against writing about atomic energy was still in force.50

The Office of Censorship's precautions were useless, however, and it was powerless to act, when atomic bomb leaks came from overseas publications. Such was the case on May 21 when the London Daily Express ran a sensational front-page story from Oslo which began: "It can be revealed today that for five years British and German scientists fought their own war within a war. They fought to perfect the atom bomb, which, with the most explosive force in the world, would have given either side walkover superiority." The article then described how British paratroopers had twice wrecked the Germans' heavy water plant at Rjukan, Norway.

Although the article contained nothing about U.S. attempts to develop the bomb, the Office of Censorship was concerned. "It seems certain that more stories like this one, and ones which go a lot further, will pop out of the newly freed countries willie nillie," an internal memorandum predicted. While that fear proved to be unfounded, the Oslo story did cause problems. Some American journalists complained because they still could not write the same stories as their foreign peers. As for the Army, it was irate about the British allowing the leak. Consequently, it wanted the foreign press censored until the war was over, but the Office of Censorship noted the Army would have to take that up personally with the British. The Army knew that would be a waste of time because a British admiral already had indicated to the Americans he was against further censorship. He had pointed out that it would be unfair to impose restrictions on stories with foreign datelines when "the
British press has been subjected to so many restrictions for so long and played ball on them.\textsuperscript{51}

On June 8, the Army complained again when Newsweek wrote: "Look for a lifting of the rigid censorship restrictions on scientific experiments in nuclear physics. The first disclosure, from one of the major electric companies, will concern equipment used in atom smashing experiments."

Theodore Koop, a former AP and National Geographic Society employee who had replaced Lockhart as head of the Press Division in May 1945, told the Army he was not overly concerned and did not intend to reproach Newsweek about it. But Koop changed his mind quickly when Groves wrote Price on June 11 that the magazine's piece was "the most serious violation of the voluntary Code of Censorship that I have seen. At this time it can cause greater harm to our security than any other past breach." The head of the Manhattan Project concluded by bluntly demanding to know what the Office of Censorship planned to do to halt "further breaches."

What Koop did was to write Newsweek a day later. He called the magazine's statement "most unfortunate" and lamented the fact that the Office of Censorship's confidential censorship restrictions on atomic energy had been made public for the first time. He stressed this would alert the enemy "that we have regarded these experiments as of such importance that the restrictions could not be placed in the Code of Wartime Practices." Another letter on the same day assured Groves that Newsweek had been "most cooperative" in the past and was not likely to repeat its error. Koop concluded:

I want to assure you that we are doing everything possible under the voluntary censorship system to prevent the publication or broadcast of material about secret war experiments. Of course, such a voluntary system cannot guarantee perfection, but the record over the last three and one-half years is such that
we are confident future indiscretions will continue to be infrequent and inadvertent.

Newsweek, meanwhile, told Koop that the information was published "in good faith" because it was referring to betatron experiments which had no military value and it did not realize this was a code violation. It promised to clear all future stories about nuclear research before running them.\(^{52}\)

But that was not the end of the Newsweek story. In a delicately worded followup, the Associated Press said in a Washington roundup on June 9: "LID SLIGHTLY LIFTED?--Look for disclosures concerning some of our hitherto hush-hush wartime scientific developments. Some of the nation's top scientists would like to give the green light right now on a few things, but some hitches still have to be worked out." Although atomic energy was not mentioned, AP still was reprimanded on June 27 by the now overly sensitive Office of Censorship for using "generalizations [that] may throw out valuable hints to people who are trying to combine bits and pieces of information."\(^{53}\)

By late June 1945, the British also realized the danger of not continuing to control atom bomb information, even though the war was over in Europe, and quickly brought their censorship policies in line with the Office of Censorship. British Adm. George P. Thomson, who had indicated earlier to the Americans that he was against further censorship and would not reimpose it, noted again on June 27 that he could only censor a story if it threatened his country's security. However, he continued, "I would have no objection to telephoning an Editor, who had submitted an atomic bomb story, informing him that the U.S. authorities had asked me to do what I could to prevent publication of stories on this subject and that I would be very grateful if he would not publish this one."\(^{54}\)
Yet, several days later, another "very bad bust," as it was labeled by the Office of Censorship, originated in London. Cmdr. Herbert Agar, assistant to the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain, gave an address at an English college on June 29 that made no mention of atom splitting. However, three London newspapers obtained copies of his speech which contained some remarks that were deleted. These included the fact that American scientists estimated the Germans might have been able to split the atom by August 6, and thus if the war had lasted another six months, the Germans may have dominated the world.

