This document contains two lectures concerning the nature and status of peace studies. Adam Curle, in "The Scope and Dilemmas of Peace Studies" presents: (1) the study of peace and related subjects; (2) diversities and contradictions in peace studies; (3) personal interpretations; (4) teaching peace studies; and (5) moral and practical dilemmas. He urges people to recognize mankind's common traits and to eliminate or diminish those issues that are divisive. In "Towards an Understanding of Concepts in the Study of Peace," James O'Connell examines the linkage of concepts concerning peace, justice, and freedom and considers coexistence in the contemporary world in terms of the community of nations, technology, and arms control. Ideas and attitudes about the nature and extent of peace studies in academic environments are explored, and peace is identified as a subject that civilization cannot afford to ignore. (JHP)
Peace with Work to Do

The Academic Study of Peace

James O'Connell
Adam Curle
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and
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Introduction

... and when Peace here does house,
He comes with work to do, he does not come to coo,
He comes to brood and sit.

G.M. Hopkins, Peace

Few would deny the centrality of the issue of peace in our time. Those who differ with one another about peace do so less in terms of peace itself than in terms of values, notably justice and freedom, that are analytically and socially linked with peace. For such reasons the painful paradox continues that everybody favours peace; and yet peace remains a controversial term. It is a controversial term especially for those who believe that many advocates of peace have not properly weighed the claims of justice or would barter freedom for the sake of an empty and fragile peace. For related reasons those who remain uneasy about much advocacy of peace resist also the endeavour to bring in the academic study of peace.

If peace has been a central preoccupation in Western Europe, at least since the turn of the century, why has the structured study of peace not come about until recently? Three main factors seem to me to explain this lateness. Firstly, the social sciences themselves — amongst which peace studies is best classed — are late-comers: political science was no better developed by 1900 than when Aristotle left it over 2,000 years before; sociology — and in some measure economics — has only slowly built up its house and more slowly again put it in some order. Secondly, political science dealt in good measure with the basic issues of peace, not least the order internal to the state as well as the order between states, the latter order specifically being studied by the new discipline of international relations which
emerged at the end of the First World War; and though its approach to peace was narrow and underdeveloped, political science appeared to make a separate study of peace unnecessary. Thirdly, ruling groups have traditionally been concerned to promote security, and often dominance, through military capacity. Such attitudes made the study of peace as well as the advocacy of peace look marginal: peace was something to be pursued by those outside the main institutions of society and by those who held different values from the ruling groups; and often those who argued the cause of peace held themselves apart from such institutions and proclaimed values that looked impractical to those with the charge of societies. However, in the wake of the Second World War the situation began to change. It was then that the subject of peace studies began to be developed, and there is a certain parallel with the emergence of the science of international relations after 1918. Bert Röling, the founder of peace research in Holland, called it 'the science of survival'. Survival became a global issue in the years after 1945.

During the 1960s members of the Society of Friends began to search for a British university that would set up a chair to study peace. They were unsuccessful until an approach to Bradford in the early 1970s led a sympathetic Vice-Chancellor, Ted Edwards, and his deputy, Robert McKinlay, to convince their university senate that the project was worthwhile and should be accepted. Once the university had agreed to the project, members of the Society of Friends, operating through the Quaker Peace Studies Trust, raised funding for the chair in the space of ten weeks. The University of Bradford added its own share and the chair was established in 1973. In those following years during which university expansion was still possible the university built a department around the chair: the School of Peace Studies.

Once the chair and the department were founded, the next task was to promote the subject as well as to convince academic peers and others that peace could be a proper subject of university work. While other countries had much earlier accepted the worth of the academic study of peace the United Kingdom was
coming relatively late to such acceptance.* Adam Curle’s inaugural lecture sought to argue a place in
the university for the venture and sketched ways in
which peace studies as a subject could make a way
forward. My lecture, presented eight years later,
takes a certain development for granted and deals in
good measure with ideas that were architectonic in
the development of the area study that peace studies
is.

It would be misleading not to admit that the
School, operating within the tightly-knit organisation
of British university work, did not have initial prob-
lems in working out its degree structure, courses and
assessment system. Moreover, in elaborating teach-
ing and research that were heavily applied it was not
easy early on to separate academic work on peace
from activism about peace in the minds of students.
The latter tended to be impatient with theory and
anxious for action. Only as the years went by did the
conviction crystallise in the School that the true ac-
tivism of university work is scholarship.

At the present moment the School’s degree work
falls into three broad categories: an undergraduate
degree (BA); a taught Master’s course (MA); and
research leading to degrees (MPhil and PhD). It
seems useful to add here a sketch of the main catego-
ries into which the teaching and research concentra-
tions of both staff and students of the School broadly
fit.

Peace history,
theory and
methods

Exponents of a subject need to explore the history of
its thought. Moreover, the long history of peaceful
action and pacifist movements offers material for
reflection. As yet this area is barely explored, unlike

*Some examples of earlier institutions are: The Center for Research
on Conflict Resolution (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1959);
International Peace Research Institute (PRIO, Oslo, 1959); Polemo-
logical Institute (University of Groningen, 1961); Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, Stockholm, 1966);
Canadian Peace Research Institute (Oakville, Ontario, 1961). Often
such research institutions when linked to universities introduced
courses in peace studies.
other social reform movements, and in stark contrast to the detailed histories of wars and battles. Not only historical description but philosophical analysis needs to be brought to bear on the theory of a 'just war' and on pacifist views. In this connection too the attitudes of the world's great religions earn a place in our consideration of theologies of peace. The study of non-violent methods of social change in contemporary society as well as the roles of peace organisations merit examination. In this context as well problems and challenges raised by peace education are taken up. In concluding this section it is essential to say that theoretical and ethical enquiry as well as political and sociological considerations on non-violence have a certain primacy in the work of the School, as they have in the struggle for peace. Unless longer-term reflection as well as action can be undertaken on changing traditionally received bellicial attitudes and values, it will not be possible for peace ideas to have a dissolving effect on many aspects of social and individual violence. And if bellicial attitudes and values, inherent in previous ages of human psychology, are not modified it will be impossible to insulate indefinitely such attitudes and values from contemporary technology and nuclear weapons — with consequences too fearful to contemplate fully.

Nuclear and non-nuclear defence

If peace theory has a certain primacy in the School the nuclear issue has a psychological saliency. Unless the nuclear problem is resolved there will not be any other problem to resolve. It is also an issue that will remain acute and dangerous during the next two generations of humankind, at the very least. For such reasons teaching and research deal with the polarisation of the two super-powers and the defence policies of the British and other European powers as well as the roles of the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact. Attention is also given to the issue of nuclear proliferation which may well contain the most immediately destructive threat to peace. The School, accepting that countries need to be reassured about military precautions for security, has concerned itself
Relations between economically developed and developing societies

In a world grown technologically small and in which social thinking has not yet come to terms with the new closeness of global neighbours peace studies is concerned to do forward research on relations between the world's regions. Peace, justice and development form the strands of such research which include the use and allocation of energy resources, markets for commodities, the export of technology and the sharing and education of skills. Politics, sociology and economics come together in much of this work. Developing societies are also studied in their own right as well as in relation to other societies. Issues such as the legitimacy of state authority, the work of government and public administration, the ideologies of development, the role of public and private enterprise, competitive ethnic modernisation and the reactions of primordial communities to rapid social change provide teaching topics and research opportunities.

Industrialised societies

There is an abundance of teaching and research topics on industrially advanced societies. The problem for peace studies is to make a realistic choice. Three areas have effectively been taken up within the School. The first is race/ethnic relations in European countries. The second is the problem of industrial/social class divisions as well as the roots of class/industrial conflict in a country like Britain; and here the most important contribution of peace research may be to develop the positive aspects of peace by looking at worker/management participation policies, the effect of forms of consultation and shared decision-making, and worker collectives/cooperatives/common ownership. The third area is that of the conversion of arms industries into industries for other purposes. Here peace in the industrial system may be linked with broader disarmament strategies.
Unfortunately various regions and countries provide fascinating areas of study: the war between Iraq and Iran in the context of oil revenues and religious and social change; the many facets of conflict in the Indian sub-continent as well as in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka; the revolutionary movements in Latin America; the intractable Arab/Israeli contestation as well as the Lebanese civil war; communal/ethnic crises in Cyprus and in Northern Ireland; civil wars in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe; and, not least, the simmering threat to peace in reactions to the apartheid policies of South Africa. Themes such as social identity, fair access to political power and economic resources, respect for human rights, and trauma of social change run as a leitmotiv through such research. In the School we have concentrated our efforts on the Arab/Israeli conflict and on the troubles in Northern Ireland. But we have research being undertaken on the revolution in Iran.

The unifying outlook in the School is the concern for peace. But this concern is meant to be structured intellectually, related to the traditional academic disciplines, and grounded empirically. The ideas and values of peace, justice and freedom pervade the work of the School which is manifestly not value-free. The work is however meant to be carried on with integrity and fairness; otherwise it would fail not only to meet the requirements of academic rigour but also not meet crucial conditions for deepening understanding and building trust between persons and groups.

