This policy study discusses two models of merit pay programs enacted in Florida: the Florida Meritorious Teacher Program and the Quality Instruction Incentives Program (QUIIP). Using the Motivation-Hygiene Theory (Herzberg et al.) as a theoretical framework, each program was analyzed from the perspective of how it worked as a motivator and source of satisfaction or dissatisfaction for teachers in their work. Evidence from the research was sufficient to warrant a number of general conclusions about the two programs: (1) business imposed its model of merit pay (the Florida Master Teacher Program) on the educational system; (2) QUIIP was implemented in response to the perceived limitations of the Florida Master Teacher Program; (3) merit pay became a confusing phenomenon for both those experiencing it and evaluating it, with two different programs being imposed on teachers at the same time; (4) the two models of merit pay functioned, in part, in different ways; and (5) merit pay in either the form of school based merit pay or individual level merit pay does not provide a solution to the general problem of low teacher salaries. Policy recommendations are suggested based on these conclusions. (JD)
A Comparison of Individual and School Level Approaches to Merit Pay: A Case Study of the Dade County Public Schools

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Eugene F. Provenzo, Jr.
University of Miami

Gary N. McCloskey, O.S.A.
St. Thomas University

Marilyn M. Cohn
Washington University

Robert B. Kottkamp
Hofstra University

Norman Proller
Dade County Public Schools

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Eugene F. Provenzo, Jr., University of Miami
Gary N. McCloskey, O.S.A., St. Thomas University
Marilyn M. Cohn, Washington University
Robert B. Kottkamp, Hofstra University
Norman Proller, Dade County Public Schools

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ABSTRACT

The development of merit pay programs for public school teachers has become a widely discussed and controversial aspect of the recent reform movement in education. This policy study examines the historical development of Florida's response to this national movement as a story of business pressure to reform education. Two models of merit pay enacted in Florida are examined: 1. the Florida Meritorious Teacher Program, and 2. the Quality Instruction Incentives Program (QUIIP). Using Herzberg et al.'s Motivation-Hygiene Theory as a theoretical framework, each program was analyzed from the perspective of how it worked as a motivator and source of satisfaction or dissatisfaction for teachers in their work.

Evidence from the research is sufficient to warrant a number of general conclusions about the Florida Master Teacher Program and the Quality Instruction Incentives Program:

1. Business, by means of the legislature, imposed its model of merit pay (the Florida Master Teacher Program) on the educational system.

2. An alternative school based merit pay program, the Quality Instruction Incentives Program, was implemented in response to the perceived limitations of the Florida Master Teacher Program.

3. Merit pay became a confusing phenomenon for both those experiencing it and evaluating it, with two different programs (the Florida Master Teacher Program and the Quality Instruction Incentives Program) being imposed on teachers at the same time.

4. In the context of Herzberg et al.'s motivational-hygiene model, the two models of merit pay introduced in Florida functioned, in part, in different ways.

5. Merit pay in either the form of school based merit pay or individual level merit pay does not provide a solution to the general problem of low teacher salaries.

Policy recommendations are suggested based on these conclusions.
The development of merit pay programs for public school teachers has become a widely discussed and controversial aspect of the recent reform movement in education. Despite the failure of such programs in the 1920s and 1960s (Johnson, 1964, p. 175), public pressure has increased since 1983 to implement merit pay programs as a means of creating incentives for improving teacher performance and student outcomes. Evidence for this renewed interest can be found in the numerous proposals for merit pay that have surfaced in recent years.

This policy study examines the historical development of Florida's response to this national movement as a story of business pressure to reform education. As a result of this pressure, flawed models of reform were enacted. One interesting alternative to traditional merit pay, however, appeared as part of this reform pressure—the Quality Instruction Incentives Program. This study also demonstrates that the pressure to implement flawed educational reforms is a circumstance that creates difficulty in evaluating the merits of alternatives.
In the Spring of 1984, the issue of whether or not merit pay programs should be implemented in schools across the country was being debated by legislators, educators, union leaders and business people. Support for the general concept of merit pay came at a national level from President Reagan. In a speech the previous May at Seton Hall University in New Jersey, he stated that: "Teachers should be paid and promoted on the basis of their merit and competence. Hard-earned tax dollars should encourage the best. They have no business rewarding incompetence and mediocrity" (Johnson, 1984, p. 175). Statements like Reagan's avoided the very difficult question of implementation.

The push for merit pay programs that began in Florida in 1983 was part of a much larger debate in the state over educational reform and taxation. On April 5, 1983 Governor Robert Graham had opened the legislative session with a speech that focused on education. Arguing that it was imperative that Florida raise additional funds from taxes to support schooling, he quickly ran into opposition from business lobbying groups such as the Associated Industries of Florida (AIF).

Associated Industries of Florida was led by its president and chief lobbyist, Jon Shebel. Shebel was among the most influential figures in Tallahassee, and AIF was widely considered the most powerful and conservative business lobby in the state (Starobin, 1984, p. 10). The day before the legislature convened
(April 4, 1983), the AIF Board met and adopted a position opposing "any and all tax increases" during the 1983 session. Graham was not pleased with the position taken by AIF. Chief among his goals for the 1983 session was to raise sufficient tax monies so that Florida's teacher salaries would be in the top quartile in the country. Graham charged that by opposing increased taxation the AIF was coming out "against quality education" (Starobin, 1984, p. 11).

A meeting was requested by Graham with Shebel and the AIF Board to discuss how to gain the support of the AIF to raise taxes for salary increases for teachers. The AIF Board had its own agenda, which included talking to Graham about the proposed RAISE bill, which would increase the requirements necessary for high school graduation throughout the state. As Shebel recalled the meeting:

...the question was not whether we were going to raise teachers' salaries—of course they were going to get more money—everyone could foresee that. The questions were, one, by what amount, and two, on what basis would the money be distributed in the system (Starobin, 1984, p. 11).