The London newspapers rushed Agar's written comments about atom splitting into print without checking with the government to see if they should be used, and then every American wire service filed stories. Since these were based solely on the newspaper stories, the English censor could not stop them because of prior publication. Agar was severely reprimanded by both the Navy and the American ambassador for being careless, but the Office of Censorship refused to try to get the wire services to suppress copy that had been approved by a foreign censor. However, it did discourage attempts by the United Press and others to further develop Agar's remarks.55

Groves, who was pleased with Great Britain's move to retain some semblance of censorship while the war continued in the Pacific, suggested to Koop on July 10 that the Office of Censorship's confidential guidelines on scientific experiments should be distributed to all British newspapers and should be accompanied by a letter from Thomson requesting the press' cooperation. In addition, with Agar's recent slip-up fresh in his mind, he also wanted the admiral bluntly reminded that the U.S. form of censorship "has resulted in breaks that were few and minor compared
with those in Great Britain that have been few but major." While Groves' tactless comment was not relayed to the British, Price did suggest that it would be beneficial to send a confidential note about voluntarily censoring information on scientific experiments to every English newspaper. Whether this was done, however, is unknown.56

Meanwhile, atomic energy leaks kept occurring. In late June and early July, the Office of Censorship complained about stories to the University of Michigan's Michigan Daily, the Detroit News, and the New York Herald Tribune.57

But remarkably no leaks resulted when an atomic bomb was tested for the first time on July 16 at a remote, desert site on the Alamogordo Army Air Base in New Mexico. Not only had the Office of Censorship been warned in advance about the test, but the Army had prepared a 50-word press release claiming that the blast, in which no one was killed or injured, was caused by the explosion of an ammunition dump. The release also noted that the Army had considered temporarily evacuating nearby civilians because of the danger from "gas" liberated by the explosion, but this had been unnecessary.

Immediately after the blast, the Army became concerned because the wire services were preparing eyewitness accounts of the blast, and it expressed hope that these stories would only be carried in the Southwest to avoid nationwide interest. The Office of Censorship made no promises, but it did ask the wire services to allow it to approve any eyewitness accounts before they were sent out. The Associated Press submitted the first such story about an hour later. It quoted several persons who had seen the blast from 150 miles away as well as a blind woman who had asked, "What's that brilliant light?" The story also claimed that the
blast was heard 200 miles to the northwest at Gallup, N.M., and had rattled windows 200 miles to the west in Silver City. The Army wanted these eye-witness reports suppressed, but the Office of Censorship refused. It pointed out that the press normally put together "fantastic and conflicting" stories about such incidents, and it was not showing more than usual interest in this explosion. However, if the Office of Censorship tried to suppress the AP story, this could tip off the press that it was missing something important. Therefore, the wire services were not discouraged from doing eyewitness accounts, but they were not allowed to send anything out of the country other than the information contained in the Army's 50-word statement.

The Office of Censorship's decision to not show undue interest in the story was rewarded as few papers around the nation played it prominently. This fact was not lost on Groves. On July 18, he thanked the Office of Censorship for its handling of the story, saying he was "most pleased." 58

The last leaks of the war on atomic energy appeared in the final two weeks of July 1945 in every Hearst paper, the Baltimore Sun, and The Christian Century. 59 An Arthur "Bugs" Baer column on July 18, which was sent out by the King Features Syndicate to the Hearst chain, was considered "the worst bust of the war" by the Office of Censorship. Writing in his usual humorous manner, Baer called the atomic bomb "as dangerous as a quack with a diploma" and claimed that both the Germans and the Americans were ready to explode it. "By arrangement with the governments of America, England and Russia, this is all I can tell you about the atomic bomb," concluded Baer. "This is all I know."

When Koop complained to King Features about the column, Editor and
General Manager Ward Greene wrote Price to ask if he thought Baer had violated the code. "Of course we try scrupulously to observe all your regulations," explained Greene. "If a humorous column by Bugs about experiments with the atom is a violation, we shall have to be doubly careful." Price was blunt in his reply:

Unlike any censorship I know anything about, this Office has always recognized prior publication. I am just wondering now how many serious writers are going to come down on us, saying "if Bugs Baer can tell the enemy that we have perfected the atomic bomb (whether it is true or not), why can't I?" Or, worse still, I wonder how many of them will simply take this publication as an indication that the lid is off and go ahead without consulting us.