Let me finish this introduction by saying that, apart from academics rooted in an unbudging status quo and those upset by the belief that peace studies has fallen into the hands of their political opponents (I have no desire to say that these groups may not be disproportionately numerous), there is acceptance of the intellectual study of peace. Increasingly the situation is that it is rare to find a developed country that does not have an academic unit concerned with the subject.* The most relevant and challenging academic

*Almost every issue of the International Peace Research Newsletter (the quarterly journal of the International Peace Research Associ-
problem now is to go on improving teaching and research. The truth is that there is no escaping the problem of peace in our time. Minds have been concentrated on the issue by the technical development of weapons in the nuclear age and a concomitant failure to develop cooperative relations between states. We know now that we will be destroyed if peace breaks down between the super-powers. We know also that within two or three generations the nuclear capacity available only to the super-powers at present is likely to become the possession of many more powers. Moreover, there seems little likelihood in the foreseeable future that defence can cope with the potentialities of attack. In these circumstances the nuclear issue and the means needed to resolve it retain for us and our contemporaries an excruciating urgency. For that reason alone there would be an extraordinary failure by academics — an ultimate trahison des clercs — were they not to undertake a systematic study of the conditions of contemporary peace. Yet it is also necessary to insist that the study of peace ranges much more broadly than the nuclear issue or international politics. And in the longer run nuclear war may become avoidable only in so far as groups begin to grasp the general worth of non-violent attitudes and come to realise that the costs of inter-state and inter-group violence are higher than has tended to be traditionally received.

ation, the main professional body in the field) contains notices on new peace research institutes and new peace studies courses. Recent establishments range from the Austrian Institute for Peace Research (under official auspices) to the New Zealand Foundation for Peace Studies. This year (1985) the United Nations University for Peace in Costa Rica is receiving its first students. The officially endorsed and funded US Academy of Peace is likewise about to become operative. There is a distinctly provincial cast to polemics in Britain against the principle of peace studies as separate from more genuine concern about how the area should be researched and taught.
The Scope and Dilemmas of Peace Studies

Adam Curle

Introduction
Since I shall be dealing with what is, for many, a little-known and perhaps mysterious or nebulous subject, I have felt it necessary to cover a wider field than is necessary in most inaugural lectures, where the speaker wishes to deal with a particular facet of a subject whose lineaments are in general well-known. For the sake of clarity, I have divided my talk into several sections dealing with different aspects of the field. I shall first attempt to locate peace studies in the wider range of related studies. Next, I shall attempt to define what is an admittedly, but I think healthily, diverse subject — but then so are many others more strongly established. From this act of reportage I shall outline my own approach to peace studies. Then I move on to a discussion of how all these ideas are woven into a teaching programme, and what sorts of career our students may reasonably hope to follow after graduation. This leads to a rather difficult consideration of the moral and practical dilemmas in which the student of peace may be placed. I end on a note of optimism that this university is setting a progressive pattern for others to follow.

The study of peace and related subjects
It is, perhaps, wise to begin with an attempt to identify the position of peace studies within the framework of other academic studies and disciplines. I am sometimes asked whether peace studies constitutes a separate discipline and, if so, what body of knowledge it is founded upon. Let me deal with the second point later, for during the course of my lecture I shall be attempting to define the types of knowledge which I think may be thought of as comprising peace studies. With regard to the first question, as to
whether or not peace studies be thought of as a discipline, I have to admit that I am more interested in problems, both intellectual and practical, than in defining disciplines.

These, it seems to me, were created not by nature but by academics in order to demarcate spheres of intellectual interest, and are now institutionalized in the form of departments, faculties and so on. This, of course, has been necessary in order to prevent chaos but we have to be flexible. As knowledge advances, and as we are presented with fresh problems, we put together what had previously been separate, hence biochemistry or social psychology, or we separate out of previously unitary subjects certain specialisms, such as genetics or molecular biology, which have evolved to the status of virtually distinct branches of study. In order to deal with the needs and difficulties of the day, many of which in their complexity cut across a number of these useful if artificial disciplinary boundaries, we have such subjects as environmental sciences, management, international relations, planning, human purposes and the like, many of which are taught in this University. These branches of study have arisen because existing disciplines, as defined and taught, were not quite able to encompass them. Thus, international relations evolved a few decades ago because history, politics, international law and economics could not individually throw sufficient light on issues which were widely recognized to be of great importance. All of them were relevant, but new ways of combining them in focusing on particular issues had to be sought. Much the same could, I think, be said of peace studies. Whether or not, however, any particular field of intellectual endeavour qualifies as a discipline strikes me as relatively unimportant, provided that it is carried out with intellectual rigor, offers new and valid insights and generalizations, and has some practical significance.

Peace studies is, in fact, only the newest among a range of related studies. These comprise, among others, international relations (to which I have just referred), conflict research, war studies, and strategic studies, not to speak of the less easily defined work of the members of the various peace movements.
which, as for example in the case of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Dom Helder Camara, have had a considerable intellectual content.

A few rough definitions may assist us in understanding this mosaic of relationships. War studies (apart from the more specific techniques of warmaking studied in staff colleges or defence colleges) involves the examination of how wars arise, how in general they are conducted, how they may be brought to an end and their impact on the social and economic fabric.

Strategic studies are concerned with many of the same issues as war studies, but with the emphasis on wider strategic issues; geopolitics, the balance of power, economic warfare and the use of strategic weapons.

In conflict studies the stress is on the mutual reaction of people and groups in conflict situations, and how this may be modified. It is definitely not confined to international conflict but deals equally with industrial, social, racial, and other sorts of conflict. Conflict studies have been developed by some with great statistical sophistication, and various aspects of game theory are often employed. In general, conflict studies emphasise only one stage of what I term (as I shall shortly explain) peacemaking: the stage of negotiation or bargaining.

International relations deal, obviously, with the relationships between states, with diplomacy, international law, with the international order and the way in which it is maintained and, of course, with international conflict and the processes of international peacemaking.

The separation of these fields from each other and from peace studies is not precise and all of them — at least in certain aspects — are facets of or are connected with each other. Peace studies and conflict studies are, perhaps particularly close (for example, as illustrated by the name of the Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research in which, so far as I am aware, no precise effort is made to separate these functions).

Peace studies, at least as I define the field, differs from these others in various ways. The focus is, as
the term implies, upon peace, that is to say upon a relationship between individuals, groups, nations, or even larger units, which is based on cooperation. It analyses those conditions in which, instead of cooperation, there is mutual hostility and violence, and seeks to discover techniques by which these relationships may be changed into peaceful ones.

However, before proceeding further with an examination of the nature of peace studies I would like to define what, in my opinion, the field does not include. Some would perhaps disagree with me and this illustrates that fact that there is some confusion about the word 'peace'. This theme will recur during my lecture, so I will only deal with it briefly at this point. To my mind the study of peace is not the study of pacification, of suppressing dissent, of maintaining the status quo however painful it may be to the less privileged. Some would maintain that peace was simply the absence of overt violence, which can do as much harm as more open sorts and which may, on occasion, be employed in the name of maintaining peace or law and order. Nor, on the other hand, do I believe that peace studies can be based on a kind of sentimental attempt to make everyone be friends, without correcting genuine injustices or conflicts of interest between them. The student of peace, for example, would not attempt to reconcile the master and the slave without having first worked to abolish the practice of slavery.

Nor do I include in my definition of peace studies approaches which are mainly philosophical or psychological. I admit that in doing this I am putting up one of those artificial barriers which circumscribe all disciplines or fields of study, but I believe that in this case, at this stage, it is necessary, in order that we can grapple effectively with a field which is already very diverse and complex. It has been put to me by serious people that the only peace is the peace of God, that that is indeed a peace, as it is stated in the gospels, which passes all understanding and which, although some of us may believe in it personally, it would be impossible to introduce into the form of academic enquiry suggested by our principal foci of interest. Somewhat in the same vein, a young man asked me
recently whether there could be any peace, unless individuals had peace of mind. This is indeed an interesting, but ambiguous and complex question: some of the most saintly and committed persons have been tormented inwardly while, on the other hand, I have known of people who are reputed to have enjoyed great peace after having committed some atrocious act of sadism or revenge. This is not to deny the importance of the concept of peace of mind, but simply to say that its study would take us into unexplored avenues which might lead us away from what I conceive as our main problems and purposes.

Diversities and contradictions in peace studies

Those who tend to think of themselves as being involved in peace studies or peace research — the terms are often used interchangeably, though perhaps we should learn to differentiate them — can be divided along two lines: functional and ideological. The functional division is between those who are interested in scholarship and those who are interested in action: the latter may also be interested in research, but as a prelude to efficient action. Peace researchers, who may be drawn from any academic background, are concerned with a great diversity of fields. This diversity may be judged by anyone who cares to look through the table of contents of, for example, the Journal of Peace Research. I give a few titles chosen at random from recent issues: The Marxist Theory of War and Peace; The Place of International Law in Peace Research; Military Spending and Senate Voting in the United States; Domestic and Foreign Conflict Behaviour of Nations; Developmental Tension and Political Instability; Twenty-five Years of Local Wars; Freedom and Civilization: A Quantitative Conflict Model; Structural and Direct Violence; Social Inequality; Another Mother for Peace Campaign; Peaceful Co-existence; The Role of I.L.O. Standards in the Global Integration Process; Peace Research and Developing Countries; Divided Berlin — One Past and Three Futures; Divided Nations as a Process: The Case of Korea; Imperialism: The Dynamics of Colonial Violence; Ghetto Riots; Miscalculations in Deterrent
Policy; Religion, War and the Institutional Dilemma; Children's Developing Orientations to International Politics; Economic and Power Frustrations as Predictors of Industrial and Political Conflict Strategies; Perceptions of Foreign News; Middle East and the Theory of Conflict; Human Resource Cost of War, and so on and so on...

