The following papers were presented at this meeting:

(1) "The Moral Import of the Concept of Education" (Robert D. Heslep) Response: J. Gordon Chamberlin; (2) "Religion and Public Education: Formulating a Rational Legacy" (William F. Losito) Response: James W. Garrison; (3) "Using Scientific Logic To Reconcile Theism and Secular Humanism as Religions" (Tom Hawkins) Response: David Kennedy; (4) "Vision and Person in Teacher Renewal" (Jon A. Rinnender) Response: Cheryl Southworth; (5) "Teaching Justice through Classic Texts: The Coppin-Hopkins Humanities Program in the Baltimore City Schools" (John Furlong and William Carroll) Response: Anthony G. Rud, Jr.; (6) "A Theater of Memory: Viro's View of Personal Identity" (Thomas O. Buford) Response: John R. Scudder, Jr; (7) "Teaching Cooperation" (Richard J. McGowan) Response: Beatric Sarlos; (8) "Censorship and the Right To Read" (Susan O'Brien and Joseph O'Brien); (9) "On the Horns of a Moral Dilemma: An Anatomy of the Hawkins County, Tennessee, Textbook Controversy" (J. Hamilton Hoit and Elizabeth Hoit-Thatford); (10) "Is it Always Moral To Raise Levels of Moral Judgment?" (Mary I. Yeazell and Julie Tasker); (11) "Predicate Conditions for Moral Education" (Virgil S. Ward); (12) "In Praise of Illiteracy" (Joseph Di Bona); (13) "Moral Education: Ignorance and Stupidity" (Rocco Porreco); (14) "Erikson and Rogers with Kohlberg: Stange Bedfellows" (Virginia S. Wilson and James A. Liele); (15) "Understanding the Soviet Union: A Method of Fostering Peace" (Carl W. Holland) Response: John B. Haynes; and (16) "Standards for Ethical Teaching: Are Teachers' Personal Lifestyle Choices Foreclosed?" (Bruce Beezer) Response: Neale H. Mucklow. (JD)
Education: A Moral Enterprise

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of the
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Editor's Introduction

The 1987 Annual Meeting of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society was held in the academical setting of Duke University. Professor Peter Carbone did double duty as both President and congenial Host. A high point of the annual banquet was an address by historian Professor Robert F. Durden on "The Duke Family and Duke University." Of special note was the importance placed by the Dukes on the education of teachers. The university's academic environs were fully complemented by balmy fall weather and the natural beauty of Duke Forest. All members doubtless look forward to a return visit to the hospitality of Duke University in the near future.

Space does not allow for editorial comment on every contribution included in this issue of the Proceedings; however, special mention must be made of the fine Keynote Address by Professor Robert Heslep, and an equally fine response by Professor Gordon Chamberlin. As readers will know, each of these gentlemen are experienced and well known philosophers. Professor Heslep is a skilled practitioner of the analytic mode of philosophizing, and Professor Chamberlin is equally prominent in phenomenological philosophy. Those who attended the 1987 Annual Meeting will recall the excellence of the verbal exchange between the two, but in now having their written comments for mulling over at a more leisurely pace, the reader is presented with a ready example of the historic tension between the two distinct ways of doing philosophy. Each makes points that are food for thought.

As intended, the event of the Keynote Address set a tone of intellectual interchange for the concurrent sessions. Readers will note contributions from both regular contributors, and a healthy infusion of new contributors. The theme of Education: A Moral Enterprise sparked substantial work, and as usual, there were contributions on other topics that added valuable philosophic treatment of related topics. Original papers and response papers took on such pertinent moral education issues as the place of religion in education, the nature of "secular humanism," the concept of justice, the problem of censorship, and a recent textbook controversy to name a few. Concurrent sessions were well attended and the discussions were valuable and enlightening.

This issue ends my three year term as editor of the Proceedings. I have learned much from the work, and I leave office with mixed emotions: I will be relieved of some work, but I will miss the correspondence, phone conversations, and helpful support from colleagues and contributors. One of the high points of my term was, with the direction and support of the Executive Committee, getting the Proceedings published by ERIC and having it indexed in Philosopher's Index. This will go far in helping our organization have a better impact through a greater dissemination of its work. I am gratified to have been a part of this development.

Samuel M. Craver
Editor
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I want to argue that the concept of education implies some moral principles. The first reason for this project concerns the efforts of analytic philosophers two decades ago to resolve the issue of whether or not the concept of education has any normative significance. While some of these philosophers, who were exemplified by R.S. Peters and Paul Hirst, contended that the concept does have such a significance, they, I believe, failed to make a sound case. Hence, there is still room for another effort to show the normative importance of the concept. The second reason bears on the educational thought of radical theorists during the past ten years. While these theorists have had much to say about the moral significance of educational institutions and practices, they have not based their arguments upon a fundamental and systematic analysis of the connection between morality and education. The result is that their arguments are not as strong as they might be and that they overlook some useful theoretical points. Thus, an examination of education's moral implications should be of interest to critical theorists of education.

My argument will consist of several steps. It will begin with a discussion of why the position by Peters and Hirst fails. It next will analyze the moral framework of education. It finally will indicate ways in which that analysis is of value to radical theorists of education.
According to ordinary language the primary sense of education is that it is a practice. There is education as a field of study, as a profession, as a business, etc. Each of these other meanings, however, is understandable only with reference to education as a practice.

The activities that distinguish education from other practices are learning activities, namely, activities that lead to learning. Studying and listening are actions that may lead directly to learning, whereas instruction and conditioning are actions that can lead indirectly to learning. Not all learning activities, however, need to be educational. It is doubtful, for instance, that an act of lying belongs to the practice of education. To be educational, an activity must have as an end one's learning something characteristic of an educated person. An educated person has a breadth and depth of knowledge, to be sure; but he or she also has a comprehensive understanding that rests upon the theoretical disciplines. Moreover, the educated person has intellectual skills and dispositions pertinent to such matters as searching for evidence and drawing inferences, perceiving relationships, and discussing topics, issues, and problems according to the canons of public argument. The person also has appreciations relevant to all these cognitive matters. In addition, the notion of an educated person allows that certain bodily skills and habits are of educational significance, mainly, those that enable a person to acquire a cognitive perspective founded on the theoretical disciplines, for example, manual, speech, and job skills and habits of health, leisure, and socialibility. There are diverse kinds of
learning activities that might help a person to become educated. Among pedagogical actions tending to shape beliefs, there are those that aim at a learner's believing a statement that the teacher finds justifiable but of which the teacher encourages scrutiny by the learner. Among pedagogical actions tending to shape behavior, there are those that aim at the acquisition of skills and habits that the teacher regards as justifiable and is prepared to explain to the learner.

For Peters and Hirst, the normative significance of education as a practice has to do not so much with the specific content of any instance of the practice as with how the term "education" is used normally. It is a commendatory term. To describe something as education, educated, or educational is to imply that the transmission of something worthwhile in a morally acceptable manner is involved. "It would be a logical contradiction to say that a man had been educated but that he had in no way changed for the better, or that in educating his son a man was attempting nothing that was worthwhile."¹ These philosophers acknowledge that the normative view of education is not the only one; in truth, they allow that there is a normal use of the word that is normatively neutral. They insist, nevertheless, that the normative view is more defensible. The reasons why they think it is are two.² First, the normative conception is that of people "in the main educated" and "professionally concerned with education" and therefore are more knowledgeable about the language of education. Second, the nonnormative conception belongs to the majority, who are less knowledgeable about such language.
That the Peters and Hirst position is unsatisfactory can be shown without much difficulty. The identification of the normative idea of education with those "in the main educated" and "professionally concerned with education" does not prove anything. For one thing, the identification is an empirical claim; but it is not clear what evidence Peters and Hirst have for supporting the claim. Is the evidence just their impressions formed by their experiences of the everyday world of British university life? Does it consist of facts discovered through a systematic investigation of pertinent literature? Was it gathered through a survey of professional educators and other educated people? Whatever the evidence is, these philosophers do not reveal it. For another thing, the identification is ingenuous. Having worked hard and long to become educated, educated people should be expected to regard education as good. And just as the members of any other professional field are supposed to have a favorable attitude toward that field, those professionally concerned with education are supposed to have a positive attitude toward education. For still another thing, it may be argued that why people berate or esteem matters they call "education" is irrelevant to their being "uneducated" or "educated" or being or not being "professionally concerned with education." People esteem or condemn education for the reason they might esteem or condemn anything else: they see it as agreeing or disagreeing with standards they hold. Finally, it must be noted that the argument advanced by Peters and Hirst involves a dubious point about the logic of the term "education." It says that a reference to the practice of education implies that something worthwhile is being transmitted in a morally acceptable manner. The
standards by which the something is deemed worthwhile and the manner is judged morally acceptable are relativistic, not absolutistic. Hence, what was called "education" in Nazi Germany was not called "education" in the United States; and what is called "education" at Bob Jones University is not called "education" at Harvard University. This relativistic position certainly has an initial plausibility. It simply is a matter of fact that what is described as education in one context might not be describable as such elsewhere. Nevertheless, the fact does not prove Peters and Hirst's relativistic position; for it is quite compatible with an absolutistic view of the standards by which the content and manner of education are to be judged worthy. It is quite possible that in view of some absolutistic standards the Nazis were simply mistaken in describing as "education" the content and manner of their schools.

III

Even though Peters and Hirst have not provided an adequate defense for the thesis that education conceptually has a normative implication, they have not thereby left the position indefensible. In an effort to make the position tenable, I will maintain (A) that the practice of education is of moral concern by logical necessity, (B) that the practice logically involves certain basic moral principles, and (C) that these principles logically impose limits upon what may count as the content and manner of the practice. The moral principles to be identified will be absolutistic, not relativistic.

(A) Just as action, including its variants of activity and act, is a major element of education, it is a chief ingredient in morality. It is interwoven in such non-technical topics as purpose, duty, consequence,
rule, character, freedom, and judgment. As normally understood, an action is a doing of something; and a moral action, or one which may be judged as morally right or wrong, is an action that is purposive, vol. , and interpersonal. An action is purposive if it has an end that the agent desires to attain. The end might be nothing more than the performance of the action itself. The agent may be aware of the end more or less clearly, more or less dimly. When people judge the moral quality of an action, they might not use the action's end as a principle for determining its value or rectitude; but they do assume that the action has some point. Actions are voluntary if their agents freely choose them and are informed of what they are doing. To say that an agent freely chooses an action is to allow that the agent is not compelled, physically or psychologically, to perform it and to allow that the agent's selection of it is not a Hobson's choice. Agents are informed of what they are doing if they know who they are, what they are doing, what purposes they have, who are the recipients of what they are doing, and the immediate outcomes of their doings. We certainly would not hold a person morally accountable for any action that he or she has performed forcibly or in ignorance; and even though we may speak of such an action as morally fortunate or regrettable, we should not judge it as morally right or wrong, good or bad. An action is interpersonal insofar as its agent is rational and it has an impact, direct or indirect, upon another rational agent. That a moral action logically is interpersonal is suggested by the fact that ordinary discourse draws a distinction between prudence and morality and that the former is concerned with one's own welfare and no one else's. Being purposive, voluntary, and interpersonal are not
only necessary but also sufficient conditions for an action to be open to moral judgment. Acknowledging an action to have these qualities, we would be prepared, despite disagreements over specific moral theories, to judge it as morally right or wrong, valuable or invaluable.

It should be obvious now that the practice of education is of moral concern. Having a goal, namely, the educated person, the practice in a general sense is purposive; and teaching, studying, doing arithmetic, and other stock specific actions of the practice are purposive. Indeed, the only actions of educational significance that are not essentially purposive are those that contribute in an incidental way to one's becoming educated; and even they count as educational because of their ties to a goal. Acts of teaching are voluntary from the standpoint of the teacher and may be voluntary from the viewpoint of the students. And learning activities that are involuntary for the student usually are regarded as less preferable in education than those that are voluntary, as evidenced by the tendency to defend involuntary learning activities as educational on the ground that they are somehow necessary. Educational learning activities performed by learners apart from teachers may be voluntary. Educational learning activities, of course, may be interpersonal. Teaching involves interaction between a teacher, who is an occurrently rational agent, and a learner, who is a prospectively, if not an occurrently, rational agent; and informal educational learning activities are typically interpersonal, as in the case of those in families and peer groups.
(B) On its face the idea that education is of moral concern is definitely unexciting. It presents nothing that has not been recognized for centuries, and it fails to demonstrate that each and every aspect of education is of moral interest. After all, by allowing that educational learning activities might be involuntary, it leaves open the question of whether or not involuntary educational learning activities have a moral quality. Nevertheless, the idea that education is of moral concern reveals much of interest when unpacked; for it commits one to specific moral principles and colors each and every facet of education with a moral interest. That the nose of moral concern of the camel of morality is under the tent of education means that it will be followed by the rest of the camel. My effort to reveal the specific moral principles implicit in the concept of moral action is largely, but not totally, indebted to the work of Alan Gewirth on the normative structure of voluntary action.

Voluntary actions are purposive as well as free and witting, but they need not be interpersonal. By conceptual necessity the end of a voluntary action is desired by its moral agent; but it cannot be desired by him, who is a voluntary agent, under any compulsion. For Gewirth that voluntary agents desire the ends of their actions implies that they value them.7 It is arguable, however, that a voluntary agent might desire the end of his or her action without valuing it; the agent might desire it whimsically.8 Whims are stock items of human experience; and a person who desires something capriciously may be a voluntary agent: to desire something from caprice is to desire it not only without reason but also without cause. As Gewirth explains, to value something is at least implicitly to judge it to be
Hence, voluntary agents who prize their respective ends view them as good. Voluntary agents who esteem their ends necessarily evaluate something else too. Because they regard their actions as means to things they regard as good, they also must prize the actions, including the latter's purposiveness, voluntariness and deliberativeness; and this means that they, in order to be consistent, must appreciate the purposiveness, voluntariness, and deliberativeness of all their voluntary actions. Moreover, voluntary agents who do not value their ends have to esteem their actions, including the latter's purposiveness, voluntariness, and deliberativeness. They must select their actions as means to their desired ends; for if they did not, they would be performing the actions in ignorance and thus would be acting involuntarily. In selecting their actions as means, they have to prize them for their effectiveness, efficiency, or some other quality as means.

The purposiveness of an agent's voluntary actions encompasses, from the standpoint of the agent, three kinds of goods: the basic aspects of the agent's well-being that are the proximate necessary conditions of the performance of any and all his actions, the present level of his or her purpose fulfillment, and the raising of the level of his or her purpose fulfillment. Because the agents of voluntary actions take as good the generic features—the purposiveness, freedom, knowledge, and deliberativeness—of their respective actions, they logically must maintain that they have rights to these features. After all, what could be a more urgent object of an agent's rights claim than the necessary conditions for his or her engaging in voluntary action in general and successful voluntary action?
the agent views the generic features of his or her voluntary actions as necessary for the possibility of his or her agency, is it not logical that the agent hold that all other persons refrain from interfering with these conditions and, on occasion, help him or her secure these conditions?

Because it is contended here that agents may or may not prize their goals, it is denied that all agents have to be able to appeal to a valuation of their objectives as a reason for their actions; but it is conceded that an agent who appreciates his or her purpose and, hence, can give the valuation of it as a reason for his or her action is, in this respect, more rational than an agent who does not value his or her purpose and, therefore, cannot appeal to an esteem of it as a reason for his or her action. Besides this principle of degrees of rational agency there is the principle of degrees of claim, which holds that a rational agent asserts a claim to an action to the extent that he or she has rational grounds for performing the act. By this principle, if an agent has reason for all aspects of his or her action, the agent has rights to all the aspects; if not, the agent lacks a right to any feature for which he or she has no reason and thereby diminishes his or her claim to any feature for which there is a reason. Moreover, the tentativeness of an agent's reason for his or her action determines the strength of a claim to the action. The basis for the principle of degrees of claim is the more general one that a rational agent establishes a right to an action by having a reason for it. The conjunction of the principle of degrees of claim with that of degrees of rational agency leads to the principle of superior and inferior rights, which states that, all other things
being equal, agents prizing their goals have claims to the generic features of their actions that are greater than those of agents who do not prize their goals.

Voluntary action is moral when it is interpersonal. So, to analyze the moral structure of such action, one must examine it from the standpoint of its recipients as well as from that of its agents. Because the agent of a voluntary action takes himself or herself to be a prospective, as well as an occurrent, agent of voluntary actions, the agent also, in order to be consistent, must take recipients of his or her current action as prospective, if not occurrent, agents of voluntary actions. And because the agent lays claim to the generic features of his or her voluntary actions to the extent that he or she has reasons for the actions, the agent further, in order to be consistent, must allow that the recipients of his or her voluntary actions have rights to the generic features of their respective voluntary actions to the degree that they have reasons for their actions. This allows that an agent with a valued purpose not only has relatively superior rights to his or her action's generic features but also has a right to the evaluativeness of the action, which from our standpoint, it will be remembered, should not be regarded as a part of the generic features of voluntary action. It also implies that an agent, who sees his or her recipients as having certain duties towards himself or herself, sees himself too as having definite duties toward the recipients. For instance, the agent ought to refrain from harming them and assist them occasionally in securing the conditions of their well-being; and, all other things being equal, the agent is obligated, when rendering assistance, to give priority to those agents who
appreciate their aims. So, in view of these points every moral agent is bound by the following precept: act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself and, in so doing, consider the relative superiority and inferiority of these rights. Because this precept is a revision of Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency, it will be dubbed "the Revised Principle of Generic Consistency" (RPGC).\textsuperscript{11}

While the RPGC is the fundamental precept implied by the notion of moral action, it certainly is not the only one. For convenience, only one other will be discussed; it serves as a guide in the application of the RPGC. Its meaning is not quite the same as that of Gewirth's Principle of Proportionality, but its formulation is the same: "When some quality $Q$ justifies having certain rights $R$, and the possession of $Q$ varies in the respect that is relevant to $Q$'s justifying the having of $R$, the degree to which $R$ is had is proportional to or varies with the degree for which $Q$ is had."\textsuperscript{12} It will be labeled "the Revised Principle of Proportionality" (RPP). This principle, which is remindful of Aristotle's dictum that equals should be treated as equals and unequals as unequals, is not derived by Gewirth from his claim that any agent esteems his goal. It is derived, rather, from another contention, namely, that there are "degrees of approach to full-fledged agency."\textsuperscript{13} At any rate, it is especially helpful in applying the RPGC to cases involving the generic rights of human fetuses, children, the mentally deficient, and animals.

But whether the Principle of Proportionality is called "Revised" or not, it might fall prey to misinterpretation. Specifically, it
might be taken to mean that talents and only talents count when one assesses the claims of different agents to actions requiring capabilities; it might be regarded as a principle of unconstrained meritocracy. The reason why the principle should not be viewed as intending this is that it allows that matters other than talents may be considered when one evaluates the claim of agents to actions requiring certain capabilities. As stated by Gewirth, it will be remembered, the PP speaks of "some quality Q" that justifies having certain rights R"; and while some quality Q might be a talent, it might be something else, too. It might be, for instance, a moral handicap or some resource other than a talent that is in the public interest. Therefore, the talents required by given actions should be taken as the sole determinants in competing moral claims to the actions only when other qualities are not required by the actions; and they should be regarded as overriding only when all other qualities required by the actions have been determined to be less important than the talents. Extreme meritocracy, accordingly, is not entailed by applications of either the PGC or the RPGC.

(C) The moral principles involved in the practice of education do more than mean that the practice is a morally normative concept; they also place limitations upon the practice. Even though learners might be only prospective interpersonal voluntary agents or occurrent interpersonal voluntary agents only in degree, they nevertheless have rights as well as duties under the RPGC and RPP. According to the RPGC they have rights to the three cardinal goods of purposiveness: the proximate necessary conditions of the performance of voluntary actions by them, the present levels of their purpose fulfillments, and
the increase of the levels of their purpose fulfillments. They have rights to the freedom, knowledge, and deliberativeness embodied in voluntary action. And they have rights to assistance in obtaining the objects of their rights. Also according to the RPGC they have all these rights under the condition that they respect the similar rights of other moral agents. With respect to the RPP learners can have their rights only to the degree that they are individually capable of attaining the objects of their rights, or only in proportion to their respective capacities, abilities, dispositions, appreciations, and other qualities relevant to obtaining the object of their rights. Hence, while both gifted and mentally retarded students have rights to purposiveness, voluntariness, and deliberativeness, they have rights to them only to the extent that they individually have the qualities relevant to obtaining them. This means in turn that the assistance to which gifted and mentally retarded students have a right must be addressed to their respective qualifications and needs for being or becoming agents of interpersonal voluntary action.

Being moral agents, teachers have rights under the RPGC and RPP; but they also have duties. Generally speaking, they are bound to engage in activities that foster and do not impede their students' acquisition of qualities for the exercise of their generic rights as voluntary agents. This means that teachers must be open minded, that they must encourage students to think critically and independently, and that they must respect the relevant individual differences among students. It also means that teachers should engage in acts of indoctrination and conditioning only when they are necessary because of student deficiencies and only when they are designed to prepare
students for subsequent learning activities that are voluntary from the students' standpoint. It still further means that teachers logically are morally obligated to assure that students as well as themselves become conscious of the so-called "hidden" curriculum of schools, universities, churches, and other learning institutions. Covert social and cultural factors are likely to be present in such institutions; and when they are unknowingly present, they are likely to be impediments to voluntary action by students and teachers.

The moral aspects of education also place limits upon the content of education. Students should be encouraged to learn the concepts and principles associated with rational agency. More specifically, they should be encouraged to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary action; to be disposed toward and prizing of voluntary action; to be inclined toward establishing and being appreciative of actions with valued goals; to acquire facts, skills, dispositions, and standards involved in deliberating about courses of action; and to grasp, apply, and see the worth of the RPGC and RPP. Because moral agents have bodies and minds and interact with one another, students need to learn the skills, habits, and appreciations of physical and psychological health and of social manners. A study of the theoretical disciplines is compatible with the moral aspects of education in that it will provide students with knowledge, intellectual skills, and appreciations that will help them understand the general features of human beings and the world within which they live. But moral agents cannot live by theory alone. Hence, the theoretical disciplines should not be the only intellectual disciplines learned by students. Students ought to study the practical disciplines, or the arts of
decision making, especially when learning about governmental operations, the public interest, personal interests, health, and manners. And they should study the productive disciplines, or the fine and useful arts of production, especially when learning about economic and aesthetic institutions, careers and hobbies, and health and social interaction wherever they are seen as products.

As already indicated, the practice of education typically takes place in a social and cultural context; and because the RPGC and the RPP are embedded in the practice, they logically impose moral restraints upon any context in which it operates. The principles require that the institutions, class structures, and values of any society in which education is to occur not only avoid being obstacles to the practice but that they be supportive of it. For instance, not just schools and colleges but churches, families, industry, and the mass media must encourage education. Social classes must be so constituted that each of them positively relates to education. And society must esteem purposiveness, voluntariness, deliberativeness, cognitive perspective, the intellectual disciplines, and the other elements of being an educated person. In addition, the principles bind any society in which education is to appear to have such policies as freedom of inquiry, freedom of speech and press, and equal educational opportunity; for without policies of the sort education, guided by the generic traits of voluntary action, cannot thrive. Finally, the principles demand from society financial and other forms of material support for education. Education cannot operate without such support, and how much it should receive is a function of how much it needs to be successful, the material resources possessed by
society, and the society's other obligations competing for these resources on moral grounds.

By now it should be obvious that the moral principles implicit in education are significant for education's goal. What have been portrayed as the implications of these principles for learners, teachers, curricular content, and society all point in one direction, namely, that education is logically committed to producing a person who is morally sound, that is, a person who understands, follows, and appreciates the RPGC and RPP in some form. What this says is that one can deny only on pain of contradiction that a fully educated person rejects the RPGC or RPP. Hence, the German professors who supported Hitler's infamous policies were not only morally deficient but educationally deficient too. And while the so-called "education" offered by the schools and universities of the USSR under Stalin's regime might have been prized by all officials of that nation, it was not morally correct from the viewpoint of the RPGC and RPP and thus was educationally faculty.

IV

The moral implications for education that have been set forth should not be upsetting to radical theorists of education, for they agree with much that has been advocated by the latter. The emphasis upon freedom in learning and teaching is consistent with the centrality given by radical theorists to emancipation.\(^{14}\) The stress upon a variety of intellectual disciplines in the curriculum is compatible with the radical theorists' rejection of the idea that there is only one type of knowledge.\(^{15}\) The concern expressed about hidden curricula reflects the same concern more extensively expressed
by radical theorists.\(^\text{16}\) The points made about social institutions and class structures constitute a major theme of radical theorists.\(^\text{17}\) The insistence that education is essentially a moral and not just an economic matter is present in the writings of radical theorists.\(^\text{18}\) And the position that the moral principles underlying education are absolutistic rather than relativistic agrees with the reliance by radical theorists upon the moral principles of early Marx, which also are absolutistic.\(^\text{19}\) Radical theorists, nevertheless, might find our moral implications for education objectionable in that they are abstract and do not come to grips with the realities of American education here and now. Even so, radical theorists should acknowledge that the implications are applicable to concrete problems and that they can be related to such problems on another occasion.

Given the compatibility between what I believe to be the moral features of education and the views presented by radical theorists, I urge that the latter thinkers entertain the analysis of education that has been provided as a theoretical basis for their own ideas. The term "education," of course, is quite common; but the conceptual structures to which it refers is very complex and thus conducive to ambiguity, confusion, and oversight. Accordingly, inquiries into the moral aspects of education will do well to follow from an analysis of the concept. As far as I can tell, the radical theorists of education have not examined the concept of education in a fundamental and systematic way; they certainly have not considered it as revealed in normal discourse. Not relying upon the standard conception of education, radical theorists usually have resorted to programmatic definitions. Such definitions might be rhetorically effective, but
they might be philosophically indefensible and can be philosophically defensible only when ordinary definitions are unacceptable. If, therefore, the radical theorists had carefully looked at the normal notion of education, they should have seen that it is compatible with their overall position and, hence, that their programmatic definitions of education are unnecessary.

Take the case of Aronowitz and Giroux. Education, they propose, is to be distinguished from schooling; it takes place outside as well as inside established institutions and spheres.

In a radical sense, education represents a collectively produced set of experiences organized around issues and concerns that allow for a critical understanding of everyday oppression as well as the dynamics involved in constructing alternative political cultures. As the embodiment of an ideal, it refers to forms of learning and action based on a commitment to the elimination of class, racial and gender oppression. As a mode of intellectual development and growth, its focus is political in the broadest sense in that it functions to create organic intellectuals, and to develop a notion of active citizenry based on the self-dedication of a group to forms of education that promote models of learning and social interaction that have a fundamental connection to the idea of human emancipation.

If Aronowitz and Giroux had analyzed the standard notion of education, they would have seen that it too regards education as broader than schooling and indeed that it allows that some schooling might be uneducational. Moreover, they would have discovered that in its emphasis upon the generic rights of interpersonal voluntary action,
the standard notion is logically compatible with their appeal for the elimination of oppression and the advancement of emancipation.

This compatibility does not entail the correctness of the program of action presented by Aronowitz and Giroux; it simply allows that the program is possibly correct. It must be noted, however, that Aronowitz and Giroux, like anyone else constructing a programmatic definition of education, have included their preconceived program in the content of their definition of the matter. Hence, their definition logically commits one to their program of action; whereas the standard definition does not. The standard definition leaves the correctness of their program to the canons of public argument. So, by relying upon the ordinary idea of education, Aronowitz and Giroux could have avoided the charge of begging the question.
NOTES


7. Ibid., p. 40.


10. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

11. Ibid., p. 135.

12. Ibid., p. 134.


15. Ibid., p. 10.


18. David Purpel and Kevin Ryan, Moral Education...It Comes with the Territory (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1976).


I assume that everyone here agrees with Professor Heslep and with R.S. Peters that education is a moral enterprise.

I assume further that most of us would like to have the outcome of this enterprise be persons such as the one described in Professor Heslep's glowing phrases:

"An educated person has a breadth and depth of knowledge, to be sure, but he or she also has a comprehensive understanding that rests upon the theoretical disciplines. Moreover, the educated person has intellectual skills and dispositions pertinent to such matters as searching for evidence and drawing inferences, perceiving relationships and discussing topics, issues, and problems according to the canons of public argument. The person also has appreciations relevant to all these cognitive matters." (p. 2)

On closer examination, however, I am not so sure how far we all are ready to go hand in hand. The affirmation about education being a moral enterprise may be made in the sense that education is an action "that can be judged right or wrong." However, it is also used in the sense that if what is done is not right, not moral, then the activity is not education. There we may part company with Professor Heslep.

We have to wait awhile in his presentation to get a fix on what he is up to, but it is revealed on page 5 when he says,

"I will maintain that the practice of education is of moral concern by logical necessity; that the practice logically involves certain basic moral principles, and that these principles logically impose limits upon what may count as the content and manner of the practice." and "The moral principles to be identified will be absolutistic." (p. 5)

There is the menu set before us. It causes some problems of digestion. We, as you have already heard, are in for a demonstration of logic applied to elements in a concept which, Professor Heslep maintains, are embedded in the ordinary use of the term education.

The outcome of an exercise of logic clearly depends upon the initial premise. Before we get to page five in this presentation we have already been introduced to several matters relating to his premise.

Education

First are assumptions about what is "ordinary." We find here a
criticism of R.S. Peters' claim to the "normal" meaning of education. Of course "normal" has at least two meanings. One would be what people normally or commonly hold. In education, however, the term has been applied historically to schools that promoted particular norms relating to educational activity.

Professor Heslep appears to assume that Peters uses the term in the first sense for he charges that Peters provides no empirical evidence for his claim of the "normal" usage of the term. But Professor Heslep provides no empirical evidence for his own claim of "ordinary" usage. It is to be noted that on page 18 he refers to the "standard" conception of education and on page 19 to the "normal" conception of education, both as the view he holds. Nevertheless he goes on to show how loaded his own term is in the passage about the educated person quoted above. What he appears to be describing is a person at the lofty state of final arrival as "an educated person." Is it only in that sense that we can speak of an educated person.

Here we are told that what marks an activity as educational is the product, whereas the first assumption was that education is a practice. We gather that he is referring, with that term, to what teachers do, for ordinarily what students do is not considered as a practice.

Practice, too, has more than one meaning. Bernard Christian engages in a medical practice when he goes into the operating theatre to transplant hearts. Yo Yo Ma engages in practice before he goes on stage. But in whichever sense, practice emphasizes what a teacher does, and the moral concern appears to be limited to one side of the educating act.

The way the two elements -- teachers and students -- are brought together leaves us, right at the beginning, with uncertainty as to whether the moral element in the concept of education has to do with the intention of teachers, with the manner in which the practice is conducted, or with the outcome in the accomplishments of students. Or with all three.

What we see here is that a commitment to logical necessity implies that words have a single meaning, and of course they do not. It is not clear how universal the claim of "ordinary" is. Are we limiting it to the English language? Lehrgung and ausbildung are both used for education in German, with different meanings. It is the same with French and Spanish words. And the Latin root of the word offers two different meanings: educare and educare. Professor Heslep is certainly justified in stipulating the way he is going to use the term, but the exercise of strict logic only leads to Heslepian absolutes which cannot be expected to apply to those who interpret "ordinary usage" another way. I think a case can be made that the ordinary usage of "education" in the U.S.A. means "schooling." To be educated is to have gone to school.

From these initial matters Professor Heslep moves on to three more terms. He asserts that the practice of education is an action and "a moral action, or one which may be judged right or wrong, is an action that is purposive, voluntary, and interpersonal." (p. 6) When action is "education," I will contend that interpersonal is prior to purposive and will address the three in reverse order.
Interpersonal

Interpersonal precedes voluntary and purposive because both aspects are conditioned by the fact that education involves both teachers and students, both human beings. Therefore education involves two centers of action, two sets of values, two sets of purposes. This basic fact is not necessarily considered when discussion is built around the term agent.

Agent connotes inanimate object or objects which may prompt learning: a rake left lying in the grass wrong side up, an electric shock, what we are taught "by the end of a hickory stick," or a chemical agent. But if "agent" refers to a human being a number of aspects of logical analysis call for some qualifications.

Clearly teachers are agents, but are not also boards of education and administrators agents of the society in conducting a social function for the young? Can students be considered as agents? What are they agents of?

It is illuminating to contrast the lists Professor Heslep and R.S. Peters present of moral issues involved with education. The Heslep list is "purpose, duty, consequence, rule, character, freedom and judgment," which apply to practitioners but are not necessarily interpersonal. The Peters list is "equality, interests of the student, freedom, respect for persons, and fraternity," clearly implying interpersonal human relationships. Neither includes truth!

Professor Heslep, in considering the personal aspect of education, refers to a "rational agent," a rather impersonal term. Human beings are not just "rational;" irrationality is also endemic in the human condition. Human decisions are made in choices framed when prior commitments (beliefs, understandings, interpretations) meet particular situations (as interpreted). To expect absolutistic principles to guide moral action is to leave out an essential human factor which is decisional responsibility of both persons in the educational endeavor.

Action, like agent, recognized as a crucial aspect of the moral dimension of education, can also be very impersonal. The Winchester 22 which I used as a boy had a bolt action, a movie director is said to yell "lights, camera, action," and animals spring into action. It is important in relation to education that it is intentional human action which raises questions of moral significance.

An interesting detour along a single track could be to consider "interpersonal" in relation to a major feature of the schooling process -- textbooks. Surely teaching is going on in their use, but is it interpersonal when the individual author is present in a rather indirect way to a learner, but the individual learner is present to the author only in general imagination. Or, if the textbook writer sees himself or herself as distributing objective information as in lecturing, total attention may be on the subject matter and the manner is totally impersonal; can that be an interpersonal relationship?

Well along in the paper Professor Heslep makes this interesting
observation: "On its face the idea that education is of moral concern is definitely unexciting. Nevertheless the idea reveals much of interest when unpacked." (p. 8) And unpack it he does.

The image this prompts for me is of a track down which a loaded train, powered by logic, travels in a straight line from "ordinary language" use of the term to absolutistic rules for practice.

If it is assumed that interpersonal involves two or more human beings, two sets of interpretations and two decisional responsibilities, one approaches the next term, "voluntary," which Professor Heslep holds to be crucial in determining the morality of the practice, with more questions.

**Voluntary**

In what sense is the educational action of a teacher voluntary? In the groves of Academe in Athens students chose teachers. At the Studium Generale of Bologna, in the 8th century, students not only chose teachers, they fined teachers who were late to class.

How voluntary is what we are required to do in a contemporary college or university? Do deans and chancellors or presidents in their ordinary concept of education consider professoring as a voluntary activity? For one thing, we expect to be paid; we are not volunteers.

However we answer that question the voluntary aspect of education is most questionable in its application to students. In what sense is being a student, whether in the grades or in college, a voluntary act? If you cannot be certified to be a teacher without certain academic credentials, set by others, or a lawyer without passing the bar (that special logalese that has nothing to do with Bud Lite), or if you are under 16 and required to go to school, what is voluntary about it? Is learning a voluntary or an involuntary act, or both? Choosing to go to college may or may not be voluntary, but in a required course a student decides what to accept or reject of the teacher's, or textbook's, interpretations. Transmission is not possible because appropriation is decisional. Learning is an activity of a learner, thus controlling the outcome of an educational activity.

In the light of such a view it is difficult to accept Professor Heslep's assertion that "education is logically committed to producing a person who is morally sound, that is, a person who understands, follows, and appreciates the RFGC (Revised Principle of Generic Consistency) and RPP (Revised Principle of Proportionality) in some form." (p. 17) The reason, education is not a production process.

After giving a detailed analysis of the use of Gewirth's views about the Principle of Generic Consistency and the Principle of Proportionality, as Professor Heslep revises and applies them to logical necessity, he writes about teachers in their voluntary practice, saying,

"they are bound to engage in activities that foster and do not impede their students' acquisition of qualities
for their generic rights as voluntary agents. This means that teachers must be open minded, that they must encourage students to think critically and so forth. (p. 14)

How can set requirements for producing certain kinds of students, or of certain kinds of teacher behavior, be an expression of voluntary action?

Purposive

The move down the track among these interesting branch lines of thought logically brings us to the question of purposive action. If one is only saying that to act is to display purpose, that makes no very distinctive contribution to thinking about the educating act. But if the practice of education is an interpersonal activity of at least two human beings, it is logical to recognize that each functions in a world of multiple competing purposes. The educating act is not a single move of the hand, a single thought exploding, a single word spoken. In this sense it is not an act but a congeries of many kinds of functions of both bodies and both minds.

Perhaps Professor Heslep is using that term to include all levels of purpose: to earn a living, to use my talents, to extend knowledge, to change the world, to show off my brilliance, to find out what makes things tick, to help students mature, to recruit disciples. All of these purposes might be simultaneously in operation within a teacher in a single class. The point of this listing is that there can be no separation of "educational" purposes from all of the other drives of a human beings' life; they intermingle so that commitment to one's institution, to one's discipline, to one's students, to one's family, to one's community, and so on, prevent a single track logic in educational practice. And the same complex of purposes marks the practice of every field. The same complex of purposes marks the situation of students.

This trip backwards through Professor Heslep's three steps demonstrates the many ways that educational actions pose moral and ethical issues at every step. The field is rife with different kinds of decisions, choices, objectives, responsibilities which can be judged on ethical grounds. Because of this the claim that logical analysis of the ordinary term can, nay must, yield binding rules teachers must employ if what they do is to be called education -- such a claim must be challenged.

Professor Heslep's claim is that "the German professors who supported Hitler's infamous policies were not only morally deficient but educationally deficient too." What I take that to mean is that what they were doing was not "education."

This opens up a question with which Professor Heslep does not deal. He does not fault the German professors on the grounds that they produced Nazis. He does not examine the consequences of their teaching. The fact is that those professors "produced," if that is an appropriate term, some
anti-nazis. Teachers' efforts do not always yield what they intend.

When consulting at the interdenominational seminary in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 20 years ago, I remember being told by some faculty members that when they were students their theology professor vigorously attacked the views of Karl Barth. What this sparked in the students was curiosity about Barth, so they obtained his books, studied them, and became Barthians.

In considering morality, is action to be judged only by intent, or should outcome be taken into account? R.S. Peters made a strange defense of "harsh things practiced in institutions as a result of which" they turned out educated and dedicated men. Those two terms are interesting, "educated" and "dedicated." Professor Heslep assumes that the German professors were dedicated but how can he be sure they were not "educated," for obviously their university experiences preceded the Hitler period. And Peters could be talking in a circle if he holds to transmission, for having gone through the British universities would certainly mean that one is educated. But dedicated to what? Exploiting the British subjects in India, dividing and conquering African tribes, or imposing a tea tax on the American colonies? "Dedicated" can have as many unethical as ethical connotations. How about Ollie North?

**A Different Perspective**

This review of the three aspects in reverse is not to deny that in most educational activities elements of the three are usually present. It is when Professor Heslep goes on to unpack the train that we discover how loaded it was, way back at the first, with specific moral rules that must, he holds, be followed, based on logical deduction from his premise. Here, it would seem, Professor Heslep becomes the Bork of our field.

In real life every board member, every administrator, every teacher, every student, is always interpreting the limitless claims and expectations pressing upon them. Their interpretations frame their responsibility. Rational action may appear as illogical to one who is not privy to each actor's life situation, beliefs, pressures.

At the end of the paper Professor Heslep points to the "radical theorists" as employing programmatic uses of their terms. But did not he so load his use of "education" from the first that his, too, could be considered as one kind of programmatic use of the term?

One other problem with the very straight logical track down which Professor Heslep sends the loaded train has to do with the source of moral claims. The religious community usually holds that moral responsibility is rooted in some transcendent frame of reference, and that any particular field of human endeavor stands under the judgment of that source; or to put it differently, that no field is morally autonomous. Does not basing morality on logic only give a gauze covering to a loaded premise in which a larger ethical frame of reference is already implicit?

In this respect I find it difficult to accept the claim that logic
specifies absolute moral rules which the educational agent must follow in carrying on the educating act. I dealt with this general problem in a paper at the 1977 meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, and titled it, "The Ethical Dilemma of Trying to Help Someone Learn Something." I, too, had three points: Education as Activity, as Relationship, as Purposeful. I held then, as I do now, that ethical responsibility prevents both teachers and students from conducting education by a priori rules. At every moment we are responsible for decisions without any possibility of knowing the ultimate outcome. That is our dilemma.

It so happened that when Professor Heslep's paper arrived I was just finishing the reading of an impressive long novel, The Sleep-Walkers, by the German author Hermann Broch. In his philosophical reflections on the three-part story showing the roots of national character leading up to Nazism, he made this observation:

"Every system of values springs from irrational impulses, and to transform those irrational, ethically invalid contacts with the world into something absolutely rational becomes the aim of every super-personal system of values -- an essential and radical task of 'formation.' And every system of values comes to grief in the endeavor."


We have been talking about the human condition.

*   *   *

Amidst the heated debate over the past several years about the role of moral values in public education, one position emerged with the promise of breaking the Gordian knot. The emergent position asserted that public education should be value neutral and that other institutions, such as family and church, should assume full responsibility for the moral development of the young. There is an immediate attractiveness to such a position, because the moral pluralism in our society makes it seemingly impossible for public education to inculcate a set of moral values which would elicit universal consensus.