You see these are some of the troubles of a censor. They often run a great deal deeper than appears on the surface. So, I have no choice but to answer definitely in the affirmative your question whether I consider the Baer column a violation of the Code. I do so consider it.

Although he still felt Baer's column was harmless, Greene admitted that Price was "fair" in his criticism of King Features. Thus, he promised to remind all of the syndicate's editors and writers about the confidential atomic energy instructions of June 28, 1943.

At 11 a.m. on August 6, the White House announced that Allied scientists had split the atom and an atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima. That was followed thirty minutes later by an Office of Censorship message on all the wire services to editors and broadcasters rescinding the 1943 confidential request on scientific experiments. It continued:

In the interest of the highest national security it is requested that editors and broadcasters continue to withhold information without appropriate authority concerning scientific processes, formulas, and mechanics of operation of the atomic bomb; location, procurement and consumption of uranium stocks; quality and quantity of production of these bombs; their physics, characteristics and future military employment; and information as to the relative importance of the various methods...
or plants, or of their relative functions or efficiencies.

Over the next twelve hours, as the story became one of the biggest of the century, the Office of Censorship's Press Division was deluged with nearly fifty press inquiries on a wide variety of atomic bomb topics. These included the Associated Press being given permission to locate and interview Niels Bohr, the Danish atomic scientist; Blue Book magazine being told it could run a fiction story that it had been withholding because it dealt with atomic experiments; the Boston American being given approval to publish pre-war cyclotron and atom splitting photographs; and the Chicago Tribune having an editorial cleared on atomic explosives.61

The Press Division took the view that virtually anything was permissible except a description of how the atom was split or the internal workings of the bomb. Thus, the press was asked to change very little—but there were occasional deletions. The Chicago Tribune, for example, had a statement from a former Undersecretary of the Navy that the explosive charge in the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was about the size of a softball. Since the Manhattan Project had been entirely under the auspices of the Army, the Navy was not considered an "appropriate authority" on the bomb and the paper agreed not to publish the statement. The paper also submitted an article for approval on August 6 with the following sentences: "It is understood from a reliable source that four different 'war heads' have been developed for the new bomb. One embodies radar to detonate the bomb above ground, so that its destructive force will not be expended under ground." When the paper admitted to the Press Division that the "reliable source" was a scientist who worked on the phase of the bomb that he described but did not want his name used,
the sentences were deleted because an anonymous source was not considered an "appropriate authority."62

While the Office of Censorship continued on August 7 to approve almost everything the press submitted on atomic power, there were two notable stories. One ran and one did not. The former, from the International News Service, was written by Harold Jacobson, a scientist who had played a minor role in the development of the bomb. He proceeded to discuss an area that had not appeared in previous articles—the bomb's radioactive effect. According to Jacobson, an atomic bomb would kill anything within a wide radius, the land would be sterile for seventy years, and rescue workers entering the bombed area for a number of days after the blast would be killed by the radioactivity. The Office of Censorship passed the story because the radioactive properties of uranium were already known, and it assumed Jacobson had been briefed exhaustively by the Army C. what he could publicize.

As soon as the story appeared, the Army wanted to know why the Office of Censorship had cleared it and complained that much of it was untrue. Koop replied that his agency was not required to check the accuracy of stories. In addition, Jacobson was visited by both the FBI and Army Military Intelligence and threatened with prosecution under the Espionage Act for violating a government secrecy agreement he had signed. To counteract the damage from the story, scientist Robert Oppenheimer issued a statement challenging what was written. A second statement came from Jacobson. He said that his article reflected merely his personal views and was not based on restricted information about the actual effects of radioactivity. As a result of the story, Tokyo radio began elaborating on the subject of radioactivity and continued to do so even
after the American occupation of Japan.63

The second alarming story on August 7 was sent to the Office of Censorship by the Philadelphia Bulletin. Walter Case Jr., a former copy boy on the paper, had been employed as a civilian electronics engineer on the atomic bomb project in New Mexico. After observing the detonation of the atomic bomb on July 16, he went AWOL from his job, returned to Philadelphia, and gave the bulletin an eye-witness account of the event. The six-page, double-spaced story, which contained numerous technical details, was shocking and sensational:

So closely-guarded was the first test of the atomic bomb, that a Philadelphian who was there didn't know officially what he had been working on until he read it in the newspapers.