You may rightly feel that many of these titles might have been published in journals dealing not necessarily with peace but with conflict, with war, international relations, or indeed other social sciences. That they were not, perhaps indicates something more about the motivation and interests of the authors than the nature of the topic. Students of peace studies also usually have other more orthodox labels such as economist, sociologist, political scientist, biologist and so on. It is the use to which they habitually put their discipline which differentiates them from their colleagues. I might add, however, that the application of the concepts and methods of one discipline to a particular range of problems in this case those dealing with peace, may also influence those concepts and methods. Thus, while the student of peace may well be recognised as a distinguished social scientist, he will probably be a somewhat unorthodox one.

The activists are represented, for example, by many of those who have over the years, been associated with War Resisters International or Peace News. I am not suggesting that there are not able scholars among these who contribute also to the various learned journals. Bertrand Russell, after all, was one such. Indeed, many are interested in both academic work and action. Nevertheless, there is a cleavage. The activists are concerned to change situations which they conceive to be liable to lead to war and violence, and if they do carry out research it is in order that they may be better informed and so act more efficiently. The 'pure' researchers tend to feel that it is enough to obtain the facts, that if only we were adequately informed we would avoid wars and violence. To which the activists reply: 'Who makes the decisions; who uses your research results; they may be as useful to the Pentagon' — I use this word as a
symbol for the war machine — 'as in promoting harmony and peace'. They would further maintain that as well as offering information it is necessary to acquire the capacity or the influence to use it to achieve the right action. This functional split is often a temperamental and often in part an ideological one.

But the chief ideological division between those who are involved with peace studies involves their interpretation of peace. To some, but I think now fewer and fewer, peace is simply the antithesis of war: war may be the most fearful expression of an unpeaceful situation but I think that most people would include in their field of interest peaceful and unpeaceful situations in such areas as industry, race relations, community and even family relations. The main difference, however, is between those who see peace, on whatever scale, as the absence of overt violence, and those who would equate it rather with social justice. The former would be in favour of maintaining the status quo on the grounds that while there is no open violence things are not so bad, but any attempt at change, particularly unconstitutional change, might lead to dangerous disturbances of the existing order. The latter would maintain that often, as in South Africa, the relatively 'peaceful' status quo is maintained by injustice and that, in fact, a masked violence is constantly done to the rights and indeed the lives of human beings. This, they would say, is actually a condition of unpeacefulness which must be changed. Those who feel like this would themselves be divided among some who believed that this form of what has been termed 'structural violence' (Galtung) can only be overthrown by militancy, involving if necessary counter-violence, and others who believe in non-violent techniques of social change.

Around all these issues there is considerable debate, often acrimony. I do not, however, find this divisiveness to be unhealthy or undesirable. There is a ferment of concern, often very well informed, on questions profoundly affecting human survival. Moreover, some approaches to peace studies have elucidated the links between war and violence on the one hand, and on the other such perils to humanity as massive poverty and hunger in the Third World,
With all this diversity it is, however, important to attempt to develop a central core of ideas which, while permitting wide variations of interests and diversity of opinion on many topics will, nevertheless, permit some orderly growth, a greater degree of consensus. Many of us have tried to do this, and during the last few years I, too, have grappled with the problem, both in my writings, and latterly in my attempts to build up the School of Peace Studies at Bradford University. It may perhaps help if I give a brief account of how my own approach evolved.

Having spent many years concerned with Third World problems and being much moved by the violence and suffering I saw, I attempted to understand its origins. Then, over a period of four or five years, I was directly involved in mediation efforts in wars in Africa and Asia, and my rudimentary ideas on peace and violence began to focus on problems of international negotiation. However, even as I developed my conclusions, I realised that my approach was too narrow. A skilful negotiator might ease a particular situation, but the circumstances, the rivalries, the oppression, the scarcity of resources — which had given rise to it — remained. Moreover, even if wars are brought to an end, many of the conditions associated with war continue throughout large areas of the world: people are driven from their homes, unjustly imprisoned, separated from their families, flung into detention camps, virtually enslaved, exploited by landlords, victimised by the police, oppressed by the government, starved and malnourished because of official neglect or official policies; they are humiliated and have their perceptions distorted by propaganda; many in fact die because of these conditions. Circumstances such as these inflict such damage on human life, health, capacity for creative and happy existence and work, and for the development of potential, that I find it impossible to refer to them as peaceful: they inflict upon human beings, though in a less direct
and concentrated form, many of the same destructive horrors as does war.

From my perception of these circumstances I drew three conclusions. Firstly, the study of peace should not be confined to the analysis of means of preventing or terminating wars.

Secondly, because many of these circumstances were internal — rather than international — the study of peace should not be considered as exclusively on the international level.

Thirdly, and for the same reason, I came to believe that support for a status quo which permitted or encouraged such unpeaceful conditions could in no sense be considered as the promotion of peace: on the contrary, it was the tacit condoning of violence.

The concept of peace I found, however, to be unsatisfactory. It was both too vague, too emotive, and too manipulative. I therefore developed an approach based on what I termed peaceful and unpeaceful relations — between individuals, groups or nations. This concept enables us to analyse our interaction in a number of dimensions — psychological, economic, political and indeed human — in terms of which individuals are adversely affected. I defined peaceful relationships as those in which individuals or groups are enabled to achieve together goals which they could not have reached separately, or at least do not impede each other (but neutrality of interaction is, in my experience, rare). Unpeaceful relationships are those in which the uni's concerned damage each other so that in fact they achieve less than they could have done independently, and in one way or another harm each other's capacity for growth, maturation or fulfilment; or they are relationships in which one party suffers in this fashion even if the other does not and may gain advantage through his conquest.

The first task of peace in my opinion is, then, to identify and analyse these relationships. I say 'identify' because they may not always be obvious. I look back on my own youth when, to most Englishmen, the colonial relationship seemed not only legitimate and natural, but also beneficient whereas, in fact — although there were many wise and humane colonial
administrators — it was socially, psychologically, culturally and economically damaging to the colonised. And I say 'analyse' because such relationships can be complex even if, as in the case of war, they are not hard to identify.

This leads directly to the next function of peace studies, which is to use this information in order to devise means of changing unpeaceful into peaceful relationships. Here theory and practice may become closely related. I am concerned with an attempt to define the scope of peace studies rather than to elaborate my own ideas in detail and will therefore not try to describe the various stages by which I believe that unpeaceful relationships may be transformed into peaceful ones; I will merely suggest that there must be certain key variables to take into account. One is the relative degree of power (or perceived power) of the parties in the unpeaceful relationship. Let me suggest in very simple terms the sort of thing I mean. Contrast a row between a small weak boy and a much stronger bully who intends to steal the small boy’s pocket money, with a quarrel between two boys of equal size and strength. The small boy’s options are different from those of the two equal contestants. He may back down and try to placate the bully, or to match his strength, for example, by arming himself with a stick or getting a friend to help him or by finding some psychological way of intimidation: in the absence of one or more of these the bully will not be deterred. The equal contestants can either fight it out or negotiate, or fight and then negotiate, or fight and part still enemies. But the weak boy cannot either engage in a straightforward fight, nor can he negotiate because he has nothing with which to bargain. If, however, he gains the advantage of a stick, an ally, or whatever, he then has the same options as the other pair.

Another variable is the perception of the situation. Let us take the boys again. The small boy may have been brought up in a society in which it is customary for bigger boys to exact tribute of the smaller ones. The latter do not like it, but accept it as part of the natural order and their acquiescence is partially self-protective. There are many groups whose inadequate
perception of the situation prevents them from taking effective action. In the case of the two other boys there may be no real conflict of interest whatsoever, they may simply have quarrelled because one misunderstood what the other said. In this case a tactful third party may reconcile them before blows are struck.

These examples have several implications. Firstly, that the quarrel (or some other form of unpeaceful relationship) can be resolved (or made into a peaceful relationship or at least moved in that direction) through changes in perceptions (growing awareness, in my terms) or changes in the power structure of the relationship (or at least the perceived power structure), or both.

Secondly, that faulty perceptions and less apparent power tend to be associated.

Thirdly, that negotiations between the strong and the weak generally mean that the weak give in to the strong.

Fourthly, that negotiations in the sense of bargaining are only likely to be mutually satisfactory if both parties are more or less equally strong.

From these examples I derive two principles for peace studies. There must be concern for changing perceptions, for enlarging awareness of social reality: and there must be concern for changing the balance of power where strength is being employed to enhance or maintain the strong at the expense of the weak. These will have very different implications for both analysis and action in different settings, but in all cases they involve a purposeful alteration of the existing situation.