Upon further reflection, the position of value neutrality has deep philosophical and practical difficulties. The most fundamental difficulty is the practical impossibility of carrying out the educational enterprise without assuming certain moral values and attempting to develop moral values in students. The process of education constitutively assumes a moral conception of fairness in the admission and treatment of students, for instance. Likewise, the educational enterprise inherently strives to develop moral dispositions in students concerning such matters as intellectual honesty, aesthetic appreciation, and the like. With the realization that education is constitutively moral in character, the attractiveness of that position faded and professional educators have returned to the tedious task of formulating a model for moral education in public, pluralistic institutions which is meaningful and simultaneously does not intrude upon the legitimate moral values of the various pluralistic constituencies.

An analogous debate has developed concerning the role of religion in public education. Not only religious pluralism but long-standing difficulties in interpreting our constitutional provisions have made it difficult to sort out the appropriate relationship of religion to public education. As with the issue of moral values, there are those who hold that educational exclusion is the best route to follow. In this case, religion is to be excluded from all aspects of the public educational enterprise—curriculum, extra-curricular activities, and policy formulation. Paul Vitz, and others, have concluded from their research that the exclusionary point of view has become systematically implemented in the American curriculum. He has documented the gradual but significant erosion of references to religion in social studies and humanities textbooks. Most U.S. history texts, for instance, confine the discussion of religion to the colonial period.

Many professional educators and textbook publishers have adopted an exclusionary attitude toward religion for pragmatic reasons, i.e., to minimize conflict with parents and other pressure groups. Others, however, have
advocated the extensive and systematic exclusion of religion from public education based on a strict separationist interpretation of the Constitution. The separationist account interprets the Constitution to require a wall of separation between "Church and State" so as to neither advance nor inhibit the establishment of religion and thereby avoid excessive entanglement with religion.

In my view the attempt to implement religionless education has worked to the detriment of public education in a like manner to the efforts of creating a value neutral education. But does the rejoinder take the same form as the argument against value neutral education? Is public education constitutively religious? I think not, unless one construes 'religious' in some strange way. But I do think that there ought to be meaningful linkages between religion and good public education in a society such as ours. I shall commit the remainder of the paper to briefly indicating why education is not constitutively religious and sketching out two points of desirable linkage between religion and education in a society such as ours.

**Public Education: Neither Constitutively Religious Nor Constitutionally Religionless**

First, let us turn to the contention that education is not constitutively religious. The argument depends in great part on what we mean by 'religion.' While the term 'religion' is open to radically diverse interpretations, I will follow what I think is the meaning given by the mainline traditions. I take religion to mean that set of beliefs which characteristically express an ultimate explanation and meaning to life based on a personal relationship with a transcendent being with a set of practices or prescribed behavior as an implication of those beliefs. There are, of course, systems of ideological beliefs in public and private life which function as religions yet do not express a belief in transcendent reality. For our purposes, we will limit our discussion to the ordinary, standard meaning of religion described above.

If one confines inquiry to the standard, typical sense of religion, it is apparent that public, general education does not necessarily presume religious beliefs about reality nor does it presume to effect a religious change in students. Some conception of reality to be sure, is implicit in the justification of policies and instructional goals, but an ultimate interpretive level of meaning is not necessary (or even desirable) for public education to be effectively implemented. Many educational policies and proposed educational goals are compatible with the mainline religious belief systems, however.

An analogy to the game of baseball might make the point more apparent and cogent. The game of baseball requires that there be some rules to play by and a universe to be explained and interpreted, i.e., the playing field. But there is nothing inherent in the game that the rules of the game be the ultimate rules of life and the ultimate universe. The rules of baseball, in fact, could be instances of ultimate rules, such as fairness and good sportsmanship, but it would make the game unwieldy if the rules were too general.
and pertained to an extensive universe. So, too, then, with education. These are rules, moral rules, that are inherent in the process and a view and interpretation of the universe -- general knowledge -- but it is simply not necessary that an ultimate set of values or understanding of the universe characterize public education.

But if religion is not constitutive of education, on what basis and manner should it be included in public education in a democratic society? The exclusionary view, cited earlier, would maintain that constitutionally public education should be disentangled from religion at every point. While the basis for the exclusionary view is formidable (a strict separationist constitutional interpretation), there is a prima facie reason for preventing it to preclude the discussion of a religious dimension to public education. First, there is no reason for accepting uncritically the strict separationist interpretation of the Constitution. Neither the Congress nor the Supreme Court has definitively or continuously adopted the strict separationist thesis as the only interpretation of the Constitution. There are a number of credible jurists, politicians, and academicians who hold and have held an alternative position with respect to the Constitution, namely the non-preferentialist theory. The non-preferentialist view would not interpret the Constitution as requiring a "wall of separation" but rather prohibiting the creation of a national religion or placing any one religion, religious sect, or religious tradition in a legally preferred position. And according to the non-preferentialists, there have been many Supreme Court precedents which provide a reasonable basis for this interpretation.

My intention here is not to present an involved Constitutional argument about the extremely complex relationship between church and state. My point is more limited; simply put, there is no prima facie basis for preempting the discussion of important inclusionary dimensions of religion in public education.

Curriculum & Policy: Religious Dimensions of Public Education

In this brief concluding section, I want to point out a promising direction for theorizing about the desirable points of intersection between religion and public education. In order to avoid the overwhelming complexity and tediousness of competing constitutional bases, the point of reference I am proposing is "the rational person in a democratic society." The presumption is that such a conception, which not derived directly from a constitutional foundation, would justify, at least, the clear, non-controversial applications of the Constitution to religio-educational issues. Rather than explicating criteria for "the rational person," I am going to assume that we have widely shared intuitions about the "rational person" in our society which emerges in the context of specific applications. We can confirm/disconfirm this assumption with the examination of my proposals concerning the inclusion of religion in public education.

First, let us examine the dimension of curriculum. There are surely two areas of the curriculum that only the most ardent separationists would reject as being fitting for the inclusion of religion, i.e., the social studies and literature areas. There the role of religious institutions and belief
systems should properly be studied. And this point has been made in more than one Supreme Court decision, such as the Schempp case. But I think that the rational person would agree to the curricular inclusion of religion in a manner beyond the treatment of religious topics as they naturally occur in the canon of certain subject matter fields. The rational person would want the curriculum to respect and develop personal intellectual autonomy. This can be realized, in part, by examining religion(s) in the curriculum as a mode of understanding the universe and as a system of beliefs to provide ultimate meaning to existence.

Certainly, as a part of developing into an intellectually autonomous person, the rational individual would want access to the dominant modes of inquiring and understanding, such as science, mathematics, philosophy, poetry, and religion. Further, the rational person would want various religious belief systems, along with ideologies and philosophical systems, included in the curriculum as a means of enhancing an autonomously-held belief system to give meaning and order to personal existence. Sketching out the role of religion in curriculum as a mode of inquiry/understanding and system of personal beliefs points to an inclusionary direction richer than simply acknowledging historical facts about religion.

Our intuitive conception of the rational person likewise would have application to the public policy area over matters as varied as sex education, permitting students with AIDS to attend school, drug policies, etc. The rational person would want to provide every legitimate view expressed in the policy debate, whether expressed from a religious perspective or not. He would want this so that all pertinent considerations could be included in the deliberations. The rational person realizes that the arbitrary suppression of one perspective may work against him in another context; so, self-enlightened fairness dictates that the religious voice be included in the policy debate and not relegated to the private sphere.

At the same time, the rational person would not hold that a policy should be adopted simply because it is a religious view. That is an empirical impossibility, in any case, insofar as there are potentially several incompatible religious views embroiled in my particular educational policy debate. The rational person in a democratic society would want the resultant policy to accommodate the various constituencies, including religious, insofar as it can be done without conflicting with the reasonable interests of others.

The above descriptions of inclusionary dimensions of religion in public education are obviously not detailed programs. Rather, they represent the initial effort to work out a counter-argument to the exclusionary thesis in an idiom not laden with constitutional controversy/complexity and ideological stances. While public education is not an inherently religious enterprise, the central values of a democratic society such as ours require that religion have a vital potential role in the development of personal intellectual autonomy and shaping of educational policies.

2. The noted educational historian, R. Freeman Butts, holds this view and has articulated it in a recent article, "A History and Civics Lesson for All of Us," Educational Leadership 8 (May 1987): 74-25.


Religion, Religious ar, d Religious Education

James W. Garrison
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

A Reader's Digest condensed version of professor Losito's argument for the inclusion of what he calls a "mainline" interpretation of religion in the curriculum would go somewhat as follows:

P₁ "[E]ducation is constitutively moral in character...."

P₂ Religion in its "mainline" interpretation is not constitutive of education as is morality.

P₃ Nevertheless, "there is no prima facie basis for preempting the discussion of important inclusionary dimensions of religion in public education."

These three premises, taken together, purport to establish the intermediate conclusion that religion in the "mainline" sense needn't necessarily, but may contingently, be included in public education provided certain conditions are met. Professor Losito concludes by providing us with a most plausible contingent condition in the guise of his "rational person" argument. This "rational person argument is, however, highly elliptical. It is, by the author's own admission, sketched around "the rational person in a democratic society," and depends on our "widely shared intuitions about the 'rational person' in our society."

I have some minor reservations regarding the first two premises that I will try to articulate below. Nevertheless, I believe that the conjunction of professor Losito's first three premises, at least when fully and properly unpacked, yield a valid as well as sound argument for his intermediate conclusion. After confessing my concerns with the first half of professor Losito's argument I will go on to try and eliminate the dependency of his discourse upon a mere "intuition" of the rational person. At the very least I hope to illuminate some of the ingredients that lie within such an intuition.

Let me begin with a simple, but certainly controversial claim about premise one. This premise almost certainly must be true because, I would like to say, there is no human endeavor involving volitional choice that is not constituted by some or another value either epistemic or moral. The positivistic dream of a value free science has collapsed under the weight of the issues surrounding ontological commitment and the so-called Quine-Duhem thesis. Scientists qua scientist make value decisions. In the words of the prominent early twentieth century philosopher of science, Pierre Duhem:

The sound experimental criticism of a hypothesis is subordinated to certain moral considerations; in order to estimate correctly the agreement of a physical theory with the facts, it is not enough to be a good mathematician and a skillful experimenter; one must also be an impartial and faithful judge.

Perhaps we can soften this a bit by following Larry Laudan who in his book Science and Values distinguishes between epistemic and moral values. Laudan for his part, however, thinks that epistemic values are more fundamental than moral values. I admit that I bring this matter up only because I wish to remind my colleagues that the educationist dream of a value free science of education is an illusion if not a Frankensteinian nightmare. In this spirit I add my reasons for declaring morality a constitutive characteristic of education to those of professor Losito.

My quibble with the second premise is as close to a criticism as I can get. Why must we restrict ourselves to a narrow, mainline interpretation of religion? If we consider religion as an adjective rather
than a noun we could concoct an argument that religion is indeed a constitutive characteristic of education.\textsuperscript{5} I have in mind the following passage from A. N. Whitehead's \textit{The Aims of Education}:

> The essence of education is that it be religious.
>
> Pray, what is religious education?
>
> A religious education is an education which enculcates duty and reverence. Duty arises from our potential control over the course of events. Where attainable knowledge could have charged the issue, ignorance has the guilt of vice. And the foundation of reverence is this perception, that the present holds within itself the complete sum of existence, backwards and forwards, that whole amplitude of time, which is eternity.\textsuperscript{6}

It is unfortunate that we only rarely think of education as a historical task. Nor is it trite to say that teachers really do touch eternity. Perhaps a vision of the infinite if not infinite vision is indeed the ultimate goal of education.

Actually I must admit that professor Losito is by no means amiss to restrict his argument as he does. Whitehead's version of religious education makes no reference to a transcendent entity or being. This is not an essential omission. Nevertheless, Whitehead's position gives equal comfort to deist, theist and secular humanist alike, while most of the debate in education centers on mainline religion, for example, Christianity. Please note, however, that Whitehead does make reference to transcendent reality at least insofar as natural and human history certainly transcend the individual person and it certainly seems that natural history transcends humankind. I wonder what God (or the God's) did the day before the creation (assuming there was only one) and what were the laws of physics, and I mean to say it this way, the day before the big bang.

The following remarks regarding the rational person are compatible with several senses of religion and the religious. It seems to me that our intuitions about the rational person may be rendered explicit in terms of either the traditional or modern version of the liberal theory of education. For my purposes I prefer the theory of P. H. Hirst as articulated in "Liberal education and the nature of knowledge."\textsuperscript{57} Those who are adherents of classical metaphysical realism and an epistemology that calls on the correspondence theory of truth may prefer Allan Bloom's theory or, better still, its original template, Plato's \textit{Republic}. Pragmatism, Platonism or Aristotelianism it will make no difference here.

Basically my argument for the inclusion of religion in public education is identical to the argument for the inclusion of mathematics, natural and social science, history, literature, the fine and practical arts and philosophy. Religion, following Hirst, is simply another among the disciplines or forms of knowledge that, when taken together, "implies... some kind of 'harmony' between knowledge and the mind."\textsuperscript{8} The result is the "rational mind," that is a mind in which "experience" [is] structured under some form of conceptual scheme."\textsuperscript{9}

We can, as already indicated, objectify the forms of knowledge. The result is classical realism rather than the metaphysics of experience. Either way we may conclude with Hirst that "to have a mind basically involves coming to have experience articulated by means of various conceptual schema."\textsuperscript{10} Finally we may conclude: "To acquire knowledge is to learn to see, to experience the world in a way otherwise unknown and thereby come to have a mind in a fuller sense."\textsuperscript{11} To omit any form of knowledge is to close the mind to possible experience. The religious, or if you prefer, religion, is a domain of human experience. The fully rational mind will seek to understand and appreciate such experience, even if it ultimately fails to affirm it.

I have one final caveat. Although, as we saw in the case of science, the fact/value distinction is not absolute, it does, nevertheless, hold approximately and for the most part. Insofar as it does hold, and it may well hold here without exception, it can help us out a great deal. The foregoing argument for the inclusion of religion in public education must be restricted, as far as possible, to the \textit{descriptive...}
study of religion. The prescriptive study of religion in public education is tantamount to establishing a state religion.\textsuperscript{12} It seems to me that the first amendment barrier between religion and public education must be kept high and wide for the prescriptive sense. But to likewise bar the descriptive study of religion is to affirm a dogma in defense of democratic liberty, and that is intolerable.

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Notes

4. Ibid., p. 139.
5. For an interesting discussion that leads us some distance down the street I would like to go, see Donald Vandenberg's "Education and the Religious," \textit{Teachers College Record}, Vol. 89, No. 1, Fall 1987, pp. 69-90.
8. Ibid., p. 10.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 12.
11. Ibid.
PART I

In a recent court case, *Smith v. School Commissioners* in Alabama, U.S. District Judge W.B. Hand determined that certain textbooks contained material which violated the 1st and 14th amendment of the U.S. Constitution. More specifically, he determined that (a) Secular Humanism met certain criteria which have been used by earlier courts to determine which beliefs and/or belief systems are "religious", (b) such religious beliefs were taught to the exclusion of other, more traditional, Judeo-Christian beliefs; thus this was (c) a violation of the "Establishment Clause" of the 1st Amendment and (d) a violation of students' rights under the "Equal Protection Clause" of the 14th Amendment.1

Now there are those who may see this as interesting, from a purely intellectual viewpoint. But more importantly, I think, it has monumental potential consequences for future curricular and instructional decisions in our nation's public elementary and secondary schools. Why? Because it has been the Secular Humanists who have by word and deed (and even by creed) taken a stand against including any and all ideas and practices which foster or sustain theistic, supernaturally-grounded beliefs in our nation's public schools. Even more, they have repeatedly claimed that such ideas and practices violate the "Establishment Clause" of the 1st Amendment. And clearly they were correct, for the courts have repeatedly said so.

But now the worm has turned. What was/is referred to as so-called "Secular" Humanism has by legal interpretation become "sectarian", at least in the sense that sectarian ideas and practices are viewed as synonymous with "religion." Paradoxically, many of the formerly anti-traditional religious views of Secular Humanism have themselves been construed as religious beliefs and doctrine.

This raises a fundamental question: Can Secular Humanism be a religion? Well, this all depends upon what criteria are employed to
determine which belief, belief system, or practices accruing therefrom is/are religious in nature. According to the courts the following criteria are used to make such a determination:

...[A]ll religious beliefs may be classified by the questions they raise and the issues they address...
These...may be grouped as [follows]: (1) The existence of supernatural or transcendent reality; (2) The nature of man; (3) The ultimate end, or goal, or purpose of man's existence, both individually or collectively; (4) The purpose and nature of the universe.2

A pivotal question arises at this point: Do Secular Humanistic beliefs meet any of these criteria? If many of the beliefs advanced in the Humanist Manifesto I, published in 1933,3 are a guage, apparently they do. For according to some of the tenets of that document the Secular Humanistic creed would deny any belief subsumed in criterion # 1 in the above, while tending to embrace #s 2, 3, and at least part of # 4. How is this accomplished? Let's look at how Secular Humanism deals with supernatural beliefs. Part of Secular Humanism's creed is to deny the existence of anything supernatural on the grounds "that there be physical proof of the supernatural, and to claim that an apparent lack of proof means the supernatural cannot be accepted."4 Furthermore, in numerous passages they refer to their beliefs as "religion" and "religious," even though not of the "traditional" kind.5 That is to say, due largely to the rhetoric in the Humanist Manifesto I--and only to a minimal extent in the Humanist Manifesto II--the Secular Humanists have unwittingly invited the courts to perceive them as a "religion."6

PART II

As is indicated by the title of this paper, I intend to show how and to what extent modern scientific logic can be employed to (a) clarify the problem and (b) assist both the traditional Theist and the non-traditional Secular Humanist to see their belief system perhaps in a new light.

Here's what I believe has happened: The rhetoric of the Secular Humanist--while originally intended to relate strongly to, or be underpinned by an appeal to, modern science, and to its logic and
naturalistic appeal--was allowed to wander into the nonscientific, metaphysical realm, hence making it fair game for other unabashed believers--namely the traditional Theists. That is, the language employed in the Humanist Manifesto I has placed some of the beliefs of both the traditional Theist and the Secular Humanist into the same epistemological camp, and hence they are unwittingly playing the same, non-scientific, metaphysical game (although doubtless both would be appalled at such a suggestion, I am sure).

To illustrate the point, consider what I have come to refer to as the "Atheist's Fallacy" concerning the existence of supernatural entities. For example, the Theist asserts that he believes in supernatural beings, especially an all powerful being who created the universe; while, and quite conversely, the Atheist asserts with equal zeal and conviction that such supernatural beings do not exist. But when the scientifically-oriented skeptic asks whether such beliefs can be verified by scientific methodology, by first providing an operational definition, the Theist would say that the nature of the being(s) in whose existence he believes precludes (he might say "transcends") this. So the skeptic says: "With all due respect to your belief, without an operational definition followed by a controlled set of observations, I have no other alternative than to withhold judgment about your claims--until such time such criteria can be met. Now on the surface the Atheist should be relieved, comforted, and perhaps even amused, for he may think he is proved correct because the Theistic beliefs he opposes cannot be verified by scientific method. Hence the Atheist says proudly: "See, I was right all along; there is no supernatural being or beings." But the scientific skeptic would ask the Atheist at this point: "Are you saying that you believe that there exists no supernatural being(s)?" The Atheist replies "Yes, of course." "Well," says the scientific skeptic, "support your belief by using the same criteria required of the Theist to support his. That is, operationally define what you claim does not exist, then supply evidence." "But I cannot," retorts the Atheist. "Then," asserts the scientific skeptic, "you have no more grounds for believing there is no deity than the Theist does there is."

Doubtless much of what I have said thus far will come as somewhat of a shock to those with Secular Humanistic inclinations. The "true believers" may wonder how in the world can atheism--usually seen to be an "anti-religious" position--be now viewed as another religion? Well, in one sense it is an anti-religious stance. But in another it too qualifies as a metaphysical position, and as such could be (and in fact recently has been) interpreted as simply another religious position.
It qualifies as a "religion" because it has a \textit{metaphysical} nature, and not a \textit{scientific} one to the extent that it is not grounded by the rules of science. And apparently some courts and judges perceive \textit{metaphysical} beliefs as tantamount to religious beliefs, and see no constitutional/legal grounds prohibiting such an interpretation. In this vein, understand, please, the constitution admonishes: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of \textit{religion}...." (emphasis mine) It makes no mention about anything \textit{supernatural}. Hence any and all beliefs seen to be \textit{metaphysical} are beliefs often perceived as \textit{religious} in form and content.

The point here is essentially this: any proposition accepted by anyone is a belief.\textsuperscript{7} And beliefs (whatever else they are called: "facts," "theories," "claims," "assertions," "truth") about anything which cannot be grounded either by sheer deduction from axioms (as with formal logic and mathematics) or by the rules of scientific logic, are neither true or false, valid or invalid, but are simply curious "metaphysical" statements of belief, and therefore reside outside the scientific way of knowing/believing. And as the logical positivists have been wont to say for some time now, statements about what "is" are properly verified, confirmed, or disconfirmed by concrete evidence and must meet the test of rigorous scientific scrutiny; if they cannot meet such a test, they are placed in a category labeled "metaphysical;" and other kinds of statements about what "ought to be" are simply emotive or "normative" and cannot be dealt with by science. And it ought to be abundantly clear by now that both the traditional Theists and the Secular Humanists have a good deal to say about what "ought to be" concerning human nature and conduct and their good intentions and zeal notwithstanding, it ought to be equally clear that such moral assertions are not suitable for scientific disposability.

Now with this in mind, we can use the courts' other three criteria to determine whether Secular Humanism is a religion. We do this simply by raising questions: Do secular humanists make statements of belief about "The nature of man..." which are not scientifically grounded? Apparently they do. Do they make statements about the "...end, or goal, or purpose of man's existence..." which have not been demonstrated using scientific methodology? They do. Finally, have they made statements about the "...nature of the universe..." which have not been grounded by scientific study? Most assuredly they have. Were any of these assertions warranted by any empirically-based scientific research where their key terms were first clarified, then operationally defined, and from this were hypotheses generated to be
later tested by naturalistic/empirical evidence? Apparently not. This being the case, then, the only conclusion one can draw is that some Secular Humanists have come to believe in things unwarranted by scientific logic—things, which are at best "metaphysical" and/or normative "oughts," (moral statements, that is) things which if you subscribe to the rhetoric of the courts, would be downright "religious."

In this vein, John Dewey, one of the original authors and founders of the Secular Humanistic movement of the 1930's, was rather fond of the term "religious" and used it often in his numerous essays. But he used it in a way which exempted it from supernatural considerations and tended to connect it with meanings linked with faith, hope, and commitments to "natural" systems of human making—systems to be manipulated toward bettering the human condition in the present and future life. He went so far as to assert that scientific habits and methodology could be employed to address virtually any human problem.

But Dewey's ideas about "religion" notwithstanding, many Secular Humanists claim to be Atheistic and "anti-religious" and do not want to be identified with religion in any sense. Paradoxically, now the courts are beginning to tar them with the same brush traditionally used on the more traditional Theistic religions.

Is there any way out of this precarious dilemma? I believe there is. I beg those who consider themselves to be Secular Humanists to permit me to offer this suggestion for a reconciliation and resolution to their problem: (1) Declare yourselves "Scientific Agnostics" and do not make statements of belief about that which you have no evidence. (2) Argue that the only firm grounding for any belief of what is resides in the mathematico-scientific system of logic which had its modern beginnings with the methods of Copernicus and Francis Bacon and has since their time undergone a good deal of refinement by modern mathematicians, scientists, and philosophers of science. (3) If you are compelled to make moral value assertions about what "ought to be," make it known to all that your admonitions are normative and value laden and not grounded in a dispassionate study of what "is." And what of other beliefs, belief systems and their "grounding"? The "Scientific Agnostic" would view them as neither correct nor incorrect but merely as metaphysical and thereby not accessible to scientific inquiry. My concern is that if the beliefs of the Secular Humanists are not cleaned up and relieved of their metaphysical baggage which is replete in their so-called "manifestos," then the courts may continue to view them as a "religion" and thereby proscribe their teachings and preachings from
the public schools and the textbooks and other instructional media they employ.

Last, but certainly not least, some of my more astute readers are going to say I have equivocated on the terms science, metaphysics, and especially naturalism. Admittedly, I have. Even more, I realize that ultimately a belief in naturalism and in scientific method is a "leap of faith." As John Dewey and others of like mind might have argued, even though science cannot verify itself, common sense, centuries of experience, and sheer "habit of mind" indicate that science and its offspring, technology, have become the most powerful and efficacious tools mankind has yet produced for solving many of its most momentous problems. But the critic may ask: "But doesn't science itself generate belief?" I would reply, "It surely does. But such beliefs emanate from a naturalistic orientation; secured knowledge comes from studying natural phenomena." Again, the critic: "Isn't naturalism simply another metaphysical belief?" In its most epistemologically extreme sense, "It is," I reply: "Then, wouldn't it be correct to see science as simply another metaphysical and hence 'religious' system?" asks the critic. I say, "Yes, science may be seen as 'metaphysical' and therefore even 'religious', if you carry the argument that far. But if we go to that extreme, then any and all synthetic beliefs (as Kant called them), beliefs emanating from statements in which the predicate is not contained in the subject, become, by definition, 'metaphysical' and hence 'religious'." However, I would strenuously caution against making this final, monumentally devastating, logical leap; for if we ever come to a point when the courts see science as a "religion" and ban it from the public schools, then "God help us all." Why? Because except for mathematics (which is a purely analytical, idealistic, closed system) all subject matter included in the public schools which is belief-based (and most is) will become subject to proscription due to its "religious" nature. Should this happen, I say "Welcome Back to the 'Dark Ages' of education where the witchcraft, magic, and superstition of the 'Medieval Mind' shall once again haunt the Western Civilization."

And this no doubt would be logically possible if we chose to take the argument to its ultimate conclusion. That is, it could be argued that if all those beliefs which are synthetic in nature are also "metaphysical" thereby, then with the exception of purely analytical, a prioristic, "formal" statements, all beliefs would be metaphysical and thereby "religious." But do we want all synthetically based beliefs to be so perceived? I would hope not. Surely a clear epistemological distinction can be--or has been--made between synthetic statements which are
scientific on the one hand, and metaphysical, on the other. For to lose a clear-cut distinction between these two would be to throw both into the Never-Never-Land of "Religion," and I for one would not tolerate such madness even though I am well aware that some theological and legal scholars have developed a knack for argumentation grounded in a knowledge of the history of epistemology sufficient to persuade certain unsuspecting—and naive—members of the judiciary and a host of jurors whose thoughts are still embedded in Calvinistic interpretations of Augustine, Plato, and the ancient Judeo-Christian religious texts.

But again there may be a "way out" for those who subscribe to the tenets of the creed of Secular Humanism. I would simply admonish them to: "Give up the appellation Secular Humanism, declare themselves Scientific Skeptics, Agnostics, or whatever; but whatever they decide to call themselves, they should dedicate themselves to saving science—at all costs." This is the "ought" of the last decade of the twentieth century. Now to some "true believers" this may seem too extreme, too harsh. If so, permit me to offer one final alternative. One solution to the above problem might be to re-write the first Amendment to read: "No legislation shall be enacted which respects an establishment of supernatural beliefs, nor prohibits the free exercise thereof, except when in so doing the rights of others are violated."
NOTES

1. *Education Week*, March 11, 1987, pp. 18-19

2. Ibid., p. 18


4. *Education Week*, p. 18

5. Kurtz, pp. 7-9


RESPONSE TO HAWKINS

David Kennedy

As I read his paper, Professor Hawkins's presumed intent is, on the surface of it, to make some minor adjustments in the general boundaries of philosophical discourse, in order to allow what he terms "scientific logic" to rightfully and comfortably inhabit school curricula, while what he calls "religion" dutifully takes its place, along with everything else non-scientific, outside, in the realm of norms, values, and "emotive judgments."

The presumed intent is presented as a simple terminological operation, a restorative move: to put something back where it should be, to correct a blurring of boundaries that are actually quite clear, if one just gets one's wording right, and makes no dangerous "logical leaps." But what, I would submit, Hawk's argument is really trying to do, is to carry out an ideological police action in order to protect the eroding hegemony of the logical positivist paradigm in the West. Part of this action--the cultural side--is an attempt to restore the radical humanist's deceptive claim to be on the side of reason (read "science") and against the forces of superstition (read "religion") to the legitimacy it once held among people of apparent common sense and good will.

I understand the hard core of the logical positivist paradigm to be this: there is this state of knowledge called "factual" or "scientific." It is made up of analytic a priori, but also of synthetic a priori statements about reality which have ontological status because they are "properly verified, confirmed . . . by concrete evidence and . . . meet the test of rigorous scientific scrutiny." Other sorts of statements are "metaphysical," "simply emotive," "normative," and "cannot be dealt with by science," i.e. do not have ontological status, i.e. say nothing meaningful about reality.

Now this particularly extreme reductive treatment of the ontological question has, after a long period of intellectual dominance, been shown by recent developments in the philosophy of science to be a dogma in the most patently religious sense. Thus I cannot agree with Professor Hawkins that secular humanism has opened itself to charges of being a religion because it has moved out from under this position. On the contrary: secular humanism is the paramount cultural, intellectual and anthropological expression of this position. Its recent troubles are connected, not with any change in its views or the way in which they are justified, but rather with the changing status of its epistemological ground, which is the logical positivist paradigm in Western thought.

How is the logical positivist paradigm religious? Well, let's first take the criteria for religion which Professor Hawkins attributes to the courts; then his other key word, "metaphysical." First then, does logical positivism make a statement about supernatural or transcendent reality? It makes
the very statement that Hawkins attributes to the secular humanists: that there is no such reality. How so? By limiting what it recognizes as reality to what can be fit to that set of lenses called "the mathematico-scientific system of logic", with its strictly naturalistic system of what counts as evidence. Now the very definition of supernatural or transcendent is what cannot be known by this system: if it could it would no longer be supernatural or transcendent.

The same trick is applied to the second, third, and fourth criteria. Logical positivism submits the questions of the nature and purpose of human existence and of the universe to a strictly reduced methodology of knowledge whose ground rules will invariably exclude those very questions, and thus discard them by implication as non-questions, which ammounts to answering them in the negative.

The fact that we have thrown out deductive systematizing on the grand Leibnizian scale does not mean we have done away with metaphysics. At the last great paradigm shift, Kant simply replaced one metaphysical matrix for another. The axioms and methodology of the most rigorous science are grounded, like every other belief system, on a series of assumptions--about the nature of space and time, about whether every event must have a cause, about universals and particulars, substance and change, mind and body, personal identity and free will--which are metaphysical. The fact that science can stop the Black Plague or get us to the moon makes it no less so. There is always a universal set of assumptions, or what Wittgenstein called "certainties," about what is not known that acts as the necessary background for the foreground of the known. Every detail of knowledge is, finally, grounded in an assumtional "take" on the whole origins and grounding of things.

Science's success is a result of its strict delimitation of its knowledge sphere. Logical positivism's fatal hubris is to extend that knowledge sphere to make judgments about "what 'is'" in general, and to attempt to discredit every other form of knowledge as "simply curious, 'metaphysical' statements of belief," "simply emotive, or 'normative'." But it can only do this by ignoring its own assumtional background. It says the foreground is all there is: it turns its back on its own philosophical deep-structure, in the interests of cultural power. It becomes culturally aggressive--out to conquer and subjugate other knowledge-domains, to assign everything but its "fact" to the doubtful status of "value." And with its technological dossier, who can resist it?

Only, apparently, those within the fortress. For now, with religious and moral knowledge discredited and the countryside cynical but subdued (it's hard, after all, to argue with automobiles, telephones and refrigerators), its hegemony begins to crack under pressure from its own court philosophers. Both the critique of ideology and the Kuhnian historical perspective set science back in its matrix. It is seen to be culturally and historically mediated and conditioned. It is seen to evolve dialectically, in a climate of hermeneutica, conflict, and not through the hegemony of one supposedly consensual view of method, or of what grounds method. There is even new recognition of how
other forms of knowledge contribute to its discoveries about the natural world.

As the logical positivist metaphysic begins to get relativized—which, by the way, in no way effects the health of science per se, i.e. people developing vaccines or chemical weapons—the countryside is increasingly in revolt. Those intransigent partisans called "fundamentalists," who are considered by good liberals to be mad, are intensifying their attacks on the logical positivist thought-control centers scattered through the provinces known as "schools." Meanwhile a large population of secular humanists is caught behind enemy lines. This numerous minority is an aristocracy which has consistently lorded it over the common folk (the "moral majority") by claiming epistemological privilege, in that they presume to hold a logical position about the nature of things unsullied by that damning epithet, "metaphysical." Little do they know that their own intellectuals have begun to call this claim into question—have in fact taken that "logical leap" feared and abhorred by the logical positivists as "monumentally devastating," which is to examine their own deep structural assumptional ground with the understanding that there is a pluralism of forms of knowledge, and that every form of knowledge assumes a set of "certainties" which are provable only within its particular assumptional set, or metaphysic.

Hawkins mounts a police action. His strategy is double-pronged. For one, he wants to shore up the logical positivist ideology by restating it as the ground rule for all knowledge of what really "is," and not merely "ought" to be. That is, he restates the party line in no uncertain terms, and invokes the hellish torments of that secular humanist bugaboo, "the medieval mind," on all who would falter. Next, he calls on the secular humanists to get back under the cover of the party line, which is the legitimating screen for their radical atheism. He cannot guarantee them protection unless they get their language right. But he has misjudged the gravity of the problem. It is not that they have left their cover, it is that the cover has become transparent: the legitimating screen itself has been exposed as a radically--a savagely--simplistic metaphysic. The trials of the secular humanists have begun.

Now we are permitted to dream. What would a public school liberated from this tyrannous regime look like? Perhaps it would regain a human face. I must content myself now with a little speculation about what its science would look. First, a science returned to its rightful epistemological boundaries would restrain its illegitimate hegemonic tendencies, and stop trying to pass itself off as the ultimate authority about what is and what is not. Second, a science which is truly reflective recognizes that it continually raises questions that go beyond the competency and purview of science. A reformed science does not turn and interpret those questions according to its own epistemological criteria. That, I believe, is called begging the question. Those questions are the purview of philosophy and theology—or at least philosophy of religion.
What needs to be preserved in these last decades of the twentieth century is a chastened science, yes, but above all philosophy. Philosophy as a set of criteria for judging public school curricula is a tool for examining the deep assumptions both of science and religion, showing where they share narrative structure, where their differences are merely methodological, and where they are more fundamental than that. Philosophy cannot say what is, but can keep those who presume to do so honest, and mediate their epistemological border disputes.

Philosophy, for example, now seems to be releasing religious thought from its hundred-year or so persecution by the militant ideologues of science. This does not mean that the narratives of religious thought should—as scientific narratives have presumed to do—be presented in the public schools as an official version of what is. Official versions make for intellectual and relational wastelands, and foster the "banking theory" of education. What public school students should be allowed to see is the shape of narrative itself, and its implications for human practice. Given this equal chance, religious thought can take care of itself, and science too.

NOTES

VISION AND PERSON IN TEACHER RENEWAL

Jon A. Rinnander
North Carolina Center for the Advancement of Teaching

The visionary Charles Fourier is rumored to have returned daily to his house at noon for some fifteen consecutive years in anticipation of the arrival of a donor inspired by his utopian studies and proposals for social and moral reconstruction. His many speculations on the sex of the planets, their amatory aromas, and the need for a universe without repression proved an idea before its time in some aspects and zany in others. In his work and life, however, we see a linking between cosmology, moral prescription, and a vision of possible social organization. Recent research has traced the genesis and evolution of his thought from private fantasy into projected social policy. By contrast, life in schools presents a grim world. Despite an extensive theory movement, much of the day to day action in schools is performed by unreflective harried actors. Fitting day to day decisions into an overarching moral framework is not a high priority for most teachers and principals. Their lives run the risk of being cluttered with reactive detail in which they practice at best a pre-moral life, relying on habit, remembered aphorisms, and the imperfect imitation of idealized models from their own study years before. In contrast with Fourier, a theorist who waited impatiently for the universe to present him with disciples and practitioners, teachers as moral actors are often so immersed in praxis that the very possibility of analysis is threatened.

If we advert momentarily to the traditional notion of the philosopher unencumbered by work or family duties, devoted to a civic goal and possessing leisure to reflect and discuss findings, we paint all that the classroom teacher is not and cannot be. The question then arises: what does moral education mean when its practitioners are themselves imprisoned in a vocational cave with ringing bells, harsh fluorescent light, and no time to go to the bathroom much less contemplate divine essences? For the purposes of our discussion today, it does not matter whether we view these teacher-practitioners as fallen from grace or invincibly ignorant from birth. It is possible that they read and thought speculatively as undergraduates; it is even possible that they took philosophy courses and courses in philosophy of education. They may even, on starlit nights, have pondered ultimate questions, seen themselves in a Pascalian wager or a Sartrean void, or had some kind of conversion experience to or from a religion. For most, however, these musings are faint and distant. When they say "My philosophy is...." they mean "My opinion is...." The opinion expressed may be a pungent folk aphorism, a pragmatic dictum, or a pious rule of practice. It is rarely what one might call philosophy; for one thing, it is not a proposition subject to analysis or revision. As Allan Bloom has observed, what passes

Correspondence: The North Carolina Center for the Advancement of Teaching, Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, NC 28723
for discourse with such persons is the sequential articulation by discrete atomized persons of discrete atomized opinions, none subject to any criteria of verification.

The harried person described above is our student, our student-teacher, our practicing teacher, possibly (more time than we realize) ourselves. What I propose to do in the remainder of this paper is describe and analyze the current program of the North Carolina Center for the Advancement of Teaching, to see it as a possible agent of moral education and the disseminator of a paradigm which might apply to other settings which aspire to offer moral education. Since I have spent twelve out of the past fifteen years working in Episcopal Schools and reflecting also in that context on the paradoxes involved in institutionalizing moral education, I will use nomenclature which may at first seem inappropriate to a state agency; my hope is that the mutedly messianic tone of my discourse will not be offensive. I believe that moral education fashions character, that it activates a soul which can arise to moral behavior, and that love assists reflection much as Beatrice took over from Vergil. You need not share my assumptions to see the Center as important; I work beside colleagues who would give you an equally enthusiastic picture couched in more pragmatic language.

The North Carolina Center for the Advancement of Teaching is the only state-sponsored residential retreat center for teachers in the United States. While the Friends Council of Education, through the leadership of David Mallery, has offered similar programs for years for Independent School teachers, particularly those in Quaker schools, we are not aware of other similar opportunities for public school teachers from grades K-12. The Wye seminars operated on the Aspen Institute model offer a similar opportunity for faculty in small liberal arts colleges. The pragmatic goals of the state are soon stated; it wishes to provide teachers with intellectual renewal, to encourage them to value themselves and their work, and to send them to the classroom with a sense of dedication. Another goal, recognition, is implied in the selection process; teachers are nominated by supervisors and peers and have to write essays on how they would profit from their stay at the Center.

One element of presumption or even parody is implied by our title. Certainly to link "Center" and "Advancement" associates us unwittingly with the Center for Advanced Study in Princeton. It connotes great intellects strolling bucolically across well-manicured lawns, sharing the latest results of research and reflection over afternoon tea in a vaguely Oxbridge aristocratically understated way. If you put this vision beside the image of the harried teacher I described earlier, you will see some of the inherent irony in our title. We definitely offer a change of scene for the Dickensian clerks who come to us. We are far away from work and family. We are located in a mountain village, yet our teachers can walk down the hill to the largest research library in the Western third of the state. Prior to coming, they correspond with us in an almost reverential tone; they are deferential to us, as they were to you when they were your students as undergraduates.

One key difference which it takes them some time to realize is that we hold little power over them. Since we offer no examinations, credits, certificates, or degrees, we lack the coercive power which
any professor has over any degree candidate at a college or university. In the same vein, we offer no direct reward. By sitting in a chair before us, no teacher earns continuing education units or a pay increment. What we have done by this arrangement is recreate some of the preconditions for reflection.

The teachers' classes are covered by substitutes, their travel expenses are paid; while with us they live in a dormitory setting, enjoy excellent food, have access to mentors and to books, and are encouraged to think. These circumstances would hardly be worth mentioning except for the fact that they represent a significant increment in the freedom and autonomy of the teacher-participant. They are still objectively state employees while with us; they are still subject eventually to the same constraints as before. They can indulge at the Center in a Kantian freedom; their thinking is unfettered, released from the short term dominance of the pragmatic and the expedient. For all the rhetoric of academic freedom in universities, such moments are rare in the lives of most people. These persons receive this leisure as a gift from the state or, if you prefer, as an investment by the state in seriously deteriorated human capital, persons who have lost some of the properties of moral actors and reflective persons.

Since by now you grasp something of the condition of these exemplary teachers (mixed in groups by region, discipline taught, and grade level), let me shift to the question of the content of their seminars. What do they study? How do they study it? Under whose tutelage and by whose rules do they study? What is the rationale for this particular course of study or approach?

After pilot programs were tested in the summers of 1985 and 1986, the initial planning staff of the Center (three postdoctoral fellows, of which I am one) devised a rationale. Its focus was methodological but it had consequences for epistemology, ontology, and the care of persons. Frankly in the tradition of John Stuart Mill or Dewey, the rationale stressed that knowledge was expanding and disciplines changing.

