
The instructional techniques illustrated in this book present a method of infusing national security issues into the five principal social studies courses of U.S. history, world history, U.S. government, economics, and geography. Chapter 1 discusses the meaning and evolution of the term national security in its general and educational contexts. The origins and current state of national security as a field of study is outlined in chapter 2. Key themes and concepts providing a conceptual framework for curriculum development are also provided in chapter 2. Instructional strategies and 15 sample classroom lessons that illustrate each strategy are described in chapters 3 through 10. Each lesson is a complete instructional activity, containing instructional objectives and suggested procedures as well as material that can be readily duplicated for students. Suggested procedures to use to integrate the lesson with the classroom textbook are provided for each lesson. The instructional strategies employed include concept learning, decision making, case study, analysis of primary sources, role-playing, mapping exercises, interpretation of data: tables, charts and graphs, and issue analysis. The book concludes with a 35-item annotated bibliography on national security issues. (SM)
Teaching About National Security

Instructional Strategies and Lessons for High School Courses in History, Government, Geography, Economics

Richard C. Remy
James E. Harf
B. Thomas Trout

The Mershon Center
ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education
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NOTE
This book contains fifteen lessons which are examples of the teaching strategies described in the book. Each sample lesson contains material on national security such as a case-study, or a set of data, or excerpts from a primary source that can be duplicated for student use. Each lesson also contains suggestions for the teacher on how to use the material. Permission is granted to teachers to make copies of these lessons for use with their students.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

James E. Harf is a Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University and a Senior Faculty member of the Mershon Center's Citizenship Development for a Global Age Program. Dr. Harf is co-author or co-editor of twelve books on national security and global issues including *National Security Affairs: Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary Issues* with B. Thomas Trout. He is currently co-editor of Duke University's *Global Issues Perspectives Series* and Richard D. Irwin Publishers' *Business In an International Perspective Series*. He is one of the founders and Co-Directors of the Mershon Center's National Security in a Nuclear Age Project, and has lectured frequently across the country on international studies and national security education.

Richard J. Remy is an Associate Director of the Mershon Center and Director of the Mershon Center's Citizenship Development for a Global Age Program. A former teacher in the Chicago Public Schools, he is the author of several leading social studies textbooks including *Civics for Americans*. Dr. Remy has directed several major curriculum development projects and is co-author of *Lessons on the Constitution*, produced by Project '87 of the American Historical Association and American Political Science Association. He is a co-director of the National Security in a Nuclear Age Project, with primary responsibility for curriculum development activities. Dr. Remy has served as a consultant for numerous school systems, state departments of education, government agencies and development centers, including the Department of Defense Dependents Schools (Germany and Panama Regions) and the United States Information Agency.

B. Thomas Trout is a Professor of Political Science at the University of New Hampshire. He has written extensively in the field of international relations (specializing in Soviet-American relations), national security studies and international education. He has published articles in *The American Political Science Review, International Studies Quarterly, Naval War College Review* and other journals. He is co-author of *The Politics of Global Resources* with James Harf. He is one of the founders and is co-director of the National Security in the Nuclear Age Project. Dr. Trout recently ended a term as member of the Executive Committee of the International Studies Association. He holds the rank of Captain in the U.S. Naval Reserve.

The following individuals authored the sample lessons presented in this book:

Bruce Kraig is a Professor of History at Roosevelt University.

Marcel Lewinski is a social studies teacher at Heyden High School, Northlake, Illinois, and is co-author of a senior high school American government textbook.

Steven L. Miller is Executive Director of the Central Ohio Center for Economic Education and Assistant Professor in the College of Education at The Ohio State University.

Judith V. Reppy is Associate Director of the Peace Studies Program at Cornell University and Associate Professor at the Center for International Studies.

Donald A. Ritchie is Associate Historian, United States Senate Historical Office, and Editor of the "Historical Series" of executive session transcripts of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

William T. Sabata is a Major in the U.S. Army and recently served as a Professor of Geography at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

Terry L. Smart is a Professor of History at Trinity University and author of secondary level social studies textbooks for economics, government, civics and world history.

Robert B. Woyach is a political scientist and member of the Mershon Center Senior Faculty, The Ohio State University.
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Project Authors

Alan Backler, Indiana University
Linda P. Brady, Georgia Institute of Technology
Robert H. Dorff, North Carolina State University
John L. Gaddis, Ohio University
Robert C. Gray, Franklin & Marshall College
Clair W. Keller, Iowa State University
William H. Kincade, Georgetown University
Allan O. Kownslar, Trinity University
Bruce Kraig, Roosevelt University
Joseph J. Kruzel, The Ohio State University
James R. Leutze, Hampden Sydney College
Marcel Lewinski, Leyden High School, Northlake, Illinois
John Lovell, Indiana University
Michael Mandelbaum, The Lehrman Institute
Steven L. Miller, Central Ohio Center for Economic Education
Williamson Murray, The Ohio State University
Andrew G. Oldenquist, The Ohio State University
Judith V. Reppy, Cornell University
Donald A. Ritchie, United States Senate Historical Office
William T. Sabata, United States Army
Terry L. Smart, Trinity University
Robert R. Woyach, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University

June Gilliard, Joint Council on Economic Education, New York
Peter Graham, Central High School, Kalamazoo, Michigan
Phyllis Harris, Upper Arlington High School, Upper Arlington, Ohio
Christine Hayes, Upper Arlington High School, Upper Arlington, Ohio
Roland Lane, Worthington High School, Worthington, Ohio
James F. Marran, New Trier West High School, Northfield, Illinois
John Morton, Governors State University
James Norris, Linden-McKinley High School, Columbus, Ohio
Dave Parrish, Northland High School, Columbus, Ohio
Ray Pauken, Columbus Public Schools, Columbus, Ohio
Mike Rigley, De Sales High School, Columbus, Ohio
Joseph Stoltman, Department of Geography, Western Michigan University
J. Mark Stewart, Mifflin High School, Columbus, Ohio
Pat Wax, Worthington High School, Worthington, Ohio
Sandy White, Beechcroft High School, Columbus, Ohio

NSNA National Advisory Board

Gordon Cawelti, Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development
Maurice East, George Washington University
Charles Fox, Social Studies Supervisors Association
Alton Frye, Council on Foreign Relations
Carole L. Hahn, Emory University
Frances Haley, National Council for the Social Studies
Gwen Hutchenson, Council of State Social Studies Specialists
Effie Jones, American Association of School Administrators
William C. Parrish, National Association of Secondary School Principals
Robert N. Woerner, National Congress of Parents and Teachers

NSNA Reviewers and Field-Testers

Regis Birckbickler, Westerville South High School, Westerville, Ohio
Steve Buckles, University of Missouri
Dennis Cheek, Bürgub High School, Department of Defense Dependents Schools
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PREFACE

The need to teach high school students about matters of national security has, in a remarkably short period of time, been widely recognized and accepted. Any philosophical barriers to such instruction have largely, if not universally, disappeared, as the first chapter of this volume clearly testifies. Indeed, one finds in many quarters in the educational community and beyond an attitude that can best be described by the question, "Why haven't we been doing this before?"

The remaining problem, and part of the answer to the foregoing question, is that there exist important practical and conceptual barriers to the introduction of national security material into the secondary curriculum. A short list of these difficulties includes: teacher and student workload, an overburdened curriculum, teacher training requirements, what to teach, and how to teach it. This volume grows out of a four-year-old effort, National Security in the Nuclear Age (NSNA) initiated in 1983 to reduce these barriers. The book itself addresses primarily the questions of what to teach and how to teach it. This volume grows out of a four-year-old effort, National Security in the Nuclear Age (NSNA) initiated in 1983 to reduce these barriers. The book itself addresses primarily the questions of what to teach and how to teach it.

As to the former, the unifying theme is the age-old quest for security, a quest with important implications for the individual and the group throughout history. More specifically, this work describes and draws on concepts basic to national security studies, an interdisciplinary field that matured in the period after World War II and incorporates elements of politics, policy studies, international relations, military science, economics, international law, diplomatic and military history, and related disciplines. The ideas associated with the study of national security provide scholars and other specialists with a shared frame of reference and a common set of intellectual instruments, even when they disagree on specific interpretive or policy issues. This conceptual framework will also supply teachers and their students with an impartial and enduring way of understanding the ever-changing world of national security affairs.

The instructional techniques elaborated in the NSNA effort and illustrated herein involve the infusion of national security subject matter in the five principal social studies courses: American history, world history, American government, economics, and geography. This strategy permits teachers to convey national security ideas and information while meeting the content and other requirements for these courses.

In keeping with the broader goals of social studies education, this book traces the many dimensions of the quest for security across issues, across time, and across societies. This quest existed before the rise of the nation-state in the 15th and 16th centuries led to the contemporary concern for national security and the emerging interest in international security. This imparts to the material a quality that transcends the preoccupation with topical issues and current events, yet promotes comprehension of basic concepts highly relevant to those issues or events.

In the following pages, you will find (1) a discussion of the meaning and evolution of the term national security in its general and educational contexts, (2) a review of the field of study associated with it and some of the concepts basic to that field, and (3) eight instructional strategies complete with illustrative sample lessons. With the growing appreciation of the need to acquaint high school students with the fundamentals of national security as a vital part of the preparation of informed citizens, the practical tasks involved loom larger in view. The authors of this volume—along with many other specialists in national security studies or secondary curriculum development who contributed directly or indirectly to it—believe that it will go a substantial way toward the fulfillment of these tasks. Their hope is that this volume will provide encouragement, incentives, and intellectual stimulus to teachers as they undertake a new, yet essential role in creating a citizenry literate in terms of its security needs and interests.

William H. Kincade
Professor of National Security Studies, Georgetown University
Co-Director, National Security in the Nuclear Age
1. NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE SECONDARY CURRICULUM

Everyone who reads this volume will probably be familiar with at least one of the many uses of the term national security. It is a popular phrase, invoked by government officials, used by newspaper and magazine writers, addressed in television and radio broadcasts, included in armed forces recruiting advertisements, and now a part of the vocabulary of the attentive person on the street.

Indeed the term national security has been used in connection with a wide variety of activities, both domestic and foreign. It acquired notoriety among the attentive public in part because of its prominence during the Watergate affair when it was initially used to justify the break-in at the headquarters of the Democratic Party in Washington. It is featured periodically as justification for increases, or decreases, in the defense budget. It has even appeared in American education as the rationale for more training in foreign languages, international studies, science and more recently in computers.

Given its many uses, it is not surprising that educators have found the concept of national security to be ambiguous. Lack of a clear understanding of the meaning of the term can lead to difficulty when assessing the need for education about national security, when establishing educational goals and objectives, and when developing instructional materials or lecting among existing materials. In short, ambiguity and confusion about the meaning of national security can lead to difficulty in identifying its place in the social studies curriculum.

The Meaning of National Security

Since the time people began to live in organize: groups, the most basic concern of every group has been to provide safety for its members and their property. As the world has become more complex the task of providing security as well as what constitutes security has also grown more complex. With the appearance of the modern nation-state system in the 1600s, every nation has been concerned with national security in the sense of seeking to protect its vital interests against encroachment by others. The actual phrase national security, however, came into broad usage only after World War II.

National Security Today. For scholars and policy-makers today the phrase national security has at least two levels of commonly accepted meaning. First, in its most basic sense the phrase national security means protection of a nation's borders and territories against invasion or control by foreign powers. In a world where the nation-state remains the basic unit having principal control of physical force, such protection is a necessary condition so basic that no other goals can be realized without it. Thus other forms of physical security such as a nation's guaranteed access to natural resources can be pursued only after a nation has protected itself against external attack.

The writers of our Constitution understood this basic priority. In 1787 the framers were concerned about the need to defend their new nation from conquest or domination by powerful European nations that held territory in the Western Hemisphere. The Preamble to the Constitution charged the new national government "to provide for the common defense." There was broad agreement that in carrying out this mission the new government had the right, even the obligation, to act decisively to protect its national security whenever its shores or borders were physically threatened. Congress was given the right to declare war, to raise an Army, to maintain a Navy, and to provide revenues to support these tasks. The President was formally designated as Commander in Chief.

But scholars and policy-makers have recognized for some time, and especially since World War II, that national security means more than military defense against invasion.
As one leading text states, a second meaning of national security is "protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the state." This broader definition of national security focuses on the protection and promotion of national values, interests and way of life from a variety of threats.

The broader definition reflects the fact that in today's world political events in seemingly remote parts of the world as well as such problems as monetary instability, worldwide inflation and unemployment, ecological disturbances and the like can directly affect a nation's well-being. Thus, in 1987, American naval ships and aircraft escorted foreign oil tankers through the Persian Gulf because policy-makers believed Middle East oil to be vital to the welfare of America's European allies and therefore to America itself. Throughout the 1980s the President and Congress have been locked in periodic debate over how best to effect a satisfactory solution to the political unrest in Central America, because its stability was deemed vital to America's interests.

Helmut Schmidt, the former chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, was referring to the broader meaning of national security when he stated that national security involved, "the necessity to safeguard free trade access to energy supplies and to raw materials, and the need for a monetary system which will help us to reach those targets." Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense under President Jimmy Carter, was referring to both meanings of the term when he defined national security as, "the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders."

A State-Centric Conception. Several points should be noted about the two meanings of national security addressed above. As the term national implies, these definitions recognize that the nation-state is and will continue to be the primary political unit of the international system at least with regard to security issues. This assumption reflects the fact that the world is divided into political jurisdictions defined by formal state boundaries, and that the highest form of authority remains the nation-state. In addition, the basic political loyalty of Americans as well as most other people throughout the world is to their own nation-state.

This state-centric conception of national security is the view of the world held by American government officials responsible for key foreign policy and national defense decisions. The problems faced by these officials and their advisors are seen as national problems. These policy-makers view the world in geopolitical terms dominated by relations among nation-states. They see their job as developing and implementing policies--national security policies--to help the United States deal with its friends, its enemies and potentially threatening situations in a world composed of many competing nation-states. They are concerned with the role of force in a world where there is no supranational authority capable of enforcing peace. Hence their orientation is towards how the threat or use of military force can achieve the nation's security goals.

Influence of Nuclear Weapons

The appearance of nuclear weapons has greatly complicated both the meaning and the pursuit of national security. With the advent of the nuclear age in 1945, the question of national security became closely linked with nuclear weapons. It is not surprising that this should be the case. These new weapons were not just bigger and better but as one scholar remarked at the time:

it is precisely the efficiency of the nuclear bomb that makes it matter so much, the fact that there can be as many vast fire storms as there are target cities to create them and that can be ignited within the space of half an hour. . . .
The detonation of two atomic weapons over Japan ended World War II, but the consequences of what had been wrought at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not lost on wartime participants. Even as the victors celebrated the end of the most destructive war in history, policy-makers found themselves preoccupied with this new type of destructive power. As one newspaper reported that fateful week in August 1945, for two days after the dropping of the bomb it was the only topic of conversation among Washingtonians where “it was unusual to see a smile among the throngs that crowded the streets.” The rest of the world, sharing this concern, was “awed, appalled and unequivocally convinced that a terrible new revolution had occurred in the means of waging war.” Within days the Washington Post was debating the merits of a space-based strategic defense against nuclear weapons, anticipating by nearly forty years the current debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative. Clearly the question of a nation’s security was forevermore to be influenced by the existence of nuclear weapons.

Within a few short years the destructive capacity of these weapons expanded greatly with the development of a more advanced nuclear device, the hydrogen bomb. The Soviet Union also started to develop its own nuclear capability and both sides began to stockpile a nuclear arsenal. In the early 1960s the situation was advanced still further with deployment of ballistic missiles as delivery vehicles for these weapons. Such missiles soon provided a deployable, high-speed, highly-accurate, means for carrying nuclear weapons to an adversary’s homeland. These developments introduced a new level of concern about how to protect the planet from the devastating effects of nuclear weapons. Many scholars became interested in questions of strategy, giving rise to a research emphasis known as strategic studies. While still calling themselves national security specialists, these scholars tended to focus more narrowly on strategic questions of war, principally nuclear war.

Alternative Conceptions of Security

Other scholars have contended that not only the security of any given nation but the security of the entire globe is now at issue. These scholars criticize narrow conceptions of national security. They argue that a concern for security should extend above and beyond the level of the nation-state to the globe or to international security (as well as below the level of the nation-state to individual security). To those observers, the problem of nuclear deterrence, for example, is not a national but an international security problem because a nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union could bring global ecological disaster. To define such a security problem as national in scope, they claim, is inadequate because it must be dealt with at a global level like other global issues that transcend national boundaries. More broadly still, some observers have employed the phrase global security, which connotes the transformation of the nation-state system into an alternative political structure such as some form of world government or other world order model.

While a concern for the security or safety of the globe prompted by the advent of nuclear weaponry is certainly justified, the conceptual validity of national security has not been superseded by the appearance of nuclear weapons because the nation-state remains the dominant political unit in the international system. The international pattern of authority as it exists today still affords the nation-state, as it has for several hundred years, paramount control over the disposition of force, nuclear or otherwise, both within its own borders and throughout the world. A concern for national security persists because nations persist. This does not mean that an understanding of the prevailing pattern of national security today precludes a preference for a different future. Instead, such an understanding should be recognized as a necessary condition to discovering whatever alternative paths such a future might hold.
In summary, national security means, first and foremost, the physical protection of one's homeland. In addition, in today's world, it also means the promotion and advancement of vital economic and political interests, as well as one's way of life. All of this is to be accomplished in an age of destructive weapons whose characteristics forevermore link together national well-being and international security.

Why Teach About National Security?

The rationale for strengthening education about national security in the high school curriculum can be thought of in two ways. First, education about national security has an important and distinct contribution to make to education for competent citizenship, the prime mission of the social studies curriculum. Second, education about national security is an essential and to some extent overlooked component of the subject-matter of global education.

Requirements of Citizenship. Attention to national security in the social studies curriculum arises from the requirements of citizenship education. There can be no more vital requirement for good citizenship in the nuclear age than an ability to understand and participate competently in public policy processes related to national security and global issues. At a time when many nations have developed enormous destructive capacity and when the social and economic interdependence of nations is continually increasing, many of the most crucial public policy issues involve national security.

As a democratic society in today's highly interdependent, heavily armed world, the United States must have informed citizens who have an ability to acquire information, form judgments and make thoughtful decisions about security issues. Development of such competence with respect to national security issues among a broad spectrum of the public is especially important. Surveys of the opinions and knowledge of American adults and high school students reveal considerable confusion and uncertainty about nuclear arms competition, national security strategies and policies, and arms control activities and agreements. Clearly today's adults are being inadequately prepared for citizenship in the nuclear age.

Awareness of the societal need for citizen competence with regard to national security issues has increased. For many years national security had been considered the narrow preserve of specialists and policy-makers. Knowledge and background in the subject were considered too technical even for the most attentive citizens, let alone the average high school students. This situation has changed. There has been growing recognition among specialists and policy-makers that as a democracy the United States cannot successfully plan for its security without broad citizen support and responsible participation in policy processes by an informed public. As Flora Lewis of the New York Times noted while observing a meeting of a prestigious research center for strategic studies:

now . . . the experts acknowledge that democratic countries can't successfully plan for their security without broad public support . . . It has been a Western mistake to allow the fateful issues of security to be cast either in esoteric terms beyond the voters' grasp, or in bumper sticker panaceas . . .

Social studies educators have always recognized their special obligation for citizen preparation, and increasingly many are aware of the need for strengthening education relevant to national security and related issues. A recent national survey of state social studies supervisors found nearly unanimous agreement that "teachers should confront nuclear issues and help students examine possible consequences of alternatives." Surveys of other educational leaders produced similar findings, indicating the receptivity of educators for projects on national security and other international issues. For example, the National PTA passed a resolution that called for "school nuclear education programs that will enable our young people to learn about nuclear issues." And a recent Wingspread
Conference sponsored in part by the National Council for the Social Studies concluded that education on national security for a nuclear age was appropriate, particularly for the secondary level. There have also been calls for education about national security from outside national educational circles, both public and private. Legislatures in various states have turned their attention to the question of such education and have moved or are moving toward mandating such experiences within the formal curriculum. School districts across the country, particularly in large urban and suburban areas, are coming to a similar position after investigating the issue. In some instances universities with long-standing ties to local school districts are initiating dialogue about such endeavors. And finally, there has emerged from a variety of places within the private sector not only calls for formal educational experiences in this area, but also curriculum materials. Although those in the private sector are guided by a mixture of motives, they are joined together by a recognition that knowledge is a requirement for appropriate action in the public arena.

A Component of Global Education. A second reason for systematic attention to national security is the widespread support today for bringing global perspectives to the education of American youth. Leaders in the United States, both in government and in education, have observed a connection between America's vast role in today's world and the need for global education. These leaders have looked at the global responsibilities of the United States and have called for an educational response for American citizens that includes serious attention to international topics, or global education, in the pre-collegiate curriculum. In 1979 President Carter's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies was one of the first to recognize the link between our nation's security and global knowledge.

National security . . . cannot safely be defined and protected within the narrow framework of defense, diplomacy and economics. A nation's welfare depends in large measure on the intellectual and psychological strengths that are derived from perceptive visions of the world beyond its own boundaries. On a planet shrunken by the technology of instant communications, there is little safety behind a Maginot Line of scientific and scholarly isolationism.

These sentiments have been echoed by the Council of Chief State School Officers (1985), the Report of the Study Commission on Global Education (1986), the Southern Governors' Association Report (1986), and other similar studies.

As educators have sought to respond to the need for global perspectives in education, they have created new terms to describe areas of knowledge whose subject matter focuses either on topics not exclusively American or on relationships of the United States to other parts of the globe. Within secondary education the most commonly used phrase has been global education, although terms such as global perspectives, international education and international studies are also found. A useful description of the meaning of global education can be found in a recent study sponsored in part by the National Council for the Social Studies. In a synthesis of global education literature, particularly curriculum materials, this report identified four essential elements: (1) the study of human values; (2) the study of global economic, political, ecological and technical systems; (3) the study of global issues and problems: peace and security, development, environment, and human rights; and (4) the study of global history. These four subject areas were advanced as the basic elements of global knowledge about which students ought to have some understanding.

Examining the four elements above, note the place of peace and security among the global issues in category three. Clearly security matters are thought to be part of global education. It is the concern for peace and security that occupies the attention of national security specialists, suggesting that in the latter's field of study may be found the
content for peace and security aspects of global education.

The following diagram illustrates one way to think about the relationship of national security studies to global education as well as to the social studies and to education in general. All of social studies falls within the total educational universe. And it is clear that most of global education can be found within the social studies. The reason why there is some part of the global education circle outside of the social studies is that the substance of global education also emphasizes strong foreign language training. Education about national security is to be found primarily within the area in which global education and social studies education intersect but, again, part of national security education falls outside either circle. This characterization illustrates that there are parts of security education drawn from the field of national security studies that focus on topics not found within either global or social studies education. The technical aspects of weaponry, for example, draw on the disciplines of the physical sciences. Increasing attention to the effects of nuclear war, such as the idea of nuclear winter, puts national security studies into the domain of the natural sciences as well. To look at it another way, the question of an all-volunteer army may be purely a domestic rather than global issue, and thus not part of global education.

Challenges to Strengthening Education About National Security

While educators are receptive to efforts to strengthen instruction about national security, they face significant challenges in doing so.

An Uncertain Priority. Education about national security is not an established part of the curriculum. Despite considerable concern about the topic, many school boards, administrators, social studies teachers and parents are uncertain about the proper role of such education in the curriculum.

Students' Prior Conceptions. Today's high school students enter the social studies classroom with already developed attitudes and values regarding violence, weapons and war. Indeed, among all social studies subjects the topic of war would seem to be of considerable importance to them. Their views on such matters, however, are likely to run the gamut from those who seem desensitized to the extreme effects of violent behavior and weapons to those who are almost preoccupied with the horrors of nuclear war, even believing that the likelihood of such a war in their lifetimes to be quite high.22

A Crowded Curriculum. Today's secondary schools have too much to teach in too little
time. Most curricula for grades 7-12 include basic courses in American government, American history, world history, geography and economics. Increasingly, three years of such courses are required for high school graduation. There appears to be limited room to accommodate an additional focus on national security topics.

Educators' Limited Background. Social studies teachers, administrators and curriculum developers have little or no formal training regarding national security and related studies, and no ready access to such information for instructional purposes, curriculum planning and materials development. Further, the typical school system is unable to provide its teachers with the necessary training, resource materials or expert help to cope with this seemingly complex subject matter. And most college and university experts on national security are unfamiliar with secondary education and are uninterested in the curriculum problems of local school systems.

Inadequate Instructional Materials. Major social studies textbooks give little systematic attention to such topics as international conflict and cooperation, nuclear strategy and war, and arms competition. In some cases, interest groups or concerned educators have produced their own curriculum materials on national security and global issues. These materials, however, tend in many cases to be flawed by superficiality and a bias toward particular political causes or special interests. Few of these materials are pedagogically sound or have strong conceptual foundations. Few are placed in typical scope and sequence patterns of standard curricula.

Inability to Develop Curriculum Materials. In the American system of public education, state and local education agencies have never been in a position to become research and development centers for new curricula. While these agencies are interested in curriculum improvement they are unable to fund major efforts to develop new curriculum materials and teacher training programs related to national security. Most school districts are not able to spend more than a very small fraction of their total annual budget on instructional materials. That small amount is usually allocated to the purchase of materials already produced by commercial publishers.

Scholars' Training and Experience. Despite the best of intentions, the contributions of university scholars who become involved in curriculum development, teacher training or related tasks may be limited by a lack of skill and experience with pre-collegiate education as well as a lack of interest in such collaboration. While scholars have critically important disciplinary knowledge, they do not routinely use this knowledge of their field to build general education curricula. As a result scholars may not, indeed are not likely to, contribute to curriculum improvement or teacher training in truly relevant ways. They are more likely to get bogged down in facts, or to treat concepts and generalizations in overly abstract ways, or to pursue issues that while interesting are clearly too peripheral to be useful in the general education of junior and senior high school students.

These challenges represent formidable barriers to strengthening education about national security but they are not insurmountable, particularly when appropriate criteria are employed.

Criteria for Education About National Security

While it is important that explicit criteria exist to guide every educational experience, it is especially useful for a subject matter about which there is public controversy. This controversy centers around the general problem of how best to achieve security in the nuclear age. Other controversies fall within this larger framework, such as the question of whether the existence of nuclear arms increases or decreases the likelihood of war, or whether arms reductions increases or decreases the likelihood of war, and under what conditions.

The National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS) as well as the courts have over time laid out a set of guidelines for dealing
with controversial issues. These guidelines suggest that the issue must be presented in a manner relevant to the subject matter of the course being taught, appropriate to the age and maturity level of the student, regarded as important and not disruptive. Moreover, multiple perspectives must be provided without politicization, exploiting emotional trauma, or promoting feelings of alienation or despair.

Wingspread Conference Guidelines. Representatives of the social studies community met in September 1984 in a Wingspread Conference co-sponsored by NCSS to consider specifically the question of guidelines for education about national security in the nuclear age. This group included officers of professional associations, representatives of the Council of State Social Studies Supervisors, university educators, classroom teachers and curriculum developers. After affirming that the guidelines for controversial issues spelled out above apply equally as well to the issues of the nuclear age, the Conference participants adopted specific guidelines for teaching about the latter. These prescriptions address the rationale for such education, goals, selection of materials, approaches to the subject matter, evaluation procedures and suggestions for school systems.

Although these guidelines have received wide circulation, let us briefly summarize key suggestions. With respect to the instructions' materials, there was a recognition that multiple perspectives do exist and thus should be presented in an objective and balanced fashion. Where agreement or disagreement about subject-matter exists, it should be so presented. Moreover the Wingspread Report recommended that national security issues be placed in an appropriate context, defined as "historical, international politics, cultural and political diversity of societies, preservation of democratic values, economic impact." With respect to skills development, the Report stated that education about national security should require students "to engage in critical thinking" and should "provide the affirmation of empowerment and political efficacy." Finally, the Report suggested that before the introduction of what it termed nuclear age education, a clear and appropriate rationale statement should be developed, and procedures for adequate staff development must be put into operation.

With the benefit of the Wingspread Conference Report and other studies, as well as our own experience in developing national security curriculum materials and in working with educators to introduce the topic into the schools, we suggest the following criteria for the school board, the school administration, including the social studies department, and the individual classroom teacher.

Role of the School Board. School curriculum begins with the board of education and this is no less true with national security subject matter. Clearly the board makes broad educational policy and just as clearly the board will have previously approved a social studies curriculum. However, if a decision is made to introduce a program in national security education implying discrete treatments of extensive length occurring periodically throughout the standard courses or an entire course (or major portion of one), the school board has a very important role to play.

o The school board should officially recognize the legitimacy of education about national security and provide general guidelines and support for implementation plans designed by the district's professional educators.

While national security subject matter properly belongs in the secondary social studies curriculum, given the challenges spelled out earlier, particularly the uncertain priority and inadequate instructional materials, it is important that the school board approve and provide general guidelines reflecting the criteria below for efforts to introduce any distinct national security education program.

The situation is somewhat different when an individual classroom teacher takes advantage of control over daily lesson planning to introduce a few lessons that use a national security topic to meet the general social studies goal of the day. While the teacher in
the latter case ought to feel free to act without prior board consideration of the whole question of national security education, any educational strategy beyond this infusion method should involve the board.

Role of the School Administration. School officials—the superintendent, principal, the social studies supervisor and department chair—must also involve themselves in varying degrees in implementing education about national security. They ought to be familiar with the pedagogical and political issues surrounding the topic in order to translate board policy into effective instructional practice.

School administrators should understand the dimensions of education about national security topics and be involved in the implementation of plans for its inclusion in the curriculum.

Officials should be prepared to offer full support to efforts to introduce education about national security in a manner consistent with board guidelines. They must also expedite efforts on the part of the social studies department and individual teachers to meet the challenges outlined earlier, including the need for faculty and curriculum development.

The social studies supervisor and/or chair of the social studies department must undertake the responsibility to ensure that teachers have access to the major curricular and other educational resources in the field, a basic set of content materials designed for the teacher, and other relevant literature (for example, studies of student fears of nuclear war). Those charged with responsibility for the social studies curriculum need to make certain that proper attention has been given to the goals of such instruction, no matter what specific implementation strategies are to be employed.

Criteria for the Teacher. There are four basic criteria for teachers as they undertake education about national security. The first criterion relates to the question of the relationship between the goals of such education and those of the general social studies curriculum.

- The goals for education about national security must be consistent with and reinforce the goals of the existing social studies curriculum.

As noted earlier, the social studies curriculum is already crowded. John Patrick has cautioned educators that new instructional materials should not be thoughtlessly added to the curriculum since other materials will have to be removed to make space for them. Teachers who are thinking about adding new ideas and materials to their courses should, Patrick argues, think carefully about content trade-offs. They should decide whether or not the new material is more valuable educationally than the content it would replace. Further, they should think carefully about the fit of the new content and materials with the existing curriculum and their educational objectives.

Fortunately, there is no need to change the goals of a district’s or school’s social studies curriculum in order to strengthen education about national security. National security concepts fit well in existing course structures throughout the social studies field and should already have been included. The subject matter does not represent an add-on or luxury for the teacher who has covered the regular materials. Indeed, the requirements of citizenship education dictate that it be part of the curriculum as scope and sequence direct. For example, the knowledge goal of understanding "the nature of conflict among individuals, groups, and nations and evaluate alternative methods of resolving conflict," or the skill goal of "locating, compiling and weighing the evidence and data necessary for clarifying issues and making decisions" are two typical social studies goals. These goals, extracted from the State of Connecticut’s formal guidelines for social studies, are not only compatible with but can be met very well by systematic instruction about national security.