Thus, certain unpeaceful relations can only move towards a peaceful character after a period of change, even turmoil, in which, paradoxically, peace studies — as I perceive it — must be implicated. But if this sounds strange one can only point to the alternative of permitting the unpeacefulness to persist. It does, however, indicate a further role for peace studies: that of seeking non-violent approaches towards changing the status quo, for it would seem to me inconsistent to repay one sort of violence with another. Here we may gain guidance from a number
of approaches to non-violence, some of which have been systematically and even officially developed under the title of civilian defence.

I have referred in passing to negotiation and it is clearly a task of peace studies to examine this process very carefully, determining not only how to carry it out but in what circumstances it is appropriate in that it may lead to a genuine settlement and not a formula for submission. It is part of the process which is normally a major preoccupation of conflict research.

It is now time to mention a characteristic of peace studies which differentiates the field from the others referred to earlier: its possible qualities. Most of those involved in the area do not think of peace as being the mere end of hostility or conflict but, as I have already suggested, a more purposive eventual coming together for mutual advantage.

Thus, peace studies must be concerned with approaches to reshaping society and the world order in such a way that not only is violence, overt and covert, eliminated, but harmony and cooperation are established and maintained. For this reason, a further dimension is added: the study of the future and possible alternatives to the existing system.

Given these very complex and varied tasks it will be appreciated that peace studies must be a large and diverse enterprise. It will call for the contribution of persons from very different academic backgrounds, possessing varied personal qualities and capacities. I believe, however, that it is possible to construct a framework into which these different efforts can fit constructively and thus be applied to the common good of humanity. The framework is essentially the study of relationships; the determination of what renders some destructive mutually or unilaterally, and what makes others constructive; the attempt to discover, and in some cases to practise, the methods by which the unpeaceful may be changed into peaceful relationships; and finally the imaginative effort to envisage a more peaceful world order.

Teaching peace studies

Those of you who have listened to me up to this point and even perhaps found my definition of peace stud-
ies acceptable, may still be asking the sort of ques-
tions which I admit to having asked myself when I
first began thinking about how to construct an
academic programme of peace studies. Would our
students end up with a body of knowledge which
was well-structured, significant and useful? Or con-
versely, would they end the course with a hodge-
podge of miscellaneous information which it would
be very hard for them to apply, and which would
lead to no recognisable opportunities for employ-
ment? And, indeed, what forms of employment
might a graduate in peace studies hope to obtain?

To begin with, let me briefly sum up what we hope
to do in our teaching programme. Firstly, to engage
in a study, made systematic by the analysis of relation-
ships, of important issues, both contemporary and
historical; secondly, to attempt to apply analysis to
practice; thirdly, to offer what I hope will be a good
general education and a useful method of approach
to some of the world’s most urgent problems.

I can perhaps illustrate the way in which we hope
to achieve our purpose and, at the same time, pro-
vide an answer to some of the questions by looking at
one particular field of enquiry. You
would not, I
know, wish me to go into tedious details concerning
the curricula. These have already been published, but
I find that formal descriptions of programmes in
university catalogues give very little indication as to
their real substance and quality. So let me give you
some illustrative details of a part of the programme
which do not appear in the catalogue. Rather than
spread ourselves too widely we have decided that in
our teaching on the international level we shall con-
centrate on the Middle East. One reason for this is
that several of us have had direct ex-
perience of this
area, but it is perhaps more important that it
represents
a number of themes which are crucial to the under-
standing of peaceful and unpeaceful relationships
throughout the world, and even those of us who do
not know the Middle East have studied these themes
in other settings and can apply them to the Middle
Eastern situation. This troubled area of the world is
the scene of great power rivalry; it illustrates the
extraordinary significance of an important natural
resource — oil; it provides us with many examples of third-party intervention, both official and unofficial; of the role of United Nations peacekeeping forces and, in general, of the scope and limitation of UN involvement in international disturbances; it illustrates the part of deep-seated historical, religious and national elements in conflict; it provides interesting comparison with other recent or current conflicts with which some of us have also been involved — those of the Indian subcontinent, the Nigerian Civil War, Southern Africa and the agonising problems of Northern Ireland; it illuminates questions of socio-economic development and of the relationship of the rich and the poor nations which are also bound up in the Middle Eastern situation; it provides classic instances of conflict situations and of the impact of war and war mobilisation upon several very different societies. And, finally, it offers an example of how like-minded groups may struggle for peaceful aims across the barriers of conflict.

I am not suggesting that the Middle East should be used as a case study. I hope to imply something more profound and more universal. We shall be looking at the relationship between many of these other elements I have mentioned — development and under-development, colonialism, the distortions of perceptions which come with hostility, and the dangerous games of global strategy played by the great powers. These and the other things I have referred to are, of course, topics in themselves, but by being purposively focused on the concrete issues of a particular part of the world, over a particular period of time, they will, I hope, impart an understanding of the totality of life, and also enable both our students and ourselves to identify the separate strands out of which is woven the tapestry of human experience.

You may complain that inevitably knowledge in any single one of these interrelated fields is bound to be fragmentary, but this depends upon the perspective. In my opinion it is more important to understand interactions than to have an intensive knowledge of one of the interacting elements at the cost of ignorance of the others. I recall my experience some years ago as so-called adviser on social affairs to the Plan-
ning Commission of Pakistan. A considerable number of my colleagues were economists and there were also specialists in agriculture, irrigation, mineral extraction, communication, housing and a number of other fields. I think it was a fairly common experience amongst us all that initially we found our own expertise of very little value because we had no understanding of the complex interaction of other factors in which it had to be applied. We also found, however, that we could fairly easily learn enough about the skills of our colleagues to ask the right questions, to go to the right sources for information, and to adjust our own specialised approach to the broad purposes of the group as a whole. And, I should add, in so doing to learn something unexpected about our own particular expertise. Thus, while I would not expect that our students would become experts in all the various interrelated fields, or even in any of them, I would anticipate that they would become, as it were, specialists in disentangling relationships, or, to put it perhaps in a more positive way, in fitting things together. Returning for a moment to my own experience, I soon found that I learnt enough of economic development theory to guide me in my own non-economic contribution to a plan for economic development, and even to say things about development which were relevant to the thinking of my economist colleagues.

This, I hope, will illustrate the way in which we aim to achieve the first and third objectives of which I recently spoke, namely to study important issues and to provide a good general education. I have said nothing as yet about the second one which was to apply analysis to practice. We would not, of course, normally expect our students, more particularly our undergraduate ones during their third year, which will be spent in employment away from Bradford, to get themselves involved in the Middle East or some other trouble spot. This could be perilous both for themselves and for others. Our aims are much less grandiose. For those who are particularly interested in international affairs we would try to arrange for some attachment to an appropriate agency overseas; for those who are more concerned with situations
within our own society (which would be approached from the same comprehensive point of view as I have described for the Middle East) there will be opportunities of working with suitable community agencies. I certainly do not envisage that this work will, in any sense, be dramatic. On the other hand, the world is made up of a great web of relationships many of which have their unpeaceful elements, if we only learn how to recognise them, and I hope that during their practical work our students will be able to perceive these relationships and, under wise guidance, perhaps learn some of the approaches by which they may be changed.

As for employment, I find it hard to think ahead for four years to the time when our first undergraduates will be looking for jobs. I will, however, attempt a little crystal-gazing. But first, let me refer to our post-graduate students. A considerable proportion of these are likely to be somewhat older people who have already been involved in the affairs of the world and are taking what might be called a 'sabbatical in reverse' in order to come to intellectual grips with problems which they have been facing at the practical level for some time previously. For younger people it will, of course, be somewhat different. I imagine that for a proportion of them our course will simply provide a good general critical education with focus on important problems, and that the openings available to them would be as wide or as narrow as for many students with a good liberal education in, for example, history or geography. But I also envisage that many will be involved in different aspects of community work or race relations, or will seek jobs in labour organisations. Some who specialised in the international field may join agencies such as the International Labour Office, the United Nations Institute of Training and Research, and World Council of Churches, or Oxfam, or, if they are from overseas, the Organisation of African Unity. Or they may return to grapple with the problems of their own countries. Some may very appropriately go on to professional careers such as the law, practising it according to some of the principles which they have learned through peace studies. A number may go into edu-
Moral and practical dilemmas

This reference to the possible difficulties which lie ahead induces me to shift gear from the somewhat abstract and academic tenor of my lecture to discuss briefly what I hope will be the hypothetical implications of what I have been talking about. Let us assume that in a period of economic and social confusion an abhorrent regime were imposed upon this country by a powerful minority, that democratic procedures were abandoned, that those who were not of pure Anglo-Saxon descent were butchered or put into concentration camps, dissidents were brutally punished, education was corrupted with racism, censorship imposed, and so on. (The same thing could, of course, happen through invasion, and might have done thirty-five years ago, but is now, I think, a less likely contingency.) The country would be manifestly dominated, in my terminology, by unpeaceful relationships. How should we, and I mean of course particularly those who are involved in peace studies, and should be specifically concerned with such things, respond to this situation? There are several alternatives:

1. We are pleasant as possible to our new rulers, hoping to gain their favour and then influence them to change their evil ways. I have personally refused
to be implicated in such efforts elsewhere, believing them to be worse than useless.