Shebel and the members of the AIF Board were interested in radically restructuring the teacher salary system around the concept of merit pay. Together with his Board, Shebel assumed that since merit pay had proven viable in business settings it would also work for teachers. According to him:

Under the pay system we had, when the raises came through every year, the outstanding teacher got the same percentage as the incompetent teacher. We thought that was wrong. That wasn't the way you pay people in business and that wasn't the way to motivate people. You motivate teachers by salaries (Starobin, 1984, p. 12).
The AIF Board members were convinced that Florida needed to adopt legislation that would not only pay teachers on the basis of evaluated and tested performance, but that would also eliminate those teachers who were not qualified. In Florida opposition to merit pay initially came from teachers who were concerned with how such programs could be fairly administered. Business leaders were strongly in favor of merit pay, maintaining that it had worked for them in business and industry and that it could work in teaching. In addition, they were not going to support any tax increases that would pay for educational reforms unless some sort of acceptable merit pay plan for teachers was agreed upon by the governor and the legislature (Starobin, 1984, p. 12).

The lobbying efforts of the Associated Industries of Florida, perhaps more than any other single group, were responsible for shaping the merit pay programs that were eventually enacted into law. In the 1983 legislative program, two major educational bills were passed: (1) the "RAISE" bill which set performance standards for high school students (Chapter 83-324), and (2) the Educational Reform Act of 1983 which addressed a wide-range of items including standards of excellence in mathematics and science, the critical teacher shortage, merit pay for teachers and quality instruction (Chapter 83-327).

Under the 1983 Educational Reform Act, the legislature established the Meritorious Instruction Personnel Program. The intent of this individually based merit pay program, which was promoted by business groups such as the AIF, was to recognize
superior ability and provide economic incentives for teachers to continue in public school instruction. In addition to individual based merit pay, the legislature created the Florida Quality Instruction Incentives Council. In doing so, it mandated district plans which were aimed at increasing performance through offering school based merit incentives to instructional personnel through school based merit awards.

In 1984, the legislature passed in a single law (Chapter 84-336), a series of unrelated educational reforms, including a reworking of the Meritorious Instruction Personnel and Quality Incentives Program. Among the changes within the Meritorious Instruction Personnel Program were its renaming as the State Master Teacher Program, a specific description of the teacher evaluation system, substantially reworking the subject area tests in the State Master Teacher Program and tying the number of associate and master teachers to the level of the legislative appropriation. In addition, under this law the requirement of the 1983 law (Chapter 83-327) that teachers rewarded in meritorious schools had to qualify also under the Meritorious Instruction Personnel Program was struck.

Essentially, by the end of the 1984 legislative session, two pieces of legislation supporting different types of merit pay in the schools were fully in place. One was a traditional individual level teacher merit pay program (the Florida Meritorious Teacher Program). Under this plan teachers took a written exam in their subject specialty and were observed and
evaluated teaching in their classrooms by a series of independent observers. Those teachers receiving the top 5% combined score received a one time bonus equal to 10% of their salary. The second program was a less traditional "merit schools" bill or school based merit pay program which provided financial rewards not only to teachers, but to the entire staff of individual schools for improving student achievement. This program was developed as an alternative to the Master Teacher Program, and was heavily promoted by groups such as the Florida Education Association (American Federation of Teachers). It was hoped that the "merit schools" bill would replace the Master Teacher Program. The stated purpose of both these items of legislation was to increase the academic performance of public school students and to provide greater economic incentives to instructional personnel and staff (Ch. 213.532).

Under the "merit schools" legislation, a total of 19.5 million dollars was to be divided among school districts across the state that voluntarily developed plans for rewarding employees of their most improved schools. Each school district would be limited to rewarding only the top 25% of its schools. Each local school district would develop criteria by which these awards would be made. These criteria would be subject to the approval of the State Department of Education.

It is important to note that serious problems were created as a result of the simultaneous implementation of both merit pay programs. Teachers had problems discriminating between the two
programs—both were perceived, in some way, as merit pay and therefore at times seemed to be the same thing, although as will be demonstrated each was based on very different assumptions. Evidence suggests that it was never the intention of the Florida Education Association to have both merit pay programs implemented. In trying to avoid what they felt were inherent problems in an individual level teacher merit pay bill they proposed what they believed would be a much more viable alternative in the form of a "merit schools" program. What they do not seem to have anticipated was that both programs would be implemented at once. The simultaneous implementation of the two programs tended to create confusion for both the general public and the teachers throughout the state, as to what each of the merit pay programs was actually about. As a result, the successful adoption and implementation of each program became more problematic.

Assumptions Underlying Florida’s Two Models of Merit Pay

Although both of the individual level and the school based merit pay programs shared a number of assumptions, they were distinctive from one another. Both models were based on the belief that financial rewards would be incentives that would increase motivation for performance on the part of teachers and that in turn would improve student outcomes. Both models were competitive in nature. Where the two programs differed significantly from one another was in their focus on the unit of competition and improvement. In the case of the Florida
Meritorious Teacher Program, competition was at the individual level. Teachers within the same school and across the district competed against one another for recognition and salary increases. In the case of the school based merit pay program, the unit of competition and reward was the school. Implicit in each of these plans were very different assumptions about the nature of teacher work and schools as social systems.

