In 1984, the New York State Regents issued an action plan calling for changes in curriculum, high school graduation requirements, and educational standards. Histories of school reform indicate, however, that state legislation alone cannot successfully or permanently improve educational practice. This essay therefore surveys the history of federal and state-sponsored school reform efforts in New York State in the 20th century to identify general characteristics of these varying reform movements that distinguish successful from unsuccessful attempts to change New York's schools. Included are three of the major reforms that attempted to change schools in New York State before World War II: the Hanus Report of 1911-1913, the Rural School Survey of 1922, and the Regents' Inquiry of 1937. In the postwar era, the National Defense Education Act of 1957 and Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1975 are considered, along with state-initiated efforts such as the Fleischmann Commission and the Regents' Competency Testing Program. Data are presented topically, rather than chronologically; the essay begins with a brief examination of how changing contexts have shaped major reform efforts in the state's past, and then proceeds to a discussion of how past reform efforts have been affected by the specificity of their goals, their consistency, executive leadership asserted, resources, and provisions for accountability. The evidence indicates that reforms that are clearly articulated, consistent, and within the realm of existing knowledge have a greater likelihood of being implemented than those that pursue vague goals such as "excellence" and "good citizenship." Forty-eight notes are appended. (TE)
A History of School Reform in New York State: Implications for Today's Policy Makers

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In the past two years a multitude of commissions on the nation's schools have issued reports calling for massive educational reform. In 1983 and 1984 the New York State Regents held a series of meetings throughout the state and in August of 1984 issued an action plan which calls for changes in curriculum, high school graduation requirements, and educational standards. These reforms are intended to herald an era of excellence and strengthen schooling's contribution to the state's economy. Other states have taken steps to upgrade their schools. Some have changed graduation requirements; others have moved toward changing course offerings, initiating more rigorous testing programs and changing teacher recruitment and certification requirements.

While there have been reforms mandated, it is by no means clear that the changes the states are initiating will be translated into practice or, if put into practice, that they will have their intended effect. Histories of school reform indicate that it will take more to change educational practice than enacting legislation that calls for curricular revision, higher standards, and "excellence." Reforms of the past have often been nothing but a series of paper recommendations that were revived, or forgotten ten years hence.

This essay is a case study of the history of school reform in New York State in the Twentieth Century. Through a survey of the many commissions and reforms that sought to improve the state's schools, we ask what lessons can be learned from past reform efforts that might inform today's policy makers. The main focus is on identifying factors that are common to these varying reform movements despite different historical contexts that have influenced their outcomes. Are there general
characteristics that distinguish "successful" from "unsuccessful" attempts to change New York State's schools? While our focus is on New York State, we believe that what can be said about the many well-intentioned efforts to change the state's school system and its educational outcomes has relevance to other states now trying to bring excellence to the schools in a time of scarce resources and erosion of public confidence in the public schools. What we can learn from the history of reform in this state can help guide policy makers elsewhere as they formulate reform programs and attempt to translate them into practice.

In this essay we do not purport to study every reform ever attempted in New York State. Rather, we have selected those reforms that represent serious and wide ranging attempts to change the quality and outcomes of primary and secondary education as do the national reports on excellence of the 1980s. We therefore selected three of the major reforms that attempted to change schools in New York State before World War II; namely, the Hanus Report of 1911-1913, the Rural School Survey of 1922, and the Regents Inquiry of 1937. In the post war era, we looked at state-wide reforms instigated by the federal government -- the National Defense Education Act of 1957 and Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act -- as well as state initiated attempts to change the quality and distribution of education, namely the Fleischmann Commission and its successors and the Regents' Competency Testing Program. Unlike pre-World War II reforms, the reforms of the last two decades as current reform efforts, were instigated largely by the federal government and the courts. These reforms tended to treat the State as a single entity and prescribe changes for the entire state. Earlier reforms of the 1920's and 1930s had
not attempted to improve all the state's schools; rather they had addressed the problems of New York City or rural schools.

We have not organized this essay chronologically; rather, we have chosen to present our data topically, structured around what we have identified as the implications of New York State's history of school reform for current efforts. In the pages that follow we ask how reform efforts of the past have been affected by the specificity of their goals, their consistency, executive leadership exerted, resources, and provisions for accountability. Before so doing, we begin with a brief examination of how changing contexts have shaped major reform movements in the state's past. Despite the ways in which shifts in demography, economy and politics have shaped specific reforms and their impact, we will argue that successful reforms in the past have had common characteristics that are relevant to today's attempts to improve the schools.

The Context of Reform

While this essay argues that there are lessons today's policy makers might learn from the past, specific economic, social and political contexts have shaped both the goals and outcomes of attempted reform. Chart 1 summarizes the recommendations of the reforms considered in the pages that follow. As the chart shows, educational reform in New York State has varied over time in sponsorship and in recommendations. While a detailed account of the background of each reform mentioned in the chart is beyond the scope of this paper, the impact of economic, demographic, and political factors on educational reform will be illustrated by the examples that follow.

Economic conditions have played a major role in shaping the goals of
educational reform. Two of the pre-World War II reforms, the Hanus Report on education in New York City and the statewide Regents' Inquiry of 1937, reflected a perception of economic scarcity and therefore had as major goals the provision of more efficient, economical education. Although the Hanus Report appeared at a time when New York City's economy was expanding, the even more rapid expansion of public expenditures for urban services, especially schools, led to demands for economy and efficiency. The concern of the Regents Inquiry of 1937 with more efficient uses of resources reflected the general economic contraction of the Great Depression. The federally sponsored educational reforms of the 1950s and 1960s, on the other hand, reflecting an era of relative prosperity, focused on other priorities. The National Defense Education Act of 1957, for example, grew out of a concern for America's military superiority relative to the Soviet Union; the federally induced Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, subsequent bilingual and handicapped education legislation of the 1970s arose from Supreme Court decisions focusing on equality of educational opportunity and outcome as well as from civil rights activism and within New York State, a growing Hispanic and minority population which began to exert political power. The reforms of the 1960s and early 1970s thus occurred within the context of economic prosperity and efficiency was not the major concern. This was the case with the Fleischmann Commission whose report appeared in 1973. The report reflected a real concern for equality; however, the successor commissions, appointed to implement the Fleischmann recommendations, occurred in the midst of severe economic recession and decline in the state's industrial and tax base. As a result, the recommendations were "studied" but not
fully implemented.