It urged center staff to plan interdisciplinary seminars that were "interactive." Implied in this paradigm was some nod to Robert Hutchins. We did not wish the Center simply to be a lecture hall for practitioners of the traditional academic disciplines. Our teachers had the option of attending graduate school to get graduate degrees; we were neither charged with nor had the desire to offer programs paralleling those in regular graduate departments. While none of the fellows believe in the ontological status of a canon of great books, we did lean toward the notion that the principal components of a seminar would be assigned reading, a knowledgeable discussion leader, and the participation of all twenty teachers each week in focused discussions around a seminar table. We did not believe that teachers would "find themselves" through intuition, self revelatory anecdote, or rambling discussion. In many ways, our method was suited admirably to one frequently assigned reading, namely Goethe's *Italian Journey*. Goethe was freed from his administrative tasks in the little douchy of Weimar and took off in a coach to enjoy Italy. While there he observed antiquities, geology, and customs, learned to sketch, wrote poetry and drama, and engaged in conversation with everyone from marketsellers to other tourists. He kept a regular journal. We would hope that the
experience of teachers at our seminars would have several elements of
that which Goethe had in Italy. We want them simultaneously to look
within and without; the sources of their educational experience with
us include reading, discussion, aesthetic contemplation, aesthetic
creation, the activation of associational memory, and the
contemplation of nature. As you can see, we offer as a kind of
spiritual purgation the tools used by the German Romantic movement.
It is not surprising, therefore, that our model of knowledge should
be Wordsworthian, that we should strive for some balance of
experiential and contemplative components. Clearly, there are
difficulties with such an approach, particularly if our teachers
return to a school with many aspects of the factory model and
authoritarian management. Are we simply feeding the discontent of
teachers by leading them to delight in a world of freedom, beauty,
and solidarity which they cannot duplicate in their homes or schools?

I will try briefly to explain the correctives built into our
program. The first is that the object of study is something real,
not the self which perceives it. Some weeks our invited faculty are
teaching economics, in other weeks geology, in others music history.
Teachers actually learn something about a subject new to them; they
share this knowledge and practice a kind of collegial learning. The
design of the program moves people away from gratuitous impressions
toward observations which can be understood, criticized, and amended
by other participants. Our notion is that the process of knowing has
as its goal the sharing and refinement of thought in a corporate
setting. While neither this rhetoric nor this practice might seem
unusual to college professors of philosophy or education, they
represent a disjunction for our teacher participants at the Center.
For most, collegial discussion of ideas is a relative rarity; faculty
meetings are filled with announcements about parking or the lunch-
room or special schedules. Teachers who work across the hall from
each other may know each other for years and exchange only
pleasantries. Thus, our uniqueness, as I said earlier, consists in
providing the setting for public school teachers to experience a kind
of professional validation that many prep school teachers take for
granted.

For us, the moral component of our program consists most clearly
in the type of discourse we model, a non-coercive discussion among
free adults concerning subjects vital to their lives. Our Center is
a protected space free from the violence and vulgarity of network
television, free from the immediate press of the marketplace, free
from religious or political conventicles. We have aspects of the
Abbey of Theleme, Rabelaisian monument to Augustine's
injunction to "Love God and do what you will." We offer harried
professionals a place to discover or rediscover that part
of themselves that hopes, that articulates visions, that "utters" truths.
What they do after they have talked with themselves and
others is not our immediate concern; while we have not tried to shape
those events or decisions, we are pleased with what we heard. Family
members, co-workers, and supervisors report that persons returning
from the Center have a different sense of themselves, are more
tolerant both of themselves and of others, and often are ready for
new responsibilities. In a word, they value themselves more. We
have somehow assisted them in exorcising the forces within themselves
which led them to depersonalization or what Maurice Blanchot has called "the neutral."9 One cause of their improvement has been the fact that, like the Benedictine monasteries, we combine two very strong traditions; learning and hospitality. By our very acceptance of these teachers, we assist them in taking the risks of intellectual discussion and speculation.

By now you know what we do, why we do it, and even some alleged results of our doing it the way we do. Let me reflect now on the consequences of our program for the examination of the term "moral education." In many ways our situation helps throw into relief some of the problems inherent in other models. If you distinguish, as we would, between moral education and indoctrination, you must be leery of situations where some participants in the dialogue have the power to impose themselves by wealth, education, accent, sex, or charismatic intensity on those with whom they are sharing the message. In our initial year we brought this problem up into consciousness, studied it, and have taken steps to remedy it; despite our nominal collegiality with our teacher participants, we had several kinds of edge. To be blunt, most of our staff had had several years of the kind of education which our teachers were getting in a one week package. We were at home with conceptualizing and abstract reasoning; they were coming from the fragmentary daily life of schools. While we now have two female fellows and two male fellows, we did not have female fellows in our first year of operation. Thus, the idyllic scene I have described earlier in this paper, a male philosophic Utopia kind of like Dante's Limbo, was the precinct visited by those who were expected to learn from persons of a different sex, a different social class, and a different region.

In short, the Center was both paternalistic and patriarchal, as well as elitist. It would have been odd, as creatures of our time and place, if we had escaped reflecting in some way the polity which funds us. We think we have come close to a model of a collegial discourse among peers, but there are issues of power and control in our seminars. We try to create a space in which the voiceless can speak but it is sometimes the case that men interrupt women, that cosmopolitan urban teachers intimidate the rural teachers, and that quick thinkers attempt to dominate those who are equally perceptive but more deliberate. Part of our own moral education as a learning community is noticing and correcting these patterns of dominance and submission. We are working with fully grown adults, most over thirty years old. Certainly those who teach K-12 classes and undergraduates would be in even greater danger of imposing themselves by power of personality or intellect. If the freedom and autonomy of the learner is a structural component of a kind of relationship which fosters the moral growth of both parties, then any aspirant to teach or embody moral education must constantly examine the power relationships within the group of teachers and learners. An ethic of mutuality and reciprocity needs not only to be articulated but practiced. There is obviously a long philosophical and theological tradition urging one to listen to the still small voice, to the inner light. The voice is important not because it manifests the personality or feelings of the speaker but because it is a possible avenue to the corporate construction of an evolving truth.
Moral education, if we accept the above, is the activity practiced by a community of learners open to seeking, articulating, and sharing the truth. Such a community is difficult to form, sustain, and develop in circumstances where participants are compelled by law, by greed, or by ambition to attend. Certainly it bears little resemblance to the modern bureaucratic university or a school whose faculty is hired through standardized certification procedures. Moral education, defined in this way, is not teaching about moral behavior or the presumed stages of moral development. It is not the inculcation of liberal scepticism or sectarian piety. It assumes the paradoxes of a pilgrimage experience: that human beings are going somewhere, that there is dross to be burned away or, if you will, illusion to be displaced by greater clarity. Current members do not possess the truth in its totality but have the obligation to be attentive to the voices of those who bring new reflection and experience.

If our Center can be offered as an example, one key component of moral education is the fostering of catalytic personalities, persons whose perceptions and energies will make a difference in the institutions to which they return. Part of our agenda is to assist such people to see themselves not as isolated cranks but as potential members of supportive teams which value intellect, imagination, and moral vision. We try to get them to see their identity as professionals in a new light; they are not the custodians of a body of deteriorating knowledge. Rather they are persons who can exemplify a stance towards ultimate value. They can lead toward or point toward qualities like curiosity, tenacity, integrity.

For us at least, moral education is not the name of a content area but rather a global term which embraces the totality of our operation. It includes our staff meetings open to program associates and clerical workers; it includes our way of analyzing glitches in program without assaulting the dignity of a staff member; it includes the candor with which we assist each other in accomplishing our tasks. What can be generalized from our Center is its ethos; after working for years in parishes and church-related schools I am delighted to find in this particular, small, new, state-sponsored agency a kind of respect for person and autonomy which has eluded me and others in other settings. Part of our morality is keeping on the beam. Our ideology is up front, discussed and amended at frequent meetings. We modify theory in respect to practice and practice in respect to theory. Our mission statement and goals are succinct but sufficiently ambiguous to permit growth. We have profited by having on our original team persons with rhetorical skills, historical perspective, and knowledge of organizational behavior. As a consequence we have been able as a team to philosophize in situ; unlike the harried teachers who are our clients, we have alternated between thinking and doing, with the advantage that we had collective resources to sustain us. If Goethe showed up in a coach at our door, I think we would be ready for him. We have tried to follow him in being faithful to the things of this world but seeing them in the light of ideas. We have tried, in short, to model the love of knowledge and the belief in human improvement if not perfectibility. Conceived as an institution to deter good teachers from leaving the profession, we have set for ourselves a larger agenda, the
redefinition of profession as a vocation.

1 Jonathan Beecher Charles Fourier The Vision of a and his World (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1986, 126
8 Recent work on George Eliot has stressed the role of the "utterance" in the moral development of her characters. These are particular moments in life in which one comes to a realization of the truth and then speaks it aloud. For this insight, I acknowledge an unpublished paper "Re-reading George Eliot" given by Prof. Neil H. Hertz of Johns Hopkins at the 1987 Georgetown University Conference on Literary Criticism.
9 For an elaboration of Blanchot's concept of "the neutral" as an immobilizing psychological state working against moral action see the Hertz paper cited above.
Cheryl Southworth  
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

As I worked to absorb exactly what was being said in Jon Rinnander's paper, I was struck by the poignancy of our current enterprise in moral philosophy. There are so many threads of thought on which to draw, each with their own power, their own potential, their own meaningfulness. Individually and in groups we struggle to weave together these threads into a coherent way of structuring our work. At the N.C. Center for the Advancement of Teaching, as described, there is a strong Aristotelian grounding, gently permeated by transcendental idealism, along with Dewey and transcendental psychology. What kind of tapestry do they form? What do they have to say about today's moral enterprise in education?

The Center seeks to be value explicit and to create their value stance through dialogue. The presentation of their current synthesis given here raises several questions. First, what is their truth model? Moral education is the "activity practiced by a community of learners open to seeking, articulating, and sharing the truth", Rinnander says. The notion of there being a truth that one seeks is difficult to reconcile with an evolving truth that is a "corporate construction", though perhaps possible. How does the still small voice enter into the construction of corporate truths? How can the truth be unfolding, implicit, and yet in need of construction through group dialogue? The metaphors of unfolding and construction, one naturalistic and the other mechanistic, are hard to reconcile. This question needs to be addressed to develop a cohesive approach to moral education.

Second, the paper starts with a serious critique of the plight of the modern educator. Teachers are presented as so encumbered by practical immediacies of a bureaucratized educational system that reflective moral activity is precluded. Thus, one needs to take the best of these teachers out of the system for a week and seclude them in an idyllic, naturalistic, intellectually oriented learning environment to give them the missing opportunities for moral reflection. Praxis and theory are separated. Theory and intellectual growth occurs in retreats; praxis in the schools. Yet, the center staff is engaged in constant modification of theory "in respect to practice and practice in respect to theory." They do this as a stable, ongoing work group, not as single isolated teachers. The staff at the center have the context for praxis-theory interaction. Teachers, apparently, do not. Thus for teachers praxis-theory must be separated in time and space. Further, the teachers are separated from their working groups to temporarily form an alliance with others while they develop theoretical perspectives. Just what is the desired relationship between theory and praxis, the individual and the group? Is separation
of teachers from their working groups an effective way of uplifting the profession.

Third, development of autonomy and "finding one's self" co-exists with the commitment to the participants being given "something real" in the form of specialists knowledge not "merely something which the self perceives." Participants are to develop from making "gratuitous (unreflective?) impressions" towards the making of observations which can be transformed through social interaction. Observations are data, then, whose meanings are dialogically established. The autonomous individual learning directly through observation appears to be missing. What is the relationship between the autonmous individual and the social group in moral education?

The naturalistic setting is deemed quite important. It appears to be a setting for intellectual growth and provides an occasion for aesthetic enjoyment and contemplation. It is a context for engagement in learning but itself has no direct learning value. Given the evoking of Goethe several times during this paper, and as required reading, this seems quite strange. Goethe did not collect data and subject them to dialogue to determine their significance, nor was aesthetic contemplation unrelated to knowing. Goethe ever strove to live into that which he observed. In so doing, says Goethe, we learn to think about ourselves, sorting our egotism from that which is.

"...nothing motivates us so much to think about ourselves as when, after a long interval, we finally see again objects of the highest significance, scenes of nature with particularly decisive characteristics, and compare the impression remaining from the past with the present effect. We will then notice by and large that the object emerges more and more, that while we earlier experienced joy and suffering in our encounter with the objects and projected our happiness and perplexity onto them, we now, with egoism tamed, grant them their rightful due, which is that we recognize their particularities and learn to value their characteristics more highly by thus living into them. The artistic eye yields the first kind of contemplation; the second kind is suited to the researcher of nature; and I had to count myself, although at first not without pain, still in the end fortunate that, as the first kind of sense threatened to leave me by and by, the second kind developed all the more powerfully in eye and spirit."1

Freedom from egotism, the being overwhelmed with the aesthetic and emotional impact of the object, enabled him to develop the ability to live into the object and come to know it. Out of this scientific approach developed his increasingly recognized

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scientific works on plants, color and optics. Goethe, the artist and scientist, like his friend Schiller, sought the multiplicity and changeability in the aesthetic and feeling realms, the unified and the permanent in the scientific. Both were distinctive areas of experience, mutually necessary for the living human experience. Schiller said:

"It would be less difficult to determine which does more to impede the practice of brotherly love: the violence of our passions, which disturbs it, or the rigidity of our principles, which chills it—the egotism of our senses or the egotism of our reason. If we are to become compassionate, helpful, effective human beings, feeling and character must unite, even as wide-open senses must combine with vigor of intellect if we are to acquire experience. How can we, however laudable our precepts, be just, kindly and human towards others, if we lack the power of receiving into ourselves, faithfully and truly, natures unlike ours, of feeling our way into the situation of others, of making other people's feelings our own?..."\(^2\)

But note, Goethe did not work from theory. He worked from a living in the object of contemplation. A modern day Goethean style scientist, Nobel Laureate plant geneticist, Barbara McClintock explains as the complexity of nature exceeds our capacity to imagine, one must let the material tell you what to do, rather than imposing your order upon the material. Science does not begin with theory and data collection, based upon a subject-object dichotomy. Each plant (her objects of study) must be watched intimately so that it may reveal its particularized story. In time a shift in orientation will occur that will enable one to see what one has not see. before:

"I found that the more I worked with them, the bigger and bigger (the chromosomes) got, and when I was really working with them I wasn't outside, I was down there. I was part of the system. I was right down there with them, and everything got big. I even was able to see the internal parts of the chromosomes—actually everything was there. It surprised me because I actually felt as if I was right down there and these were my friends...As you look at these things, they become part of you. And you forget yourself."\(^3\)

You forget yourself and in so doing see the object of one's contemplation. The object of contemplation reveals itself as if


it "were a friend". Compassionate understanding, the very heart of morality, enters into the heart of knowing.

In Goethean style science lies a possibility for integrating some of the diverse threads of thought in Rinnander's paper. The attempt to develop compassionate understanding as the basis for moral growth is what I hear as one focus of the moral enterprise described at the N.C. Center for the Advancement of Teaching, the other being reflective thought. Collegial discourse devoid of "power issues and control" (egotism) is sought—learning to listen to and respect the dignity and worth of the others with which one discourses. Such discourse requires the contemplation of the other as the other is, separated from one's own egotism; a separation from one's own egotism that enables a connection of the heart with that which one seeks to know. What ability could be of more value to a teacher in working with children and colleagues, as well as for personal growth? Then the task of education could be addressed concretely and abstractly simultaneously. When intellect is too abstracted, it all too often becomes disengaged from particularized, compassionate understanding. Therein lies moral danger. Educational theory, caught up in an ethos of equalitarian mass education, easily becomes abstracted from contextual particularity. Compassionate understanding is a necessary companion to equalitarianism, a protection against uniformitarianism and personal insensitivity.

Such retreats as the center offers an opportunity to deepen one's ability to live in experience. To the extent that one engages in the possibilities, one has a "pilgrimage experience", the experience of enlargement of self through contemplative engagement of the other. Transformation/growth is an action of one's total being. The aesthetic and feeling realms are potentially far more than backgrounds for intellectual growth. They are distinctive and necessary compliments to the intellect, a necessity for moral growth.

Fourth, engagement in retreat experiences may be the occasion for the development of "catalytic personalities" though in no way guarantees that these catalytic personalities would be either strong enough or willing, after one week, to return to their school environment and, alone, attempt to engage others in similar transformative work. "Catalytic" personalities can only work well in environments in which there is significant openness to transformation. Careful reflection on when it might be more valuable to work with teams of teachers/administrators from the same school setting and to what extent some ongoing relationship with some of the schools might facilitate deeper transformations would be of value. There are, as we all know, major social/political difficulties of engagement in value centered rather than context centered pedagogy. Such experiences/dialogues more readily impact educational settings that can be value explicit. Facing such issues takes a high level of compassionate understanding along with the necessary component for moral action, courageous commitment. In the Center for the Advancement of Teaching, these qualities appear to be emergent, even if in need of refining.
The Education Crisis and The Humanities

The last three years have seen at least eight major reports on the status of teaching in higher education in this country, citing an alarming decline in the quality of undergraduate education. Most of these attribute the erosion, in large measure, to "arid teaching" and the "narrow scholarly interests" of college and university faculty, resulting in byzantine curriculum patterns, especially at the freshman and sophomore levels. These studies dovetail reports sounding similar alarms at the secondary level. There, too, faculty are cited, less for specialization than for lack of competence in their fields. Yet, though both institutions are being assailed, almost all of these studies strongly recommend a closer working relationship between secondary schools and higher education, since it appears to be the very breakdown of "articulation between secondary and higher education" that abetted the decline, indeed, spread it from the one institution to the other.

Our special concern has been the deterioration of humanities education in both secondary and higher education. Those who have spoken on this subject decry a loss greater than declining SAT scores. Besides William Bennett's now well-known injunctions, Allan Bloom has recently lamented the fact that "the old teachers who loved Shakespeare or Austen or Donne, and whose only reward for teaching was the perpetuation of their taste, have all but disappeared." This loss "results in students' seeking for enlightenment wherever it is available, without being able to distinguish between the sublime and trash, insight and propaganda." Yet even if one is persuaded by Bennett, Bloom and others of the need to rekindle the humanities curriculum, there are several problems to be confronted that, because of the pluralistic society in which we now live, will very likely be with us for a long time:

1. Should students be exposed very early on to the "great books" or should the accent be upon teaching different ways of apprehending the world? Will it be texts or tactics that drives a humanities curriculum?

2. Should students be taught humanities as if they were a specific body of knowledge, a tradition which we all ascribe to or should they be taught as if the great minds were always probing beyond the traditions of the time? In other words, should humanities teaching be edificational or visionary, hermeneutic or deconstructionist?

3. Should students be taught moral values in humanities courses as if these are to be lived by or as if they are options? In other words, should teachers aim at a neutral or agnostic stance to moral questions or should they actively advocate...
certain moral positions, and if so, which? 8

We have now posed two different sorts of questions: the procedural ones about how to alleviate the crisis in secondary and higher education, and the substantial ones about how/what to teach in humanities courses. How do the two relate and what are the consequences of relating them? Our answer to this question comes in terms of a model--the collaborative effort between secondary and higher education that we call the Coppin-Hopkins Humanities Program in the Baltimore City Schools.

II
THE COPPIN-HOPKINS PROGRAM

This program, a partnership involving the Johns Hopkins University, Coppin State College, and the Baltimore City School System's Office of English, is currently training all literature teachers in the Baltimore secondary schools to teach classic texts to their students. The current project comprises three three year phases, at the end of which all city school teachers will have learned to teach Plato's Republic, Dante's Divine Comedy, and de Tocqueville's Democracy in America. We will be discussing the first phases, the teaching of Plato's Republic.

Overall, the intellectual focus of the project is the teaching of certain "pressure point" texts, those in which one can view an age in microcosm. In teaching Plato's Republic, for instance, the senior high school literature teacher will need to discuss elements of Greek history, raise questions about the meaning of certain Greek terms, and explore implications of Plato's philosophy in his very attempt to teach the literary dimensions of the work. One reason a primary text is adjudged a "classic" is that it is polyvalent, and this is as well a most compelling reason for spending class time on it.

There are 150 secondary school teachers of literature in the Baltimore City school system. Over a period of three years, all of these will be trained in the reading of the Republic, beginning with teachers of junior students and ending with teachers of senior students. The training will involve an intensive five-week summer course of study on the text and its historical, philosophical, and literary context. Also there will be activities during the following academic year designed to deepen the teachers' knowledge and to incorporate the text into the curriculum (bi-monthly seminars featuring internationally-known figures in Greek literature and culture, and monthly visitations by professors to participants' schools). At the end of the three year process, a curriculum guide unifying and improving the teaching of ancient literature and culture by means of the Republic, will at that time become a permanent feature of the curriculum.
III
TEACHING JUSTICE

The previous section attempted an answer to the first set of questions: we believe that any curricular change in high schools should involve all teachers in a particular discipline, intensive training in content, extensive discussion of methods of teaching the content, articulation between secondary and higher education, and constant re-evaluation. This will provide the backdrop for our paper. Within this structure, now, we will spend the bulk of the time allotted for the paper in addressing those questions specifically treating humanities education. We will do this by using an example arising from our summer session on the Republic: How can one teach secondary students the concept of justice using classic texts?

Employing the Republic, Book I as a background and Antigone and parts of the Oedipus myth as foci, we will demonstrate how it is possible to focus on process—critical thinking—with the aid of "great books." This addresses the first of the three questions forwarded in Section I. But two questions still remain: with this method aren't we teaching one particular culture's views on justice and aren't we teaching these as values to be ascribed to? These two questions have tended to be answered along ideological lines even in philosophy. Our proposal, we hope, undercuts in some measure the entrenched positions of left and right by accenting values of critical thinking and free-but-disciplined inquiry. The Socratic dialogue, we will argue, embodies certain values (fairness to opposing positions, the attempt to distance oneself from his/her own biases, the dedication to getting to the facts of the matter, the commitment to constant rethinking of one's own position, etc.) that are, or should be, primary values of both left and right. In the Coppin-Hopkins Program we have teachers face these questions and develop their humanities curricula with an awareness of the implications of text-selection and thematic development.

FOOTNOTES

For a comparison and summary of earlier reports, see Education Under Study, Second Edition (Northeast Regional Exchange, Inc. 1983), which analyses nine studies.

2. The quotations are from William Bennett in "To Reclaim a Legacy," and Ernest Boyer in "Integrity in the College Curriculum."


5. Ibid.

6. See similar questions put by Derek Bok, op. cit., p. 40 ff.


8. The best and most comprehensive study done on this question is the twelve volume Hastings Center series The Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education (Hastings-On-Hudson: The Hastings Center, 1979).
HOW DID IT PLAY?
A RESPONSE TO FURLONG AND CARROLL

Anthony G. Rud Jr.
The North Carolina Center for the Advancement of Teaching

In a provocative and elegantly-written paper, John J. Furlong and William J. Carroll have described an ambitious project, the Coppin-Hopkins Humanities Program in the Baltimore City Schools. I propose to briefly summarize the main points of the essay, and then offer what I hope is constructive criticism based upon my experience working with K-12 teachers that may aid the ongoing development of the project.

The authors describe a program supported by NEH that will provide a rigorous and rich introduction to works by Plato, Dante, and Tocqueville. Furlong and Carroll, along with faculty from Johns Hopkins University, are now involved in the first phase of the project, teaching Plato's Republic to the 150 secondary school teachers of literature in the Baltimore City Schools.

Furlong and Carroll make a strong argument for the use of classic texts in their teaching. Classics such as the Republic do not admit of facile interpretation, and any easy appropriation of their "truths" is bound to fail. Since the Republic presents multiple perspectives in dialectical conflict, the type of teaching needed to even begin to appreciate the work must encourage students to extract those views, examine them for their merits, and defend or criticize them based upon their cogency. This requires not only careful thought (logic), but also broad knowledge, or what everyone now calls "cultural literacy." When one is challenged to muster a well-supported argument, more recent and immediate texts than the Republic may be examined and brought to life. The authors have shown how this may be done through an examination of Plato in conjunction with the Declaration of Independence.

I would want to have more detail from the project coordinators on many aspects of the program. What is the nature of the participants and their background? Are the classes mixed randomly, or is an effort made to achieve a certain mix of participants? Particularly with a text such as the Republic, a mix of race, gender, and background would enliven discussion of the nature of justice. What differences are noted in the teaching of this curriculum? Are small group work or innovative projects more likely to occur as teachers try to enhance particular aspects of the text?

Furthermore, I would want to know more about how this curriculum affected the schools where the teachers taught. These teachers are organized around a common text and manner of learning. I would want to know if a sense of collegiality developed in the group. Matthew Lipman and others speak about the importance of converting the classroom into a "community of inquiry," a cooperative venture fueled by a love of learning. Do the teachers swap stories on how to teach certain topics, and does the reading of the Republic encourage them to read "around" the text - perhaps other dialogues, history, or historical

Correspondence: North Carolina Center for the Advancement of Teaching at Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, NC 28723

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novels? I would also want to know if there was any transfer, or dialogic "coupling" with other disciplines, especially the sciences, and whether there a sense of real participation, pride and even ownership by the teachers, students, and parents in these newly discovered "old" texts.

I would also hope to hear how novice teachers learn from the veteran instructors. Some of the most interesting research occurring today in the area of education has to do with "teacher knowledge." Lee S. Shulman and his research team at Stanford University are exploring, in what they call "wisdom of practice" studies, how veteran teachers approach a lesson. Shulman's group assumes "that experienced and excellent teachers are capable of pedagogical performances that educational theory and research cannot yet explain, much less predict." It would be valuable to know the nature of the dialectic between novice and veteran teachers or what Shulman calls the "pedagogical content knowledge" involved in teaching Plato in the public schools. Veterans may have valuable insights, not only for teachers of the Plato course, but also for scholars, that may enhance the living legacy of Greek thought.

When these teachers go back into their classes, what do they encounter? In bringing Plato alive to students, what are the unexpected difficulties encountered, and what are the pleasant surprises? Allan Bloom criticizes the "psychological obtuseness" of today's students: "It is a complex set of experiences that enables one to say so simply, 'He is a Scrooge.' Without literature, no such observations are possible and the fine art of comparison is lost." Perhaps an unofficial measure of the effectiveness of the reading would be if teachers and students were overheard describing a bully as a "Thrasymuchus" rather than as a "pain" or "jerk."

One final concern: though "great books" are mentioned in the text, there is no further discussion of the relation of this proposal to Mortimer Adler's work. Central to Adler's current thinking is the importance of what he calls "the Wednesday revolution," where time every Wednesday morning would be set aside throughout a school for a seminar on a central text. Such seminars are led by all faculty at a school, since Adler assumes that no advanced or specialized content knowledge is necessary for effective seminar teaching (indeed, in a conversation last year at our Center, Adler suggested that elementary school teachers, who must juggle many different subjects and stress their interrelatedness, are often better seminar leaders than discipline specific secondary school teachers).

I bring up Adler to emphasize my central concern with pedagogical issues in the Baltimore program. Our work at the North Carolina Center for the Advancement of Teaching (NCAT) has led us to de-emphasize the role of the visiting expert. We are at home with the facilitator who wears his or her learning lightly. What Paulo Freire calls "banking" occurs all too often with experts: glazed-eyed participants passively receive the expert's pellets of information without actively engaging in brisk discussion with the expert and thus, actively acquiring the knowledge themselves. I am slightly suspicious of the "bi-monthly seminars featuring internationally known figures in Greek literature and culture" unless these sessions are conducted as genuine seminars where the leader serves as a facilitator and catalyst for discussion. I have endured enough canned and cavalier lectures masquerading as seminars given by "distinguished" faculty to sound a note of caution about this part of the Coppin-Hopkins project, since at other places, the authors praise "socratic" teaching as the avenue to thinking in
the humanities. For these experts to be truly effective, their important insights must be imparted socratically even to the teachers. In this way, "banking" would be avoided and a fundamental weakness of Adler's "great books" curriculum would be overcome, namely, the overriding tendency of that approach to see books or ideas removed from the historical and cultural contexts that provide layers of rich meaning.

Furlong and Carroll address two different sets of concerns: procedural issues related to overcoming "the crisis in secondary and higher education" and substantive issues concerning the content of these courses. They examine three related concerns in asking whether humanities education should emphasize tactics or tests; whether humanists should preserve or challenge tradition; and finally, whether humanities teachers should be morally neutral or take a stand. Furlong and Carroll make convincing arguments about the first two questions. Concerning the moral stance of a teacher, the authors are not so clear. I assume that "taking a stand" means being explicit about an issue; such pedagogy would certainly be antithetical to the beginning of a conversation on justice. Again, good teaching about ideas is a process of extraction, so that students see and defend a point of view as their own. Since the authors do suggest later that good teaching is "socratic," it would have been helpful if this point had been made more explicit here. They offer their model as the answer to these concerns. I have asked for more information on the actual program, one that a teacher wise in practice, to paraphrase Lee Shulman, might ask. Plato revised his thinking about government in light of his failed efforts in Syracuse; so too might the team in Baltimore later present us with information gleaned over the history of the project that would begin to answer the question: how did it play in Baltimore?

4. Ibid.
8. See Plato's Letter VII.
The concept of personal identity has received detailed attention in philosophical literature since the seventeenth century. In recent years investigation has focused on such topics as: (1) what differentiates persons from animals, (2) the criteria for individual differentiation, (3) the criteria for individual reidentification of the same person under varying conditions, and/or (4) the characteristics that determine a person's real identity. And the investigation has been conducted within the background of mind-body dualism and the person-personality distinction (sometimes referred to as the problem of personal unity).

The theorist who set the stage for present discussions was John Locke, who believed that consciousness in the form of memories makes a person the same through different times and places. However, Locke's memory theory has been criticized as untenable by numerous philosophers including David Hume, Joseph Butler, and Antony Flew. Their attacks focused on the circularity of the memory argument and the problem of justifying memory claims. The problem of justifying memory claims arises because of the necessity of distinguishing between genuine and apparent memory in a case of reidentifying an individual person. Her own memory cannot be appealed to to justify her own memories. That is clearly circular. The justification must come from something other than memory or consciousness itself, and physical presence is cited as a source of evidence. Unfortunately, this erodes the memory theory of identity. The result is that the self-sufficiency of the memory theory of identity is generally rejected.

However, one memory theory that has not received much attention is that of Giambattista Vico. In this paper I shall develop Vico's view of personal identity with special attention to his view of personal identity. I am particularly interested in practical/moral identity by which I mean the "desires, goals, character traits, and normative beliefs...(that fix our) practical orientation toward the world."

To do so, I shall examine the following topics: (1) Vico's life and thought, a quick survey; (2) his rejection of the person as substance; (3) the rhetorical theory within which Vico develops his view of personal identity; (4) Vico's memory theory of personal identity, and (5) finally, his memory theory as an answer to the two major critiques lodged against other types of memory theories.

First, we turn to Vico's life. He spent his life in Naples, Italy from 1668 to 1744. The sixth of eight children, his father was Antonio di Vico of Maddaloni; (1632-1708), and his mother was Candida Masullo. Antonio, the son of a farmer, went to Naples about 1656, opened a small bookshop and married Candida (Antonio's second wife), the daughter of a carriage maker. The first significant event to young Vico's life was a fall from a ladder at age 1; his doctor predicted he would die or grow to be an idiot. Rather he developed a melancholy and an irritable temperament. He completed grammar, logic, and rhetoric and entered the Royal University of Studies, where he studied law. During this time he was heavily influenced by the Jesuit and nominalism. Unfortunately, the family fortune was severely reduced and he left school and worked in his father's bookshop. He met Monsignor Rocca, Bishop of Ischia, who aided him in becoming a tutor to his nephews in a castle and the cimento. He stayed with the family for nine years. During this time he studied Platc Aristotle, geometry, and Descartes, particularly the critical method. When he returned to Naples he found Descartes' philosophy at the height of its
reputation. He had no heroes, and was sure he disagreed with Descartes. Through a friend Don Nicola, he obtained an appointment to the University of Naples as a teacher and rhetoric. While there he produced On Methods in Contemporary Fields of Study (delivered in 1708, published in 1709), On the Ancient Wisdom of the Italians Taken from the Origins of the Latin Language (published 1710), The First New Science (published 1725), The Second New Science (published 1730), Autobiography (1725-1731), The Third New Science (published 1744).

He changed drastically in 1733 after he failed to secure a chair of law. His position prepared young men for admission to the law course and paid a miserable 100 ducats a year. The law chair paid eleven hundred. The winner was Domenico Gentile a notorious seducer of servant girls and sickeningly weak as a writer. His "one attempt was withdrawn from the press after being exposed as a plagiarism." This freed Vico from any hope of professional advancement, and he spent the remainder of his life writing what he believed in. His grand achievement was the New Science. Beyond the details of his personal life any study of Vico must recognize the shifts in his philosophical views. Early in his career his neoplatonist leanings were evident in On the Method of the Studies of Our Time (1709) and The Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians (1710). But by 1725, with the publication of the New Science, first edition, he had discovered the principle that occupied twenty years of his life, the imaginative universal. In the two earlier works he attacked the methods and educational philosophy of Descartes and the Cartesians, but it was only in the New Science that he fully rejected the deepest underpinnings of Platonism and Cartesianism.

From this brief biography one point must be singled out and emphasized. Vico was a teacher of rhetoric and loved jurisprudence. These formed the views and approach in his writings. It is accurate to say that Vico's theory of the person is a rhetorical one. One purpose of this paper is to explain what that means.

We turn now to Vico's discussion of Descartes' critical method and the substantive self. As a modern thinker Vico had some sympathy with the critical method. He believed that we must begin in ignorance as if there were no books in the world. This type of skepticism is reminiscent of Descartes' "First Meditation" and Nicholas of Cusa's learned ignorance. Clearly Pyrrhonists were looking over Vico's shoulder as well. And he believed they must be reckoned with. He was also impressed by advances Cartesians made using the critical method, particularly their study of geometry. But he recognized the limitations of the critical method particularly for the education of the young. They should be taught fables and not simply mathematics and the deductive method. The imagination of the young must be developed. Only then can they develop the art of eloquence essential to proper education. The Port Royal Logic was inadequate for developing a rhetor's eloquence. This critique is the theme of On Method in Contemporary Fields of Study. But his major critique of Cartesianism was reserved for the cogito.

Vico believed that Descartes' confidence in the certainty of the self's existence rests on an argument that is faulty. Rather than prove the truth of the existence of the cogito, Descartes succeeded only in proving the certainty of consciousness. He has not answered the skeptic. Vico's claim rests on the distinction between the true and the made. The "true" is a knowledge of causes (Aristotle's four causes) and is the subject matter of philosophy, the discipline concerned with universals. The "made" is the arrangement of the particulars under a reason or a form. The true is made. God as Maker makes the first truth. He fully understands all things. We are finite and know only what we make. We do not make the natural world or our
bodies, and we cannot know them. We, however, can think about them and develop views, and those views are only probable. We persons possess a finite knowledge only as we provide the warrant justifying the connection between grounds and claim. Through the warrant, the third term, we bring the particulars of the claim and the grounds under a cause or rationale. We can be certain of the occurrence of experience without knowing the truth of it.

In the case of the cogito, we can know for certain that we think without knowing the reasons supporting it. Consciousness is not made by us and we cannot know its causes. In the case of the cogito we are certain of our existence but do not know our existence. It may be objected that Vico has failed to understand that Descartes bases his argument for the cogito on logical grounds. Descartes distinguishes between logical and psychological certainty, and Vico failed to recognize this distinction. But that would be a misreading of Vico's critique. By connecting the true and the made Vico has introduced a distinction that Descartes ignores. We have the particulars of consciousness but no rationale sufficient to explain them (God has, but we do not.) For this reason Descartes' argument for the self is faulty, and Descartes has not answered the skeptic. This also means that Vico does not believe Descartes' claim that we have knowledge of a self underlying the changing particulars of our experience. The essentialist self cannot be supported in the way Descartes does so.

We now have before us Vico's main argument against the essentialist self, in particular, and the Cartesian philosophy, in general. What the critical method leaves out is that which is necessary for the possibility of art, for rhetoric, and indeed for science itself, ingenium. Rational argument as defined by the critical method focuses on mathematical, logical reason and the conceptual universal. It attempts to reason about experience within the constraints of logically necessary propositions. However, Vico believes that what we learn from rhetoric is that which connects the elements in an argument is something other than the argument itself. It is the third term. This is a presupposition of argument and cannot be justified by argument itself. All argument rests on a prior seeing, ingenium. How are we to account for this connection?

To understand the third term, a principle fundamental to the logical structure of the New Science, we must turn again to the verum-factum doctrine. In the development of this doctrine he provides the key to his philosophy and to his view of person, the imaginative universal. How are the verum-factum principle and the imaginative universal related? As we saw, verum means "truth" or "true," and factum means "make." By "true" Vico means that which we know the causes of. By "make." Vico means that made by the mind that is intelligible. This refers to the third term in an Aristotelian syllogism. It connects the claim and the grounds. We can supply the justification only for what we have control over. We can know the world we make, the human world; but we cannot know the world we do not make, the material world and our consciousness. Only God knows the connections among the particulars in the world. We can know what we make but not what we do not make. What of the mind gives it the power to make, to connect? Vico contends that it is the imaginative universal.

The imaginative universal is the heart of Vico's philosophy, and it can be discussed from many perspectives. We shall study it as the root of thought itself. Here Vico asks the fundamental epistemological question. True to the view that Vico's philosophy is rooted in Rhetoric, Verene says, Vico "asks how the mind comes to have something before it all. By asking how there ever comes to be something, rather than nothing, before the mind, Vico is able to see knowledge as
The mind rises above immediacy through the image. Images are not of something; rather they are the basis for there being anything before the mind as individual, particular or universal [the intelligible or conceptual universal]. The mind forms through the image, the imaginative universal, the individual. The mind is able to form individuals through the power to produce identity. Through the image the mind is able to "find again" in immediacy. Thus Vico believes that the mind is able to connect because of its capacity to form images, imaginative universals. Forming images, as we have seen, requires "finding again" in immediacy. What does this mean?

Thought rests in the capacity of the mind to form immediacy through images. The "againness" that is present in the imaginative universal is rooted in memory. Vico believes that the faculty that allows for the formation of the imaginative universal is memory. Memory consists of: (1) itself, (2) imagination [fantasia], and (3) invention [ingegno]. Memory as "itself" is the capacity of the mind to bring before what is not before it. We might simply call it recall. This is the power of the mind for "againness." Without this capacity we could not form an image, an identity. Imagination is the "power to reorder what has been recalled and to shape it after the general form of the subject. . . . Through fantasia the mind makes the object familiar; objects are not simply apprehended in themselves but are shaped as human objects." Finally, ingegno is the power of the mind to form the elements recalled into arrangements and relationships. This capacity allows us to take a name, say that of Jove, that is realized in one instance and spread it through the whole of experience. All three capacities of the memory function collectively to find again, to form sensation into imaginative universals. In this sense they are the primordial powers of the mind. To complete this discussion of memory and before we move to the characteristics of the person we must consider one other important topic, common sense.

The development of nations and persons within them takes place within the meaning we make for ourselves. This means that the forms of nations and persons take place on the basis of and within the capacities of the imaginative universal, memory. Vico's word for this meaning we commonly share is common sense. He says: "Common sense is judgment without reflection, shared by an entire class, an entire people, an entire nation, or the entire human race." This means that all subsequent development of human life and institutions takes place within common powers of the mind and within common makings of the mind. As we have just seen, memory is at the root of the imaginative universal. Memory is also the theater of the person. (Hume uses this metaphor, but he fails to explain adequately how particulars are related, particularly in memory.) But what is in that theater? This brings us to narrative.

As we form imaginative universals we narrate. Vico says, "The fables in their origin were true and severe narrations, whence mythos, fable, was defined as vera narratio." Metaphors are "fables in brief." His primary example is Jove. Every nation has its Jove. As such it is the basis of law, of nations, and ultimately of persons. The important point here, however, is that narration is at the root of common sense which in turn is the common background of all society.Narration is also the necessary condition for the possibility of persons. We now turn to Vico's view of person. As we shall see, however, that this rather lengthy discussion of the theoretical aspects of Rhetoric was necessary to grasp what Vico means by person.

Vico wrote no full statement of the nature of person. What he says is scattered through the New Science. However, with the foregoing analysis of Rhetoric for our
background we are in a position to pick out the most important features and to present a somewhat unified view of person. We shall discuss person under the following headings: identity, narrative, choice, community, relativity, and eternality.

First, persons possess identity, but the kind they possess is not best understood within the framework of particulars and universals employed by many philosophers who have investigated this issue. Most discussion since Locke is conducted within an empiricist epistemology that is projected into the political theory that persons are first particular solitary persons that later organize themselves into a society. In response to moral and political issues the problem of personal identity is to identify, reidentify, and justify claims about a distinct person as numerically the same. Locke appeals to memory as the criterion for establishing personal identity.

Locke and others who have appealed to memory as the basis of identity failed to take into consideration the function of imagination and invention. Most discussion since Locke is conducted within an empiricist epistemology that is projected into the political theory that persons are first particular solitary persons that later organize themselves into a society. In response to moral and political issues the problem of personal identity is to identify, reidentify, and justify claims about a distinct person as numerically the same. Locke appeals to memory as the criterion for establishing personal identity. He conceives of consciousness as capable of being extended backwards to any past action or thought. Memory is a form of internal perception. We have a memory of the past. As present memory is of events that occurred in the past. Rather, for Vico, though identity rests in the memory, memory is not simply of the past. As we have seen it is much richer for it includes itself, imagination, and invention. And through the imaginative universal or metaphor, wholes are formed. Therein arises the individual. We create or make the individual through memory and the imaginative universal that develops through memory. Locke and others who have appealed to memory as the basis of identity failed to take into consideration the function of imagination and invention. But the memory makes only the individual. How does the individual of the here and now have a past and future as well as a present? We turn to narration for help.