The individual plan, at least implicitly, assumed that teaching is a highly individualized phenomenon and that classroom social systems are relatively closed. In contrast, the assumption underlying the school-based merit pay program was that there is a strong interrelationship between the individual classroom social system and the larger social system of the school. School improvement was seen as being a collective effort of a faculty, administration and staff, rather than being primarily dependent upon the efforts of isolated classroom teachers.

Driving the implementation of the Meritorious Teacher Program was the belief on the part of business groups such as AIF that the potential for increasing salaries would be an incentive for teachers to perform at higher levels of excellence and efficiency. This model, which was drawn directly from business and industry, flew in the face of research on motivation. In the following section an attempt is made to present a model that explains how each form of merit pay functioned from a motivational point of view.
Herzberg et al.'s Motivation-Hygiene Theory

The work of Frederick Herzberg and his colleagues (1959) provides a useful theoretical framework for interpreting the function of the two merit pay systems that were undertaken in Florida. This theory, which has been variously described in the research literature as the two-factor theory, dual-factor theory and simply Herzberg's theory, postulates that one set of rewards contributes to satisfaction and motivation while a separate set of rewards contributes to dissatisfaction. According to Herzberg et al., the presence of certain factors serves to increase an individual's job satisfaction. The absence of these factors, however, does not necessarily produce job dissatisfaction. Theoretically, individuals start a job from a neutral point. They have neither positive nor negative attitudes towards their job.

Factors called motivators increase job satisfaction beyond the neutral point. When motivators are not available only minimal levels of dissatisfaction result. When factors called hygienes are not available, however, negative feelings are created that lead to much higher levels of job dissatisfaction. Hygienes lead only to minimal, if any, job satisfaction. In contrast motivators combine together to contribute more to job satisfaction than dissatisfaction. Hygienes contribute more to job dissatisfaction than job satisfaction. The two sets of rewards leading to job satisfaction and dissatisfaction that are basic to Herzberg et al.'s theory are outlined in Table 1.
TABLE 1. Graphic Representation of Herzberg et al.'s Motivation Hygiene Theory (Based on Hoy and Miskel, 1987, p. 182 and Herzberg, et al., 1959)

Job Satisfaction Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dissatisfaction (-)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>(+) Satisfaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>MOTIVATORS OR SATISFIERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Work itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Advancement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HYGIENES OR DISSATISFIERS

- Interpersonal relations--
  - subordinates
- Interpersonal relations--
  - peers
- Interpersonal relations--
  - superiors
- Supervision--technical
- Policy and administration
- Working conditions
- Personal life
- Salary
- Possibility of growth
- Status
- Job security

Dissatisfaction (-) | 0 | (+) Satisfaction

It is important to note that Herzberg et al.'s theory maintains that motivators are related to satisfaction, while hygienes are related to creating dissatisfaction. motivators and hygienes are not opposites. Instead they represent separate and distinct dimensions of the attitudes that people have towards their work.

In the context of the two merit pay programs enacted in Florida, each focused itself on different segments, as defined by
Herzberg et al., of the "Job Satisfaction Matrix." The Florida Master Teacher Program attempted to provide motivators to teachers by recognizing them for having achieved a certain level of success (Achievement and Recognition). Advancement did not come into play as a motivator since teachers were given awards only for a year. Hygienes or dissatisfiers were provided to teachers in the form of increased Supervision—technical, Policy—administration and Salary. In the case of the merit schools or school based merit pay program no motivators seemed to be aimed at. As will be explained later, in the case of the school based merit pay system, Achievement and Recognition was at a school level rather than at the level of the individual teacher. Hygienes included Interpersonal relations—superiors, Interpersonal relations—peers, Supervision—technical, Working conditions, Policy and administration.

According to Herzberg et al.'s theory, salary is a hygiene. If the argument is accepted that the improvement of hygienes leads only to lessening job dissatisfaction, then using salary as a means of motivating teachers in their work and increasing incentives is ineffective as a means of generating teacher satisfaction. The generation of teacher satisfaction is something that must evolve from motivators rather than hygienes such as salary.

In the case of Florida's two models of merit pay—hygienes were confused with motivators. This was more evident in the case of the Florida Master Teacher Program. Traditional individual
level merit pay, as it was implemented in Florida, could only deal with hydienes, but it was perceived as having the potential to address issues of motivation. Using merit pay for motivational purposes, however, represents a contradiction of how the Job Satisfaction Matrix and Herzberg et al.'s theory function. Jon Shebel and the AIF failed to understand this fact when they proposed the Florida Master Teacher Program. Following Herzberg et al.'s model, merit pay is a construct that functions as a hygiene and therefore by definition cannot be expected to function as a motivator for teachers.

Teachers' Attitudes About Merit Pay at the National Level

As previously stated, Florida's recent experience with merit pay must be understood as part of a larger national merit pay movement that was sweeping the country by early 1983. Merit pay, as we have seen, was initially promoted in Florida by business leaders and the legislature, rather than by local school systems or teachers. Throughout the country, merit pay was defended as a means of improving the performance of teachers and making schools more effective. Many individuals perceived that opposing the concept of merit pay was "tantamount to endorsing mediocrity." (Johnson, 1984, p. 175) This was basically the situation in Florida.

The extent to which merit pay was endorsed on a national level is indicated by a September 1983 Gallup Poll which reported that 61% of the general population supported the overall concept of merit pay (Gallup, 1983, p. 15).
Described in these very general terms, a significant majority of both the general public and teachers endorsed merit pay. This is not surprising, since merit pay endorses the idea of the work ethic, and the notion that those who contribute the most in any effort should receive the greatest rewards. As one advocate of merit pay has explained:

Imagine being an effective, hardworking teacher condemned to receive exactly the same raise as the listless, barely adequate dolt down the hall. To anyone reared on tales of Henry Ford and Horatio Alger, this wrongheadedness is so glaring that seeing it officially sanctioned must be grounds for despair (Allen S. Blinder, "The Merits of Merit Pay," Boston Globe, 23 Aug. 1983, quoted by Johnson, 1984, p. 178).