Demographic as well as economic factors shaped the various movements for educational reform. The Hanus Report's recommendations that the New York city schools expand vocational education and social studies were a direct response to the heavy influx of European immigrants, a new school population for whom non-academic training and Americanization were considered essential. After World War II, the rapid growth of Hispanic (and other non-English speaking) and black populations meant that new constituencies militated within the state for reform focusing on equality in education. The changing nature of students in public schools also has affected reform priorities. In New York State, for example, in 1962, 13.5 percent of students in the schools were black, 7.3 percent were Hispanic; by 1992 blacks comprised 18.6 percent of all students; Hispanics 12.5 percent. In the "Big Five" cities of Buffalo, New York City, Rochester, Syracuse and Yonkers, blacks comprised 38.8 percent of the student body; Hispanics 29.0 percent.

Changing reform movements in New York State reflected demographic variations not only over time, but also from one part of the state to another. The Hanus Report reflected the concerns of urban New York State with its densely populated areas of ethnically diverse populations, complex bureaucracies, distinct educational needs, and at least until mid-century, great economic resources. The Rural School Survey of 1922, on the other hand, reflected the vastly different concerns of sparsely populated agricultural areas, where isolated, educationally disadvantaged children were served by poorly equipped one-room schools and where educational leadership was often as scarce as resources. The Regents'
Inquiry of 1937, the first attempt to survey the needs of the state as a whole, recognized and identified a third New York, the tier of wealthy suburban counties north and west of New York City, where high incomes were reflected in large school budgets, superior educational facilities, and high achievement. While earlier educational reforms such as the Hanus Report and the Rural School Survey confined their efforts to one of these demographically (and economically) identifiable New Yorks, later statewide and national efforts have attempted the more difficult task of reforming education in the state (or nation) as a whole, often with insufficient attention to local and regional differences. The many reforms that have addressed racial and ethnic inequalities are directed predominantly to six cities in the state, and not the schools of rural New York or the suburban counties surrounding the state's major cities.

Finally, the importance of political as well as economic and demographic factors in shaping educational reform in New York State is evident in the changing sponsorship of the major reforms. Despite the existence of the State Education Department, most of the responsibility for planning, funding, and reforming education in the early decades of the Twentieth Century rested with the local districts, of which there were more than twelve thousand at the turn of the century. The earliest school reform movements, therefore, were initiated by cities to meet local educational problems. Much of the history of educational reform in the first half of the century reflects efforts by the state to convince reluctant districts to embrace voluntarily its agenda for reform, including consolidation of rural districts and improved administrative and fiscal practices. The fact that the Rural School Survey of 1922 and the
Regents' Inquiry of 1937 were initiated and conducted at the state rather than the local level reflects the gradually increasing power of the state in educational funding and policy making, an increase not always welcomed by the districts. The reforms of the last two decades were instigated increasingly by the federal government and the Courts, a reflection of the post World War II centralization of financial and political power at the federal level and an added source of concern to districts (and states) fearing loss of autonomy and local perogatives. The changing distribution of financial and policymaking power among the various levels of government -- national, state, and local -- continues to influence the shape and effectiveness of educational reform.

While the context, sponsorship and goals of educational reform have changed over time, in response to specific economic demographic and political circumstances, certain characteristics seem to be shared by successful reform movements in New York State in the past. It is to these characteristics that this essay now turns.

**Lofty, Vague Goals and Reform**

The various national commissions on education in 1983 and 1984 have set "excellence" as a goal for education, which is expected to reinstate "America's competitive challenge." The schools, many of the reports maintain, should prepare for the technological society of the future. No one contests such admirable goals for the schools; the question, however, is whether such goals can indeed be achieved as the states enact reform.

The history of reform movements in New York State suggests that attempts to reform schools have often been ineffective when their goals and recommendations were general rather than specific and when they called
for knowledge no one possessed. The fates of the Hanus Report of 1911, the Rural School Survey of 1922 and the Regents' Inquiry of 1937 and of the attempts to equalize education in the 1960s and 1970s illustrate the impossibility of achieving commendable, but vaguely defined educational and social goals.

The first important Twentieth Century reform commission was the Hanus Report which, while dealing with the schools in New York City, affected over half the public school children in the state. A detailed survey by experts from university education departments and municipal research bureaus, it set a precedent for other city surveys, for the multi-volume Rural School Survey of 1922 and Regents Inquiry of 1937, and for other more specialized commissions on school reform in the state. Unfortunately, the Hanus Report set a precedent for vagueness as well. It instructed schools to inculcate "those things which, if known, would insure intelligent cooperation and competition among men" but neglected to specify what those "things" were. It instructed schools to train "efficient citizens" who would "appreciate the common interests of our democratic society" but did not specify what made a citizen "efficient" or what those "common interests" were. Similarly vague goals appeared in the Rural School Survey, which directed schools to give children "such training as will make them acceptable members of society," and in the 1937 Regents' Inquiry, which urged that children be taught "those qualities, attitudes and abilities that are essential for efficient living in an evolving industrial democratic society." Local school officials may well have been perplexed as to what measures to enact to reach these worthy but imprecise goals.
Recommendations as well as goals were often too general to be helpful. One of the main recommendations of the Hanus Report, for example, was curriculum reform. Migration from rural areas as well as overseas and the extension and enforcement of compulsory school laws had filled New York City schools with unprecedented numbers of children from widely diverse backgrounds. The Hanus Report recommended that curriculum be adjusted to meet the special needs of each individual and group. The report did not specify how such a sweeping curricular reform could be accomplished, however, with the exception of adding home economics for girls, nothing was suggested about how curriculum could be changed to meet the needs of the dozen or more ethnic groups that might be represented in a single classroom. Twenty years later yet another report called for a curriculum adjusted to the various nationality groups in New York City; apparently the Hanus Report's recommendations had not been implemented. Within three years, the Regents Inquiry reiterated the same recommendation.