"All we knew was that we all might be wiped out," said Walter Case, Jr., of 200 Strathmore road, Brookline, who just returned from an experiment which he described as "superhuman—something out of this world."...

Even when the eve of the test arrived, Case did not know definitely what was to happen, although he knew it would be something frightful, and his experience and background had caused him to guess that it was to be an atomic bomb...

"The night before the test," Case said, "we stayed awake all night, drinking beer and playing poker. Everybody was nervous. One man was so frightened he got drunk. Nobody, not even the scientists, new [sic] exactly the amount of power they had in this charge, which could be carried by a 90-pound woman."...

Case's station, as a member of the ground crew, was at 10,000 South, which means 10,000 yards from the tower, which was known as Zero. Everybody wore welder's glasses, and laid on the ground, face down. Altogether, Case said, there were about 100 observers.

"Forty-five seconds before the charge was set off," Case added, "one of the scientists at a microphone started counting off the diminishing seconds—forty-five.... forty-four.... forty-three.... forty-two....

"We thought he was counting off the last seconds of our lives. Boy, did we really sweat those seconds out. We could not see the man, and that voice in the darkness seemed like the voice of doom."
"Finally, he was counting five, then, four, then three. We were laying with our feet toward the tower, face down. The voice said 'One second'. Then life stopped. The tower started glowing and huge rays, like bolts of lightning, shot in all directions.

"We could feel the heat nearly six miles away, and we thought for several seconds that we would be burned to crisp. Everybody started praying and several of the men started blessing themselves. We didn't think those rays pointing toward us would ever stop.

"About this time the man who had been drunk, an Army cook, came to life and took a look at Zero. He had forgot to put on his welder's glasses, and was blinded for a couple of hours. He had to receive medical treatment.

"About 45 seconds elapsed between the time we saw the flash and the time we heard the sound and felt the concussion. We had been told to raise up on our elbows and toes so that if the earth jarred the worst that could happen would be broken arms. But the jar was less than we expected. It was more of a rumble which lasted about 45 seconds, reverberated through the mountains like thunder.

"A column of smoke, purple and organdy, went straight up into the air, burned a hole through the clouds, then billowed out. The tower just turned into gasses. Another tower, 1,000 yards away, was knocked to the ground, twisted and scorched."...

Because of the radio activation, Case said, it was four days before anybody could go safely to within 800 yards of Zero and two weeks before anybody could go to Zero, where the tower had stood.

"When we approached Zero," Case said, "we discarded everything down to our skin except our shoes and stockings. We put on canvas boots over our shoes, put on coveralls, canvas gloves, medical hats and respirators..."

"For a radius of about 800 yards from Zero all the sand had solidified into a glass substance about one quarter of an inch thick. It was sort of aquamarine, or blueish green, in color, and when you walked over it, it felt like walking over snow with a thick crust. I started to pick up a hunk of it for a souvenir, but one of the scientists said this would be dangerous as it had radioactivated.

"After the charge had been set off we wore brass badges with a film in them to detect just how much radioactivation our bodies had assimilated while working in the area. Once we went into a spot about 100 yards from Zero, and after an hour we had to go back and let another crew replace us, while we took a shower and got a reissue of clothing.
"Whenever we got too much activation we would be taken back to 10,000 South to this portable shower and given new clothing. Even the tires on a truck I drove into the area became activated. The human system cannot stand too much activation. It would kill."

Case said that about five hours before the atomic bomb was detonated the scientists expected only about two percent efficiency. After it went off they calculated it had been 13 percent efficient.

"If they had got 100 percent," he declared, "there is no way of telling just how much of New Mexico would have been wiped out."

About two hours after the bomb was detonated, Case said, the scientists evacuated a town about 60 miles away from Zero.

"A radioactivated cloud was sweeping toward it," he added, "and they were afraid they might come along and find all the people in the town dead."