How teachers actually feel about merit pay, however, seems to very much depend on how they are asked about it. In a 1984 Gallup Poll of Teachers’ Attitudes Towards the Public Schools, when teachers were asked: “How do you yourself, feel about the idea of merit pay for teachers? In general do you favor it or oppose it?” Sixty-four percent of the teachers responded that they opposed merit pay (Gallup, 1984, p. 103). Evidently, teachers’ feelings about this issue are negative when the question includes the term “merit pay” and the focus is solely on money (Kottkamp, Provenzo and Cohn, 1985, p. 566). This response is consistent with Herzberg et al’s motivation-hygiene theory. The seemingly contradictory response of teachers about whether or not they support merit pay seems related to whether merit pay is presented as a motivator or simply an improvement of a hygiene (better salary).
Florida Teachers' Attitudes About Merit Pay: The Dade County Story

Research on teacher attitudes in Florida has addressed the issue of merit pay. In April of 1984, under the sponsorship of the National Institute of Education and with the cooperation and support of the Dade County Public Schools and the United Teachers of Dade, data were collected in relation to a project on teacher work, incentives and rewards (Provenzo, Cohn and Kottkamp, 1983-85). This project included a survey, interview study and collection of historical data. The historical data in this study are a part of the data base resulting from the N.I.E. study. The survey included teachers in 251 Dade County schools (all of the schools in the system excepting special schools such as juvenile detention facilities). A 40% random sample of classroom teachers was drawn from each school in order to produce a large enough sample to allow, when appropriate, the use of the individual school as a unit of analysis. An intensive follow-up resulted in a response rate of 64% (N=2,718). The survey, which repeated many items used by Dan C. Lortie twenty years ago when he did his research in Dade County for the book Schoolteacher (1975), asked a wide-range of questions concerning teacher attitudes about the profession, the schools in which they worked and their attitudes about different types of reward and incentive systems.

In the case of the Dade County teachers surveyed, it is clear that they were by no means in favor of the concept of merit pay—either now or twenty years ago when Lortie collected his data for Schoolteacher. When Lortie surveyed all of the teachers
in Dade County in 1964 for his *Schoolteacher* research, he asked teachers whether or not they favored a system of differential pay and prestige. Significantly, he did not use the term "merit pay." At that time, 58.4% of those surveyed indicated that all teachers should receive "more-or-less equal income and prestige." By 1984 the Dade County teachers who answered this same question split their responses almost evenly (50.2%). Thus the 20-year interval between the 1964 Lortie study and the 1984 survey brought a gain of 8% in the number of teachers who favored differential pay and prestige (Kottkamp, Provenzo and Cohn, 1985, p. 565).

Despite the increased desire for differentiated income and prestige, the desire for simply monetary rewards was relatively low in both 1964 and 1984 for Dade County teachers on a list of extrinsic rewards for Dade County teachers. Salary does not act as a primary motivator for the Dade County teachers. This is consistent with Herzberg *et al.*'s motivation-hygiene theory. As expected, since salary is a hygiene it does not act as a motivator. Thus low salaries are much more likely to create dissatisfaction than satisfaction.

Specifically, with respect to extrinsic rewards that motivated them, the largest proportion of Dade County teachers in 1984—31.7% cited "The opportunity to wield some influence" as being the most satisfying reward they received from their work; 26.3% cited "The respect I receive from others" as being the most satisfying extrinsic reward for them, while 14.2% reported "the
salary I earn in my profession" as being the most satisfying reward. Significantly, 27.8% of the teachers reported receiving no satisfaction from any of these rewards (Kottkamp, Provenzo, and Cohn, 1985, p. 564).

It is important to note that not only is salary not a very important extrinsic reward for the Dade County teachers, but that its importance (or lack of importance) has remained relatively constant between 1964 and 1984. When Lortie collected his data in 1964, for instance, 14.3% reported that "The salary I earn in my profession" was the extrinsic reward that was most satisfying to them, compared to 14.2% in 1984. Results such as these contradict assumptions made by business leaders such as Jon Shebel and the AIF that, "You motivate these teachers by salaries" (Starobin, 1984, p. 12). As mentioned earlier, what these findings suggest is that following Herzberg et al.'s motivation-hygiene theory, the opportunity to wield influence and gain respect is a more important motivator for Dade County teachers than salary.

In the 1984 survey, when asked to evaluate a series of elements on a merit/differentiated pay system using a five point Likert Scale, 71.6% of the teachers responded in the highest category "1" ("Absolutely unacceptable to me") when asked to evaluate: "merit raises assigned to a specified percentage of teachers in the system." All responses for the same item of the survey show a consistent tendency on the part of the teachers in the survey to reject merit pay as a reward (Table 2.). Once
again this is consistent with the idea of merit pay being a hygiene rather than a motivator. It must be pointed out, however, that rejection of merit pay does not mean satisfaction with low salaries, only that merit pay does not act as a motivator.