Curriculum reforms that were specific rather than general, on the other hand, were more likely to be implemented. The Hanus Report's recommendation that social studies and vocational subjects be expanded was gradually carried out in the New York City schools. On the other hand, when the Rural School Survey made the general recommendation that the many subjects taught in rural elementary schools should be consolidated, the schools continued to teach the same subjects any how. A decade later, however, when the State Education Department issued two syllabi showing specifically how to consolidate school subjects, curriculum reform took place.
In the past, commissions that have called for reforms based on knowledge no one possessed have seen their proposals shelved. For example, the Rural School Survey suggested replacing the locally elected "amateur" district trustees with state appointed, professionally trained supervisors on the grounds that the latter would bring the benefits of "the science of education" to local school management. The author of the recommendation admitted, however, that "We cannot point to any organized body of printed material and say 'That is our body of education science.' It is yet largely in that empirical stage when it is mainly held in the minds of the professional workers, largely as the results of their professional experiences...." Rural voters rejected the proposed change of administrative personnel; they were not convinced that the admittedly primitive "scientific" knowledge of the new professionals was better than the common sense of the old trustees, who at least could be controlled by their local constituencies.

A second illustration of the importance of an adequate knowledge base is the 1937 Regents' Inquiry's recommendation that all teachers systematically teach good character, using methods of "proven worth." Unable to recommend such methods from their own experience or from educational literature, the Inquiry asked representative principals how they taught character in their schools. The resulting unannotated list of suggestions was then incorporated into the report for the benefit of other principals. The suggestions (none of "proven worth") ranged from "sports" and "encouragement of recreational and free reading" to "pictures on display," "arbor day programs," and "teaching of etiquette in lunchroom periods." It is doubtful whether the report's recommendations on
systematic character education were implemented, or, given current knowledge, whether they could be today.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{Inconsistency: The Bane of Reform}

The various reports urging reform in the nation’s schools in the 1980s call for a myriad of changes. The history of school reform in New York State suggests that the extent to which the reforms posited are consistent strongly affects whether any reforms are implemented at all. Diverse initiatives and sources of reform at any given period in the past have produced commission reports with recommendations so diverse and conflicting that effective implementation was difficult if not impossible. The recommendations of the Hanus Report, for example, reflected the varied and often conflicting interests of the City Board of Estimate and Appropriations who initiated it, the educators who wrote it, and the businessmen and civic and women’s organizations who served as unofficial consultants. The Board of Appropriations called for school budgets based on "facts...not educational opinion," for better accounting, and for elimination of waste and "frills." Educators wanted the schools divorced from city politics and called for "progressive" pedagogy. Business interests were reflected in the report’s request that schools "act as a transmitter between human supply and industrial demand," and civic organizations hoped to make the schools social service agencies to uplift, Americanize, and control the immigrant slum populations.\textsuperscript{12}

Rather than choose among these viewpoints, the Hanus Report included something of each with little regard for consistency.\textsuperscript{13} Thus while recommending an enriched and differentiated curriculum to please progressive pedagogues, it also called for the elimination of specialty
teachers who might teach such a curriculum in the elementary schools in the interests of economy. While expressing concern for the language problems of immigrant children, the report suggested that instruction in English grammar be struck from the elementary curriculum; progressive educators thought grammar too "abstract." The report recommended more vocational training in the schools; at the same time it urged investigation, in the interests of economy, of on-the-job training outside the schools. It advised corporal punishment, isolation, and early entry into the workforce for the recalcitrant student to prevent waste of classroom time, while advocating social and medical correction of student defects and a curriculum so "vital" (the Progressive Era equivalent of "relevant") that there would be no failures. Recommendations for expensive social services and vocational training could scarcely be reconciled with simultaneous demands for economy and efficiency. Not surprisingly, much of the Hanus Report was quietly shelved.

Reform efforts sometimes failed or became side tracked not because of contradictory aims of reform, but because contradictory definitions of a seemingly agreed upon goal were adopted, as were conflicting strategies to achieve these goals. This was exemplified in the attempts in New York State since 1965 to provide educational equality which were, more often than not, court-mandated.

While committed on paper to "equality" since the 1960s, New York State, like the rest of the nation, has been hard pressed to define what providing equality in education meant in actual practice. The Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965, which brought appreciable funds to the state from the federal government, defined
equality in terms of providing the conditions for children from "deprived" backgrounds, presumed to be at high risk for failure, to succeed in school. \(^{14}\) ESEA defined equality in terms of programs made available to targeted populations, not in terms of whether equality of educational expenditure or outcome was assured. While ESEA, which was administered by New York State for the federal government, defined equality in terms of programs for targeted populations, subsequent state and federal legislation provided at times less than consistent definitions. The Bilingual Education Act, for example, defined equality as providing mother-tongue education to students whose first language was not English. This federal legislation argued that children needed to have equal access to knowledge, not necessarily equal educational processes in a common language. The notion of cultural deficit, central to ESEA, was implicitly rejected by New York State's own Bilingual Education legislation, which insisted that minority cultures were by no means an impediment to school success. \(^{15}\) Not only did federally induced and state promoted programs provide differing and conflicting definitions of equality, but additional state and federal legislation relating to handicapped children argued that equality meant that all learners ought to be entitled to participate in the same educational processes, regardless of their handicap. \(^{16}\) Special schools for mentally and physically handicapped children, which the state had sponsored for decades, were perceived as counter to the very concept of equality.

While varying state and federally mandated programs carried their own often less than consistent versions of what constituted equality, New York State initiated a series of commissions that sparked yet another debate.
about what equality entailed. In 1969 Nelson Rockefeller, then governor, appointed the now almost forgotten Fleischmann Commission. Its 1973 three volume report represented the first full survey of the state's schools since the 1940s. In it the Commission called on the state to provide educational equality and defined it differently from the ESEA, the Bilingual Education Act, or the legislation that mainstreamed handicapped children into the public schools. The Fleischmann Commission defined equality in terms of educational expenditure, need, and tax burden. The Commission argued that education in New York was unequal because districts with high property values were spending much more on education than districts with lower property values. Poor districts taxed themselves more heavily in proportion to their property values than rich districts and still had less to spend per student for schooling. In addition to the tax rate being higher in poor areas, the Fleischmann Commission found per capita cost of education in poor districts much higher than in wealthier districts because of the concentrations in poor districts of bilingual, handicapped, and disadvantaged students whose educational costs were over twice that of children from affluent English speaking homes. Defining equality as the provision of educational monies according to a child's needs rather than a district's wealth or the size of the tax burden it could bear, the Commission recommended that local property tax should not be the basis for determining how much was spent on schooling.