That which gives the person identity through time is narration. We have seen that through the three functions of memory and the imaginative universal identity is formed. Identity must be understood in terms of narration. Thus the connection through time that we experience and that is fundamental to common sense is narration. Vico believes that the narrative that is found in every culture is the Jove myth. All thought arises, for Vico, in fear. The imaginative universal does not arise "as the answer to a problem thought sets for itself. It is given birth through the master passion of fear." After the flood recorded in the Old Testament giants were wandering the earth. By a mortal fear of thunder they were awakened from their animal condition to a human condition. In response to thunder the giants formed the image of Jove. They saw Jove as thunder. This fear is primordial in the sense that life is in danger of being completely overcome; deeper still, this fear is angst. Jove is the first individual, and in this personage is the experience that is threatening. They elaborated myths, and distinctions began to emerge between earth, sky, humans along with benign and malignant forces. Further, in myths all the oppositions were brought together in an attempt to mediate them. But what part does the Jove narrative play in the identity of persons?

Third, persons are first members of a community under Jove. Only later and within this common sense do individual persons arise. Persons are dyadic or communal in nature. This means that persons for Vico were not originally isolated individuals who come together in a political community born of desire for safety and unified by contract. Evidence for this dyadic view of the person comes from Vico's analysis of the heroic view of the body and in the New Science. He distinguishes between the body, soul, and spirit. The body is composed of solids and liquids. The soul was the air and "the vehicle for life". The spirit is "the vehicle of sensation." The theological poets who formulated this heroic view thought of the spirit as masculine and the soul as feminine for the spirit acts on soul. The soul is the origin of motion, and the spirit is the principle of conatus. There is no mind-body dualism here. Indeed, the spirit was thought of in terms of three parts of the body: "the head, the breast, and the heart." They
assigned imagination and memory to the head. Passions were seated in the breast, and the seat of counsel was the heart. Wise men were called hearted, and stupid men were called heartless. What is instructive about this view of persons as it developed in the heroic age, according to Vico, is its superficial analysis of the internal life of persons. We must remember that all of these came before Freud. The important thing about persons was not their internal life but their relations to their fellows under the sacred narrative, the myth. Verene captures the sense accurately in his comment, "...the human appears first in communal form, out of which the individual human being is developed. The history of the self begins with the community, not the reverse; the being of the individual emerges from the being of human culture."35

Fourth, persons have the capacity for choice. This ability is exercised in sensus communis which in turn is rooted in the imaginative universal. As we have seen myth, as the elaboration of image, mediates opposites, the malignant and benign forces in human experience. The presence of these opposites make human choice possible. Only in the presence of alternatives can there be alternatives available for choice. Further, choice as agency and as the basis for the world order (factum) "is not based on rational inference from rules or laws but is accomplished by acting from a common perception of things, a sensus communis."36 Choices are included in the certainties that philology investigates and that form the basis for Vico's view of ideal external history. Choice implies the possibility of persons as moral agents.

Fifth, the identity of persons varies with the age of which they are a part. Vico believed society develops through three ages: the age of the gods, the age of the heroes, and the age of men. The important point here is that the identity of persons changes as their culture changes. Vico describes the ages in this way: "These are: (1) The age of the gods, in which the gentiles believed they lived under divine governments, and everything was commanded them by auspices and oracles, which are the oldest institutions in profane history. (2) The age of the heroes who reigned everywhere in aristocratic commonwealths on account of a certain superiority of nature which they held themselves to have over the plebs. (3) The age of men, in which all men recognized themselves as equal in human nature, and therefore there were established first the popular commonwealths and then the monarchies, both of which are forms of human government."37 The nature of persons changes with each succeeding age. There is no underlying essence that is continuous through that change that constitutes personal identity. To grasp Vico's point here we turn to the sixth and final point about his view of person.

Persons go through a cycle that Vico calls ideal eternal history. This is a master image by which to envision the whole of human events, the primary interest of the New Science. Vico uses this image to recount the history of people as they move from the age of the gods to the age of men. He sees human society moving from barbarism to barbarism. One is the "thick darkness" of antiquity in which society and men first arise. The other is the barbarism of reflection. Here persons lose contact with sensus communis that constitutes the basis of society and replace it with "the deep solitude of spirit and will."38 This is the barbarism of reflection. His is our age. Insight is now divorced from memory, and the intellect [rooted in the conceptual universal] guides unaided our lives in society.10 But this is not the end of it all. Societies rise and fall only to rise and fall all over again. This is the way of society and persons within them.

We are now in a position to draw some tentative conclusions about personal identity in Vico's thought. He rules out our knowing any kind of soul or bodily substance. Furthermore, memory for Vico is not (except in a limited sense) of an
object; as such it is not the basis of personal identity in Locke's sense. Rather, narration rooted in the imaginative universal that grows out of memory constitutes the identity of persons. Can Vico's view and personal identity avoid the problems of circularity and criteria? It can because the identity of Vico's person is not based on memory understood as consciousness of past events, actions, or thoughts. Rather memory constitutes objects, one element of which is arranging them structurally and temporally. Vico's theory of person avoids the problems of Locke's and provides a fruitful alternative.

16. Causes refer to the four causes of Aristotle. A developed theory of causation in the manner of Hume is an achievement later to be won.
17. See Verene, Imagination 69-94, where he discusses the imaginative universal "(1) as a theory of concept formation, (2) as a theory of metaphor, and (3) as a theory of the existential conditions of thought" (69).
18. Verene, Imagination, 81.
19. The theory of metaphor Vico uses contrasts the theory in which metaphor is understood in terms of likeness or similarity. Both arise from Aristotle's view of metaphor, "Metaphor is the application of the name of a thing to something else..." Poetics, 57b 9-10.
22. Ibid., 104.
24. Ibid., 814.
25. Ibid., 403-404.
26. Ibid., 193.
31. Ibid., 692-702.
32. Ibid., 695.
33. Ibid., 696.
34. Ibid., 599.
35. Verene, "Response," 42.
36. Verene, Imagination, 147.
38. Ibid., 1106.
For some years, I have attempted what I call generative responses to papers. This precedent should serve me well in responding to a paper on Vico since I know very little about his thought. In fact when I agreed to respond to this paper, I thought it would force me to study Vico's philosophy of history. Having started my career as a historian, philosophy of history was my first love when I entered philosophy. At my age the prospect of rekindling an old flame was enticing. But when Tom's paper arrived I discovered that it was concerned with the self not history. His paper rather than directing my thought down memory lane generated thought about the self in the phenomenological tradition.

Certainly anyone in the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition would welcome Vico's contention that self identity originates with the common sense of historic community rather than with individuals forming compacts as Locke contended. However, a Husserlian would caution that common sense can distort ordinary experience. This raises the question of how one can understand oneself historically and at the same time avoid the pitfall of historicism?

In my original reading of the first draft of Tom's paper, I thought Vico contended that one understood oneself by creating a narrative drawing on one's memory, a narrative which, of course, would be influenced by the common sense of one's time. My response speaks to this interpretation of self understanding. If it fails to do justice to Vico, it will raise the issue of romantic distortions of the past through narrative recreations. Romantics recreate the past to satisfy current ego needs as exemplified in the recreation of the old south by southern historians. In addressing the problems of historicism and romanticism, my response will consider the privileged place of first person understanding of the self and of the relationship of past to present and future.

The influence of historical thinking is evident in Vico's view of the self. A historian uses records from the past to create a narrative account of a people's past. In similar manner, I could come to know myself as a narrative reconstructed or recreated from past memories. But knowing myself historically is different from writing history in that I am the major primary source for the narrative. After all I was there in the sense of participating in the events of my life but also in the sense of my being there. Since I was being there, I remember my being there differently from others who were also there as participants in the events of my life but were not me being there. My parents

Correspondence: 3229 Landon Street, Lynchburg, VA 24503
tell many stories about me when I was young. They should know, after all they were there. But when they recall stories about me their being there was not like my being there. Both of our stories would count as primary sources in writing history since we were both there. I could construct a third person account of my story carefully avoiding the use of I; thus, pleasing my former English teachers. But I must reconstruct this account because I was not there as a character in my stream of consciousness, I was being there or put differently I was the stream in which the story unfolded, but I was not in the stream. I was the presence to the world in which my story was unfolding but I was not in that world in the way my parents were.

William James recognized this difference in pointing out that experiences which I have lived are remembered with warmth and intimacy lacking in stories of my life told by others. Although James' insight helps us to recognize lived experience in the memory, it still seeks the self in past experience. Whatever else I mean by myself I certainly mean me being there as presence to the world. Myself names that first son encounter with the world which can no more be reduced to Dewey's organism interaction with an environment than the thou of Buber's I-Thou can be reduced to "a dot on the world's grid of space and time".2

James did, of course, recognize that by self we mean "I" being conscious of the world. In fact, he designates the self as "the me" which I know and "the I" which does the knowing.3 But he did not account adequately for how we know "the I" without making it the object "me".

One way in which I can know myself is to interpret my creations and actions. For example, interpreting my article on the Buber model for teaching in response to critics helped me recognize that I respond to most philosophers creatively, or generatively, as I am in this response to Vico as interpreted by Buford. Similarly, students could come to a better understanding of themselves by interpreting their creations if they expressed their being-in-the-world rather than their conformity to a teacher's requirements. Without freedom of self expression, as Dewey has pointed out, students cannot be known through their works.

Students also can come to know themselves through interpreting actions. Since the theme of this conference is morality and education, I will include two events from my high school experience through which I gained understanding of myself as a moral being. At the conclusion of a boxing bout which determined who would be the first boxer in my weight class, my opponent and friend asked why I had not finished him off when I had him dazed on the ropes. I responded that I could not attack a defenseless person, much less a friend. The following year I discovered that I could. Then, by any standard, I was a star boxer. Our coach asked me to box one of our young... inexperienced boxers. After some hesitation I agreed; but only if the coach understood that I
would not hit hard so as not to hurt him. My opponent hit me with a hard punch which wounded my ego more than it hurt me. I unleashed such a devastating attack on him that the coach stopped the fight. His look of disapproval and his silence indicated to me that, unlike my former coach who demoted me for my lack of "killer-instinct", he believed that aggressive attacks on defenseless weaker opponents was morally reprehensible, and so did I.

I can make the above interpretations of my past because as Husserl points out, I am not only present to the world but am aware of my way of being in the world. Recognition of my generative way of thinking came not merely from my interpretation of my writing, but from being aware of how my thinking occurred when I was writing. In the boring examples, I was aware of my reluctance to attack my dazed friend and of my embarrassment which evoked the vicious attack on my helpless opponent. This privileged position was possible because I was not only aware of what was occurring during an event but of how I was involved in that event.

Of course, it could be argued that such interpretation of actions and creations concern what has been done and created in the past and therefore could be included in Vico's narrative based on memory. But extant creations and intersubjective interpretations of events serve as checks on the memory of one's past which as James points out is often distorted in recreating it. But there is another and perhaps more important way of guarding against romantic falsifications of my past. When I project into the world, my memory is constantly at work drawing on skills, understandings, and attitudes from the past. I am only required to re-member when my past fails me in projecting into the future. I project myself into the future in a way which requires a past I do not have, then I live in tension and pretense. My tense, inauthentic way of being indicates to me that I have constructed a false narrative of my past.

Seeking self-understanding through creating a narrative account of the self drawn from memory is one important way of understanding the self. But it requires a distinction between memory of experiencing events as a participant and as my being there. Also, it must avoid an historicism which would make the self a creation of past, on the one hand, and a romanticism which would use the past to recreate the self to satisfy ego needs. Guarding against creating a false narrative is necessary because my understanding of myself is integrally related to the way in which I project myself into the future. As Kierkegaard has eloquently put it: "It is perfectly true, as philosophers say, that life must be understood backwards. But they forget the other proposition, that it must be lived forwards."
TEACHING COOPERATION

Richard J. McGowan
Milwaukee School of Engineering

A goal, and consequent problem, which I have undertaken as a professor teaching ethics is that of teaching students in an effective, hence affective, way to value cooperation. This goal is especially relevant in an ethics classroom inasmuch as "a society's system of moral standards will identify situations in which each person must restrain his or her self-interest in order to secure a system of conduct that is mutually advantageous to everyone."1 Prescinding from considerations of ethics, I would make the further, stronger claim that even in many non-moral or non-ethical situations, restraint of self-interest secures a system of conduct that is mutually advantageous to everyone. The results of this function of moral standards and the suggested further prudential claim is the paradoxical situation of generally maximizing self-interest by seemingly curtailing it. The problem for me as a professor is how to show this.

The Cooperation Experiment

My solution to this problem is a matter of giving students their choice of workload. Having assigned a workload of two papers and two tests on the first day of the quarter,2 I offer my students in the first week of class the following choice:

Option A: optional exemption from a paper and a test

Option B: optional exemption from a paper

I allow neither discussion nor questions of me and instruct the students to write their name and their choice on a piece of paper. However, I add this rider: if less than 15% of the class members choose Option A (referred to as the "greed option" by my students), each person will have his or her choice honored. Thus, should 10% of the class members choose Option A, those who comprise that 10% would be exempt from a test and a paper at their discretion, not mine.

To give my students the widest latitude, I announce that Option A can be exercised at any time up to the first week of the next school term. The point is to emphasize for my students that the optional exemption is wholly their choice and within their province, even if that choice may entail more work for me in making a retest or changing grades. Should a successful chooser of Option A skip a paper or test, dislike or wish to improve the final grade, that person may invoke the option of doing the work after the due date. That choice constitutes a legitimate exercise of Option A.

The only way that anyone can "win" a reduced workload is if better than 85% of the students restrain their self-interest.1 This fact about the game, while somewhat obvious, is rarely given proper consideration.

Correspondence: General Studies Department, Milwaukee School of Engineering, Milwaukee, WI 53201-0644
The Results

As might be expected, my students have, in their words exhibited "non-cooperative, self-seeking behavior." After thirty trials, only two classes managed to cooperate and "win" on the initial run. My most recent experience involved three ethics classes. Of these classes, none showed 85% or better cooperation. Seven of thirty-one students chose Option A in one section, ten of thirty-four in another, and ten of thirty-one in the third.

The failure of my students to cooperate and restrain their self-interest angers and disappoints me. I let them know my feelings on the failure and then point out that no one maximized self-interest, not even me. Everyone must do all assignments and I, in turn, must grade all the work. Usually, my students respond in kind, telling me that my directions were unclear. But the kinds of claims they make may suggest that, far from unclear, the directions were clear and direct. For instance, I have been told that people must choose Option A in order to have a successful trial. The directions never refer to a mandatory choice of Option A, however. The frustration of failing to "get out of" an assignment or two does lead to some resentment and maneuvering. Thus, the instructions for the cooperation must be repeated for clarity's sake, or, possibly, in writing. Also, despite clarity, frustration with the failure will inevitably lead to some bitter remarks.

The problem is not so much with the instructions but with the temptation of a greatly reduced workload. The rational decision to ensure a lighter workload is to choose Option B. The only way to "win" is through cooperation in significant numbers.

Embellishing the Experiment

I would hope that my students learn the lesson of cooperation: self-seeking, non-cooperative behavior diminishes desire satisfaction for both the individual and the members of that individual's community. One sure way or determining whether they learned anything is to run the experiment immediately, or even in the next class, following the failure of the initial run. If all the students realize what they have done to themselves and me, they will all choose Option B. Thus, I repeat the experiment, asking them to make the choice again, and, again, without discussion.

The instructions I give my students are slightly different though. I ask them to make the same choice and that is all. On the second trial, I make no promises and provide little context. Students assume the game is intact as previously played.

However, the parameters have changed. On a second trial, I feel I can legitimately expect 100% cooperation, especially after chiding them for the initial failure. But I do not tell my students that the parameters for a successful trial have changed. I do not tell them that if less than 100% of the class chooses Option B, failure will result. Omission of specific reference to the change in parameters preserves freedom of choice, and, ultimately, shows the meaning of knowledge. After all the students have chosen, I gather their papers and inspect them. Upon finding the first choice of Option A, I scoop
all the responses and crumple them, announcing that the second trial failed also.

The first trial shows that self-interest demands restraint in order to be maximized; the second trial shows that one person can make a difference.9

The second trial also shows the special nature of ethical and axiological truths. Ethics is a knowing related to a doing. Ethical truths are not dispassionate bits of information but guides for conduct. It is not enough for my students to say that cooperation maximizes self-interest; they must act on that basis.

Furthermore, the experience serves to remind us that human beings, including students, exist in a community. My students become aware of this fact in the ensuing discussions after the experiments. I ask them how they would feel toward a classmate who chose Option A on a successful initial trial. After all, those few who chose Option A have, in effect, jeopardized everyone’s chance for a reduced workload. When those few do not show up to take the tests with their peers, those few are "marked" as self-interested and greedy. Hence, even after a seemingly successful choice of Option A, self-interest may be far from maximized inasmuch as those few are shunned socially and academically.

The belief that the virtues of competition outweigh the benefits of cooperation, I should add, has in recent years undergone empirical study. The findings show, by and large, that cooperation, not competition, produces greater success in attaining the desired goals of the individual and the group.10 The classroom experiment I devised shows the students in a first-hand manner what the studies have found.

A Further Device for Teaching Cooperation

An alternative or addition to the cooperation-defect game by and with all the students in the class. The game is a set of ten discrete moves of either cooperation (C) or defection (D) by two players. Each player numbers one through ten on a piece of paper and, one move at a time, writes a C or a D. If each player cooperates and enters a C, each player scores 3 points. If one cooperates and the other defects, the defector scores 5 points and the cooperator scores zero points. If each player defects, each scores 1 point. The players score each move before proceeding to the next move. Thus, if player Y writes C and player X writes D for each’s first move, Y scores 0, X scores 5, and both are aware of the results before proceeding to the second move. High scores are desirable. In a game with the two players, the player with the higher score wins.

One obvious strategy to win or at least tie every game is to enter a D for every move regardless of the other player’s move. If two players were to adopt this strategy, the worst they could do is score the identical 10 points.

My classes have played this game under the following condition: highest average will net its possessor an optional exemption from a
test or a paper, student’s choice. The obvious strategy of "winning" every game through constant defection will yield the strategist many victorious battles but, unless the entire class adopts the same strategy, a calamitous loss in the war. One cooperative move will upset the balance of constant defection. Furthermore, unless the defector is playing a machine programmed to cooperate always, a move of defection will be returned in kind. Defection, in short, has the net effect of lowering the scores of both players, besides lowering the net utility, rendering unlikely the defector’s exemption.

If both players cooperate, each will score 30 points for a 60 point net utility. The first move of defection, though, begets defection. The spiral of defection increases until net utility is lowered. Indeed, the "winning" score for this game, at least in my classes, has never been above 28 points. In turn, those who cooperate generally have had the higher averages.

It is possible, though not probable, and almost impossible practically considered, to have a classroom of constant cooperators. In such a case, every student will have an identical 30 point total and each will have earned an exemption since each has the winning high score. The exemption, though, is such temptation that reversion to unthinking, non-cooperative, self-seeking behavior results. Mass cooperation not only raises the net utility, but also results in individuals’ maximum utility. One of the lessons of the cooperation-defect game is that in many activities, there may be more than one winner.

The other significant lesson from the cooperation-defect game is the corollary that not every game is a zero-sum game and there could be many winners. For every winner, there need not be a corresponding loser. For every winning move, there need not be a losing move.

Life is not a series of zero-sum games. For professors and students this is especially true, for learning and teaching are activities where everyone can win.

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2. Students at MSOE normally carry 16-20 credits in the 11 week quarter. The course load consists mostly of engineering courses, following students' interests. The general studies courses meet 3 times per week and carry 3 credits.

3. Students win a reduced workload of mandatory assignments. They are free to submit more than the required amount of work. I encourage them to do more than what is required.
4. The original inspiration for my experiment derived from William Allman's "Is Greed Smart?," *Science* 84 (Oct. 1984), pp. 24-32. I have presented this choice to my classes since then.

5. In one of the successful classes, a student blurted out, "You mean if we all choose Option B, we get out of a paper?" He was the cause of my refusing to answer questions and disallowing discussion.

6. The lesson of cooperation maximizing self-interest is valuable enough for any class.

7. Justification for a reduced workload for the successful, cooperative class may be relatively simple: those students have less to learn.

8. As I teach at a school of approximately 1700 students, the students will leave class and "do their homework" on my teaching history. They will come to the class following failure prepared for me. In the early days of this experiment, I did not do an immediate second trial, but allowed time outside of class to lapse.

9. I did retain the responses for this past term's results, partly for this paper, partly to see if cooperation can be taught or learned. All classes had four or more students choosing Option A, but all classes had at least a 35% decrease of Option A students. Those that chose Option A decreased from ten to five, seven to four, and ten to four.

I appreciate Professor McGowan's candid and honest description of his cooperation experiment. Let me see if I understand correctly what he is trying to do in his ethics course, as he outlines a strategy for the game.

He is giving individuals the option of substantially reducing their workload in the course. But the reduction is tied to a cleverly put condition, which effects everyone else's workload. Too many "greedy" students mean that no one can have a workload reduction. By discussing among themselves, even by shunning of classmates who persist in selfishly exercising their personal greed option, these academic egoists are led into a reluctant state of cooperation. Slowly they come to realize that personal restraint in favor of the entire class's benefit will allow everyone to come into the benefit of a somewhat reduced—although less so than the greed option offered—work/exam load. Thus, according to McGowan, the lesson of cooperation is learned.

A clever game! But can it be called teaching ethics? Is it even ethical teaching on McGowan's behalf? Let us examine his game, its rules, its effect on the players, and even his overall stance in the design.

McGowan's cooperation experiment leaves me curiously unsatisfied, and even a bit insulted, and I would like to forge somewhat stronger links in the chain of his argument for teaching cooperation. To begin, one would need a definition or at least a fairly clear conception of some of McGowan's terminology: "teaching ethics" and "cooperation."

Let us examine what we mean when we talk about teaching ethics. McGowan is correct in stressing the relation of ethics to action. The Greeks called it "praxis" or "pragma." But by reducing the cooperation game to self seeking pragmatism where the finally-chosen behavior is based on the consequences of one's actions for one's own well being, he opts for finding the least admirable common denominator among reasons for human cooperation.

I claim that there is a special character to the rules of behavior which we recognize by calling them ethical. We are talking about rules of behavior which relates to goodness, badness, duty, and obligation. These however, are not qualities which are identical to others, such a pleasurableness, desirability, comfort, ease, etc.

Most discussions of ethics, but not Professor's McGowan's, start by attempting to define goodness in terms of other concepts, which again include the adoption of a system of beliefs about what we ought to do for ourselves and for others. In G.E. Moore's words, "Propositions about the good are all of them synthetic."
The most I can get out of Professor McGowan with regard to an ethical belief is a statement that the common good is a good, and that it can be arrived at only by cooperation. Thus, one needs to examine what he means by cooperation. While he does not offer a definition, one may assume from context that he holds cooperation to be a relationship between human beings which is mutually satisfying. Satisfying for what reason, is my strong although grammatically inadequate plea? What are the underlying principles for teaching cooperation? Reflections on ethical issues are about principled behavior, about motives underlying actions, motives which are tied to adopted sets of beliefs about what is good, bad, dutiful, or obligatory.

In looking at McGowan's cooperation experiment—the success of which I do not debate—I am attempting to trace the developmental process which his students undergo as they come to grasp the desirability of individual restraint in pursuit of a more generally satisfying state of affairs. Here I must sharply differ with him, especially since he professes to be a teacher of ethics.

McGowan has engineered his students into a bit of social learning. Like Ashly Montague's human zoo, his class roca is filled by creatures who have come into the world with a set of basic instructions that can be ignored or disobeyed only at their own peril. After all, we humans—seen biologically—are herd mammals. Each member of the herd has to survive against the pressure and throng of the multitude of which each one of us is one. To escape being penalized for self seeking, uncooperative behavior, and to come into the benefit of the possible work/exam load reduction, his students learn to restrain themselves from exercising the greed option, option A in his experiment. But has he helped them expand their sense of social responsibility?

His game has little to do with the expansion of students' sense of social responsibility. They are not grasping the relationship between duty and common good. Thus, he is what C. L. Stevenson would call a propagandist, interested in shaping cooperative behaviors. But he is not a moralist, one who influences ethical attitudes. He has no ethical cause. At least, he does not state one. Although his experiment is persuasive, it is questionable in regard to ethical wisdom. Is it even professional? Beyond our bodily existence in the human zoo, we are cognizant of ethical systems of belief. Homo sapiens is more than a naked ape. Man has acquired the ability to create values beyond a mere naturalistic ethic and has developed systems for passing on the tradition.

Throughout the history of philosophical inquiry the notion of the sumnum bonum has been one of the central issues for debate. McGowan's argument, unfortunately unstated by him, may be taken to be: what is good for all, ought to be. But at what expense is he engineering his students into the desired cooperative behavior? What antecedent reflections are pursued by them? The notion of good will is sadly missing. Not even a watered down Kantian categorical maxim is lurking in the discussions in his class. Most shockingly, what is McGowan's own perception of his students' social principles? The message into which they are so skillfully massaged seems to be: Everyone wants to get out of work. This includes even a professor who wants to get out of grading papers. Trying to get out of work is OK. All this course work might not be necessary. Putting pressure on others to get out of work is also OK. I add: Why have the course at all?

Of course, I would hardly accuse Professor McGowan seriously of unethical behavior. But in his zeal for innovation he has undercut the very subject he teaches. Since he is discussing ways of achieving an educational aim and means of
achieving it, John Dewey comes to mind easily. McGowan's students learn to appreciate that restraint and cooperative behavior are desirable. According to Dewey's distinction the cooperation truth remains a statement of fact, or at best an evaluation or appraisal statement. It is never elevated to a statement of moral judgment.

McGowan's students come to appreciate cooperation for what Hume might have termed an attendant pleasing sentiment of approbation — fed back to them by reactions of their classmates. Lastly, by changing the rules of the game unbeknownst to his students in the middle of the game, he keeps a heavy hand on what he would term their ethical development. Says Lao Tsu: a leader is best when people barely know he exists. Having structured his experiment around stimuli for obtaining avoidance responses, McGowan's rewards are for not-doing, rather than for freely choosing from embraced ethical principles. But I forgive him all, because he has led me to ponder at some depth a few truly worthwhile questions which any teacher should examine during not too distant intervals in her career. Although I would differ with his answers, I wholeheartedly agree with his question into ways of helping students develop insights into the importance of striving for the common good in all one's actions.

CENSORSHIP AND THE RIGHT TO READ

Susan Bjork O'Brien, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Child Development Center

Joseph E. O'Brien, Virginia Commonwealth University

Introduction

"Students should not be asked to accept the tenets of democracy on faith, but rather they should be assisted to develop commitments based on analysis and reason."

"Many discussions and textbooks leave students to make up their minds about things. Now that's just not fair to our children."2

These statements represent quite divergent views on the role of ideas and students in our nation's public schools. Few people question the public school's responsibility to prepare young people for life in our democratic society. As the above statements indicate, some people question the means by which the schools accomplish this end. The position taken by New Right groups, such as the Gablers and Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority, and by some groups on the left, is that there is a set of values and a certain outlook on life which all young people must absorb and accept prior to graduation.

These values are a mixture of morals and democratic principles which are seen as forming the basis of our constitutional system. The Gablers and Falwell portray the fate of the nation as resting upon the acceptance and practice of these values. Any criticism or change in these values not only endangers the spiritual well being of the individual, but threatens the nation's future. As Mel Gabler put it: "[W]hen a student reads in a math book that there are no absolutes, suddenly every value he's seen taught is destroyed. And the next thing you know, the student turns to crime and drugs."3

Supporters of this viewpoint perceive citizenship education as a closed-ended problem -- there is only one answer, one vision of our constitutional system. When public schools encourage students to analyze the abortion issue in an objective fashion or to brainstorm possible solutions to crime, they fail to properly prepare students for citizenship. While we do not question their right to espouse these views, we do challenge their attempts to impose these views on public school students.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that public schools may not cast a "pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."4 Yet through the censoring of library books and textbooks, the New Right in particular is attempting to use the public schools for exactly this purpose. The future of this nation depends not upon the acceptance of a rigid set of beliefs by students who are taught to perceive problems in an either-or fashion, but rather upon the development of humane, rational young people who perceive problems from a global context. One means to help guarantee this and to fight the rising tide of censorship is by guaranteeing young people the right to read.

Correspondence: Virginia Institute for Law & Citizenship Studies, Box 2020, 1015 W. Main Street, Richmond, Virginia 23284-2020.
Overview

Prior to elaborating upon the right to read, we briefly will examine censorship from a historical and contemporary perspective. We intend to present for threat that censorship poses to the educational system. After reviewing the censorship issue we will construct a right to read based on five premises:

1) Public schools are intended to serve as laboratories of democracy.
2) A young person's intellectual and social development depends upon the opportunity to explore a variety of ideas, even ones contrary to established disciplines and community norms.
3) Knowledge is power. Access to information and the ability to manipulate ideas are crucial to an individual's continued personal growth and professional advancement.
4) The purpose of a right is to maintain a balance between governmental, authority and individual autonomy.
5) The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees individuals' freedom of expression in a public forum, but as presently interpreted, fails to provide adequate protection for public school students.

Censorship: The Battle for People's Minds

The question over how much to allow people to encounter new ideas stretches far back into our history. Over 300 years ago Sir William Berkely, colonial governor of Virginia, wrote, "But I thank God we have no free Schools nor Printing and I hope we shall not have these hundred years. For learning has brought Disobedience and Heresy and Sects into the world, and Printing has divulged them . . . God keep us from both."

The realization that a free interchange of ideas and opinions represented the cornerstone of a democracy led the framers of the Constitution to adopt the First Amendment. This amendment guaranteed freedom of expression in a variety of forms such as freedom of speech and the right to petition the government. During the nineteenth century, this amendment did not apply to the states and even though the states often possessed similar guarantees in their own constitution, these often only protected mainstream political and religious groups. Laws prohibiting slaves from learning to read, the banning of Karl Marx's Communist Manifesto, and the repression faced by the Mormons are just several examples of successful attempts to censor ideas during the 1800's.

Despite these shortcomings, the U.S. Constitution represents the embodiment of a set of ideals which serves as a guide for us both as individuals and a nation. The First Amendment forms the centerpiece of these ideals. Also, the Constitution lays out a governmental framework designed to work towards the accomplishment of these ideals and to adapt, and in some cases expand, the interpretation of these ideals as the times warrant. Beginning in the 1920's, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the states failed to adequately guarantee people their individual rights. Slowly but surely the Court determined that the Bill of Rights applied to the state governments as well as the federal government. This process started due to attempts by government officials to suppress people's freedom of speech and to censor newspapers. The application of the First Amendment to the states, though failed completely to curtail censorship attacks.
School and public libraries in particular, since they represent the primary forum of information in our nation and are a bulwark of our democracy, are the foremost targets of censors. In response to a rash of censorship attacks in the 1930's, the American Library Association (ALA), developed the Library Bill of Rights. Several pertinent sections include:

1. **Books** should be provided for the interest, information and enlightenment of all people. Materials should not be excluded because of the origin, background, or views of those contributing to their creation.

2. Libraries should provide materials and information presenting all points of view on current and historical issues. Materials should not be prescribed or removed because of partisan disapproval.

While the ALA's Bill of Rights represented a cogent and forceful statement of principles, if often failed to deter censors. In the early 1950's, for example, the Boston Post attacked the Boston Public Library for carrying such Communist literature as Karl Marx's Communist Manifesto and the Soviet newspaper, Pravda. The Boston Public Librarian commented:

"[It] is essential that information on all aspects of political, international and other questions be available for information purposes in order that the citizens of Boston may be informed about the friends and enemies of their country. The basic question is whether we still have confidence in the average American's ability to separate bad ideas from good by his own unaided effort. When we lose that confidence we shall have lost our faith in democracy itself."

The early 1950's and the age of McCarthyism represent the first modern bout with censorship. Fear of communism caused people to challenge not simply the promotion of communist ideas but even access to them. Censors lashed out at schools as well as public libraries. In November 1953, Mrs. Thomas J. White, a member of the Indiana Textbook Commission demanded that schools remove the story of Robin Hood from all Indiana textbooks. Mrs. White claimed that "[T]here is a Communist directive in education now to stress the story of Robin Hood. They want to stress it because he robbed the rich and gave to the poor. That's the Communist line."

Fearing the effects of limiting people's opportunity to explore new, and sometimes controversial ideas, groups like the ALA attempted to curb the censor's efforts. The ALA revised and reaffirmed its Library Bill of Rights. This statement was only as effective as people's willingness to observe it. People like Paul Blanshard went a step further and articulated a right to read. He argued that the people's right to freely seek out ideas contrary to the community's norm overrode people's interest in maintaining that norm.

With the civil rights movement in the 1960's, the censors became subdued. As the momentum behind the civil rights movement began to subside, the censors became more vocal. The attacks on school libraries, in particular, increased. Some of the more frequently censored books in the early 1970's included: Catcher in the Rye, Grapes of Wrath, and Lord of the Flies.
While there was a decrease in the number of challenges to books during the late 1970's, various conservative forces coalesced into such groups as the Moral Majority. These forces also found voices in people like Mel and Norma Gabler in Texas. One of the most noteworthy political developments during this same period was that religiously driven conservative groups began to realize how to use the political process to advance their interests. This included everything from placing pressure on a local school board to remove supposedly immoral books from the school library shelves to the evolution of the "New Right" as a powerful political force.

By the early 1980's, censorship was on the upswing. This was first documented in a study conducted by the Association of American Publishers, the American Library Association, and the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development. In March 1986, the U.S. National Commission on Library and Information Sciences reported to the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriation for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and related agencies that censorship attempts had risen by over 35% between 1979 and 1982 and had remained constant since then. More importantly, the Commission concluded that only about 15% of the censorship incidents are reported to the ALA.

Conducting their own study, the People for the American Way claimed that there were censorship incidents in 46 states in 1984-85. Approximately 46% of the challenges resulted in removal or restriction of the material. The report indicated that some challenges came from the left. For example, a fourth grade history textbook in Sioux City, Iowa, was rejected because it was deemed "offensive to American Indians." Challenges from the left, however, were few and far between.

The bulk of the challenges came from conservative groups. Mel and Norma Gabler exemplified not only the view of these groups, but also their growing political sophistication. They formed the Texas-based Educational Research Analysts which was designed to "review" textbooks. Their efforts became crucial for two reasons. First, textbook publishers use the major purchasers of textbooks, which Texas is one, as test markets for new books. Second, 28 states adopt textbooks on a statewide level. The Gablers use their reviews not only to influence the Texas textbook commission's selection, but also send the reviews to other state textbook commissions. While one may perceive their efforts as a shrewd marketing strategy, the ALA has concluded that the Gablers' reviews have resulted in over 50% of the textbook controversy.

The controversy centers around the reasons the Gablers use to justify their actions. In their Handbook No. 1, the Gablers argue: "As long as the schools continue to teach abnormal attitudes and alien thoughts, we caution parents not to urge their children to pursue high grades and class discussion because the harder students work, the greater their chances of brainwashing." This attitude is shaped by the Gablers' fundamental religious beliefs.

A major tenet of fundamentalism is that only God is capable of solving human problems. Faith, right belief and conforming are essential to a person's and nation's spiritual well being. They perceive life in polar terms: good-bad; right-wrong; innocent-guilty. Since there is no in-between, there is no reason to explore alternative solutions to problems or to encourage creative thinking. For fundamentalists like the Gablers, "[T]he teaching of humanism in public school not only defies Christian values and authority of parents, but borders on treason and violates the U.S. Constitution by teaching a religion." For them, teaching
humanistic values is little different from selling drugs to students -- both are wrong. Yet, it simply is not important that their own children learn these tenets, but that all children learn them. Fundamentalists feel threatened even when other children read books like *Grapes of Wrath*. This vision of the United States, however, runs counter to the principles which form the basis of our constitutional system.

Public Schools as Laboratories of Democracy

"The great moral attribute of self-government cannot be born and matured in a day; and if children are not trained to it, we only prepare ourselves for disappointment if we expect it from grown men . . . . As the fitting apprenticeship for despotism consists in being trained to despotism so the fitting apprenticeship for self-government consists in being trained to self government." 11

In his Ninth Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board of Education, Horace Mann in 1846 argued for public education which allowed young people to develop into democratic citizens. By so doing, Mann envisioned citizenship education as the primary goal of public education. This raises two questions: What is a democratic citizen, and how do schools prepare such citizens?

One of the ironies of American history is that as the nation grew larger and more democratic, the definition and expectations of citizenship diminished. Most definitions of a democratic citizen today focus on the notion of participation in the political process and on the possession of the personal skills necessary to adjust to an ever-changing society. While these are important, this is a far cry from the Enlightenment period when political leaders like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison envisioned citizens not as participants in society but as society-makers. As Jefferson noted in a letter to Edward Carrington on January 16, 1787, "I know no safe depository of the ultimate power of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education." 12

According to Jefferson, a democracy depends upon an enlightened citizenry. Instead of consumers of information who learn simple citizenship skills such as voting, students must become familiar and experienced with democratic processes and learn how continually to adapt the ideals inherent in the Constitution to an ever-changing society. Since society does not expect this latter role of citizens, schools do not prepare students for it. Instead schools emphasize the importance of gaining skills necessary for their economic livelihood and of becoming literate so as to participate in elections. Schools prepare servants and consumers of democracy, rather than the makers of it.

In order to prepare democratic leaders and society makers, schools must serve as laboratories of democracy. As noted in a position statement on citizenship education by the National Council for the Social Studies, "schools and classrooms cannot operate as dictatorships in which the highest virtues are obedience, submission, and conformity, and expect students to develop into democratic citizens." 13 The governance process utilized in classrooms and schools "can help or hinder the cultivation of qualities associated with democratic citizenship." 14 As laid out by NCSS, a democratic school climate is characterized by such items as the opportunity
for students to express their concerns over school-related issues such as classroom procedures, as well as the opportunity to explore controversial issues and to express opinions about them.

Unfortunately, censors and often even educators usually address the role of controversy in the public school curriculum either by ignoring or removing it. People's hesitancy to deal with controversial issues is particularly ironic since a host of democratic yet conflicting principles threaded throughout the Constitution serve as the source for most of the controversy. The abortion issue, for example, arises out of a clash between the right to privacy and the state's power to regulate areas which fall within their domain. Censors maintain that the manifestations of these conflicting democratic principles are inappropriate for classroom discussion. By sanitizing the curriculum, censors and educators deny students the opportunity to learn ways to engage in healthy, open democratic debates within an educational environment. The present approach to citizenship education creates the seeds for eventual disenchantment with the government as the students come to realize the true nature of politics, and it stresses conformity to the point where divergent ideas are regarded as unhealthy and possibly un-American. Conformity rather than consensus is regarded as a major goal of citizenship education.

John Dewey recognized the importance of allowing students to explore new ideas when he commented that "[T]he only freedom that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence . . ." He realized that solely relying upon ideas and experiences of the past as the basis of young people's education represented sheer folly. He saw little value to "subject matter that was selected and arranged on the basis of judgment of adults as what would be useful for the young sometime in the future, [since] the material to be learned was settled upon outside the present life-experience of the learner . . . [and] had to do with the past." While he acknowledged the importance of learning about the past, he perceived the dangers of allowing the past to dictate the future.

Students need to discover the world around them. Complete reliance upon other people's past experiences takes the discovery out of the learning process. As Jerome Bruner stated, "[M]uch of the problem in leading a child to effective cognitive activity is to free him from the immediate control of environmental rewards and punishments. Learning that starts in response to the rewards of parental or teacher approval or to the avoidance of failure can too readily develop a pattern in which the child is seeking cues as to how to conform to what is expected of him." By solely focusing the educational process around the adults' perception of the world, educators encourage the students to conform to the prevailing norms and to define the world around them in terms of their parents' experiences.

According to Dewey, schools should encompass the "practical learning of science and technology, democratic community, spontaneous feeling liberated by artistic appreciation, freedom to fantasize, and animal expression freed from the parson's morality and the schoolmaster's ruler." Such an environment allows students to draw upon their personal experiences as the starting point for the learning process as they explore and discover the world around them. This includes those areas which often are perceived as taboo by the community. Instead of selecting areas considered to be appropriate for investigation by students, the teacher serves as a guide for the young
people's exploration. The students, as much as the educators or parents, need to dictate the focus of their education since they are ones who will serve as the citizens of the future. While imposing the values and ideas of prior generations upon them provides them with a link with the past and avoids current controversies, this hardly prepares them to deal with the problems of the future.

Knowledge and Power

The acquisition and application of knowledge frees and empowers the individual by enabling the person to define and conceptualize the world around him. Horace Mann recognized this as he sought to establish a public education system in Massachusetts. By establishing an academic community at the University of Virginia, Thomas Jefferson realized that knowledge and sovereignty went hand in hand in a democracy. Restricting or stopping the flow of information to a person stifles intellectual growth and development and threatens the health of a democracy. When an individual lacks the information necessary to interpret and make reasoned decisions about issues, the person is forced to rely upon others to perform this task for him. By so doing, the person loses some of his power as a citizen.