TABLE 2: Dade County Teachers' Evaluation of Different Potential Elements of a Merit/Differentiated Pay System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Absolutely Unacceptable to me</th>
<th>Absolutely Necessary for me</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merit raises assigned to a specified percentage of teachers in the system</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merit raises available to all teachers who meet the established criteria</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merit raises for exemplary classroom performance only</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merit raises for additional non-classroom responsibilities only</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merit raises for both classroom and additional non-classroom responsibilities</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional pay tied to advancement through a career ladder of differentiated levels of duties, responsibilities and months under contract (e.g. apprentice, senior and master teacher levels)</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The general opposition to individual level merit pay indicated in the results of the survey was confirmed in an interview study with Dade County teachers conducted as part of the 1984 National Institute of Education Research project. A stratified random sample of 100 teachers was drawn for interviews. Stratification was accomplished by assigning each
school to a three by three matrix consisting of three levels of socio-economic status and three levels of grade range (elementary, junior high, senior high). Thirty-six schools were randomly selected for the nine cells and teachers were then randomly selected within each school. A total of 73 teachers eventually participated in the interviews, of which 53 were women and 20 were men. The grade level figures were: 30 elementary, 17 junior high, and 26 high school teachers. The ethnic mix was 48 Whites, 15 Blacks and 10 Hispanics.

Nearly every one of the teachers interviewed in our sample indicated that they were opposed to merit pay for individuals. While the idea of financially rewarding those teachers who were outstanding or exceptional in the classroom might have been a reasonable and appealing notion for them, they simply could not imagine any fair way or practical means to accomplish it. As one teacher explained:

"There is no way to make merit pay fair. That's the simplest way I can put it. In some way merit pay has to be judged and therefore it becomes subjective."

Fair and accurate evaluation also seemed to be an insurmountable obstacle. As another teacher said:

"There is absolutely no way my contribution to our school can be evaluated."

Teachers interviewed indicated that they felt that teaching does not lend itself to the types of evaluation that are possible in business and industry. To begin with, from the perspective of teachers, there is no clear consensus as to what specific observable items constitute good teaching. While some teachers
acknowledge that they know good teaching when they see it, they find it hard to state that knowledge in terms that can be isolated and codified.

Most of the teachers interviewed did not feel that effective teaching could be assessed through either the testing of teachers or assessing academic gains made by students. As one teacher observed: "I've never seen a test that can assess whether someone can teach or not." Another factor that was seen as affecting effective teaching was the impact of family and home life on student success: "Student test scores are unfair because of emotional problems at home..." A music teacher described the problems associated with evaluating teachers as a result of student performance in these terms:

It depends on the situation that you're in. Say it is the worse situation in Dade County and I went in there and I was working and it was still the worst conditions in Dade County. I was doing a lot of teaching and the kids were learning, but performance wise it wasn't up to snuff with the rest of the county. Who's to say that I should not get the merit pay, and that someone who gets a superior band rating every year should.

Aside from the problem of identifying who deserves individual merit pay and who does not, many of the teachers interviewed indicated that they were concerned about how an individual/competency based merit pay program would affect the social and professional climate of their schools. Some of the teachers indicated that they were extremely uncomfortable about the fact that rewarding some teachers with merit pay in their schools, while not rewarding others, would turn colleagues into competitors. One teacher indicated that the implementation of
individual merit pay programs such as the Florida Master Teacher Program would pit "teacher against teacher." Another argued that it would discourage the sharing of materials and ideas.

The idea that merit pay has the potential to interfere with the development of effective instructional teams within schools has also been identified by Murnane and Cohen (1986, p. 9). In the interviews of Dade County teachers, some individuals indicated that this interference could manifest itself in many different ways. As one teacher explained:

"The merit pay plan seems horrible. I think of all the complaints about teachers now. I teach fourth grade. You have merit and I don't, parents will say, "I'm very sorry, I want my kid in her room. Why should I want my kid in a class with a non-meritorious teacher?"

Some of the teachers interviewed felt that the competitiveness caused by implementing individual merit pay would actually lead to less work getting done in their schools. As one teacher explained:

"I can't see how they are ever going to get around the feeling, on the part of the teachers, that "They got it, I didn't. I'm not helping on inventory, if I'm not getting extra for it. Let the people who are getting paid more money do it."

The Dade County teacher interview data suggest that individual level merit pay programs such as the Florida Master Teacher Program are flawed because they do not address the complex social reality of schools. The educational policy analyst Susan Moore Johnson aptly summarized this problem when she stated:

"Merit pay is a remedy drawn from a part of the pragmatic, no-nonsense corporate world, and while many educators..."
endorse it "in principle," they anticipate problems "in practice." Schools are not businesses. Objective measures of teaching ability are lacking. Differences in evaluators' standards make merit pay systems potentially subject to patronage and political "pull." Systematic merit ratings would require extensive administrative training and time. Merit pay would promote competition, but not cooperation. (Johnson, 1984, p. 176)

Evidence from the research literature, as well as the findings of this study clearly suggest that individual level merit pay is an inappropriate method of providing incentives for teachers. Its acceptance, and its repeated reintroduction into the educational system at least once every twenty or thirty years, is an indication of the extent to which business, legislative and educational leaders feel that it should work. Yet the intuitive belief that individual level merit pay is a viable incentive system for teachers is not borne out by its implementation and practice. In addition, teachers do not want individual level merit pay. They never have, and unless there is a radical shift in their attitudes and beliefs they probably never will.

The question then arises, why did teachers agree to the implementation of individual level merit pay systems in Florida such as the Florida Master Teacher Program? The answer, pure and simple, is that the business community and ultimately, the legislature "blackmailed" the teaching population. In Florida, raises for teachers would not occur unless they agreed to submit to specific performance standards—standards that were specified by law and at least in part implemented through merit pay programs such as the Florida Master Teacher Program.
Intense efforts were made to head off the Master Teacher Program. Business groups such as Shebel and the AIF seemed to want, however, to have a traditional merit pay program no matter what. Educational leaders such as Pat Tornillo, the President of the Florida Educational Association and the Executive Vice-President of the United Teachers of Dade, joined with legislators such as Senator Jack Gordon to propose legislation for an alternative program. Shebel's program became the Florida Master Teacher Program, while the alternative program eventually became the Quality Instruction Incentive Program. Two, not one, programs were implemented under the guise of merit pay.