2. We keep as quiet as possible, trying not to attract attention, and waiting for the time when the regime falls and we can once more wage peace. This is a kind of cowardice which Gandhi called worse than violence.

3. We can take up arms, join guerilla bands and sabotage groups, as many have done, including Catholic clergy in Latin America, who felt that the only way to extirpate violence was through counter-violence. Others would feel, however, that the exigencies of the struggle would force us to develop the same type of oppressive bureaucratic structure as our oppressors: that we might become so like them that when we won we merely replaced one terror by another.

4. Or we may take part in a non-violent struggle. The political objective of this is the same as for the previous type of action. We do not, however, do to our enemy what he has done to us: that is damage his potential as a human being. Our weapons are the massive withholding of labour, boycotting, non-lethal sabotage, making intentional mistakes in every official operation, civil disobedience of every sort eventually bringing the machinery of the state grinding to a standstill. Such a non-violent campaign requires, as indeed does a violent one, organisation, courage, determination, and persistence of a heroic type.

It is not my purpose to argue the advantages and disadvantages of these different approaches, although I have already suggested that the first two do not appeal to me. Whether we feel impelled to employ violent or non-violent techniques of resistance to an obnoxious regime or indeed to a foreign invader, depends upon considerations which are, on the one hand, moral, and on the other tactical and strategic. I would only emphasize that I am not advocating pacifism of the traditional sort which a noted Quaker scholar (who is, in fact, Reader in War Studies in the University of London) referred to as the 'intellectual
ghetto of pacifism’, though I do recommend that we should take serious account of the tough and tough-minded approaches to non-violence as described by such writers as Adam Roberts, Gene Sharp, George Lakey, and Boserup and Mack. My main purpose is, however, to indicate that our commitment to peace and peaceful relationships, as I have tried to define them, may logically lead us to situations which are exceptionally uncomfortable and to decisions which could be all the more agonising because our choice may be seen by some to contradict the principles which we profess.

I trust the circumstances will not arise in which my colleagues or I, whether in peace studies or not, are faced with such stark alternatives. We must not forget, nevertheless, that we must always be prepared to practise the principles which we preach, and that in large ways or small the practice may make us unpopular with those who have the capacity to make life uncomfortable for us.

Conclusion

I have attempted to define the scope, nature and problems of the field in somewhat intellectual terms. But I believe that most of my colleagues and I have come to this work for reasons which are not primarily intellectual. We have come to it, often with pain and suffering, because we cannot resist the obligations imposed upon us by our experiences in this darkening world. ‘I have a dream’, said Martin Luther King in a famous sermon. I, too, have a dream. In this sad age I have a dream which I shall not see come true, but which — if we do not seek now to realise it — our grandchildren will not see, either. I dream of a world in which we are not separated from each other by fear, suspicion, prejudice, or hatred; in which we are free and equal, considerate and loving with each other.

By establishing peace studies at an intellectual and practical level we may in some measure help this world to be born. Here lies our motive. But it cannot come into being if we who comprise it are inwardly riven by guilt, self-loathing, greedy ambition or despair. Let us, then, do all we can in the world and in
our minds, but above all cherish the humanity in ourselves and in each other, not least in those from whom we are separated by the more superficial barriers of ideology, or religion, or race. Until we can recognise that our common nature and our common destiny are more important than the things which divide us, the shadows will continue to lengthen until night irrevocably falls.
Towards an Understanding of Concepts in the Study of Peace

James O'Connell

In this lecture I shall simply mention the background to the study of peace since 1945. There was a first phase that saw peace mainly as the absence of war. A second phase realized that a negative approach to peace was inadequate and moved towards social reform and the ironing out of structural injustices as the positive side of promoting peace. A third phase saw sections of the peace movement, deeply concerned with wars of liberation, support such wars strongly and come close to defining peace as a state that followed on a just war. In more recent times a reawakened sensitivity to the possibility of nuclear war, harder headed and more scientific thinking among those in peace groups who had never given up their commitment to non-violence and opposition to war, and new efforts to tie together concepts of positive and negative peace have meant that a mature synthesis of thinking and experience in relation to peace is now possible. There will be no final synthesis because the continuity of personal and social living requires that syntheses go on being made and re-made.

What I want to do in this approach is, firstly, sketch the idea of peace and two other ideas — freedom and justice — that are crucially related to it. These three ideas are fundamental to human living. Secondly, I want to draw attention to ideas — community, technology and development/arms control — that concern our living together in the contemporary world. This second set of ideas conveys the extraordinary paradox of present-day living in which great material achievement and the possibility of almost
total human destruction are two sides of one coin. Both these sets of ideas are controlling or architectonic ideas in the study of peace. Finally, I want to make some comments on the nature and organisation of peace studies.

Architectonic ideas in the study of peace

Ideas and the basis of living

The first set of ideas — peace, justice, freedom — are intrinsically linked with one another. The desire for peace is ultimately the basis of the search for security and survival which is a powerful, perhaps the most powerful, human urge. Yet human survival is not physical only, crucial though the latter is. There is a saying of Socrates: ‘Gentlemen, fear evil rather than death because evil runs faster than death’. For such reasons peace is linked to freedom, the absence of which is a great evil and the presence of which enables persons to survive much as they see and want themselves to be. Finally, peace and freedom remain empty without justice. To live deprived of rights is to enjoy a shallow peace and possess a hollow freedom.

If peace, freedom and justice are intimately linked, peace has a certain practical primacy among them. Peace provides the conditions in which freedom can best flourish and justice be best achieved. It is also the general condition towards which human effort moves. As St Augustine puts it: ‘For the good of peace is generally the greatest wish of the world, and the most welcome when it comes . . . the sweetness of peace which all men do love’. All the goods of human endeavour are best held when they can be held in the security of peace. But it is time to look in a little more detail at each of these ideas in turn.

Peace The idea of peace contains two basic elements: willing co-operation among persons for social and personal goals and the absence of violence (in the shape of direct physical, psychological or moral violence). St Augustine sums up the positive element of peace in saying: ‘Peace of all things is a well disposed order’ (City of God, xix, 13). Such order in the changing circumstances of human life has to be a dynamic order in which cooperation seeks not only to main-
tain concord between divergent human efforts but both to perfect it and to adapt it to new situations. This cooperation has aims which are eventually as wide as life, truth, freedom, justice and love. The negative element of peace is the avoidance of discord or inflicted disorder in the shape of violence. It is often the most psychologically salient of the elements of peace. However it stimulates persons to remove what harms them much as illness stimulates the science of medicine to remove its harm and in practice conditions the organisation of medicine more than does the preservation of health. While it is easy to point out how inadequate negative peace is, it is worth insisting that such peace is a necessary though not a sufficient condition of positive peace. Also, the psychological saliency of negative peace reflects the pervasive normality of positive peace in human relations. The danger of concentrating on negative peace only is that practitioners and theorists alike may neglect to work on constructing the foundations of peace. Yet in recent Western European history peace between the main contenders in the last two civil wars (1914 and 1939) has been more firmly established by their discovering that their interests converge than by their recoiling from war.

In the previous paragraph the stress has been on the concept of peace. In that sense peace can be understood as a state at which people arrive or hope to arrive. The state of perfect peace in which the lion will lie down with the lamb is a pervasive human ideal. Peace has also to be seen as process. Involved in any living concept of peace is a set of attitudes among persons that are dynamic and purposeful, that are ready to carry the costs of the search for peace and that seek to uphold the values of justice and freedom inherent in stabilising peace. In short, peace is in St Augustine's words 'the tranquility of order' but it is a dynamic order that seeks to under-pin human cooperation and remove not only violence but its causes. Hopkins puts well the dynamism of peace:

... and when peace here does house,  
He comes with work to do, he does not come to coo,
He comes to brood and sit.

**Freedom**  Freedom is the ability that persons have to choose their own future and to reject what is not chosen. Since the end of the eighteenth century within Europe on a national or state level and in opposition to European colonialism outside Europe the desire of national or social freedom has inspired peoples and classes. But even in the most intimate parts of personal life where love reigns freedom is essential. Only what is given freely can be love — and lovers have to live with leaving those loved free, while accepting that love which is free may cease. Persons, groups and states have to live with the paradox that freedom is the condition and source of human cooperation in peace and simultaneously the greatest threat to it. Freedom can be used and abused, abused even to the extent of taking other persons' freedom away. Freedom itself is not exercised in a vacuum, nor is it at best arbitrary. It has to respect and deal with situations as it finds them. It has also in integrity to respect the freedom of others. It is in this context that to ensure peace there has to be concern for human rights.

**Justice**  Justice is giving everybody their due. The general principle is easy. Its application however as it meets the inheritances of history, social organisation, differing individual abilities and varied needs is far from easy. Succeeding generations have had to revise their ideas of applied justice, for example, as new circumstances have changed thinking and as in recent times new groups, notably nations, working people and women have argued for a different understanding of rights. Within contemporary states injustice in allocating goods between groups is hardly faced up to adequately anywhere. Between states the breakdown into rich and poor countries, based on uneven access to the world's resources, remains a scandal of injustice.