The Bulletin's managing editor, Dwight S. Perrin, refused to print the story, but he mailed it to Price because he felt the government would be interested in it as well as in Case. Price promptly sent the story back to Perrin with two-thirds of it deleted with a blue pencil, noting that he had no objection to the paper using what was left. He added, however, that the Army hoped the Bulletin would run nothing. "They [Army officials] take the position that everyone known to have participated might be subjected to pressure from unfriendly sources at some future time," Price cautioned ominously, "and for that reason they are endeavoring to hold down publicity about most of the people." He concluded by saying that both he and Army were "grateful" for Perrin's cooperation.64

In the final week of the war, the Office of Censorship continued to receive numerous inquiries, most of them routine, about the permissibility of atomic bomb stories. But it still occasionally asked for deletions. On August 9, for example, the International News Service
interviewed Rep. J. Buell Snyder of Pennsylvania, chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee, who said that the "atomic substance is the size of a nugget, although the bomb itself is apparently much larger." The Office of Censorship, in checking the story, agreed that it was not in the business of censoring congressman, who definitely were appropriate authorities. However, it noted that the facts in the INS story had never been published, and thus it would prefer them deleted. The wire service complied.65

On August 14, the day of the Japanese surrender, Groves thanked the Office of Censorship for doing a "very fine job" in protecting the security of the atomic bomb project. Price announced the end of censorship, and the Code of Wartime Practices, on the following day, and then wrote a final letter to Groves on August 17. After thanking him for his comments three days before, he gently chided the Army for its reluctance throughout the war to completely trust voluntary censorship:

I believe that the success of voluntary censorship in this particular instance [atomic energy] points a lesson. Had we been similarly taken into the confidence of military authorities on other projects they were trying to protect, the results would have been better.

I also congratulate you and all of your staff on an achievement which I believe the whole world will accord first place in the history of military development in science.66

Price received a final congratulatory letter in September 1945 from Gen. H.H. Arnold, head of the Army Air Force. Arnold predicted that the Office of Censorship's suppression of "any mention" of the atomic bomb in the press until it was dropped at Hiroshima "shall go down in history as the best kept secret of any war."67

III

Arnold's comment about total secrecy was indicative of the myth that
arose around the atom bomb. In fact, as hundreds of documents at the National Archives show, the bomb was mentioned numerous times by the press during the war. But the way it was mentioned was the most important point. As this study has shown, the press revealed virtually no technical details about the bomb, and few stories connected its development with the three principal project sites in Tennessee, Washington, and New Mexico. What was run on almost every occasion was simply that the U.S. or Germany, or both of them, were working on the bomb. That, of course, was no secret although, operating on the premise that it was better to say less, the Office of Censorship did not like even that to appear. At the same time, it realized that attempting to suppress such news was almost ludicrous. That was evident in July 1945 when Koop wrote the editor of the Detroit News to complain about an article that made "a passing reference" to the military possibly using atomic energy. "This may be what Jack Lockhart in a letter to you earlier this year on the same subject called 'straining at gnats,'" said Koop, "but we have come to expect you to bear with us even in such cases."68

And the press did bear with the government, primarily because it enthusiastically supported the war. Thus, not one instance occurred where the press deliberately violated the Office of Censorship's voluntary regulations concerning atomic energy. Instead, violations usually occurred because publications did not know about the regulations or, even if they were aware of them, they did not think they applied to their specific story. And occasionally mistakes were caused by the war itself. As large numbers of reporters and editors joined the armed services, publications operated at reduced manpower levels and with far
less experience. "Staffs were badly disorganized and through carelessness or lack of discipline things got into the papers and on the wir [sic] which never would have got there under any normal operation," Price noted. Others at the Office of Censorship realized this, too.

In July 1944, Lockhart criticized the Indianapolis News for a column by Managing Editor Herbert R. Hill that said the U.S. military had "well-advanced" experiments in atom smashing. Hill apologized and said the mistake occurred because he had to write a daily deadline column while trying to do "two or three other jobs" at the same time. Lockhart sympathized with Hill. "We know how slips occur, particularly in these days of manpower shortages," he said.

So, given the press' willingness to cooperate, and the obvious importance of not revealing atomic bomb information, the major question is why the government did not blackout the subject with mandatory censorship until the war was over. Certainly, the Army, which was in charge of the Manhattan Project, favored such a move and continually nudged the Office of Censorship, sometimes angrily, in that direction.