The strategy of infusion offers a flexible method of introducing new ideas into the curriculum in ways that reinforce the
achievement of such existing goals and objectives. Throughout each of the existing major social studies courses—world geography, world history, American history, American government, economics—there are multiple entry points where the content, skills and values associated with security are especially relevant and thus may be introduced. To give but a few examples, in the standard American history course one can use the debates of the Constitutional Convention and the discourses of The Federalist papers to focus on the initial structural arrangements for and the problems of seeking national security. George Washington's Farewell Address set the foundation for American security policy well into the 20th century. As the United States began to develop and expand before the Civil War, questions of national security were continually posed—over the Louisiana Purchase, the acquisition of East Florida, the debate over expanding the military service academies, and so on. Examples are also easily found for the other major sections of the standard American history course. In fact, not only are the number of examples virtually endless for this course, but the same situation also exists for world history, American government, geography and economics.

Once goals have been determined and teaching strategies selected, the teacher's attention should turn to the substance of the material. Three criteria are especially important in this regard.

- The content must be grounded in a conceptual foundation extracted from the body of theory and research in the scholarly field of national security studies.

It is critically important that instructional materials used should be solidly rooted in and informed by the organizing concepts of the field of national security studies. Moreover, the teacher ought to be able to place the material in such a context. For example, no discussion of contemporary arms control can be complete without reference to the major causes of arms competition such as the pace of technology, domestic political pressures, the quest for prestige and visibility, as well as the contemporary international environment including the Soviet-American rivalry. Without such focus arms control appears to be divorced from the context in which the debate about it rages. In short, not only must all topics have a reference point in a commonly used conceptual foundation but the teacher should be able to identify the connection.

- Teaching strategies and materials must present information about national security in a balanced manner that does not advocate any particular point of view.

This criterion implies a number of major considerations. First, the content of the material must be accurate. To the extent possible, materials should be free of factual errors as well as error in interpretation of key events and ideas. Obtaining such accuracy implies a role in the materials development process for balanced representation from the research field of national security studies. Curriculum developers who are not conversant in this field should have input from scholars who understand both the different points of view within the scholarly community and where these points converge. Second, instructional materials and classroom instruction should be balanced and free of advocacy. Multiple perspectives should be presented where relevant. Where there is major agreement among research scholars about an issue, this evolving consensus should be so noted and emphasized. Only such an approach can succeed in meeting the demands of teachers, educators, administrators, school boards, parents and students for educational experiences that inform rather than divide them.

Our final criterion relates to the issue of how to address student fears when teaching about national security.

- The addressing of student fears should represent an instrumental goal in the pursuit of understanding of the subject matter and the ability to analyze the issues.

The purpose of education about national security is not to scare young people or
reinforce existing fears. Students should not be traumatized with instructional preoccupation with the specific details of the devastation of total war. Instead, to the extent such material is dealt with, the consequences of such warfare should be used as a catalyst to address the much broader and important question of peace and security in the nuclear age, and how to achieve them while avoiding major conflict.

These criteria for teachers, taken together, should provide sufficient guidance for undertaking the important task of preparing students to understand the nuclear age. Teachers need to understand the link between national security and the total content domain of the social studies. While it is unreasonable to assume that teachers will have the time or inclination to learn the substance of the field of national security, they must have some grounding in its conceptual foundation. Using lessons to infuse national security content into the classroom is one way that teachers learn about this link. Reading substantive material designed for the attentive public represents a second method of self-learning. Participation in in-service workshops devoted to the substance and pedagogy of national security is a third strategy for developing understanding. All of these approaches are enhanced if the school provides adequate resources in the teacher resource center.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have described the meaning of the term national security. We have paid particular attention to the use of the word national because we believe that a full discussion of the merits of this word will help eliminate misconceptions about its role in today's world. Our rationale for inclusion of such education is focused on the twin objectives of global education and citizenship requirements.

We have also noted seven challenges to strengthening education about national security in the social studies curriculum. While some are unique to national security and others more general, such obstacles can be overcome. Attention to the type of criteria noted here will maximize the chances for success. By success we mean the development of educational programs that will help the young acquire the knowledge and skills they need to function as citizens in a democratic country within a world quite likely to be even "smaller" than it is today. We do not know whether it will be a more or less secure world, nor do we know whether tomorrow's adults will live in a nation that is more or less secure. But we are fairly certain that wise men and women will not be able by then to repeal the widespread knowledge of how to manufacture nuclear weapons. Thus our students must be able to accept the reality of the nuclear age. And they must be able to function in this age in such a fashion that they leave for their children a world that is at least as good as if not better than the world that they inherit.

Notes

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
5. In some areas of the developing world primary loyalties to units that are smaller than or not co-terminus with national borders such as tribes persist.
9. Brodie, *War and Politics*, p. 54. For an excellent description of the many reactions to the dawning of the nuclear age see Boyer, *By the Bomb’s Ear*: *Light*.


17. California and Oregon are two states whose legislatures have formally addressed the question of nuclear age education. See, for example, "Nuclear Age Education: A Report to the Legislature as Required by Assembly Bill 3848" (1984), California State Department of Education, Sacramento, 1986.


27. Ibid.

2. NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES AS A CURRICULUM RESOURCE

The term national security refers not only to the security problems faced by nations but also to the academic study of those problems. In this chapter we briefly outline the origins and current state of national security as a field of study and then we describe ten themes that provide a manageable way to draw upon the subject matter of national security studies for the purposes of curriculum building.

National Security Studies Today

Efforts to strengthen education about national security in the social studies curriculum need to be firmly rooted in the multidisciplinary field of national security studies. Research and writing in this field can provide a knowledge base—the basic concepts and facts—with which to build curriculum that meets the need for accuracy and balance. How did this field originate? What are some of its main characteristics and notable features?

Origins of the Field. The field of national security studies developed after World War II as a number of scholars and scientists, many of whom had participated in the war effort, sought to analyze the post-war course of foreign policy, military power and international relations in light of the profound changes brought about by the war. These changes included a basic redistribution of power in world affairs. In relative terms, the war had destroyed or irrevocably eroded the dominant role of the former European powers—Germany, Italy, France, Japan and the United Kingdom—and reduced or eliminated their former colonial holdings. In their place, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the war in a new bipolar power relationship replacing centuries of complex European balance-of-power politics. Soon international relations were dominated by the Cold War, a series of intense U.S.-Soviet confrontations, with the rest of the world left to cluster around one or the other of the two emerging poles of power.

In absolute terms, World War II also irrevocably changed the face of conflict. Not only had the scope and tempo of war been accelerated by technology—heralded by the blitzkrieg of German armor sweeping across Europe—but the conceptual foundations for the use of force by one nation against another had been unalterably transformed. Nations had advanced the concept of total war introduced by Napoleon in the nineteenth century to World War II's strategic bombing. A war whose beginning had included cavalry charges in Poland and horse-drawn artillery in the Soviet Union, ended with the detonation of two nuclear weapons over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These weapons introduced a level of destructive power to international conflict so profoundly different in degree as to make a difference in kind. The nuclear age changed the very nature of the international security environment and brought significant changes in the way people thought about the use of force.

As scholars and scientists began to work out the implications of such changes for post-war American strategy and for the study of international relations, a distinct field of national security studies began to emerge. Scholars found themselves working alongside of military advisors in such places as the newly established RAND Corporation both to develop appropriate frameworks for the post-war era and to deal with specific policy-related topics such as the meaning or place of limited (non-nuclear) war in the nuclear age. By the late 1950s and early 1960s national security studies had emerged as a distinct and expanding multidisciplinary field with its practitioners located in the growing number of research institutes or think tanks such as RAND, in specially created university centers and within traditional university departments (most often political science).
Early efforts by national security specialists or defense intellectuals as they were sometimes called, sought to learn and apply the lessons of World War II. For example, a comprehensive review of the strategic bombing strategy by national security specialists concluded that it was effective neither in achieving significant reductions of enemy military production nor in weakening the will of the populace to fight (it may have reinforced the latter). But the attention of post-war national security studies turned quickly to the security consequences of the growing U.S.-Soviet rivalry and Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons. Following the admonition of Bernard Brodie, one of the early leaders in the field, that nuclear weapons could no longer serve the purpose of prosecuting war but only of averting it, national security studies turned to developing the vast theoretical structure of nuclear strategy with its often arcane terminology of deterrence, megatonnage, countervalue targeting, and the like. With the evolution of such strategic thinking, national security studies became an integral part of the debates that have shaped and continue to shape United States security policy.

As the national security specialists pursued their new field, they began to train their successors and to bring a sharper focus to examinations of the international security environment. By the 1950s, graduate programs in national security studies had begun to develop in a number of universities across the country. As a new generation of national security specialists trained in these programs took their place in the scholarly community, undergraduate programs addressing national security as a field of inquiry emerged as well. In recent years courses on such topics as national security, defense policy, arms control and the like have become widely available in universities at both the graduate and undergraduate levels, and some programs offer degrees in such areas as strategic studies.

National Security Studies as a Field of Inquiry. Today the field concentrates on studying the presence of force as an instrument of national policy and on examining a wide range of issues related to how nations plan, build, sustain, manage, employ, control, limit, reduce and eliminate such force. While nuclear weapons dominate those issues today, the basic contours of national security are not new. They are little different indeed from those identified by Thucydides in the classic history of the rivalry between Sparta and Athens and the wars among the Greek city-states in the fifth century B.C. Nevertheless, the application of security concepts to the contemporary nuclear setting has expanded both the scope and substance of inquiry.

How does national security studies compare to other fields of inquiry related to world affairs? While it is concerned with the use of force, national security studies is not the same as traditional military science. Military science involves strategy and tactics in a narrower sense; it is concerned with such issues as air tactics or the proper use of tanks on a battlefield. National security studies is concerned with the processes through which governments decide upon and carry out national security policies and with the ways in which nations interact with each other to resolve their security problems.

Nor is national security studies the same as the fields of international politics, foreign affairs and diplomacy although there is some overlap with those traditional areas of study. Richard Smoke, a national security specialist, explains that, "In general, national security focuses more than these fields on the role of force in relations among nations, and on the implications of advancing military technology." In addition, he notes, national security deals more with policy questions than does international relations and similar academic fields. Thus, national security specialists are concerned with the following kinds of questions: What should the United States (or some other nation) do about existing or foreseeable threats? How should it go about deciding what to do?"
sensitive to changes in technology, such as a new targeting system for a missile or new radar capability. Third, since the field is very problem or policy-oriented, it is characterized by a shifting set of issues that it must address and about which there seems to be little agreement. Finally, the points at issue—addressing questions of nuclear strategy, the defense budget, the policy-making structure, and a wide array of other subjects—are often expressed in esoteric terminology that makes the debates surrounding them seem as much theoretical as substantive.

Unfortunately these characteristics have made national security studies appear more highly specialized and confusing than is actually the case. Despite its breadth, its topicality and its sometimes perplexing terminology, national security studies is a field with established foundations about which both scholars and practitioners, who may differ about solutions to particular problems, are in basic agreement. It is to such fundamental themes that we now turn.

Key Themes and Concepts for Curriculum Building

In addressing the stark landscape of national security in the nuclear age, people, especially the young, tend to ask stark questions: "Why do nations arm themselves to the teeth?"; "Why do they possess weapons that can inflict such horrible damage?"; "Why do they continue to accumulate those weapons?"

The "why" in these questions frequently expresses the frustration people feel when confronted with the knowledge that two nations, the United States and the Soviet Union, if they were to use their awesome nuclear arsenals, could cause the virtual destruction of one another's societies and perhaps fundamentally alter life on the planet as we know it. Where, people ask, is the concern for human beings, for the fate of the earth? This frustration is in part the absence of any comparable framework in everyday life that could make such a condition comprehensible. Supported by popular images, there is a sense that nuclear weapons are beyond the logic or control of policy, a sense that seems to be reinforced by disagreement among specialists and political leaders who not only have different approaches to the problem, but who treat it in an apparently detached manner.

While such feelings of fear and frustration cannot be disregarded, it is more important that we as educators respond to these questions analytically. To ask why is to seek answers. In this case, the questions seek a framework for understanding national security in an era populated by nuclear weapons.

Yet, while nuclear weapons seem now to dominate our concerns, a focus on such weapons does not provide an adequate knowledge base or conceptual framework for curriculum that will help young people better comprehend and make informed judgments as citizens about a wide range of key national security issues, including nuclear weapons. In fact, a tendency to treat the present security environment as if it were simply a by-product of nuclear weapons can result in systematic, albeit often unintentional, mis-education. Such an approach leads to a concentration on technical details and a tunneling of analytic vision. Like the blind men encountering the elephant in the familiar Japanese folk tale, students are led to view the subject of national security solely in terms of nuclear issues and often in terms of only a single component of those issues.

Rather, what is needed for curriculum development is a more comprehensive view or conceptual framework for understanding the national security concerns of nations. Such a framework would, for example, help us recognize that the presence of force in the world, whether it is nuclear or non-nuclear, is a reality of the international political environment. Understanding why force is present in international relations, how it is used and what its contemporary forms are like, can provide some of the knowledge that will help dispel the frustration expressed in such questions as "why do nations arm themselves?"

In 1985 the National Security in a Nuclear Age Project (NSNA) began a multi-year effort to identify and describe a framework that would provide educators with a way of looking at and understanding national security studies that is both manageable and relevant
to the practical task of curriculum building. Working with leading national security specialists and social studies educators, the NSNA group identified ten themes and associated concepts which taken together provide a framework, a conceptual roadmap, for the apparently vast and complex body of subject matter that comprises national security studies. These themes are:

1. premises of national security;
2. conflict management in the modern era;
3. conflict in the modern era;
4. strategy in the nuclear age;
5. arms competition and arms control;
6. technology and national security;
7. policy-making for national security;
8. the economics of national security;
9. the military and society; and
10. morality and national security.

While these ten themes are not the only way to order research and thinking from national security studies, they do illustrate how to organize information from the field for the purposes of teacher education and curriculum building. These themes are discussed at length in Essentials of National Security: A Conceptual Guidebook for Teachers. Here we summarize some key ideas associated with each theme.

Premises of National Security

The immediate answer that a specialist might offer analytically to address the why of national security seems to be simple: nations arm themselves because there is no one else to protect them. There is no enforceable international order... can govern the behavior of all the other nations in the world. Because no one is governing the others, each individual nation must rely on its own devices to protect itself and promote its interests and values in all areas from physical defense to economic welfare to the general well-being of its citizens. The premises for national security are contained in those simple statements. But of course the statements are not simple. They beg other questions about the behavior of states and the nature of international politics.

At the foundation of international relations, nations exist in a setting that approaches and may even approximate a condition of anarchy, i.e., the absence of order. Unlike the domestic society, to which most of us are accustomed, there is no governing body of laws in international relations that is accepted as legitimate by all nations at all times or in all circumstances. Nor, most important, is there any set of institutions outside of the nations themselves to enforce order were such laws to be recognized by all. There is no centralized source of control or authority, no hierarchy. In the international realm, individual nations, territorially defined and territorially confined, have complete power over their own affairs. In some respects they are like individuals in the domestic society but they lack the superior presence of a common governing body.

The premises for national security are then to be found in the absence of an enforceable international order and the consequent principle of self-reliance. Where a stronger nation exists, there is no independent agency to which other countries can turn to prevent that nation from using its strength to force the others to comply with its wishes. That does not mean, despite the prevalence of conflict, that nations are constantly at war with one another. International conflict takes many forms short of the actual use of force. However, in the absence of a superior authority, the choice ultimately is between compliance or the resort to force. Therefore, nations must be prepared to go to war. If force is used by any state, or is expected to be used, then the only recourse may be to use force or be prepared to use it. The threat of force may be countered by a military build-up to convince an adversary not to strike. The build-up may be real or a bluff. A nation may seek to join or to form an alliance. A nation may even choose conciliation or appeasement. But it is the presence of force that shapes the outcome.

Conflict Management in the Modern Era

Despite this presence, nations in fact seldom make such stark choices. Like
individuals, they have tended to prefer order to disorder. For this reason it is important to recognize that the international environment is said to approximate rather than to constitute a state of anarchy. The pursuit of order has acted to temper international relations, providing alternatives to endless conflict. Consequently, there is and has been throughout the history of international relations a relatively structured international system that influences nations' behavior. Note, however, that at the same time, when any nation decides that it is not in its interests to abide by the prevailing rules of that system, it is in principle at least completely a matter of its own choice whether or not to do so.

Nevertheless, an international system has evolved and is reflected in the continuing reliance on three basic and related modes of behavior. First, nations engage in diplomacy—the practice of orderly relations between states. Diplomacy presumes the use of peaceful means and it is based on official representation of states in the various forums in which it takes place. Over the years, the practice of diplomacy has become highly institutionalized, as we can see in the complex system of ambassadors, embassies and embassy staffs that exist in all of the capitals of the world. Diplomacy can also have intrinsic benefits; the fact that nations engage in such patterned and peaceful intercourse indicates the general value that nations ascribe to such rules.

Second, nations have instituted and subscribed to the processes and structures known as international organization. International organization is an effort to address some issue or group of issues more or less permanently. Pursued through diplomacy, international organization is the common procedure through which nations agree to discuss and administer those issues—for example, economic cooperation, security, political coordination, and the like. The outcome is a common institutional framework for dealing with an issue or set of issues such as the European Community, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the United Nations. Each such framework becomes an organization in the literal sense with headquarters, staff, routinized operations, and all of the other elements associated with large corporate structures.

Finally, when it is in their interest to do so, nations follow a structured set of rules known as international law. International law is formed largely from convention—the patterns of behavior which nations have accepted as legitimate over time but which may or may not be formally codified—or from international treaties—negotiated agreements between nations that have been ratified by the respective governments and therefore have the force of domestic law. However, because it arises in a fundamentally anarchic environment, international law cannot be understood (except by analogy) in terms of domestic law. That is, there is no central authority that can carry out the dictates of international law and thus nations retain for themselves the right to accept or reject either the applicability or the judgment of international law. These three efforts—diplomacy, international organization, and international law—provide nations a level of predictability in their relations with one another.

Summarizing the international system as it has evolved, we can then see several objectives that would serve the interests of states. First, states see value in preserving the order itself. Preserving the rights and responsibilities of the other states in the system is simply a means of reinforcing the rights of one's own state. This objective helps to explain why there were few instances of states being eliminated, although a nation's rights have sometimes been circumscribed, as happened to Germany after World War I, and the shape of states has been forcibly changed, as happened to a number of states, Germany included, after World War II. Second, states share the desire, contained in the prevailing pattern of authority of the international system, to preserve their own autonomy and independence. This objective tends in fact to transcend the first: states would rather preserve their independence than preserve the international order as such. And that focus helps to explain the fragility of the international order when faced with a crisis situation. Third, states seek peace as a form of interaction preferable to war. In this form,
peace means literally the absence of war. War, even in circumstances in which the balance of power is to the evident advantage of one nation over another, diverts national resources and places the nation at risk. Hence, it is generally viewed by nations as undesirable.

Conflict in the Modern Era

Even though states seem to prefer order, disharmony still appears to be the most conspicuous feature of the international environment in which we live. Conflicts in world affairs can take many forms, of which war, the particular form of conflict that most preoccupies us, is only one. Conflict can be defined as hostility, carried on by means including but not limited to the use of force, resulting from the failure of nations or groups within nations to resolve their differences in mutually acceptable ways. Wars, both international and civil, thus fit within this category, but so too do antagonisms carried on by means short of war, such as terrorism, arms races, economic rivalries, or competitions for prestige and influence. Nor is this definition necessarily limited to disagreements between sovereign states. Some of the most significant conflicts of the contemporary era have occurred among factions within states, or among movements whose organization transcends state boundaries.

International conflict rarely results from any single cause; more often than not the causes are multiple, and confusingly interrelated. To seek specific causes for specific conflicts can often therefore produce misleading conclusions. But if we are to get a sense of why nations disagree, we must at least seek to identify certain categories of causes in order to make analysis possible. Among these categories are: (1) disruptions in the international balance of power, arising from such events as the entry of a new power into the system (e.g., Israel in the Middle East in 1948), or the removal of a state from the system (e.g., the end of the colonial period following World War II), or simply competitive rivalries among nations (e.g., the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union); (2) ideological confrontations such as independence movements that separate a nation from the former homeland (e.g., the American Revolution) or transform a political system (e.g., the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia), or religious or ethnic separatist movements; (3) economic differences in which nations make competing claims on the international economic system (e.g., Japanese economic expansion prior to the Second World War) or pursue resources considered vital (e.g., Hitler's campaign into the U.S.S.R. in 1941); (4) domestic politics that may drive leaders into conflict in order to satisfy domestic factions, or distract from domestic concerns, or avoid humiliation; and (5) conflict resulting from unintended consequence of some other action, (e.g., the strategic planning and diplomatic posturing that contributed to the outbreak of World War I). It should be kept in mind, however, that conflict in the real world is much more likely to result from some combination of such causes rather than from any one of them.

Whatever forms it takes, the existence of conflict is a fact of international life with which all leaders of nations must grapple, just as individuals must deal with conflict in their relations with one another. To the extent that nations feel insecure, it is because of the existence of conflict in the world; the incidence, characteristics, and causes of conflict, therefore, are subjects of fundamental importance for any student of national security policy.

Strategy in the Nuclear Age

The need for strategy, a plan for using force, also arises from the anarchic character of the international system. Every state therefore has a strategy, its political ends shaped by its size, location, and principles of internal governance. But prevailing strategy is also decisively influenced by the state of technology. All countries will want the most advanced weapons. In war, as in other industrial enterprises, the party with the best machines enjoys a distinct advantage over the others. For most of the history of warfare
technology changed slowly. But as we have seen, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the pace of change quickened, leading to the advent of nuclear weapons, which have dominated the strictly military aspects of post-war strategy, especially in the United States.

With an initial monopoly and then clear superiority in nuclear weapons, American strategy had an enormous impact on other countries. Although post-war U.S. strategy has never been entirely nuclear (much of American military policy, and most of American defense spending, has involved non-nuclear weapons), the power and revolutionary nature of these weapons made them a preeminent concern. Their most important technical feature is obviously their explosive power, measured in the millions of tons of TNT equivalent. When atomic bombs were used for the first and so far only time in combat there were just two. But it soon proved possible to make many of them without economic strain. And in over forty years the United States and the Soviet Union accumulated thousands, in fact tens of thousands of them. So, if the first technical feature of the bomb is its power, the second is its availability in large numbers. And the third, advanced through missile technology, is the ease with which it can strike designated targets located far away.

The power of nuclear weapons, the condition of nuclear plenty that the United States and the Soviet Union achieved, and the capacity to penetrate defenses to deliver crushing strikes all lent themselves to a particular military strategy, nuclear deterrence, which has in fact been the principal American strategy since 1945. The concept of deterrence is a simple one: prevention by threat. One state seeks to prevent another from taking a particular action, ordinarily aggression, by threatening to respond forcefully if the action is taken. If the other state believes the threat and refrains from the action for fear of the threat being carried out, that second country may be said to have been deterred. Deterrence has two noteworthy features. First, it is in essence psychological. It operates on the calculations, not the capabilities of the party being deterred. Second, it is a way of gaining political benefits from armaments without actually using them. Deterrence is a defensive strategy, and as such it is particularly compatible with American political goals in the post-war world that sought to prevent the Soviet Union and other communist countries from advancing beyond the lines established at the end of the war.

The threat to use nuclear weapons, of course, like the threat to use any military force, can be employed for purposes other than deterring or preventing an adversary's action. Such a threat may also be made in an effort to halt or modify a course of action already undertaken, in which case it is called compellence. In the nuclear age, frequent resort has been made to this use of this threat of nuclear force; it is implicit in such terms as nuclear blackmail and missile-rattling.

Yet nuclear weapons lend themselves particularly well to a strategy of deterrence because any country possessing them has the capacity to inflict great damage upon an enemy. Others will automatically proceed with caution in dealing with a nuclear-armed state. Deterrence thus became explicit and central to American post-war nuclear strategy, although the details of implementation changed with the growth and development of the American and especially the Soviet nuclear arsenals. Strategic nuclear deterrence departed from the precedent of almost all of military history in that it did not rely on the promise of effective defense but on the certain threat of devastating retaliation—assured destruction.

Assured destruction is the capacity to strike back after being attacked; it is regarded as the necessary condition for a successful strategy of nuclear deterrence. In time both the United States and the Soviet Union provided themselves with this capacity by having many nuclear weapons, by diversifying the ways that the weapons can be delivered, and by protecting the means of delivery. With the acquisition of this mutual capacity—mutual assured destruction or MAD—the basis of the U.S.-Soviet relationship changed and deterrence became the prevailing condition of the nuclear age.
Arms Competition and Arms Control

With the constant threat of force, nations seek to prevent others from inflicting physical harm. That is generally accomplished by acquiring the means to defend themselves from military attack or from the consequences of being subjected to superior military force. Without that capacity no nation can be said to be completely secure in an anarchic world. Physical security tends therefore to be expressed in terms of military power (although the quest for security is by no means limited to the physical defense of the homeland, for it is the promotion and not just the protection of interests that determines the capacity of a nation to survive).

But in that environment power is not measured in the abstract. Useful power is measured against the power and potential of the other states in the system. Consequently, the process of national security tends to involve a nation's assessment of its power relative to the perceived capabilities of others. However, that assessment is difficult at best. First, the measurement of power, military or otherwise, is imprecise. One of the constant issues in planning and maintaining military power is therefore: "how much is enough?" Second, even where the power needed is evident by the imprecise measures available, it may not determine the outcome of a conflict. There are many instances where apparently superior military power could not prevail over a demonstrably weaker force such as the United States in Vietnam or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Finally, the assessment of the relative power of other states is most often based on uncertainty. States choose not to reveal just how powerful they really are nor to declare their actual intentions. As a consequence, their adversaries may not be sure of either capability or intent and must engage in intelligence gathering to try to assess both capability and intent. All of these difficulties add anxiety to the calculations of relative power in which states must engage.

In such an intractable environment, nations engage in arms competition to acquire weapons to deal with the level of threat posed by the perceived capabilities of real or potential adversaries. Such arms competition may be reinforced by technological impulses or domestic interests. The weapons themselves are ethically neutral. Weapons do not go to war; nations do. But weapons can aggravate tension, and make war more likely. This threat requires nations seeking security to think about ways of restraining, if not abolishing, the very instruments of destruction that they build to protect themselves. The companion to arms competition in the international security environment is therefore arms control.

Arms control is often confused with disarmament. But the two can be conceived of as distinct concepts rather than variations on the same theme. Making such a distinction can help eliminate the confusion and wrangling about arms control that stems from a blurring of the differences between the two concepts. Disarmament means the elimination of all weapons, and along with their elimination, the eradication of war. Disarmament is based on the compelling notion that if there were no more weapons there would be no more war. Certainly weapons can contribute greatly to anxiety and insecurity, and the development and maintenance of military forces may cost a great deal of money that could be better spent on other things. However, disarmament tends to mistake the symptoms for the disease. Nations arm themselves for a reason, and the reason is conflict with other states over competing and sometimes mutually exclusive goals.

Arms control differs from disarmament in that it accepts the existence of weapons and the possibility of conflict. It therefore encompasses a wide range of actions that attempt to minimize pressures for the use of force. Arms control is any type of restraint on the use of arms. It is essentially an accounting between adversaries of what is permitted and what is forbidden in their respective military activities with the objectives of stabilizing the status quo, managing conflict, encouraging peaceful resolution of disputes and limiting the resort to military force. Any form of military cooperation between adversaries is appropriately called arms control whether implicit or explicit, formal or informal, or whether unilateral,
bilateral, or multilateral. Thus unlike disarmament, arms control properly conceived is consistent with defense policy, not an alternative to it.

Arms control is generally considered to have three objectives: (1) to make war less likely; (2) to reduce the destructiveness of war if it should occur; and (3) to reduce the cost of armaments. However, each of these objectives encounters practical problems. In the nuclear age, reducing the risk of war has become most important in the arms control process. But there are two serious problems that follow from making this objective the centerpiece of arms control activity.

First, reducing the risk of war is impeded by our limited understanding of what in fact causes war. Arms control may not be the solution if the problem is not properly known. Second, reducing the risk of war may be superseded by other objectives such as preserving a way of life, for which most people would willingly accept some risk of war, nuclear or otherwise.

What about reducing the level of destruction should war occur? Most arms control advocates oppose such a step, at least on the nuclear level, arguing that deterring war is far more important than reducing the amount of damage which might result if war should occur.

Finally, there is the objective of saving money. Despite the growing burden of arms expenditures, few experts today would attach great importance to this goal. In fact, an arms control accord which unambiguously reduced the risk of war but cost billions of dollars would likely receive the enthusiastic support of the arms control community.

Dissatisfaction with these objectives has led to the conclusion that the primary function of arms control is to promote stability. This concept is sometimes divided into three components: crisis stability, arms race stability, and political stability. Crisis stability is achieved by reducing as much as possible the incentive for either side to launch a preemptive attack. Arms race stability is achieved by prohibiting the deployment of weapons which encourage a counter-deployment by the other side. Political stability is the broadest and least precise of the three components. It encompasses all actions that build confidence in the East-West strategic relationship, thus indirectly helping to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Since even the most hostile opponents can agree that if war comes it should come on purpose and not by accident, political stability includes all efforts to reduce the risk of accidental, unauthorized or catalytic war. In pursuing stability, arms control can reduce the threat, though not necessarily the risk of war. Arms control must be understood then in the anarchic international setting of the nuclear age not as a substitute for weapons, but a complement to them.

Technology and National Security

Technology, especially in the accelerated pace that followed the industrial revolution, has played a role in wars, battles, or arms competitions throughout history. That role is shaped by a number of factors, including not only the action of a particular technology within some specified combat environment, but also its interaction with other technologies involved. Hence, much of the debate over weapons acquisition flows from different evaluations of the most likely combat environments, from varying assessments of what constitutes appropriate technology for a designated set of conditions, and from divergent views on whether a particular technology will survive in battle conditions. The most important technological interaction tends to be that between offensive and defensive systems. This relationship has several dimensions.

As we have seen, calculation of military balances is an effort to summarize the relative strengths of actual or potential adversaries, including their relative technological strengths. The dynamics of military technology thus operate in cold wars or periods of armed peace, as well as on the battlefield. Current U.S. proposals to establish a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, sometimes called Star Wars), for example, is a response to fear of a future attack or conflict. Even though its goals are far from realization, the U.S. Air Force is already developing systems to spoil any Soviet development of a similar system.
Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. has pledged that it will both create systems to overcome SDI and strive for ballistic missile defenses of its own. Although the basic causes of such contests arise from the need for nations to rely on their own resources to protect their security and promote their interests, the persistent effect of technical innovation and the offense-defense interaction provides an additional incentive to rivalry.

The goal of technological innovation is not only potential effectiveness on the battlefield. A technological competition is driven at least as much by the belief that a reputation for technical leadership is a potent instrument of political influence, especially for powers with worldwide interests. Meanwhile, a perceived imbalance in the number or performance of weapons is a major source of anxiety and hence of efforts to redress the imbalance. Thus, considerations of security and influence, as well as psychological factors, motivate nations to compete for technical supremacy. More simply, technology is the kind of stuff of which arms competitions are made.