As argued earlier, in light of the work of Herzberg et al., each merit pay program addressed, in part, very different aspects of the Job Satisfaction Matrix. In addition, each program was administered separately and followed different guidelines. The State Department of Education was responsible for implementing the business backed Master Teacher Program. In contrast, local school districts were responsible for setting up and running the school based or Quality Instruction Incentive Programs. In the school based merit pay program, local school districts throughout the state had the option to set up specific plans subject to state approval, while with the Master Teacher program uniform guidelines and requirements were implemented throughout the state. How the school based merit pay program functioned in comparison to the Florida Master Teacher Program can be seen in the case of Dade County's Quality Instruction Incentive Program.
Dade County's Quality Instruction Incentives Program: QUIIP

In Dade County a school-based merit pay plan was developed jointly by the school system and the United Teachers of Dade. On September 8, 1985 an agreement was reached that established the Quality Instruction Incentives Program or "QUIIP." Two weeks later the QUIIP program was unanimously approved by the School Board. The following day, Dade's teachers ratified the agreement by a three to one margin. Under the agreement no school or individual employee was compelled to participate in the program. Awards for the program would be based on student achievement and other criteria (Dade County Public Schools/United Teachers of Dade, 1984).

QUIIP received the full-fledged endorsement of the teachers union, the United Teachers of Dade, as indicated in a joint United Teachers of Dade and Dade County Public Schools Bulletin:

Most merit pay plans, including the state's Master Teacher Program, pit teacher against teacher. QUIIP is a team approach. It recognizes that the entire staff of a school, working together, can make a difference. It's an approach that makes sense and is worth a try.... (QUIIP, 1985, p. 1)

QUIIP represented a collegial model tied to merit pay (Neff, 1986, p. 4). As such, it was an important alternative to more traditional merit pay programs.

A two-thirds majority vote of a school's staff was required before a school could participate in the QUIIP program. Of a possible 243 elementary, junior and senior high schools that were eligible, all but eleven, or 232, eventually decided to participate in the program and developed plans for the
improvement of instruction. In each school, a committee of school employees developed a plan that was approved through a process of joint review by the school's union steward and principal.

QUIIP programs for individual schools were begun in the Fall of 1984 and were evaluated after a single year. Once test data were analyzed and other criteria taken into account, awards were made to 25% of the participating schools. Three levels of awards were provided: E, E and Q. These were defined as follows:

Quality or "Q". The 58 schools that have satisfied this first criteria level are those that have recorded the greatest gains in student achievement beyond predicted levels since 1983-84, according to Stanford Achievement Test results. Additionally, each school has achieved a 1984-85 student participation rate of at least 80 percent in the Presidential Fitness Test or the AAHPERD Health related Physical Fitness Test, and has maintained or exceeded its 1983-84 participation rate.

Excellent or "E". The 30 schools that have satisfied this second criteria level are those "Q" schools that have shown the greatest rise in their student attendance rates and at the senior high level, the greatest decline in their dropout rates.

Educational Excellence or "E". The 10 schools that have satisfied this top criteria level are those "E" schools judged by the Educational Awards Committee, a blue-ribbon panel of prominent Dade County citizens, to have developed the most outstanding projects for student performance in a particular area, such as math achievement. These schools are those that demonstrated the most improvement during the 1984-85 school year (QUIIP, 1985, p. 3).

Merit awards for certificated personnel in Q schools was to be no less than $500, $750 in E schools, and $1,500 in E schools. Because of the redistribution of state funds for QUIIP as a result of non-participating school districts, more money was eventually allotted at every level to awardees in the QUIIP.
program (Neff, 1986, p. 7). The approximate shares received by QUIIP awardees are listed in Table 3 (Neff, 1986, p. 8).

TABLE 3. Approximate QUIIP Shares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>E2</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time Certificated Personnel</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>Half</td>
<td>Third</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School-site Administrators</td>
<td>$2,569</td>
<td>$1,285</td>
<td>$685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time Teacher</td>
<td>Half</td>
<td>Quarter</td>
<td>Sixth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aides/Assistants</td>
<td>$1,028</td>
<td>$514</td>
<td>$343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time secretarial Clerical</td>
<td>Quarter</td>
<td>Eighth</td>
<td>Twelfth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>$514</td>
<td>$257</td>
<td>$171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other full-time Personnel</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$308</td>
<td>$155</td>
<td>$103</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examples of QUIIP Programs in Dade County

Basic skills were targeted as a major area of concern by many elementary schools participating in the QUIIP program, while junior high schools focused on areas such as cross-cultural knowledge and awareness. At the senior high level reading skills, geography, writing and math were targeted as areas for improvement, as well as the improvement of State Student Assessment Scores and various Honors and Advanced Placement programs.

Examples of the types of efforts undertaken in the schools as part of the QUIIP program can be seen by looking at individual school projects. At George Washington Carver Elementary School,
one of the ten "Excellence Squared" schools (the highest category of QUIIP award), the school's plan focused on improving the oral and written language skills of students by increasing their exposure to literature. Student scores for the Stanford Achievement Test increased at Carver by an average of 9.5 points per grade between 1984 and 1985. To achieve their objective, teachers at Carver involved students in activities such as book swaps, lectures by authors and illustrators, video-taping of student skits, poetry and book reviews, book fairs and so on (QUIIP, 1985, p. 7).