Those in power clearly recognize the relationship between power and knowledge. Anytime government officials feel threatened, they seek to control the dissemination of information. Common actions in extreme cases include curbing freedom of speech, nationalizing all means of communications, limiting freedom of press, and curtailing the activities of universities and colleges. Government officials understand that by manipulating the information received by the citizenry, the government is able to shape the people's opinions so as to satisfy its interests. Knowledge becomes dangerous to some people when individuals use it to make decisions which threaten the interests of the government or the way of life of a people. In this instance, censorship becomes a means judiciously to select knowledge which is deemed appropriate for consumption by the individual. The censor attempts to control a situation by carefully monitoring individuals' exposure to ideas. Possessing little faith in the individual, censors fear that the individual's enhanced awareness might result in the creation of a society which is contrary to the censor's views.

Government Authority v. Individual Autonomy

The early opponents of the Constitution voted against the document because it lacked a Bill of Rights. They felt that merely relying upon the good intentions of those in power to respect the rights of individuals was foolhardy. They argued that despite the institutional checks placed upon the government, the individual always would remain at a disadvantage due to the power inherent in a centralized national government. They recognized the importance of limiting the power of the government in relation to its activities with individuals.

Individuals rights define the parameters of the relationship between the individual and the government. A procedural right, for example, places a duty upon the government to act in a certain manner. By guaranteeing individuals a "speedy and public trial," the government is required to make public the actions taken against a person accused of committing a crime and to handle the proceedings in an expeditious and public manner. Without such a guarantee the government might use its power to prosecute individuals who are suspected of subversive activity in closed hearings without the benefit of public scrutiny.
A substantive right differs from a procedural right in that it defines individual spheres of autonomy. With a substantive right the emphasis is on the individual's relations with other individuals, as well as with the government. Instead of placing a duty upon the government to perform in a certain manner, a substantive right dictates those areas of individual autonomy which are beyond the reach of the government.

Throughout American history rights have provided a means to maintain a balance between the individual and the government. During the 1960's, people began to realize that slowly but surely the balance had started to tilt in favor of the government. This led to a broadening of the Bill of Rights and even the evolution of unenumerated rights, such as the right to privacy. The right to privacy was perceived as an amalgamation of existing rights such as the right to be secure in your home and personal belongings and the protection against the quartering of troops in the home. The evolution of the right to privacy was an indication that the rights listed in the Bill of Rights were no longer sufficient to protect the individual. Reaction to the 1960's slowed the expansion of rights but the growth of the government's power continued unabated.

Many people feel uncomfortable forging new rights out of the existing list of guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Ironically enough, many members of the first Congress were wary of drafting a Bill of Rights for fear that people might perceive the list as the only rights guaranteed to individuals. They attempted to leave the Bill of Rights open ended by writing the now largely forgotten Ninth Amendment: "The enumeration of the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by people." Just as the body of the Constitution was left open ended so as to remain flexible enough to meet changing needs, so the authors of the Bill of Rights meant to leave future generations room to adapt it to the changing needs of the times.

The First Amendment and Schools

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble; and to petition the Government for redress of grievances."

Placing the various freedoms of expression in the first Amendment to the Constitution hardly was an accident of fate. The members of the first Congress deemed freedom of expression as the cornerstone of democracy. Over 100 years later U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis eloquently summed up the thoughts of the political leaders during the Constitutional era when he concluded that those who won independence "believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly, discussion would be futile, that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine."19 Justice Brandeis envisioned the guaranteeing of freedom of expression as protection against the very threat perceived by the censors. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes also recognized the problem posed by censors when he concluded that the purpose of the First Amendment was to guarantee "the principle of free thought - not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought we hate."20 Justice Brandeis and Holmes realized that the First Amendment was meaningless unless individuals were guaranteed security in their thoughts.
Since public schools are agents of the government, this casts the First Amendment in a special light for students and shapes the role of parents, students, and educators. The "public" nature of local school systems is a double-edged sword for parents. Parents often envision schools as the means by which the community transmits their values and beliefs onto the upcoming generation. Many perceive the schools' responsibilities as an extension of their obligations as parents. What they often fail to remember is that as agents of the government, schools represent interests different from those of parents. The schools' primary responsibility is not to look out for what the parents perceive as the best interest of the child, but rather to best serve the interest of society and the child. Public education does not connote parental ownership. Parents are only one group which possess an interest in the education of young people. Therefore, while schools should remain responsive to the requests of parents, they are not obligated to allow parents to dictate the curriculum.

As extensions of the government, schools dramatically shape the forum in which students exercise First Amendment rights in several ways. First, the government's participation in any marketplace of ideas tends to inhibit freedom of expression. Due to the disproportionate amount of power the government possesses in relation to an individual, it tends to dominate the marketplace of ideas. This is of particular importance in schools where the government determines the time, manner and place of this marketplace. Second, compulsory attendance means that students are subjected to speech from which they are unable to escape. Third, since schools are a public forum, they are limited in their ability to control the content of the expression. The U.S. Supreme Court has allowed censorship based on content in only a few areas, primarily obscenity and "fighting words." As the Court ruled in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, schools may not cast a "pall of orthodoxy" over the classroom. The Court forbade the government from advocating a set of political ideas in schools since the government is able to unduly influence the forum for debate, thus threatening the continuation of the marketplace of ideas. Yet, many challenges to books arise out of attempts by censors to use the schools to perform the action which the Court ruled against in this case.

Fourth, since schools are a limited public forum in which students are compelled by law to participate, the students are entitled to some of the guarantees provided by the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that while schools are not the traditional public forum, "first amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment are available to teachers and students."

The nature of schools dictates the scope and limits of students' individual rights. In this special situation, unlike adults in a public forum, students are highly dependent upon the government for their rights and the opportunity to exercise them. This power of the government dramatically shapes students' rights in unintended ways which warrant granting students' rights that are unnecessary in a general public setting. The idea of freedom of expression is based on the notion that the individual
possesses the ability to gain access to those ideas which are available to the
government and society at large. Without this ability, individuals are unable to
engage in the "free trade of ideas" which assures "that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Students' exposure to ideas are limited by the content of the curriculum, by the
constraints faced by a school library, and by their inability to fully participate in
the marketplace of ideas. This is where the school library plays a critical role in
the student's development as an individual and a citizen.

The schools act as editors in that they determine the content of the curriculum. The curriculum serves as a framework which guides the decisions that educators make regarding what to include or ignore in their instructional programs. Simply because an idea is not included in the curriculum doesn't mean the idea is unworthy of study or that students don't possess a right to learn about it outside of the formal instructional program. By preventing a student from exploring these ideas, school officials fail in their responsibility to develop citizens and place unnecessary limits upon students' freedom of expression. Guaranteeing students a right to read insures that students are allowed the freedom to investigate new ideas. This right also provides school officials a means to deflect censorship attacks.

Given the special nature of schools, the right to read does not follow the
typical framework of analysis used for freedom of speech. With freedom of speech there are three elements: a speaker; a message; and a recipient. Opponents argue that there is no right to read since there is no duty imposed upon the speaker to speak, i.e., the schools. Schools are obligated to provide for a limited marketplace of ideas and while they are not bound to "speak", they are obligated to transmit information. They must provide a means for other "speakers", such as authors of books, to air their ideas. Failure to offer the students as the recipients of the message an opportunity to make decisions about exploring these messages is tantamount to benign indoctrination. A right to read places a duty upon the state to provide students with access to a diversity of ideas since the students' eventual responsible exercise of their First Amendment rights depends in large part upon the education the state provides them.

As evident by the success of the censors, the traditional enumerated First
Amendment rights fail to provide students with adequate protection. This is because freedoms of press and speech apply to individuals in a public forum while students are in a governmental setting. A "right to read" better defines the relationship between the student and the government. Unlike freedom of speech, a right to read is best defined as a procedural right in which a duty is placed upon the government to perform in a certain manner. A school then is not only obligated to offer students access to an open, yet limited, marketplace of ideas but also to protect them against the challenges of censors. Without such protection students are subject to the whims of censors. As Justice William O. Douglas commented after the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review a "right to read" case which centered around the banning of several books, "[W]hat else can the School Board now decide it does not like? Are we sending children to school to be educated by the norms of the School Board or are we educating our youth to shed the prejudices of the past, to explore all forms of thought, and to find solutions to our world problems?" Schools must serve as laboratories of democracy in which students gain the knowledge necessary reasonably to exercise their power as citizens and to shape our democratic system so as to meet the challenges of tomorrow. In order to insure that schools perform this function and to
protect students against the threat posed by censors, students must be guaranteed the
right to read.

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ON THE HORNS OF A MORAL DILEMMA:

AN ANATOMY OF THE HAWKINS COUNTY, TENNESSEE, TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY

J. Hamilton Hoit
East Tennessee State University

Elizabeth Hoit-Thetford
Hawaii Pacific College

Over the course of five months, a local dispute involving a sixth-grade reading textbook became a religious issue of national proportions. Most such disputes are resolved before they go as far as the superintendent's office; indeed, few parental objections to classroom material and/or textbooks even reach the local school board. What, then, happened in Hawkins County, Tennessee?

Until the end of August 1983, the controversy over the basal reader of the Holt, Rinehart and Winston series was confined to an in-house, parent vs. school problem, and relatively few people in the general public were aware of it. The parent, Vickie Frost, objected to two stories in Riders on the Earth because she felt that the stories included concepts such as mental telepathy that were contrary to her Christian faith. She asked that the school provide an alternate reading text for her sixth-grade daughter.

Dissatisfied with the school's response and finding a growing base of support, Frost "publicly denounced" the text in an interview on a local radio station and promised, through an area newspaper, that her efforts were "just the beginning of the exposure of this." Although school superintendent Bill Snodgrass tried to reassure people of the suitability of the text by reminding them that it was on the state-approved adoption list and that it had gone through a screening process by the local textbook selection committee, a meeting was still planned for the next night. At the meeting about seventy-five people gathered to hear various speakers condemn the book that Frost now said referred to mental telepathy on "nearly every page," a concept she declared to be part of the Hindu faith.

Within a week Frost had obtained 225 signatures on a petition that was presented to the school board. In speaking to the board at its meeting, she and three other parents told the board that the text included concepts from ten different religious faiths. One of the parents asserted that the concept of telepathy was "the first step in demonology." Unconvinced, the school board denied the parents' request for an alternate textbook. Two weeks later, the parents organized themselves into a group they called Citizens Organized for Better Schools (COBS), electing Bob Mozert as their president.

The month of October saw little change, except that both sides became more positive of the "rightness" of their convictions. Two students, daughters of a COBS member, were taken out of the public schools after the mother and the grandmother objected to a story in the second grade reading text about dinosaurs which, they said, taught evolution as a fact. When the elementary school principal refused permission for the younger girl to use an alternate text, both girls were placed in a "Christian" school. The next day a letter to the editor appeared from COBS' Mozert. In the letter he detailed objections to the entire reading series,

Correspondence: 1810 Brook Hollow Road, Johns City, TN 37601 or 94-681 Kime Street, Waipahu, HI 96797
objections which showed that, according to him, the series contained "the secular humanism religion . . . throughout." He continued," Two of the tenets of this faith begun by John Dewey, father of progressive education [are] pro-ERA and change of cultural ethics and values." As a specific example, Mozert cited an illustration in one reader that showed a boy cooking while a girl read. Although he conceded that the girl was later shown cooking, he stated that "the religion of John Dewey is planted in the [student's] mind that there are no God-given roles for the different sexes."

Meanwhile school officials downplayed the controversy by pointing out that the only complaints they had received had come from just two of the schools in the system—Carters Valley Elementary and Church Hill Middle Schools. They did, however, meet with representatives from Holt, Rinehart and Winston to discuss the company's methods of selecting series included in the texts and to talk over the objections made by COBS members. Speaking for the schools after the meeting, Snodgrass reported, "We didn't find anything that would lead us to do anything other than what we've already done."

During the first week of November, the school board solidified the system's position with a unanimous decision to ban the use of alternate textbooks. A week later, eight families and their lawyer met with the middle school principal and the director of elementary instruction to discuss the situation. Nothing was changed as a result of the meeting. "It's going to be a showdown," pledged Frost. Mozert agreed, "We are totally, absolutely committed." The next day, ten students reported to the middle school with notes from their parents stating that the students could not use the Holt readers. The principal suspended the students for ten days.

As school officials reacted with the view that "This is a vocal minority," COBS was discussing the conflict with two attorneys from national Christian legal aid organizations, and Mozert was promising, "a suit will be filed," if the situation remained unchanged.

A week later, Frost went to the elementary school to take her second-grade daughter out of class to teach her in another room. Although successful on at least two previous occasions, Frost had been asked to leave the school area on several other visits by school officials and at least once by a policeman. This time she took the chief of police with her "because I wanted a policeman to be my witness that they were making me leave formally. I wanted him to establish that I was not being loud or rude or argumentative." In the ensuing confrontation, Frost was arrested on misdemeanor counts of trespassing and of being improperly on school premises. Each side remembered the encounter differently: According to the police chief and the principal, Frost "stated that she would not leave but would have to be arrested." Frost, however, denied she told anyone she would have to be arrested and said further that no one ever asked her to leave. "If they had asked me just one time to leave, I would have left. All I said was, 'I don't feel like I'm being unlawful,' and then he arrested me." She was taken to the jail and held in a cell for about an hour and a half before being released without bond.

At the November 28th arraignment, Frost was represented by Michael Farris, a lawyer for Concerned Women of America (CWA), a group described by Farris as being a "traditionally oriented Christian women's group" whose national membership is 230,000. After Frost waived arraignment, pleaded innocent, and requested a jury trial, Farris told reporters he proposed to file a suit in federal court. "We're planning to file an action to enjoin the school district from taking adverse action
against these children [whose parents will not allow them to use the Holt series]." He also brought up the possibility of filing suit over the arrest of Frost but said that action would wait until after her case had been heard in court.

Four days later, Farris filed the federal suit on behalf of eleven Hawkins County families. Named as defendants in the suit were the five school board members, the superintendent, and four school principals. The suit asked the court to reinstate seven students (who were then in their second suspension from school), to require the school system to provide the students with alternate texts, and to compensate the plaintiffs for unspecified monetary damages. In a press conference afterwards, Farris told reporters that CWA would be paying the legal costs of the suit: "We feel this is a landmark case." And, indeed, in a fundraising letter CWA founder Beverly Le Raye said the case was "the first major legal battle which will establish the right of Christians to refuse to read material which offends their religious convictions." By this time an area newspaper was referring to the dispute as a "battle," and other groups had joined the fray. At a PTA-organized rally, about 800 people loudly voiced opposition to COBS and to the suit. One of the most fervent speakers was school superintendent Bill Snodgrass, who said, "I was advised to be scholarly and low key... but it's difficult to be scholarly and impossible to be low key when you're accused of being unpatriotic and anti-God." At the meeting, the formation of two anti-COBS groups was announced: Citizens Advocating the Right to Education (CARE) and Students Against COBS. CARE also announced that it would file a "friend of the court" petition to join the school board as a defendant in the lawsuit.

Believing that they were becoming caught up in something that was no longer simply a local dispute, school officials were quick to acknowledge outside influence. As a school board member asserted, "I think that COBS is trying to dictate education regardless of textbooks or anything else. If textbooks were not the issue, they'd bring up something else. Every tactic they've used so far has come out of Longview, Texas," (home of Mel and Norma Gabler who run a self-styled Christian textbook review organization). Principals, too, vented their frustration with the situation. In agreeing with the board member, one said, "We took it (COBS) to be an honest effort to do something for their children's education. We failed to realize it was a well-orchestrated group." Another principal added, "We're not dealing with common, down-to-earth people. We're dealing with well-planned, well-thought-out, organized people."

Whatever it was that school authorities felt they were entangled in was definitely escalating. Two days after the school officials made their remarks, four middle school students were suspended a third time for refusing to use the Holt readers. The next day, all charges were dropped against Vickie Frost, who had been arrested at the elementary school the month before. As the defense attorney discovered, someone forgot to do his homework on the charges before Frost was arrested, for a federal court had ruled the trespassing law unconstitutionally vague more than ten years previously and "parents of students" were specifically exempted from the law against being improperly on school grounds. Afterwards, CWA attorney Michael Farris reminded listeners that the likelihood of a false-arrest lawsuit was "a very live option," while Frost said, "The Lord has fought for me today and won."

In another court that same day, U.S. District Court Judge Thomas Hull declined to issue an injunction to force the school to provide alternate reading textbooks.
Hull took the matter under advisement and said he would decide later if and when to schedule a trial on the lawsuit.

During the three-hour hearing, the two positions came clearly into focus. Speaking for the COBS parents, Farris argued that they were the victims of discrimination against Christians. "The children who object to reading the Bible have all the rights of the world, but those who object to these books have no rights. If the books were offensive to Jewish people or blacks, they'd be out in a minute... because it's popular to object to things because you're Jewish or black or feminist." School board attorney Nat Coleman countered that the parents were "neo-conservative politicians" who were "advocating political beliefs thinly veiled with a patina of religious beliefs so as to be applicable as a constitutional case." Coleman further argued that the parents' proposal could result in "twenty different groups with twenty different requirements reading twenty different books." 17

By Christmas, there might have been peace on earth somewhere, but it was not in Hawkins County. In a late December interview, superintendent Bill Snodgrass underscored the school system's views: "I think that something within [COBS] got it started, but now they're getting help from somewhere else. They've done a complete turnaround. At the first [school board] meeting, the big thing was mind control and mental telepathy being taught in the book. They were hot on that, but now it's been pushed aside. At first they tried to stay away from religion, but now they emphasize it." In referring to the phonic method of reading instruction advocated by COBS, he said, "We cannot teach reading from a stop sign, and it seems this is what they want us to do. You cannot teach reading without literature, and literature has ideas in it." COBS' Bob Mozert responded that in teaching reading using literature, philosophies in the stories as well as reading skills are taught. "[The books] should be teaching reading; they should not be teaching something else as well. One story comes right out and says there was no reason for us to be in the Korean War. That's an opinion, and people are entitled to their opinions, but it shouldn't be taught in reading class." Mozert further said such opinions were scattered throughout the eight-grade Holt series, and over the years the elements of secular humanism presented in the stories slowly changed a child's thinking from what he was taught at home to a different outlook. He summed up by saying, "We aren't trying to censor anything. Parents have the right to say what their children should be taught." 18

By January 1984 all of the students named in the lawsuit had been removed from the school system or had agreed to use the Holt readers pending the outcome of the suit. After the plaintiffs' attorneys notified the court that there was no longer a need for an immediate decision on an injunction, Judge Hull announced that it would be at least another month before he would rule on the merits of the lawsuit.

In February, Hull dismissed eight of the nine allegations in the lawsuit, saying that only one of the allegations was of a nature as to "rise to a constitutional issue." Among the claims dismissed were allegations that the books "teach witchcraft and other forms of magic and occult activities," "depict prayer to an idol," "imply that Jesus was an illiterate," and "teach that man and apes evolved from a common ancestor." The allegation that was left, the one that then became the sole basis of the lawsuit, was that the books "teach that one does not need to believe in God in a specific way but that any type of faith in the supernatural is an acceptable method of salvation." 19 After further deliberation, Hull dismissed the remaining allegation and thus dismissed the lawsuit, stating that the plaintiffs were unable to show that any part of the books "impinged on the constitutional rights" of the students or parents. 20 As expected, within a month COBS appealed.
For the rest of the spring and through the summer, matters remained at an impasse and out of the public eye. In October, however, a national organization formed in 1980 as a response to the "growing rhetoric of the fundamentalist Right in this country" added fuel to the waning fire. People for the American Way (PAW) announced that the Hawkins County group opposing the textbook suit, Citizens Advocating the Right to Education (CARE), was the recipient of PAW's first "Freedom to Learn" award. PAW's director, Anthony Podesta, said in a letter that the recognition had been given to CARE "because of its efforts to protect the freedom to learn in Hawkins County and its support of the county's public schools." In responding to the commendation, G. Reece Gibson, president of CARE, cited PAW's mentor relationship to CARE by thanking PAW for "the tremendous support, advice, and encouragement that we received [from them]. They came forward at a time when we were confused, unorganized, and not sure of what was happening or why to our school system."

A month later, Vickie Frost sued the Hawkins County Board of Education, the city of Church Hill, and three individuals for alleged violation of her civil rights when she was arrested on school grounds after trying to remove her daughter from a classroom. She asked for $600,000 in damages.

The next seven months were uneventful, but in June 1985, the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed Judge Hull's dismissal of the COBS' lawsuit and sent the case back to Hull for an evidentiary hearing. The ruling gave "no opinion of the merits of the plaintiffs' claim or those of the defendants, as we [judges] have considered only the procedural posture of the case." The court also stated that a "two-step analysis" must be applied to determine if a burden was placed on "the litigant's exercise of religion," and if so, "this burden must be balanced against the governmental interests with the government being required to show a compelling reason for its action."

Before the COBS' case was heard, though, Vickie Frost had her own day in court with her false arrest lawsuit. When the six-day trial was over, the jury ruled that Frost's constitutional rights were violated and that the Hawkins County Board of Education was liable for damages of $70,000. The city of Church Hill and the three individuals named in the suit were cleared of liability.

When the textbook case came to trial in July 1986, both sides were represented by legal "teams" (of four lawyers for the plaintiffs and fourteen for the defense) headed by Washington, D.C., attorneys. For the plaintiffs was Michael Farris of Concerned Women of America, and for the defense was Timothy Dyk, hired by People for the American Way. In a pre-trial conference, Dyk agreed to stipulate that the religious beliefs of the plaintiffs were sincerely held and that the material in the textbooks offended those beliefs. In addition, Farris and Dyk narrowed the issues down to five questions, four of which were to be decided by Judge Hull: 1. Did compulsory use of the textbooks violate First Amendment rights by placing a burden on the free exercise of religion? 2. If so, was there an overriding and compelling state interest that justified the uniform use of textbooks in school? 3. If so, was the least restrictive means used by the school system in dealing with the plaintiffs? 4. Would granting relief to the plaintiffs violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment by establishing their religion within school? After a well-attended trial dubbed by many in the media as "Scopes II," Hull's October decision was in favor of the plaintiffs: "In forcing the plaintiff-students to read from the Holt series or forfeit a free public education, the defendants have burdened the plaintiffs' right of free exercise of their religion." The twenty-
seven page ruling included a plan whereby the students could go to a study hall or library during reading class and be taught reading by a parent later at home; in effect, the students could "opt out" of reading classes. Hull stated that his solution avoided the "excessive entanglement between the state and religion" that would occur if an alternate Christian text was offered by the school.

The school board appealed Judge Hull's ruling to the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. As it did so, numerous state and national organizations publicly chose sides by filing "friend of the court" briefs. Among those supporting COBS were the Christian Legal Aid Society, Citizens for Educational Reform, and the National Association for the Legal Support of Alternate Schools. Allying themselves with the school board were the education departments of several states, the National Education Association, and the American Association of University Professors.

Hull's verdict stood ten months. In August 1987 the three-judge panel of the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously overturned Hull's ruling. In its decision, the appeals court panel wrote that "the plaintiffs appeared to assume that material clearly presented as poetry, fiction and even 'make-believe' in the Holt series were presented as facts which the students were required to believe. Nothing in the record supports this assumption." Further, the panel found that "there was no proof that any plaintiff student was ever called upon to say or do anything that required the student to affirm or deny a religious belief." The panel's resultant decision was "The requirement that students read the assigned materials and attend reading classes, in the absence of a showing that this participation entailed affirmation or denial of a religious belief . . . does not place an unconstitutional burden on the students' exercise of religion."

As of this writing, most observers agree that this latest ruling is nothing more than one engagement in a long campaign. As CWA's Michael Farris said immediately after the ruling was announced, "We always viewed this level of the decision as just a whistlestop on the way to an ultimate decision by the U.S. Supreme Court." Other fundamentalists, like Robert Skilrood, executive director of Pat Robertson's National Legal Foundation, echo that determination: "We're going to utilize the system that's made America great and proceed to exhaust all those [legal] possibilities."

Those on the other side of the controversy see the legal decision as just one part of the overall strategy on the part of the fundamentalists to bring about change. According to Ira Glasser, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, the fundamentalist movement has pursued a three-pronged attack: promote Creationism, pressure Congress and the courts to permit school prayer, and fight for fundamentalist religious content in public school curriculums and textbooks. In Glasser's view, the series of court decisions, in themselves, will not end the fight, but they "confirm that the law is on our side, and [that] makes the fight easier to win."

Although not labeled as such by the court, at the heart of the plaintiffs' case are objections to topics which come directly from what the religious Right calls "secular humanism." The subjects in the textbook series Frost and others objected to include "Futuristic supernaturalism, one-world government, situation ethics and values clarification, humanistic moral absolutes, pacifism, rebellion against parents or self-authority, role reversal, role elimination, animals are equal to humans, the skeptic's view of religion contrasting belief in the supernatural with science, false views of death and related themes, magic, other religions, evolution, godless supernaturalism . . . and specific humanist themes."
What is "secular humanism"? It is a menace, says the religious Right. According to Beverly LeHaye of Concerned Women of America, "A battle is raging in America today. The struggle will determine if Secular Humanism becomes pervasive in our society or whether we will see a renaissance of the biblical values of our founding fathers." She defines a secular humanist as a person who "believes in studying man's activities and seeking man's betterment apart from God. . . . The secular humanist believes in relative and situational ethics and denies that man needs to live by the moral code set forth in scripture." She further sees that "By default of lacking a higher authority, the god of the humanist system is the State. The use of the power of the State becomes the humanist's favorite method of social engineering to break down the old social fabric and create a new humanist man." As part of this "social engineering," she believes that "Parents' wishes no longer determine how children are educated; they are now the humanists' experimental guinea pigs in their quest to construct a socialistic plagued society, a brave new world order devoid of God and absolute moral standards."

Not so, says the religious Left; "secular humanism" is a bogeyman. Writing for People for the American Way, Christy Macy and Ricki Seidman counter that "by tacking on 'secular' to the word 'humanist,' the religious right has created a catch-all phrase to describe what they see as a 'godless' religion which is taking over the country. . . . According to [them], if public education doesn't include religious instruction, then it is tantamount to indoctrination in 'secular humanism.'" While Macy and Seidman point out that three textbook review studies published in 1986 "all found that textbooks did not offer adequate coverage of either the role of religion in our society, or the influence religious groups and individuals have had throughout American and world history," they say that "the groups and individuals who warn against the ills of 'secular humanism' go far beyond this point, criticizing books, courses and teaching methods that they don't agree with, and that don't conform to their sectarian worldview. If they disapprove of something in the school curriculum—whether it's learning about the theory of evolution, historic tragedies like the Holocaust or literary classics from Homer to Shakespeare—then they simply call it 'secular humanism' and claim it must be thrown out."

While the battle rages on on the national level, it has been a long and costly four years for the troops of both sides in Hawkins County. In an interview to discuss some of his views, COBS' president, Bob Mozert, first expressed reservations about being misquoted or having his remarks taken out of context. He seemed disappointed with the media's depiction of his group and its goals and speculated about the likelihood of evenhanded treatment by the press when "80% of reporters do not go to church," according to the results of a 1986 survey. Additionally, he noted, "newspaper reporters seem to have a bias that all Tennesseans are hillbillies—ignorant; therefore, any Tennesseans who are Christians are [seen as] 'less' than normal people—at least different."

With regard to the 400 or so objections COBS makes to the Holt series, he says "There is a preponderance of Humanism. I don't go for all that stuff. . . . [Humanism in the texts] fills the vacuum since the Bible and Christianity are not allowed in the school curriculum." Subjects like evolution, he says, "should not be allowed in the school texts or curriculum—not even as a theory. If God cannot be mentioned, evolution should not be mentioned." He sees that in the future "these textbook committee persons will be more cautious in book reviews and selections, that is, the content." Above all, he believes that "We must be obedient to the Word of God."
Bill Snodgrass, the former superintendent of Hawkins County Schools, has also become wary about discussing the case. In the midst of the controversy, he lost his bid for re-election and has been advised by his attorneys to be cautious in his remarks, for there is still a possibility that he could be liable for some damages. He has spoken out, though, because "being accused of ungodliness and pro-sexual permissiveness" in addition to other things has been more than he will take. As he thinks over the case, he questions the genuineness of the original views: "First, Vickie Frost wanted to remove her child from the school for one class period; she later came on with the Christian principles' charges. Civil liberties came [even] later. [She] changed her views from objections to 'selected' stories to religion and religious rights to violating her civil rights." As for the future, he does not see any way to accommodate the COBS' demands and still have a manageable public school. "We can't have separate classes. [It is] a plan that will break the school." His solution? "If parents want their children to be separately taught, [they should] please withdraw them from public school and enter them in a private school of their own that presents ideas or thoughts more to their liking."

What is really at issue here? Is it, as one writer has noted, that "the plaintiffs are not really speaking for the Christian faith in their attack on the Hawkins County school system"? Are they "arguing for their version of the scientific truth," their science being "the literal content of the Bible provable by scientific data and carbon tests"? Is this simply "an old educational issue: whether schools should impose religious absolutes or promote independent judgment" or is it "a battle for the heart and soul of America and the world"? Perhaps, somewhere in all this debate of what is and what is not religion, there is, after all, a lesson to be learned from John Dewey; for, as he noted, "Religious feeling is unhealthy when it is watched and analyzed to see if it exists, if it is right, if it is growing. It is as fatal to be forever observing our own religious moods and experiences, as it is to pull up a seed from the ground to see if it is growing."
32. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
38. Bob Mozert, interview with the authors, Kingsport, Tenn., 11 July 1987.
39. Bill Snodgrass, interview with the authors, Johnson City, Tenn., 30 June 1987.
42. LeHaye, "Whose Ethics," 75.
IS IT ALWAYS MORAL TO RAISE LEVELS OF MORAL JUDGMENT?

THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE GIFTED CHILD

Mary I. Yeazell and Julie Tasker
West Virginia University

... Sara, aged 6, is a highly emotional and sensitive gifted child who became interested in the plight of Ethiopians during the drought crisis several years ago. She was obsessed with learning more about it. Her sympathy for these people was overwhelming. Her empathy and intellectual understanding brought on daily crying spells as she felt helpless in the situation. Finally, a sympathetic parent helped her send money to one of the African relief agencies.

... Abby, a 3-year old, became very concerned about the people who lost all their possessions in the 1985 flood in West Virginia. She talked about the victims, watched the news on television, and asked questions daily. Finally, she gathered all her prized possessions in a pile to give to the children. That night her mother heard Abby crying. She wanted to help but couldn't bear to give away all of her toys as she had planned. Helping these children was important to her, but emotionally she was just a child who loved her toys. The next day she and her mother went to a store and bought a toy to give to the flood victims.

In both of these true incidents, an emotionally sensitive gifted child faced a situation which was beyond her control but about which she had a strong moral commitment. Fortunately, in each case, a perceptive parent, rather than ignoring the child's feelings or telling the child, "There's nothing you can do, so don't worry about it," helped the child cope with the feelings and take control of the situation within the constraints which reality imposed.

These children are good examples of the moral and intellectual characteristics attributed to gifted children and the basis for the question raised in this paper. Is it moral to merely raise levels of moral judgment? or put another way, Is a cognitive developmental model of moral education sufficient for gifted children?

The unique intellectual characteristics of gifted children have been thoroughly researched and widely discussed. Most writers in the field are agreed upon the following intellectual attributes as characteristic of most gifted children.

Compared to their peers, gifted children typically learn to read earlier, with better comprehension of the nuances of language. They read widely and intensely and have large vocabularies. They commonly learn basic skills better and more easily, with less practice. They are better able to construct and handle abstractions than their age mates. They are frequently able to draw inferences that other children need to have spelled out for them. They take less for granted, seeking to know the "How's" and Whys". Gifted children display the ability to work independently at an earlier age and for longer periods of time than other children.1

Correspondence: Dept. of Education Foundations, College of Human Resources and Education, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 26505
Terman's longitudinal studies of intellectually gifted individuals dispelled many myths about such persons, including the myth that gifted individuals were prone to mental illness. Terman and his associates reported that their intellectually gifted subjects exhibited superiority in emotional adjustment. Recently, however, research trends have emerged that question the "Terman myth" and assert that gifted individuals may experience social and emotional stresses precisely because of their uniquely high abilities and sensitivities. Subsequent recent investigations, however, have indicated that gifted students may be no less well adjusted than their more average peers. The apparent confusion about whether gifted students are more or less subject to social and emotional disturbances than their nongifted peers should not blind us to the specific affective needs of these students. Gifted students may not always make it on their own either emotionally or intellectually.

Recently counselors and educators of the gifted have recognized that such young people have special affective needs that require attention. Gifted children have been characterized as emotionally intense, excruciatingly sensitive, and filled with idealism. They are prone to self-criticism and perfectionism. They often express feelings of inadequacy and inner conflict. Another characteristic more pertinent to our discussion here, however, is the gifted child's early concern with values and morals. By the age of five or six, many gifted children begin to worry about moral, social, and humanistic concerns. Malone has stated that gifted children develop an early-in-life value system and have an urgency to search out meaning in their lives. Sisk conducted a study of 200 gifted children aged 4-14 and found that death, man's inhumanity to man, war, poverty, and cruelty were reported as fears by 88% of the children in her sample. Karnes and Brown reported a study of 233 students ranging in age from 9-15 who were enrolled in a program for the intellectually gifted. The students' mean PZ score on the Defining Issues Test (the percent of answers at the principled level on the Kohlberg model) was found to be at Level III, Kohlberg's highest level. The study indicated that the majority of responses made by this gifted group (74%) were at Kohlberg's stages 4 and 5. The cognitive level of moral functioning of these students was related positively to their level of intellectual functioning. Typically this level of moral reasoning is not reached until late adolescence or early adulthood.

Although we have made great strides in meeting the cognitive needs of gifted students, we have not become responsive to their unique affective needs. It is because the emotional maturity of the gifted child rarely keeps pace with the intellectual development that special attention must be paid to affective and moral education.

If there is inconsistency and confusion about the social and emotional characteristics of the gifted, the same may also be said for moral education. The field of moral education in the U. S. has been dominated by two competing models whose supporters frequently throw barbed criticisms at each other, and each group seems to assume that its model is the only warranted approach to moral education. These two models are the cognitive developmental model of Kohlberg and the Values Clarification Model of Raths, et al. The models approach moral education from entirely different perspectives. Based on our knowledge of the nature of gifted students, it would seem that neither model, alone, is sufficient for the moral education of the gifted.

The Kohlberg model emphasizes development of moral judgment, a cognitive
Kohlberg proposes that moral judgment is transformed through a series of developmental stages characterized by an increasing awareness of broad social considerations and a decreasing concern with individualistic, egocentric considerations. As the individual's judgment becomes more mature, he or she comes to understand the need for a social perspective and is able more fully to take the role of another, including that of a member of the larger society. The Kohlberg educational methodology consists in presenting moral dilemmas to the child and using dialogue and discussion to engage the child in reflection about the moral and ethical choices involved in the dilemmas.

Kohlberg has identified three levels of moral judgment each of which has two stages. The first level, the Preconventional, is characterized by concern with individual interests in the first stage, with actions being judged as right or wrong in terms of concrete consequences to self. The second stage individual is aware that others have different interests and points of view which conflict with his or her own. The individual in the second stage makes moral decisions on the basis of an instrumental exchange with others, always recognizing the need for the goodwill of the other and the desire to be liked by others.

The second level of moral judgment, called the Conventional, is characterized by the ability to understand the shared feelings and expectations of others in one's own group, which take primacy over individual interests. Stage three morality involves considering the expectations of others who are close to you or making judgments on the basis of being a "good person." Stage four involves fulfilling duties and keeping laws in order to keep the society functional.

The Postconventional, or Principled level of moral judgment is philosophically based on principles of justice. In Stage 5 there is a sense of obligation to the social contract between all members of a society. Stage 6 is characterized by moral judgment based on self-chosen universal ethical principles. Ethical delmmas at this level are resolved on the basis of the most extensive consideration of rights and interests of both individuals and the larger social group.

The Values Clarification model deals with personal awareness and commitment. It attempts to promote a consistent set of values through a valuing process. It asks students to examine their life style and the hierarchy of values reflected in their personal preferences. Its techniques are well known and values clarification exercises have been developed for use in social studies, personal health, and language arts classes. There has also been widespread use of the techniques in special projects devoted to improving self-concept and other short term self-improvement workshops.

Values clarification focuses on personal commitment to values following a reflective process of becoming aware of one's values. Proponents of values clarification believe that many problems children exhibit in schools and at home are the direct result of confusion about values or a lack of values. The theory has also been extended to suggest that clarity of values and commitment to them will help to determine the behavior we exhibit.

Both values clarification and the Kohlberg model are rooted in dialogue. Neither approach aims to instill particular values and both aim to increase both personal awareness and the awareness that the values of others may be different than one's own. Values clarification techniques can be used with personal issues
and with some social issues such as racism and poverty. Values clarification uses "soft" dialogue and does not call for in-depth probing or confrontation which is characteristic of Kohlberg's model. Values clarification activities require students to analyze and state their own feelings and subsequently to become more cognizant to their own value priorities.

Values clarification has been criticized as leading to a relativistic view of morality and also for failing to distinguish between moral and nonmoral values. It has been charged with failure to be concerned with the aspect of morality which is the primary focus of the Kohlberg model, that is, the consideration of justification for moral behavior. This criticism is reinforced by the admonition against asking "why" questions.

Kohlberg's model focuses on reasoning and has been accused of failure to link reasoning and emotion. Mary would argue that it is too rational and takes account only of the cognitive side of moral decision making to the neglect of other aspects of personal development. Humanistic psychologists have expressed concerns that current theories of moral education do not take adequate account of total personality development. Because of its emphasis on cognition, and the thrust of most programs for the gifted, which is the development of complex intellectual characteristics, the Kohlberg model has great attraction to workers in the field. However, it is the combination of the unique intellectual abilities and the social and emotional developmental needs of gifted students which make a purely cognitive model of moral education inadequate if not actually harmful. It is equally true that a model of moral education which neglects the superior reasoning powers of gifted students is inadequate.

The "worst case scenario" develops as we consider all of the factors which have been presented thus far in this paper. Gifted students have unique social, emotional, and moral patterns of development which make them especially vulnerable to external and internal pressures, depression, alienation, and possible suicide. And their intellectual prowess enables them to reason at a level well above their age mates and many adults.

Adults often forget that the gifted child is still a child and that he or she may be subject to emotional stresses because of his or her giftedness. Parental or teacher over-emphasis on achievement may lead to perfectionism and such children may fall into the trap of being perfectionists even when their skills are not well enough developed to meet their own high standards. The situation is not helped by comments such as the following from leading educator-researchers of the gifted:

It has become almost axiomatic to say that the welfare of the world rests significantly with the realization and utilization of the potential of the gifted and talented youth to solve future social, economic, ecological, potential and human problems. or Nelson who states, "It seems important that we pay some mind to the values education of our gifted children who have the potential for the greatest good or the greatest harm for our society."

In an article discussing suicide among gifted adolescents, Delisle suggests that one of the factors which may contribute to extreme maladaptive behaviors in gifted adolescents is the societal expectations placed on gifted teenagers. Often they are identified as "future leaders" and as the "movers and shakers of
the next generation." He states that "Such assertions may seem overly ambitious and perhaps unattainable to the gifted adolescents themselves. What parents, teachers, or other adults may consider justifiable urgings to 'do your best' and 'work your hardest' the gifted adolescent may interpret as not so subtle forms of external pressure."

James Webb of Wright State University has established a program to assist gifted students and their parents with meeting their emotional needs. Webb writes, "These children are told that they are the world's hope for the future—a heavy burden for children whose adjustment, emotional maturity and tolerance for gradual change or long term solutions may all lag far behind their intellectual capabilities. He concludes that "... the most serious problem in the child's early concern for moral issues is that her ability to understand the issues intellectually far outstrips her ability to cope with the issues emotionally."

The stress which may develop from pressure to be successful, coupled with high self-imposed expectations, perfectionism, and the knowledge that one is expected to be the savior of the world because of one's unique abilities may prove to be debilitating. We have the possibility that children who are already worrying about issues which are beyond their control are now being told that they are expected to "fix things" when they grow up. It is easy to infer that the last thing such a child needs is to be subjected to a model of moral education which attempts to raise his or her already highly developed moral judgment by discussions of increasingly more complex moral issues.

In addition to the emotional stress possible because of cognitive functioning, the attitudes and pressures of peers may also present emotional difficulties. Webb writes,

The differences between the gifted child's moral and intellectual views and those of others with whom he spends time can be a major stressor. The gifted child's perception of reality differs from the average child's perception of reality, and his concern with universal laws and principles rises above the usual provincial and personal ethical concerns of most people. The child will likely need help in learning to lessen the inner tension that arises from these differences between himself and others.

Continuing with our construction of the "worst case scenario", we find that stress which remains unattended can lead to far more serious problems such as depression and even suicide. Depression is a serious problem in our society today. It is described as intense feelings of despair, guilt, hopelessness and a sense of worthlessness. A depressed person recognizes that things are not right but feels helpless to correct the situation. As has already been pointed out, because of their high levels of moral judgment and isolation from peers, gifted students often exhibit the symptoms of depression and despair. Otto Rank describes the person who experiences a struggle between attempts to form personal goals, ideals and values and those sanctioned by society as "conflicted and neurotic." Such a person's will is in conflict and this may result in failure to realize the potential as a functioning, creative individual.