As innovation makes available new or improved hardware, military organizations are under two kinds of pressure. They must develop new plans to integrate these advances and they must also create countermeasures, that is, better strategy and tactics or still better equipment to deal with their adversary's innovations. These pressures reflect the continuing, multiple interactions both between one's own strategy and technology, and between one's own and the strategy and technology of an opponent, potential or real. Failure to assess or respond adequately to these interactions may produce serious mistakes. The relationship between a plan and the instruments available for carrying it out is obvious in theory but often less clear in practice. Sometimes innovations in equipment tend to govern plans or even to outpace them; this is called technology push. At other times, plans and theories dictate the direction of military-technological innovation; this is known as strategy pull.

The advent of nuclear weapons meant that planners and strategists had to contend with radically new destructive devices. In this situation, technology push and strategy pull operated simultaneously in a complex, interdependent fashion. The signature of the nuclear age--highly-accurate, multiple-warhead, ballistic missiles capable of attacking an adversary's missile silos—is a product of both technological opportunities and strategic maxims that traditionally place a high priority on destroying an opponent's most lethal offensive forces.

Policy-Making for National Security

As has been stated, national security policies are grounded in the inherent right of nations to defend themselves in an anarchic international system. This duty was recognized by the framers of the United States Constitution when, in the Preamble, the enumerated as one of their cardinal purposes the need to "provide for the common defense." National security policy is thus one type of public policy, but unlike most other sectors of domestic policy, those who formulate it must deal not only with pressures from within the United States but with a wide array of forces--friendly, neutral, and hostile--from outside.

At first glance, it might seem as if the existence of these outside forces would give national security decision-makers a common purpose absent from the arena of domestic policy. In reality, however, different institutions and actors frequently disagree on how to respond to threats and sometimes differ on whether a given situation poses a threat. Thus, decision-making in the national security arena contains all the complexity of domestic policy-making including pressure groups, competing values, and absence of consensus with in the government along with such added complications as managing relations with allied nations and being ever prepared to use force to protect the interests of the nation at times and places that may be chosen by adversaries. Or, to put it another way, the U.S. has its own goals, driven by interests, domestic pressures, and ideology but must also respond to the actions and threats of others.

The policy-making process produces concrete decisions that establish both the goals
or objectives of the nation and the capabilities or instruments that are necessary to pursue those goals and achieve those objectives. National security policy tends to be continuous, although it occasionally results in a policy that is so over-arching in its definition of reality that the whole context of policy is shifted. Such was the case in 1947 when the United States adopted the policy of the containment of communism as its principal focus. At the same time, it is important to recognize that policy is made in a shifting, frequently competitive environment. Various actors seek to define and resolve a particular problem in terms of their own approaches or interests. Except at the most general level of preserving democracy and repulsing an invasion of the United States there is no single national interest.

Like other forms of public policy, moreover, national security policy is determined within an institutional context that we might call bureaucratic politics. The outcomes of national security deliberations, whether measured in terms of weapons programs (such as the MX or Peacekeeper missile), declared strategy (such as deterrence), or finite policy decisions (such as the deployment of U.S. intermediate range nuclear missiles in Western Europe), reflect in part the dispositions of bureaucratic actors within the system. Organizations such as the Department of Defense and sub-agencies within such organizations establish routines and pursue their own institutional goals in ways that can have great impact on the way the overall system operates. Individual decision-makers within these bureaucratic organizations such as the Secretary of Defense, also influence, sometimes decisively, the kinds of inputs that go into making national security policy. These various inputs, operating together but differentially in the decision-making structure, are then formalized through established procedures. National security policy emerges from the continuing exchanges or tradeoffs between the people in such bureaucratic institutions.

The Economics of National Security

Every society must make such decisions concerning the allocation of limited or scarce resources. Seldom are those decisions easy. The government must raise revenues through borrowing, going into debt, or taxing its citizens, and then determine how best to allocate these revenues across often competing demands. In many societies, including the United States, budget-making is the process by which those determinations are made. The United States Constitution reserves to the Congress the right and responsibility to determine how resources are allocated. By custom, the President proposes an annual budget to the Congress. The latter then responds to the President's program by appropriating funds to support various domestic and international requirements, thereby determining the nation's priorities. Most commonly these priorities are divided into two Constitutionally mandated categories: "to provide for the common defense" and "to promote the general welfare." Those categories restate the classic societal choice between guns and butter.

The extent to which limited or scarce resources are dedicated to providing for the common defense is closely related to the nature and scope of a country's security commitments. Since the end of World War II, there have been dramatic changes in the nature and scope of U.S. commitments abroad and in the strategy adopted in support of those commitments. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a major actor on the international stage, widening U.S. commitments in Western Europe and Asia, and the impracticality of mobilization as opposed to preparedness forced a change in U.S. strategy to deterrence. The expense of reliance on conventional forces and the perceived gap between U.S. commitments and resources led American decision-makers to rely increasingly on nuclear weapons and the deterrent strategy of assured destruction.

Examination of trends in defense outlays, the percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) devoted to defense, and the percent of the budget devoted to defense reveal that although we have always invested a significant portion of our resources in national defense, the extent of that investment has varied with the nature and scope of U.S. commitments abroad and among in the...
strategy adopted in support of those commitments during the past four decades.

However, the way one looks at defense spending produces different views. Budget authority is the Department of Defense's legal authority to award contracts, place orders, or take receipts on goods and services. Outlays are actual payments in a particular Fiscal Year (a budget year that runs from October 1st to the following September 30th). If we focus on outlays as the indicator of defense spending and examine trends in nominal or current dollars for the past three decades, the comparisons of one year to another will be distorted upward by the effect of inflation. There will appear to be a steady increase in defense spending. However, if one examines the same period using constant dollars, dollars adjusted to control for inflation, the trends will appear cyclical. Defense expenditures peaked in the early 1950s and again in the mid- to late-1960s representing spending for the Korean and Vietnam Wars respectively. But correspondingly low levels of defense expenditures appear in other years, with the 1970s lowest compared with other peacetime spending levels in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Another way to get a perspective on defense spending is to compare defense with all output or non-defense expenditures. One way of doing so is to examine outlays as a percent of the Gross National Product (GNP), the measure of all the goods and services produced by the United States. This measure shows that trends in defense spending vary only marginally over time, with defense outlays in the 1970s and early 1980s actually below the peacetime levels of the late 1950s and early 1960s.

A second method of comparison is to examine defense outlays as a percentage of all federal outlays. In this comparison an almost steady decline appears from 1955 to 1980, with an average rate of growth of 5 percent per year in real terms (i.e., accounting for inflation) beginning in 1980 to produce an overall increase of 30 percent by 1986.

Overall, defense outlays in the 1950s averaged almost 50 percent of all federal outlays. By 1984, they will average about 30 percent. Some of that change resulted from a shift in federal accounting in the 1960s that removed certain expenditures that were not part of the active military force from defense outlays, such as military retirement and veterans benefits. But the overall trend still indicates that, while defense spending has varied in absolute terms with the nature and scope of U.S. commitments and strategy, it has declined as a percent of all federal outlays.

The Military and Society

As a democratic society, the United States faces a special challenge in its effort to provide and maintain national security. Democracies desire not only effectiveness and efficiency, but also adherence to procedures that ensure majority rule, freedom of dissent, accountability of policy-makers to the governed, political equality and due process of law, and other canons of democratic practice. In the formulation and execution of policies involving the nation's armed forces, situations arise sequentially in which tradeoffs appear to be required in order to reconcile competing demands of democratic practice and those of effectiveness and efficiency. How and how well the nation recruits, organizes, arms and equips, trains, and uses its armed forces in the formulation and execution of national security policy provide key indicators to the success or failure of the nation to meet this special challenge.

Take the use of armed forces. Must, for example, the Congress and the public be told more about the role of the American armed forces in assisting the Nicaraguan Contras in their battle against the Sandinista regime in order to adhere to democratic practice? What if revealing an American role strengthens opposition to such assistance and thereby reduces its effectiveness?

Modern technology has given added urgency to the requirement to respond expeditiously to threats to the nation's security, thereby enhancing the argument for granting the President discretionary authority in the commitment of troops. However, such authorities, like all authorities, are susceptible to
tbuse. Convinced that unfettered presidential authority had led to a calamitous escalation of commitments in Vietnam, the Congress in 1973 passed a War Powers Resolution designed to reassert Congressional prerogatives. The constitutionality of legislative veto that the resolution provides, restricting the President's ability as Commander-in-Chief to commit American troops to combat without a declaration of war or other explicit authorization from Congress, has been questioned but not yet tested. Since 1973, Congress has shown little stomach for insisting upon a literal interpretation of this challenge to the President's authority to commit troops. The Congress has tended to rely instead upon the potent authority provided in the Constitution for control of the purse strings. The President is dependent upon the Congress for providing the funds for defense.

Equally difficult issues are raised by the question of how a democracy such as the United States should raise and maintain its armed forces. What role should military conscription play in maintaining national security? Is the intrusion upon individual freedom that is represented by conscription compatible with democratic values? Or to look at the problem differently, is the present so-called all-volunteer armed force compatible with democratic values if, as at present, it is composed largely of young men and women from lower middle-class backgrounds, with the upper middle-class and upper-class largely unrepresented, at least in the enlisted ranks? If democracy implies that risks to the nation's security should be borne equally throughout the society, then is military conscription or a system of universal national service required to satisfy this criterion?

Raising an army in a democracy means establishing the basis upon which individuals will be expected to serve their country. As a new nation, the United States had limited needs for military manpower and its requirements were met through voluntary enlistments. But with greater responsibility came greater demands and with a more complex world the need for a larger military force. Conscription, introduced in the Civil War, was reintroduced in World War I and again in World War II through the Selective Service Act or, simply, the draft. The post-war era brought with it global responsibility and, for the first time, a peacetime draft. However, though not formally at war, the United States was not at peace either. In addition to a number of hot incidents in the Cold War, the United States found itself twice engaged in serious conflicts in Korea and in Vietnam.

The last of these called into question the standards for service and addressed the issue of equity in the social composition of the armed forces at war. Lower socio-economic groups, especially minorities, were over-represented in the military and therefore in the casualties of combat. The result was the return to an all-volunteer force. But the question of social composition remains, including the questions surrounding the role of women in the armed services, and especially their role in combat. This issue of national service is one of far more than academic relevance to today's high school students. Their lives and careers will be influenced profoundly by how the debate is resolved. Moreover, beyond the personnel issue, the manner in which the armed forces are organized, controlled, and utilized has implications for all of us, young and old. Such implications relate to the security and survival of the nation, and to the health and stability of our system of democracy.

Morality and National Security

The human race has been practicing war and organized violence since the time of primitive social organizations. We can be sure that, as soon as early humans developed ideas of right and wrong, they disputed about their application to warfare. As society grew more complex and the instruments of war became more lethal, these disputes became more difficult and challenging. And, in this century, "the century of total war," advanced forms of weaponry and changes in military doctrine blurred the distinctions between combatant and non-combatant on which so much moral reasoning and international laws of war depend.

Total war was not new in this century. The campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars and
the American Civil War, and the rise of terrorism in nineteenth century Europe contributed to the breakdown of these distinctions. After World War I, still the bloodiest in history, the progressive improvement of the tools of destruction—whether in the hands of governments, revolutionaries, rebels, or terrorists—dramatized still further the moral dimension of organized killing and raised the issue of whether the means or effects of warfare had exceeded the value of the ends for which they were employed and thus outstripped the moral framework used to judge them. At mid-twentieth century, it was the advent and subsequent steady improvement of nuclear arms that brought these and other moral questions even more urgently to the fore, prompting a debate that continues to this day about what it is morally justifiable for nations to do in order to preserve their security.

This age-old problem has been complicated today by the immense destructiveness of weapons coupled with the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which uses threats based on these weapons to provide security. The contemporary debate centers on whether and how to employ the threat to use nuclear weapons as an instrument for achieving national interests and what to do in the event that deterrence fails. What happens should the United States be forced to make good on its threat?

The moral issues in nuclear deterrence have been visible from the outset and are now more prominent in the national debate, owing to increased public concern and to the willingness of major religious denominations to speak out on them. The most significant moral challenge turns on the fact that the deterrent use of nuclear weapons could mean an end to the traditional injunction against killing non-combatants. This violates one of the most important principles of moral reasoning about conflict: that it must be discriminate if it is to be justified. Indeed, in its earliest form—one that is still commended by many authorities—nuclear deterrence seemed to rely solely on the threat virtually to destroy major population centers and thus their inhabitants. Later, when it appeared feasible to target military objectives, the issue remained because many argued that any use of nuclear weapons would be uncontrollable. Security, therefore, seemed to rest on a threat to kill very large numbers of innocent civilians who are hostages to a policy they did not choose and to the actions of leaders over whom they may have little or no control.

Beyond issues of nuclear weapons and strategy as a matter of national policy, are a set of related but separable moral issues concerning the role of the individual citizen in the nuclear age. Although less prominent than the policy issues, they exhibit some parallels with them. The first is that the problems posed for individuals also change with altered circumstances. In the early 1960s, when a federal fall-out shelter proposal stimulated public interest in bomb shelters, discussion focused on such questions as the moral acceptability of denying neighbors or strangers admittance to a private shelter or a public one that was filled to capacity. Now, discussion involves larger questions of personal responsibility in a nuclear world, such as how to respond to the unresolved questions embedded in national policy. Here issues of choice and control once again arise.

Applying moral or ethical standards to international behavior does not lead to any easy or self-evident conclusions. There are conflicts among differing moral frameworks and principles, which may make simultaneous and competing demands on our behavior. The existence of these conflicts does not relieve us of the necessity of trying to balance our obligations, to harmonize them or establish priorities among them as they relate to specific moral choices. Moral understanding does not oblige us to come to some universal truth on which all must agree but it does require that we search for and respect the facts, that we know and understand moral perspectives and principles, and that we try to reason consistently and in a generalizable way, rather than in a manner that is merely self-serving and partisan. In the nuclear age, as in preceding ages, the intelligent and informed search for a proper balance among self-interest, family or community interests, national interest, and global interest remains the mark of a good citizen.
The Contemporary Setting

The contemporary security environment is still dominated by the competition of the nuclear powers, the superpowers. Those powers have attempted to find a strategic approach that could achieve the persistent goals of security in the face of the profound changes brought by the nuclear age while at the same time preserving the continued benefits of international society. Note that the goals of nations within that society do not appear to have been abandoned; nuclear war is not advanced by any responsible policy-maker as a rational instrument of policy. Instead, the principal nuclear nations have adopted a warlike posture involving the possession and declaratory employment of nuclear weapons, designed to reduce the probability of war by engaging their adversary's desire to avoid war.

The evolution of this strategy of deterrence has been intricate, variable and complex. In application it has appeared to pursue two seemingly contradictory goals. It requires credibility; to achieve security the adversary must believe that the threat to retaliate with massive nuclear destruction is valid and certain. But by achieving that belief, anxiety about war is increased, often stimulated further by compellent threats seeking to alter an opponent's action or policy. Thus, to preserve international society in face of the prospect of virtually immediate mass destruction, there must then be some form of reassurance among adversaries. For this reason, one finds in U.S.-Soviet relations the apparently counterproductive pursuit of warlike arms competition, on the one hand, and diplomatic negotiation to achieve arms control, on the other. From the perspective advanced in this discussion, these two efforts can now be understood as differing expressions of the same set of goals, a singular effort to achieve security in the prevailing international system.

However, the dynamics of that system are changing. And these changes also need to be accounted for. Over 110 new nations have come into existence since the end of World War II. Most of these nations, the less developed nations, are poorer and less powerful than those already established. But their presence has begun to alter the issues that lie before world politics, multiplying the number of actors and changing the substance of concerns that affect security. With the proliferation of the number of nations, virtually all of which are part of the less developed world, the international political environment has become more mixed and issue dependent. From such changes, new configurations of security may also be emerging based on developing perspectives on resource scarcity as a focus of conflict.

National security has taken on global dimensions that commend the attention of anyone who teaches that or related subjects. With the multiplication of actors, the post-war period has shown both an increase in the occurrence of force as a means to settle disputes and a worldwide increase in expenditures on arms of all types. The pattern of authority in international relations remains the nation-state system, now made more complex by the increase in numbers. Nevertheless, nations in the contemporary environment have continued to seek security through means other than the resort to force. Diplomacy and negotiation, international organization and international law remain as active and constructive avenues for nations to avoid, prevent or resolve conflict. Nations continue to use them in their efforts to manage risk in the international environment.

None of these mechanisms, however, has proven sufficient to provide the reliable and enforceable order necessary for international security. Force and the threat of force remain not just the ultimate recourse, but a constant presence in the international arena. In the absence of enforceable order, the requirement for nations to provide for their own physical security persists and national security remains the foundation for the conduct of international relations. That prospect may seem dim indeed, unless we remind ourselves of the prevailing sense of international society that has constrained national conduct. History informs us that peace is not a state of mind; it is the product of a continuing, sometimes tortuous political process, a process that is subject to human rationality and concern.
Notes

3. TEACHING CONCEPTS

What kinds of instructional strategies can teachers use to strengthen education about national security? In this and subsequent chapters, we describe several types of strategies for teaching about national security and present sample classroom lessons that illustrate each strategy in practice.

The NSNA Lessons in This Book

The exemplary lessons presented in this book are taken from five books of lessons developed by the National Security in the Nuclear Age Project (NSNA). NSNA is an activity of the Mershon Center's Citizenship Development for a Global Age Program at The Ohio State University.

Supplementary Lessons. Each of the five books in the NSNA series contains approximately thirty lessons and is designed to supplement one of the existing core social studies courses: world geography, world history, American history, American government, and economics. Taken together, the lessons in this five book series constitute a large pool of teaching resources that can be used variously by teachers to infuse national security topics into their on-going curriculum. The lessons do not duplicate textbook content nor do they constitute a comprehensive survey of the field of national security studies. Rather, they are designed to help teachers strengthen education about national security by:

- filling gaps in textbook coverage,
- enriching current textbook treatment of topics relevant to national security, and
- enlivening the curriculum with ideas and information that will help make social studies more interesting and understandable to students.

This infusion approach accommodates the crowded nature of the social studies curriculum by helping teachers do a better job with courses they are already responsible for teaching.

Format of the Lessons. Each lesson in the NSNA series is a complete instructional activity containing instructions for the teacher as well as material that can be readily duplicated for students, such as a case-study, or set of data, or excerpts from an original source. Each lesson is designed to be taught in one to three classroom periods of forty minutes.

Each lesson begins with a "Lesson Plan and Notes for Teachers." This material includes a description of the main points or themes of the lesson, the instructional objectives, and suggested procedures for teaching the lesson. In addition, there are suggestions about connections of each lesson to related topics in textbooks. These suggestions can provide guidance about how each lesson can be used to supplement the content of standard textbooks.

The teacher material is followed by one or more Handouts for students that can be readily duplicated for student use. It is expected that teachers will duplicate and distribute copies of the student materials to each student. The student materials always contain exercises and application activities. Application exercises require students to use information and ideas presented in the Handout in order to indicate achievement of lesson plans.

Use of Lessons in This Book. The fifteen lessons presented in this book were selected from the five-book NSNA series to illustrate the various teaching strategies described in Chapters 3 through 10. Teachers are encouraged to use the sample lessons presented here. The lessons are sound as designed. National security specialists from several academic disciplines and social studies educators participated in the development of the lessons, and over 25 teachers and curriculum supervisors field-tested and reviewed various
lessons. At the same time, teachers should not hesitate to modify the lessons to suit their courses and students. In addition, teachers are encouraged to use these exemplary lessons as models for creating their own lessons on national security.

In this chapter we describe a concept learning strategy. In subsequent chapters we discuss the following instructional strategies: decision-making, case-study, analysis of primary sources, role-playing, mapping exercises, interpreting data in tables, charts and graphs, and issue analysis.

A Rule-Example-Application Strategy for Teaching Concepts

An understanding of national security requires some comprehension of basic concepts like containment, deterrence, arms control, massive retaliation, balance of power, interdependence and the like. Such concepts are part of the daily lexicon of policymakers; they are used in the academic study of national security and many of them find their way into the mass media. Education about national security that will contribute to citizenship competence requires teaching and learning basic concepts.

While the requirement to teach concepts seems congruent with the frequently stated importance of concept learning in social studies, there remains a good deal of ambiguity and confusion about the meaning of concepts and concept learning. In actual classroom practice, the teaching and learning of concepts can all too easily begin and end with definitions that are presented by the teachers and textbook, and repeated by students as evidence of achievement. Such an approach fails to examine the phenomena encompassed by the definition and it does not involve students in using the definition to organize and interpret information related to the phenomena. A concept is a definition, a criterion, or a set of criteria, for assigning phenomena to a category. Concepts are thus used for grouping objects or events that have something in common. Students who learn the concept of bipolar system, for example, can use a definition as a rule to distinguish examples of historical periods or eras that fit the rule, such as the decades following World War II, from examples that do not, such as the period between World Wars I and II.

A "rule-example-application" strategy can be used to teach effectively national security concepts. In this strategy a concept, such as diplomacy, is presented through the use of definitions (rule) and examples. Students are then asked to engage in application activities in which they apply the definition to the organization and interpretation of fresh data relevant to the concept or in which they generate new examples of the concept. Such application exercises give students the opportunity to practice using the concept and to demonstrate that they are learning the concept.

Sample Lessons

This chapter contains three lessons that are examples of this type of concept teaching strategy. In the first lesson, Deterrence: A Cornerstone of American Security Policy, students are taught that deterrence means preventing an enemy from attacking by threatening to punish him if he does. They also learn why the development of nuclear weapons made deterrence a particularly attractive strategy to the United States after World War II. They use the definition of deterrence to identify examples and non-examples of it. Then they learn the role of credible threat and the survivability of weapons in deterrence, and in each case must apply these ideas to refining the meaning of the concept. In conclusion, students are confronted with four historical events and asked to describe how each threatened or strengthened deterrence. This tests their ability to use the concept to organize and interpret information.

In the second lesson, "Guns Versus Butter: The Opportunity Costs of Defense Spending, students are given an explanation of opportunity costs and then required to
apply the concept by identifying examples of opportunity cost arguments in hypothetical Congressional testimony about spending for new weapons systems. In a concluding application exercise students prepare and interpret a graph that illustrates the relationship between scarce resources and opportunity costs in spending for weapons and food, or the classic "guns versus butter."

In the third lesson, Introduction to Geopolitics students are given the definition of geopolitics. They then study two classic and related geopolitical theories as examples of the concept—Mackinder's Heartland theory and Spykman's Rimland theory. In an application exercise entitled "Using Thinking Skills" students classify examples of recent international events in terms of the two geopolitical theories.

Notes


2. The Citizenship Development for a Global Age Program (CDGA) seeks to enhance the capacity of schools and civic groups to prepare young people for competent citizenship in our global age. CDGA has three goals: (1) to increase the capacity of teachers to understand and teach about national security and global issues, (2) to assist teachers and school districts strengthen their world study courses, and (3) to help civic groups and schools train youth in leadership skills relevant to national security and global issues. For more information contact CDGA, Mershon Center, 199 West Tenth Avenue, Columbus, Ohio, 43201.


4. Ibid., pp. 176-7.


Lesson Plan and Notes for Teachers

Deterrence: A Cornerstone of American Security Policy
by Robert B. Weyrich

Preview of Main Points

This concept learning lesson introduces students to the idea of deterrence. In the lesson, students distinguish deterrence from other defensive strategies. They also see the importance of credibility and the ability of weapons to survive an attack by an enemy to the success of deterrence in a nuclear age.

Connection to Textbooks

All American government texts devote some attention to the U.S.-Soviet conflict in the post-World War II period as well as to the basic principles of American foreign policy. Some also briefly mention deterrence in the context of material on the arms race and the Cold War. This lesson reinforces and enriches the textbook treatment of this core national security concept.

Objectives

Students are expected to:
1. define deterrence;
2. distinguish the unique features of nuclear deterrence;
3. explain the importance of credibility and the ability of weapons to survive an attack to the success of deterrence; and
4. explain historical reasons why the American government adopted deterrence as its primary defensive strategy.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson

Remind students that all nations must defend themselves.

You might wish to note that four defensive strategies used by nations have included: (1) fortifications, (2) preparation for war, (3) offense and (4) treaties and bribes.

1. Fortifications: Walled cities, or building walls along the frontier of the Empire as in Rome, Britain and China are classic ways to defend the cities against attackers.

2. Preparation for War: Having sufficient force to repel attackers is a straightforward form of defense exercised throughout history. Being prepared for war could have a deterrent effect if a potential enemy knew you were prepared and as a result chose not to attack. But being prepared for war, like buying a gun to defend oneself against muggers, was not primarily a deterrent strategy. The purpose of the armed force was to actually repel invaders. If it also deterred them, so much the better.

3. **Offense:** "Getting the other guy before he gets you" is another way of thinking about Caesar's dictum that offense is the best defense.

4. **Treaties and Bribery:** Nations as well as people have also tried to defend themselves by buying off or creating dependency relationships with other nations. The Chinese, for example, routinely gave great gifts to the leaders of such states as Korea, Vietnam and even the neighboring Mongol tribes. The gifts were thinly veiled bribes to maintain peace along the borders. Royal families in Europe similarly married each other's daughters. It made less sense to attack states which might be "within the family" in the next generation.

Explain that this lesson is designed to help students learn about nuclear deterrence, a strategy the U.S. government adopted soon after World War II to defend Europe and later the United States from possible Soviet attack. Note that particularly with the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles, this strategy seemed like the only feasible one to policy-makers.

**Developing the Lesson**

- Ask students to read the Handout and complete the application exercises ("Apply Your Knowledge") at the end of each section of the lesson.
- Conduct a discussion of the three application exercises. Use this discussion to determine the extent to which students understand the concept of deterrence and the main requirements of deterrence (the credibility of the threat and the ability of weapons to survive).

**Concluding the Lesson**

- Have students apply the concept of deterrence to the new examples in the concluding application exercise, "Making Deterrence Work." This could be an in-class or homework exercise.
- Use this learning activity as a final gauge of the extent to which students comprehend the concept of deterrence as presented in the lesson.

**Suggestions**  

**Bibliographical Reading**


**Answers to the Handout**

1. Only situation (c) reflects a strategy of deterrence. The little girl is trying to prevent an attack on her brother by threatening to do something that will presumably bring an unacceptable punishment down on the bully. As with any deterrence, its credibility depends on whether the girl will actually tell (or will be able to tell), and whether the mother will actually punish the bully.

All the other options represent a strategy for defending one's interests. But they are not examples of deterrence.

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Deterrence: A Cornerstone of American Security Policy

Wherever groups of people have been in contact with each other, they have felt the need to defend themselves. For most of history defense consisted of meeting the enemy "at the gate." In other words, defense meant having enough military power to defeat attackers when they attacked.

After World War II American policy makers believed that defense in this sense had become impractical. The American people would not pay for an army large enough to defend Europe against a Soviet invasion. Later, with the development of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads from the Soviet Union to the United States, "defense" seemed impossible. There was no way to meet a missile "at the gate."

Yet, a prime mission of the American government was to defend the security of Western Europe, Japan and North America. So, over time, a new strategy was created. That strategy, nuclear deterrence, has remained at the center of American security policy to this day.

In this lesson you will learn the meaning of nuclear deterrence. You will also see why the threat of punishment must be believable if nuclear deterrence is to work.

The Meaning of Deterrence

Deterrence in general means to prevent an enemy from attacking. The Romans, for example, believed that "If you want peace, prepare for war." The powerful Roman army could defeat almost any attacker. As a result, surrounding empires and barbarian tribes usually chose not to attack. The Roman army deterred them.

Similarly, towns in the American West hired famous gunfighters in the hope that outlaws would go elsewhere. The marshal's fame with a gun deterred would-be trouble-makers. But the deterrence only worked if outlaws believed the marshal could out-draw or out-smart them. Sometimes trouble-makers came to town just to test the legend!

In international politics, the development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles changed deterrence. Beginning in the 1950s American policy-makers used their monopoly over nuclear weapons to deter possible Soviet aggression. The policy that emerged was that if the Soviets invaded Europe, the United States would punish them by destroying Soviet cities. The cost of an invasion would far outweigh any benefits for the Soviets.

When the Soviet Union developed their own nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear deterrence was used to defend American cities. Should the Soviets attack New York, they would be punished. American bombers and missiles would destroy Moscow and other Soviet cities.

Thus in the nuclear age the threat of punishment became the basis of deterrence. Nuclear weapons were ideally suited to this. Nuclear weapons are so destructive that any aggressor would see that the cost of making trouble is far greater than any possible gains. In this sense nuclear weapons are a more powerful deterrent than the Roman army could ever be.

Apply Your Knowledge

1. Which of the following reflects the same kind of defensive strategy as nuclear deterrence? Why?
   a. A man buys a gun to protect himself from muggers.
   b. A famous adage says "Get the other guy before he gets you!"

From American Government and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
c. A small girl defends her baby brother from the neighborhood bully with the words "If you hit him, I'll tell your mother!"

d. A rich man builds a large, electrified fence around his mansion.

2. Explain the following statement. "In effect, nuclear deterrence is a way to defend yourself when defense is impossible."

3. Why did nuclear weapons make deterrence a more effective strategy than ever before?

Credibility of the Threat

There can, however, be some question as to whether a government really would use nuclear weapons in a particular situation. So one clear problem in making deterrence work is to ensure that the threat is credible, or believable.

American nuclear policy in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, appeared to be believable. There was no reason to doubt that American policy-makers would try to destroy Soviet cities if Soviet troops invaded Western Europe. It was less clear that American bombers could get through Soviet defenses and deliver their bombs accurately on Soviet targets. But luckily the American will and ability to retaliate massively was never tested. This policy was called massive retaliation.

The credibility of the American threat was diminished, however, when the Soviets developed their own nuclear weapons. It crumbled completely when the Soviets developed missiles that could carry those weapons to American cities. Would the American government really attack Soviet cities in defense of Western Europe if Soviet missiles would destroy American cities in return? Even Western Europeans in the 1960s worried that the answer might be "no!"

Apply Your Knowledge

4. What does credibility mean and why is it important to deterrence?

5. What was the American strategy of responding to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe and why was it adopted?

6. The Soviet development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, that is missiles capable of going from the Soviet Union to the United States, did more to damage the credibility of massive retaliation than the Soviet development of the atomic bomb. Why do you think this was so?

The Ability of Weapons to Survive

Recent advances in the accuracy of weapons have raised additional doubts about the credibility of deterrence.

Deterrence only works if one is clearly capable of inflicting the threatened punishment. A marshal in the American West could only deter outlaws if he and his guns were in good shape. But what if an outlaw learned that he was faster than the marshal? And what if his aim was so good, that he knew he could shoot the marshal's gun out of his hand? Under those conditions, the marshal would be a poor deterrent.

From the very beginning of the nuclear age, American and Soviet policy-makers have seen the need to protect their nuclear weapons from attack. A nation had to be able to suffer a first strike and still have enough weapons left to severely punish the aggressor. Only the ability to launch a second strike, that is launch an attack after the other side had attacked, made nuclear deterrence credible.
The triad system was developed to ensure that American nuclear weapons survived a first strike by the Soviets. Nuclear weapons were put on planes, atop land-based missiles and on missiles in submarines. Even assuming it was possible, the cost of developing ways to destroy all these types of weapons would be enormous. It would also take many years. Until then, the Soviets could not destroy all the warheads that could be launched against them.