Through the 1970s New York State grappled with the issues raised by the Fleischmann Commission, while several cities litigated against the old state formulas for providing aid to local school districts. In June 1978 the New York State Supreme Court handed down the Levittown decision which
argued, like the Fleischmann Commission, that the state denied equality of educational opportunity by basing most educational expenditures on the local property tax. In 1980 and again in 1982 the state issued reports on how equality in education might be provided. Meanwhile, differences in expenditures per student continued to widen between school districts. In 1974-5 per pupil expenditures varied from $1820 to $978. By 1981-2, two commissions later, it ranged from $3560 to $1763. Equality, while state policy, remained elusive.

The Role of Strong Executive Leadership

The National Commissions on Excellence, like so many of the reports on the schools issued in 1983 and 1984, challenged parents, teachers, the community and business to reform the schools. The question must be asked, however, to what extent do the reports acknowledge the role of committed, persistent executive leadership in bringing about successful reform? The history of educational change in New York State demonstrates that unless such leadership is exerted, schools are likely to resist change. The role of Governor Alfred E. Smith in rescuing the schools from the fiscal crisis of the early 1920s illustrates how important the executive office is in bringing about effective change. During the opening decades of the century and especially after World War I, the costs of local government had risen much faster than income. Local taxes, primarily property taxes, had soared, producing an outcry for tax relief throughout the state. Cities, whose property tax rates were limited by state law, were facing bankruptcy and the poorer rural counties had reached the limit of their resources.

While all areas of local government had become more expensive,
education costs had risen most and were therefore most subject to

criticism. In 1919, a legislative Joint Committee on Taxation and
Retrenchment (better known as the Davenport Commission) noted "the
extravagance of educational expenditures" and suggested the need for
further investigation. Rather than making political capital out of the
drive for economy, the new governor asked the legislature for and received
in 1919 and 1920 twenty-two million dollars to increase teachers' salaries. This was not an isolated triumph but the first of a series of
persistent efforts to solve the financial crisis of the schools. In the
decades before Smith took office the proportion of school expenses born by
the state as opposed to the local governments had steadily declined until
it reached a low of 8 percent in 1919. Legislation passed under Smith's
leadership reversed this trend, raising the state's contribution by 1930
to 38.6 percent. During this same period state aid to school districts
increased from $7,474,440 to $102,000,000, permitting continuing expansion
of education, especially at the secondary level.

A precursor of the New Deal, Smith believed that the state should
take an active role in meeting people's needs. He believed educational
problems could not be solved without money and that this obligation could
not be postponed "because time lost cannot be regained by the children who
are injured by the state's failure to make adequate provision for their
education." Smith acted on the premise that voters would support
additional spending if they understood its importance and were assured of
value for their money; his administration sponsored a series of
commissions on education, the most important of which were the Davenport
and Friedsam Commissions, and lobbied successfully to implement their
recommendations.

Reversing its earlier suggestion about educational extravagance, in its 1924 report the Davenport Commission assured the public that the schools were not wasteful. Its recommendations became the Cole Law of 1925. Although it did not abolish the old "quota" system, whereby the state gave districts financial "quotas" for more than a dozen different purposes, the Cole Law added a large state grant for each "teacher unit," greatly increasing state aid. In addition the law gave each district enough money (above what the district raised by a mandated "equalized" tax rate) to provide a minimal per student education fund. With the Cole Law, the state assumed financial responsibility for the first time for a minimum educational fund for every child, no matter how poor the child's district, and provided for statewide "equalization" of tax burden for the support of that fund.

When an economy minded legislature refused his request to finance another commission on education, Governor Smith assembled an informal conference of educators and economists, including Michael Friedsam, president of B. Altman and Company. The conference became the Friedsam Commission, chaired and financed by Friedsam; and its recommendations, sponsored by the governor, became the Friedsam Law of 1928. The Friedsam Law raised the minimal state supported educational fund, increased the state's contribution, and lowered the contribution required by the districts. In 1970, when the law took full effect the old "quota" system -- in which the state gave the districts many small grants for specific purposes, often unrelated to need -- was submerged in the new "equalized" aid structure. Following the recommendations of the Friedsam Commission,
Governor Smith lowered the state property tax, developed new sources of state revenue, and shared this revenue with local governments in unprecedented amounts. Thus Smith did more than advocate and lobby for increased state spending on education; he initiated fiscal policies that made local and state increases feasible.

The importance of strong executive leadership is underscored in more recent years in the failure of the state to implement the Fleischmann Commission recommendations even when bolstered by a State Supreme Court decision. State government was ambivalent about what it would mean to move toward equalizing educational expenditure between school districts, with equality defined as in the Fleischmann Report as providing greater amounts of money to bilingual, poor, and handicapped students. The Fleischmann Commission had recommended that the state either take over all educational finance through the institution of a statewide property tax, or that the state begin immediately to equalize expenditures per pupil among and within districts by removing state aid from wealthy districts and leveling up poor districts. This would have meant that 40 percent of the districts in the state would probably lose substantial amounts of money, while 60 percent would either remain at current funding levels or gain state aid.24

The financial recommendations were politically explosive. Rather than take immediate action New York's governors appointed various commissions to study the proposals.25 These commissions focused exclusively on the property tax and state funding formulas not because of strong leadership from the governor's office or the state legislature, but rather because of litigation that eventually led to the Letittown Decision
of 1978. No agencies followed up on implementing the other recommendations the Commission made proposing changes in curriculum and standards, which are echoed in the 1984 Regents' plans for improving the state's primary and secondary schools.