Depression is in many cases a precursor to suicide or attempted suicide. In the past two decades, suicides among youth have increased 250% and suicide is
cited as the third leading cause of death in the United States for persons between ages 15 and 24. The number of gifted young people who attempt or actually commit suicide remains unknown and data are difficult to document. However, the recent rash of "suicide pacts" and cluster suicides reported in the press gives pause for concern since the anecdotal records revealed that many of these adolescents were above average or superior in their academic performance. In a review of two decades of research on adolescent suicide, Lajoie and Shore concluded that "suicide statistics and theories about the causes of suicide are most accommodating to the idea of overrepresentation of the gifted, especially at college age."17

Obviously, the interactions among the phenomena discussed here—high levels of cognitive functioning about moral issues, high expectations for self, depression over perceived failures, extreme emotional sensitivity, and internalized anxiety—are speculative. The "worst case scenario" is based more on logic than quantitative data. Nevertheless, the problem is real. Suicide is a serious problem among American teenagers and more recently children, and undoubtedly some of these students are intellectually gifted.

From the preceding discussion, it seems clear that a purely cognitive model of moral education is insufficient for the education of gifted students. The cognitive model will not enable the gifted child to find the existential meaning in the world and in his or her own life. A cognitive model may in fact only increase the level of anxiety and frustration of students who have a vision of what might be but who are unable to be effective in bringing it about because of their age and their powerlessness.

Moral education without concern for emotional development is an anathema. For morality, however defined, includes emotion. It is well known that high levels of moral judgment have little relationship to moral behavior. Thus what may be missing is the development of appropriate feelings about self which enables one to have empathy and caring for others. While Gilligan's model of moral development is not well researched or operational as yet, it could provide a mature integration of caring and integrity equally as advanced as Kohlberg's model of rights and justice.

This leads us to consideration of a moral educational model which makes use of values clarification exercises in connection with raising levels of moral judgement.

Some of the reluctance to approach moral education from the standpoint of emotional development stems from psycho-analytic concerns about the negative effects of guilt and strong emotions on behavior. Guilt has sometimes been characterized as debilitating for moral behavior. However, Allport maintains that constructive guilt motivates one to live up to one's moral ideals. To have moral integrity in Allport's terms is to have an emotionally compelling sense of self. It is respect for oneself that leads one to preclude certain actions as inappropriate. Thus the capacity for mature moral behavior is "bound up with both knowing (what is the right thing to do) and feeling (wanting to do it)."18

Hersh et al in an appraisal of models of moral education states that "the values clarification approach does seem to promote increased self-understanding and sensitivity to values issues."19 The developers of Values Clarification state
Values Clarification seems to increase people's confidence that they can deal productively with life's confusions.

There are many values clarification exercises which will provide gifted students an opportunity to become more aware of their own values and feelings about their perceived helplessness in the face of current events and complex moral issues. Their pessimism about the future may be placed in perspective as they try goals clarification exercises, for example. Writing a list of goals and reflecting on what would be required to accomplish them may improve self-understanding and add a dimension of reality to concern about moral issues. Working in pairs with nongifted students or other gifted students and sharing with each other all the occasions which they have experienced that week that were unfair will provide insight into each other's world and may produce a calming effect and relieve hostility and frustration.

Helping gifted students gain better self-understanding will also allow them to see themselves as moral agents in the world and help them reconcile their personal ideals and values with those sanctioned by a less than perfect society. The creative person as described by Rank is the one whose development allows liberal creative exploration while at the same time demonstrating moral and ethical commitment to society's well-being. This cannot be accomplished by one who is confused and anxious about self and depressed and alienated by a world which is perceived as out of control or in the hands of the incompetent.

It has been speculated that deprivation of ego needs very likely leads to a state of pre-occupation with the self—with one's own needs, hopes, and fears. A state of psychological well-being and need fulfillment, on the other hand, may very well facilitate prosocial behavior, because it leaves the person more open and responsive to the needs of others. Extending this idea to what we know about the gifted, we can arrive at no other logical conclusion than this; the emotional needs of the gifted must be met if their creative potential as moral actors is to be released.

Our gifted students appear to be our most moral students, in the sense of understanding complex moral issues and situations. They may also be our most fragile students in terms of ego and self-concept. Their moral development is not an educational option. But neither is the relentless pursuit of a moral education model which ignores their affective needs. Because our goal is virtue, it does not follow that any means is justified. Our gifted students deserve a better moral education than that. Our own morality should cause us to search for a model of moral education which neglects neither the cognitive nor the affective needs of the gifted. Isn't it time that we got on with it?

15. Ibid., pp. 109-110.
PREDICATE CONDITIONS FOR MORAL EDUCATION

Virgil S. Ward
Emeritus Professor of Education
University of Virginia

I. Perspective

A. Thesis and Delimitation

This paper is prefatory to, but different from a theory or a plan for moral education and character development in the contemporary American school. Authentic, i.e., valid, effective, contributory education toward the character development of individuals, it is held, can be successful following only upon the assurance of certain prerequisite and attendant conditions which are here termed "predicates" to the act of moral instruction as such.

The thesis begins with the contention that the current upturn (actually a return) in appreciation for the need for moral education in the schools, while altogether gratifying in intent and objective, is nonetheless significantly deficient in predilection, method and contextual foundation, and is thus characterized by a "predicate deficiency." The ensuing positive argument centers in three successive propositional statements. The first identifies the need, foremost in the present analysis, for an encompassing theory of moral education for the complex and changing ways of life which now prevail, this imperative being termed "theoretical predication"; the second proposition, termed "authentic predication," identifies certain pre-existing bodies of knowledge (precepts, approach strategies, process skills) now dormant -- underdeveloped, evaded or not known to exist and relate, but still in fact relevant and awaiting cultivation; and the third, designated as "practical predication," holds that precursors of this nature, when stated in the functional form of general principles and provisions, are necessary to the practical success and enduring effects of the objectives, processes and activities which directly engage teachers and students in the classroom.

The worth of the proposed separation between supportive conditionality and actual program, argued implicitly throughout the discussions of the respective predicate variables, is viewed as threefold: (a) making possible and urging that in planning for moral education in the contemporary school, we bring actively to bear the constructive wisdom from past periods in which such concerns were in the forefront; (b) making possible greater concentration upon each phase of the total initiative, both the background preparation and the act as such, and accordingly bringing forth clearer understandings as to role, responsibility and accountability among the principals involved; and (c) aggrandizing the opportunity and the obligation toward stronger conceptualization, and thereby increasing the probability of the practical success (Greek "praxis") and enduring effects of the intended end.

In their nature, the topic and treatment are bound not by the conventional constraints in which an argument is judged by the merits with which evidence, reason and imagination are brought to bear upon an established arena of thought; but rather,

Communication: 301 Kent Road, Charlottesville, Va. 22903; Tel.: 804/295-2085
in that the essay is heuristic and exploratory, not ramifying an established field of thought and activity, whatever strengths, if any at all, that can be ascribed to it, must rest upon the persuasiveness of the observations submitted in the thesis as such and in each phase of the argument.

B. Background: Historic and Contemporary

That there is a history to the concern for the moral education of youth in the American school, beyond the ancient thought of Hebrew, Greek and Roman philosophy where it was paramount, will surprise few students of the American school as a social institution. This concern has found explicit expression, albeit episodic and transitory, over the entire range of the present century, in which the concept and practice of public schools as we now know them has arisen.

Early manifestations are found at large in such works as the McGuffey Readers, widely used as the century began. And various individual scholars and researchers, responding to the prevailing sentiments of their respective periods, have investigated and written on the subject, examples of such work being: William J. Hutchins, who in 1916 won the "donor's prize" in a national competition for developing a "Children's Code of Morals"; Hartshorne and May, who in 1928 inaugurated their massive empirical investigations under the designation Studies in the Nature of Character; and Vernon Jones, who in 1936 published his Character and Citizenship Training in the Public School, An Experiment in Three Specific Methods.

The literature available to the present author in the early 1950s when he addressed the problem of "personal, social and character development" in regard to the special education of gifted youth (Differential Education of the Gifted) was somewhat elaborate and well-reasoned: Ernest M. Ligon, 1948, A Greater Generation; Harold Saxe Tuttle, 1949, Dynamic Psychology and Conduct; Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association, 1951, Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools, and other comparable works.

The depth and breadth of the moral potentiality and expression thereof within the human species, has furthermore led to inquiries on the part of social and psychological scientists, working in territory bordering upon the philosophical. C. Marshall Lowe, for instance, in plumbing among the practices of Clinical Psychology, identifies four philosophic schools--Naturalism, Culturalism, Humanism and Theism--within which value positions are inherent, and among which conflicts affecting not only the therapist but the parent, minister, teacher and politician as well, are notable. Broad conceptual positions or schools of thought in Psychology--Behaviorism, Psychoanalysis, the "third force" approaches of such theorists as Allport, Maslow and Rogers, of course, embody significant reasoning about moral and ethical conduct, and the differences and especially the contradictions make for extraordinary complexity in the practicing position of the educational theorist and curriculum designer. And especially during the last couple of decades, this happily on the fortuitous side, the systematic stage theorists, predominantly Erikson, Piaget and Kohlberg have been enormously influential toward establishing for practical school projects and activities in such scattered places as these have come about, certain philosophically and scientifically respectable theoretical bases, albeit each circumscribed and significantly different in some respects.

And finally among these sketchy references to background, it must be noted that among social theorists and intellectuals the problems of personal, social and character development have invoked some of the more profound thoughts within human experience: Is man inherently good or evil? Can the impulses of our animalistic
nature be brought under the command of individual reason and will; or is the shaping of motives and conduct possible only under the force of human engineering? What knowledge is of most worth? Does knowledge of the good conduce toward right con-
duc?:
Is common man capable of the complex and subtle distinctions involved in higher order of moral reasoning and conduct? And indeed: Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?

It is then in the light of such deep and extensive considerations as these, which lie in the background for reckoning, that contemporary initiatives toward the moral education of today's youth can but take place; and it is in the context of such diverse arrays of problems and issues thus briefly invoked that the present argument now unfolds.

II Predicate Conditionality

A. Predicate Deficiency in the Contemporary Initiative

The thesis begins with a portrayal of how, in the author's reasoning, current approaches to the problem of character development and moral education in the schools are lacking in the foundations and contextual prerequisites which would in turn allow for and predispose practical action toward success and enduring effect. In sum, the prevailing preparations are viewed as negative and handicapping in various ways, thus constituting not a "normal" sociocultural and institutional base, but rather a deficit conditionality which in itself must be reckoned with before positive action, directly involving children themselves, can begin.

Institutions as the source of stability, and to a considerable extent of self-fulfillment for persons, are arguably in these times in an unaccustomed state of deterioration. Negligence, disarray, and conflict are rampant, and the resultants in the demoralization of persons (alienation, egocentricity, racism, substance abuse, and the like) are but following suit, as it were. What with the widespread nature of scandals in business, government, politics and even religion, as well as in private life, societal character itself appears to have become tainted. New levels of inquiry as to what is "normal" behavior and what pathological have arisen, with confusion reigning seemingly more often than clarity by dint of the sheer complexity of conditions prevailing within a globally interdependent 'human condition' and unprecedented rates of technological development and sociocultural upheavals.

In a recent cover story on Ethics in Time Magazine, a summing up in one sweep of the alleged questionable conduct and wrongdoings of individuals on the current scene--North, McFarlane, Deaver, Boesky, Hart Lonetree, Jim and Tammy Bakker, "maybe Edwin Meese and perhaps even the President"--the question "What's Wrong?" is raised, and followed with the observation: "Their transgressions--some grievous and some petty--run the gamut of human failings, from weakness of will to moral laxity to hypocrisy to uncontrolled avarice. But taken collectively, the heedless lack of restraint in their behavior reveals something disturbing about the national character."10

Now as to the nature of initiative and action taking place within this unhappy setting, the activities appear to be sporadic, fragmentary and disconnected, concrete and particularistic, and by and large to center by accident of time, place and circumstance upon any of dozens of manifest problems of immediate awareness -- juvenile delinquency, drug and alcohol use in the elementary school, vandalism, teen-age pregnancy, adolescent suicide, school dropouts, youth unemployment -- any one such concentration serving as well as another as a stopgap to assuage for the moment a heightened concern in a given region or community.
As to aegis and support (national and state governments; private sector foundations and benefactors) for these diverse and free-floating impulses of conscience and advantage, similarly spontaneous and incidental promptings seem to prevail among special interests, targeted populations, and selected subject areas (math or natural science or the humanities; critical thinking or creative problem solving) where weaknesses are perceived as odious and alarming. And concurrently the flow of committee studies and reports continue; and in schools, an endless array of in-service themes, drives and projects for the year, large scale and small, seem to blend indiscriminately with one another, and some responsible critics observe all the while that little impact beyond immediate media hype and newspaper headline appears to accrue.

Still more serious in negative import is the strong dissent and conflict in beliefs as to what in fact the schools should be doing to and for children, the contention on one hand being that they should stick to subject matter and leave values to the home, church and community; and on the other hand, that few aspects of developmental experience are indeed more fundamental within the school's potential agenda than the inculcation of a sense of morality (democracy, justice, responsibility), and along with this often a specific set of prescriptive understandings and principles.

Given all these rips and tears in what should be a whole fabric of understandings, attitudes, antipathies and preferences; and as well little if any apparent interest and power directed toward seeking out and constructing an encompassing policy, buttressed by philosophy and science and professional insight—and what we appear indeed to have is a predicate deficiency of significant import, which mitigates against the success of any given initiative, even the better among those now of record, and any effect that is beyond the immediate time and locale within which it takes place.

B. Positive Predication

In that any consideration by way of specific educational reform should relate to some idealized vision, plan or design into which the proposed change fits, and that in order to be contributory at all to the thematic emphasis of the present conference (Education: A Moral Enterprise), this exposition of negative and inauspicious facts and circumstances must be paralleled with considerations on the positive side which in the presented view would tend toward greater authenticity, increased probability of enduring effects in the lives of the persons affected, and eventually in the character of the society of which these individuals are members and to which they are thereby obligated.

Now in advance of the projection of the three types of predicate conditions as such, and the somewhat intricate relationships which obtain among them, the reader may find the following descriptive summary to facilitate apprehension:

Theoretic Predication. A proposition (the first) contending that the practical act of moral instruction in the schools must as a first and foremost condition be buttressed by explicit and warrantable theory;

Authentic Predication. A proposition (the second) contending that beyond this predicate theory, certain prerequisite conditions, three being projected, are essential to promising programs of moral instruction; and
Practical Predication and Exemplary Resources. A proposition (third and final), with an accompanying itemization of related works (specific publications; classes thereof), contending that the prescribed conditionalities (i.e., the authenticating predicates) are directly and substantively applicable to current action initiatives (activity, project, program) toward the moral enlightenment and character development of contemporary youth and adults, three such practicing mandates, in appropriately adapted language form and paralleling the three authenticating predicates, being set forth.

These prerequisite modalities have been arrived at in a process more or less inductive in nature but in reverse sequence, working backward from the illustrative and suggestive resources in the final proposition to the general form in the second. Taken together, the general prescription and its parallel practicing mandate comprises a set of prerequisite provisions which serves as either or both (1) attributes of the setting out of which program planning should occur, on the part of any responsible agent, in any locale; and (2) of qualities of understanding and commitment with which personnel mainly involved with the developing clientele should be imbued. Theory (first proposition) is, of course, the "jewel in the crown" of any and all constructive educational inquiry, noteworthy in the present problem.

Proposition 1: Theoretic Predication, i.e.,

That the central and most critical mandate weighing toward the success of institutional programs of education in the moral spheres of human experience is a generic theory of moral responsibility and moral conduct--informed, reasoned and intellectually authoritative, as transcendent and subsumptive as possible in terms of the current circumstances and settings within which modern man is embraced, and as inclusive as possible of the wisdom of the past, winnowed for relevance today and as is likely to be in the near future.

Men and women, nations and societies, must learn to build constructively within what has been aptly called an 'emergent human condition', a way of life which is all over again as gratifying as we think to have been the case in past peaks of human experience. The literature available for the construction of theory toward this ideal necessity is as abundant as is the human imagination thus represented, encompassing not alone our rational impulses but the inspiration and understanding inherent in our art -- drama, novel and poetry; architecture, sculpture and painting; the humanistic and supernaturalistic reflections of philosophers and scientists -- these ranging over all the "realms of meaning" (Phenix) of which the species is capable.

But all this, admittedly an immense order, albeit as compellingly necessary as it is forbiddingly complex, is in the present view still not beyond the realm of human effort; and it is feasible if exemplary outreaches in such kind out of yesterday are to be trusted, and also feasible, on however modest a scale, among those of us who in these times profess to take education seriously.

Proposition 2: Authentic Predication, i.e.,

That fields of knowledge and thought exist--powerfully relevant to the problem of moral guidance and character development in the contemporary school and fitting in nature to the prerequisite infrastructural place and function rather than to instructional content and process per se--lying dormant and fallow (not known about, evaded or otherwise effectively precluded) in institutional planning, but available for formulation and use to aggrandize the probability of success and enduring effect of the program objective.
Three such authenticating bodies of understanding are projected, thus:

a. Value authenticity. Only through explicit and informed efforts to pursue surface manifestations of issues and problems which excite initial concern to the deeper levels of philosophic and scientific analysis and the higher orders of conceptual abstractions which reason allows, is the school initiative appropriately structured, either for good fit within relevant theoretical structures or as public policy in a pluralistic society.

As philosophy, tempered by science (or the other way around), these core understandings must link past understandings to the present and near future; and as public policy the constructs must, even while respecting sharp and basic differences in value predilection and derivative codes of belief and conduct, transcend and subsume all significant subordinate ideologies (save those which like nihilism and terrorism lie at such extremity that they will eventually fall by their own incontinence and irrationality) through the sheer capacity of the human mind for understanding, integration and reasoning. As a product of his own history, man's thought in each generation can and should be subsumptive, and hence transcendent, of and over his past.

This understanding links strongly and supportively to the further positions set forth immediately following, as to the progressive nature of social reconstructions and the requirement that education is a life-span process, possible only of partial accomplishment during the periods of childhood and youth.

b. Sociopolitical essentiality. Proper education in the public domain must of course fulfill itself within the confines of its central state of sociopolitical authority. But societies -- and governments differ in the latitudes allowed for dissent; and in that higher authorities and sanctions have been identified and stand as options for free men in essentially free societies, the demands of morality test our temperament and our courage at given places and times--whether in the days of the Spanish inquisition or in contemporary Afghanistan or Poland--to exercise the prerogatives fought for throughout Western history--the Magna Carta, the American Declaration of Independence, the French Revolution, the Constitution of the United States of America--which tests are manifested in peaks of intellectual acumen and moral circumspection such as the Athenian state, the European Renaissance, and American benevolence to war-ravaged countries in the post World War II years.

The complexities of the present time, so greatly different and challenging in the process of cultural adaptations to runaway technology, place uncommon strains on the quest for moral certainties. But the same prevailing condition of an impossibly complicated surround, characterized by imbalances more in the nature of change, discontinuity and destabilization than of continuity and stability, also makes it more certain than ever that the older certainties of prescriptive injunctions and constraints are no longer viable within the sociocultural matrices of the present and future.

A methodological notion, however, is necessary to render this extraordinary ideal feasible within the real world of power dynamics, and to render manageable the question of what is and is not moral. Some form of purpose or faith appears necessary to drive and direct our energies--physical, intellectual, spiritual, artistic--which faith is amenable both to scientific thought and democratic sociopolitical ideology; and some conceptual notion which enables and lends warrant to the timeless quest which appears to be a near-indigenous attribute of the human personality. Bold or foolhardy, as the case may be, this functionally useful understanding, in the
present view, lies within the meaning and import of the construct of instrumentalism, defined in part in the Angeles Dictionary as "...ideas useful or powerful enough to explain and cause change and satisfy human needs and purposes."

c. **Biosocial functionality.** A central issue in the field of human development, i.e., that of continuity versus discontinuity, has been substantially resolved over the past couple of decades in favor of "stage theory" (Erikson, Piaget, Kohlberg), wherein our species potential for perceiving, learning and thinking is viewed as unfolding in successive periods across the life span, within each of which developmental phases categorically different capabilities for knowing and performing emerge. In the light of this advancement in psychological science, the concept and practice of general education (all subjects, all grade levels) in the American school, centering still as it does in the years of childhood and youth appears oddly archaic, that is stubbornly resistant to biopsychological research information and tragically deprivational for people at large in denying them the privilege of fruitful life span development (maturation linked with ongoing experience) in their mature years, and all manner of constructive advancements in knowledge and in personal fulfillment.

This condition, irrational, unnecessary on any known grounds, and perverse in consequence, affects moral education in particular on the score that the subtle and complex problems in this sphere of human experience require for authentic reckoning i.e., other than immature, simplistic and naive perception and internalization both the biopsychological growth of which the person is capable and the sociocultural reformations which advance cumulatively through the adult years, both of which factors responding to constructive sequences in the institutional formalities of education.

Proposition 3: **Practical Predication** (Greek "praxis"), i.e.,

That in representation of the conditional modalities thus argued as prerequisite to substantive arrangements for moral education in the modern school, certain prescriptive attributes and principles may be educed and illustrated by exemplary works (types of information, specific publications and other expressions), past and present, such that these embodiments of existing but now substantially dormant learnings may be fruitfully and functionally brought to bear upon current initiatives under school, district, state or regional aegis in the interest of enhancing the probability of success of the intended objective.

Again, three such requirements are presented, these being as previously indicated, in parallel phase with the general conditionals just depicted (thus: 2 a, b and c; and 3 a, b and c), adapted into adverbial phraseology so as better to indicate concrete particularity and applicability. The reader is respectfully asked, in the interest of space limitations, to transfer the respective meanings from the general form to the particularized obligation of practicing personnel in any given locale and circumstance. In this manner, the text in this section is confined to the identification of the resource information suggested, here essentially in narrative form, with end notes supplying references where particular works appear to justify the detail.

a. **Philosophically and scientifically veritable.** (1) Religious affirmations and their moral derivatives as expounded in scriptural documents and ongoing literature, representing both fundamentalist and liberal traditions, and including other than mainstream American religions (e.g., Buddhism's "nine incapacilities" and "Aryan eightfold path", Mormon creeds, Quaker beliefs); (2) secular manifestos and
humanistic creeds and prescriptions for conduct; and (3) philosophic and other meta-analytic syntheses of values tending toward the universal, the elements of human nature, the moral characteristics of "future" societies.13

b. Consummately democratic in precept and function. (1) Studies like those of R. Bruce Raup and his colleagues on the Improvement of Practical Intelligence; Stephen Corey on "action research", and others which entail efforts to arrive at consensual views and to resolve problems in ways indigenous to the democratic way of life;14 studies of the change process, ranging from the work of Goodwin Watson to that of Ronald Havelock,15 and still more recent ones; (3) reflective studies via print and other media in renewed appreciation for the American Constitution during its 200th anniversary year; and (4) imaginative constructs such as Kohlberg's "just community" and high but sensible expectancies such as Ligon's "seven-day-a-week undertaking," out of his plan for developing "a greater generation," and earlier plans for moral development.16

c. Developmentally applicable. (1) Sociological and psychological literature, such as the works of Robert Havighurst's "developmental tasks"17 and Robert White's "lives in progress,"18 which depict the organicity of experience on the whole and across the life span; and (2) theoretical schema, such as those of Erikson, Piaget and Kohlberg,19 which portray progressive sequences (categorical discontinuities) in understanding, predilection and conduct in the process of healthy development, each of which works supports and/or urges purpc.e.ful differences in the order of teaching and learning with advancing age, and especially during adulthood.

III. Prospect: Outlook and Responsibility

Given then that on the negative side (predicate deficiency) current initiatives toward moral education in the American school are so inadequately conceived and grounded that they by no stretch of the imagination can be thought likely to make a significant collective difference in individual predisposition or societal character; and that on the positive side (the three forms of positive predication here developed), the infrastructural and prerequisite preparations for effective programs are so forbiddingly deep and broad as to be less than probable of immediate attraction, what are the prospects for the turnaround which is testified by popular hue and cry, and by reasoned analysis, as so badly needed?

As with other pervasive and encompassing deficits of a social nature, approached for reform through conscious institutional action, e.g., logical proficiency for the man on the street, and his epistemological depth; health awareness and the wellness ideal; family cohesiveness and inter-generational harmony, pessimism, though never fatalism, is the readiest of realistic alternatives. Put in resistance to that hopelessness, which but demeans man's capacity for constructing his own institutions and thereby in considerable part, himself, there is a focal, powerful and entirely realistic hope to be placed in the dual appeal to the individual mind and conscience, a "ruggedly individualistic" appeal, if once again it needs be, and to the process of education, especially to education as a lifelong quest, with fruitfulness quite possibly expanding during the lengthy period of adulthood.

This appeal, to people like ourselves and to those with less opportunity and accordingly lessened obligation to exemplify the understanding and reasoning of which the species is capable, and to act in accordance with the best that we know,
extends outwardly and inwardly to a stable yet progressively accruing "apperceptive mass" (Herbert) of human culture, this in our artistic and spiritual heritage and in the intellectual; and also to known procedures bent toward the enlargement of the individual's perception and vision, such as elective course work in community colleges and degree programs in universities; counseling centers and volunteer inquiry and action groups and associations; great books seminars; and even instruments for the appraisal of psychological traits and prepotent tendencies, some of these remarkably penetrating and persuasive, which are amenable to private and personal use—all of which resources for continuing education are available to the degree that reason and conscience, here and now, mine, yours and that of our neighbors, can summon the will to pursue.

In this recourse, an abiding faith on the author's part, it is gratifying to note in a recent study by Rosemarie Tong of certain legal aspects of the particular issue of pornography and women, a similar understanding and commitment, as is reflected in this passage with which the present essay is concluded:

The real weapon with which to fight thanatic porn is education and not the law. Porn will remain a problem until people no longer desire it, and it is in the country's classrooms—not in its courtrooms—that desires are shaped. ...

By thinking and speaking, by deciding and acting, by using our reason and expanding our heart together with our students, we aim to reaffirm that we are morally responsible persons who not only have the capacity to direct the way the world goes but who care—deeply—about the way the world goes.20

Notes and References


9. For this and all ensuing references to well established theories and systems in general, developmental and educational psychology, each represented by a voluminous literature, secondary sources are sufficient, and alone feasible, for the purposes of this paper. The main references of use to the author for the summary character of each such theoretical source, perhaps sufficient as well for the reader, are: James E. Birren, et al., *Developmental Psychology: A Life-Span Approach* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981); Richard H. Hersh, Diana P. Paolitto and Joseph Reimer, *Promoting Moral Growth: From Piaget to Kohlberg* (New York: Longman Inc., 1979); and Neil J. Salkind, *Theories of Human Development* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1981).


19. Birrin, et al., Hersh, et al., and Salkind, as in Note #9 above.

IN PRAISE OF ILLITERACY

Joseph Di Bona
Duke University

The title of this paper is not meant as a joke or a misprint; its purpose is to look critically at the concept of illiteracy and ask some questions about how this phenomenon can be so intractable in the face of concerted universal efforts to eradicate it. The paper will try to relate illiteracy to the workplace and suggest that not all illiterates are either fools or laggards; indeed there are a large number of illiterates who hold responsible, productive jobs and live exemplary lives. The folk or oral tradition is alive and well in many parts of the world and still represents an alternate approach to knowledge that literacy zealots ignore under peril of parochialism. One additional thread runs through this paper and it concerns the rise of the electronic media. Millions of Americans (not to mention the rest of the world) spend infinitely more time watching the news rather than reading. The same is true of entertainment, commercials, etc. Needless to say, it is increasingly possible to be informed, to be moved and to be involved without ever opening the pages of a book or newspaper.

My thesis in this paper is that we are in a transitional phase from literacy to electronic communication. For millions of years mankind (I use the term in its generic sense) could neither read nor write. Writing was invented and spread rapidly to facilitate the transference and perpetuation of ideas. That period has lasted for several tens of thousands of years. In the last century, electronic handling of data is rapidly moving to accomplish all those tasks. We must ask ourselves today whether the struggle to ward off illiteracy is not a misplaced effort spawned of a nostalgic affection for the past rather than a recognition of the forces that are making for change. The point may be difficult to accept largely because there is an intense need for all of us to read and write, both in school and outside. What I am asking here is that we examine the question both historiically as well as in the context of present and future technology.

The Literacy Issue

If we read current educational reform plans carefully we can discern the outline of this argument implicit in a number of their pronouncements. The Carnegie Report, for example, on education and the economy said,

"The world is moving into a technological information age in which full participation in education, science, business, industry and the professions requires increasing levels of literacy. What was a satisfactory level of literacy in 1950 probably will be marginal by the year 2000."

They are not talking about reading more books or changing the high school drop out rates. They are talking about welding education to the information age in which libraries are increasingly tied into computerized networks that retrieve, abstract, collate, search and tally information we could not possibly do unaided. Computer use in American schools more than doubled between 1980 and 1982 and continues to rise as does all areas of electronic data-handling equipment.

Correspondence: Program in Education, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708
The impact of this change can be seen in some stark figures from the world of media. Between 1958 and 1980 expenditure on media rose from 37 billion to 227 billion or from 7.7% of GNP to 8%. At the same time the percent of our GNP spent on books actually fell. Newspapers have decreased both in numbers and in circulation by household. In this period of time it fell from just over one to just under one per household and continues to fall. Every home in America has a radio and television and the proportion of our GNP spent on books and newspapers and magazines has fallen below what we spend on electronic media.\(^3\) Behind these facts are economic realities that point to future changes we can expect in the workplace and in the schools. Literacy is expensive and it costs a great deal to teach a child to read and even then we do not do a very good job if the 1983 report by the National Commission on Excellence in Education is to be believed. They said that 23 million Americans are functionally illiterate, that 13% of all 17 year olds are in this category and among minority youth the rate is 40%.\(^4\) If we assumed 50 million children in our schools and an expenditure of $100 million dollars, that would work out to a cost of $2000/student expenditure. Television expenditures for 1982 were about 15 billion and with a population of 200 million Americans that works out to an annual cost of $68.00 per person. We may argue the value of watching television as opposed to going to school, but the cost differentials are clear as well as the increasing use of the media. In terms of personnel we can see 3 million teachers being utilized for 50 million students while the radio and T.V. industry had just over 200,000 employees.\(^5\) This works out roughly to one worker impacting on roughly 1,000 people and at a cost that is roughly 25 times more efficient.

If we draw an analogy between the erosion of literacy and the demise of handicrafts in the 19th century, it could hardly be a precise one. But we should recall that hand spinning and weaving did not disappear because they were inferior products, although today we make invidious comparisons between machine-made and hand-made products that distinction is learned. At the time of the contest between the old and the new, the old was accepted as superior. Home cooked food, handmade clothing and most other items were regarded as superior to the crude machine version. What could not be attacked was the cost. Machines produced products cheaper than individuals working with their hands could produce. So too it is with teaching. More and more products electronically produced will replace products produced by hand and that includes a literate person. My argument is that it is already taking place and this explains the continuing problem of literacy training and points to why instead of succeeding in our battle for universal literacy we will increasingly lose the struggle.

**Why is Literacy Important?**

A great deal has been written about the origins of American education in the early church schools of Massachusetts which sought to use Bible reading to save souls. But literacy was also seen as a means of preserving order. The leaders of the 17th century society according to Merle Curti, "...to ensure the obedience of good men, good wives and servants, these must be able to read the capital laws on which tested the rule of the clergy and gentlemen."\(^6\) Add to this literature, a large body of work drawn from archeology, linguistics and classical studies—all of which have extolled the great virtues of our literature tradition, and you have a formidable array of learned men on the opposite side of argument here presented. Edward Clodd writing over a century ago, saw the discovery of the alphabet as essential for human progress.
"It is only in the passage from the ideogram to the phonetic whereby constant signs are chosen to stand for the constant sounds that the progress of human race was assured because only thereby was the preservation of all that is of abiding value made possible."

A century earlier, Carlyle had said, "Certainly the art of writing is the most miraculous of all things man has devised. With the art of writing, the true reign of miracles for mankind commenced." More often in mythology writing is attributed to the gift of the Gods, so precious was it supposed to be.

The history of how writing evolved is pretty well established and begins generally with the introduction of picture writing. There are examples of this in even paleolithic times—decorated bone, antler and stone figures dating back as far as 27,000 years. In later stages the picture became symbolic, representing an idea. In the final stages of writing, the symbol represents a sound, either a word, a syllable or a letter. From picture writing to phonetic symbols, all the alphabets of the civilized world have passed through similar stages of development. According to Edward Clodd the printed letters or sound-signs which compose our alphabet are about 2500 years old. What was truly remarkable was the discovery that the signs could be used for single consonants because it involved the abstraction of the consonant from the syllable. The sound of a can exist by itself, but not the sound of k. The consonant requires a vowel with it making it ak or ka. The sound of the consonant is inseparable from that of the vowel, but the alphabet separates it in writing.

Whichever dates we use for the origin of writing or our alphabet, the important point is that the invention came about for a particular purpose and to fulfill a specific need. That need certainly included the need to protect and preserve a cultural heritage that had already become too burdensome for the oral tradition alone. But for most of mankind's existence, he has not known how to read nor needed to know how to read. With the invention of printing and the wide distribution of books, there has been an explosion in reading and literacy, but all this was before the recent introduction of the electronic media. Today we cannot ignore the booming business in all aspects of non-print facilities. In 1986 video sales hit new highs in the U.S. Paramount Home Video and sales jumped from 2.65 million units to 3.2 million in one year. They were responsible for such successes as Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom for $29.35. Disney Home Video showed a sales jump from one million units in 1985 to 2.8 million units in 1986. Their contribution included Sleeping Beauty, Pinocchio and The Sword in the Stone—all for $29.95. Is it likely these same viewers will be tempted to read the original text? The chances are, like their parents, they will be content to "watch" the story and report on it to the teacher from that. And who knows, the teacher may be doing likewise.

Conclusion

Some will certainly, like Jonathan Kozol, deplore this sad state. He commented last year on a Princeton Study entitled the National Assessment of Educational Progress in which it was found that "only" 10 million Americans could not read or write. But it also found that another 36 million could not read at an 8th grade level and 70 million adults could not read at an 11th grade level. These are not people who have not attended school. They have. But they have not learned how to read with understanding and insight. On the other hand it is probably true that this population has spent more time watching television or videos or films than they have spent reading or perhaps even in school. But rather than wringing our hands in
dismay. I would suggest that we accept this state and work with youth to train them for worthwhile careers which are compatible with the skills they have. They must still be informed and critical citizens, they must still be able to fill out tax forms, but all of these skills must be adapted to the electronic media which play an increasingly important part in our lives.

Before this concept can take root, it is necessary to have an understanding of the process with which we are dealing. It is not delinquency, or resistance or moral turpitude that leads to a lack of literacy but exposure in very effective ways to nonprint media which competes with reading in ways that ensure reading will lose in its battle with T.V. It is a truth that every parent in America already knows but has not yet incorporated that knowledge into a plan that will attack the problem. This means beginning with a future assessment of what men and women will need to know for jobs of the future and provide them with that training through the most efficient means. What we cannot lose sight of under any circumstances is the necessity of educating good men and women able to distinguish between right and wrong, good and bad. They must vote, they must participate in society and they must labor for themselves and for others who need that support—but all this they must do as winners not losers. Today, to be illiterate is to be in distress. My plea is for us to change our attitude toward the unsuccessful reader. Instead of condemnation let us now praise illiteracy instead.

8. A salmon decorates the ceiling of Abri de Poisson, a rock shelter in France. See the article by Robin Dennell, "Needles and Spear-throwers." NATURAL HISTORY. 10/86 p. 70.
10. Jonathan Kozol is the author of ILLITERATE AMERICA. His article appeared in the NEW YORK TIMES. October 30, 1986. p. 27.
MORAL EDUCATION: IGNORANCE AND STUPIDITY

Rocco Porreco
Georgetown University

I wish to argue that education must deal with both stupidity and ignorance and that there is a significant difference between the two. This is how I use the terms: I expand on the meaning of the term "stupidity," relating it to affective as well as cognitive states, and give it a moral connotation. "Ignorance," on the other hand, I relieve of any moral meaning as in invincible ignorance. I do not wish to establish a dichotomy between these two states of mind, preferring to define them as contrary and not contradictory terms; neither do I want to equate virtue with knowledge or vice with ignorance. This is a thesis I tried to defend against Cat in the course of a lengthy examination of virtues and vices. Let me take a couple of minutes, however, to tell you about Cat since I know that most of you have never heard of him and, once you do hear about who and what he is, might not wish to listen to our conversation about this matter.

I first met Cat, as I came to call him, several years ago in a dream occasioned by my thinking long and hard about the teaching of values. This subject had been at the center of my thinking for some time in connection with courses on the philosophy of education that I was teaching to college undergraduates and high school teachers. All of my students, and my colleagues as well, were strongly of the opinion that teaching should have nothing to do with values, especially moral ones. At least in the narrow circles that I moved in, I was virtually alone in holding that an education, especially a liberal one, should be moral. It was while I was in a state of frustration and isolation that I first met Cat. Perhaps that is why, at least in our early conversations, he, responding to my irascibility, appears to be somewhat truculent and to like disagreement for its own sake. I do not wish to impugn the intelligence and intellectual honesty of Cat, however. He was always a formidable adversary and often made me painfully aware of the limitations of my philosophy. In order to preserve the flavor of our original conversation I am going to maintain the dialogue form in this reading. Unfortunately, I am not able to imitate Cat's voice, but I will try to lower the pitch of my voice as I tell you what he said since he intoned rather than spoke his thoughts. I wish that I were a better actor so that I might be able to carry this off well, but I will do my best, including certain asides for you, my hearers.

AN ASIDE: Although I had given the topics of evil, vice and sin a lot of thought, it was not easy to know how to begin this particular dialogue with Cat. In his mind, and probably also in

Correspondence: Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057 Rocco Porreco
yours, evil and vice are more palpable and more real than good and virtue. Abnormal psychology has the same kind of appeal and it seems to be the case that the anatomy of illness often attracts more interest than the anatomy of health. Yet morality, as I had presented it to Cat, is a positive quality and immorality is negative or privative in the sense that it represents a kind of deficiency or lack of something that an action ought to have. I had always tried in our conversations to make the point that being moral leads to man’s fulfillment and being immoral leads to his frustration.

Metaphorically speaking, vice describes a kind of sickness and virtue a kind of health. I know that some of the conditions that were described as vices in former times are now properly recognized as diseases and are treatable by drugs and other forms of therapy. I strongly resist the idea, however, that all vicious conduct results from mental illness or will eventually be reduced to it. Moral weakness or akrasia, as Aristotle calls it, is a problem for ethics and not just for psychology. Dr. Karl Menninger, I think, asks a good question in his book, "What Ever Happened to Sin?"

Having laid an experiential basis for ethics and having described the anatomy of the moral virtues, I believed that we could now address ourselves more directly to educational problems such as the teaching of values and that we could do this most effectively in conjunction with an examination of the virtues and vices. Education, as I see it, is essentially a moral enterprise. In this part of our dialogue I quote from contemporary writers out of deference to the wishes of Cat who had become wearied with the distinctions I was making and also because I believe that these writers describe the educational problems we are facing in a concrete and compelling way. Despite Cat’s remonstrances to the contrary, however, I continued my practice of erring to distinctions we had made and making new ones. I do this because I believe that many difficulties can be resolved if the terms and concepts in which they are described are clarified. When I told Cat that we were going to discuss the vices he was eager to begin because, you see, he thought that he knew a lot more about evil than I did. We began in medias res.

ME: Having a vice indicates a loss of integrity and a consequent breakdown of unity. It is in this sense that the perpetrator of injustice suffers more harm than his victim. Moral decay is like physical decay: it results in the loss of unity and life. I also happen to think that there is a very real sense in which vice affects one’s health adversely.

CAT: Then I would expect the vicious person to manifest symptoms of his disease and would suggest that he avoid moral philosophers like you and see a physician or psychiatrist. I would also expect the virtuous person to live longer.

ME: As a matter of fact, I do recall reading somewhere that "nice guys do finish last" in that they actually live longer. The essence of disease, I think, consists in disturbing the kind
of equilibrium that ought to exist, in particular that equilibrium of justice. I see vice, moreover, as most often rooted in a kind of overwhelming sensuousness that prevents a person from seeing things clearly. It may also result from insensitivity but that, I think, is rare.

CAT: Insensitivity probably occurs rather often among rationalist philosophers like you and other eggheads. I won’t comment on your antediluvian notion that the essence of disease is a loss of equilibrium. Only as an hypothesis am I willing to accept your contention that vice is characterized by irrationality. I’m much more inclined to accept the explanation of reality that you gave earlier, namely, that human reason, guided by practical wisdom, transforms a knowledge of things as they are into a realization of the good. I strongly object to any definition of rationality that overlooks or downplays the role of the emotions when talking about morality. I think it is just as natural for a being to be evil as it is to be good...

ME: I think we’re pretty much in agreement that the rationality we’ll be talking about in examining the vices involves a kind of transformation of what we know into what we love, and that what we love influences and determines what we know and how we know it.

CAT: A mutual transformation! But haven’t we reviewed enough? Why don’t we just get on with our discussion? And I want to remind you that you haven’t kept your promise to be economical in making philosophical distinctions.

ME: I did promise that I would use contemporary writers and this is a good place to begin. I’ve been thinking about a distinction that William Raspberry makes in a column entitled "Drug Stupidity, Not Ignorance." (6) Raspberry discusses the drug problem among athletes and makes what I think will be a most useful distinction for us. Let me read from it passim.