Few things threaten peace as much as does resentment of injustice by individuals or groups. In fact, fear which principally threatens peace is most often bred in situations of resented injustice. In the tradi-
tional theory of the just war thinkers consider that what may be fought for has to be due in justice. At the limit this may be a people’s right to survive. Yet the theory is nuanced and does not make the claim to justice an absolute right because war itself is not only a source of great injustice but the cause of many other evils. Hence, if traditional theorists concede a right to fight, they hedge it in closely with insistences that there has not only to be a just cause but also justice in the means used to wage war, not least in maintaining the distinction between combatants as well as discernment in weighing the proportions between justice or any other good that is hoped to be secured by war and the injustice as well as the other evils that form an inevitable part of war. In other words, traditional theorists — and what persons of decency would part company from them on the issue — argue that there are times when injustice has to be put up with to avoid the greater evil that lack of peace can be. In this approach injustice is not condoned. Rather people are asked to reflect on the means of remedying it as well as on the cost. In practice this implies bringing a spirit of peace to living with injustice in a way that recognises that human reality contains more values, and often richer ones, than justice. Yet justice holds all values together; and all other values are held fragilely without justice as they are held fragilely without peace.

Peace, freedom and justice are abstract values that to be effective in our contemporary world need to be mediated through related attitudes and values as well as through practical capacities and organisational forms. To begin with, I want to suggest three ideas that enable the values which we have been discussing to operate effectively in concrete circumstances. These ideas are community, technology and development/arms control. Community implies a sense of belonging in which peace, freedom and justice can grow; technology lies behind a vision of the control over the world that is becoming possible to us; and development/arms control points to the awful ambivalence of achievement where peace and community remain insecurely obtained. I want, firstly, to look at
the interplay of community, technology and development, stressing in the process the structural aspects of the interplay. Then, secondly, I want to look at community, technology and arms control, stressing more this time the psychological aspects of the interplay.

Community  In practice to live well with others, to live with them in unity and to live with them in peace, persons need a sense of community. Community is a sense of belonging to persons, sharing objectives with them and willing their good. It is in traditional philosophical language an analogous term, finding shared but proportionately differing meanings in being applied to different things. It is applied to groups that range from families and local communities through nations and ethnic groups to reach out to the whole world. Where there is community there is bound to be the cooperation and the absence of violence that make up peace.

Community can be harmed in two ways. Firstly, it is injured where internal structures serve to throw persons and groups into relations that embody injustice and/or threats to physical or cultural security and that foster fear and dislike between persons and groups. Secondly, it is weakened or taken away by those who are ignorant of or ignore its existence. The first harm sees negative peace injured. The second takes away the basis of cooperation that underlies positive peace. In the first form of harm communities are often thrown against one another within states in inter-ethnic, inter-class or inter-racial conflict or between states or blocs of states in economic competition or war. In the second form of harm the poor within, and even more so the poor without, can be forgotten. In the first kind of harm community is confined; in the second community is not extended. If, on the one hand, conflicts which break community have been endemic in history, it is also true that conflicts are almost always seen as aberrations (St Augustine remarks that even the goal of war is peace) and are localised in space and time. Historically, on the other hand, neglect or the failure to extend community by defining it too narrowly has been a much
more pervasive phenomenon. Partly this has been
because in the context of the scarcity of resources
groups preferred not to know than to be under pres-
sure to share. More important again, they did not
have the physical capacity to travel or to communi-
cate other than intermittently over any great dis-
tance. Only as the scientific renaissance became
operative through the industrial revolution did both
the problems of scarcity and distance begin to be
resolved. In the process it also became easier to
translate an abstract understanding of humanity into
a sense of global community. But that brings us
already to the role of technology and to the necessity
of development.

Technology Technology is a complex combination
of scientific method (observation, hypothesis, test or
verification) applied to the development of tools and
the application of tools to the human and material
environment. It has three basic elements: attitudes,
tools and techniques, and organisation. Firstly, ana-
lytico-causal attitudes are brought to bear on every
problem. Historical tradition, sacred meanings and
sociological linkages may condition approaches to
problems but analytical attitudes, particularly those
geared to number, remain central. Such technological
attitudes, though they have a heavily applied orienta-
tion, are however wider than efforts to apply know-
ledge and have roots in ultimately speculative
thrusts. Secondly, since the renaissance but espe-
cially since the early industrial revolution, the appli-
cation of scientific method to tool-making (applied
techniques) has resulted in the multiplication of tools
and techniques until in the developed world men and
women have altered or fabricated almost every inch
of the space about them. Again, attitudes and tools
work in a dialectical relationship with one another,
attitudes generating new tools and new tools gener-
ating new attitudes. In the contemporary developed
world, for example, new weapons have called into
question the rationality of war between major pow-
ers; and in developing societies new machines and
medicines have exorcised the gods more effectively
than the most rigorous theistic analysis. Thirdly,
concomitantly with scientific attitudes and industrial tools social structures have been generated that meet and facilitate the speed and complexity of the machines. Bureaucracy — administrators who are skilled, permanent and committed to political or other forms of association — is the central institutional structure devised or revised to cope with as well as to make industrial society function. Obviously this description is an ideal-type (Weber). However allowing for what history and sociology do to individual bureaucracies, what the ideal-type description does is to emphasise how far modern societies differ from traditional societies where ruling and administrative structures are, or were, linked firmly to kinship and age.

It is easy to give the impression that technology is neutral in a political or social sense. This is hardly likely to be the case, given the pervasive impact of technology. As Celso Furtado puts it: ‘Technological innovations, which are the essence of economic development, do not simply provoke changes in the structure of the productive system. They provoke . . . a series of chain reactions resulting from the interdependence existing among the basic elements of the culture as a whole’. There are two main direction-controls in a value-embedded technology. Firstly, technology through its need for skills has a built-in meritocratic bias. Persons, no matter how highly they have been placed or esteemed traditionally, can no longer hope to wield political and social authority without modern skills and those who possess those skills cannot easily be excluded from authority and social advance. The gains made by contemporary women illustrate this logic. Both the spread of skills which has a consciousness-raising effect and the decline of the need for physical strength have enabled women to make gains in spheres that range from reducing the incidence of polygyny in African countries to competing in Western countries for traditionally masculine jobs — not to mention the greater employment availability of women from the spread of better contraceptive methods. Secondly, technology serves the interests of those who control it and responds to the values that they possess. For that
reason technology in an exploitative society or exploitative world can be — and is — used to consolidate or increase exploitation. It may, for example, be used to reinforce the unfair access to world resources that the developed countries already have or it may be used to buttress the disproportionate privileges of new elites within developing countries.

In discussing technology let me refer in particular to its tools and techniques of communication. Through its information systems technology is spread and consolidated. Moreover, individuals and groups and generations can communicate with one another through printing, broadcasting and computing in a veritable explosion of knowledge. Through the sharing of information and the speed of machines the world as well as its individual regions has been made small. Distance is a function of the time that it takes to traverse it; London is closer to Bombay now than it was to Newcastle 150 years ago. It is true, as Toynbee has remarked, that it is easier to export sewing machines than ideas to Bombay — or vice versa. But these days print, films, words, translations make it harder — though obviously and unfortunately not impossible — to ignore other persons in their basic humanity. Thus too, for example, once the revelations of television and the interests of the American middle classes converged it became most difficult to continue in Vietnam one of the last colonial wars. The Soviet rulers are being much more careful to confine the impact of the Afghanistan war on their society. In short, the world has steadily contracted. The process of development is, in consequence, a world issue. So to that let us now turn.

Development Development is a concept of the human betterment of poor countries and peoples. It brings together the inchoate sense of the universalism of the human community of earlier times and the technological achievement of our times. Most people in the world are still poorly nourished, under-doctored and badly sheltered. Yet they live in a world which in a physical sense is smaller than Britain was two hundred years ago and where poor neighbours can no longer easily pass unrecognised as neighbours. It is true that it is taking time for people's
thinking to catch up with technology. But the fact is that soon it will be as psychologically — not to mention morally — difficult to accept that there should be rich and poor countries or utterly uneven distribution of the world’s goods as it is difficult to accept that there should be extreme inequality within one country. Disraeli’s rejection of the two nations applies in our times to the whole world because we are not only conscious of poverty but able to do something about it. In mentioning Disraeli it is also important to keep in mind that there are pockets — and at times more — of poverty within technologically advanced countries that flout principles of justice and compassion.

Beyond justice as contemporary sharing attitudes there needs to be a forward-looking sense of justice which takes heed of generations still to come. Allowing for changes in the use of resources that technology itself may bring about from successful innovation, it is hard to believe that countries can go on consuming mineral and other resources at present rates. Moreover, present rates and patterns of the consumption of raw materials — timber is an obvious example — are possible only because a small proportion of the world’s population is involved in the consumption. In fact, one of the gravest reproaches that future generations — if there are any — may make to us is that we have misdirected research on energy and other resources at a time when it is already clear that we need desperately to find new energy sources as well as new forms of raw materials for production and use.