At Booker T. Washington Junior High School, which received the "Excellent" or "E" designation (the second highest category of QUIIP award), a plan was developed to help students increase their writing skills. On a four-point scale used to measure the performance of students on pre-tests and post-tests, the writing of Washington's students improved from 1.58 to 2.33. Each test, administered in English, math and science classes, required students to write a three-paragraph composition about the class subject. Students were graded on grammar, coherence and originality. In order to prepare for the program, teachers participated in inservice programs that helped them plan their subject area lessons so that writing exercises played a major part in the development of the curriculum for their classes. (QUIIP, 1985, p. 32).

An example of an "Excellent" or "E" school at the high school level was Miami Killian Senior High School. County, state
and national geography was emphasized as a knowledge area on which attention would be focused by the school. Special geography instruction was integrated into classes as diverse as art, music and foreign language. Each classroom was equipped with world maps and special activities related to geography were provided for the students. On the National Council for Geographic Education Competency-Based Geographic Test, pre and post test analysis indicated an overall increase of 8% on test scores (QUIIP, 1984, p. 34). At Kenwood Elementary School, which was designated a "Quality" or "Q" school (the lowest category of QUIIP award), emphasis was placed on the improvement of basic math skills appropriate at each level. In contrast, at another of the "Q" schools, Caribbean Elementary, emphasis was placed upon the effective use of the library media center for the purpose of improving student performance in basic skill areas and to provide enrichment in the content areas (QUIIP, 1985, p. 36).

Although individual school plans played an important part in the award of QUIIP at the E level, it is clear that improved scores on the Stanford Achievement standardized test were the single most important criterion used in selecting schools, since no award at any level came without it. Ultimately, QUIIP represented an attempt at a competitive production-oriented model of school based merit pay, with rewards based primarily on the outcome of student test scores.

**QUIIP as an Alternative to the Florida Master Teacher Program**

By the middle of 1985, it was clear that the Florida Master
Teacher Program had failed after only two years of operation. (American School Board Journal, 1985, p. 12) Many factors seem to have contributed to the failure of the program including dissatisfaction on the part of teachers with the evaluation methods used, the fact that the awards were given only on a one-time basis, the relatively small amount of money awarded, the confusion over two systems of merit pay operating within the state simultaneously, and so on.

Whether QUIIP would prove an equal failure was by no means clear. QUIIP represented a highly modified form of what Bacharach, Lipsky and Shedd refer to as a system of "New Style Merit Pay" (Bacharach, Lipsky, & Shedd, 1984), also referred to as "payment by results" (Coltham, 1972). Under this system, teachers were evaluated according to the outcome of student gains on measures such as standardized tests.

...the evaluation problem is solved by actually measuring certain dimensions of each teacher’s output, thereby avoiding the subjective quality of evaluations conducted under old style merit pay, in which bonuses are based on supervisor’s evaluations of teachers performance (Murnane and Cohen, 1986, p. 4).

In the case of the QUIIP program, individual competition between teachers within a school was eliminated by having the entire school compete against other schools in the system. In addition, teachers were not rewarded for the improvement of just the test scores for their students, but also for improved school-wide attendance of students, improved student fitness and so on. Teachers were rewarded together with their colleagues for the total improvement of all of the students in their school. Thus an
individual teacher was only successful if his or her colleagues were also successful. Such an approach potentially eliminated the previously discussed problems resulting from individual competitive merit pay programs interfering with the development of cooperative instructional programs within schools.

Murnane and Cohen note that "new style" or "payment by results" merit pay programs have not been very popular. According to them, one of the reasons for this is that:

Any explicit list of pay rates for specific levels of student test score gains (economists would refer to such a list as a payment algorithm) creates a specific price—a piece rate—for each student's test score gain in each subject area. For example, an algorithm that bases compensation solely on gains in average reading scores implicitly places a zero price on the student gains in subject areas. Moreover, it places an equal weight on each student's gain. If teacher time is viewed as a private good (time spent with one student reduces time available for other students), then this algorithm creates incentive for teachers to allocate time so that the last minute of time spent with any child yields the same expected test score gain. This means that there are incentives for teachers to minimize the time they spend with children whose test scores will not respond to modest increases in attention (Murnane and Cohen, 1986, pp. 4-5).

In the case of the QUIIP program, the problem outlined above (incentive to focus on a limited number of students to maximize possible gains) was overcome in an interesting way. To begin with, multiple criteria were used to determine whether or not a school achieved QUIIP status. In addition to improved test scores on the Stanford Achievement exam, QUIIP was awarded on the basis of students' performance on a standardized physical fitness test and school attendance (Stephenson, 1986a, 1986b). Although each of these criteria related to gains, because they dealt with
different types of gains a more heterogenous group of students would be drawn into the population with whom teachers spent time to create gains.

**QUIIP as Providing a Potential Solution to the Problems of Traditional Merit Pay Programs**

The QUIIP program provided an interesting alternative, for teachers, to the Florida Master Teacher Program. Some teachers in the interview study talked about QUIIP as being preferable to the individual level merit pay program. They preferred QUIIP because they felt it was a more cooperative and empowering enterprise. One teacher, for example, who strongly objected to the state's Master Teacher Program said, concerning his school's participation in QUIIP that:

One of the things that I think has been real good is the merit pay plan for the school, where we set up goals and actually work towards them. It has been interesting watching everybody in our building become interested in that.... It is motivational because every department has something to do. It is not overbearing on any department, and at the same time, if everybody pulls together and they do it right, it works. You as faculty set up your own criteria as to what areas you are going to affect. The plan that comes from you is the one that you have decided as a whole group to work on together.... I want to know that if I am going to make a pay raise, it's going to be based on two factors: One, something we all decided together. The other is that I have my job to do and then the other person has to do his job. We are all more of a family instead of just working independently.