In recent years, advances in technology have weakened the triad. Both the United States and the Soviet Union can now destroy each others' land-based missiles. It is also unclear how many aircraft would be able to get through Soviet air defenses with their nuclear bombs. But weapons on submarines are still safe from surprise attack. As long as the submarines cannot be detected, enough American missiles will survive a first strike to make deterrence credible.

Apply Your Knowledge

7. How is the ability of weapons to survive a nuclear attack related to the credibility of deterrence?

8. What is the triad? How did it increase the ability of nuclear weapons to survive? Does the triad still make American nuclear weapons better able to survive nuclear attack?

9. What does it mean to be able to launch a "second strike" and how is that related to the credibility of deterrence?

Application Exercise: Making Deterrence Work

Pick three of the four situations or decisions below. For each one write a paragraph describing how it either threatened or strengthened deterrence.

10. In the 1950s an important symbol of the American commitment to Europe was the presence of American troops in Germany. No one believed these troops could hold off a Soviet attack. They were a "trip wire," a guarantee that the United States would immediately become involved in any European war.

11. When the Soviet Union developed a sufficient quantity of atomic weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the United States, the American government deserted its policy of massive retaliation. In its place, it created a policy of flexible response. Flexible response meant that whatever the Soviet threat, it would be met "in kind," that is at a similar level of force and with similar types of weapons.

12. The new American MX missile made the American nuclear force far more powerful in the 1980s. It carried ten war-heads and was accurate enough to destroy Soviet missiles in their silos. But the MX was based in old Minuteman silos in the mid-West and Western United States. One of the reasons for replacing the old Minuteman missiles with the MX was that the Soviets could destroy them in their silos.

13. The missiles that are now on board U.S. nuclear armed submarines are not very accurate. They could be used effectively against cities. But they are not accurate enough to destroy Soviet land-based missiles. However, submarine-launched missiles currently being developed by the United States would be accurate enough to destroy land-based missiles in their silos. Over 70% of the Soviet nuclear force is in land-based silos.
"Guns Versus Butter:" The Opportunity Costs of Defense Spending
by Steven L. Miller

Preview of Main Points

National security requires both the arms necessary to defend a country from danger from without and the production of goods and services to make the nation secure from within. The purpose of this lesson is to apply the concept of opportunity cost to the fundamental choice between guns and butter thereby reinforcing the idea that choices are necessary when productive resources are scarce.

Connection to Textbooks

This lesson can be used in conjunction with most standard economics textbook treatments of opportunity cost, the production possibilities frontier (in some texts), or the economic functions of government.

Economic Concepts

Opportunity cost, scarcity, trade-offs, and economic institutions (government).

Objectives

Students are expected to:

1. define opportunity cost precisely;
2. give examples of opportunity cost in terms of foregone alternative consumption, purchases of other defense materials, or other government spending; and
3. graph a production possibility frontier to relate the problem of scarcity to the need for making choices.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson

- Inform the students of the objectives of the lesson.
- Explain that the term opportunity cost comes from the idea that any use of resources to produce one thing means that there is an important, but often hidden cost: the opportunity to use those resources in the next most valuable way. For the individual, each person is the ultimate arbiter of what is most valuable to him or her. Societies often use voting or some other political process to determine the "best" use of resources.

Ask the students for some opportunity cost examples, e.g., time spent watching TV costs the use of that time for listening to records or doing homework. Help students to see that the opportunity cost of watching TV is the best foregone alternative, such as listening to records, not the sum of the lost opportunities.

Developing the Lesson

- Distribute copies of Handouts 1 and 2 to the class. Be certain that the students understand the directions in the student materials.
- Divide the class into small groups of about four students each. Have the students read Handout 1 and complete the questions at the end working in groups of four.
- Check the students' answers to Handout 1. Have the students work in groups to complete Handout 2.

Concluding the Lesson

- Ask each student to write a definition of opportunity cost and provide an example.
- Discuss the following questions:
  1. Is there always an opportunity cost to the use of resources to provide national security?
  2. Since money is not a resource of production, why will spending for weapons decrease production of something else?
  3. How can we tell if the opportunity cost of something is too much?

Suggestions for Additional Reading


See Brady for more background information. Early portions of the chapter discuss the guns vs. butter problem and there is a section that provides material on the budget process that could be helpful in conjunction with Handout 1 of the student material.


Trout's chapter provides more information on the selection of weapons systems as related to a nation's national security objectives.

Answers to Handout 1

1. Answers will vary. An example is retaining the {\textit{dums}} and giving up the B-13.
2. Answers will vary. The opportunity cost of the cruisers might be either the missiles or the bombers.
3. Answers will vary. Generally, private spending will be curtailed, e.g., spending on clothing or recreation or medical care will be given up.

Answers to Handout 2

4. 23; 15.
5. 6 units of weapons; 12 units of food; 7 units of food.
6. 3 units of food; 4 units of food.
7. Not enough productive resources.
"Guns Versus Butter:" The Opportunity Costs of Defense Spending

In a world where productive resources—land, labor, and capital goods—are scarce, the use of those resources to produce one thing means that they cannot be used to produce anything else. Land used to house a military base cannot be used for a park or a housing development. Mechanics that fix airplanes for an airline are not available to maintain planes for the military. Thus, nothing is really "free" if it is produced with scarce resources that have alternative uses. This basic economic principle is summarized by the acronym "TINSTAFL"—There Is No Such Thing As A Free Lunch!

Economists use the term opportunity cost to describe the best of the alternative uses that were not chosen. For example, you might use an hour of your time watching TV instead of listening to records or doing homework or talking to friends on the telephone. There are hundreds of ways in which you might employ the resource of one hour of your time. The best one of these alternatives that you did not choose is your opportunity cost of watching TV.

Opportunity cost is a powerful idea in helping clarify choices that must be made. One area where the idea of opportunity cost is applied quite often is in deciding how much money the federal government should spend for defense. There are several common arguments that one generally hears that are based on the idea of opportunity cost.

In this Handout you will identify the opportunity cost argument in several statements and then provide some examples of your own. In Handout 2 you will develop a graph that depicts opportunity cost.

Opportunity Cost Arguments

Imagine that you are watching the evening news during which the reporter who covers Congress gives the report below. Underline the examples of opportunity cost that are mentioned and then answer the opportunity cost questions that follow.

"The choices the Congress faces are difficult. To reduce the deficit in the federal budget by the amount agreed upon will require either a politically unpopular tax increase or cuts in spending. The committee has already decided that a tax increase is out. So a decision will have to be made about what government program to give up. The committee has narrowed the choices down to four programs. At least two of these will have to be eliminated if taxes are to remain the same. Look at the chart on the screen and keep in mind that all four programs could cost about the same."

Alternatives

B-13 bomber
"Intimidator" Missile System
"Redoubtable" class cruisers
Western states dam projects

"The advocates of each of the programs have turned out in force. Here is a videotape of one conversation we heard earlier today. I am sure you will recognize each of the individuals."

From Economics and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
General Hire Flyer: If we go ahead with the production of the new "Intimidator" missile system as you have proposed, Senator, I am sure that the Congress will not also provide the new B-13 bombers that we have requested. I believe that giving up the bombers is too high a price to pay.

Senator Bluff: I have suggested that we need both, General. Congress might fund both if funds can be found elsewhere in the budget. Why not eliminate several of the "Redoubtable" class cruisers proposed by the Navy. They are somewhat less important for national security at present.

Admiral Salt: Senator, you must be joking. Adequate ability to project our naval power where it is needed is no laughing matter. I suggest we can ill afford the reduction in our planned shipbuilding program. We should look outside the military budget for the funds and cut the planned dam construction projects, painful as that might be.

Congressman Dry: My constituents are counting on the water that the dams will make available. I suggest that the proposed military budget is more than adequate for our national security needs. I believe that the water projects must be funded even if that requires some sacrifice in the weapons budget. We do not need both the B-13 and the "Intimidator." I believe the missile system must be given up.

Opportunity Cost Questions

1. Give one example of opportunity cost that illustrates giving up one defense weapons system in favor of retaining another type of government program.

2. Give two examples of opportunity cost that illustrate giving up one weapons system in favor of retaining another.

3. What are some possible opportunity costs from a decision to raise taxes and fund all of the programs mentioned above?
Production Possibilities

It should be clear by now that resources used for weapons cannot be used for other purposes and vice versa. One way to express both the idea that scarce resources mean limited output and the notion of opportunity cost is through a graph called a production possibilities frontier. To make the idea easier to grasp, assume that a society has a choice to produce weapons or food or some combination of the two. In the space provided, graph the quantities of weapons that could be produced given the corresponding production of food. For example, the table below shows that 15 units of weapons is the maximum amount that can be produced even if all the society's resources are used to produce weapons and none is used to produce food (food = 0 on the table). On the graph this point, weapons = 15 and food = 0, is already graphed for you as an example. In this example the opportunity cost of producing 15 units of weapons would be 23 units of food.

Using the information in Table 1, fill in the remainder of the graph and answer the questions that follow.

Graph

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th>Food</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. What is the maximum number of units of food that the society can produce? ________ The maximum amount of weapons? ________

5. What is the opportunity cost of producing 11 units of food? ________ Of 9 units of weapons? ________ Of 6 units of weapons? ________

6. Assume that the society had been producing 3 units of weapons and 20 units of food. What is the opportunity cost of the weapons? ________ Now assume that due to an external threat the society decides to produce 3 more units of weapons this year compared to last year. What is the opportunity cost of the additional 3 units of weapons? ________

7. Why can't the society produce a combination of weapons and food outside or beyond the line of the graph, for example, 20 units of weapons and 25 units of food?
Introduction to Geopolitics

by William T. Sabato and Richard C. Remy

Preview of Main Points

People have long been interested in the balance of power in the world and with the possibility of world conquest by one nation or another. Geopolitics is interested in these matters and examines the relationship between state power and a variety of geographic elements such as size of territory, location, population and resources. In this lesson students are introduced to two classic and related geopolitical theories.

Connection to Textbooks

Most geography textbooks deal with relationships among the world's nations. This lesson complements textbooks by helping students become aware of classic frameworks within which to view the foreign relations of the superpowers--the United States and the Soviet Union.

Objectives

Students are expected to:

1. know the meaning of geopolitics;
2. describe the major arguments of Mackinder's "Heartland" theory and Spykman's "Rimland" theory;
3. compare the two theories to identify the key difference between them;
4. understand that geopolitical ideas influence government leaders today; and
5. classify examples of recent international events in terms of the "Heartland" and "Rimland" theories.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson

o Write the word "Geopolitics" on the chalkboard. Briefly explain the meaning of the term and then inform students of the main points of the lesson.

Developing the Lesson

o Distribute the Handout. Have students read it and answer the "Reviewing Facts and Main Ideas" questions. Review the questions and answers as a class. Students will need an atlas or wall map to answer some of these questions. Answers to these questions appear at the end of this lesson plan.

Concluding the Lesson

o Remind students that Mackinder developed his "Heartland" theory before the Soviet Union became a major power; Spykman developed his "Rimland" theory before the end of World War II.

o Divide the class into small groups of 3 to 4 students per group. Have each group work together to complete the application exercises under "Using Thinking Skills."

Note: Some students may need prompting or assistance with exercise 11. See the answer for question 11 below for some suggestions.

Have each group report its responses to exercises 10 and 11. Conduct a class discussion to insure students understand the key point of each theory.

Suggestions for Additional Reading


Mackinder provides a detailed description of the Heartland theory.


Spykman provides a detailed description of the Rimland theory.


This atlas provides a detailed description (including excellent maps) of U.S. foreign relations.

Answers to the Handout

1. The Soviet Union.
2. It was protected from the navies of the world. It was therefore like a fortress in which strength could be gathered and developed.
3. a. The armies from the heartland would conquer the coastlands, taking over their navies.
   b. The heartland would use the captured navies to conquer the rest of the world.
4. Unification would need to begin in Eastern Europe because it was the most heavily settled and productive part of the heartland.
6. Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle Eastern countries of Southwest Asia, South Asian countries, Southeast Asian and East Asian countries.
7. Spykman noted that the rimland contained most of the world’s people as well as a large share of the world’s resources. He contrasted this with the thinly settled, environmentally harsh Heartland.
8. He recommended that the U.S. either try to unify the rimland states itself or keep the rimland states from being unified by someone else.

Suggestions for "Using Thinking Skills"

10. Student answers may vary somewhat but they should center on the idea that the basic difference is in Mackinder’s and Spykman’s view of which area—the "heartland" or the "rimland"—is critical to control of the world.

11. Student answers could vary. They should be able to justify their answers. The following are suggestions.

   a. Mackinder. The Soviets have sought to master Eastern Europe in order to control the "heartland." "Who rules Eastern Europe controls the heartland."
   b. Mackinder. The Afghanistan invasion could be viewed as an attempt to extend Soviet control over another part of the heartland.
   c. Spykman. The wars could be seen as an attempt by the U.S. to control the rimland or keep it out of communist control.
   d. Spykman. U.S. bases could be seen as an attempt to limit Soviet or Chinese communist expansion into key rimland areas.
Introduction to Geopolitics

People have long been interested in the possibility of world conquest by one nation or another. Over the years a school of thought called "geopolitics" developed to explore these matters. Geopolitics studies the relationship between states' power and a variety of geographic elements, such as size of territory, location, population and resources.

Two of the most important theories of geopolitics were developed by Sir Halford Mackinder, a British geographer, and Nicholas John Spykman, an American scholar of international politics. In this lesson you will learn the main ideas advanced by each man. You will learn how Mackinder's thinking influenced Adolph Hitler's military strategy in World War II (1939-1945). You will also read how Spykman's writing in the 1940s predicted major trends in international politics that developed in the 1950s and 1960s and continue to shape our world today.

Mackinder's Heartland Theory

In the late nineteenth century, there was little evidence to suggest that one day Russia would become a world power. It was a rural nation. It was isolated from the rest of the world. It was a vast, poorly organized place.

Nevertheless, the British geographer, H.J. Mackinder, did foresee the rise of Russian power. From 1904 to 1919 he developed his "Heartland theory" to explain how it would happen.

Mackinder thought that the heartland of Eurasia (the Europe-Asia land mass) was the base from which a successful campaign for world conquest could be launched (see the accompanying map). The heartland was isolated from the sea and was not penetrated by major navigable rivers. It was therefore protected from the navies of the major world states. (At the time Mackinder was writing, naval power dominated warfare.) The heartland was a fortress in which strength could be gathered and developed since it was walled off from the coastlands by mountain ranges.

The coastland countries of Eurasia (along the Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean) could all be reached by armies from the heartland. For this reason, Mackinder argued, a unified heartland power could attack and conquer the coastlands with its arms and take over the coastlands' navies. This seapower could then be used to conquer the rest of the world.

Mackinder felt that unification of the heartland had to begin in Eastern Europe. This was the most heavily settled and productive part of the heartland. Mackinder's theory can be summed up in three statements:

- Who rules Eastern Europe commands the heartland.
- Who rules the heartland rules Eurasia.
- Who rules Eurasia rules the world.

Mackinder believed that international politics in the first part of the 20th century would be a conflict between two great powers, Germany and Russia, for control of Eastern Europe. Mackinder's ideas appealed to a Karl Haushofer, a German geographer. Haushofer became Adolph Hitler's favorite geopolitician.

During World War II Hitler gained control of Eastern Europe and invaded Russia. Haushofer's ideas may have contributed to Hitler's determination to conquer Russia and the heartland. In any case, Mackinder's ideas predict major trends in international politics that developed in the 1950s and 1960s and continue to shape our world today.

From World Geography and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
case, scholars explain that, "Haushofer’s influence was considerable in military circles and became the basis for many of Hitler’s conceptions of Nazi expansion."

**Reviewing Facts and Main Ideas**

1. What country occupies the major portion of the "heartland" as described by Mackinder?

2. Why did Mackinder think that the heartland of Eurasia has the logical base from which a successful campaign for world conquest could be launched?

3. Describe how the heartland would come to dominate the world, according to Mackinder.

4. According to Mackinder, where did the unification of the heartland need to begin? Why?

5. What are the three statements that summarize the "Heartland theory?"

**Spykman’s Rimland Theory**

There were other theorists who felt that Mackinder had over-stated the importance of Eastern Europe and the heartland. One of these was Nicholas John Spykman who developed his "Rimland theory" in 1944.

Spykman agreed with Mackinder that Eurasia was the key to world conquest but he placed greater significance on the coastlands, which he called the "rimland." The "rimland" consisted of the area around the outside of the heartland (roughly, Western Europe, the Middle East and South and East Asia). Spykman noted that the rimland contained most of the world’s people as well as a large share of the world’s resources (see the accompanying map). He therefore concluded that it was much more significant than the thinly populated and environmentally harsh heartland. His argument was:

Who rules the rimland rules Eurasia.
Who rules Eurasia rules the world.

Spykman urged that American foreign policy should be directed to the control of the rimland states or at least to keeping the rimland from unifying politically. He saw the German and Japanese threat prior to and during World War II as a serious attempt to unify the rimland.

Spykman accurately predicted the shape international politics would take after the end of World War II in 1945. He argued that after the war Russia and China would become a threat to world stability. He also predicted that the United States would become committed to protecting the offshore island of Japan for the same reasons that the U.S. protected Great Britain during World War II, to preserve world stability. Some scholars have concluded that Spykman’s ideas about the "rimland" provided the basis for American foreign policy after World War II which was aimed at preventing the expansion of the Soviet Union into the "rimland."

**Reviewing Facts and Main Ideas**

6. What are some of the countries that occupy the rimland, as described by Spykman?

7. Why did Spykman think that the rimland of Eurasia was the logical base from which a successful campaign for world conquest could be launched?

8. What did Spykman recommend as a way for the United States to keep the rimland under control?

9. What are the two statements that summarize the Rimland theory?
Geopolitics Today

Geopolitical ideas continue to have an influence on the thinking of government leaders. For example, during Richard Nixon’s presidency (1969-1974) there was great tension between the Soviet Union and China. Many thought war might break out between the two nations.

Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger believed the Soviet Union had a greater chance to dominate the world than did China. Kissinger later explained, “President Nixon and I were convinced... that the United States could not accept a Soviet military assault on China.” As a result, they ordered the U.S. government to make plans to defend China if necessary. Their decision was not the result of an agreement between the Chinese government and the United States government. Rather, Kissinger explained, “was based on a sober geopolitical assessment.”

Using Thinking Skills

10. Compare the main ideas of Mackinder and Spykman. What is the major difference in the two theories?

11. Which theory—Mackinder’s “Heartland” or Spykman’s “Rimland”—best explains the following international events? Give reasons for your answer.

   a. At the conclusion of World War II the Soviet Union refused to withdraw its troops from Eastern Europe and today maintains control over the governments of Eastern Europe.

   b. In 1979 Soviet troops invaded neighboring Afghanistan and in 1987 continued to occupy that nation.

   c. In the Korean War (1950 to 1953) and the Vietnam War (1965 to 1975), the United States fought against communist troops.

   d. The United States maintains a string of military bases in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean area, including major naval and air force bases in the Philippines.
Heartland-Mackinder

Rimland-Spykman

STRATEGIC VIEWS
4. TEACHING DECISION-MAKING

In a democracy, decision-making is a fundamental and inescapable task of citizenship. Citizens are free to participate in a variety of decisions related to national security ranging from choices that may have immediate, personal consequences to choices that when aggregated across large numbers of people shape the direction of the nation.

Should I join the armed forces? Which way should I vote on a nuclear freeze referendum? Do I support a candidate who calls for increases in defense spending? Was the President right to send American troops to the Middle East? Should the U.S. boycott Japanese goods?

One of the highest priorities in civic education is development of civic decision-making skills. The health of our democracy and the quality of government depend upon the ability of citizens to make thoughtful decisions and to consider carefully the decisions made by political leaders. A decision is a choice among two or more alternatives. Thoughtful decision-making involves a conscious search for alternatives and an assessment of the consequences of alternatives in light of the decision-maker’s values or preferred goals. Thoughtful decision-makers take account of the impact of their choices on themselves and on others.

How can education about national security be strengthened through the use of decision-making teaching strategies? One approach involves systematic examination of key national security decisions such as President George Washington’s decision to issue a Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793, or President Abraham Lincoln’s decision to oppose secession of slave states, or President Harry Truman’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan. Cases about the actions of political leaders throughout history or in modern times as well as cases about the economic choices involved in national security issues are excellent vehicles for teaching about decision-making. Teachers can use such case material to improve students’ skills in framing issues, clarifying alternatives, making connections between alternatives and their likely consequences, using values to rate alternatives as positive or negative, and judging a decision as more or less desirable.

The Decision Tree Strategy

The decision tree is one analytical tool that can help students systematically practice such skills as they analyze the national security decisions of others as well as make and defend their own choices. It is based on a problem-solving procedure that involves mapping of alternatives and consequences in an occasion for decision. How do students use a decision tree?

Decision trees graphically depict four key elements of decision making: As students fill in decision trees, they use these elements to analyze historical issues and decisions in a systematic way. These elements are discussed briefly below.

1. Confrontation with the need for choice, an occasion for decision. An occasion for decision involves a problem or issue where the solution is not obvious. For example, in October, 1962 the CIA gave President John Kennedy photographic evidence that the Soviet Union was placing missiles in Cuba that were capable of firing atomic weapons at the United States.

2. Identification of alternatives. The quality of a decision depends upon identification and clarification of all reasonable alternatives. The decision tree lesson in this chapter focuses upon Kennedy’s use of a special group of advisors, known as Ex Comm, to present and explore all the possible options, or alternatives, open to him. Two options
advanced by the Ex Comm group were an air strike on Cuba to destroy the missile bases and a naval blockade to prevent further missiles and equipment from reaching Cuba.

3. Assessment of consequences associated with alternatives. Alternatives have consequences, which may be judged as more or less desirable. For example, some of Kennedy's advisors warned that an air strike could lead to retaliation by the Soviet Union, a highly negative outcome given everyone's goal to avoid nuclear war. Others argued that a blockade would not remove the missiles already in Cuba. Decision-making involves identifying consequences, calculating the likelihood various consequences will occur, and using one's values or goals as a guide to whether likely consequences are more or less positive or negative.

4. Selection of alternatives in terms of goals or values. Goals are outcomes valued by a decision-maker. However, in any given decision situation the decision-maker is likely to hold several values which are in conflict. For example, President Kennedy wanted to avoid nuclear war with the Soviet Union. At the same time, he wanted to stop the spread of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Decision-makers must determine which goals they value most in order to assess which alternatives they prefer most.

The decision tree strategy teaches students how facts and values are related in civic decision-making. Knowledge of the facts is needed to clarify alternatives and to predict consequences likely to result from one choice or another. At the same time, the decision-maker's values—beliefs about good or bad, better or worse—are needed to judge consequences, and to rank alternatives associated with them as more or less valuable or desirable. Civic decision-makers use both facts and values to make thoughtful decisions about national security issues.

In using decision trees to analyze cases about public issues, students should be informed that they are imposing a structure on events in history to help them clarify and assess choices of policy-makers. Decisions in history, subjected to social pressures and personal passions, often do not proceed systematically in terms of the essential elements of the decision tree. Thus, teachers should emphasize that a particular decision-maker, President Kennedy, for example, may not have acted as deliberately as students are required to do in using a decision tree in the environment of a classroom. Teachers should also point out that the model of reflective choice exemplified by the decision tree can be a useful aid to choices in one's life.

Sample Lessons

This chapter presents an example of a lesson that uses the decision tree, Ex Comm and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The lesson describes the decision-making process that led to a peaceful settlement of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Students use the information presented in the lesson to work through four essential elements of civic decision-making represented graphically in a decision tree.

A second lesson in this chapter illustrates another strategy, a decision chart, to help students develop skill in working with the same essential elements of decision-making encompassed by the decision tree. In this lesson, Commerce and Alliances: Britain's Decision About Fighter Aircraft, students analyze a decision by the British government about whether or not to participate with other European nations in the development of a fighter aircraft called the Eurofighter. The decision chart provides a very systematic way to help students appraise each alternative in light of the criteria or goals involved in the decision.

Notes


Lesson Plan and Notes for Teachers

Ex Comm and the Cuban Missile Crisis
by Donald A. Ritchie

Preview of Main Points

This lesson follows the decision-making process that led to a peaceful settlement of the Cuban Missile Crisis, averting the greatest threat of nuclear war the U.S. had ever faced. It outlines the way President Kennedy used Ex Comm (Executive Committee of the National Security Council), a group of government officials, and former officials, who met for a free and open discussion of the problem and the options, and how Ex Comm helped the President to decide in favor of a blockade of Cuba.

Connection to Textbooks

All textbooks cover the Cuban Missile Crisis in their accounts of the Kennedy Administration, but few have the space to explain how decisions were made during this momentous event. This lesson can be used in connection with the Cold War, the 1960's, or to contrast with the ways in which other presidents made major decisions affecting national security policy.

Objectives

Students are expected to:
1. identify the nature of the Cuban Missile Crisis;
2. identify and explain the various options facing the President;
3. analyze the way in which the President made his decision; and
4. evaluate the decision-making process in this crisis.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson

1. Present the class with the following scenario. You are President of the United States. The Director of the CIA brings word that an aggressive nation has been placing offensive weapons in a small country near your borders. These offensive weapons are not yet in place or operational, but within a matter of weeks they may be. The purpose of the aggressive nation is not clear, but it could plan to use these weapons as a threat to the United States, or as some form of blackmail: to make the United States back down somewhere else in the globe. So far, the existence of these weapons is a secret. The aggressive nation denies that they exist. What should you do?

2. Ask the students to respond, and note their suggested actions on the blackboard. After gathering all the possible ways they might respond, ask them: How, as President, would you reach your decision on what to do? Discuss with them the ways in which they think a President does, or should make decisions.

From American History and National Security: Supplementary Lessons for High School Courses, 1987. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43201.
Finally, it out that the above scenario is not far-fetched, but actually faced President Kennedy in October 1962.

**Developing the Lesson**

- Have the students read the Handout. Focus their attention not only on the options, but on the ways they were debated, and the way the decision was reached.
- Have the students complete the Decision Tree and respond to the questions at the end of the Handout.

**Concluding the Lesson**

- Compare the students’ initial suggestions for action to the actual events of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Ask them to note the differences, both in the actions they would have taken and the ways they would have made their decisions. Ask them to speculate on the consequences of their actions.
- Remind the students that even after Ex Comm presented the options and the President made his decision, diplomatic negotiations had to take place with the Soviet Union, and that the crisis was settled when both sides could agree to terms.

**Suggestions for Additional Reading**

This lesson was drawn from Robert F. Kennedy’s *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: W.W. Norton Co., 1969). The book is written in a simple and direct manner that most students should be able to grasp, and it expands upon the issues raised in the lesson. Also see Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Use of History for Decision Making* (New York: The Free Press, 1986).

**Answers to Questions**

1. Soviet offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba.
2. Air strikes to destroy the missile bases, or a blockade to stop new missiles and equipment from being delivered to Cuba.
3. Neither option could guarantee the destruction or removal of missiles already in Cuba; air strikes might require a full-scale military invasion of Cuba; the Soviet Union might respond militarily; Soviet ships might challenge a blockade.
4. To blockade Cuba.
5. Decision left to the class; answers will vary.
6. A variety of government officials were invited to express their candid opinions, criticize others’ suggestions, and raise all possible objections to proposals.
7. Members of Ex Comm settled on two likely options, prepared full reports, drafts of the President’s speech, and responses to situations that might follow. Members also warned the President what the consequences might be of either decision.
8. Diplomatic negotiations with the Soviets.
9. When the President chose to respond to an earlier proposal by the Soviet Union, in which they removed their missiles in return for a pledge by the U.S. not to invade Cuba, and when the Soviets accepted that agreement and turned their ships around.
Ex Comm and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Background to the Crisis

In October 1962, the world came very close to nuclear war when the United States discovered Soviet offensive missile bases on Cuba and demanded they be dismantled. For thirteen days, between October 16 and 29, tensions mounted until the Soviets agreed to remove the missiles and the crisis ended peacefully. During those tense days, President Kennedy made use of a special group of advisors, known as Ex Comm (Executive Committee of the National Security Council) to present, explore and debate all of the possible options open to the President.

Ex Comm included the Secretaries of State and Defense and their top staff, the director of the CIA, the National Security Advisor, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and on some occasions the Vice President, the Ambassador to the United Nations, and Congressional leaders. This group met almost continuously during the crisis and was encouraged by the President to speak out openly and to argue forcefully for their differing proposals and opinions. From their deliberations, the President was able to grasp fully all of the alternative courses of action open to him, and their possible risks.

This lesson will examine some of the arguments made in the Ex Comm, and how the President used this mechanism to help solve the gravest challenge of his administration.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

On October 16, CIA officials presented the President and Ex Comm with high-altitude photographs taken by U-2 planes flying over Cuba. These photographs demonstrated conclusively that the Soviets were placing missiles in Cuba, capable of firing atomic weapons at the United States. It seemed clear that the Soviets had lied when they promised not to place such missiles in Cuba.

Alternatives Presented to the President
1. A small minority of Ex Comm felt that the missiles did not change America’s defense capacity and that the U.S. should take no action against them.
2. Most members initially favored a surprise air strike to destroy the missile bases before they could launch missiles against the United States.
3. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara disagreed that air strikes could knock out all of the bases, and believed that a full-scale military invasion would be necessary to complete the job. Instead, he recommended that the U.S. conduct a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent further missiles and equipment from reaching the island.

Debate Over the Alternatives

Those who wanted an air strike responded that a blockade would neither stop work on the bases or remove the missiles already in Cuba. Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously favored immediate military action.

President Kennedy was skeptical of military views that the Soviets would not respond to a military attack on Cuba. He believed that if the Soviets did not act in Cuba, they would retaliate by blockading Berlin.

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson argued that the President must protect the security of the United States by destroying the missiles in Cuba.

From American History and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, the President's brother, supported the idea of a blockade. He argued that America's history and traditions ran against launching a surprise attack on a smaller nation. Such an action would weaken America's moral position at home and abroad.

ExComm was now deeply divided between those favoring an air strike and those favoring a blockade. Feeling the pressure that a wrong decision could trigger a nuclear war and destroy all humanity, the members continued their deliberation. They divided into groups to write their recommendations to the President, and draft his speech to the nation. They were also asked to anticipate all conceivable consequences that might result from the action and recommend how to deal with them. After writing their papers, the groups exchanged and criticized each other's work.

Those advocating a blockade had outlined the legal reasons for a blockade, called for meetings of the Organization of American States and the United Nations to deal with the crisis, and outlined procedures for stopping Soviet ships and responding to any military force that might be used. Those advocating air strikes listed their targets, outlined the way they would defend their actions to the world, and suggested a letter to the Soviet leadership warning against any retaliation against Berlin or any other trouble spot in the world.

The decision was now up to the President.

President Kennedy's Decision

On Saturday, October 20, both sides made their presentations to President Kennedy. After considerable discussion, the President decided in favor of a blockade.

The President was convinced of the wisdom of his decision after further military advice that the Air Force could not be certain of destroying all missile sites in Cuba with a surprise attack. If a blockade would not remove the missiles, neither would an air attack.

On Monday, the President met with Congressional leaders. They also favored air strikes, but the President remained committed to a blockade, and announced his decision on national television that evening.

Diplomatic negotiations continued during the tense days as the blockade went into effect. The world watched as Soviet ships steamed toward the American blockade around Cuba, wondering if they would turn back, or if there would be a confrontation.