Finally, in the longer run the present set of developed countries are faced with taking part in reworking not only consumption patterns but divisions of labour between themselves and developing countries. All this is owed in justice. If peace is preserved in the face of existing inequalities, it is only while awareness of, and access to, technological possibilities grow among those who are becoming new neighbours in a ‘global village’ (McLuhan). In consequence, Western countries out of enlightened self-interest as well as out of human solidarity are faced with the task of helping neighbours. It is true that societies can in the last resort only develop themselves. But they can under-
take the tasks of development best when they not only receive adequate help but when richer neighbours exercise the discipline in their own houses that new forms of innovation, divisions of labour and patterns of consumption require.

**Community** Through its foreshortened distances, its sharing of goods and trade and its enhanced communications, the modern world provides the conditions for underpinning a sense of community. Its technological structures and the social organisation that permeates them facilitate a human coming together that is not dependent on fragile human goodwill. In spite of the enormous problems that still confront the global community as its rich and poor parts move closer together and in spite of unresolved problems that fester in the developed world — communal relations in Northern Ireland, race relations in the United States and Britain, autonomy issues in Spain and Canada, large population proportions outside general prosperity in almost every developed country, to mention some — we already hold in principle technological solutions to age-old problems of subsistence. The fact is that provided we can get the phasing right peoples can now realise that their material interests are complementary and not conflicting. People are in a moral sense no better and no worse than ever they were; and no contemporary ethical teaching suggests an advance on the Sermon on the Mount. The advance that has taken place is that a certain potential abundance can remove from people the historic temptation to believe that their economic interests are in conflict with one another. In that way much temptation is avoided; and it is easier to be virtuous in avoiding temptation than in trying to be strong in its presence. It is true that relative advances may deepen a sense of relative deprivation. But a combination of social communication and productive capacity offer us enormous possibilities of human encounter and peace.

**Technology** In their rational, technical and social progress men and women are able to transform the physical world as never before; they can overcome
the age-old threat of hunger; and they can deal with the debilitating effects of disease. In other words, they control nature and fashion it to their image. In the process they feel a new sense of confidence in dealing with the world; indeed, if they believe in God still, they see themselves as his co-creators rather than his beggars. They, finally, have a degree of comfort — whether in eliminating darkness, moderating heat or cold, keeping out the wind or covering space — that is profoundly new. They can, in fact, construct dwellings for ordinary people that have comforts that kings did not have in ages past. Control, confidence and comfort are so securely held that lots of young people reared in the new era can in dropping out afford to disdain its benefits. But they are the exceptions that serve to underline the ruling trends. The natural world also has experienced efforts that despoil it. But again built into contemporary scientific approaches is a revision exercise that enables their exponents to reexamine and remove harmful initiatives.

This optimistic scenario must however be distinguished from technological determinism — theories in which the machines and the structures they evoke are thought to create circumstances of perfect rationality. Essentially all that I am contending is that conditions are becoming available for a world to live in peace and plenty. An analogous forecast would not however have consoled a German at the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 who could not foresee unification in 1871 nor another German in the ruins of 1945 who could not envisage West European politico-economic confederation in 1958. One of the most immediate problems we face is that the pace of social change, which is in good measure dictated by the speed of machines, is accelerating all the time and is making societies uneasy as it upsets established relations between persons and between groups. Moreover, such unease and certain elements of political and economic competition, not least among the big powers but also among lesser powers, that have outlasted their time enable hostile media to falsify an information role and to go on leading people to see one another through unfavourable stereotypes. In
consequence, it is still difficult to establish the trust among states and peoples that would facilitate cooperation and avoid war, especially the terror of a war whose weapons take their rise in the same technology that is transforming the world so powerfully. In short, for all our potentially close drawing together and wonderful actual and potential abundance the phasing of the coming together and the sharing could go fearfully wrong. For that reason it is time to turn to the issue of control over arms.

Arms control Reference has just been made to the trauma and the collisions of the German peoples over two centuries as they made their way towards a dimly sought and for long reluctant unity. So too reference has been made to West Europeans who fought two bloody civil wars (1914 and 1939) on their way towards discovering that their interests were complementary and that while tensions would continue they could be contained and even profited from. To come back to an earlier theme: the world is growing as small now as Western Europe was in 1939. But we cannot afford the short-sightedness, the lack of political and social structures, and the endemic fears of Europe and elsewhere of a generation ago. Those failures cost Europe millions of lives. If we fall into the same failures, they will cost us total destruction in Europe and close to total destruction elsewhere in the world. We do not have the time nor can we carry the cost of not working out quickly, probably within the next fifteen to twenty years, political and social structures that will enable us to cooperate with one another and avoid nuclear war.

The two military super-powers — the United States and the Soviet Union (though the roles of Britain, France and China introduce awkward and unnecessary complications) — provide the main threat of global destruction in their theory of deterrence and uncertain balance of terror. The most obvious weakness of deterrence is the instability inherent in an arms race where the prize is immense, possibly survival; where the competitors are all the time running faster and cannot see one
another clearly; and where there are in the last re-
sort no binding rules in the game — one may recall
Hobbes’ famous pun: ‘Where there are no rules of
the game, clubs become trumps’. In these circum-
stances nuclear war could be sparked off by miscal-
culations, intransigencies and fears in complex
evolving crises. It could also be set off by client or
satellite states (nuclear or non-nuclear) dragging in
their patrons. Unfortunately such war could also be
started by human error or madness or by mechan-
ical failure. One must hope that leadership groups
in the super-powers will work out ways in which
their countries can move from coexistence to coop-
eration. In the last resort they differ rather than
conflict ideologically; they stand to gain from econ-
omic cooperation and trade with one another; and
they have everything to lose by indulging in pos-
tures and acts, not least the arms race, that harm
them economically and involve a great risk of end-
ing in war.

Whatever about the super-powers, we will have
to go on living in our time with the knowledge that
Pandora’s box is open. In fact, it is probaby the
case that the most immediate threat of nuclear war
lies among the lesser powers. The proliferation of
nuclear weapons threatens entire regions of the
world, not least the Middle East. Moreover, the
gradual simplifying of nuclear technology as well as
the miniaturisation of nuclear weapons suggest that
little gangs of terrorists are more likely than not to
gain access to such weapons in the not-too-distant
future. The thought hardly bears contemplation.
Up to now the two super-powers, locked into theo-
ries of mutual deterrence, have not turned flexibly
towards the burgeoning problems of nuclear prolifer-
ation and terrorism. Yet the super-powers and
other powers have not been left with a lot of time
to think out how they are going to elaborate struc-
tures and develop attitudes to deal with such prob-
lems. There are no alternatives to international
policing, whatever shape that may take. More im-
portant again, there is no alternative to world struc-
tures, no matter how loose, that organise cogently
relations between states and regions and transna-
tional and multinational organisations. In this approach the themes of the present section — technology, community, and development as well as arms control — come together, and their relationships with the fundamental themes of the first section — peace, freedom and justice — is close and clear.

However I want to end this section by drawing together its arms control/armament reduction theme with its development theme. In the case of the developed countries spending on armaments is consuming an enormous part of their resources. It is easy to show a negative correlation between levels of capital intensive military spending and economic growth. Moreover, the developed countries have sought to recoup part of their own investment, usually without too much political sensitivity or social concern, by selling arms to Third World countries, inducing the latter to live beyond their means and to dissipate scarce development resources. Until they have substantially reduced their arms expenditure it is unlikely that developed countries will face up seriously — in some equivalent of a Marshall Plan, for example — to the problem of aiding developing countries. There are, in fact, two great scandals of our time. One scandal is the existence of systems of violence that imminently — a technical 15 minutes away only — threaten to destroy millions of lives and centuries of achievement. The other scandal is the existence of extreme poverty in most parts of the globe. Arms control in the shape of phased and structured and relative disarmament is the condition of the human survival of the First World. Development is the condition of the human hope of the Third World.

In this short section I want to suggest an idea or attitude that lies at the heart of peace studies. It is the conviction that conflict needs to be — in so far as this is humanly possible — resolved by peaceful or non-violent means. Those who are drawn to peace studies may be fascinated by the intellectual problems of war and peace. In a similar way I am impressed by how
scholars concerned with social work are animated by a passion for improving the lot of deprived people. For such reasons the study of peace is an applied study as are development economics and medicine, though it does not have a professional dimension like medical studies or engineering.

Translated into applied scholarly pursuits the study of peace does much more than establish ethical criteria. Rather peace studies deals systematically with two sets of converging considerations. The first set consists of ethical reasonings; the second is concerned with practical estimates of action. Both sets are linked, in so far as estimates of good and evil are based on practical judgements of consequences. Embedded in the traditional theory of a just war there is, for example, an estimate made of the proportion between any ends that war sets out to achieve and the awful costs that come with war. It is for such reasons that Christian Mellon in reflecting on nuclear deterrence argues that ethical debates are irrelevant, but that they are a sterile exercise, if they limit their aims to issuing moral "condemnations" or "approvals", without giving any attention to the practical, social and political problems which prevent these condemnations or approvals from having practical effects. In the particular case of nuclear weapons, it is obviously important to realise that people do not think about them only in terms of morality, but also in terms of security, defence against aggression or blackmail, the need to feel protected, and so forth. However strong the moral condemnations, the likelihood of unilateral nuclear disarmament will be slight as long as people remain convinced that nuclear weapons are needed to defend their country, and that there is no other way by which protection can be secured. What I am arguing here in citing Mellon is that systematic reflection on peace is not meant to remain in a cocoon of moralism.