Price supplied the answer. A former A³ editor, he championed freedom of the press and opposed peacetime censorship because he felt it was "contrary to all American principles." However, he agreed with Roosevelt that censorship became "a necessary nuisance" during wartime since it was imperative to protect the country. The problem was determining the form censorship should take. Many in government, from Roosevelt on down, would have welcomed mandatory censorship on all subjects touching on national security and the military. But Price knew this would not work because neither Congress nor the press would accept it. In fact, even the much milder voluntary form of censorship that was
adopted was a strain on the press-government relationship. "In short, under a voluntary system . . . the traffic will bear only so much," Price wrote Howard on March 27, 1943. "We have imposed the limit, and have often been close to a condition of open revolt [from the press]. It is no public service to advocate measures which would push the whole operation over the brink." The timing of Price's statement was significant—it came three days before the Office of Censorship was told about the development of the atom bomb. With that view of censorship and the dangers connected with it, Price clearly was not receptive to any suggestion of blacking out atomic bomb information in the press.

And so Price, and the government, staked the secrecy of the country's most important war research on voluntary censorship. This resulted in frustrating leaks, but they were not disastrous. As for Price, his view of censorship earned him the gratitude of a press that feared it might be muzzled. On December 14, 1943, the Richmond (Va.) News Leader said in an editorial, titled "Wise Censorship":

Although overzealous and uninformed public relations officers of detached army and naval agencies occasionally put needless obstacles in the way, the course of sane and intelligent censorship in the United States has been made smooth by the labors of the Director of Censorship, BYRON PRICE. He always was one of the ablest and most astute of American newspapermen. We hope he knows with what pride, admiration and affection his fellow-craft have followed his superb performance as the representative of a free, self-restrained press. The News Leader's compliment was deserved, and both Price and the Office of Censorship could be proud. So could the press. They had worked together to keep the atom bomb story reasonably quiet while justifying once again the validity of having a free press in the midst of a war that threatened the very life of the country.
NOTES


2"Biggest Secret," *Editor & Publisher*, August 11, 1945, p. 40.

3"Statement by the President," December 16, 1941, Record Group 80, File 89-1-8, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

4Office of Censorship, "A History of the Office of Censorship," Vol. II, undated, pp. 8-9, Record Group 216, National Archives. When the Press Division was at full strength, it had nine employees, but openings occurred frequently because of men returning to their publications.


6"A History of the Office of Censorship," p. 9. The Office of Censorship was not staffed from 1 a.m. to 9 a.m., but during that time any press inquiries were referred to division members at their homes.


8Laurence. *Men And Atoms*, p. 95.


12See N.R. Howard, "Memorandum," April 6, 1943, and R.H.K. Marett to N.R. Howard, April 15, 1943. Both are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing, National Archives. Also see Office of Censorship, "A

14 Office of Censorship, "A History of the Office of Censorship," p. 158. Herbert M. Merrill, whose letter appeared in the Schenectady Gazette, caused problems for other publications as well with letters about atomic power. He also had letters published in the Schenectady Union-Star on September 27, 1943, the Des Moines Register on October 16, 1943, the New York Herald-Tribune on January 5, 1944, and the American Freeman in March 1945, resulting in immediate objections to editors from the Office of Censorship. See Jack Lockhart to Philip H. Wertz, September 29, 1943; Jack Lockhart to George A. Cornish, January 7, 1944; and Jack Lockhart to E. Haldeman-Julius, January 15, 1945. They are in Record Group 216, Files 012 D/4 Atom Smashing, 012 D/4 Atom Smashing Jan. ’44, and 012 D/4 Atom Smashing Jan. 1945, National Archives.


16 See Ernest Lindley, "Germany's Last Hopes," Washington Post, August 11, 1943; and Jack Lockhart to Ernest K. Lindley, August 11, 1943, Record Group 216, File 012 D/8 "L" Columnists & Columns, National Archives.

17 See Memorandum, Charter Heslep to J.H. Ryan, October 6, 1943; Memorandum, J.H. Ryan to Price, October 19, 1943; Memorandum, Jack Lockhart to Price, October 20, 1943; and Jack Lockhart, "Memorandum," October 21, 1943. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom.
Smashing, National Archives.


See Jean Craighead, "Just an Atom-Smasher," Washington Post, October 31, 1943; Jack Lockhart to Alexander F. Jones, November 1, 1943; and Alexander F. Jones to Jack Lockhart, November 2, 1943. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing, National Archives.

See Dorothy Thompson, "On the Record," Washington Star, November 15, 1943; Memorandum, Warner to J.H. Lockhart, November 15, 1943; and Jack Lockhart to Henry M. Snevily, November 16, 1943. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing, National Archives.