On October 26, Soviet Premier Khrushchev sent President Kennedy a long, rambling, secret letter in which he warned of the danger of nuclear war. "What good would a war do you?" Khrushchev wrote. "You threaten us with war. But you well know that the very least you would get in response would be what you had given us; you would suffer the same consequences." Then Khrushchev made an offer: "I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments [missiles]. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will be obviated [made unnecessary]." Then, the next day, Khrushchev sent a second, more formal letter with an added demand: that the United States must also remove its missiles from Turkey. President Kennedy felt that to accept this second demand would weaken NATO. He decided to accept Khrushchev's first offer and to ignore the Turkish missile demand.
The gamble worked. At the last moment, the director of the CIA brought word that Soviet ships had stopped dead in the water. They would not confront the American blockade. The Soviet Union accepted the American pledge against invading Cuba, and turned their ships around. The missile bases were dismantled and the crisis ended. As Robert Kennedy wrote, "For a moment the world had stood still, and now it was going around again."

Evaluating Decision-Making During the Cuban Missile Crisis

Use the Decision Tree to help you answer the following questions:

1. What was the occasion for the decision facing President Kennedy?

2. What alternatives did Ex Comm recommend?

3. What were negative consequences of these alternatives?

4. Which alternative did President Kennedy choose?

5. What is your judgment of President Kennedy’s decision? Why?

Further, consider the ways in which decisions were reached during the Cuban Missile Crisis:

6. In what ways did Ex Comm permit full discussion of the problem and the options to solve it?

7. How did Ex Comm help the President reach his decision?

8. What steps were necessary to solve the crisis after the President had reached his decision?

9. How was the Cuban Missile Crisis finally solved?
The decision-tree device was developed by Roger LaRaus and Richard C. Remy and is used with their permission.
Commerce and Alliances: Britain's Decision about Fighter Aircraft

by Steven L. Miller

Preview of Main Points
This is a case study of a decision that the British government must make. It requires balancing competing goals, some of which are largely economic, and determining which of several alternatives provides a better avenue to national security.

Connection to Textbooks
This lesson could be used with a section on economic decision-making or economic goals.

Economic Concepts
Economic goals, decision-making, exports, and competition.

Objectives
Students are expected to:
1. use a decision-making procedure to solve a problem requiring the balancing of desirable goals;
2. discuss the reasons for competition among allies in the production of weapons; and
3. discuss the implications for national security of export competition in weapons among allies.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson
- Have the students read Handout 1. Reinforce the steps of the decision-making procedure. You might want to explain how different alternatives might meet the criteria differently and that students will have to judge which of the criteria are most important.
- Have the students examine the "Decision Chart." Give an example of how the chart might be filled in.

Developing the Lesson
- Have the students read "The Eurofighter," Handout 2.
- Ask the students for an example of one of the alternatives mentioned. Ask for an example of the criteria.
- Remind the students that they are to solve the problem from the British point of view. Let each student use the decision-making procedure to solve the problem.
- As the students are working, you might want to check each one's problem statement and help those who have missed the problem.

Concluding the Lesson

- Discuss the solutions and reasoning of several students. Focus on reasons why they might have disagreed.

- Have the class vote on the various alternatives based on their solutions.

- Discuss why the cooperating countries were also competing with each other. Focus on economic incentives and their effect on the ability of countries to cooperate.

- Ask the students the following questions:
  1. Do you think the answer you chose is the best solution for national security or the best decision balancing a number of concerns (criteria)?
  2. Are these two things the same? Different? Always?

Further Discussion

- Your students might want to know how the EFA situation turned out. As of late 1985, Britain, West Germany, and Italy had agreed to produce an EFA and were working out details including that of production responsibility and weapons systems. France and Spain were unhappy with the other countries’ insistence on the Harrier air superiority design. These two countries decided not to participate.

Suggestions for Additional Reading


For more information on the Eurofighter see these issues of The Economist which helped provide information for the student materials.


This article cites some of the political reasons for West Germany’s move toward the French position.


Kruzel’s chapter provides some background information on arms competition and the technological drive behind weapons development.
Commerce and Alliances: Britain's Decision about Fighter Aircraft

A Decision-Making Method

In this exercise you will make a tough decision that concerns a proposed new fighter aircraft for some of the countries of Western Europe. You will make this decision from the point of view of the British. To do that you need some information that is provided in Handout 2. You also need a method to help you clarify the problem and make up your mind about what Great Britain should do. The following decision-making method should help you reach a sound decision. Record your decision on the "Decision Chart" at the end of this Handout.

Here are the steps in the decision-making procedure:

1. Define the problem.
2. List alternative solutions.
3. State the criteria or goals.
4. Evaluate alternatives in terms of the criteria.
5. Make your decision.

Let's look at the decision procedure a little more closely.

(1) You must define the problem with care or else you might wind up solving the wrong problem. The article itself contains a problem statement if you look for it carefully.

(2) Alternatives are the different solutions that might be chosen to solve the problem. One of these is underlined in the article as an example, but there are several others mentioned. You might even add ideas of your own.

(3) Criteria are the measuring sticks we use to tell us whether a proposed action is a good idea. In the article the criterion of "saving money" is discussed. Saving money to use for other defense spending is one thing the British would like to achieve and thus, it is a criterion.

(4) However, each alternative must be measured against all of the criteria. Most alternatives will not meet all of the criteria. You will have to evaluate each alternative to see which one meets the most important criteria.

(5) Finally, you will make a decision.

Begin by reading the article and writing the problem statement on the top of the "Decision Chart." Next, record all of the alternatives in the first column and criteria in the top row. One way to record the evaluation of each alternative in terms of the criteria is to use +'s, 0's, and −'s. Place a + in the space on the grid if an alternative meets a criterion very well and a − if it measures up poorly on that criterion. Use a 0 for an average rating.

From Economics and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
**Decision Chart**

**Define the problem:**

______________________________

______________________________

**CRITERIA**

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63 72
The Eurofighter

Britain, West Germany, France, Italy and Spain have been trying to agree on a fighter aircraft that would be produced and used by all five countries. In addition, the Europeans plan to sell the fighter (called the Eurofighter or EFA) to other governments and thus compete with planes sold abroad by the United States. The Europeans would like a larger share of the export market for fighters partly because it is expected to be a huge business opportunity—3,100 planes costing over $60 billion in the next 20 years.

However, difficulties have arisen. There is disagreement over the kind of plane to build. The French want a ground attack bomber because they think that it would sell best to other countries over the next few decades. The West Germans want a fighter to defend against attacks from other aircraft in case of an invasion by the Soviet Union. The British think that a plane that can do both, a fighter-bomber, is needed even though it will be more expensive. So, the countries cannot agree on the final design for the plane.

The countries are also competing with each other. The British version of the plane requires heavier engines that are produced in Britain. The French version can use smaller engines that are built in France. The countries also disagree on how much of the production work will be done in each country. France originally wanted to do 46% of the work, but has lowered its demand to 31%. The British have suggested 10% for Spain, 15% for Italy, and 25% shares for each of the other three.

At one point, all countries except France seemed to have agreed with the British plan and version of the plane. However, it now appears that the Germans will side with the French for political reasons. That will leave the British with the problem of what kind of air support to acquire. The British could agree to go along with the French. Collaboration would be good for relations with France and might help to encourage the French in their movement back toward a common defense of Europe.

On the other hand, the British could give up on the partnership effort and single-handedly build the version of the planes they think they need to have. The British experts believe that the plane they want to build would be up to 20% cheaper if they built it alone compared to building the same plane in collaboration with the other countries. Saving money is particularly important because the British have other defense needs, some with a higher priority than the fighter aircraft. The “go-it-alone” possibility could result in some exports for Britain, although fewer than if the French version sells as well as expected.

Buying American planes or producing these planes under license purchased from American producers would be even cheaper. But, either of these options would mean discarding the design work done so far and giving up some of the jobs that British industries had been counting on. Furthermore, some of the jobs lost would be in the aerospace industry. This industry is one that political leaders in both France and Britain have been trying to develop.

One other suggestion has been to forget the EFA in favor of a combination of more anti-aircraft missiles and “Harrier” bomber planes. The missiles would be used to defend the skies over Europe from enemy planes and the Harriers would take up the bombing role of the EFA.

What do you think the British should do?

5. TEACHING WITH CASE STUDIES

Case studies have been used for years in schools of business, law and medicine to bring reality closer to the classroom. Case studies may take several different forms. One typology divides case studies into nine basic types based largely on the nature of the source of information used to create the case: "court cases, open-ended episodes, interpretive essays, cases based on documents, memoirs, eyewitness accounts, vignettes, chronicles and narratives."

Uses and Abuses of Case Studies

Education about national security can be enhanced through the use of case studies. Case studies can be an excellent means for initiating study of a topic or issue, for taking an in-depth look at a complex subject, or for providing students with a culminating experience that summarizes, highlights, or brings together key dimensions of national security subject matter. Case studies can also help highlight the human side of seemingly arcane national security issues or governmental institutions by focusing on human relations or dramatic events in the lives of individuals. Case studies can also efficiently present students with conflicting points of view or interpretations of a complex situation or event. Finally, this instructional strategy is well suited to teaching concepts by presenting main ideas and points of complex national security topics in ways that are interesting to students.

Unfortunately, the case study method is also one that can be easily abused. Perhaps the most common form of this abuse is simply to give students a long excerpt from a news story or other readily available source and to ask a few questions about the material. While at first glance such a "case study" may seem interesting, the fit between the material and the purposes of instruction will usually not be very close. This is because such material is not specially prepared to meet the particular objectives of the social studies lesson being taught nor is it written with the reading capabilities of high school students in mind.

Requirements for Effective Use of Case Studies

Several requirements need to be met for the effective development and use of case studies in education about national security. First, the instructional objectives that a case study is to serve must be clearly identified. This means confronting squarely two questions: What should students learn as a result of studying the case? What case materials and examples will best help students learn what you want them to learn? While these questions may seem obvious, sharply focusing a case study by using such questions is too often overlooked.

Second, in most instances the case study should be originally prepared to meet the learning objectives that have been identified (usually this means written, although films and audio tapes are possible). Lengthy excerpts from newspapers, diaries, government documents and the like should not routinely be used directly as the main component of the case study. Where such material appears in a case study it should be carefully constructed so students understand how the material relates to the purposes of the instruction and the topic under study. In addition, such material should be carefully selected and edited to insure students can read it without undue difficulty.

Third, case studies should always be accompanied by questions that require students to demonstrate that they have grasped and understood the facts and main ideas in the case. In addition, the case study should contain questions that require students to use higher level thinking skills appropriate to the purposes of instruction. Students, for example, might be asked to interpret key ideas in the case, or to evaluate or make judgments about sections described, or to explain certain events in light of concepts being studied.

Sample Lessons

This chapter contains two lessons that illustrate the use of the case study strategy
in education about national security. The first, *Press Censorship During the Civil War*, is a concise look at how Generals Winfield Scott and William Tecumseh Sherman sought to limit press coverage of their military campaigns. This case study illustrates the inherent tension in a democracy between freedom of the press and the needs of national security, and is suitable for students with a wide range of ability levels. The case contains an application exercise midway through the narrative and both factual recall and higher level questions in the concluding exercise, "Reviewing Facts and Main Ideas."

The second exemplary lesson, *African Resistance to Imperialism*, presents three short case studies that illustrate why armed resistance to western imperialism was seldom effective in 19th century Africa. Each case is followed by a series of questions that require students to identify the main ideas presented, to draw inferences and to compare the experiences of the different groups studied—the Ibo and Central Plateau peoples of Nigeria, the Zulu in South Africa, and the Ethiopians. The concluding exercise asks students to apply what they have learned from all three cases to the interpretation of a quotation from a French historian of imperialism. The case material in the lesson also illustrates how primary sources, in this instance eyewitness accounts of African battles, can be effectively woven into case material written specifically for students.

Notes


Press Censorship During the Civil War

by Donald A. Ritchie

Preview of Main Points

This lesson describes some of the means by which military authorities imposed censorship on the press during the Civil War. The lesson contrasts the early rules covering what correspondents could and could not report, against later orders that barred them completely from certain armies. It raises issues of both military secrecy and sensitivity to criticism, and it poses questions about how a fundamental constitutional right, freedom of the press, could be limited for reasons of national security.

Connection to Textbooks

Most textbooks cover the major battles of the Civil War, and discuss civil liberties on the homefront. But rarely do they connect civil liberties to the battlefield. This lesson can build on textbook accounts of Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus and his "stretching" of the Constitution to preserve the Union, for a general discussion of rights and liberties during wartime. The lesson also provides supplementary information on censorship and a case study of one General and the press.

Objectives

Students are expected to:

1. understand the basic conflict between reporters seeking news to satisfy the growing readership of their papers, and military authorities trying to keep valuable information from falling into enemy hands;
2. identify the types of news that was permissible or forbidden to send under General Scott's orders;
3. recognize the differences between this type of limited press censorship and General Sherman's more sweeping orders barring reporters from his lines;
4. interpret and appraise General Sherman's decision to court marshall the reporter; and
5. recognize the complexity and ambiguities in the clash between freedom of the press and national security.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson

Suggest the following scenario to the students: a reporter for the high school paper discovers that the star player for the school's football team has been injured and may be unable to play in the upcoming game against a rival school. Absence of the player would cause a major revision in the team's strategy, and they have held back the news to avoid alerting the rival team. The student paper is due for publication on the day before the big game. Should the reporter publish the "scoop?"
Poll the students for their reaction. If sentiment is largely in favor of suppressing the story, ask what the difference would be if the reporter had discovered that a key player on the rival team had been injured. What is the basic responsibility of the reporter? Discuss the conflicting loyalties between reporting for the paper and protecting the school.

Developing the Lesson

Have the students read the first part of the Handout, "General Scott's Telegraph Orders," and answer questions 1. through 6. Ask them to justify their answers. Answers are:

1. Could be published, since it violates none of the three stipulations.
2. Could not be published, reveals troops movements.
3. Could not be published, predicts troop movements.
5. Could not be published, reveals mutiny among the soldiers.
6. Could be published.

Ask the students to identify which of the three stories that were publishable (i.e., 1, 4, 6) might raise additional objections from the military for reasons not specified in General Scott's orders. Answers are stories 1 and 4 because:

1. Reports of major defeats were sometimes censored or delayed because they might demoralize the pub' s. Thus the government held back news of the Union army's defeat at Bull Run in July 1861.
2. Criticism of individual officers damaged their reputations and wounded their pride.

Conclude the discussion of General Scott's orders by informing students that in addition to controlling the telegraph, many military officers tried to censor the letters that war correspondents sent to their papers from the military camps. The generals feared that such news would give valuable information to the Confederates. Some officers also objected to unflattering accounts and criticism they received in some papers. Officers held up newspaper dispatches until the correspondents agreed to make certain changes, such as substituting the word "withdrawal" for "retreat."

Concluding the Lesson

Have the students read the remainder of the Handout, "General Sherman Bars the Press." Then ask them to respond to the review questions at the end of the Handout.

Conduct a discussion of the review questions to be sure they understand the main ideas and motivations involved.

Use questions 12-15 to determine whether the students recognize the differences between the first portion of the lesson, concerning General Scott's specific prohibitions, and the second portion, concerning General Sherman's blanket prohibition. These are open-ended questions, designed to stimulate debate but not to elicit definite answers. Discuss the ambiguities in knowing what are legitimate and illegitimate restrictions on a free press and the public's right to know.
Further Discussion

You might want to compare the situations of the Civil War to recent times. Ask the students if television reporters should be barred from battlefields. Class discussion might be related to the media's role in changing public opinion during the Vietnam War. Or comparison could be made to the government's prohibition against reporters during the sending of American troops to Grenada in the Caribbean in 1983. Press criticism of their exclusion led to a government proposal that a small pool of reporters be available to accompany such emergency missions, as a means of preventing news from leaking prematurely.

Or students could be asked to construct their own scenarios in which the desire of the press to cover a story would be pitted against security considerations.

Suggestions for Additional Reading

Students who wish to explore this subject further can be directed to J. Cutler Andrews, The North Reports the Civil War (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985 [1955]); Bernard A. Weisberger, Reporters for the Union (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977 [1953]). These books describe censorship and other hazards facing the Civil War reporters.

Students might also want to read Knox's account, published in the New York Herald, on January 18, 1863; and other Civil War era reporting in newspapers available on microfilm.

Press Censorship During the Civil War

The First Amendment to the Constitution protects the freedom of the press. However, there is often uncertainty about what limitations on the press are legitimate to protect national security. This problem becomes even more difficult during wartime.

When the Civil War began in 1861, the public clamored for news of the latest battles, strategies, and casualties. The sales of newspapers increased dramatically throughout the North. As their circulation increased, newspapers could afford to send out many correspondents to cover the battlefronts. These reporters risked their lives to follow the troops, observe the battles, and send back reports to their papers.

The Union government did not want news reports to interfere with the war effort. In this lesson you will read how two Union generals acted to control the war news.

General Scott's Telegraph Orders

Because of the demand for quick news, Civil War correspondents sent stories over the telegraph whenever they could. But early in the war the federal government took control of telegraph lines out of Washington, and set certain conditions under which stories could go out.

In July 1861, General Winfield Scott, commander of the Union armies, set the following conditions for reporting military activities over the telegraph, based on an agreement with the correspondents: Reporters could not telegraph anything about 1) troop movements, 2) mutinies among the soldiers; and 3) predictions of future military movements.

Under these conditions, which of the following stories could be telegraphed, and which would be censored?

1. Union troops suffered a crushing loss in battle today. Casualties mounted to over 500 men killed and a thousand wounded.

2. The 5th Massachusetts Regiment crossed the Potomac into Virginia today, fresh from their recent victories. They will be quartered in Centerville for the next two weeks.

3. General Sherman reports that his forces have completed their mission in Tennessee, having successfully achieved objectives and routed the enemy. It is expected that his troops will move into Georgia within the next week.

4. The failure of our armies at Bull Run can be blamed entirely on the incompetency of General McDowell. He should be removed from command immediately.

5. This reporter has established that the brief rioting among troops from the 1st brigade stemmed from their failure to be paid when promised. Military authorities are at work to solve the problem. Tonight the troops are calm.

6. The 6th Pennsylvania Regiment reports no evidence of the Confederates in the vicinity of Gettysburg.

From American History and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
General Sherman Bars the Press

General William Tecumseh Sherman suffered from especially poor relations with the press. He once complained that newspaper correspondents “come into camp, poke around among the lazy shirk[er]s and pick up their camp rumors and publish them as facts, and the avidity [eagerness] with which these rumors are swallowed by the public makes even some of our officers bow to them. I will not. They are a pest and shall not approach me and I will treat them as spies which in truth they are.”

In 1862, Sherman issued orders that barred all civilians from the area occupied by his army. Despite this order, many newspapers correspondents continued to follow his troops and report on their engagements. In December, Confederate forces in Mississippi turned back an offensive by Sherman’s troops. Before the correspondents could send out their stories of the defeat, Sherman ordered his staff to seize and open any bulky letters being mailed. This search uncovered a thick envelope containing a story and two maps of the battle being sent by Thomas Wallace Knox to the New York Herald. Knox’s account criticized General Sherman’s leadership, and many of his facts about the battle were wrong. Sherman decided to punish the reporter. As he explained to another officer:

I am going to have the correspondent of the New York Herald tried by court marshals as a spy, not that I want the fellow shot, but because I want to establish the principle that such people cannot attend our armies, in violation of orders, and defy us, publishing their garbled statements and defaming officers who are doing their best.

The Herald correspondent was charged with: 1) giving information to the enemy, directly or indirectly, 2) being a spy, and 3) disobeying orders. In February 1863, a military court found Knox innocent of the first two charges, but guilty of the third. He was sentenced to banishment from Sherman’s lines and warned that he would be imprisoned if he attempted to return. Other correspondents also moved away from Sherman’s armies.

Reviewing Main Facts and Ideas

7. What reasons made military officers uneasy about newspaper correspondents accompanying their armies?

8. What were General Sherman’s objections to reporters in his camp?

9. Why did Sherman decide to court marshal Thomas Knox?

10. What orders was Knox found guilty of violating?

11. What was Knox’s punishment?

12. In what ways did General Sherman’s treatment of the press differ from General Scott’s earlier orders on censorship?

13. Why did newspaper correspondents risk offending military officers by reporting on the battles they fought?

14. Should the press be permitted to cover all military engagements?

15. Under what circumstances might the freedom of the press and the public’s right to know be restricted to protect military actions?
African Resistance to Imperialism

by Robert B. Woyach

Preview of Main Points

This lesson uses a series of short case studies to help students identify reasons why armed resistance to imperialism was seldom effective in 19th century Africa. The case studies look at the Ibo and Central Plateau peoples of Nigeria, the Zulu in South Africa, and the Ethiopians. They demonstrate in particular the importance of the gap in military technology between Africans and Europeans. Where available, primary sources are used to provide eyewitness accounts of clashes between Africans and the European invaders.

Connection to Textbooks

All major world history textbooks devote a chapter to European imperialism in Africa. However, most look at the period solely from the viewpoint of Europeans: European strategy, concerns and the impact on European politics. Seldom is any mention given of African resistance to imperialism. This lesson provides an opportunity to look at African efforts to defend their homelands and at the obstacles they faced in doing so.

Objectives

Students are expected to:

1. identify the key ways in which Africans and Asians responded to imperialism in the late 19th century;

2. know the location of Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia;

3. analyze case studies of armed resistance by Africans in order to identify reasons for the success of European imperialism in Africa;

4. explain the impact of the technology gap between Africans and Europeans on African attempts to resist imperialism; and

5. explain the importance of modern weapons to Ethiopia's ability to maintain its independence through armed resistance in the late 19th century.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson

- Review with students the basic purpose of the 1890 Berlin Conference. Note that while the Treaty of Berlin was meant to limit conflict among Europeans over African colonies, it did not ensure them control of Africa.

- Ask students to put themselves into the shoes of Africans during this period. Europeans are trying to extend their control over the Africans' homelands. They are putting up
settlements, taking over trade, imposing taxes and trying to change time-honored local ways of doing things. How would the students react? What would they do? (See Background Information for Teachers on responses to imperialism on the part of Asians and Africans.)

If the class has a hard time taking on the perspective of Africans, ask them how they would react if the Soviet Union were to "take over" the United States, and Soviet bureaucrats and military began creating a socialist economy and authoritarian state for us.

List the suggestions on the board. Ask the class how feasible they think each suggestion is. That is, would it succeed in stopping the Europeans in 19th century Africa?

Developing the Lesson

Explain to the class that while we seldom hear about African resistance to colonialism, in fact Africans in all parts of the continent did so, some through armed struggle.

Distribute copies of the Handout. Explain that the reading is a set of case studies from three parts of Africa: Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia. Locate all three areas on a map of Africa.

Have the class read the case studies answering the questions at the end of each in turn.

Alternately, you may want to read the case studies aloud and have students in small groups discuss the questions and write answers to them. In either case, the questions at the end of each case study should be answered before going on to the next case.

Concluding the Lesson

Discuss the students' analyses of the case studies as a class. You might ask:

1. What were some reasons why armed resistance by Africans was generally unsuccessful? What was the single most important reason? How do these case studies support your answer?

2. How important to the history of colonialism were European efforts to restrict the flow of modern arms to Africa? Why did European efforts to restrict the arms trade break down in the case of Ethiopia? What implications might the African experience have for contemporary arguments about restricting the flow of modern weapons to other countries?

3. Africans generally used traditional tactics in their wars with Europeans. These called for daylight fighting by massed troops, not unlike the Europeans themselves. Within a century a new style of guerrilla warfare would emerge. How would guerrilla tactics help people with less advanced technology defend themselves against imperialism?

4. Based on these case studies, do you think it was better for Africans to resist imperialism through passive or armed resistance in the 19th century? Why?

Background Information for Teachers

Responses to European Imperialism. All Third World peoples who came into contact with Europeans during the Age of Imperialism reacted in some way. Their specific reactions depended on many things, as did the success of their efforts to maintain local autonomy. Some key responses included:

1. Military resistance: prolonged military resistance was the exception rather than the rule because of the technological imbalance between Westerners and African and Asian peoples. Successful military resistance required access to modern weapons as in Ethiopia, which was
generally difficult. It also required a political system capable of organizing the manpower and other resources needed. In much of Africa, the political systems were not large or centralized enough for this.

2. **Passive resistance**: passive resistance, the most common response to the imperialists, took many forms. For the ll0 it meant failure to pay taxes or otherwise cooperate with colonial laws until and unless armed forces came to force compliance. Passive resistance made a colony more expensive and less economically attractive to the Europeans. The Chinese used passive resistance of a different sort. They created a government office to monitor Western compliance with the unequal treaties, trying to use the imperialists' own laws to slow down Western penetration.

3. **Negotiated Takeover**: some African nations, such as Uganda, actually negotiated an arrangement with Western powers giving the latter control over their international affairs. This was the kind of arrangement the Italians were trying to negotiate in Ethiopia. The benefit of this strategy for indigenous rulers was the relatively high level of autonomy they were often able to wrest from the Europeans.

4. **Collaboration**: in parts of Africa the immediate response of many smaller groups was to cooperate with the imperialists in attacking and overthrowing rival political and national groups. Most colonial powers in Africa depended on Africans rather than Europeans for their military and bureaucratic manpower. Collaboration sometimes positioned a people to take greater advantage of new arrangements under colonialism. But it never succeeded in staving off foreign domination.

5. **Transformation/Adaptation**: to varying degrees many peoples tried to transform their political, economic, social and military systems to enable them to compete with the West. Few, however, had the time or the stability to transform themselves successfully. The most successful example of this strategy was Japan whose motto was "Eastern ethic; Western technique."

6. **Diplomatic Buffering**: a very few states with organized political systems managed to maintain some measure of independence by playing off two or more colonial powers. Thailand was a classic example of such a buffer between French and British interests in Southeast Asia. Buffer states could maintain some local autonomy but could not escape penetration by Western powers. Their survival depended on being seen as cooperative with all the rival powers in the area.

**Armed Resistance by Africans.** Armed resistance against imperialism by Africans during the 19th century was generally futile. As noted above, African political units were usually too small and fragmented to organize large-scale resistance. Even when they did, the gap in military technology was overwhelming.

Moreover, Africans generally were not innovative about military tactics. Guerrilla tactics seemed cowardly to the Africans. But their frontal assaults on European positions made the latter's rapid-fire weapons even more awesome. Historian Hilaire Belloc has called the rapid-fire Maxim guns (early machine guns) the "sovereign determinant of African affairs" during this period.

The importance of rapid-fire weapons is clear when one compares the experiences of Nigeria, the Zulu and Ethiopia. Nigeria was more typical of much of Africa, in which the small scale of political units made active resistance virtually impossible in any event. But even in cases like the Zulu in which large scale and well organized societies came up against the Europeans, they could not succeed in the long run because of the technological gap. The success of the Ethiopians, who were less well organized and trained and less martial than the Zulu, depended clearly on two things: (1) Menelik's understanding that frontal assaults on fortified positions would be too
costly; and (2) the fact that the Ethiopians had managed to wrangle modern rapid-fire weapons and cannon out of the Europeans.

Suggestions for Additional Reading


A scholarly work that provides a lot of information about the hidden history of the Ibo.


A collection of scholarly articles about the Plateau State and its political and economic organization before and after the coming of the British.


An engaging history of the Zulu War and its causes. This book could be read by above average students, or students with a particular interest in the subject.


A very thorough look at Ethiopia, its political system and its history in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The discussion is too detailed for all but the most interested student.

Answers to the Handout

1. a. Disunited. Each town was responsible for its own defense and no one political leader could mobilize all the towns.

   b. Experienced, though not necessarily a martial people.

   c. Primitive in comparison with the British. They had only bows and arrows, spears and muzzle-loading muskets.

   d. Brave, they met the invader head on.

   e. Independent. A high level of local autonomy characterized both the Ibo towns and the plateau peoples.

2. Answers will vary. Ease of conquest was due in part to political disunity and primitive military technology. Difficulty in ruling was also due in part to disunity and traditions of independence.

3. Some saw cooperation as a way to defeat traditional enemies. Others saw it as a way to end slave raiding.

4. Yes. He describes them as brave.

5. The ease with which the Europeans killed so many warriors devastated the old man. He seems to have simply given up.
6. Answers will vary. Students should see that the Zulu, in contrast to the Ibo and the plateau people, were a unified nation. They were also more militaristic. Similarities included their bravery, independence, relatively primitive arms and tactics in battle.

7. Answers will vary. The most important reason was the British inability to keep up their rate of fire. If they could have, they might have won the battle despite everything else.

8. Zulu frontal assaults made the British rapid-fire weapons all the more effective.

9. So many warriors died in the battles that prolonged resistance proved impossible.

10. a. The Zulu were the most unified. The Ethiopians were more unified than the Ibo but their feudal system had cracks in it. The Emperor could not be certain of the support of regional kings.

   b. The Zulu had the most formidable military tradition. The Ethiopians also had a military tradition. The Ibo were the least militaristic.

   c. The Ibo could field relatively few soldiers. At Isandhlwana the Zulu had 20,000. At Adwa the Ethiopians had 80,000.

   d. All three appeared to be characterized by discipline and bravery.

   e. Of the three, only the Ethiopians had weapons equal to the repeating rifles, machine guns and artillery of the Europeans.

12. Answers will vary. The Zulu probably would have beaten early invasion forces. If the British had mustered all the force they could, however, the Zulu probably would have been defeated. They were a smaller nation, with no industry, and would have been totally dependent on the outside for modern arms.

13. Answers will vary. Students should see, however, that rapid-fire weapons were terribly important to European dominance over Africa.
African Resistance to Imperialism

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, European nations extended their colonial empires to include most of Africa. However, Europeans did not simply divide up and take over the African continent. Many Africans resisted imperialism. Some did so passively, by not cooperating with the Europeans. Others took up arms against the invaders.

Armed struggle proved hopeless in most cases. The following case studies highlight the obstacles that Africans faced in defending their homelands from Western imperialism. Read the case studies and use the questions at the end of each to come to some conclusions about why armed resistance failed in Africa.

Resisting the British in Nigeria

By the 1890s, the British had maintained trading posts in the Niger River area of West Africa for almost two centuries. They had long declared the area a British Protectorate, even though their control was limited to a few coastal settlements.

The area was economically important to the British. At first it had been a source of slaves. More recently the Delta area in southeastern Nigeria had become a source of palm oil, used to lubricate the machines of the Industrial Revolution. Farther north, the Central Plateau had become a source of tin.

The Conquest of Iboland. In 1897 British colonial administrators and commercial interests wanted to eliminate African middlemen from the palm oil trade. They began to plan the conquest of southeastern Nigeria.

The people occupying the area, the Ibo, presented a challenge that was typical of West Africa. Iboland was densely populated but at a national level it was only loosely organized. Many towns were located within a twenty mile radius of any one place. But while each town saw itself as part of the Ibo nation, each was essentially an independent unit. So each town had to be taken over by the British invaders.

The British invaded Iboland in November 1901. The invasion force consisted of 74 European officers and 3,464 African soldiers and carriers from other West African nations. The invaders were armed with Maxim guns (an early machine gun), rockets and a repeating rifle specially designed for bush fighting. The Ibo were armed with spears, bow and arrow and musket. The report of a British officer to the Colonial Office describes a typical battle.

The enemy as a rule employed sniping tactics only, but on the 12th February, when the column was marching from Elelle to Ubele, the enemy made a determined effort to oppose the column's advance. On approaching the town of Ubele, both the Advance and the Rear Guards were simultaneously engaged, the former in fighting its way into the town whilst the latter was engaged in beating off the enemy pressing on the rear of the column. A large market place was eventually occupied, and the troops formed a square . . . The enemy made a determined attack on all sides of the square, advancing with great bravery, but were repulsed with heavy loss, suffering principally from the effect of Maxim and M/m gun fires.