I look at Magic Johnson and Buck Williams warning the kids against experimenting with drugs, and I want to tell them to save their million-dollar breath. The kids know at least as much as these All-Star basketball pros know about the dangers of drugs. They know about Len Bias and Don Rodgers, both promising professional athletes and both dead of cocaine overdoses.... What can Magic and Buck say to the youngsters that could possibly be more effective than the message of these messed-up lives? ...Ignorance isn’t the problem. Stupidity compounded with arrogance is, and drug education, no matter how well intended, can’t cure that.... What is it about people that makes them take such overwhelming risks for such trivial pleasure? A part of the answer may be that they believe that experts exaggerate the risk--just as they exaggerated
the risks of marijuana use. A part of it may be that they believe the dangers in general but, young people having difficulty accepting their own mortality, doubt that the risks apply to them. But part of it, surely, must be the same sort of stupidity that makes adult smokers think they won’t get lung cancer, or that leads otherwise intelligent men and women to engage in sex with strangers knowing (but not really believing) that they could contract the deadly AIDS... Whatever the reason, or combination of reason, education doesn’t help, because ignorance isn’t the problem. Neither the earnest advice of such clean-cut heroes as Magic Johnson and Buck Williams, nor the pleas of former addicts who managed to pull back from the brink, will do the trick. It isn’t information we lack but a sense that it could really happen to us... Education can save the few of us who are still ignorant of the dangers. But what is the cure for stupidity?

CAT: I would like to meet Mr. Raspberry. He talks about real situations and shows a keen sense of the practical. He explains the irrational nature of man in a very cogent manner. I’m surprised that a rationalist like you, who believes that morality can be taught, would quote him at such great length.

ME: As you may recall, I’ve been trying to convince you that your concept of rationality and of me as a rationalist is much too narrow. I’ve been talking about irrational elements which, especially in the practical order, are an essential part of man’s nature. These irrational elements arise from the appetitive side of man and certainly could be found in the "stupidity" that Raspberry would like to cure. I believe that morality can be taught but in teaching it I would think of stupidity as a kind of practical and moral ignorance. I read Raspberry’s column to you because I think that his distinction between stupidity and ignorance and his discussion of it may help to clarify the notions of both virtue and vice in education.

CAT: But stupidity doesn’t refer to morality: it refers to a lack of knowledge. I suppose that "being stupid" is one stage below "being dumb." Raspberry even says that "it isn’t information we lack but a sense of what could really happen to us." Isn’t it a matter then of coming to a proper self-knowledge? How do we acquire that sense of what could really happen to us if not cognitively? I would, of course, be delighted to hear you say that we acquire it through a kind of education of our feelings, a process that I have called sentimentalization.

ME: Raspberry does say "a sense of" which indicates to me that, if he is talking about knowledge, it is not logical or theoretical knowledge. Our emotions are intimately involved in developing a knowledge of good and evil. I’ve heard that a
program of bringing potential young criminals into the prisons and showing them the terrible fate that awaits them there has been successful in "scaring them straight." That is a kind of education that rests on the emotion of fear guided, of course, by a first-hand and concrete knowledge of prison life.

CAT: You humans also teach religion through fear and, before you became so permissive, firmly believed in the adage, "spare the rod and spoil the child." Nowadays your educators say that the way to reach a child is to win his love and respect, but I'm sure that the effort to do this is not characterized by logical persuasion. Are you saying that the cure for the stupidity that Raspberry describes is emotionally based?

ME: I think that the educator needs to involve all human emotions in trying to effect a cure. Look at the way humans make decisions in the practical order. I think that we both agree that Mr. Spock as a Vulcan without emotions isn't a proper model for human beings. His logical nature and the absence of emotions, or the kind of sensuousness that humans have, would seem to prevent his ever being stupid.

CAT: I don't know about that. Spock would act stupidly if he didn't understand humans and his own lack of human emotions might well prevent him from doing so. Aren't you always telling your children to use their heads? I can't imagine your telling them to use their hearts instead. I suppose that you're trying to tell me that there's a way in which hearts and heads can be combined to produce moral behavior.

ME: I don't have a cure for moral stupidity which could be ministered evenly to mankind. I think that I might know how to apply a cure on an individual basis, but it would be a difficult and lengthy process. We can examine the causes of moral ignorance and in doing so possibly learn some ways of dealing with it through our educational system. I'm grateful for the way in which Mr. Raspberry has called attention to a difference between ignorance and stupidity. With respect to drugs, he says that the problem is stupidity compounded with arrogance. From what we've already said, I wonder whether arrogance isn't an essential part of stupidity and that part of its cure is in developing self-esteem or the virtue of self-respect. If one has this virtue, he thinks neither too little nor too much of himself.

CAT: Mr. Raspberry gives some of the reasons for stupidity. He speaks of the difficulty that young people have in accepting the fact of their own mortality, and conceive of themselves as cats with nine lives in that respect. He also refers to the scepticism that exaggerating the bad effects of "evil" actions engenders. I was pleased to hear that Mr. Raspberry doesn't deny the attractiveness of evil. That's a common mistake of educators, presenting evil as something wholly perverse and unattractive. I happen to know that forbidden fruit is very tasty.
ME: Optimism in the face of great difficulties is a pretty common phenomenon. It must relate to the feeling of confidence in oneself that one needs to face perilous situations courageously. Elizabeth Kubler-Ross says of the dying that they often believe that death is something that comes "to thee and to thee but not to me." The lack of self-knowledge reflected by stupidity is traceable to a lack of moral virtue and the presence of vice. In a way the morally stupid person is like the akrates or morally weak person described by Aristotle. Education, I believe, can do something about stupidity and moral weakness.

CAT: It seems to me that Mr. Raspberry gives good illustrations of how the moral education you're always talking about simply doesn't work. The examples of Magic Johnson and Buck Williams provide a positive content for such education, but they don't seem to have much impact either. It's quite possible that there isn't any cure for stupidity and that it's the very nature of human beings to be stupid--something like the original sin I've heard you talk about. I would say there is a kind of original stupidity which humans are constitutionally unable to overcome.

ME: Given the optimism of youth and the human tendency to deny personal weakness and vulnerability, I would say that the message of Magic Johnson and Buck Williams is not completely convincing. Moreover, there are many counter-examples of men and women who, having overcome the drug habit and publicly confessing and testifying against the evils of drugs, have become great heroes as a result, and prosperous ones to boot. Thus the young person can say to himself that drug addiction is something that can be overcome, even with possibly great benefits to himself. So why not take a chance? One former TV star was recently quoted to say that it was suggested to him that a cure for declining popularity was to "get busted." In reply to your pessimistic conclusion about mankind, I would point out that moral education is extremely difficult considering the different kinds of messages which young people get, messages which appeal to both their heads and their hearts. Because moral education is difficult, however, we should not conclude that the stupidity described by Raspberry has no cure. I'm happy to say that Raspberry himself doesn't share your pessimism: he says that "it isn't information we lack but a sense that it could really happen to us." The cure for him would seem to consist in conveying a sense of vulnerability, a realism about oneself presumably based on self-knowledge.

CAT: As I've always maintained, it would have to be a realism of the heart. That's the kind of realism that anyone who is selling anything whatsoever must have, and you are trying to develop and sell a cure for stupidity. A look at the way things are advertised should convince you of the truth of what I'm saying. It's not very often that advertisers use a rational approach. As an educator, you have a lot to learn from them. If you wish to cure moral stupidity, you've got to base your approach upon the emotions. How did you convince yourself to stop smoking? Wasn't it because a dentist told you that continued irritation to the roof of your mouth, caused by constant pipe-smoking, would eventually cause cancer? And you had seen cases of mouth cancer!
You might like to think that your decision to quit was a rational one, but I say it was motivated by fear. You were scared straight! I could multiply examples to show that human beings are just not moved to make practical decisions unless they are emotionally prodded.

ME: You continue to insist on taking a narrow view of human rationality. My defense of the virtues as a cure for moral stupidity makes no sense whatsoever if rationality is depicted as something in isolation from them whether complete or partial. The content of the moral virtues, especially courage and self-control, is appetitive or emotional and we saw this in examining their anatomy. Especially since Watergate, the number of articles and columns on teaching values has increased and is given a continuing impetus with each new scandal. And there have been many, including Wall Street insider trading and the Iran-Contra-gate revelations. Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., in a column entitled "Students Don't Learn Values," says that "... our standards of behavior... aren't hammered into us propositionally: not, that is, the way we learn the square root of two or the date of Appomattox or the chemical formula for salt. Trying to shape behavior that way is like trying to replicate a Michael Jordan by exposing someone to a biography of Dr. Naismith and the diagram of a basketball court." (7)

CAT: Does Mr. Yoder have a cure for stupidity? Perhaps he agrees with me that the only way to get students to stay on the straight and narrow is by appealing to the emotions.

ME: I'll let Mr. Yoder speak for himself because I think that his opinion is shared by many who tend to conceive of learning somewhat narrowly and who confuse virtues and vices with skills.

As ethical beings, setting terror aside, we become what we become in two ways. The non-pedagogical way is by imitating and internalizing the values and examples of people we admire and esteem. The pedagogical way--the only pedagogical way, as far as I know, yet discovered in 4,000 years of Western civilization--is by a process that used to be called "sentimental education," the education of the sentiments. That quaint old 18th century phrase still says more than most modern educationese. How does sentimental education occur? The only known way is to teach--well--those subjects in which values are implicated: literature, religion, philosophy, drama, art. Students do not "learn" values; but their sentiments may undergo enlargement and refinement by imaginative involvement in the situations dramatized in those subjects...

CAT: As you well know, my agenda for education essentially consists in the sentimentalization of humanity and I think
Yoder's program is just excellent. You know how I like proverbs. Mr. Yoder's position reminds me of one I haven't heard in a long time: "Values are not taught; they are caught." Exactly why do you think that Mr. Yoder and I conceive of learning narrowly?

ME: Because you both implicitly assume that all rational learning is like learning mathematics, philosophy or even skills like baseball. In doing this you equate virtue with skills that may be learned, an oversimplification that will distort any philosophy of education. You then say that learning values is impossible, implying that it is not a rational process. Admitting the possibility of students being terrified into compliance with a certain set of values and implicitly excluding this as learning, Yoder presents a dichotomy: "... setting terror aside, we become what we become in two ways." There is, he says the "non-pedagogical way," which proceeds "by imitating and internalizing the values and examples of people we admire and esteem." Now I just don't understand how this is non-pedagogical unless Yoder means that it is a type of learning that doesn't and shouldn't take place in the classroom. I am under the impression that teachers have traditionally encouraged reading the lives of great men and women precisely to set up role models and encourage imitation.

CAT: Perhaps Yoder simply means that values are just picked up outside of school and are therefore "non-pedagogical". And I myself would agree: "Values aren't taught; they're caught."

ME: Just because values are "caught" doesn't mean they aren't learned unless you want to describe this process as a kind of mindless "monkey see, monkey do." A child may not understand why it is good to follow the example of a hero except in the simplest utilitarian terms, but human imitation invariably involves a certain kind of learning. I think this is also true of animal imitation as shown by efforts to teach chimpanzees a language. On that score alone Yoder seems to take a narrow view of rationality. But the other part of the dichotomy, the "pedagogical way," is more interesting in terms of our discussion. Yoder says that he knows of no other way of teaching values besides "the education of the sentiments" in 4000 years of Western civilization.

CAT: I should think that we might forgive Mr. Yoder for not familiarizing himself with your particular philosophy of education and you shouldn't take it amiss if he wishes to restrict the meaning of the term "learning" to its more traditional usage as in learning "readin, 'ritin, and rithmatic." That has been, and still is, the traditional program of your schools. In proposing "the education of the sentiments," Yoder broadens his concept of learning to include the humanities. He says says that "... the sentiments of students may undergo enlargement and refinement by imaginative involvement in the situations dramatized in ... subjects like literature, religion, philosophy, drama and art." You're offended because you unrealistically think that philosophy and the other humanities do more for students than expand their sentiments.
ME: Let's say that I'm not so much offended as surprised. I like Yoder's emphasis on the humanities and agree with him that the humanities' portion of the curriculum is the best place to learn about values. But students can also effectively learn about values in other courses in the curriculum. As I said before, if one does not have an evidentially based metaphysics and philosophy of man, he can't develop a sound or workable philosophy of education. One of the objections that I have to the "Great Books" approach to education, and also to Professor Allen Bloom's formula for opening the American mind, is that its proponents never seem to face the issue of its philosophical foundations. I still say with more conviction than ever that you and Mr. Yoder share a somewhat narrow view of human rationality.

CAT: Since I can detect a testiness and lack of charity in your remarks, I won't continue my defense of the education of the sentiments at this time. You just don't seem to understand what Mr. Yoder is talking about. It occurs to me that you're now pretty close to saying, in a paraphrase of Plato, that virtue is practical knowledge and vice is stupidity.

ME: But there is a very real sense in which vice is stupidity. As Raspberry uses the term, stupidity is acting against knowledge that we have. It has various causes including a lack of self-knowledge, a desire to conform, a denial of one’s mortality and, most of all, arrogance. I would also say that virtue is almost equivalent to practical knowledge but in a very special way. It is not speculative or theoretical knowledge; rather it is the kind of knowledge one applies in making a decision and as such it includes the influence and direction of the will. I have also made the point that insofar as virtue is a skill—and it is much more than that—man himself and not something outside of him is its product. Let me revise the formula which you presented to say that "vice is stupidity; virtue is practical wisdom (prudence) in cooperation with art as its companion and helper."

CAT: I'm not too happy with that version of the formula and I think you're overloading the connotation of the term "stupidity," but let me try to understand what you're saying. You say stupidity is the opposite of practical wisdom with art or skill assisting it. The vicious person is then the stupid person and the virtuous person is the smart one. Or you might want to say that being vicious or sinful is being dumb. If you ask me, your formula is simplistic and deceptive to boot.

ME: Without the distinctions I've been making my formula doesn't make much sense. We spent a great deal of time discussing the importance of self-knowledge and a knowledge of what things are and what they are for in making decisions. And that's what we're talking about, choosing. Everyone knows that some "stupid" persons are "smart" and some "smart" persons are "stupid," but we're talking about being smart or stupid from a moral point of view, the point of view of human fulfillment. I think it is true to say that being stupid involves making choices or decisions while being just plain ignorant usually doesn't.
CAT: You’re still using an angry tone with me and I must be careful in what I say. I think that if I were willing to go along with your metaphysics and philosophy of man that logic might incline me to agree with you. Would you say that in being “street smart,” I am displaying the kind of practical wisdom that you’re talking about? After all, you’ve insisted that the whole practical order is a moral order and in that order survival is by far the main consideration. As you may know “street smartness” has to do with survival or, as you would put it when you are being pedantic, with the preservation of one of your fundamental goods.

ME: Since I find it difficult to see how morality can be compartmentalized and set off from all other practical activity, I do see the whole practical order as a moral order. If “getting along on the street” simply means survival, I don’t think it’s a very intelligent policy, at least: not for humans. True enough, there is an art to being a survivor and survival is prized as an ultimate good by some people, but there are others who correctly, I believe, see the stupidity of a policy of survival at all costs. I think, Cat, that you’ve been unjustly accusing me of being angry and irritable: when I say that someone is being stupid I am simply drawing a reasoned conclusion, assigning to the term “stupid” the particular meaning we’ve been developing for it.

CAT: Perhaps I’ve misinterpreted the tone of your voice, or perhaps your anger is a holy one with moral justification, but I must say that you’ve left me with many more questions than answers. I think that for some people stupidity is just as invincible as ignorance sometimes is. I too would like to find a cure for stupidity because I think that it would really improve the quality of my life and even yours. I would even admit that stupidity has a moral connotation, as you insist, if such an admission helped me to develop a philosophy of education that could effectively help us implement our hopes for the future. But, unlike you and as a cat, I can’t dream about what might be: I have to accept what is.
Erikson and Rogers with Kohlberg: Strange Bedfellows

Virginia S. Wilson and James A. Little
North Carolina School of Science and Mathematics

G. David Allen's paper, "Moral Education for Adolescents: Erikson, Rogers or Kohlberg?" suggests four potential areas of exploration. First, has the paper established a clear definition of moral education and demonstrated the merit of moral education? Second, has a clear definition of adolescence been arrived at and has the purported value of moral education for this specific group been established? Third, and most importantly, do the theories of Erik Erikson and Carl Rogers "embrace", "enhance" or "coalesce" when interfaced with Lawrence Kohlberg's stages in moral education? Finally, does this paper offer any practical assistance to the teacher of adolescents?

Underlying Mr. Allen's paper are two assumptions. The first one is that moral education inevitably takes place and that there is merit in moral education. Many people would agree that there is, in theory, merit in moral education, but the problem comes at the point of Mr. Allen's second assumption, namely, that there is a commonly accepted definition of what constitutes moral education and morality in general. In this case, the skeleton poses no problem; it is when the flesh of content is added that the debate begins. That is, G. David Allen has chosen to concentrate on improving the process of moral education, ignoring the content of moral education. Can process be so easily separated from product? As Marshall Herbert McLuhan reminds us "the medium is the message" and if the message is not defined, then the role of the medium is unclear. On the first page the reader could make the assumption that the author is defining moral education in Kohlberg's terms, but later Allen states, "I do not view morality in quite the narrow terms Kohlberg does..." However, how Allen defines morality and what moral education is, or should be, is unclear. The only definition Mr. Allen seems to offer comes too little too late. In the last sentence of the paper, he states "cognitive the y filled out by psychoanalytical developmental theory leads us toward a firmer, more holistic practice of teaching our children the difference between good and evil." Yet, from the substance and tone of the paper, it would appear that Allen finds moral education to be much more than just differences between good and evil, and certainly Kohlberg does. Mr. Allen's paper would have been strengthened by a working definition of moral education at the very outset.

The assumption is also made that adolescence is a separate,
clearly definable stage of development. On the one hand, G. David Allen seems to accept uncritically Erikson's stages of development and, in particular, his concept of adolescence and its characteristics; yet, on the other hand, Allen issues the disclaimer that Erikson's "stages are not a lock step sort of affair. There is room for human individuality." If we accept the disclaimer, then the problem for the teacher remains, what to do when not all of the 150 students taught during the class day reach adolescence at the same time. What then is the validity of Erikson's stages for the teaching of moral education to students within an individual class at different levels of development?

The crucial problem cited at the beginning of the paper and the one that Allen's paper attempts to address is whether Erikson's psychoanalytical theory and Rogers' views on growth can meaningfully "embrace" Lawrence Kohlberg's outline for moral education. The thesis itself, "that indeed psychosocial and psychoanalytical theories of development can meaningfully embrace moral education seems to be built on shifting sand. If "embrace" is truly what the author meant, then there is no debate because psychoanalytical development theories do provide insights for the teaching of any subject. The more appropriate word for Mr. Allen to have used might have been "enhance."

Indeed, there are obvious ways in which Erikson's and Rogers' theories can assist teachers in enhancing moral education. Erikson's identification of idealism as a prominent characteristic of adolescence is important in that, for example, a teacher, recognizing this idealism, might be able to help students discern the significant differences between charismatic leaders. In 1969, Erikson spoke about positive and negative leadership when he wrote

...charismatic leaders of many kinds can attract among the young those potential heroes who are willing to die in the endeavor to kill men or to destroy institutions judged to be inimical to the dominant utopia. Other leaders can arouse an early ethical sense, which wins potential martyrs, who will court prison, injury, or death in response to an all-demanding sense of irreversible truth. In some extreme situations, youth is torn between heroism and martyrdom; and in both directions the step from romanticism to deadly involvement is often short and sometimes an accidental one."

In like manner, Carl Rogers' insights concerning the roles of
empathy and positive regard certainly "enhance" a teacher's ability to deal with moral education but, in reality, they are equally applicable to all teaching and counseling situations.

Do these psychosocial and psychoanalytical theorists "embrace" moral education? YES. Do they "enhance" the teacher's ability to deal with moral education? YES. Do the psychosocial or psychoanalytical theorists coalesce or converge in any real sense with Kohlberg's cognitive stages? NO. The examples of coalescence offered by G. David Allen seem more to enhance moral education than actually coalesce with Kohlberg's cognitive development theory. Essentially, the cognitivists and the psychoanalytical developmentalists are dealing from different premises that lead to different conclusions. Erikson's studies on organic development patterns conclude that people think or are susceptible to certain ideas at a specific time in their growth development. Rogers takes this a step further by suggesting that teachers as counselors might do to facilitate a student's learning about anything. On the other hand, Kohlberg's stages in moral development have no relationship to the organic growth of the individual but rather Kohlberg suggests that the mind at any age can reach various, though not necessarily all, stages in his hierarchy of moral development. Kohlberg argues for a linear moral development not tied to any particular age or organic growth pattern. As Allen stated, Kohlberg himself argued that psychoanalytical and cognitive development theories cannot coalesce or be integrated in any theoretical sense because the former deals with relativity and the latter with universals. Kohlberg sees himself as joining social psychology and philosophy together in his theory while the other two are purely social psychologists and on this Kohlberg wrote,

It seems to me that anything worthwhile we can say about moral education requires our being simultaneously a social psychologist and a philosopher. An approach to moral education based on putting together some consensus of current psychology and current philosophy is the typical camel, the committee-constructed animal, whose only virtue is that it does not drink.²

It is not that the task that the author has set for himself is unworthy but rather that the coalescence or convergence is unworkable in a philosophical as well as psychological sense. It is the combination of insights from the theoreticians in a blend peculiar to each teacher that is of value and not a philosophical or psychological point of convergence. Having said that, insights from
other social psychologists as well as philosophers can be added to the blend. In the final analysis, Mr. Allen has carried through on his promise to sketch out several ways cognitivists and psychoanalytical "developmentalists may "lend each other a hand." The operative phrase is "lend each other a hand" because this gesture represents an extended connection rather than an organic unity.

Finally, does having familiarity with the insights of Erik Erikson and Carl Rogers in relation to Lawrence Kohlberg's practice of moral education offer any practical assistance to the teacher of adolescents? POSSIBLY AND HOPEFULLY. The teacher's attitude and his or her approaches to adolescents might be altered. However, the problem of how to implement a moral education program with appropriate teaching/learning activities remains unanswered. Barry Chazan reminds us that

As the architects of many creative educational programs and curriculum projects have painfully learned, many great ideas and programs have been rendered ineffective because they did not take into consideration the myriad of issues related to the teacher.... The analysis of moral education must deal with the nature of the educational materials proposed; how the materials will be used by teachers; the relation of the topic of moral education to other subjects in the curriculum; and the costs in dollars and cents.  

For most teachers the question is, and remains, what does the teacher actually do with moral education in the classroom?

Improvement in mutual understanding by the population of two diverse cultures is a fundamental and sound approach to enhancing peace. The two great military powers, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, use their respective educational systems to assist in perpetuating their societies, values, and way of life. While similarities in purpose exist, the philosophical foundation of the teachings in the educational systems appear to be diametrically opposite. The Soviet government and Soviet educational system place emphasis on the state; the American government and American educational system emphasize the individual. If American leaders and the people can better understand the Soviet society, our educational system may contribute to peace.

While the main thrust of this paper does not deal with Russia before their revolution in 1917-18, the topic cannot be appropriately ignored. Karl Marx (1818-1883), with significant input and influence from Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), wrote Communist Manifesto, Das Kapital, and numerous other publications. The first of these was published in 1848. Das Kapital, a three-volume publication, was written during the last third of the nineteenth century and is generally cited as being one of the most influential books ever written.

Marx was not a government office-holder and his writings contain no topic of how to set up a communist government. To restate the last thought, Marx did not leave Nikolai Lenin (1870-1924) a blueprint for forming a communist government. However, the significance of his works on Soviet policy can certainly not be questioned. The impact can be seen in the historical interpretation of class struggle, with a severe indictment of both religion and free enterprise. His denunciation of profit is incompatible with the theory taught in American colleges of business, that profit is a necessary result of production. Profit is the hope and the dream of every business in America, regardless of its size.

Russia was devastated during World War I. Its social, political, and economic system were left in complete disarray; there was tremendous physical destruction and heavy loss of lives. When the provisional government was overthrown, Lenin was not well known throughout the nation. For most of the years prior to the revolution, he had been in Europe plotting, planning, and writing about revolution.

Correspondence: College of Education, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, Tenn. 37614

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Lenin returned to Leningrad (then called Petrograd) to set up the communist government. A building in Palace Square which had been the home of former czars, was used for the Provisional Government. The capital was established at Moscow and the nation was called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. When many of the new communist doctrines failed to bring about economic recovery, Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy in 1921. With the help of others, he wrote the first of their four constitutions.

Five-Year-Plans were instituted in the Soviet economy during Stalin's era. Then, as now, direction and control of the economy emphasize military expenditures and development of heavy industries. For over fifty years the Five-Year-Plans have consistently followed the policy of making the consumer needs of the individual subservient to the demands of the state. Any leader, including the Secretary of the Communist Party, who attempts to change the entrenched policy of the Party may be subject to removal from the Politburo.

The Soviet economy is not characterized as a money society, like that of the United States. Since Soviet money is not an international currency, one does not hear references in the business news report to the value of the dollar as compared to the ruble. The ruble does not have an exchange value in United States banks, and is of very low value on the black market. One may not legally take rubles into or out of the Soviet Union; a few kopeks (coins) or rubles may be brought out as souvenirs. Soviet citizens are not allowed to own foreign currency. Although there are some stores or shops in Russia where one may purchase goods with the use of foreign currency, Soviet citizens are not allowed in those shops. Thus, there are major differences between the economic systems of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Likewise, the axiology of personal traits of the various leaders of the two nations are extremely different. Lenin taught, "Beware of the cult of the personality." Therefore, the reply to a question this writer asked a member of the Soviet Debate Team was not surprising. Having attempted to determine the cause of death of all members of the Soviet Politburo from 1918 to Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet team member was asked how certain Politburo members in the 1930s died. His reply was revealing; he acknowledged that Soviets do not put much emphasis on the personal lives of their leaders except Lenin. He also stated that he had just been studying the topic, and knew the information would be difficult to find. To further illustrate the point, our press was not sure the recent Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov (1911-1984) was married until his wife appeared at his funeral.

Little documentation is needed to prove that people in the United States are interested in the personal lives of their leaders. From the bood feats of George Washington, the log-splitting ability of Abraham Lincoln, to Gary Hart's visitors in Washington, the personal lives of our leaders are like an open book.
Lenin is viewed as the last brilliant Soviet leader, with the possible exception of their current leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. Seldom does one read derogatory accounts of Lenin's personal life. He was not a drunkard, dope addict, or rapist, but could be brutal when opposed from outside the Party. An example of his brilliance in action was at Minsk in 1896, when he chose the word, "Bolsheviki," meaning majority, to name his party, even though he believed in control by a few hard-core members. Later, the name was changed to the Communist Party, to give it more world-wide appeal. Currently, the size of the Party in the Soviet Union is estimated at eighteen and one-half million members; however, that is only 5 percent of the population.

Whether one is viewing the statue within the Kremlin Walls in Moscow, the mosaic portrait of Lenin on the ceiling of the subway system, or the painting in the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow, Lenin is always shown wearing civilian clothing, including a shirt, tie, and coat. A masterful speaker, he used short, appealing slogans in his speeches. His study in the Kremlin is being preserved for the privileged few to visit. It appears that regard for Lenin is becoming a religion in the Soviet Union. Is it not strange that the leader taught, "Beware of the cult of the personality," yet his body (supposedly) is being preserved for exhibit?

An astute account of the relationship among religion, the Russian czars, and the writings of Marx is given in a government publication of 1946. The brief description explains that each czar desired to build a more beautiful cathedral than those built by previous leaders. From the time of Peter the Great whoever was czar became the head of the Russian Orthodox Church. Thus the same individual was both head of the church and head of the government. Therefore, in order to destroy the czar and the government, the need would exist to destroy the church; destroy the church, and this would result in destroying the government.

Specific reference is made to religion in the Soviet constitution of 1936 and the one adopted in 1977 (the fourth constitution since the revolution in 1917-1918). Article 124 in the 1936 constitution proclaims that the church is separated from the state and "Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized all citizens." Article 52 of the 1977 constitution also acknowledges that the church is separated from the state, and ". . . the right to profess or not to profess any religion, and to conduct religious worship or atheistic propaganda."

A careful reading of both constitutional documents indicates that atheism, and not religion, has the right to use propaganda. Article 6 in the constitution of 1977 states, "The leading and guiding force of Soviet society, of all state organizations and public organizations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." One needs to understand that in the Soviet Union the government is not bound by a constitution; their courts cannot declare an act of the Communist Party illegal. The Party is. "the leading and guiding force . . ." The Party line today states that Christianity is nothing more than ancient myths based on pagan
stories of nearly two thousand years ago. It claims Christianity has been replaced by scientific atheism.

A common purpose of most educational systems throughout the world is perpetuating the society in which the system exists. Surely this is a common characteristic of the educational systems in both the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet celebrate the October Revolution, and we declare Independence Day a holiday; they teach about communism and Marx-Leninist doctrines, and we teach civics, social studies, and American history. The common axiology, then, is preservation of one's society through the educational system.

There appears, however, to be a fundamental philosophical difference between the educational systems of the two nations. Our system, though not perfect, offers educational opportunity for the individual. Their system educates for the state. Our constitution makes no mention of education; their system guarantees every citizen a free education. American children generally start school at the age of five or six; their children frequently start school (although it is not called school) at the age of two or three months. By age two or three years, their school children have been introduced to collectivism and regimentation, because these theories characterize the socialist society in which they will live their adult life. Our system attempts to educate the individual for life in a competitive, free society—a democratic society based on constitutional government.

Educators of both nations could, and should, learn from each other; each nation has much to offer. Few nations have ever progressed, in an equal span of time, as the Soviet Union since their revolution; their educational system has surely contributed to this progress. On the other hand, the United States has produced the world's best educational system for all people. Educators from around the world come to study our educational system.

The historical events of the war years, 1939-1945, are generally referred to in our society as World War II; the Soviets refer to the conflict as The Great Patriotic War. The two nations were allies during this war; they were also allies during World War I, but the differences of interpretation are astounding.

In order to "buy time" against the rising military might of Germany, the Soviets entered into a non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939, then took part of Poland to build a buffer zone to protect "the Motherland," a name they used to refer to the Soviet Union. The Soviet expansion into Poland and three other Baltic nations was totally compatible with the strategy of world-wide communist expansion.

The Soviets explain the policy of appeasement did nothing to deter Adolf Hitler during the 1930s. Without provocation, Germany unleashed their mighty military machine against the Soviets in June, 1941. Millions were killed and much of the Soviet homeland destroyed. They charge, that for six months after Russia was attacked by Germany, the United States did nothing to help. They
claim, in fact, that we did not even open the second front in Europe until after the Battle of Stalingrad, and that we then opened the second front only to improve our position at the peace table.

When asked about the effectiveness of lend-lease aid, the Soviets acknowledge that they have made official studies which indicate it furnished about 4 percent of their supplies. They do acknowledge that American trucks were useful.

When asked about our war with Japan, the Soviet reply is that they had already destroyed the Japanese army in Manchuria, and that the war was actually over before we needlessly dropped the atomic bomb on Japan. They further charge that this action marked the beginning of the Cold War, as the United States is the only nation to have ever used atomic warfare against humans.7

The American interpretation of some of the events cited is far different. During the 1930s this nation, and its form of government survived the worst depression in its history. Long before the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, it was obvious that when we entered the conflict it would be on the side of the Allies. Our peace-time draft had already begun and the supplies being sent, particularly to England and France, were accompanied by American military escort.

The final outcome of World War II may well have depended upon the success of opening the second front in Europe. It would have been a military disaster had that operation failed. To have attempted this move prior to June, 1944, could have been a catastrophe for the Allied forces. Invasion of Japan, using conventional methods of warfare, would have cost approximately a million U.S. casualties. Had we used the usual “softening-up” methods of bombardment from the air and sea, plus the deaths from the conflict itself, perhaps ten to twenty million more lives would have been lost. One might ask whether this is a good excuse to start the cold war... 

Through the respective educational systems of the nations, peace could be enhanced if, through the search for knowledge, sincere attempts were made to reconcile the differing interpretations of many historical facts. Soviet losses in World War II are generally estimated at twenty million, with an additional twenty-five million left homeless. The numerical losses of the United States do not even remotely compare with theirs. However, America's ability to produce and deliver the materials may well have been a major deciding factor in the outcome of the conflict. America's second great contribution to mankind is the ability to produce. In the 1940s, the world had never seen anything to compare with our production.

Peace can be enhanced by reasoning, exchanging ideas, and attempting to develop appreciation for the cultural values of others. The procedures must be at work in both nations for a fostering of peace. The educational system of our nation should play a vital role in the effort.
6. Ibid., 9.
7. Conversation with Soviet guide for Intourist, Moscow, August 6, 1981.
UNDERSTANDING THE SOVIET UNION
A METHOD OF FOSTERING PEACE
(A RESPONSE)
John B. Haynes
James Madison University

Professor Carl W. Holland, East Tennessee State University, has selected a most timely topic for our session this morning considering the current media blitz dealing with life in the Soviet Union and Kremlin policy changes. At the outset, I want to argue in response that Holland's paper is primarily a stimulating social studies presentation written from an historical perspective. Although I am certainly not a Sovietologist, it is evident that we should also be examining the meaning of such popular concepts in vogue among Soviet leaders as perestroika ("restructuring") through glasnost (the Russian word for "openness"), legal and economic reforms, and greater individual responsibility (by government order). This fashionable approach has been labeled "a new way of thinking". It emphasizes a different set of attitudes (rather than things or material goods) for the present era of hopeful progress for the Soviet giant. As opposed to a Marxian Utopia through collective philosophy and absolute state power, Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts toward modernization is being hailed as a "new revolution" within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. If these policy trends are for real (beyond the present mood of optimism resulting from the 27th Congress), perhaps we shall indeed experience a breakthrough in foreign relations between the two major military superpowers in the near future.

For people engaged in philosophic inquiry about the process of education, Holland's basic thesis that mutual understanding and cultural appreciation gains represents a sound approach to enhancing peace would appear to be quite acceptable. I have no quarrel with the thrust of his claims or with his plea toward contributing to peace by utilizing our educational system. From this viewpoint, we must appreciate the serious intent of his paper to spark a dialogue on a most significant topic which is also a matter of human survival in an age of nuclear arms races and space missions for supremacy. Another important benefit of the focus selected for this panel forum is the opportunity for all of us present this morning at Duke University to discuss concepts, values, and characteristics related to the international scene. A brief review of the previous SAPES Proceedings published since 1971 revealed a limited number of papers on international or comparative subjects. More addresses written on this theme would seem to be appropriate for meetings of our society. As a respondent, I will make my analytic remarks within an outline of Professor Holland's major points. Some critical comments on the current Soviet situation will also be included in my reply to his paper.

First, premises about the similar purposes of educational systems employed by the superpowers are established. However, the relative emphasis on the state as opposed to the individual could be construed as a dichotomy as sketched in the introduction to Holland's arguments. Recent prevailing shifts toward modern or "new" views and what appears to be an opening of windows by Soviet leaders prevents simplistic contrasts. Due to critical economic problems and continued inefficiency,
it is interesting to note that individuals are now being asked to assist in the new revolution through creative and flexible conditions imposed by the Kremlin.

Another fundamental concern is that the initial proposition of the paper rests upon the notion of "peace", but this term is not defined for us in the context of such political realities as "detente", "peaceful co-existence", or "comprehensive versus common security". Further, do we need a new label to describe the need for "civilized relations" and some new rules for international life under the constant threat of nuclear warfare? This diplomatic query was posed to the Soviet Information Minister during an exciting interview on ABC's Nightline television show on September 16th. Part of the official response seemed to be a rather defensive reference to a return to V. I. Lenin's doctrines in contrast to Stalin's rigid governance by dictatorship. Earlier efforts toward modernization by Nikita Khrushchev were not discussed. Of course, the underlying doubt for many observers as reported in the various media, is whether or not the present humanizing directives evident 70 years after Lenin are only a phase of a political cycle in Soviet Russia. At this juncture, we might ask if "peace" can be projected as a realistic goal without a basic trust between foreign powers leaders, as well as among their citizens. The pervasive focus on peace by Holland implies a commendable faith instead of an approach along the lines of threats issued by top officials. Perhaps skeptics should give a little thought to the alternative to mutual cooperation given the nuclear stakes today. The possibility of a world-wide economic crisis is considered by some experts to be even more likely as a survival threat. We know that interdependent world markets have produced an awareness of the need for concerted efforts through open channels of communication. "Peace studies" and "philosophy of peace" are now controversial courses in colleges in response to the lack of arms control.

Second, Holland provides historical background from the period preceeding the 1917 Russian Revolution, with references to Karl Marx's writings on class struggle. He notes that Marx actually did not describe communist blueprints for setting up a government, and briefly presents contrasting theories about profit. Comments are given next on Lenin's leadership, as well as some interesting comparative statements on a country's attitudes concerning personal aspects of their heroes' lives. Valid insights follow on the history of the relation of church and state in Russia. An interesting value judgment is also made about views held toward Lenin today by asserting the commitment is becoming a secular religion. The four Soviet constitutions are cited to analyze the issue of religious freedom and the power of the Communist Party at the present time.

Third, some attention is given to schooling differences between the two nations, but the treatment is too brief in light of Holland's argument that we have much to learn about each other in this area. The relative strengths of each educational system are contrasted in an interesting manner by using such points of comparison as: the Soviet constitutional right of each citizen to an education; the child's age of entering school; the extent of individual opportunity; and socialism as opposed to a democratic education to prepare children for life in a free society which is based upon a competitive economic system. Unfortunately, philosophical analysis of such key concepts as the nature of freedom and views on individuality is missing. The request for a greater understanding of the Soviets suggests that critical as well as normative or prescriptive techniques should be applied in this kind of address on philosophy of education. For example, because of ten years of service work involving a national Task Force on Human Rights and Equal Opportunity, I am interested in a comparative approach to such issues. The apparent Soviet humanistic easing of past restrictions on internal debate and
self-expression provides grist for examining systematic differences between East and West governments. In the arts, an attitude of "stunned silence" among Soviet artists has been the norm until recently.

Another fruitful area of inquiry is the potential impact of the prevailing efforts toward modernity on Soviet education. Attitudinal changes, plus raised hopes and policy reforms leading to increased freedom, will in turn influence what goes on in Soviet classrooms. Time will determine the extent of these effects within education across this vast land of different states and geographic contrasts. It is clear that the Soviet system depends upon early selecting and sorting, with an emphasis on specialization. Dr. Tatiana Mukhina, one of only five Soviet exchange scholars, is presently teaching Russian courses at James Madison University this term. During a recent interview for the campus newspaper, she observed that "everywhere young people are the same". College curricula are now influenced by student input. Government stipends are provided. New reforms are in response to the need for technical specialists. Strong academic records lead to higher employment salaries after graduation. Mukhina noted the double classroom time and longer study hours, as compared with American students who have much more freedom and flexibility regarding major program. In the U.S.S.R., vocational choices are made in high school based upon aptitudes and cannot be switched later in college. A recent trend is an emphasis on independent studies and night schools for older students who work. She expressed the positive idea that such cultural exchanges among the superpowers will definitely increase as beneficial outcomes are realized. This more open situation will in turn lead to closer contacts and mutual understanding. Such interaction, according to this Soviet scholar, should produce greater trust in one another as a final result.

Personally, seven previous visits to India (a unique, vast land with an ancient heritage of over 5,000 years), have really helped me to better appreciate diverse cultures and the need for world unity through a variety of international avenues. In terms of the East Bloc countries, news reports have indicated that these governments have reacted in different ways to Russia's leadership proposals of glasnost. For those citizens who experienced terror under Stalin, memories of oppression and suffering prevent ready acceptance of these new doctrines. The passage of time and overt actions seem to be criteria for evaluating the merit of the restructuring proposals which may lead to greater autonomy among these other nations.

As a fourth section, an extensive part of Holland's paper is given over to a re-interpretation of certain historical events related to the war years 1939-1945. To illustrate his argument that peace would be enhanced by reconciling facts about the roles of the two nations during World War II, he employs a case study of the circumstances related to the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan by American forces. The "cold war" is also cited as an effective example of conflicting opinions on the issue of the bombing event and the resultant problems in foreign relations with the Soviets. Holland rightly admits his biases as a former teacher of American History. A counterpoint to the remarks made on relevant lectures might be to raise the following question: What kinds of teaching strategies would Holland advocate to "preserve" our own societal system? Would these methods be consistent (including the implied value judgments) with democratic education from a Deweyan perspective of inquiry and problem-solving? To avoid the charge of indoctrinating our pupils we need further explanatory details in terms of pedagogy. If an open, experience-based approach is to be adopted in the classroom, can we actually predict how history will be constructed or interpreted in the final analysis? Again, other arguments are needed to help us resolve the practical issues if we are to
implement these kinds of curricular activities in our schools. In the U.S.S.R., it is evident that the recent swing in the direction of internal debate does not include potential criticism of the Communist Party system itself.

Finally, I would like to share some other points concerning the current U.S.-Soviet scene as further support for the thesis that mutual understanding is essential. As previously stated, the stakes are high. The present situation and recent events now demand critical policy decisions. American leaders must react to policy issues in such areas as: the extension of cooperative space ventures (Venus and comet studies since the 1970's) to future projects (such as Mars research) or a competitive approach with further contests for dominance in space development; significant reduction in nuclear warfare capabilities through diplomacy (a Summit Conference of this kind may be possible soon) or continued spending of enormous funds by both powers on the arms race; increased access to Western "high-tech" knowledge or continued secrecy in research efforts; and the issue of the quality of bilateral relations in ecology, terrorism problems, and other categories of mutual concern and interest.