See Dudley Toll Hill to Jack Lockhart, December 10, 1943, and Jack Lockhart to Dudley Toll Hill, December 13, 1943. Both are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing, National Archives.


Ibid., pp. 162-63.


26 See Jack Lockhart, "Memorandum," April 11, 1944; Jack Lockhart to Burton C. Hoffman, April 13, 1944; Sidney G. Phillips to Jack Lockhart, April 20, 1944; Jack Lockhart, "Memorandum," April 22, 1944; and Jack Lockhart to Sidney G. Phillips, April 24, 1944. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing Jan. 1945, National Archives.

The Last Secret surfaced again in January 1945 because Quinn Publishing Company had purchased the rights to it from Dial Press and was preparing to republish it. Lockhart told the Army that the publication could not be halted, but it did not matter since the book was "a lot of poppycock." See Memorandum, E.H. Bronson to Jack Lockhart, January 27, 1945, and Jack Lockhart, "Memorandum," January 27, 1945. Both are in the same file as above.


28 Ibid., pp. 166-67.

29 See Lt. Col. John Lansdale Jr. to Jack Lockhart, April 26, 1944; Jack Lockhart to John B. Fullen, April 26, 1944; John B. Fullen to Jack Lockhart, May 1, 1944; and Jack Lockhart to John B. Fullen, May 4, 1944. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing Jan. '44, National Archives.

30 See Jack Lockhart to Joseph Wright, June 3, 1944, and Jos. F. Wright to Jack Lockhart, June 6, 1944. Both are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing June '44, National Archives.

to S.C. Lind, May 31, 1944; S.C. Lind to Jack Lockhart, June 2, 1944; Jack Lockhart to S.C. Lind, June 6, 1944; Jack Lockhart to Charles E. Doell, June 6, 1944; and Chas. E. Doell to Jack Lockhart, June 12, 1944. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing August 1945, National Archives. Only two days after the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945, the Bulletin requested permission to publish Lind's article. The Office of Censorship granted permission immediately. See Chas. E. Doell to Jack Lockhart, August 8, 1945, and Theodore F. Koop to Charles E. Doell, August 10, 1945. Both are in the same file as above.

32 See Jack Lockhart, "Memorandum," May 24, 1944, Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing June '44, National Archives. It is unclear how widely the Science Service cyclotron story was used. The Office of Censorship files only indicate that it appeared in the July 1944 issue of Allied News, Radio and Electronics, which was published by Chicago's Allied Radio Corp.


34 See Nat Finney et al., "Washington Memo," Minneapolis Tribune, August 24, 1944; Memoranda, Mil Petty to Jack Lockhart and Frank C. Clough to Jack Lockhart, August 26, 1944; Frank C. Clough to W.P. Steven, August 26, 1944; and Bill Steven to Frank C. Clough, August 30, 1944. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing July 1944, National Archives. The atomic power item also appeared in the Des Moines Tribune, which was another Cowles newspaper, on August 24. Clough wrote the acting managing editor and received a promise that the paper was taking steps to see that such a leak did not reoccur. See
Frank C. Clough to J.S. Russell, August 26, 1944, and J.S. Russell to Frank C. Clough, September 6, 1944. Both are in the same record group as above in File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing Sept. 1944.


36See Memorandum, Phil Adler to Jack Lockhart, September 12, 1944; Jack Lockhart to Paul A. Tierney, September 12, 1944; Jack Lockhart to Managing Editor, Press Alliance Inc., September 12, 1944; and C.E. Robbins to Philip Adler, September 13, 1944. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing Sept. 1944, National Archives.

37See Jack Lockhart to Eric Hodgins, September 16, 1944; Eric Hodgins to Jack Lockhart, September 26, 1944; and Jack Lockhart to Eric Hodgins, September 29, 1944. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing Sept. 1944, National Archives.

38Office of Censorship, "A History of the Office of Censorship," p. 171. It was not surprising that a complaint about the press came specifically from Groves' office. A month later, Lockhart noted that Groves had told him "he did not think much of newspapers in general." See Jack Lockhart, "Memorandum," October 26, 1944, Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing October 1944, National Archives.