Given the importance of reflection on how ethical and behavioural needs interact on one another in working out policies, it is crucial — and here is the main applied thrust of peace studies — that persons come to practical tasks convinced that peace is a primordial need which is the condition of meeting
other human needs and underpinning other human achievements. At its minimum such conviction includes an awareness that war cannot any longer be assumed to be a generally acceptable way of settling quarrels between states. In stressing this minimum I am not denying the theoretical possibility of a just war — whoever does not subscribe to a ‘troops out’ approach in Northern Ireland implicitly accepts a just war theory. Moreover, I believe that there are evils worse than violence, worse even than the organised violence of war; and I reluctantly accept that a minimal use of force may prevent a later and greater incidence of violence. What is important however in accepting a theory of just war is that its conditions be taken seriously and given proper weight and not discounted in the hysteria of crisis or the blindness of nationalist sentiments. For that reason a cause needs to be genuinely just and defensive only; there needs to be a proper proportion between whatever gain victory is calculated to achieve and the losses inherent in war — and it is in this principle of proportion as well as in the principle of discrimination that the imperatives of ethics throw their cogency against nuclear war; there has to be a basic discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, setting recent erosions of such discrimination resolutely aside; and, finally, other means of resolving a conflict need to have been exhausted before war is embarked on, for unfortunately wars almost always come too soon.

If by implication I have distanced myself from a theory of pure pacifism, whatever about practical pacifism in most concrete situations, I want however to finish this section with a word on pacifism. Sociologically and politically pacifism is likely to remain minority and marginal. Yet it offers a precious prophetic witness without which peace thought and action would be much the poorer. Pacifism brings out the primacy of conscience in the best human decision-making. As well, such conscience upholds the right to do violence to no other person as well as upholding an unyielding determination to suffer, if need be, so as to defend the principle of non-violence. Those who reluctantly accept a theory of just war and know the difficulty of discerning the
validity of any particular application of the theory are reminded by pacifists of the evil of war. They are also prompted by pacifists to find the courage of patience to endure beyond the conventionally or traditionally tolerable in reckoning the balance between the ends sought and the losses incurred in making war. And by pacifist witness they are encouraged to refuse to accept too soon that all non-violent means have been tried in avoiding war.

If peace studies (irenology or polemology are other terms) now occupies an academic place in higher education in various countries, I want to argue here the benign paradox that peace studies is a proper and needed academic study that has a worth related to the importance of peace; and that none the less the main impact of the study of peace as well as the most pervasive influence of the values of peace come through other academic disciplines, especially the other social sciences of politics, sociology, economics and psychology. One reason for this last argument is that far more persons will study, and research in, the main disciplines than will study peace as such; and the social science disciplines in measure overlap with, and can encompass, the concerns of peace studies. What peace studies does is to take problems of order that are already considered in or touched on within the disciplines and to deal with these problems in a coordinated way and with a unified focus. What is also at issue here is the organising of the boundaries of disciplines. There is no perennial orthodoxy in organising a particular study of society. Some may regret, for example, that political economy did not prevail as a discipline but for the sake of a division of labour broke up into politics and economics. Yet in a contrasting and coordinating approach human geography groups problems that are dealt with in both sociology and economics. The relevance of peace studies is that it has the unifying focus of a concern for peace — as geography has a similar focus in its concern for the uses of the earth — and deals with issues of order where human cooperation is crucial to human development and where violence or disruption is threatened or present. For such reasons
peace studies as a subject is best seen as an area study — the same is true of war studies — which deals with social content where other disciplines converge and where their methods are used. It is an area study in the sense of engineering and medicine rather than a geographic area study such as European, African or American studies. It is also an applied study like engineering or medicine (though it is not a professional formation), in so far as it sets out to make its results available for practical action. In short, I am saying that peace studies is an applied area study; and I am arguing its case as a most useful way of organising a study of social order and disorder. What I am not saying — indeed I am arguing the contrary — is that the study of peace is confined to peace studies. In this context it is worth saying also that a concern for peace is clearly not confined to those who group themselves in the peace movement.

Wherever peace is at risk, peace becomes a natural area of study. If I mention the factor of risk, it is to underline how the negative element of peace — the absence or elimination of violence — helps to focus the positive element. Without holding both elements together the danger is that the study of peace will spread and diffuse into a preoccupation with all that seems humanly desirable, grow excessively entangled with ideas of social reform and treat of human perfectibility rather than human concern for peace.

If there is no peace concern that the study of peace cannot take up, the same does not hold true for organised peace studies in a school or university. Teaching and research have to accept limitations that stem from combining subjects and curricula within scarce time as well as accepting limitations inherent in scarce staffing. Overall, peace studies has to deal with broad issues and in the process to draw on the resources of the established disciplines. It is concerned with concepts of peace and freedom and justice (philosophy); peace between states and between world regions (international politics and economics); between races and between ethnic groups (politics and sociology); peace between social classes as well as the social leavening of efforts to remove class...
divisions (politics, economics and sociology); and peace between labour and management (sociology, economics and industrial relations). Beyond these areas there is a case in certain institutions and places for a study of peace in the family, peace between the sexes, peace between individuals, and individual inner peace. It is also more than useful, where time and resources permit, to be able to teach and learn about the history of peace thinking and acting as well as about the main contemporary trends in peace concerns. It is also possible to teach elements of mediating and counselling. It would however be a great mistake to overemphasise the importance of these last methods as against, for example, attempts to understand and change structures that militate against peace. There was, for example, no hope of mediating in the first Nigerian republic where the constitutional structures pitted ethnic groups against one another. Hope for peace and stability in that country could only come with a reworked structure that removed the domination of certain groups over others. Also, no matter how well-organised peace studies may be, it is possible to retain a certain flexibility in its approach. This can be done at any level of study by enabling and encouraging students and teachers to take up research projects that deal with immediate issues as well as by encouraging them to build into their peace studies an experiential element stretching from improvised drama to group dynamics and community work. Finally, if peace studies is an area study where other disciplines meet, it is my personal opinion that its courses should provide a proper training in at least one standard discipline. The most accessible disciplines for this purpose tend to be politics and sociology.

Peace studies involves teaching and learning, research and practical application. If its main emphasis is applied, there is in peace studies as in all scholarly study a speculative thrust. For all the importance of application the speculative thrust is essential. Its contribution is to provide a longer term perspective to looking at peace as well as providing the detachment and breadth that are sometimes missed out in practi-
cal concentration or in ideologically committed orientations. In this sense detachment itself forms part of a broad integrity that puts truth first and in teaching seeks to share truth and not to indoctrinate; and that in intellectual discussion seeks light in argument and never simply victory in confrontation. Lastly, speculative scholarship thrives in symbiosis with policy-orientated thinking as well as in dialogue with thoughtful action for peace.

It is difficult to overstress that peace studies entails the hard purification of scholarship. It may contain an experiential component but it is an academic discipline and is not a form of activist enterprise. To retain the time and to develop the patience required for learning as well as to maintain the detachment vital to the search for knowledge an academic subject needs normally to remain distinct from and distanced from activism. This is not to say that persons involved in peace studies should not otherwise be activist in peace issues as are, for example, medical and scientific scholars. In our times, however, it may well be the case that the best contribution to activism by members of the School of Peace Studies is to provide intellectual resources and information for activists. For quite some time now students and staff have joined — among other things — in briefing politicians, providing training facilities for peace organisers and speakers, offering advice on curricula to teachers, and generally endeavouring to carry on extension work and high level popularisation.

Obviously studying and teaching about peace is not the only way of building for peace. Moreover, academics should distrust temptations to over-value their own contributions. They should not forget the observation of Hegel on his own discipline, philosophy: it is the owl that flies in the dark when the light of the day is gone. But it is true that scientific social thinking can inform and sensitise those who influence public decisions and those who make public decisions. Existing peace groups in various countries are much better informed now than they were a generation back and have been able powerfully to carry arguments on nuclear weapons policies, for example, to relatively inflexible but now worried
governments. At least some credit for this change and its effects on public opinion deserves to go to scholars concerned with peace studies. In any case there are subjects such as peace that our civilisation cannot afford not to study. In the issue of peace what is at stake in our times at certain levels is the intellectual, moral and physical well-being of individuals and groups. What is at stake at a global level is not only such well-being but human survival.
Under the threat of global destruction there has been a growing awareness that peace is not mainly the absence of war but a good to be actively pursued. It is here that peace research has an important role to play. In this booklet the first two holders of the only Chair of Peace Studies in Britain define the scope and the place of 'the science of survival' among other academic subjects and point out ways in which the study of the conditions of peace can contribute to its preservation.