The Ibo campaign was concluded in March 1902. Not a single British soldier was killed during the campaign, although a number of native troops lost their lives. No one bothered to count the considerable number of Ibo who died. Yet the British were still not firmly in control of Iboland.

From World History and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
When the British troops moved on, the Ibo went on with their lives pretty much as if the white man had never come.

The Conquest of the Central Plateau. Soon after the conquest of Iboland, the British focused their attention on the Central Plateau north of the River Benue. The plateau was inhabited by a crazy quilt of competing ethnic and language groups.

The plateau people had had even less contact with white men than the Ibo had had. Some thought the white-skinned people were ghosts whose defeat required magic more than weapons. Some groups cooperated with the British. They used British arms to defeat their own traditional enemies. Still others cooperated because they believed British promises to end slave raiding in the area. But none of the plateau people liked the harsh taxes the British imposed. Nor did they want to mine tin for British factories. Yet, their efforts at armed resistance failed. One village elder explained what happened:

By the time of the white men’s coming, a message had been sent to my grandfather from Jipari about the danger of resisting . . . But my grandfather said “Come what may, nothing has ever defeated us here in Kagu. If it means death, let it be . . . .” They thought it was the type of war they were used to. (The men of Kagu went out to battle the British invasion force with bows, arrows and spears. Suddenly the guns roared. And just as suddenly scores of warriors lay dead on the ground around the old man.) At the end, when the chief saw all the dead bodies, he said “Well, it is finished. What am I to live for?” He sat down by his traditional worshipping house. We did not know exactly what happened to him, but only discover his dead body.

Identifying and Interpreting Main Ideas

1. In the following pairs of adjectives, which best characterizes the people of Iboland and the Central Plateau in the early 20th century?
   a. Politically Unified......Disunited
   b. Militarily Experienced......Inexperienced
   c. Technologically Advanced......Primitive
   d. Brave.......Cowardly
   e. Independent.......Controlled by Outsiders

2. Which of the above traits helps explain why the British could so easily defeat the Ibo and plateau people in battles? Which help to explain why the British found it difficult to actually rule these people?

3. Why did some African peoples cooperate with the British?

4. Did the European who reported on the encounter with the Ibo seem to respect them? How can you tell?

5. What can you tell about the psychological impact of these battles from the African account?
The Invasion of Zululand (1879)

The European invaders did not always win their battles with African defenders. In southern Africa the British faced a very different foe than they did in West Africa. The Zulu were a highly organized African nation. The Zulu king commanded a disciplined and well-trained army that included the majority of able-bodied Zulu men.

By 1879, the Zulu had lived peacefully with the British colony in Natal for over 30 years. Nonetheless, in January 1879 a British army under the command of General Lord Chelmsford invaded Zululand to prevent incursions by the Boer settlers to the north and west. The invading army was composed of 9,000 British regulars armed with repeating rifles, Gatling guns, rocket batteries and cavalry. Lord Chelmsford also had 8,000 African troops under his command.

When he was informed of the invasion, King Cetshwayo of the Zulu decided to follow a defensive strategy. Zulu armies were to delay British advances by confronting the invading army. But they were prohibited from crossing the border into Natal and attacking British settlements. Cetshwayo hoped the British would come to their senses and call off the invasion. In the event that hostilities occurred, Cetshwayo believed that if the Zulu could win one decisive battle, the British would see the futility of the war and sue for peace.

Isandhlwana. On January 22nd, with bands playing and brass cannon gleaming, the main British column set up camp at a place called Isandhlwana. On January 22nd, around noon, a British cavalry force caught sight of the Zulu army and the battle began. Almost 20,000 Zulu troops had massed for the attack. They faced one prong of the invasion force—600 British infantry, 100 cavalry, 70 artillerymen with two cannons, and about 600 native infantry.

Despite the discipline and overwhelming numbers of the Zulu, the British appeared at first to have their way. Rifle fire racked the on-coming warriors, forcing them to take cover and hold back. But then the firing slowed. It was the opening the Zulu needed. Surging on despite heavy losses they overwhelmed the British redcoats by sheer will and numbers. A Zulu commander later recalled:

We were fired on first by mounted men who checked our advance for some time. We lost heavily from their fire. My regiment suffered most, not only from the mounted troops but in a crossfire from the white soldiers.

As we advanced I heard a bugle call and saw some soldiers massing together. The soldiers had fired at a terrible rate, but suddenly stopped, and some began running. We went for those who remained. They got into and under wagons but we killed all of them there. Next we came on a mixed party of mounted and foot numbering about a hundred. They resisted desperately, some firing, some using swords. I repeatedly heard the command "Fire!" shouted. But we proved too many for them and killed them all.

The Zulu killed all but a few of the British troops at Isandhlwana. It was the most humiliating defeat suffered by the British in a colonial war. The defeat was due in part to the overwhelming numbers, discipline and dedication of Zulu troops. A variety of tactical errors had hurt the British as well. But in spite of everything the British might have won at Isandhlwana except...
for the mysterious slowing of British fire half-way through the battle. There had been plenty of ammunition. But the ammunition boxes were tightly nailed and belted. Quartermasters had stuck closely to regulations in distributing ammunition during the battle. As a result, the British soldiers were not resupplied as fast as they were firing. The quartermasters in effect gave up the one advantage the British invaders had over the Zulu—their rapid-firing weapons.

Battles Won But Wars Lost. In victory, however, the Zulu suffered terribly at Isandhlwana. Over 2,000 Zulu warriors lay dead. At least as many were wounded. One tenth of the nation’s male population had been killed or wounded on that single day!

Zulu armies halted the advance of every British column that invaded Zululand in the early months of 1879. But Zulu losses in each battle were enormous. By June 1879 it was clear that they could no longer resist British carbines and Gatling guns. On July 4, 1879 British troops marched into Jlanda, the royal family’s settlement. Zulu independence was crushed.

1. Identifying and Interpreting Main Ideas

6. In what ways was the Zulu nation different from the Ibo? In what ways were they similar?

7. Why were the British invaders defeated at Isandhlwana? Could they have won the battle? How?

8. Did Zulu battle tactics play into the hands of the British?

9. Why did the Zulu, despite their success in stopping British columns, still lose the war?

Ethiopia Maintains Its Independence (1896)

On March 1, 1896 two armies camped in the highlands near Adwa in northern Ethiopia. General Oreste Baratieri commanded an Italian force that included 11,000 Italian regulars along with 7,000 colonial troops. The Italians were dug into fortified positions where they had remained for over a month. The Ethiopians, led by their Emperor, Menelik II, were about 80,000 strong.

Neither general was eager to fight. The Italians wanted the Ethiopians to attack their fortified positions. The Ethiopians knew that would be a mistake.

A complicated chain of events had brought the two armies to Adwa. But they all amounted to one thing. The Italians were bent on turning Ethiopia into an Italian Protectorate. Menelik was determined to prevent Italian annexation. He wanted all Europeans to recognize Ethiopia as an equal nation.

Menelik’s position was weak, however. Famines had ravaged much of northern Ethiopia just two years before. Even now food was short in the Ethiopian camp. Menelik’s control over key regional leaders, including the king of the Adwa region, was also uncertain. These men swore allegiance to the Emperor but their loyalty could not always be counted on.

What Menelik did have was an army equipped with modern weapons. The Emperor understood the importance of repeating rifles, Maxim guns and cannon to the future of Africa. He had obtained arms wherever he could. The Italians themselves, in diplomatic intrigues, had given him some weapons. More recently the French had become Menelik’s main source of arms.
At 4:00 a.m. on March 2nd, couriers began reporting Italian troop movements to the Ethiopian command. Baratieri had been pushed by the Italian government into leaving his fortified positions and attacking the Ethiopians. The Italians could not believe that a modern European army could be defeated by a rabble of black savages, however numerous.

\[5:00\text{ a.m. the Ethiopian army had been roused. Their confessions had been heard and holy communion distributed by their Christian priests. Around 6:00 the Ethiopians met the on-coming Italians on the battlefield. By 9:00 the center of the Italian line had broken; a full scale retreat was sounded by noon. The Ethiopians suffered almost 17,000 casualties. The Italians lost 6,000 men, 4,000 of them Europeans. Another 1,400 were wounded; 1,800 were taken prisoner by the victorious Ethiopians. A French reporter who saw the battle wrote "The machine guns of the (Ethiopians), the Wetterleys, the Martinis, the Remingtons and the Gras (types of repeating rifles) had done their work of death."\]

Adwa proved to be decisive. Menelik chose not to follow up the victory by attacking the Italian colony in Eritrea. He feared this would only strengthen Italian resolve. If pressed the Italians could have mustered a larger and stronger army than Menelik could defeat. But Adwa remained a humiliating and controversial defeat. Europeans long debated how any European nation could supply modern arms to "uncivilized" black Africans.

The Italians would avenge their defeat in 1936, using ever more modern weapons and tactics to overcome Ethiopian independence. But for a generation and a half, Ethiopia would remain one of only two independent black African nations.

Identifying and Interpreting Main Ideas

10. Compare the Ethiopians with the Ibo and the Zulu in terms of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ibo</th>
<th>Zulu</th>
<th>Ethiopians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Political Unity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Military Tradition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Number of Soldiers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Bravery and Discipline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. What factor(s) appear to best explain the success of the Ethiopians?

12. If the Zulu would have had rapid-firing weapons, do you think they might have won their war with the British?

13. A famous French historian once called the Maxim gun the "sovereign determinant in African affairs." What did the historian mean by that comment? Do you agree or not? Be able to defend your answer.
Primary sources, whether in the form of treaties, Presidential memos, committee meetings, speeches, newspaper accounts, transcripts of trials or diaries, are the raw material of history. They provide a record of national security events throughout history as well as in modern times. As such, primary sources can be used in a variety of ways to deepen students' knowledge of national security topics and to increase their skills in interpreting and using evidence. In the course of achieving those aims, primary sources can add fresh perspectives, authenticity, and a change of pace to textbook-centered instruction.

Clarifying Positions on Issues

Some of our nation's most complex public policy problems involve national security issues. Primary sources may be used to teach students to clarify and explain positions on national security issues, such as: (1) presidential versus congressional authority under the Constitution to make war, (2) limits to freedom of press and speech in times of national crisis, (3) the power of the President to withhold sensitive foreign policy information from the Senate, (4) strategies for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, (5) the necessity for new weapons systems such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (the so-called Star Wars proposal), (6) the desirability of specific efforts at arms control (the Zero Option Plan to remove medium range nuclear missiles from Europe, for example) and so forth.

Primary sources on different sides of a national security issue in American history or current events can be presented to students who examine the sources, identify and describe the main ideas of each one, compare the main ideas to find similarities and differences, and speculate about reasons for similarities and differences in main ideas. For example, students might study documents that reveal contrasting positions in the debate about American overseas expansion which followed the Spanish-American War. As a result of the War, Spain lost its colonial possessions of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands. A national debate ensued as to whether the United States should hold these former Spanish colonies as its own or make them independent. Senators George Hoar and Albert Beveridge represented entirely different views on this issue in fierce Senate debates of the time. Students might examine one side of the issue by reading Senator Hoar's views on the need to adhere to American principles of self-determination. They could see the other side by reading Beveridge's arguments on the need for America to promote its security and economic growth through expansion. Students could be asked to identify, compare and explain ideas of Hoar and Beveridge on U.S. expansionism. They might also be asked to consider why Hoar and Beveridge had different ideas on this issue.

Interpreting and Using Evidence

Instructional strategies based on primary sources can also be designed to develop students' skills in interpreting and using historical evidence. For example, in lessons where students examine alternative positions on a national security issue they may search for meaning by reading between the lines and inferring explanations. To describe alternative positions on the issue they will need to find main ideas and supporting information. To compare the alternatives they need to interpret and organize information. To develop and consider explanations for the differing ideas being expressed about the issue they need to think creatively about the information presented in the primary source and about the context or historical setting of the issue. After developing explanations students may consult textbooks or other secondary sources to confirm, reject, or modify their explanations and to locate answers to their questions.

Studying Processes and Concepts

Primary sources can also be used to help students examine and better understand basic
mechanisms or processes of foreign policy and diplomacy relevant to national security such as treaties, executive agreements, congressional resolutions and the like. For example, students might study excerpts from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as an example of an international agreement through which nations seek to protect their national security. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed in 1968 after three years of negotiations. Its chief architects were the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. Treaty provisions attempt to control the spread of nuclear weapons through voluntary restraints. Students could examine the Articles of the Treaty describing these provisions and answer questions about main ideas expressed in the Treaty. Then they could demonstrate their understanding of the Treaty provisions by classifying a series of actions in terms of whether they would be permitted or prohibited by the Treaty. Could, for instance, the Soviet Union place nuclear weapons in Cuba under the control of Soviet soldiers or could the Thai government, a Treaty signatory, request technical assistance in developing a nuclear weapon from the People’s Republic of China, which has not signed the Treaty?2

Primary sources can also be used to develop students’ comprehension of major concepts, ideas or doctrines that have shaped national security policies throughout history and in modern times. For example, in an historic speech to Congress on March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman committed the United States to a strategy of containment of Soviet expansionism. The Truman Doctrine, as the principles in the speech quickly came to be called, officially reversed America’s long-standing isolationist stance toward European affairs and committed the nation to a variety of interventionist policies and programs. It became one of the most important diplomatic principles in our nation’s history.3 Students might study Truman’s speech to identify basic ideas and to see one example of how nations publicly enunciate major diplomatic principles. They might also examine excerpts from George Kennan’s article in Foreign Affairs, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” written under the pseudonym of X. Kennan’s article became one of the key explanations of and a rationale for the American policy of containment.4

Sound lessons involving the interpretation of primary sources should introduce the source with brief statements about the date, authorship, and historical significance of the document. Long documents with many difficult words should be abridged and annotated so most high school students can read them. Finally, students’ examination of the document should be guided by questions prepared in advance of the lesson. The questions should first insure that students have understood the main ideas in the document and then give students the opportunity to interpret the document in ways appropriate to the objectives of the lesson.

Sample Lessons

This chapter contains two lessons that illustrate the use of primary sources in education about national security. In the first lesson, The First Peace Treaty: Egyptians and Hittites, students examine the text of a peace treaty between the kings of Egypt and Hattusas (Hittites) from about 1270 B.C.5 The document illustrates that treaty-making has been an important process in maintaining security since the beginning of history. Students read the two versions of the treaty found by archaeologists and identify the main ideas presented in the treaty. Then, as advisors to either Ramses II or Hittites III, they prepare a position paper arguing for or against acceptance of the treaty.

In the second exemplary lesson, Who is Responsible for National Defense?: The Federalist Numbers 23 and 41, students examine excerpts from The Federalist papers, which contain Hamilton and Madison’s arguments for giving the national government central control of military policy and sole responsibility for conducting national defense.6 Students identify the main ideas presented in each essay and then compare the essays. Through comparison students learn that while both men recognized the need for a standing army under national government control, they had different ideas about the extent of constitutional limitations on the power of such military forces needed to protect the liberties of the people.
Notes


3. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), pp. 139-152.


Lesson Plan and Notes for Teachers

The First Peace Treaty: Egyptians and Hitcites
by Bruce Kroig

Preview of Main Points

This lesson is about the world’s first peace treaty of which we have copies from both parties. The date is about 1270 B.C. The signatories were the kings of Egypt and Hattusis (Hittites). Students will read portions of the texts and decide what the clauses in the treaty meant. The students should note key concepts of national security that figure in this early treaty and among nations today.

Connection to Textbooks

Ancient Egypt is a feature of all world history and western civilization textbooks, though usually as an isolated phenomenon. Many textbooks do not deal with Egypt’s foreign relations nor with its imperial period, the time of this treaty. Hittites also figure in most textbooks though they are usually given only the most cursory treatment. Nonetheless, they are usually recognized as a major power in the middle and later 2nd millennium B.C.

Objectives

Students are expected to:

1. locate Egypt, the land of the Hittites, and the area of Palestine/Syria on a map of the ancient Near East;
2. identify key provisions of a peace treaty between the Hittites and Egyptians, including respect for each other’s territories, mutual defense, agreement to aid each other against rebels, and appeal to divine enforcement;
3. assess strengths and weaknesses of the treaty; and
4. write an argument for or against acceptance of the treaty.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson

- Explain to the class that during the 13th century B.C. the Egyptians fought a series of wars with the Hittites for control of present-day Palestine and Syria.
- Review the geography of the ancient Near East so that students understand where Egypt and the Hittite kingdom were located. Note the area of Palestine/Syria that they fought over.
- Ask students to imagine themselves as diplomats of Egypt charged by Pharaoh with bringing peace to the realm by negotiating a peace treaty with the Hittites. What kinds of things would they want to include in that treaty? Write their suggestions on the board.

Developing the Lesson

- Distribute the Handout to the class. Have students read the text and answer the questions that follow it.

From World History and National Security: Supplementary Lessons for High School Courses, 1988, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43201.
With some classes you may want to go through the treaty section by section discussing the main concept within each section.

Discuss the following questions with the class:

1. What appear to be the benefits of the treaty for the Egyptians? For the Hittites?
2. Are there any weaknesses?
3. If you were an advisor to Pharaoh, would you tactfully suggest any changes?

Concluding the Lesson

Have students prepare a 1-2 page position paper. In the paper they should take the viewpoint of an advisor either to Ramesses II or Hattusilis III. Their paper should argue for or against acceptance of the treaty, giving reasons why.

Suggestions for Additional Reading


Answers to the Handout

1. Their explanation was to "give good peace and good brotherhood between us." (Our explanation would be to stop fighting and divide up the land into spheres of influence.)

2. The treaty was personal. One reason for this was that each country was the personal property of the king. (Explain to students that these nations had no idea of citizen participation in government.)

3. Evidently the two countries had a treaty before, but according to the Egyptian version it had been broken by the Hittites.

4. The kings agree not to invade each other's territory. (By this they do not mean the homeland, for these were many hundreds of miles apart, but the Syrian territory in dispute. Yet, these seem to have been regarded as important to national security.)

5. Each king promised to send military aid in the form of troops and chariots. In this respect, the treaty was a mutual defense pact. (However, it seems to have applied only to the Syrian lands.)

6. The phrase applied to subject peoples in Syria/Palestine and referred specifically to rebels against each of the kings. Thus, each kingdom is committed to help the other maintain its control over these lands.

7. The gods were appealed to for help in enforcing the treaty and if anyone broke it, they were subject to destruction by the many gods of each nation.
The First Fence Treaty: Egyptians and Hittites

Diplomacy and treaty-making are important aspects of national security. Political entities--tribes, states, cities--have engaged in these arts since the beginning of history.

The first peace treaty of which we have written evidence from both sides dates from about 1270 B.C. For some twenty years before that date, the two most powerful states in the ancient Near East, Egypt and the Hittite kingdom (located in present day Turkey), fought over the land lying between them, Palestine and Syria. Each kingdom wanted control of this rich land filled with important trading cities.

The Egyptian pharaoh, Ramesses II, fought a well-known battle at the town of Kadesh, Syria in about 1286 B.C. which seems to have been something of a Hittite victory. Yet, after years of conflict the Egyptians and Hittites fought to a draw. With neither power able to defeat one another Ramesses and the Hittite king, Hattusilis III, drew up a peace treaty. While no actual territory is mentioned in the document, it appears that the Hittites received northern Syria around the River Orontes and Egypt retained control of southern Syria and Palestine.

The treaty was written in two versions. One was sent by Pharaoh Ramesses II to the Hittite capital of Hattusis where it was found by archaeologists. King Hattusilis III sent his version to Ramesses where a copy was made on the walls of the temple at Thebes.

The Text of the Treaty

Version Found at Hattusius

I.
Ramesses, the great king, king of all Egypt, the strong in all lands, unto Hattusilis, the great king, king of the land of Hatti, the strong. Behold I give brotherhood and good peace between us forever, by means of this treaty.

II
Behold the policy of the great king of Egypt and of the great king of Hatti since eternity--the gods did not permit hostility between them by means of a treaty. (We now renew that policy, made by the gods through this treaty.)

Version Found at Thebes

I.
The treaty which the great prince of Hatti, Hattusilis the strong made upon a treaty of silver for Ramesses the great ruler of Egypt, the strong: the good treaty, giving peace [and] brotherhood between us.

II.
Now, since eternity, as regard the policy of the great ruler of Egypt and the great chief of Hatti--the gods did not permit hostility between them by means of a treaty.

But my predecessor, my brother, fought with Ramesses the great ruler of Egypt. But hereafter, beginning this day, behold Hattusilis, the great chief of Hatti, makes a treaty so as not to permit hostilities between us forever.

From World History and National Security, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
Version Found at Hattusius

III. And Ramesses the great king shall not trespass into the land Hatti to take anything from there; and Hattusilis the great king shall not trespass into Egypt and take anything from there.

IV. And if another enemy come against the land of Hatti, and Hattusilis ask me for help, Ramesses the great king of Egypt shall send his troops and chariots and shall slay his enemy. He shall restore confidence to the land of Hatti.

And if another enemy come against Egypt, and Ramesses the king of Egypt, thy brother, send to Hattusilis saying, "Come to my aid against him"; immediately shall Hattusilis send his troops and chariots and he shall slay my enemy.

V. And if Hattusilis, the great king of Hatti become angry with his servants and they sin against him and you send to Ramesses, the great king of Egypt concerning it; immediately Ramesses, his troops and his chariots shall come. And they shall destroy all against whom you are angry.

Version Found at Thebes

III. And the great chief of Hatti shall not trespass into the land of Egypt to take anything from it; and Ramesses the great ruler of Egypt shall not trespass into the land of Hatti and take anything from it.

IV. And if another enemy come to the lands of Ramesses, the great ruler of Egypt, and he send to the great chief of Hatti saying, "Come to me as help against him"; the great chief of Hatti shall come to him. The great chief of Hatti shall slay his enemy.

And if another enemy come against the great chief of Hatti, then shall Ramesses come to him as help to slay his enemy.

V. Or if Ramesses become angry against servants of his, and they do another offense against him, and he shall go to slay his enemy, the great chief of Hatti shall act with him to destroy everyone against whom they are angry.

(There are other sections to this treaty but only one version of them remains. The following section from the text found at Thebes probably concluded the other version as well.)

VI. As to these words which are upon this table of silver of the land of Hatti and of the land of Egypt, as to him who shall not keep them, a thousand gods of the land of Hatti and a thousand gods of the land of Egypt shall destroy his house, his land, and his servants. But he who shall keep these words and not neglect them, a thousand gods of the Hatti and a thousand gods of Egypt will cause him to be healthy and live, together with his houses and his servants and his land.

From World History and National Security. Mershon Center the Ohio State University.
Review of Main Facts and Ideas

1. What was the reason Hattusilis and Ramesses gave for making their treaty?

2. Was this a treaty between nations or an agreement between rulers?

3. Had there been a treaty before this? What do the two versions say about this in section II?

4. What do the two rulers promise not to do in section IV?

5. How do Hattusilis and Ramesses promise to aid one another in the event that they are attacked by another enemy?

6. What do you think the phrase "angry with his servants" means and why should each king send military aid against them?

7. By what means was the treaty to be enforced?

Interpreting History

8. How close were the two versions of the treaty?

9. Did the Hittite and Egyptian rulers treat each other as equals? If so, what would you say were the results of their many wars over Syria and Palestine?
Who Is Responsible For National Defense?:
The Federalist, Numbers 23 and 41
by Marcel Lewinski and Richard C. Remy

Preview of Main Points

In this lesson students read excerpts from The Federalist number 23 by Alexander Hamilton and number 41 by James Madison. Both present arguments for giving the national government central control of military policy and sole responsibility for conducting national defense. At the same time Hamilton and Madison express somewhat different ideas about the relationship of national security to liberty.

Connection to Textbooks

Standard high school textbooks mention The Federalist papers. However, they do not provide opportunities for analysis of ideas in those essays. This lesson can highlight how concern for national security was an important factor in creating a strong central government.

Objectives

Students are expected to:

1. identify main ideas related to national defense in The Federalist numbers 23 and 41;
2. know that the Constitution gives control of national defense to the national government; and
3. compare Madison’s and Hamilton’s views about the need for constitutional limitations on the power of military forces in order to protect the liberties of the people.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson

- Tell the students about The Federalist papers—who wrote them, when, why and with what consequences.
- Remind students that under the Articles of Confederation the government had little power to deal with threats to national security. For example:
  1. Great Britain kept some forts inside the northern border of the United States.
  2. Spain controlled the mouth of the Mississippi River and made allies with Cherokee, Creek and Chickasaw Indians to prevent American expansion to the Southwest.
  3. The Barbary Pirates regularly captured American ships and sailors.
- Inform students of the main points of the Lesson.

Developing the Lesson

- Distribute copies of the Handout.
- Have students examine and interpret ideas in The Federalist 23 and 41 in terms of the questions at the end of the Handout. Students may work individually or in small groups.

Concluding the Lesson

- Review with students their answers to the questions in the Handout.
- Conclude the lesson with the activity on the last page of the student materials which evaluates whether students understood the key ideas in the document.

Suggestion for Additional Reading


This military history of the United States discusses Number 41 of The Federalist papers on pp. 586-587.

Answers to the Handout

1. Provide for common defense; protect against both external attack and internal subversion; preserve trade with other countries.

2. No limitations.

3. True.

4. True.

5. True.

6. The power to declare war, provide armies and fleets, regulating and calling out the militia, and levying and borrowing money.

7. The national government.

8. To provide security against foreign danger.

9. It is necessary for self defense.

10. C.

11. C.

12. False.

13. True.

14. True.

15. Yes. Both believe national defense is a prime responsibility of the national government.

16. No. Hamilton believes no limits are needed. Madison distrusts a standing army.

17. Answers will vary.
Who Is Responsible for National Defense?:
The Federalist, Numbers 23 and 41

Though the Constitution was written in 1787, it was not ratified until 1789. Soon after it was submitted to Congress, arguments about it began. Supporters of the new Constitution were known as Federalists. They presented their arguments in a series of eighty-five newspaper articles which came to be called The Federalist papers.

Numbers 23 and 41 of The Federalist papers deal with the question of the national government's powers to conduct the nation's defense. The new Constitution divided military powers between the national government and the states. The Constitution allowed the states to maintain their militias. (Today state militias are usually called the national guard.) At the same time the Constitution gave the national government ample authority to create a regular standing Army.

Which level of government was responsible for conducting the national defense? In The Federalist 23 and 41, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison discuss the Constitution's provisions for giving the national government central control of the military and national defense. Printed below are excerpts from these essays. Read the excerpts and answer the questions that follow.

The Federalist, No. 23 by Alexander Hamilton

... The principal purposes to be answered by union are these—the common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries.

The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same councils [executive branch of the national government] which are appointed to preside over the common defense....

... there can be no limitation of that authority which is to provide for the defense and protection of the community in any matter essential to its efficacy—that is, in any matter essential to the formation, direction, or support of the NATIONAL FORCES....

... the Union [United States of America] ought to be invested with full power to levy troops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues which will be required for the formation and support of an army and navy in the customary and ordinary modes practiced by other governments....

Shall the Union be constituted the guardian of the common safety? Are fleets and armies and revenues necessary to this purpose? The government of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them....

From American Government and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
Reviewing Main Ideas in *The Federalist*, No. 23

1. According to Hamilton, what purposes should the national government serve regarding national security?

2. According to Hamilton, what limitations should be placed on the national government in carrying out its responsibilities for national security?

**True or False (T or F)**

3. Hamilton argues the national government should have control over national defense.

4. The power to raise armies was essential for preserving the nation's security.

5. Hamilton believed there should be no constitutional limits upon power exercised by military leaders.

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*The Federalist, No. 41 by James Madison*

To the People of the State of New York:

... it will be proper to review the several powers conferred on the government of the Union [the national government]... as they relate to... Security against foreign danger...

The powers falling within the first class are those of declaring war and granting letters of marque; or providing armies and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying and borrowing money.

Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal councils.

Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question in the negative.... The existing Confederation establishes this power in the most ample form....

Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary? This is involved in the foregoing power. It is involved in the power of self-defense.

But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in PEACE as well as in WAR?....

The answer indeed seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion in any place....

How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit in like manner the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these rules and by no others.... If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it
oblige the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding precautions. . . .

A standing force, . . . is a dangerous, at the same time that it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.

The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it cements and secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment which could be dangerous. America united, with a handful of troop, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding posture to foreign ambition than America disunited, with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. . . .

. . . A dangerous establishment can never be necessary or plausible, so long as they continue a united people. . . . The moment of its dissolution will be the date of a new order of things . . . the face of America will be but a copy of that of the continent of Europe. It will present liberty everywhere crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The fortunes of disunited America will be even more disastrous than those of Europe. . . .

This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who loves his country, every man who loves liberty ought to have it ever before his eyes that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment to the Union of America and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it. . . .

The . . . necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure which has spared few others parts. It must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of America that as her Union will be the only source of her maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of her security against danger from abroad. . . .

The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply interested in this provision for naval protection. . . . If we except perhaps Virginia and Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their eastern frontiers, no part of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on this subject than New York. Her seacoast is extensive. A very important district of the State is an island . . . The great emporium of trade commerce, the great reservoir of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events, and may also be regarded as a hostage for . . . the dictates of foreign eneiy, or even with the . . . demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of the . . . situation of European affairs, and all the unruly passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous. In the present condition of America, the States more immediately exposed to these calamities have nothing to hope from the phantom of a general government which now exists; and if their single resources were equal to the task of fortifying themselves against the danger, the object to be protected would be almost consumed by the means of protecting them. . . .
Reviewing Main Ideas in The Federalist No. 41

6. According to Madison, what powers are granted in the Constitution to the central government to secure against foreign danger?

7. According to Madison who was in charge of "regulating and calling forth the militia"?

8. What does Madison believe is the most important reason for forming an American Union?

9. Why does Madison believe governments must have power to raise armies and equip fleets?

10. Which of the following statements reflect Madison's views on standing armies. Explain your choice.
   a. They are dangerous and should not be allowed.
   b. America is disunited and has no way to protect itself.
   c. Armies should be carefully watched, but are necessary to maintain security.

   a. National security is one of the main concerns of any government.
   b. The Constitution provides the best hope for the common defense.
   c. States could easily protect themselves without a need for a national military force.

True or False (T or F)

12. Madison believed the distance of the United States from the powerful nations gave even a disunited U.S. security.

13. Madison saw the navy as the principal source of security for the U.S.

14. Even the Articles of Confederation recognized the need for the government to have the power to declare war.

Comparing Ideas in The Federalist, No. 23 and No. 41

15. Do Hamilton and Madison agree about the responsibility of the national government for national defense? Explain.

16. Do Hamilton and Madison agree about the need for constitutional limits on the power of national military forces? Give reasons to support your answer.

17. To what extent do you think Hamilton and Madison have different ideas about the relationship of national security to liberty? Support your answer with examples from essays 23 and 41.
7. ROLE PLAYING IN THE CLASSROOM

A role play involves students in taking the position of hypothetical or real-life characters in a given situation. When students in a class, for example, act out their version of a candidate giving a speech they are role playing.

A role play requires students to step inside someone else’s shoes, and act and react as appropriately as they are able. The essential core of a role play activity is understanding the situation of another person. In a typical role play students are assigned roles that are representations of roles in the real world, such as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. They make decisions or take other appropriate actions in response to the situation in which they find themselves, such as having to decide whether to vote for or against development of a new weapons system. Such decisions or actions may be undertaken individually or in conjunction with other students assigned similar or related roles.