In part there was little action on the curricular recommendations of the Fleischmann Commission because the Commission did not propose that new monies be brought to the schools; rather, the Commission implied that its recommendations could be enacted by increasing the "productivity" of the system through efficiency measures. The Commission asked for massive change without increasing monies available to education. At the same time it urged that monies be redistributed among districts, significantly reducing state aid to many districts. It is little wonder that the executive leadership was tentative. Given the poor state of New York's economy and declining federal aid to education, the state focused solely on the formula for aid to local districts and, though pressed by impending legal action, it moved very slowly indeed. Ten years after the Fleischmann Commission issued its report, its proposals on educational finance were only partly implemented; those regarding curriculum and standards were being proposed once again, although in changed form.

Reforms and Resources

The extent to which resources are specified for the schools to reform affects quite strongly whether local districts change their practices. Even when the government has strongly and consistently urged specific reforms, local school districts have failed to implement them fully, not because they opposed the reforms, but because the changes they were asked to make entailed large and continuing new expenditures. New York State
often requested the changes but failed to provide adequate and specifically earmarked funding for their execution. Examples of reforms frustrated by insufficient funding include plans for the introduction of a "practical" curriculum in the rural high school during the second and third decade of the century and the implementation of the National Defense Education Act in the late 1950s and early 1960s and, as discussed earlier, the Fleischmann Commission recommendations.

Participating in a nationwide trend toward a more "practical" high school curriculum, the Rural School Survey of 1922 recommended that rural high schools change their traditional college preparatory curriculum to meet the needs of increasing numbers of students who would not go to college or even finish high school. Specifically, the Survey recommended that agricultural and industrial arts courses be available for all boys and that home economics be not only available but required for all girls. The Survey also recommended that the current concentration on Latin and mathematics be replaced, especially for the non-college-bound, with social studies, general science, and other useful subjects. Commissioner Groves wanted rural students to have all the opportunities available to their city counterparts. This would have meant the inclusion of more modern languages and laboratory sciences as well. The new curriculum did not materialize, however, largely because the states did not provide the necessary funding.26

The State began its effort to change the rural high school curriculum in 1910 with a law offering to pay two-thirds of the cost of the first teacher and half of the cost of the second teacher for agriculture programs. In 1917 the federal Smith Hughes Act provided additional
subsidies for teachers of vocational subjects, including agriculture, industrial arts, and home economics. Because of these special appropriations, by 1921 agriculture was taught in 72 rural high schools and in six separate state agricultural high schools.²⁷

While advocates of the new "practical" education were pleased with this initial success, it is significant that in no part of the state did the percentage of rural high schools teaching agriculture exceed 14.5 percent in 1921, and in most areas it was substantially less. The recommendations of the Rural School Survey in 1922 that agriculture should be available to all high school boys who wanted it made little difference; further growth in the 1920s was slight. Although state and federal subsidies made it possible to hire a well trained male high school level teacher of agriculture for half the cost of the usual female rural elementary school teacher, neither the state nor the federal government subsidized the considerable additional expense of equipment or operating costs. By 1922 the scattering of communities motivated enough to pay these additional costs already had programs. Most rural high schools were in villages, which saw no reason to spend their own money on programs of benefit mainly to non-resident, "open country" students. Hard pressed to pay for existing programs, they had other priorities.²⁸

Closely tied to agricultural education, home economics programs also illustrate the important role of adequate outside funding in creating change at the district level. Although home economics was probably a more popular "practical" curricular reform than agriculture and its potential clientele was larger, the original state aid legislation of 1910 did not subsidize it independently. Early state aided home economics programs had
to be housed in agriculture departments, their teachers usually hired as
the "second", and less heavily subsidized teacher. (Agriculture, however,
could be taught and subsidized with or without home economics.) Because
of the state subsidy law, almost all early high school home economics
programs were in rural areas; after the state law changed in 1919 to
finance home economics independently of agriculture, the number of home
economics programs were in rural areas; after the state law changed in
1919 to finance home economics independently of agriculture, the number of
home economics programs increased both in rural and urban high schools.
Still, as late as 1921, there were only 74 state aided departments, 45 of
which were still subordinated to agriculture programs. Although home
 economics programs grew more rapidly than agriculture during the 1920s,
The Rural School Survey's recommendation that the subject become mandatory
for all girls in rural high schools was not carried out; perhaps ten
percent of all girls had access to the program. One reason for the slow
growth was the fact that local communities could get subsidies under the
Smith Hughes Act only if they offered a "vocational" program, one that
took up almost half of a student's academic time. Few girls were
interested in an extensive (and unremunerative) "vocational" home
 economics program, and even though subsidies were available for teachers
salaries, few communities were willing to commit themselves to the high
equipment and operating costs of such a program.

Home economics and agriculture entered the curriculum of at least
some rural high schools because they were partially subsidized by the
state and federal governments. Reforms lacking subsidies were implemented
even less fully, if at all. Studies of high school curriculum in 1927 showed that although courses taken in social studies had increased, Latin and mathematics were still prominent in student programs. Science, modern languages, and vocational subjects that were expanding in urban high schools were growing slowly if at all in their village counterparts. Despite increased state aid in the 1920s, many rural districts were poor. It was cheaper to teach Latin and algebra than to hire specially trained modern language teachers or pay for the laboratories, special equipment, and high operating costs of the recommended "modern", or "practical" subjects. No new money was appropriated in the 1920s to finance the desired curricular reform, so little reform took place.  

Forty years later another effort to change curriculum, this time initiated by the federal government, was less than successful also because of inadequate funding. Congress passed The National Defense Education Act (NDEA) in 1957, following the Soviet Union's launching of Sputnik. The legislation proposed to upgrade the teaching of science, mathematics, and foreign languages in the schools and recommended a variety of means to do so, from more laboratory facilities in the schools to more advanced placement classes in targeted subjects, especially science and mathematics. Under the terms of NDEA the federal government provided funds for local districts to purchase equipment for science, mathematics, and language laboratories. The state was to administer the funds, under broad federal guidelines and to decide on the validity of local requests. The NDEA also provided matching funds for the states to improve supervisory and related services to the schools.

The New York State Education Department (SED) greeted NDEA with
enthusiasm. The state established an Ad Hoc Advisory Council on Science and Technology in 1957 to study math and science programs. Between 1958 and 1963 the state revised curricula in the targeted subjects and developed instructional materials for the new curricula. In addition SED ran summer institutes to train teachers to use the new materials and established science and math demonstration centers.