39See Jack Lockhart to Roy T. Bramson, September 21, 1944; Wallace Scotten to Jack Lockhart, September 23, 1944; Jack Lockhart, "Memorandum," September 25, 1944; and Jack Lockhart to Wallace Scotten, September 27, 1944. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing October 1944, National Archives.

40See Memorandum, Phil Adler to Jack Lockhart, October 25, 1944; Memoranda, James E. Warner to Jack Lockhart, October 26, 1944; and Jack

41 See Jack Lockhart to Adelaide Price Waldo, November 1, 1944, and Adelaide Price Waldo to Jack Lockhart, November 4, 1944. Both are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing Jan. 1945, National Archives. Also see Ray Tucker, "The National Whirligig," Johnstown (Pa.) Tribune, October 25, 1944.

42 See Jack Lockhart to John J. Crowley [sic], November 18, 1944; Fred C. Breismeister to Jack Lockhart, November 28, 1944; Jack Lockhart to Fred Breismeister, November 30, 1944; John J. Crawley to Jack Lockhart, December 5, 1944; and Jack Lockhart to John J. Crawley, December 7, 1944. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing Dec. 1944, National Archives.

43 See Memorandum, Art King to Jack Lockhart, November 22, 1944; Jack Lockhart, "Memorandum," November 22, 23, 24, 25, and 27, 1944; and Jack Lockhart to Eric Hodgins, November 24, 1944. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing October 1944, National Archives. Also see "V-3?," Time, November 27, 1944, p. 88. While the Army was irate over the story, it also was thankful that it was not any worse.

According to scientists who were consulted by the Army, the Time article apparently was put together by "second-class scientists and writers" who missed the main implications of the London report, leaving the magazine story not nearly as harmful as it could have been. See Jack Lockhart, "Memorandum," November 25, 1944, in the same file as above.

See Ralph McGill, "V-Bomb Attacks on This Nation?" Atlanta Constitution, January 13, 1945, and Jack Lockhart to N.S. Noble, January 15, 1945, Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing Jan. 1945, National Archives. For information on the other January leaks, see the same file as above and Office of Censorship, "A History of the Office of Censorship," pp. 175-77.

See Jack Lockhart to Arthur W. Stace, February 28, 1945; Jack Lockhart to Frank M. Sparks, March 22, 1945; and Jack Lockhart to Harold F. Wheeler, March 31, 1945. All are in Record Group 216, Files 012 D/4 Enemy Weapons October 1944 and 012 D/4 Atom Smashing March-April 1945, National Archives.

See Jack Lockhart to Adelaide Price Waldo, April 14, 1945, Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing March-April 1945, National Archives. Also see Office of Censorship, "A History of the Office of Censorship," pp. 178-79. After the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, McClure publicized the fact that it had voluntarily changed the comic strip to help the government.

See Jack Lockhart to Harry Kimmelman, April 16, 1945; Jack Lockhart to George A. Cornish, April 24, 1945; Jack Lockhart to Abe Krash, April 24, 1945; and Jack Lockhart to Lt. Col. John Lansdale, April 25, 1945. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing March-April 1945, National Archives.


See George P. Thomson to W. Holden White, June 27, 1945, and Memorandum, W.H. White to Cmdr. N.R. Patterson, June 29, 1945. Both are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing July 1945, National Archives.


56 See Maj. Gen. L.R. Groves to Theodore F. Koop, July 10, 1945; and Byron Price to Cmdr. N.R. Patterson, July 12, 1945. Both are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing July 1945, National Archives.


60 See Theodore F. Koop, "Press Memorandum," July 18, 1945; Telegram, Theodore F. Koop to Ward Greene, July 18, 1945; Ward Greene to Byron ...

Office of Censorship, "A History of the Office of Censorship," pp. 187-89. For information on the various decisions made by the Press Division after the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and the publications and journalists who were involved, see Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing August 1945, National Archives.


Gen. H.H. Arnold to Byron Price, September 25, 1945, Byron Price
papers, Box 1, Folder 2, General Correspondence 1945, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin.

68 Theodore F. Koop to W.S. Gilmore, July 4, 1945, Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing July 1945, National Archives.


70 See Jack Lockhart to C. Walter McCarthy, July 10, 1944; Herbert R. Hill to Jack Lockhart, July 12, 1944; and Jack Lockhart to Herbert R. Hill, July 14, 1944. All are in Record Group 216, File 012 D/4 Atom Smashing July 1944, National Archives.