Uses and Misuses of Role Plays

Used judiciously, role plays can give students an opportunity to feel what is at stake in a given national security issue or situation. In addition, participating in a role play can help students better understand the roles, relationships and interactions involved in such national security processes as diplomatic negotiations or crisis decision-making. Examples of national security situations and processes for which role plays could be developed include: the resolution of border disputes between two or more nations; the negotiation of a treaty; the interaction of advisors with a leader confronted with a national security dilemma; the handling of economic decisions in preparation of a defense budget, and so on.

Role play instructional strategies have considerable potential but they can be easily misused. Perhaps the most common problem is to not give students enough background information about the situation they are role playing. Without such information role playing can easily become shallow play acting rather than a challenging exercise in problem solving that requires students to derive their own answers from relevant historical facts and data. Successful use of role plays requires that students apply relevant background information to the roles they are assuming. In addition, in effective role plays students clearly understand what role they are to take and why they are doing so. Finally, role play exercises require carefully structured debriefing. The debriefing gives students the opportunity to reflect upon the learning experience, analyze the actions or arguments of their peers and think about what happened and why it occurred.

Sample Lesson

This chapter contains a lesson that illustrates the use of a role play to help students understand how Japanese shoguns in the late 15th and early 16th century dealt with a serious security problem posed by the European Age of Exploration. The problem was penetration of Japan by European traders and Christian missionaries who brought new ideas as well as military technology that threatened existing political arrangements.

In the lesson, Security in Seclusion: The Tokugawa Response to the West, students first learn why the Tokugawa shoguns regarded the Christian movement stimulated by the Europeans as a security threat. They then study the main steps the Tokugawa took to limit foreign influences on Japan by analyzing a memorial or as we would call it today, a position paper, prepared by advisors to the Shogun calling for expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan. With this background information in hand, students are asked to assume the roles of advisors to the Shogun who oppose a policy of isolation. In that role, they are asked to prepare their own memorial presenting arguments against isolation and suggesting an alternative policy toward the Portuguese. Presentation of these memorials is followed by a debriefing exercise.
Notes


Security in Seclusion: The Tokugawa Response to the West

by Robert B. Woyach

Preview of Main Points

This lesson looks at Japanese reactions to the coming of the Europeans during the Age of Exploration. It shows that the Japanese viewed the Europeans, especially the Portuguese, as a security threat. It shows students why the Japanese cut off virtually all contacts with the Europeans. In a role-play assignment students are asked to develop and present written arguments against the policy of isolation.

Connection to Textbooks

World history texts deal with Tokugawa Japan in various ways. Most contain some material on this period in units dealing with Asian history between the 16th and 17th centuries. A few contain retrospective material on Tokugawa Japan when dealing with the subsequent Meiji Restoration (1868). This lesson can be integrated into any course while looking at Asian responses to European expansion during the Age of Exploration. Seclusion, or expulsion; was a policy adopted by a few states during this period in response to the political and economic disruption the Europeans caused. In looking at the Japanese case, students can be encouraged to question why such a policy was adopted and why the Europeans had to acquiesce to it.

Objectives

Students are expected to:

1. identify possible responses to the security threat that the Europeans posed to Asian nations in the 16th and 17th centuries;
2. explain why the Tokugawa shoguns of Japan regarded the Christian movement as a security threat;
3. describe the main steps the Tokugawa took to limit foreign influences on Japan;
4. analyze written arguments for expelling the Portuguese from Japan;
5. identify ways in which a policy of isolation might threaten Japanese security; and
6. explain why the Portuguese did not force the Japanese to open their country to trade.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson

o Ask students to think of themselves as the rulers of an Asian country in the 16th century. They have only recently encountered Europeans for the first time. The trade the Europeans offer is attractive, but the ideas they bring threaten to disrupt the local society. How would they respond to the threat? What could they do?

o Brainstorm possible responses. Write students' suggestions on the board.

From World History and National Security: Supplementary Lessons for High School Courses, 1988. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43201.
Developing the Lesson

- Explain that this lesson basically describes the situation in which the Chinese and Japanese found themselves in the 16th century.
- Emphasize that the Japanese had only recently emerged from a century of bloody civil wars. The Tokugawa family that now ruled Japan in the name of the Emperor did not feel secure. Most importantly they feared that the Japanese Christian community, especially the Christian daimyo and samurai, posed a threat to their rule.
- Draw a timeline on the board and describe the main Tokugawa attempts to limit the influence of the Europeans. (See “Background Information for Teachers”).
- Note that in 1637 a community of Christians on Kyushu Island revolted against the local daimyo. Describe the Shimabara Rebellion briefly and explain that it caused the shogun to consider a last step in isolating Japan from the outside.
- Distribute the Handout. Explain that this is a hypothetical memorial to the Tokugawa shogun advising that the Portuguese trade be ended once and for all. Note that the effects of the policy would be to virtually isolate Japan from the outside world. Have the class read the Handout and answer the questions at the end.
- Discuss students' answers to the questions to make sure they understand the main ideas and some of the weaknesses in the arguments.
- Tell the class that they are now going to assume the roles of advisors to the Shogun. They, however, believe that Japan's security will be threatened by a policy of isolation. They also believe that the Portuguese traders do not represent a threat to the security of the regime. As advisors to the Shogun, they are each to prepare their own memorial presenting arguments against isolation and suggesting an alternative policy toward the Portuguese.
- Divide the class into small groups and allow some time for the groups to brainstorm arguments for their memorials.
- Have students complete the written assignment as homework.

Concluding the Lesson

- Ask volunteers to present their memorials orally to the class.
- Debrief the role-play exercise by discussing the security problems which the coming of the Europeans posed to the Tokugawa. You might ask:

1. Do you think that the Tokugawa shoguns really saw the Christians as a threat to security, or were they just reacting against a new religion? What in the history of Japan might have made the alleged Christian threat more credible? How do you know that the Japanese were not simply anti-foreign?

2. In what ways did the Tokugawa policy of isolation make Japan less secure in the long run?

3. Why do you think the Portuguese did nothing to force the Japanese to open their country?

4. In 1848 an American ship would sail into the bay near the Tokugawa capital to force the Japanese to open their country. The Japanese were no more interested in Western contact then, but they gave in. What do you think had changed between 1639 and 1848?
Background Information for Teachers

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to arrive in Japan. Their first mission came in 1543. By 1545 trade had begun on a regular basis. During this time, the political situation in Japan was chaotic. Local daimyo (feudal lords) competed with each other militarily and economically. Many tried to attract the Portuguese traders because they brought weapons and wealth.

The Japanese began to trade regularly with the Spanish in 1592 and with the Dutch in 1600. The competition among the Europeans in religious and trade matters was enormous. The Protestant Dutch often advised the Japanese that the Catholic Portuguese and Spanish would someday invade. Nevertheless, the Portuguese trade remained the most important European contact for the Japanese until 1639.

The Impact of Trade. Contact with the Portuguese had important consequences for Japan. The trade enlivened the Japanese economy and brought a new style and standard of living to the daimyo and samurai. Great wealth was generated for the European and Japanese merchants. Chinese goods (silk, tea, and gold) were brought to Japan in exchange for Japanese silver and copper. New industries were stimulated by 1638 the new Japanese silk industry was meeting most of the domestic demand. The trade remained so important that even when Tokugawa Ieyasu began expelling Christian missionaries in 1612, he invited the Spanish and Portuguese to expand trade.

The Japanese also quickly began to make and use gunpowder weapons (bronze cannon and muskets). This hastened the unification of Japan. Canon especially made the great daimyo castles vulnerable to attack. It also gave the richer daimyo an edge over daimyo with fewer economic resources. Cannon were first used by the Japanese in 1558. By the 1570s Japanese armies routinely featured musket corps.

The Christian Missions. In 1549 the Jesuit Francis Xavier began Christian missionary activity in Japan. The missionary movement was led by Portuguese Jesuits and Spanish Franciscans. The missionaries soon became intermediaries between the Portuguese and Spanish traders and the Japanese daimyo. They received special support in their mission activities from several Kyushu daimyo who themselves became Christian.

By 1614 there were 143 missionaries in Japan and about 300,000 Japanese Christians, mostly in the south. This was 1.5% of the Japanese population of 20 million.

From the start many daimyo of central Japan including the Tokugawa distrusted the Christian missionaries. Encouraged by the Dutch, these daimyo saw the Japanese Christians as a potential "fifth column" that could join forces with rogue samurai and threaten the Shogunate. They also saw the missionaries as the leading edge for Spanish or Portuguese invasions.

Japan Is Unified. Between 1568 and 1600 Japan was wracked by an almost constant civil war. The Portuguese and Christian Japanese played a prominent role in this conflict. The Christian daimyo of southern Japan joined with the early unifiers, Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi.

Both Nobunaga and Hideyoshi died before they could consolidate their power. It was only in 1600 that Tokugawa Ieyasu finally unified Japan under the rule of the Tokugawa family. In that year he defeated the western daimyo at the battle of Sekigahara. Although Ieyasu took the title of Shogun (supreme military commander) in 1603, many of his allied daimyo remained loyal to the house of Toyotomi, an earlier unifier. Even after the house of Toyotomi was destroyed in a bloody campaign in 1614-1615, the Tokugawa family did not feel secure.

Japan Moves Toward Seclusion. The civil wars and political chaos at the 15th and 16th centuries had left deep scars on the Japanese. They also convinced the Tokugawa of the need to eliminate
potentially divisive forces from society. The Christian Japanese and the Christian missionaries were such a force.

In 1614, a Shogunal edict called for all Christian missionaries to leave Japan. The edict proscribed all Christian rites. Many missionaries went underground. Others continued to be smuggled into Japan through the Portuguese and Spanish trading ships. At first there was little real persecution of the Christians. No foreign missionary was put to death while Ieyasu lived. When Europeans returned to Japan in the 19th century, they discovered Japanese on outer islands who still practiced baptism rites and knew simple precepts of the Christian faith.

However, in 1623 Tokugawa Iemitsu became the third Tokugawa shogun. Iemitsu had a morbid preoccupation with the threat the Japanese Christian community posed. He oversaw the virtual eradication of Christian and Western influence from the country. Over the next 50 years, thousands of Japanese Christians were martyred or forced by torture to renounce their faith.

Iemitsu isolated Japan in a series of steps. In 1624 he expelled the Spanish. Between 1633 and 1636 a series of edicts prohibited the construction of sea-going junks by Japanese, banned the return of Japanese nationals who had gone overseas, and prohibited Japanese ships from traveling to any foreign country for any purpose. These edicts ended what had been a thriving official Japanese trade in Asia.

In 1636 new restrictions were also placed on foreigners. All Eurasian children were deported to Macao. The island of Deshima was built in Nagasaki harbor and the Portuguese were restricted to it. Chinese traders were also restricted to Nagasaki. The Dutch were restricted to the immediate area around their port city of Hirado.

The Shimabara Rebellion. The last step toward isolation came in 1639. Two years earlier Christian communities in Shimabara and Amakusa on Kyushu Island rose up against their local daimyo. Over 37,000, including women and children, entrenched themselves in Hara castle in December 1637. Forces of several Kyushu daimyo, mobilized by the Shogun, besieged the castle. They finally overcame the defenders on April 15, 1638.

The Shimabara Rebellion convinced the shogun that the Portuguese were a threat. In 1639 Portuguese traders were given an edict forbidding their entry into Japan. The edict accused the traders of smuggling missionaries into the country and of supplying goods to them. It specifically laid responsibility for the Shimabara rebellion on the Portuguese. In reality the Portuguese had changed their policies and were avoiding all involvement with the missionary movement. A Portuguese mission came the next year to beseech the Shogun to reopen trade. All European members of the mission were put to death.

The Portuguese did not respond to this provocation. They did not have the military power to force a change in Japanese policy.

Vocabulary

Bakufu The Japanese term for the feudal government of the shogun.

Daimyo A feudal lord. The daimyo owned all the land and people within their domains which were called han. Under the Tokugawa all the daimyo were either members of the extended Tokugawan family, trusted generals and allies of the Tokugawa, or powerful daimyo who supported the Tokugawa in the final efforts to unify Japan.

Samurai Feudal knights. Samurai were assumed to serve a daimyo. Many became bureaucrats rather than soldiers. Samurai whose daimyo was overthrown were expected to commit suicide. Rogue samurai who served no daimyo were a constant source of trouble.
Shogun Literally, Supreme Military Commander. Formally, the title could only be conferred by the Emperor. But the Shogun was in effect the military dictator of Japan. Any daimyo capable of being shogun could easily force the Emperor to declare him Shogun.

Shogunate The Western term for the Shogun’s feudal government.

Suggestions for Additional Reading

The definitive history of the first Japanese encounter with the West. Boxer clearly documents the security issues that were involved from the Japanese perspective. He also shows how the Europeans themselves, especially the Dutch, cultivated Japanese fears that missionaries would create a community disloyal to the Shogunate.


A short but good survey of Japanese history that contains the salient information about this period.

Answers to the Handout
1. Students’ answers may vary. Basically, the Japanese Christians are seen as loyal not to the feudal government of Japan but to the Christian religion, which is run by the Portuguese. Shimabara proves that the Christians are numerous, hostile and committed.

2. Students’ answers will vary. In fact the shogun and his advisors saw any attack against authority as an attack against the Bakufu. If the writer had distinguished between the two, his arguments would be weaker.

3. An indirect threat. They support the Christians who are a direct threat. (The picture is complicated by the fact that the shogun and his advisors fear a Portuguese invasion. But they believe a successful invasion is only possible with the support of the Japanese Christian samurai. That is why at the time of Ieyasu they ruthlessly tried to stamp out the Christian daimyo and samurai. There were relatively few samurai involved in the Shimabara revolt, which made the affair all the more humiliating for the Bakufu.)

4. No. This is a problem for his argument.

5. Students’ answers will vary. He appears to believe that it once did. But it no longer benefits the Bakufu—only merchants, peasants and rogue samurai, all of whom do not count.

6. Students’ answers will vary but the writer clearly thinks the Bakufu can do without trade with the Portuguese.

7. Students’ answers will vary, but the two threats are clearly equal in the eyes of the writer. They were equal in the eyes of the shogun and his advisers at the time.
The following is a hypothetical memorial, or advisory document. In feudal Japan, high ranking samurai (feudal knights) and daimyo (feudal lords) used memorials such as this to suggest new edicts or to advise the Shogun on matters of state. This memorial is set in the year 1638. It advises the third Tokugawa shogun, Iemitsu, to prohibit trade with the Portuguese. Some of the contents of this hypothetical document are taken from an actual memorial written by Hasegawa Sahiyo, a foe of the Christians.

Most Gracious Lord,

This month samurai of Higo province, in the service of the Bakufu, finally crushed the revolt of the Shimabara Christians. The victory was not a glorious one for the Bakufu.* For three months our forces laid siege to Hara castle. Frontal assaults were repulsed by the insurgent rebel. Even as Hara castle fell our casualties numbered 13,000 samurai. This victory can only give solace to the Christian enemies of the Bakufu.

And the Christians are indeed enemies of the nation!

The Shimabara revolt comes as no surprise. It vindicates the wisdom of your grandfather in outlawing this dangerous sect and expelling the Christian missionaries from our lands. Christian doctrine teaches that followers should obey the padres as their spiritual pastors—rather than any lower temporal order. It glorifies criminals who have been justly condemned as evil-doers and rebels. The Christians even carry relics of criminals as amulets to protect them. The revolt at Shimabara shows how willing the Christians are to upset our temporal law and plunge the land into chaos. The Christians clearly seek to overthrow the Bakufu and deliver the nation into the hands of foreigners.

Nor are the Christians a threat of little consequence. As our forces at Hara now know, the Christians will sacrifice everything for the sake of their law. They glory in death by crucifixion, which they say imitates the death of their god whom they call Jesus. Their fanaticism more than anything makes them a pernicious threat against the Bakufu and the nation.

But how is it that this threat remains?

The edicts outlawing this pernicious sect have been in force for nearly 24 years. Yet over 37,000 believers were overcome in Hara castle! These traitors came from one province alone! How many others reside elsewhere, awaiting their chance to strike a sword into the heart of the nation?

The survival of this sect, despite our determined attempts to stamp it out, can be no mystery. Over the last decades we have captured a number of foreign padres who were smuggled into the land on the trading ships of the Portuguese. We know that the Portuguese bring goods and money that help support those missionaries who remained in Japan in defiance of our edict. Although there were no padres or foreigners in Hara castle, there can be no doubt that the Portuguese had some hand in this affair!

How long must we suffer the impudence of the Portuguese?

In the time of your grandfather, the glorious Ieyasu, we believed that the trade brought benefits the nation could ill-afford to lose. We believed that we would benefit from the trade and from the knowledge the Portuguese brought.

*Bakufu refers to the shoguns' feudal government.

From World History and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
But who benefits from the trade today? Money grubbing merchants benefit. Ignorant Christian peasants who cannot understand that their duty is to the Bakufu benefit. So also do rogue samurai who remain adrift in the land threatening the peace and stability your glorious grandfather bequeathed us.

For the Bakufu there remains little benefit. We now produce all the silk we need. And for other goods? Are the Portuguese the only source of trade? What of the Chinese? What of the Dutch? Their friendship has been proven by their support against the Christians and the Portuguese! These can be our windows on the world.

It is argued by some that restricting the Portuguese to Deshima Island, as we have done, will end this threat. Shimabara proves otherwise. Although restricted to Deshima for over a year, the Christian traitors were strong enough to rise up against the Bakufu!

We advise that an edict be promulgated throughout the lands.

Your gracious lord should put an end to the Portuguese threat by immediately and permanently prohibiting the Portuguese trade. Any Portuguese who sets foot upon the soil of Japan henceforth should be immediately put to death. This same prohibition should apply to all the southern barbarians with the exception of the Dutch.

To lessen the harm this action may have on your loyal vassal, the lord of Nagasaki, we suggest that the Dutch be invited to occupy the trading factory on Deshima Island.

Henceforth, however, the Dutch should be restricted to Deshima. Only chosen merchants in the service of the Bakufu should be allowed to communicate with them. In this way we can ensure our control over the Dutch trade forever.

These thoughts are respectfully and humbly submitted for your consideration, gracious lord.

Identifying Main Ideas and Arguments

1. How are the Japanese Christians threats to the Bakufu according to the writer of this memorial? How does the uprising at Shimabara seem to confirm the Christian threat?

2. Many historians believe that the Shimabara rebellion was directed not at the Bakufu but solely at the local daimyo, who was notoriously cruel and had imposed harsh taxes. Why do you think the writer portrays Shimabara as a rebellion against the Bakufu rather than the local daimyo?

3. Does the writer see the Portuguese traders as a direct or indirect threat to the security of the Bakufu? In what ways do the Portuguese traders threaten the Bakufu?

4. Does the writer give evidence that the Portuguese were involved in the Shimabara rebellion?

5. Does the writer think that the Portuguese trade benefits Japan? Whom does it benefit and how?

6. Does the writer think that the Bakufu can get along without the Portuguese trade? Why?

7. Does the writer equate a threat to the Bakufu (i.e., the government) with a threat to the nation (i.e., national security)? Why?
Maps are the basic tool of the geographer and a key resource for all subject-matter in the social studies curriculum. Whether they detail a nation, a continent or the world, maps identify and picture variations from one place to another that are highly relevant to national security topics and issues.

In physical geography, for example, world maps can reveal the great variations in natural resources which directly affect the ability of nations and regions to maintain some measure of resource independence. They can also depict complex landscapes in which landforms vary from those difficult to defend such as flat plains to those easy to defend such as rugged, heavily mountainous areas. In human geography, world maps might show the complex pattern of world trade in petroleum or the shifting pattern of national borders in Europe through different eras in history.

Instructional strategies based on the reading, interpretation and creation of maps can significantly contribute to education about national security not only in geography courses but in other courses as well. Lessons using maps can, for example, be designed to help students learn basic locational specifics such as parts of the world that share certain cultural and economic characteristics or the exact locations of political units about which they hear regularly in the news media. Or they might help students learn geographic details about specific regions of vital importance to national security, such as the Middle East.

Sample Lessons

This chapter contains two lessons that demonstrate the use of maps to teach about national security. In the first lesson, Japan’s Core Area: A Place of Strategic Importance, students use a set of maps to identify Japan’s core area. Geographers define a core area as the heart of a state; the focus of a country’s political, economic and cultural activities. Control of this area is vital to the survival of a nation and hence of great strategic importance. Students first read about the principal characteristics and historical importance of core areas. Then, working in small groups, they are given six distribution maps depicting the major population clusters, urban centers, mineral processing facilities, industrial centers and power plants, agricultural areas, and road networks in Japan. By successively transferring information on the distribution maps to a master map they plot Japan’s core area.

The second lesson illustrates how a map can be used to depict the global spread of a new weapons technology. In the lesson, Tanks A Lot: Diffusion of the Armored Fighting Vehicle, students first read about development and spread of main battle tanks. As part of this exercise they examine three tables presenting data on the diffusion of tanks from 1915 to 1945, current producers of tanks, and nations that possess over 100 tanks. Students then plot data on the production and possession of tanks presented in the tables on a map of the world in order to draw conclusions about the diffusion pattern of tanks.

Notes

Japan’s Core Area: A Place of Strategic Importance
by William T. Sabato

Preview of Main Points

A core area is the heart of a country. The country’s political, economic and cultural activities focus there. Thus control of this area is vital to the survival of a country. National security concerns require that this area be protected at all costs. Loss of the core can bring disaster. In this lesson, students learn about core areas and their importance to a country’s national identity and strength. They identify Japan’s core area and consider some of the ways core areas can be defended.

Connection to Textbooks

Every geography textbook deals with Japan. Many consider the distribution of urban settlements, agriculture, industry and the arrangement of transportation. This lesson gives students an opportunity to examine all of these patterns in Japan within the context of a basic national security concern.

Objectives

Students are expected to:
1. know the meaning of core area;
2. practice reading distribution maps;
3. use distribution maps to locate Japan’s core area; and
4. understand why core areas are important to a nation’s security.

Materials Needed for the Lesson

The following will be needed for each group of 4-6 students in your class: one transparency of the Japan map and one copy of each of the six distribution maps found in the Handout. Each group will also need pens that can write on a transparency.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson
o Inform students about the main points of the lesson. Explain how the lesson relates to material in their textbook.
o Divide the class into groups of 4-6. Provide each group with a transparency of the Japan map, with copies of the six distribution maps and the Handout. Students will also need pens that can write on transparencies.

Developing the Lesson
o Have students read the first part of the Handout, “The Meaning of Core Area” and complete the questions at the end of that section.
Conduct a brief class discussion of the students' responses to insure they understand the concept of core area.

Have students work in groups to complete the "Map Exercise" by following the directions in the Handout for defining Japan's core area.

Note: Make sure that the students try to make the core area as small as possible. It should be limited in size to about one-quarter to one-fifth of the country's area or smaller. If the area is too big (that is one-half or more of the total country) then they are not being critical in their analysis and need to be encouraged to be more detailed in their criteria for determining the core area.

Concluding the Lesson

When students have identified Japan's core area have some groups present their solutions, using their transparencies. Have them present their reasons for leaving out an area or including an area. Accept alternative solutions that are consistent with the definition of a core area. To end the lesson remind students of the importance of the core area in a country's survival. You may want to mention France in 1940 again. Then point out that they have now identified Japan's core area. Ask them to speculate about how Japan might defend its core area against attack from other countries. Again, alternate answers are acceptable.

Suggestion for Additional Reading


Pounds discusses in great detail the core area concept.
Geographers and other specialists concerned with national security often talk about the importance of a country's "core area." What is a core area? Why is a core area important to a country's national security? How do you identify a core area?

The Meaning of Core Area

A core area is the heart of a country. The country's political, economic and cultural activities focus there. A country's core area contains the largest population cluster and the most productive agricultural and industrial region in the country. In addition, communication and transportation networks are strongest at the core. Such networks reach outward from the core to the remote parts of the country.

Core areas tend to be located near the geographic center of the country. This central location provides the greatest accessibility to all other parts of the country while at the same time provides security to the core area and insulates it from foreign influences or threats. Usually the capital city of the country, or at least its largest city, is located in the core area.

Since political, economic and cultural activity focuses on the core area, control of this area becomes vital for the country. National security concerns require that this area be protected at all costs. Loss of the core area can bring disaster to a nation. The examples of France and the Soviet Union in World War II (1939-1945) illustrate this.

In 1940 Germany invaded France. The northern territory of France was quickly overrun. Paris was captured shortly thereafter. Although almost four-fifths of the country remained unconquered, France surrendered. In 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union, quickly taking the major portion of the Ukraine (an industrial and agricultural center) and most of the western territories. But the cultural and political centers of Leningrad and Moscow were never taken. The Soviet Union never faltered in its resistance. The Soviets were able to rebuild their industry and counterattack, pushing the Germans out of the country and eventually defeating them in Eastern Europe, while the Allied Powers defeated Germany in Western Europe. Why were French and Soviet reactions to invasion so different? Because in the case of France, the Germans had captured the country's core area. In the Soviet example, they did not capture the core area.

Reviewing Main Facts and Ideas

1. What is a core area?

2. List four characteristics of a core area.

3. Why is a core area important?

4. Why is the German attempt to conquer the Soviet Union during World War II a good example of the importance of a core area?

From World Geography and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
Map Exercise: Locating Japan’s Core Area

The importance of the core area has not changed in today’s world. Nations still need to find ways to protect their core areas.

How do you determine where a country’s core area is located? One way is to use the information about a country provided on maps. In the remainder of this lesson you will find the core area of Japan by working with a set of maps. Follow these steps:

1. Using the "Major Population Clusters" and "Major Urban Centers" maps, identify the regions of Japan having the major population centers and containing most of the major urban centers. Outline each region on the appropriate map with a continuous line. Transfer the outlines of these regions to your transparency of Japan. Use a different color pen for each region, if possible.

2. Using the "Mineral Processing Facilities" and "Industrial Centers and Power Plants" maps, identify the regions of Japan having the major industrial and power centers. Outline each region on the appropriate map with a continuous line. Transfer the outlines of these regions to your transparency. If possible use a different color pen for each region.

3. Use the "Major Agricultural Areas" map to identify the region of Japan having the most intense agricultural land use. This will be the region where double-cropping (more than one crop is planted and harvested in a year) occurs. Outline this region with a continuous line. Transfer the outline of this region to your transparency.

4. Using the "Major Road Network" map locate the region in Japan with the most dense road network. Outline this region and transfer it to your transparency.

5. Study your transparency. Find the area in Japan where all six regions that you transferred generally overlap. Shade in this area of overlap. This is your version of Japan’s core area. Does it include Tokyo (the current capital) and Kyoto (the historical capital)?
MAJOR URBAN CENTERS

Capital City is Underlined
INDUSTRIAL CENTERS AND POWER PLANTS

- MAJOR INDUSTRIAL CENTER
- MAJOR POWER PLANTS
  - 100 - 300 megawatts
  - Over 300 megawatts
MAJOR AGRICULTURAL AREAS

Rice dominant, single cropping
Rice dominant, double cropping
Wheat, Barley, and Oats
Tanks A Lot: Diffusion of the Armored Fighting Vehicle
by William T. Sabata

Preview of Main Points

National security policy-making involves a nation's assessment of its power relative to the perceived capabilities of others. This assessment is often expressed in calculation of "balance" with one's powerful adversaries. One consequence of this constant assessment is that when a new weapons system is developed that will upset the balance of power, it is quickly diffused and adopted by nations. In this lesson students deal with the diffusion of armored fighting vehicles or tanks, among the world's nations.

Connection to Textbooks

Geography textbooks are dealing increasingly with the idea of diffusion as they begin to focus more on the interrelationships among world regions. This lesson uses a technological innovation--tanks--as a way of demonstrating how the process of diffusion works.

Objectives

Students are expected to:

1. describe the origin and spread of tank production from 1915 to the present time;
2. plot data associated with the production and possession of tanks on a map; and
3. speculate about factors that caused tanks to diffuse from their origin in Western Europe to countries all over the world.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson

0 Begin by saying that all nations are concerned with their own security. As a result they are constantly assessing their power relative to the perceived power of their enemies. Countries are concerned about maintaining a "balance of power" with their enemies.

0 When a new weapons system is developed that is clearly superior to what existed before, it can have the effect of disrupting the balance of power if it is adopted by some countries and not others. Typically when such a new system is developed by one nation it is quickly adopted by all countries concerned about their national security.

0 End this section of the lesson by saying that in 1912, not one country in the world possessed a tank. By 1982 there were 80 countries in possession of over 140,000 main battle tanks. How this change came about is the subject of this lesson. The term main battle tank (MBT) refers to the most powerful of the armored vehicles.

Developing the Lesson

Distribute Handout 1. Have students read Handout 1 and study Tables 1, 2 and 3. Review the main points as a class. They are:

1. Change begins with an innovation—a new idea, machine or procedure.

2. During World War I the idea of a powerful but mobile weapon was an innovation. This weapon was a tank.

3. The innovation began in Britain and France and spread to Germany and Italy during World War I.

4. In the period between World War I and the end of World War II, the production of tanks spread to several countries. The spread was slowed by costs, technical problems and a negative attitude toward war and weapons.

5. From 1945 to the present several other countries also began to produce MBTs.

Other countries simply purchase tanks from producing nations. While this saves production costs it makes the purchasing countries dependent on the producers.

7. As of 1982, 60 nations possess over 100 MBTs each and at least 80 countries possess some MBTs.

Have students complete the questions in "Reviewing Facts and Main Ideas." Conduct a class discussion of their answers to insure that they have understood the key ideas in Handout 1.

Next, distribute Handout 2 and have students complete the "Map Exercise" that appears at the end of Handout 1. Students will need atlases or a wall map to help them with the exercise. Their completed map should look like the Teacher's Key at the end of this lesson plan.

Project a transparency of the completed map (Teacher's Key) on the screen. Have students compare their maps with the Teacher's Key. Ask students the following questions:

1. In what region of the world did the development of the main battle tank begin? Response: in Western Europe.

2. In what parts of the world are no main battle tanks produced? Response: in central and northern South America, Australia and Southeast Asia, and in most of Africa and the Middle East.

3. Compare countries that produce main battle tanks with those that only purchase or acquire them. What differences do you think distinguish these two groups of countries? Expect a variety of responses but have students justify their answers.

Note: Students will be tempted to answer that the possessor nations are not industrialized. This is partly true, but Australia and New Zealand, for example, do not produce tanks, but are industrialized.

Concluding the Lesson

Remind students that over a 70 year period tanks were developed in Europe and spread all over the world. To conclude this lesson ask them to speculate about the factors that contributed to the rapid spread of this particular weapons system. Keep in mind that alternative answers are acceptable. Students should, however, be able to provide reasons for their answers.
Here are some questions that are typically asked about an innovation when trying to determine whether or not it is likely to be adopted. These questions might be useful to students as they speculate about the spread of tanks.

1. Do the potential users feel that there is an immediate advantage to using the innovation as compared to what they are now using? For example, do they feel that the innovation is cleaner, cheaper, faster, better or safer?

2. Do the potential users feel that the innovation is easy to understand and use?

3. Do the potential users feel that the innovation is consistent with their particular needs and values?

Note: Students might be interested in contrasting the spread of tanks with the spread of other weapons systems, for example, nuclear weapons, and in speculating about why the spread of these two systems has been similar in some ways yet different in others.