The idea of the QUIIP program making it possible to achieve a great consensus within the schools points to perhaps its most important feature as an innovative model of merit pay. Under QUIIP, schools and the teachers who work in them, are evaluated...
on a collective rather than individual basis. The unit of evaluation becomes the achievement of the school rather than the individual teacher and his or her students. Such an approach takes into account the problem that the goals within schools are essentially multi-dimensional in nature. As Murnane and Cohen argue:

Even when there is a high level of consensus on goals, the goals are multidimensional—for example, raise the average reading level in each class, teach all students to embrace democratic values, help each student realize his or her own potential, and eliminate drugs and violence from the school. While it may be reasonable to attribute progress toward certain goals, such as raising reading scores, to individual teachers working behind closed doors, it is not possible to measure each teacher’s contribution to the group output—in this class, a lower level of drugs and violence in the school... Consequently, individual teachers’ contributions to achieving this school goal cannot play a role in determining their compensation under new style merit pay (Murnane and Cohen, 1986, p.6).

Under the QUIIP program, since the entire school, including the administration and support staff, was given the award for merit this problem was eliminated.

On the surface the QUIIP program takes into account, much more realistically than individual merit pay programs such as the Florida Meritorious Teacher program, the nature of teacher work and the collective character of schools. It recognizes that important work is done by teachers working together and that broad effects on students result from multiple contributions. Creative teachers helping their less imaginative colleagues, experienced teachers helping beginning teachers to "learn the ropes," and helping to maintain discipline in public areas, are just a few of the contributions that individual teachers make to
the improvement of a school’s climate for learning (Murnane and Cohen, 1986, p.6). Merit pay systems, whether new style merit pay, or more traditional approaches, that do not take these types of contributions into account cannot be expected to succeed on a long term basis. QUIIP, by its very definition, overcame many of these problems.

QUIIP took into account, more than did programs such as the Florida Master Teacher Program, the realities of teacher work and the fundamental nature of school cultures. As Leonard Britton, the superintendent of the Dade County Public Schools, explained about the program:

In its first year, QUIIP fulfilled its primary purpose of fostering better teaching and better learning in classrooms throughout Dade County. The key to this success, the characteristic that distinguished this merit pay program from other merit pay programs is teamwork. QUIIP is a winner because it has inspired the employees of each participating school to work together to improve the education of their students. Furthermore, it has begun to promote a much needed sense of professional pride among Dade’s teachers (QUIIP, 1985, p. 2).

Putting aside the rhetoric, the question arises, as to whether or not in actual practice QUIIP leads to the improvement of learning and instruction?

Is QUIIP a Potentially Viable System of Merit Pay?

The results of a program like QUIIP probably cannot be accurately assessed unless studied over several years. At this time, the program is about to enter its third year of implementation. Because of the loss of interest by legislators and business leaders, funding has been greatly reduced since the
program was first initiated. It is highly likely that it will be dropped in the near future. Thus tracking its ultimate success in comparison with more traditional individually based merit pay systems is threatened.

QUIIP is neither an easy program to run nor to evaluate. Its cost in Dade County amounted to $4,304,567 in employee bonuses for the year 1984-85. A total of 3,082 instructional staff were awarded bonuses together with 1,384 non-instructional staff members (Florida Department of Education Division of Public Schools, 1986). Costs for the program are of an annual and recurring nature. Simply looked at from the perspective of increased test and attendance scores within the Q, E and E schools, QUIIP can be defined as a successful merit pay program. When the overall scores on the Stanford Achievement Test for the three years from 1983-1985 are examined, however, there is little or no evident system-wide increase for the median percentile scores at the elementary, junior high or high school level for Reading Comprehension and Mathematics Computation (Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Reading Comprehension</th>
<th>Mathematics Computation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If QUIIP is to be a successful program for increasing student achievement, then these scores have to show significant and sustained increases on a system-wide basis—something they have as yet failed to do.

Conclusions

Evidence from the research is sufficient to warrant a number of general conclusions about the Florida Master Teacher Program and the Quality Instruction Incentives Program (QUIIP):

1. Business, by means of the legislature, imposed its model of merit pay (the Florida Master Teacher Program) on the educational system.

2. An alternative school based merit pay program, the Quality Instruction Incentives Program, was implemented in response to the perceived limitations of the Florida Master Teacher Program.

3. Merit pay became a confusing phenomenon for both those experiencing it and evaluating it, with two different programs (the Florida Master Teacher Program and the Quality Instruction Incentives Program) being imposed on teachers at the same time.

4. Although in some aspects different, in the context of Herzberg et al.'s motivational-hygiene model, the two models
of merit pay introduced in Florida functioned in the same way in not providing primary motivators.

5. Merit pay in either the form of school level merit pay or individual level merit pay does not provide a solution to the general problem of low teacher salaries.

Policy Recommendations

Based on the results reported in this study, the following policy recommendations are suggested:

1. Educational lobbying groups need to develop services which can make the results of existing research available on a timely basis so that their full participation in the shaping of educational reform is more likely to meet their own objectives.

2. Business models should not be used in order to increase teacher and student productivity, without a more complete understanding of their theoretical basis and their probable consequences.

3. The evaluation of QUIIP, as a program, should be undertaken after no less than three years of awards so that sufficient data are available to assess increases or absence of increases in student achievement scores.

4. Legislators need to develop ways to address the problem of low base salaries which are disincentives to working as a teacher.

5. Educational innovations such as different but related systems of merit pay should not be undertaken simultaneously, since their effects to confound one another.
REFERENCES