How much effect these efforts had in the state's classrooms is unclear, however. After much prodding of the districts, by 1964 the State Education Department had received and filled requests for 3494 pieces of science equipment, 2241 of math equipment and 2409 of foreign language equipment. Despite the SED effort, however, close to 25 percent of the districts refused to apply for equipment, stating lack of teachers qualified to use it as the reason.

While the NDEA did place government financed equipment in many classrooms, science, mathematics, and foreign language instruction in those classrooms was not necessarily strengthened. In part this was because the NDEA and the state did not provide districts with funds to hire additional math, science, or foreign language teachers who could provide the upper level instruction the reform hoped for or use the advanced equipment the NDEA had paid for. Close to a third of all the state's science and math teachers remained individuals certified in subjects like physical education, English, and Social Studies. State sponsored workshops and demonstrations reached only a fraction of these teachers; federal and state funds were too limited.

A 1965 evaluation carried out by SED concluded that while more students were enrolled in science courses (largely because the state had
changed requirements for high school graduation), there was little
evidence that instruction in mathematics, science, or foreign languages
had improved. The infusion of new equipment and materials did not
stimulate enough additional expenditures at the local level to carry the
proposed reforms to successful completion. Local districts felt that they
could not afford to divert monies from basic school subjects to upgrade
mathematics, science, or foreign language instruction. In fact, the SED
report complained that districts which did reallocate funds to science and
mathematics caused "harm" to instruction in the language arts, civics, and
health education. After 1965 the state sought to change NDEA to extend
the program to all subjects (except art and music) at the elementary and
secondary levels. In short, the state recommended unspecified grants to
school districts for general "improvement of instruction."  

While the lack of total funding was responsible for the failure of
NDEA to significantly improve high school science and mathematics
instruction, education has been improved by state mandated programs that
districts could implement without additional taxing of local resources.
This was the case in the Regents' mandated Basic Competency Testing
Program, which was put into effect in 1979. The program specified that a
local district could not award high school diplomas unless students passed
state administered tests in mathematics, reading, and writing. (Tests in
health and civics were optional.) The local districts were not required
to do anything except withhold degrees from substandard students; the
tests were graded as well as administered by the state. 

As the 1983 report of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching indicated, the New York State competency testing program did
insure that basic skills were taught. The competency testing program, still in effect in 1984, demonstrates that if the state pays for a program, especially one limited to testing, it can change minimal standards on degrees it controls. Emphasis on minimal competency does not assure "excellence"; ironically, it may actually lower educational standards while improving only students' test-taking skills.

Reform and Accountability

While the various commissions on education in the 1980s call for reforms, the history of New York State suggests that the extent to which accountability or evaluation are part of reform may well affect the ways in which reforms are enacted. In New York State neither accountability nor evaluation at the local district level has been a distinguishing feature of past reform. Until the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, school districts have rarely been asked to account for programs they have put into effect, their educational standards, or how they allocated monies given them by the localities, the state, or the federal government; nor have districts been required to conduct studies to see if the programs they offer have achieved their intended objectives. Reform often has been limited to what districts say they will do to change practices or what the state or federal government hopes they will do. This has been the case whether or not the districts were given funds to bring about change. Schools rarely have reformed practice without strong, consistent impetus to do so from either state or national governments. Often districts have used state or federal money to pay for services they would normally have provided through locally raised funds. The end result has been not the improvement of educational services intended by state or
federal reformers, but rather local property tax relief and a lessening contribution of localities to the education of their children. Even when money has been spent as the state or federal government intended, absence of evaluation at the local level has made it difficult for either the planners or the executors of the reform to know whether the effort was worthwhile. Decisions to continue or to eliminate the reform, then, are based exclusively on political or budgetary rather than educational factors.

Although education has been considered a state function since 1795, throughout most of New York's history the state has chosen to delegate its responsibility in this area to the local districts. Originally, this choice was a necessity; the state had no machinery to make and enforce educational decisions at the local level in the large and primarily rural area under its jurisdiction. Later, necessity came to be viewed as a virtue and the decision making autonomy of the local district was enshrined as American democracy in action. Early reformers shared this attitude. According to the Rural School Survey of 1922, "that which a citizen learns through operation of his own action becomes firmly established, while that which is forced upon him against his will he opposes more firmly. It is therefore fundamental in state aid that we leave final decision to the local community and leave them to choose what is best."36

Ironically, as state aid to education increased during the 1920s, state control over how the money would be spent decreased. In the opening decades of the century state aid came to the districts through a system of individual "quotas," most of which were for a specific purpose such as
hiring physical education teachers or purchasing library books, and
districts were expected to spend the money for the designated purpose.
Each district reported for example, on its use of the library quota.
Since there were only two supervisors to inspect elementary and secondary
schools libraries all over the state, however, reporting was essentially
on the honor system.37 During the 1920s non-specific state aid granted to
districts solely on the basis of the number of students in attendance
became more important than the old "quota" grants, many of which in 1930
were discontinued altogether. While the new system was intended to enable
the districts to provide better educational programs without raising local
property taxes or even to allow hard pressed districts to maintain
educational services while reducing property taxes, it was not intended to
defray local expenses for programs unrelated to education. The existence
of this misuse of state aid to education is reflected in the Friedsam Law
of 1928, which specifically prohibited "the application of state education
funds in any city to the credit of the General Fund for the Reduction of
Taxation, notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary contained in the
charter of such city".38

The power that remained to the states to hold local districts
accountable even after the abolition of the quota system was rarely used.
State appointed district superintendents in rural areas had the authority
to condemn substandard school buildings but, fearing the displeasure of
local taxpayers, used their authority sparingly. The Regents' Inquiry of
1937 noted that "literally hundreds" of unsanitary, unsafe, substandard
rural schools were still in use.39 The same report noted that "there is
no integrated systematic program for studying and appraising the work of
the school. Standardized tests were marked locally and were such unreliable guides to the quality of instruction that both the Rural School Survey and the Regents' Inquiry recommended their use be restricted or eliminated, and supervision of teachers by local or state authorities was sporadic and haphazard. Accountability was further hindered by poor accounting systems at the local level. The Rural School Survey found that half the rural districts did not have budgets, and that the reports district supervisors sent to the state were based on "abstracts" sent to them by local officials rather than receipts and other substantial data.