To resolve these vital questions, leaders on both sides of the table will have to consider what is best for the national interest within each of the respective countries. Should we help the Soviets with their reforms toward restructuring through glasnost? If the U.S.S.R. does grow stronger as a result of Western cooperative ventures, would this necessarily be a negative outcome? World stability and security are criterion standards beyond an exclusive focus on what might be beneficial for an individual nation in the short run. The United Nations is supposed to insure goodwill and understanding but recent votes concerning the Middle East are proof that a deeper commitment to the ideals of the U.N. are needed by all members for peaceful co-existence. Much needs to be done.

Holland is essentially correct in concluding that the educational systems of the two major military powers have a vital role to play in the game of striving to achieve some type of world peace. Certainly our leaders' values have been influenced by previous schooling experiences. The general public must also be educated to appreciate cultural diversity among various countries, as well as within their own host nation or "home". The emphasis on multicultural education has continued in recent years in America so it must be considered more than a passing fad, even though bilingual and related issues (such as racism or prejudice against ethnic groups) are still prevailing problems here. Holland may be able to suggest concrete ways to accomplish these goals when we begin the discussion period for this panel program. A positive trend is that proven curricular materials are now on the market to help reduce stereotypical behaviors among students in the schools. Certain teacher inservice and conference workshops on equity (i.e. "What is Fair?") have been found to be effective also if promoted in the proper way.

Another area of concern pertains to how our American way of life is being presented in the Soviet Union. Selected news reports have not been positive. Propaganda messages from the past will not disappear immediately because of a desire for glasnost. Also, the KGB still has control over copying machines, as an example of continuing central power by the Kremlin. The mixed emotional attitudes of the Soviets toward their government are additional evidence of the difficulty in providing portrayals of life within the U.S.S.R. to facilitate greater understanding. The current photographic project to document "A Day in the Life of the Soviet Union" (May 15, 1987) will assist in this process, and represents the results of patient diplomacy to gain access to all territories. A complicating factor also is the internal Kremlin power struggle to determine foreign policy as reflected
by the recent mixed signals on arms control talks. "Verification" is the trend also.

One of the internal variables producing change is that the middle professional class in Russia now wants more input in determining their destiny, as well as more economic and material gains. As in a developing nation like India, inadequate telephone systems and other basic communication resources, are limiting further progress. But if India is a valid example, tremendous changes can happen to achieve goal (i.e. reduce percentage of illiteracy) in spite of internal civil conflicts, and varied languages, dialects, customs, and creeds. Part of the formula for success in development will be a continued massive effort to insure universal, free education.

In other areas where central control is the dominant pattern, such as the world of elite sport and physical culture, strides can be fantastic. A case in point is the Soviet and East German model for training athletes. The rationale for giving such high priority to athletic endeavors stems from the belief that the worth of the socialist system is symbolically reflected in the health of youth and performance records in the international arena. This model features early testing for specialization and elite sports schools geared to highly competitive events, such as disciplines included in the Olympic Games and other world contests. The pattern has yielded handsome dividends within nations fully committed to this idea of intense, highly specialized training using the latest research data. With financial support through government funds, infrastructures have been instituted for nation-wide involvement in developmental physical activity and elite sport. Some experts in the West have argued that these young athletes have paid a very high price for this level of glory. Gold medal counts do not reflect broken spirits, split families, or careers cut short due to critical injuries. The alternative position emphasizes the effective schooling, excellent diet, and expanded opportunities open to the children who are fortunate enough to be selected for this kind of schooling. In the U.S., Olympic training is based upon a broader approach according to the ideals of Olympism and "sport-for-all" through comprehensive programs in schools. Once sound physical education programs are established for all children this model could become a reality. Individual states must recognize the value of daily movement education classes taught by trained specialists (only 10 percent of elementary schools have this requirement). Elite programs should be an integral part of education, not as high-pressured experiences to produce winners at all costs.

In conclusion, we owe Professor Holland our thanks for stimulating critical analysis among us today along international lines. Perhaps a future symposium for the SAPES meeting could address the potential role of educational philosophy in enhancing understanding and mutual relations among peoples around the world. Philosophic analysis applied to practical issues would appear to be a good recipe for an enduring peace combined with a sincere effort to cooperate in a variety of ways. Sports and games events conducted within an atmosphere free of political interference and excessive nationalism offer the potential for this kind of humanistic contact. Athletes speak the universal language of sport. Cultural exchanges like the Indo-American Festivals in the arts and the current program involving 200 law students from China for graduate study are outstanding examples of other spheres for contacts. The wise and responsible use of the various media is another avenue toward mutual acceptance of differences and greater understanding toward "peace". On a more personal level, I have enjoyed the chance for this dialogue with SAPES colleagues as another case example.
STANDARDS FOR ETHICAL TEACHING
ARE TEACHERS' PERSONAL LIFESTYLE CHOICES FORECLOSED?

Bruce Beezer
North Carolina State University

Since World War II there has been a notable evolution in lifestyles regarding the way persons live and relate to each other. One major area has been sexual relationships. The traditional family structure of a woman and man legally joined has faced increased challenge from those who seek relationship on a basis of gender equality.

A noticeable number of Americans have rejected legal marriage as the only condition by which loving and sexual relationships can be fulfilled. The U.S. Census Bureau reports that the number of single adults cohabiting with someone of the opposite sex nearly doubled between 1970 and 1979. The estimated figure is approximately 1.3 million households, with over half the persons never having been married. These type households represent 3 percent of all couples. The basic rationale for such unions is that it is one means of making sure they can successfully undertake marriage with each other. This trial period is regarded as the best assurance that the marriage will not end in divorce harmful to both persons and possible offspring.

Another change has been the decision by some women to become single parents. A recent Woman's Day poll of 1,855 readers found 580 respondents said they approved a single woman having and raising children, with 760 respondents saying no and the remainder undecided. Adoption has been the socially acceptable way to achieve such a goal for a single person. However, many adoption agencies will not consider a single person as a prospective parent. One way some women have used to become a parent is by getting pregnant in cooperation with a "meaningful" friend or artificial insemination. While the majority of single women have strong reservations about having a child out-of-wedlock, it still has become an option because of changing social values and changed adoption laws.

Some teachers have adopted these changes in social values. Those teachers who did so have been sanctioned by the state because they are not regarded as "good" moral models. One sanction has been their dismissal by the school board. These teachers have challenged their dismissal for such reasons as a violation of their legal rights. Their primary argument is that it is a denial of equal protection guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.

This paper will focus on the conflict in morals between what the schools are charged with transmitting and those teachers whose personal lifestyles convey a rejection of those morals. Namely, that there can be a difference between the implied moral concepts portrayed within the curriculum and the actual out-of-school behavior of teachers. One area where there is a difference in moral positions is the schools' interest in teaching traditional family life morals and teachers who do not practice them.

This review of such a moral conflict will discuss only two features because of space limitations. The first is what family lifestyle model is being taught
in the schools. The second is to review reported court decisions to determine why teachers who cohabitate with a person of the opposite gender or have a child outside wedlock are or not regarded as unfit to teach because of those activities.

While the paper's focus is philosophic in terms of the issues and concepts, the use of court decisions to discuss them is based on the following assumption. It is that the law can be regarded as the means by which a democratic society reaffirms shared moral prescriptions and summons society's allegiance to a common set of behavior goals.

Family Model and Schools

It is generally assumed that the traditional family life model taught in the schools portrays the family as the primary and proper institution where persons can express intimate relations, beget children, and nurture their cognitive and emotional development. The structure within which these functions are to be performed is a nuclear family created by the monogamous marriage of two people of the opposite gender. Yet, do schools teach the traditional family model? This is an important question to be considered if teachers are to be sanctioned for not practicing it.

School textbooks is one means used by the schools to convey social values. Martin and Penelope Croghan in an analysis of role models in Houghton Mifflin and Cinn 720 readers for the third grade found that the nuclear family is dominant, and "the concept of single-entourage is not introduced." Their general conclusion was that the "arch of the readers seems to be the avoidance of all contemporary problems such as: the changing attitudes, culturally and legally, towards women; . . . alternate family lifestyles, including single parenthood." The Croghan's findings do not differ from other studies on the family model in textbooks.

Secondary textbooks have not escaped scrutiny on how they portray the family. Mel and Norma Gabler, founders of the conservative oriented Educational Research Analysts, have been active reviewers. They have been especially concerned that the American Home Economics Association's definition of family is not used in textbooks.

Two or more persons who share resources, share responsibility for decisions, share values and goals, and have a commitment to one another over time. The family is that climate one 'comes home to' and it is this network of sharing and commitments that most accurately describe the family unit, regardless of blood, legal ties, adoption, or marriage. A definition they have successfully had excluded from texts adopted in Texas and other states.

This paper's author reviewed some sociology, psychology, and home economics texts currently adopted by North Carolina. These texts clearly indicated that the nuclear family formed by the union of legally married couples is the desired family model in America. The concept of "illegitimate" children was mentioned in only one text, and was defined as a child born to parents not married and can be subject to legal limitations as to inheritance.
Studies on how school textbooks portray the family in conjunction with accepted conventional attitudes by a majority persons indicate schools do and are expected to teach the traditional family model. A model that may not be adhered to by some parents, but nonetheless one those employed by schools are expected to teach and follow. The reasons is that the teacher, according to conventional wisdom, has significant influence not only on the academic life of a student, but of equal importance, their moral formation. It is believed a teacher can even unconsciously convey morals to students. This possibility requires the removal of teachers regarded as sexually immoral because they may not be able to shed such morals upon entering the classroom. Moreover, a school that retains such a teacher, can be viewed as approving such conduct.

The Courts and Teacher Dismissal

Until recently, teachers who cohabitated with someone of the opposite gender outside marriage or became pregnant outside wedlock were summarily dismissed because they either could not be the desired role model for students or would reduce the school's mission of conserving traditional marital values. The usual cause for dismissal was immorality. Teachers now are challenging their dismissals, alleging violation of either equal protection, substantive due process, and/or First Amendment privacy rights.

The resulting court cases have had to resolve significant questions regarding the rights of these teachers. Is either behavior protected by the U.S. Constitution? If so, what must school officials prove to overcome the constitutional protection? Is either behavior a prima facie proof of immorality? If so, are school officials still required to show the behavior affects teacher effectiveness?

Drake v. Covington County Board of Education is the first reported case that considered whether a tenured teacher's unwed pregnancy was protected by the U.S. Constitution. Drake's dismissal was based on a superintendent's investigation of a rumor that she had been hospitalized and pregnant. The attending physician confirmed, over the phone to the superintendent, that the rumor was true. On a recommendation by the superintendent, the school board dismissed Drake on grounds of immorality. The board's decision was based on the attending physician's written certification of pregnancy, and Drake's admission, at a hearing, that she had had sexual relations with her fiancé. Drake then filed a civil rights action claiming that the immorality provision of the Alabama Code, the statutory basis for her dismissal, was void for vagueness, both on its face, and as it applied to her.

A divided three judge panel held "that the statute was applied in this case in a manner which violated Drake's constitutional right of privacy." The Court based this position on Supreme Court rulings that held there was a constitutional right of privacy. The extension of a right of privacy to an unwed, pregnant woman to beget a child presented no problem to the court. It found the right in Eisenstadt v. Baird. "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.

If the Board's decision to dismiss Drake was a violation of her constitutional right of privacy to beget a child, what amendment gave her
The Drake decision does not explicitly identify the amendment, but it inferred that it was the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by ruling that the Board had presented no "compelling interest" to justify the privacy invasion. In other words, the Board had made no finding to show a nexus between Drake's alleged immorality and her competency or fitness as a teacher. Absent such a nexus, the court concluded that, since the Board based its dismissal only on evidence obtained in consultation with her physician, it had invaded Drake's privacy rights under the Constitution.

The Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School District case considered whether unwed parenthood was a prima facie proof of immorality. The superintendent learned that there were some teacher aides presently employed who were parents of illegitimate children. He became concerned that the employment practice would be contrary to maintaining a scholastic environment conducive to the moral and intellectual development of the students. Therefore, he implemented an unwritten order that parenthood of illegitimate children would automatically disqualify an individual, incumbent or applicant, from employment with the school system. The two plaintiffs, Rogers, an employee and Andrews, an applicant, were victims of the new unwed parenthood policy. They sued in federal district court. That court held that the rule "has no rational relation to the objectives ostensibly sought to be achieved . . .; thus it is constitutionally defective under the traditional and most lenient standard of equal protection and violative of due process as well."

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling by rejecting three rationales asserted by the school district for the policy. The first rationale was that unwed parenthood is a prima facie proof of immorality. The court said such a reason violates due process by creating an irrebuttable presumption by failing to account for mitigating circumstances or consideration of "the parent's present moral worth." The second rationale was that unwed parents are improper role models, after whom students may pattern their life. This was rejected by the court because it was in violation of the equal protection clause since there was no evidence of proselytizing of pupils by the plaintiffs, and since both plaintiffs lived with their parents it "would be a wise child, indeed who could infer knowledge of either plaintiff's unwed parent status." The third rationale that unwed parents contributed to school-girl pregnancies was denied because it "was without support, other than speculation and assertions of opinion."

The Andrews decision made it very clear that a carte blanche policy foreclosing unwed parent or unwed pregnancy employment is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the due process clause, it creates an irrebuttable presumption that such a condition is immoral per se. This presumption cannot overcome a person's protected right to beget children and fails to recognize unique individual situations. The court's use of the weakest standard, rational relationship, to reject the equal protection clause issues, further indicates that mere conjecture or assumption will not suffice.

The Fifth Circuit, seven years later, affirmed its position that termination of an unwed parent employee violated equal protection in Avery v. Homewood City Board of Education. Ms. Avery was discharged for subordination, neglect of duty, and immorality. The first two reasons were premised on her failure to inform the school district that she was pregnant before the fourth month of pregnancy, a school district policy. The basis for immorality charges was that she was pregnant and unwed.
Ms. Avery sued, alleging that her civil rights were violated under various statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection clauses. The federal district court upheld her dismissal on grounds of insubordination and neglect of duty for failure to report her pregnancy. The circuit court reversed by first utilizing the mixed-motive discharge requirement stated in *Mt. Healthy City School District v. Doyle.* The court, in assuming Avery's unwed pregnancy was constitutionally protected, rejected the Board's contention that Avery's violation of the notice rule was a substantial factor in its decision to discharge her. This is correct, but irrelevant; the appellees' burden was to prove not that their decision was substantially motivated by that violation, but rather that Avery would have been dismissed even in the absence of her out of wedlock pregnancy. The record includes no evidence whatever to permit that inference.

The court's reasoning was influenced by the fact that there was no evidence on whether the Board would have discharged Avery for the notice violation if she had been married. This was a key issue, since the superintendent had testified he would have recommended her discharge even if she had complied with the notice requirement.

Since the Fifth Circuit was remanding the Avery case, it concluded its decision by referring to its Andrews decision, in such a manner as to leave no doubt that it was still controlling authority regarding constitutional protection for unwed, pregnant school employees. The court noted Avery's statutory claims and said it would ordinarily address them first, but since the Board had argued, as had the school district in Andrews, that unwed parenthood is per se proof of immorality and an unfit role model, the trial court must consider that issue. It instructed the trial court to require the Board to prove such an assertion by showing what can be regarded as a "meaningful distinction between Andrews and this case."

If the condition of unwed pregnancy is not sufficient in and of itself to be regarded as immoral, what would a school district have to prove to sustain a dismissal for such a reason? *New Mexico State Board of Education v. Stoudt* addressed this issue. Ms. Stoudt, a physical education teacher and coach at Taos High School, was dismissed because she was pregnant and unmarried. The basis for her dismissal was that her pregnancy was deemed immoral in the Taos community, and that her continued employment would be detrimental to her teaching and coaching effectiveness as well as to the moral climate in the school. The State Board upheld the dismissal, however, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed, and the State Board appealed.

Ms. Stoudt challenged the dismissal reasons on the grounds that the Board had not proven them on the basis of the evidence before them. She claimed that the Board should have shown a nexus between her pregnancy and her effectiveness as a teacher and coach. The court agreed with Stoudt that the evidence showed that she was an effective teacher and there was no proof that the Taos community regarded her as immoral.

The court based its ruling on the following evidence. The Board had initially offered Stoudt employment on the superintendent's recommendation,
who knew she was pregnant, but then the Board changed its mind. Her evaluations showed better than average ratings. Also, at the initial hearing for dismissal, a petition signed by 208 persons was presented to the Board, requesting her continued employment. Finally, there were other unwed mothers employed as teachers in the school system. Given these overwhelming and undisputed facts, the court ruled that the Board had failed "to meet a prima facie showing that good cause existed" and the Board's action was "arbitrary, unreasonable and not supported by substantial evidence." In essence, the Stoudt decision was premised on a substantive due process analysis.

The recent case of Ponton v. Newport News School Board, however, relied on a First Amendment privacy right to favorably rule for an unwed, pregnant school teacher. Ms. Ponton was a high school home economics teacher who became pregnant. She informed her supervisor of her condition and was told to contact the Personnel Department. On doing so, she was informed she could choose one of three options: either get married, take a leave of absence, or resign. If she took the leave of absence, however, she would be only eligible for a Category B type leave and not the more desirable Category A since she was unmarried. Given the foregoing options, Ms. Ponton requested and was granted a Category B leave of absence. Some two years after the birth of her child, she was reinstated in an available teaching position.

Prior to being reinstated, Ms. Ponton filed suit, claiming that her constitutional privacy interest was violated by being forced to take an immediate Category B leave of absence. The court, utilizing free speech premised standards, used a three prong inquiry to determine if Ms. Ponton could prevail on her alleged constitutional privacy violation. The first prong was to establish whether the right of privacy extends to bearing children out of wedlock. Citing Supreme Court precedent, the court, in a summary manner, said that the "right to privacy encompasses decisions regarding whether to have a child." This right extends to unmarried as well as married persons.

The second prong was to determine whether Ms. Ponton was forced to take the leave of absence because she was single and pregnant. The court found she was forced to take the leave of absence for that reason. She was only afforded the three options by the Personnel Department and a less desirable type of leave. None of the options or Category B leave would have been required if she had been either married and pregnant or single and non-pregnant.

The third prong of the inquiry was to determine "whether [Ms. Ponton's] interest in exercising her right to become pregnant out of wedlock was outweighed by the School District's asserted interest in excluding [her] from the classroom." The Board's reason for requiring Ms. Ponton's leave of absence was "that the mere sight of an unmarried, pregnant teacher would have sufficiently undesirable influence on school children."

The court found the Board's rationale to be meritless. It did so by using the guidelines developed in the Connick and Pickering free speech decisions. There was no evidence to show the alleged undesirable effect. The court said that even if plaintiff's students would have known that she was single, the mere knowledge that their teacher had gotten pregnant out of wedlock would seem to have a fairly minimal impact on them. There was no evidence that plaintiff intended to proselytize . . . unwed
pregnancy. Plaintiff's pregnancy would not have affected School Board's authority to proscribe curriculum, nor would it have affected plaintiff's ability to implement ... curriculum. Finally, there was no danger that plaintiff's single, pregnant status could in any way be perceived as representing a School Board-sponsored statement regarding the desirability of pregnancy out of wedlock; ... could only be viewed as ... a personal decision made by plaintiff in her private capacity.34

The single, pregnant status of Ms. Ponton did not, according to the court, hamper the effective and efficient operation of the school as to student reaction, the curriculum, and the school's mission of conserving traditional marital values.

A well-known case where a teacher challenged her dismissal for living with a man not her husband was Sullivan v. Meade County Independent School District No. 101.35 Ms. Sullivan, an elementary school teacher, taught in a small rural school district. Shortly after starting her employment, a male friend moved in with her, and they made no attempt to conceal their living arrangement. The Board dismissed her in November after she had admitted the situation and refused to have her friend live elsewhere. The Board's rationale was her "personal life ... constitutes a bad example for her students who are taught by example as well as by lecture."36

Ms. Meade sued, claiming the school district's action was a denial of substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment which incorporates the First Amendment rights of privacy and freedom of association. She contended that her dismissal was arbitrary and unreasonable because her relationship was protected by a right to privacy. The federal district court dismissed her case.

The overriding issue in the Sullivan case was whether the school could proscribe that she cease to cohabit "because of their belief that it would have an adverse effect upon children," thus making her incompetent.37 The court said that the evidence supported the Board's belief. A petition with 140 signatures stating strong disapproval of Ms. Sullivan's out-of-school conduct was presented at the Board hearing. This petition, the court said, was sufficient evidence that the community would make it difficult for her "to maintain the proper educational setting in her classroom."38 While the court avoided any discussion of the morality of cohabitation, per se, it did say that a teacher's fitness was subject to a community's moral standards, especially in a small town.

In Yanzick v. School District No. 23,39 the Supreme Court of Montana sustained the dismissal of a tenured teacher for living with a woman to whom he was not married. As in Sullivan, the Montana Supreme Court said that to dismiss a teacher on grounds of immorality, the conduct must directly affect the teacher's performance. The evidence showed that Mr. Yanzick's living arrangement had caused numerous parental complaints and student discussion. He acknowledged that this conduct had so adversely affected his classroom performance, his girlfriend had moved out to help clear the air. These facts, plus his discussion of abortion and using human fetuses in class, were sufficient for the Board to regard him unfit to teach junior high school students.

However, a federal district court in Thompson v. Southwest School District ruled in a teacher's favor.40 Ms. Thompson had been required to sign a statement.
on her performance evaluation affirming that she was cohabiting with a male. Six days later, she received a letter from the Board stating that she was suspended with pay, pending a hearing to determine her fitness to teach. However, a day before the letter arrived, she had married the man.

This court also said that her alleged immoral conduct would have to be shown to adversely affect her performance. It pointed out that no evidence was presented either to show Ms. Thompson had experienced any bad discipline effects in the classroom or any indication of a hostile community atmosphere which would undermine her effectiveness. In fact, her evaluation showed her to be a satisfactory teacher and her principal and superintendent had offered to write positive recommendations so that she could find another teaching position, if she would resign. These facts strongly indicated to the court that her teaching ability had not been adversely affected.

Concluding Comments

The foregoing court decisions suggest that cohabitation and unwed pregnancy, are not, in and of themselves, sufficient to sustain a teacher's dismissal on grounds of immorality. The concept of "immorality" is regarded as legally vague. The courts' rationale is that immorality means different things to different people, and its definition depends on the idiosyncrasies of the individual board members. The courts said this variability in meaning makes the charge of immorality too vague because it fails to give fair warning of what conduct is prohibited and because it permits erratic and prejudiced exercises of authority.

Courts, however, are reluctant to declare federal and state statutes unconstitutional. This means that when their constitutionality is raised, courts will endeavor to ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question can be avoided. In order to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court's directive for judicial constraint, courts have adopted the standard of "fitness" to determine if the teacher's behavior constitutes immorality under teacher dismissal statutes. They have reasoned that when immorality is considered in conjunction with other common statutory grounds for dismissal such as incompetence, neglect of duty, and physical inability they are all directly related to a teacher's fitness for service.

The equitable application of the fitness standard has required courts to develop guidelines. The foregoing and other court decisions term to include: (1) the age and maturity of the teacher's students; (2) the likelihood that the teacher's conduct will have adversely affected students and other teachers; (3) the extent of community adversity; (4) motives underlying the conduct; and (5) whether dismissal will have a chilling effect on the rights of the teachers involved or other teachers.

The foregoing court decisions on just two aspects related to family lifestyle indicate that legal reasoning needs to be considered in an effort to determine the appropriate standards for ethical teaching. This is especially important if there is agreement there is a need for congruence between what a teacher teaches in the classroom and what she or he does outside the classroom. This position is reflected by the U.S. Supreme Court.
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he shapes the attitudes of young minds toward the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern. It must preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school authorities have the right and the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society, cannot be doubted.41

The above quotation infers that there is a necessary connection between congruence and integrity. Congruence is that aspect of integrity that affirms the proposition that teachers are influential role models for their students. There is, however, another feature of schools' integrity that is expected by the community. It is that all citizens, including teachers, must be governed by authorities subject to the law. The law, therefore, prohibits school authorities from violating the legal rights of teachers by dismissing them because their personal lives are not in congruence with the school curriculum.

The following questions are suggested for possible philosophic review in an exploration of standards for ethical teaching. How can schools assure their integrity in the teaching of the traditional family model when teachers are legally protected to choose a contrary family model? Have the courts adequately resolved the foregoing question by their rulings that protect both interests by a determination of the consequences rather than accepted norms? Is such a situational ethics approach counterproductive for teachers and students who must acknowledge viewpoints and norms in the curriculum that contradict such an approach?

Footnotes

4. Ibid., 134.
9. She appealed decision to State Tenure Commission which upheld the local board's decision.
14. The Drake decision, however, should be used with caution. The court noted that the pregnancy was made public by plaintiff's physician, who breached a confidential relationship, she could expect would be honored.
15. 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed as improperly granted, 425 U.S. 559 (1976).
16. Ibid., 613-614.
17. Ibid., 615. Some mitigating circumstances noted were subsequent marriage, length of time lapse, rape, or deception.
18. Ibid., 616.
19. Ibid., 617.
20. 674 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982).
23. Avery, 674 F.2d 341.
24. Ibid., 342.
26. Ibid., 1190.
28. Category B leave of absence is characterized by School Board policy as parental leave. Teachers, returning from this type leave, are not guaranteed their former assignments, but will be placed in a position for which they are certified and qualified when such a vacancy is available. Category A leave, available to married pregnant teachers, allows these teachers to work until physically unable to do so. Also, these teachers are guaranteed their former positions when they return.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
36. Ibid., 1243.
37. Ibid., 1246.
38. Ibid., 1247.
39. 641 P.2d 431 (Mont. 1982).
HOW NOT TO FRAME AN ETHICAL ISSUE

Neale H. Mucklow
University of Richmond

0. Introduction. In the last four paragraphs of his paper, Bruce Beezer moves from legal analysis to "questions ... for philosophic review." In formulating his "suggested" questions, he does two things about which I have doubts. First, Beezer frames the first-order ethical issue, concerning schools' curricula and teachers' life-styles in teaching about family, by using the notion of "the integrity of the schools." I have doubts about that notion, both as usable for framing this issue and even as intelligible in itself. Second, Beezer frames the second-order methodological question, as to what we should consider in answering the first-order question and as to how courts are to go about resolving it, by contrasting looking at "the consequences" and looking to "accepted norms." Now I would agree that the courts' current approach is, largely, to look at consequences, and particularly at adverse effects in the classroom; this much is shown by Beezer's own very interesting and rather careful reporting, analyzing and summarizing of nine legal cases. Further, as to the two approaches themselves, looking at the consequences and looking to accepted norms, I suspect the reasons one yields are not always commensurable with those available on the other. Nevertheless, I think the two approaches are often not as contrasting as Beezer's framing of his second-order methodological question would have us think.

1. On moral rights: a likely criticism of omission. I would argue (if space permitted) that the two different approaches are not exhaustive. As Beezer here uses the quoted terms, neither 'by a determination of "the consequences"' nor 'by looking to "accepted norms"' covers by looking to individual rights, i.e. moral rights. Yet certain moral rights of individuals are relevant to our answering the first-order ethical issue concerning what schools in their curricula and teachers in their life-styles teach children about family. The two moral rights I have in mind are the right to control one's own life and the right to equal opportunity, regardless of gender. I say "regardless of gender" because while dismissal or other penalty for living together can affect a male (as it did in the Yanzick case), realistically speaking unwed parenthood affects only women. Now this difference, between living together and unwed parenthood or unwed pregnancy, may be legally irrelevant, at least at present; at any rate Beezer, who was engaged in legal analysis rather than an independent moral analysis, is silent about this difference. Even so, these two abstract moral rights, to control over one's own life and to equal opportunity, have legal counterparts, or so someone else might also try to argue, in some of the nine cases analysed; two more-or-less parallel constitutional rights, the right to privacy and the right to equal protection of the laws, are available to the courts, and in some cases relevant to their resolving the first-order ethical issue (or its legal twin). But that would be a further matter.

2. On the ground of the relevance of legal reasoning: a difference, perhaps basic. In the first of his last four paragraphs, Beezer says that, as the foregoing cases indicate, "legal reasoning needs to be considered in an effort to determine the appropriate standards for ethical teaching." I quite agree. Indeed in general the law presents the moral philosopher or other ethical theorist with such a variety of situations, and legal reasoning by an appellate court judge is...
sometimes so clear-headed or so strained, that on many moral issues legal opinions simply must be considered in any intellectually responsible "effort to determine appropriate standards for ethical" conduct on the issue, or in any such effort to generate qualified responses to a particular situation. Experience shows this. But to have this ground for the relevance of legal reasoning is not to accept a ground formulated early in Beezer's paper: the "assumption," which may appear to be his ground, that the law "can" be regarded as "the" means by which a "democratic" society "reaffirms" "shared" moral prescriptions "and summons society's allegiance to a common set of behavior goals."

3. On how to teach the traditional family: a question. Beezer usefully reports some studies of textbooks, including a study he made. They "indicate," he says, that schools "do and are expected to teach the traditional family model." Surely in a plain sense of 'are expected to', this is true. Similarly for what he implies when stating what his paper will focus on: the schools "are charged with transmitting" and have an "interest in teaching" "traditional family life morals." The surrounding supporting society (or much of it) expects no less. Even so, someone might ask whether the schools should "teach the" traditional family "model" and "life morals." Well, the traditional family is good for bringing up children (or is so with many pairs of parents in most situations). Indeed, no doubt it is the best for the children (more often than is any one other family type). As to the schools, I quite agree with Beezer, and with this much of the 1952 Supreme Court decision he quotes, that a vital function of the schools is to inculcate favorable "attitudes of young minds toward the society in which they live"; and the traditional family is a central institution in our society (or is so in our society's still-standard image of itself). Still, the schools, in addition to being charged with inculcating, well, pro-attitudes towards good institutions, are also charged with teaching, at an appropriate level, not only about physical reality but about social reality. Social reality now contains in significant percentages several family types. Hence it is a question: Should the surrounding supporting society expect more of the schools in their teaching the "traditional family model"? Should schools teach about other family types, as the textbook studies indicate they now do not? Should schools teach that all other types are bad in all cases, as the silence on them possibly suggest to some of the children when in school? Having shown there are questions here, I move on.

4. On the opposition between consequences and accepted norms: a criticism. 'Looking at the consequences' and 'looking to accepted norms' are not as contrasting as Beezer's second-order question would lead one to suppose. To show this I shall bring out four points about accepted norms. (1) Some accepted norms, even among those which do not mention consequences, are themselves based on the consequences of the group's having them. Rule-utilitarian arguments show this. Sometimes such rules are accepted because their good consequences are apparent.

But not all rules are best understood in terms of social utility. This we must realize, if we are to appreciate the first-order view of those who, sincerely, would dismiss teachers for not following the accepted norms of the traditional family model (and also if we are to appreciate Beezer's second-order question). Some accepted norms are adhered to because they are seen as part and parcel of the way of life which the society affirms to be good. The conduct which aims to live up to such accepted norms is, I believe, what Max Weber had in mind when he said that some social action is wertrational, an attempt to "realize" some absolute value. An attempt to make real such a value may be, as the member conceives it, a "fulfillment" of some claim imposed by honour, say, or by a norm of piety or even by the importance of some 'cause' of one or another kind; or it may be in the agent's mind an act of "obedience" to an imperative. Such conduct
is not merely zweckrational, rational as a means to a given end. It also is distinct from some other social action, also called "traditional," which is "an expression of a settled custom" though not quite done simply out of habit. Neither wertrational conduct nor the covering accepted norms which are part and parcel of a way of life are necessarily irrational. The reasons supporting the conduct are, as Weber I think saw, sometimes reasons of "intrinsic" value, regardless of consequences. But beyond this, many accepted norms are backed by reason, albeit not by reasons of the kind, means-to-an-end-which-is-independently-valuable, on which our culture currently dotes. For one thing, often such a norm is subject to evaluation for its consistency with other norms accepted by the same group. At some such times it turns out that, as members of the group themselves come to realize, the norm is inconsistent (incongruous, conflicting) with other accepted norms but was not heretofore seen to be so because of ignorance of fact, false beliefs e.g. prejudices, or, say, self-deception. At other such times this test of consistency is passed by an accepted norm, which thus is backed by reason (at least to that extent). Both the existence of wertrational conduct and the rationality of some of the accepted norms covering it we must appreciate.

Implied by this, of course, is another point about accepted norms: (ii) Some such accepted norms are unacceptable, on their own terms. They fail the test of consistency. For obvious instance, "Blacks should go to "equal" "but separate" schools" used to be an accepted norm in our society. (iii) Some accepted norms, even if not more honored in the breach, are no longer taken very seriously by the majority. They are part of official morality, if one may so speak, but more sustained in the society's self-image than repeatedly re-affirmed in everyday practice. They are "accepted," but in this sense. Finally, to appreciate the appeal of looking to accepted norms and the attraction of contrasting that with looking at consequences, we would also need to remind ourselves of a combination of facts about norms. These facts have to do with generality and the positive emotive charge of the term 'principled', with motivation getting connected to norms at least among children, with simplicity being tempting, and with impartiality as more likely when looking to previously-accepted norms than when looking for consequences. But then (iv) one or two things must be said. Rigorous deduction from exceptionless principles, be these adhered to with a rigid attitude or not, should not be mistaken for rigorous thought. Perception may be called for. It may (or may not) be impartial to put aside certain facts of a case and follow the rules even though following the accepted norms will, say, hurt a relationship between friends. Such impartiality is not all there is to morality.

5. On congruence between classroom lessons and outside action: agreement, to a degree. Unwed pregnancy, unwed parenthood, and living together, which on many statutes constitute "immorality," Beezer considers under the heading of behavior on "a contrary family model" — a heading by no means inappropriate given certain norms. Unquestionably, between such behavior and the traditional family model there is "a difference" and some "conflict in morals." In some sense of 'congruence', no doubt the two are "not in congruence," as Beezer implies. "How bad is this?" seems to be the question. Beezer is asking us to agree to something on this when he writes that legal reasoning needs to be considered "especially ... if" there is "agreement" there is "a need" for "congruence" between teaching "in the classroom" and behavior "outside the classroom," between "curriculum" content and teachers' "personal lives." I am not sure what Beezer means by "a need" for congruence. I would agree that there is a case for it. In particular, as to the fundamental factual premise of that case, I would agree it to be wisdom, conventional or otherwise, that "the teacher ... has significant influence ... on ... their [the students'] moral formation," and that it is more than a mere "possibility" that teachers unknowingly "convey" morals to students (in a number
of ways, and not just in messages about family). Students do learn "by example." A student even does sometimes take a teacher to be in some respect a role model.

6. On the integrity of the schools: a criticism. Beezer speaks, in the phrase of the Supreme Court, of "the integrity of the schools," and does so in order to support the case for congruence. Granted, he does say that "another feature of schools' integrity ... is that ... school authorities" are not to violate "the legal rights of teachers." But what those legal rights should be is at issue. Perhaps Beezer introduces the Supreme Court's phrase partly to provide a common currency for comparing and weighing what otherwise seem incommensurable reasons -- the "values" of family life, the "rights" of teachers (or else "consequences"). Even so, Beezer introduces "the integrity of the schools" mainly in order to support further the case for congruence. Now there is plausibility here. That "there is a necessary connection between congruence and integrity" is plausible (though a strong reading of it, that 'there is no degree of integrity unless there is congruence of a tight sort', is implausible). Likewise, that "congruence is ... [an aspect of integrity]" is plausible (though I doubt Beezer would mean it is "that aspect" which does no more than affirm the factual premise that, in his words, "teachers are influential role models"). But the plausibility comes, I suggest, from our ordinary talk of personal integrity, and from thinking of congruence as a match between an individual's behavior and his or her moral beliefs. Congruence is an "aspect" of integrity, when thinking of an individual. Can that plausibility be transferred, legitimately, when thinking of an institution? when thinking of a school? when thinking of the schools? when thinking of the schools in a society which though democratic is also pluralistic and even heterogeneous? Those are questions, not rhetorical questions. A second set of questions is summed up with, 'Does the notion of the integrity of an institution even make sense?' It may. It so happens that in a paper before this Society last year, I tried to make use of the notion of "the integrity of a discipline." My attempt (that was the least satisfactory part of that paper) was parallel, in some respects, to Beezer's use of "the integrity of the schools." It was that a discipline, by presenting itself (behavior) as it is, namely, in a way that exhibits its methodological norms (in congruence with moral norms to be taught) is showing integrity; and showing integrity has value from a certain perspective (integrity is good as the Court assumed), so that those methodological norms should be taught (there is further support for congruence). I also gave quick examples, or so I simply assumed, of the integrity of a profession and of a craft, and spoke of the integrity of a tribe. So it may be that the notion of the integrity of an institution is intelligible, in itself, i.e. does make sense, in some cases. But what sense it makes needs clarification. The notion of "the integrity of the schools" is vague. There are few intellectual controls on any use which Beezer, or the 1952 Court in the Adler case, or anyone else, tries to make of that notion in arguing, or in framing an ethical issue.

2. See the discussion of the pro-slavery rule in Gilbert Harman, The Nature of Morality (New York: Oxford U. P., 1977), pp. 94--95 and 96--97. Also to the point is the discussion of the scavenging-cannibals rule (p. 97 f.).
SOUTH ATLANTIC PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Thirty-Second Annual Meeting
October 16 & 17, 1987

EDUCATION: A MORAL ENTERPRISE

Duke University

Schedule for Friday, October 16

11:00-1:00 Conference Registration
Sociology-Psychology, Room 144, Earle West, Secretary/Treasurer

1:00-2:15 First Concurrent Session

1) "Public Education as Religious Enterprise"
   Presenter: William F. Losito, The College of William and Mary
   Respondent: James W. Garrison, Virginia Polytechnic Institute
   Place: Social Sciences, Room 229

2) "Using Scientific Logic to Reconcile Theism & Secular Humanism as Religions"
   Presenter: Tom Hawkins, University of South Carolina at Spartanburg
   Respondent: David Kennedy, Berea Children's Center
   Place: Sociology-Psychology, Room 129

3) "Vision and Person in Renewal: The NCCAT Experience"
   Presenter: Jon A. Rinnander, NCCAT at Western Carolina University
   Respondent: Cheryl Southworth, University of North Carolina
   Place: Sociology-Psychology, Room 133

2:30-3:45 Second Concurrent Session

1) "Teaching Justice Through Classic Texts: The Coppin-Hopkins Humanities Program..."
   Presenters: John Furlong & William Carroll, Coppin State College
   Respondent: Anthony G. Rud, NCCAT at Western Carolina University
   Place: Sociology-Psychology, Room 129

2) "A Theater of Memory: Vico's View of Personal Identity"
   Presenter: Thomas O. Buford, Furman University
   Respondent: John R. Scudder, Lynchburg College
   Place: Social Science, Room 229

3) "Teaching Cooperation"
   Presenter: Richard J. McGowan, Milwaukee School of Engineering
   Respondent: Beatrice Sarlos, Loyola College
   Place: Sociology-Psychology, Room 133
4:00-4:15 General Session  
Social Sciences, Room 136

Welcome: Peter Carbone, 1987 SAPES President, Duke University  
Charles Clotfelter, Vice Chancellor, Duke University

4:15-5:45

Keynote Address: "The Moral Significance of the Concept of Education"  
Presenter: Robert D. Heslep, University of Georgia  
Respondent: J. Gordon Chamberlin, North Carolina Poverty Project

6:30-9:30 Social Hour and Banquet  
Sheraton University Center

Speaker: Robert F. Borden, Duke University History Department  
"The Duke Family and Duke University"

9:30- President's Reception  
Sheraton, Room 1002

Schedule for Saturday, October 7

8:30-10:00 Third Concurrent Session

1) Topic: Censorship

"Censorship and the Right to Read"  
Presenters: Susan O'Brien and Joseph O'Brien, University of Virginia

"On the Horns of a Moral Dilemma: An Anatomy of the Hawkins County, Tennessee, Textbook Controversy"  
Presenters: J. Hamilton Hoit, East Tennessee State University and Elizabeth Hoit-Thetford, Hawaii Pacific College

Moderator: Violet Allain, James Madison University  
Place: Gross Chemistry, Room 104

2) Topic: Gifted Students & Moral Development

"Is it Moral to Raise Levels of Moral Judgement? The Special Case of the Gifted Child"  
Presenters: Mary I. Yeazell and Julie Tasker, West Virginia University
"Predicate Conditions for Moral Education"
Presenter: Virgil S. Ward, University of Virginia

Moderator: John Davis, Bethany College
Place: Gross Chemistry, Room 105

3) Topic: Illiteracy & Ignorance

"In Praise of Illiteracy"
Presenter: Joseph Di Bona, Duke University

"Moral Education: Ignorance and Stupidity"
Presenter: Rocco Porreco, Georgetown University

Moderator: Warren Strandberg, Virginia Commonwealth University
Place: Gross Chemistry, Room 110

10:15-11:30 Fourth Concurrent Session

1) "Moral Education for Adolescents: Kohlberg, Rogers, or Erikson?"
Presenter: George D. Allen, West Virginia University
Respondent: Virginia S. Wilson and James A. Little, North Carolina School of Science & Mathematics
Place: Gross Chemistry, Room 104

2) "Understanding the Soviet Union: A Method of Fostering Peace"
Presenter: Carl W. Holland, East Tennessee State University
Respondent: John B. Haynes, James Madison University
Place: Gross Chemistry, Room 105

"Standards for Ethical Teaching: Are Teachers' Personal Lifestyle Choices Foreclosed?"
Presenter: Bruce Beezer, North Carolina State University
Respondent: Neale H. Mucklow, University of Richmond
Place: Gross Chemistry, Room 110

11:45-12:30 Annual Business Meeting

Gross Chemistry, Room 103
Peter F. Carbone, 1987 SAPES President, presiding