Cities had their own supervisory systems, and the district supervisors who represented the state in rural areas were careful not to antagonize local officials and taxpayers, feeling that to exert state power over the local districts would be undemocratic, futile, and counterproductive. In such an atmosphere, it was difficult to tell whether normal operating directives from the state, much less special requests for reform were being implemented.

An increased demand for accountability and evaluation came with increased federal spending for educational reform in the 1960s, specifically with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965. The implementation of Title I of this program through SED illustrates the fact that without accountability, even when monies are earmarked for specific purposes, intended reforms are not necessarily made in the local schools. The ESEA asked local districts (perhaps for the first time) not only how they proposed to spend funds granted through the state, but also how instructional practices and student outcomes changed as a result of the funded programs.
Title I of ESEA provided monies for compensatory education, which would be allocated by state governments for programs to aid children who were from low income homes or at least one year behind grade level in reading, writing, and mathematics. Considerable sums were involved. In 1972 ESEA paid the salaries of 45,426 teachers, aides, and supervisors throughout the state. In 1974-5 New York's share of ESEA funds amounted to $214,372,281, of which over $190,000,000 went directly to local school districts. 44

Although responsible for administering and monitoring ESEA projects, the State Education Department seemed reluctant to do more than provide money for any proposals made by the districts. The state defined 99 percent of all districts eligible for ESEA monies and before 1972 conducted no routine site visitations, nor did the state require local districts to evaluate the impact of the new funds on the targeted populations. The only monitoring was by a mail questionnaire. Only when the federal government required an investigation because of charges of misallocation of funds did the state intervene.

In 1972 a report stated bluntly that while ESEA funds reached 99 percent of the districts in the state, two-thirds of the targeted population remained outside of the funded programs. The reasons given were "political pressure" and "parental objection." 45 Because no accountability had been built into the program, the districts used the funds to hire additional staff to bolster their entire programs rather than to provide services directly to the children who were identified as in greatest need of services and for whom ESEA monies were intended. The problem lay in the fact that monies were not given to individual schools
or individual children within schools, but to the district as a whole. The federal government began to insist on clearcut accounting. Specifically, it wanted to know how ESEA would serve children, not school districts, and whether the programs had any effect on targeted populations. By 1974-5, with ESEA funds at stake, stricter accountability became part of state practice. Annual reports began to delineate how funded programs were different from programs "not previously occurring in regular classroom activities funded by local and state levy monies". Reports thereafter spoke of students served rather than of the school districts that received monies.

Evaluation as well as accountability became a stronger part of the ESEA program. Under federal pressure, in 1972 and again in 1975 the state sought to find out whether the programs funded were effective. Such data were difficult to generate. Districts did not necessarily turn over test scores to the state and although there seemed to be improvement in the number of students reading at grade level, there was no way to tell, given the nature of district reportage, if this resulted from ESEA funded intervention.

Attempts to build accountability and evaluation into reform in the case of ESEA did help get programs to targeted populations, but not without creating a great deal of enmity on the part of state and local districts toward the federal government in general and ESEA in particular. In its annual recommendations to Washington, Federal Legislation and Education in New York, the State Education Department asserted that the federal government should not set educational priorities. "Elementary and secondary education is the responsibility of the state," SED asserted, and
the federal government "should not seek to direct the expenditure of state
and local resources." The state insisted that "requirements on state
and local agencies have become excessive as related to the proportion of
federal assistance available." In 1977 New York State began to ask for
block grants from the federal government allocated on a per capita basis
(as the local districts had been receiving from the state since 1930), a
request to which the Reagan administration after 1980 was inclined to
accede.

Lessons from the Past

Our historical survey of reform in New York State suggests that there
are lessons from the past that can inform policy-makers of the 1980s as
they seek to herald in an era of educational excellence. Our evidence
indicates that reforms that are clearly articulated, consistent and within
the realm of existing knowledge have a greater likelihood of being
implemented than reforms which are not. Past reforms calling for
"excellence," "good citizenship," or some other well intentioned but
vaguely stated goal, have rarely succeeded; no one has ever quite been
sure how to attain such ends. More often than not, broad-ranging, vaguely
articulated aims, however admirable, ended up promoting contradictory
practices which not only undermined intended goals, but also often
subverted pre-existing programs of proven worth.

Reformers of 1983 and 1984 call for greater rigor and more academic
and scientific-technological training in the schools. Such reforms, like
the NDEA of the 1950s, may make students take more courses; but will such
reforms insure that students learn more. Testing programs being urged
today, like the Regents' Basic Competency Testing Program in New York
State of the 1970s, may insure that more students fail to receive their diplomas, but will they guarantee excellence in education? Such programs in the past, as in the case of the Regents' Competency Testing Program, may have undermined academic standards and promoted solely test-taking skills.

New York State's history of educational reform also suggests that it is easier to call upon the schools to teach a set of skills relating to the economy or the general well-being of society than to have the schools actually teach those skills. The Rural School Survey of 1922, which called for "applying the benefits of the science of education" to school management, or the 1937 Regents' Inquiry which asked teachers to instruct their students in "good character" both came to naught. A similar fate may await contemporary calls for the schools to prepare students for the world of tomorrow and for similar reasons. Everyone agrees it would be a good idea for schools to engage in such activities, but it will not be possible for the schools to do so without careful attention to curricular development.

The extent to which current reform efforts acknowledge the role of committed executive leadership will strongly affect the outcome of those efforts. In the past, calls for change that were not accompanied by strong leadership have not affected practice. Without strong leadership and financial resources earmarked for specific purposes, local districts have resisted, ignored and/or subverted the numerous commissions that have laid the onus for reform on their shoulders. In the past, as we have shown, the many calls emanating from the federal government, the state and the Courts for New York State to equalize educational expenditure have had
few results. No one has taken responsibility for reform, although countless committees continue to be appointed. Until some one exercises strong executive leadership, inequality will continue to be studied but not redressed. Schools will be as uneven in quality ten years hence as they are today if all the responsibility for reform is placed upon local constituencies. As the NDEA attempted reforms of the 1950s showed, some localities may prefer to ignore current appeals to change their schools regardless of national and state charges that those schools are at best mediocre and put the nation at risk.

Many of the national reports calling for school reform in the 1980s express a faith that changes in school practice can be made without substantial changes in the amount of money spent on education simply by asking districts or teachers to do more with the same or even less funds. If it was sometimes possible to do this with a limited reform in the past, it is scarcely possible to do so with the extensive changes suggested today. Although costs have risen so rapidly that taxpayers feel overburdened or the states, barely recovering from recession, perceive themselves unable to afford schools, the demands made upon the schools have increased more than the costs. Schools are asked to provide bilingual education, mainstream the handicapped, and offer remedial services to underachievers and enriched programs to the gifted, while at the same time providing "excellence" in the form of more courses in science, mathematics and technology and more advanced placement courses. Our survey of the history of reform in New York State suggests that schools may be unable to meet these demands without substantial increments of new monies. Otherwise, like the NDEA of the 1950s, programs that have
proven benefit run the risk of being undermined so that new untested ones can be funded.

We are struck in reviewing the many reforms attempted in education in New York State in the Twentieth Century with the fact that once reform follows so closely upon the other that the schools seem to be in a perpetual process of being reformed. Yet while many have been willing to "reform" the schools, few have taken the time or the trouble to evaluate past reforms, or even to see if they have actually been implemented. It is ironic that the memory of educators and politicians is so short. We find reformers in 1984 charging the schools with failure, when they may well have succeeded in large part in reaching some of the goals established within the last two decades. Just ten years ago in New York State the Fleischmann Report maintained that the state's system of education was "excellent", one of the finest in the world, that its standards were the highest, and that its only major blemish was the glaring inequalities in student outcomes. Today the reform efforts of ten years ago as exemplified by the Fleischmann Commission have been buried as new criteria are being used to determine whether past practices were adequate. New practices are being put into place without thorough knowledge of what "worked" in the past, who it worked for, or of what goals from the past are worthy of continued pursuit.

The history of school reform in New York State indicates that reform movements, like those of today, are fraught with contradictions, not because politicians and pedagogues are blind to their inconsistencies, but because major reform efforts have diverse and contradictory sources. Discontent with the schools today, as in the past, is often in reality
discontent about something else: crime, the state of the economy, racial unrest, poverty, an unfavorable balance of trade, or the country's position in the Cold War -- complex issues on which the schools have little influence but on which the national commissions on excellence nonetheless expect the schools to have a direct and salutory effect. In the past school reform has been noticeably unsuccessful when it has focused on social, political and economic issues the schools could not and may never have been able to resolve. On the other hand, when reform has focused on exposing students to specific curricula or requiring minimal academic standards, it has been able to effect change. The reforms of the 1980s may not be able to make the United States technologically superior to Japan, but they may improve upon what schools try to teach students.

When we began our survey of school reform in New York State, we found it difficult to locate state-wide school reform until the mid to late 1930s. In the first two decades of the Twentieth Century, efforts to change educational practice were directed to a particular city -- like New York City in the case of the Manus Report -- or at a category of schools like the Rural Schools Survey of 1922. In the early years of this century, the disparities between city and countryside were recognized not only in terms of the populations the schools were called upon to serve, but in the quality and scope of education offered in those schools. Paradoxically, as the population of the state shifted and changed over time, as in the post-World War II period, and the differences between New York City and the rest of the state as well as between the "big five" cities (New York, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse and Yonkers), the tier of wealthy suburbs surrounding New York City, and the rural areas of the
state grew, school reform arising from the federal government as well as New York State, failed to acknowledge the very real gaps between the different part of the state, which earlier reforms had tried to address. The ESEA of 1965 was applied to all parts of the state initially, despite the fact that the targeted population was concentrated in New York, Buffalo, Rochester, and to a lesser extent Syracuse. The various state aid formulas still have not been able to come to grips with the ethnic, racial and economic diversity in the state. As we embark on school reform today, it may be that some schools of the state are in need of drastic changes; reforms directed at these schools may well undermine the standards in other schools in a "different" New York. Plans for reform, perhaps, should take into account the fact that there is no one New York State, but rather several, that imply more than a single strategy for improving the quality of education.
Notes

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5. The University of the State of New York State Education Department, Racial/Ethnic Distribution of Public School Students In New York State, 1966, Table 3, p. 4; 1983, Table 3, p. 4.


14. This discussion is based on the yearly reports prepared by the State Education Department, Bureau of Urban and Community Programs Evaluation, on ESEA, which appeared from 1970 on. See, for example,


16. The many pieces of legislation affecting the mainstreaming of handicapped children, as well as federal and state legislation on bilingual education, are summarized yearly and published by the state. See the yearly *Summary of New York Legislation Affecting Education*, compiled by the Office of Counsel from 1975 (Albany:...
State Education Department). For federal legislation and New York State's reactions, see The University of the State and New York, The State Education Department, *Federal Legislation and Education in New York State* (Albany: Author, annual), especially from 1973 on.

17. The Fleischmann Report, op. cit. 3 Vols. The Fleischmann Commission was critical of the state and formulas worked out by the Diefendorf Commission of 1962.


27. Eaton, Ibid. p. 64. For the history of state and federal aid to agricultural and home economics programs, see pp. 13-25. See also New York State Education Department 1900-1965, University of the State of New York, State Education Department (Albany, 1967), pp. 22-24.

28. Ibid., pp. 64-70.


33. Ibid.

35. See Boyer, op. cit., chapter 1.


36-39.


43. This discussion of title I of the ESEA is based on the yearly reports prepared by the State Education Department, Bureau of Urban and Community Programs Evaluation, *New York State, ESEA, Title I*


46. 1974-5, ESEA, Title I, op. cit., p. 2.

47. See especially The University of the State of New York, State Education Department, Evaluation, Elementary and Secondary Education. A Report to the Governor and Members of the Legislature Prepared Pursuant to Section 3602 of the Education Law (Albany; Author, March 1974), especially p. 5, 8. See also the University of the State of New York, State Education Department, Office of Programs Analysis and Evaluation, A Study of ESEA Title I in Selected School Districts (Albany: Author, 1977).