Suggestions for Additional Reading


This book discusses the diffusion process and is written for high school students.


Chamberlain and Ellis describe armored vehicle development in greater detail.
Tanks A Lot: Diffusion of the Armored Fighting Vehicle

An Innovation in Weapons

Change always begins with an innovation. An innovation is something new. It can be a new machine, a new procedure, or a new idea.

In 1915 and 1916 the tank was an innovation. It was developed independently by the United Kingdom and by France during World War I. These nations were involved in a war against Germany and were looking for a weapon that could break through German lines. This need was met by the main battle tank (MBT) which originally was an armored tractor with cannon and machine guns mounted on it. The tank was both powerful (in terms of fire power) and mobile. These were essential military needs that had not been successfully combined before in modern warfare.

The Germans captured some of these MBTs and went on to develop their own tanks. They lagged behind the British and French and were required to stop building tanks when they lost the war in 1918. The Italians were the only other power to develop an MBT during World War I. Eventually they decided to import tanks from other countries instead, and adapt them to their own needs.

The Spread of the MBT

The spread of the MBT to other countries began in 1918 after the end of World War I. The spread of this new weapons system, however, was slow.

Several barriers existed. The costs of building heavy tanks discouraged many potential producers. They were also slowed because of limits on the technology of armor plating and the difficulty of mounting large guns in the tanks. A further barrier to development was the general anti-war attitude that prevailed after the experience of World War I. In fact the Disarmament Conferences of 1930 condemned heavy tanks as offensive weapons meaning that these weapons' main use was to attack rather than to defend.

Despite these barriers, the major armies of the world obtained armored vehicles for their forces. The MBTs spread through a series of steps. First, a state would acquire a model of an MBT already in production by another state. The state might then begin to develop its own design of this model by either copying it or modifying this new technology to meet its own needs. Lastly, the state would produce its own MBTs and incorporate them in newly organized armored forces or units in order to use the new technology in its own military forces. This process frequently took several years to complete.

Table 1 contains a list of those countries that acquired, designed and/or produced MBTs and related armored vehicles during the period 1915-1945. It was during this period that the spread of armored vehicle technology was the greatest.

The Filling-In Period

The period from 1945 to the present saw the emergence of many newly independent countries. As they looked to their own security needs they obtained MBTs and other armored vehicles in ever increasing numbers.

Certain countries, as they developed an industrial capacity, began to develop their own MBTs. Table 2 lists countries that are currently producing MBTs.

From World Geography and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
### Table 1
**Diffusion of the Main Battle Tank And Related Armored Vehicles, 1915-1945**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date Acquired Vehicles</th>
<th>Date Designed Own Vehicles (5)</th>
<th>Date First Produced Vehicles (6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1917 (1)</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1921 (2)</td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1926 (1)</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>1919 (1,3)</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1919 (3)</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>1920 (3)</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1928 (1)</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Not Achieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1936 (1)</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1940 (4)</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. Acquired from the United Kingdom.
2. Acquired from Germany.
3. Acquired from France.
4. Acquired from Czechoslovakia.
5. Date of first attempt at designing an armored vehicle. Often this meant copying a recently acquired vehicle.
6. Date of first operational armored vehicle. This is limited to a tank of some kind, be it light, medium or heavy, and does not include machine gun carriers, "tankettes", or armored cars.

### Table 2
**Current Producers of Main Battle Tanks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MBT</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MBT</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MBT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Yes*</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Yes**</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MBT** = Main Battle Tank

* under development

** under licensing agreement with another country to produce their armored vehicles.
Table 3 provides a list of those countries that possess more than 100 operational MBTs as of 1982. It does not list all countries possessing MBTs since such a list would be changing too quickly. In today's world, the possession of MBTs is seen as a status symbol for many countries. Also in a world of east/west competition for influence, the ability to provide such weapons is an important measure of status for certain countries' foreign policies.

Table 3
A List of Countries Which Possess Over 100 MBTs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>East Germany</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Spain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>North Yemen</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This list is not exhaustive. Since countries are constantly acquiring tanks and armored fighting vehicles it is likely that several more countries could be added to this list as time goes on.

Conclusion

The spread of armored vehicle technology, in particular the development of the MBT, can best be described by the diffusion process. Over time and space, the armored vehicle has changed and evolved until it is an integral part of the national security of many nations.

Reviewing Facts and Main Ideas

1. Which countries invented the tank?

2. What barriers slowed the spread of MBTs after World War I?

3. Once they acquired an armored vehicle, how long did it take each of the following countries to design their own vehicles?
   a. Japan _____ years.
   c. Poland _____ years.
4. Which of the following countries are current producers of MBTs?
   a. Austria
   b. China
   c. Pakistan
   d. Sweden

5. Which of the following countries possess over 100 MBTs?
   a. Belgium
   b. New Zealand
   c. Italy
   d. Nepal

Map Exercise

6. Using the blank world map, Handout 2, locate and color in those countries that produced tanks before 1920. Use information in Table 1, Column 3 and the symbol shown in the map key to complete this task.

7. Locate and color in, on the same map, those countries that began to produce tanks between 1920 and 1945. Use Table 1, Column 3 and the symbol shown in the map key to complete this task.

8. On the same map locate and color in those countries that began to produce main battle tanks after 1945. Compare the data in Table 2 with that in Table 1, Column 3, to obtain this information. Use information in Table 2 to complete this task. Use the appropriate symbol to color in these countries.

9. On the same map, locate and color in those countries in Table 3 that possess MBTs but which do not produce them. Use the appropriate symbol to color in these countries.
Produced Tanks Before 1920

Began Producing Tanks 1920-1945

Began Producing Tanks After 1945

Possess Tanks but Do Not Produce Them
9. INTERPRETING DATA IN TABLES AND GRAPHS

Another word for information is the term data. Data include descriptive statements about objects, conditions, events, people, places and feelings. Quantitative data may be thought of as information put into numerical form. We have become accustomed to quantitative descriptions of such phenomena as temperature, speed or altitude. However, we remain somewhat less comfortable with describing social, economic and political reality in quantitative terms.

Quantification involves a new way of describing reality through the language of numbers. Just as we use written words to symbolize speech or maps to represent geographical reality, we can express concepts and understandings about human reality with numbers. The wealth of a nation can thus be symbolized by its Gross National Product (GNP). The political stability of a nation can be measured by the number of governments that have come into and gone out of office over a period of time.

Descriptive Data

Most of the quantitative information we encounter in our daily lives as citizens are descriptive data. In essence, descriptive data reveal the principal characteristics or value of some concept, whether it is defense spending measured as a percentage of GNP or military readiness as measured by the number of standing divisions maintained by a nation.

Visual displays of descriptive data usually take one of two basic forms: graphs of which there are four basic types (pie graphs, bar graphs or histograms, line graphs and Lorenz curves) and tables. Once phenomena such as the deployment of American forces abroad have been described in quantitative terms they can be compared. Thus, we might compare the percentage of U.S. forces stationed abroad with the percentage of Soviet forces stationed abroad. This is an example of a comparison across nations (or cases in social science terminology). Or we might make comparisons across time, such as the percentage of U.S. forces stationed abroad in 1980.

Sample Lessons

This chapter contains two lessons that illustrate the use of quantitative data to study national security topics. The first lesson, Comparing Military Burdens: The NATO Alliance, uses tabular data to teach the concept of the military burden and its use in making international comparisons of the economic burden on nations created by defense spending. Maintaining armed forces costs money and imposes an opportunity cost on every nation’s economy in that resources used for defense could be employed productively elsewhere. The military burden is a measure of this opportunity cost and may be calculated as the ratio of military expenditures to gross national product (ME/GNP). Students learn the meaning of this concept and then use data on the military burden for NATO countries to make comparisons of the contributions of NATO individual countries to the alliance.

The second lesson, Measuring Department of Defense Expenditures, uses line graphs to
teach four ways economists measure how much is spent by the Department of Defense from year to year. The measures are: (1) total outlays in current dollars, (2) total outlays in constant dollars, (3) percentage of federal outlays, and (4) percentage of Gross National Product. Students examine and interpret line graphs showing defense spending since 1955 as measured by each of these methods. Then they use the information in the graphs to formulate generalizations about trends in defense spending.

Notes


3. Another measure of the military burden is per capita spending on defense or military expenditures (ME)/population.

Comparing Military Burdens: The NATO Alliance

by Judith V. Rappo

Preview of Main Points

This lesson introduces the concept of measuring the economic burden of military spending for the purpose of making international comparisons. Data for the NATO alliance are presented and the question of "fair shares" is discussed. There is a separate section on comparing the United States and Soviet Union, which could be omitted in a less advanced class.

Connection to Textbooks

Textbooks discuss international differences in connection with trade and developing nations. This lesson introduces these differences in a new context through comparisons of spending for military forces.

Economic Concepts

GNP, planned economies, opportunity cost, ratios, and equity.

Objectives

Students are expected to:

1. define the economic burden of military spending or the military burden as the ratio of military expenditure to gross national product (ME/GNP);
2. understand why the military burden is a useful measure for international comparisons; and
3. compare the military spending of NATO countries in terms of their military burden.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson

- Distribute Handout 1 to the class. Explain that the lesson is about making international comparisons of military spending, a task that involves both technical problems and value judgments.

Developing the Lesson

- Have the class read "Measuring the Military Burden" in Handout 1 and complete questions 1, 2 and 3. Make sure that they understand how ME/GNP is calculated and how the value of the ratio changes with changes in military budgets or in GNP.

- Have the students read the next section, "International Comparisons." This section introduces some of the technical difficulties involved and the idea of using an objective measure as a test for fairness or equity in an alliance. Have the class answer questions 4, 5 and 6.

- After the class has answered the questions, you may want to lead a discussion of the appropriateness of ME/GNP as a measure of fairness. Some would argue, for example, that other considerations, such as levels of unemployment in a country or contributions that do
not appear in the defense budget, should also be considered in judging fairness. You may point out that the United States has other military and strategic interests, so that not all of its military spending is for NATO (the same is true for some of the other NATO members as well).

Concluding the Lesson

0 Have the class read "Interpreting the Measure of Military Burden" and answer the questions together. Ask students to comment on the following statement: "There is no single, universally accepted formula for calculating each country's 'fair share' in an alliance."

Further Discussion

Handout 2 on comparisons with the Soviet Union introduces the index number problem, which arises in all international comparisons as well as comparisons over time. This section might be too advanced for some students. The two articles by F. Holzman listed in the "Suggestions for Additional Reading" section could be assigned to advanced students; they are the best discussions of the index number problem in the context of comparing military spending across countries.

The students should be told that U.S. government estimates of Soviet military spending are controversial. There is a large margin of error, which is unavoidable given the lack of official data and the technical problems of making international comparisons.

Suggestions for Additional Reading

Department of Defense. "Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense." Annual. This report is issued annually. It discusses a number of different measures of the military burden.

Holzman, Franklin. "Are the Soviets Really Outspending the U.S. on Defense." International Security, Spring 1980; and


The above two articles by Holzman discuss estimating Soviet defense spending.

Answer for Handout 1

1. ME/GNP
2. percentages.
3. increases.
5. Luxembourg.
6. Country rankings would be different than with ME/GNP. Countries with large armies relative to population would appear to be contributing more than countries that spend more on equipment. Countries with conscription would rank higher on the manpower scale than on the spending scale.
7. Only that they are making equal sacrifices based on ability to pay.

Answers to Handout 2

8. Individual components of Soviet military spending are estimated and summed to reach a total figure.
9. Lack of complete official data because of Soviet secrecy.
10. Different relative price structures are associated with different quantities (index number problem).
Comparing Military Burdens: The NATO Alliance

Maintaining armed forces costs money and uses up economic resources. It imposes an opportunity cost on the economy in that the resources could be employed productively elsewhere. This cost to the economy is labeled the economic burden of military spending or military burden, for short. Measures of the burden of military spending are often used to compare military spending between countries. In this lesson you will learn how one common measure of the military burden is defined and you will see how the military contribution of NATO countries is compared using this measure.

Measuring the Military Burden

The most common measure of the military burden is the ratio between military spending or expenditures (ME) and gross national product (GNP), or ME/GNP. This ratio tells you what fraction of a country's production is allocated to its national defense. It is usually expressed as a percent. For the United States in recent years, ME/GNP has been about 6 to 7 percent.

The military burden is different at different times. It goes up during wartime, when the whole national effort is devoted to winning the war. During World War II, ME/GNP reached nearly 40 percent in the U.S. This means that close to half of the national output was being used directly for fighting the war. In peacetime, the level should, logically, be much lower. After 1968, the height of spending for the Vietnam War, ME/GNP declined steadily, reaching a low of 5 percent in 1978 and 1979. Since then the ratio has been rising, but it is still low compared to much of the period since World War II. U.S. defense budgets are many times larger now than in earlier years, but GNP has grown even more, so the burden of military spending is smaller.

Test Your Understanding

1. The military burden can be measured by:
2. This measure is expressed in: a) dollars b) rubles c) percentages.
3. If military spending increases by 10% and GNP increases by 5%, does the military burden increase or decrease?

International Comparisons

Measures of military burdens are often used in international comparisons. Members of military alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) want to know if all of the members are contributing their "fair" share. This notion of fairness in burden sharing is based on the idea that all the members of the alliance should contribute equally according to their ability to pay.

Nations also are interested in how large a burden their rivals have, since the size of their rival's military burden is a measure of the country's willingness to spend for defense. It is also a rough indicator of the country's capacity for further increases in military spending. If ME/GNP is already very high, it may be difficult for a country to increase defense spending any further.

ME/GNP is a convenient measure because it can be calculated from data that are usually available. There is no need to convert the spending figures into foreign currencies, as there is in making direct comparisons of defense budgets. For example, if we wanted to compare the size of the U.S. and French military budgets directly, we would have to convert the U.S. figure to French francs or the French figure to U.S. dollars. The figures for the military burdens are not expressed in francs or dollars because they are ratios.

Table 1 shows the size of the military burden for a number of NATO countries. Note that some of the smaller countries have large burdens. This is because the value of the ratio depends on both the numerator and the denominator. A country might spend much less than the United

From Economics and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
States on defense and still have a heavy military burden relative to its productive capacity. Greece, for example, spends roughly 7 percent of its GNP on defense.

**Table 1**

**Military Burden (ME/GNP) for NATO Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>ME/GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, data are for 1982.

**Test Your Understanding**

4. Which two countries in NATO have the highest military burden as measured by ME/GNP?

5. Which country has the smallest military burden?

**Interpreting the Measure of Military Burden**

The measure of the military burden that has been presented in this lesson, ME/GNP, measures the cost to an economy of the resources allocated to national defense. ME/GNP is essentially a measure of pain—how much of its resources a country is giving up to support its military forces—not a measure of military effectiveness. It does not measure how strong a nation's military forces are or, in an alliance, how much a country is contributing to the joint defense. For example, a country with a low GNP may have a large military burden, even though its military spending is small and contributes relatively little to the alliance total. A country that spends little, but has a strategic location, may be important to the security of the alliance, even though its economic contribution is not large.

**Test Your Understanding**

6. A different measure of the military burden might be the ratio of the size of the armed forces to the labor force. What would be the implication of using this measure instead of ME/GNP?

7. Turkey and the United Kingdom have almost identical military burdens. Knowing this, what can you say about their armed forces and their economies?
Comparison with the Soviet Union

Comparing the U.S. and Soviet military burdens poses special problems. The Soviet Union does not report details of its military budget, and the single number for military spending that appears in the state budget does not include all of its spending. Furthermore, because the Soviet Union has a planned economy with prices set by the central government, the official figure for military spending does not represent a true market value for the part of military spending that is reported. For example, Soviet soldiers are drafted, and are paid a very low wage. Thus, the cost of manpower in the large Soviet army is understated. (This is also true for other countries that have conscription and do not pay a market wage to their draftees.)

Because of the lack of reliable, complete Soviet data on military spending, the United States government prepares its own estimates, using a method called the "building block" approach. The cost of different military activities and forces of the Soviet Union is estimated separately, using U.S. prices for similar equipment and forces. For example, a Soviet tank is valued at what it would cost to produce a similar tank in the United States. This dollar figure is multiplied by the number of Soviet tanks produced during the year. The sum of these estimates or building blocks is the cost of Soviet military activities in U.S. dollars and U.S. prices.

But the Soviet Union spends rubles, not dollars, and uses its own prices, not U.S. prices. Measurements using U.S. prices overstate Soviet military spending because the mix of forces chosen depends partly on relative prices. If the Soviet government had to pay U.S. wages to its soldiers, it would probably choose to have a smaller army. Valuing the large Soviet army at the high wages paid to U.S. soldiers gives an exaggerated figure in dollars for the cost of the Soviet army. This problem exists to some extent whenever international comparisons are made. In general, when the mix of products and prices differs between two countries, the cost of country A's products will be higher if valued in country B's prices, and vice versa.

To estimate the Soviet military burden a ruble estimate of Soviet military spending is needed. The CIA makes a separate estimate based on the building blocks, using ruble prices whenever they are known. For some parts of the Soviet program, however, ruble prices are not known, and so the U.S. prices are used and converted to rubles by a ruble/dollar exchange rate. The burden of military spending in the Soviet Union calculated by comparing the estimate of military spending in rubles to Soviet GNP is 13-15 percent. Thus, the Soviet burden of military spending is about twice as large as in the United States, partly because they spend more than the United States and partly because their GNP is smaller.

Test Your Understanding

8. What is the building block method of estimating Soviet military spending?

9. Why is it necessary?

10. Why are U.S. prices inappropriate for estimating spending in another country?

From Economics and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
Measuring Department of Defense Expenditures

by Terry L. Smart

Preview of Main Points

This lesson shows students four ways to measure the expenditures of the Department of Defense since 1955: (1) total dollar outlays; (2) total outlays in "constant dollars" adjusted for inflation; (3) defense spending as a percent of total federal outlays; and (4) defense spending as a percent of the GNP. Students interpret data from graphs, answer questions, and reach a conclusion about the trend of defense spending based on the data.

Connection to Textbooks

This lesson may be used as a skill development lesson when textbooks introduce students to graphs. This lesson may also be introduced when the class takes up federal fiscal policy or inflation.

Economic Concepts

Graphs, inflation, percentages, constant dollars, and GNP.

Objectives

Students are expected to:

1. define four ways economists measure defense spending;
2. consider how different measures of defense spending could lead to different conclusions about trends in such spending;
3. analyze data from line graphs on defense spending by answering related questions; and
4. form generalizations about trends in defense spending by applying information drawn from data in line graphs.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson

- Distribute Handouts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. Have the students read the introduction (Handout 1). You might want to mention that outlays, not spending authority, are used throughout the Handouts (see the first paragraph of Handout 2).
- To introduce Handout 2 you may want to reproduce this graph on a transparency to be sure that students can interpret this graph and review graphs in general.
- Have the students work alone or in pairs to answer the questions accompanying each of the four Handouts (Handouts 2, 3, 4, and 5).

Developing the Lesson

- As each Handout is completed you may check the students' answers or have them share responses with the class. When students answer the final question on each Handout their
responses should indicate that defense spending in recent years has been either rising, falling or staying level. These three descriptors are given in Handout 2 but not in the other three Handouts.

- Have students make comparisons as they work through the Handouts. The first two present extremely different dollar amounts. Make certain the class sees how inflation distorts the dollar outlays.

**Concluding the Lesson**

- After the four Handouts are completed call upon students for a brief summary of the four ways defense spending can be measured.

**Note:** Be aware with regard to defense outlays as a percentage of total federal outlays that some of the decrease is explained by a shift in federal accounting in the 1960s that removed certain expenditures that were not part of the active military force from defense outlays (such as military retirement and veterans’ benefits). Some analyses put these expenditures back into the defense sector (and a few also include the defense portion of payment on the national debt in this category as well). Conclusions about overall trends are not significantly altered by these changes.

- Ask the class to suggest reasons for the variation in defense spending from one time period to another. List and discuss the different reasons presented.

- Ask if there is data to support the claim that defense spending is at an all-time high; that defense spending has been increasing in recent years; that defense spending is lower today than in previous years; that defense spending has been decreasing in recent years. Students should give reasons for answers and use appropriate graphs as evidence.

**Additional Concluding Exercise**

- Have students write a brief essay which draws together the information gathered from their examination of the four ways to measure defense spending. Instruct students to use data from the graphs in an essay which responds to these two questions:

  1. What has been the trend in defense spending in recent years?
  2. What has been the trend in defense spending over the last 30 years?

**Suggestion for Additional Reading**


See Brady for more explanation of the graphs in this lesson and defense budgets in general. The data in the graphs in Handouts 2, 3, 4 and 5 are taken from this chapter.

**Answers to Handout 1**

1. 1955, about $35 billion.  
   1965, about $50 billion.  
   1975, about $80 billion.  
   1985, about $300 billion.

2. rising; rising.

**Answers to Handout 3**

3. 1955, about $190 billion.  
   1965, about $190 billion.  
   1975, about $170 billion.  
   1985, about $270 billion.

4. rising; rising.
Answers to Handout 4
5. 1955, about 57%.
   1965, about 40%.
   1975, about 23%.
   1985, about 28%.
8. falling; rising.

Answers to Handout 5
9. 1955, about 9%.
   1965, about 7%.
   1975, about 6%.
   1985, about 7%.
12. falling, rising.
Measuring Department of Defense Expenditures

The cost of national defense is likely to be a major political issue throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In Congressional debates over this issue opponents of defense-related spending have argued that in recent years military expenditures have increased too much and have reached all-time highs. Proponents of defense spending say that not enough has been devoted to national security and that Department of Defense (DoD) expenditures are lower than in previous years.

Opponents and proponents of defense spending support their arguments with economic data, but they reach very different conclusions. How is this possible?

Part of the answer may be found in the way economists compare how much is spent by the Department of Defense (DoD) from year to year. This lesson will show you four methods for doing this. Then you can determine if defense spending is higher, lower, or about the same as in recent years. The four methods are:

1. **Total outlays in current dollars.** This is the total dollars spent by DoD in a given fiscal year.

2. **Total outlays in constant dollars.** This is the total spent by DoD in a given year measured in dollars adjusted for inflation.

3. **Percentage of Federal Outlays.** This measure is the percentage of all federal or national government outlays that go to defense in a given year.

4. **Percentage of Gross National Product (GNP).** This is a measure of what portion of the GNP goes to defense in a given year.

Each of the handouts with this lesson (Handouts 2-5) briefly explains one of those methods for measuring the DoD’s expenditures. Read each Handout, examine the graphs, and then answer the accompanying questions.

From *Economics and National Security*. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
Total Outlays in Current Dollars

One way economists might look at defense spending is by calculating the total dollars spent by the DoD in a particular fiscal year. Congress has given the Department of Defense legal authority to spend money. DoD spends the money by awarding contracts, by placing orders for purchases, and by acquiring goods and paying for services. However, the DoD might not spend all of the money Congress has authorized for the year. This happens for several reasons. One is that contractors might not complete the work during the year, so they receive payment later. This graph shows the "outlays" for defense spending, not the amount Congress authorized. Outlays by the DoD are actual payments made in any particular fiscal year. The graph below presents the total amounts spent by the Department of Defense in selected years since 1955. Note that the graph shows outlays in "current dollars." This means the amount actually spend in a particular year without correcting for changes in prices from year to year.

DoD Outlays in Current Dollars, 1955-85

Questions

1. What was the total amount spent by the DoD in each of these years?
   
   1955 $ _____   1965 $ _____   1975 $ _____   1985 $ _____

2. DoD outlays for national security may be described as (a) rising; (b) falling; (c) staying level. Based on the actual dollars spent by the Department of Defense, how would you describe the trend in defense spending over the past 30 years?

   __________________________________________. In the last five years? __________________________________________.

From Economics and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
Total Outlays in Constant Dollars

Some economists point out that looking at the total dollars spent by the DoD in a particular fiscal year does not give a true picture of the cost of national security. This is because inflation can distort a comparison of the dollar amounts spent in different years. Inflation means prices are rising. Thus, the dollar cost of providing the same amount of defense will be higher after inflation simply because many of the prices paid for defense items will be higher.

Therefore, to make comparisons more accurate, economists adjust the dollar's value, taking inflation into consideration, and calculate year-to-year defense spending in terms of what they call "constant dollars." In data representing constant dollars the distortion caused by inflation has been taken out.

The graph below presents the total amount in constant dollars spent by the Department of Defense in selected years since 1955. The graph shows spending in terms of the 1985 price level.

DoD Outlays in Constant (FY 1985) Dollars, 1955-85

Questions

3. What was the total amount in "constant dollars" spent by the Department of Defense in each of these years?

1955 $ _____ 1965 $ _____ 1975 $ _____ 1985 $ _____

4. Based on constant dollars spent by the Department of Defense, how would you describe the trend in defense spending over the past 30 years?

_____ ___________________________ In the last five years? ________________

From Economics and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
Percentage of Federal Outlays

Some economists do not think using dollars is the best way to judge trends in defense spending. Instead, they consider how much of all the federal government’s outlays in any particular fiscal year go to defense. In other words, the cost of defense is calculated as a percentage of all federal expenditures.

The graph below presents the total spent by the Department of Defense in selected years since 1955 as a percentage of total federal spending.

DoD Outlays as a Percent of All Federal Outlays, 1955-85

Questions

5. What was the percent of total federal outlays spent by the Department of Defense in each of these years?
   1955 $ _____   1965 $ _____   1975 $ _____   1985 $ _____

6. In which of the years since 1955 has the greatest percent of federal outlays been spent on defense? _____

7. In which of the years since 1955 has the smallest percent of federal outlays been spent on defense? _____

8. Based on defense spending as a percentage of total federal outlays, how would you describe the trend in defense spending over the past 30 years?

                                      . In the past five years? ____________

From Economics and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
Percentage of Gross National Product (GNP)

A fourth method used by some economists to get a perspective on defense spending is to compare defense spending with non-defense spending. To do this, defense spending is calculated as a percentage of the GNP (Gross National Product). The GNP is a measure of all the goods and services produced for final demand by the United States in a particular year. This method of measuring defense spending indicates how much of the goods and services were related to national security.

The graph below presents the total spent by DoD in selected years since 1955 as a percentage of the total GNP.

DoD Outlays as a Percent of GNP, 1955-85

Questions

9. What was the percent of total GNP spent by the Department of Defense in each of these years?
   1955 ____%  1965 ____%  1975 ____%  1985 ____%

10. In which of the years since 1955 did defense spending represent the greatest percent of the GNP?

11. In which of the years since 1955 did defense spending represent the smallest percent of the GNP?

12. Based on defense spending as a percent of the GNP, how would you describe the trend in defense spending over the last 30 years?
    _______________. In the past five years? _______________.

From Economics and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
10. PRO-CON ANALYSIS IN THE CLASSROOM

The public policy agenda of any era will be filled with controversial issues relating to national security. A pro-con analysis is one instructional strategy that can give students an opportunity to consider and learn about such issues. In a pro-con analysis two conflicting viewpoints regarding an issue, such as whether to give up U.S. control of the Panama Canal, are presented in a balanced, even-handed fashion. These pro-con arguments may be specially written for students or they may be taken from primary sources. The issue under study may be a current, unresolved one or it may be a historical issue. Students examine pro-con arguments regarding the issue and then evaluate the issue and arguments in terms of a set of questions.

Uses of Pro-Con Lessons

The exercises students complete in a pro-con lesson will depend upon the purposes of the lesson. Pro-con analysis can be designed to promote several related but distinct purposes in education about national security. Such lessons might focus primarily on giving students an opportunity to practice intellectual and interpersonal skills associated with examining and discussing controversial issues.

Pro-con lessons might also develop students' understanding of the types of arguments and reasoning involved in public policy debates about different kinds of national security issues such as funding for a new weapons system or the deployment of American forces in a distant trouble spot.

Finally, pro-con lessons might aim to deepen students' knowledge of particular issues or topics through an examination of arguments regarding the issue. Whatever purpose is the focus of a pro-con lesson, students should be required to identify the main ideas embodied in the issue, consider alternative arguments and express their opinions about the issue.

Pro-con lessons do not always have to focus on contemporary issues. For example, students might examine a national security issue that was hotly debated in the early 1800s in America. The issue centered on whether or not to have a professionally trained military in the United States. While we now see a professional army as essential, at the start of the 18th century Americans looked with distrust on a large, standing army. Some of this suspicion was directed toward the newly created military academy at West Point. In a pro-con lesson students could analyze excerpts from a January 1816 debate in the House Military Affairs Committee on whether or not to expand West Point and establish new academies. In so doing students could learn that the key issues were whether such academies were constitutional, whether they were aristocratic and whether defense of the nation should not be left to citizens' armies.

Sample Lesson

This chapter presents an example of a pro-con analysis lesson that focuses on the question of whether the federal budget deficit can be reduced by cutting defense spending. In this lesson, "Defense Spending and the Federal Budget Deficit," students use a six-step approach to analyzing two conflicting viewpoints on the issue. These steps focus upon having students identify the key issues presented and the points of agreement and disagreement on those issues. Students then have an opportunity to draw their own conclusions about the issue and to support their conclusions with the information presented.

Notes

1. For a useful summary regarding the teaching of controversial issues see, "Teaching About Controversial Issues," ERIC Fact Sheet No. 10, September, 1983.
Lesson Plan and Notes for Teachers

Defense Spending and the Federal Budget Deficit
by Judith V. Reppy

Preview of Main Points
In this lesson students analyze two conflicting viewpoints on the question of reducing the federal deficit by cutting defense spending. Students use a six-step approach to examine two readings from opposing perspectives.

Connection to Textbooks
This lesson can be used in conjunction with textbook presentations of the federal budget process or fiscal policy.

Economic Concepts
Fiscal policy, deficits, and trade-offs.

Objectives
Students are expected to:
1. identify the main ideas in two conflicting readings;
2. apply a method for dealing with conflicting viewpoints in these two readings; and
3. consider additional information to form an opinion about the key question in the lesson.

Suggestions for Teaching the Lesson

Opening the Lesson
o Review the meaning and nature of the federal budget deficit. Explain that among many recent proposals for reducing the deficit is one calling for reducing federal spending by cutting military spending. Tell students that in this lesson they will read pro and con viewpoints on this subject.

Developing the Lesson
o Have the students read the six recommended steps for dealing with conflicting viewpoints on the top part of Handout 1. Discuss the six steps if necessary.

o Have the students read and complete Handouts 2 and 3. Require the students to complete the questions on the bottom half of Handout 1. This may be done orally or in writing as individuals or in small groups. Point out how the questions are related to the first five of the six steps for dealing with conflicting viewpoints.

Concluding the Lesson
o Discuss the students' answers to questions 1 through 5.

o Ask the students which reading they believe made the stronger argument. The students should be able to defend their answers using information generated by answering questions 1 to 5.

o Discuss step 6 of Handout 1 as a class.

Defense Spending and the Federal Budget Deficit

Recently there has been great debate in both houses of Congress on ways to reduce the federal deficit. One proposal has been to reduce federal spending by cutting outlays for defense. This proposal has sparked controversy between supporters and opponents. Handouts 2 and 3 express some of the pro and con opinions on cutting military-related spending.

Steps for Analyzing Conflicting Viewpoints

How do you go about dealing with conflicting viewpoints like those expressed in Handouts 2 and 3? In this lesson you will use the six-step approach given below—a simple way of examining any issue on which there are two (or more) conflicting sides or opinions.

Step 1. Identify the issues on which both sides agree.

Step 2. Determine the issues raised by one side which were omitted by the other.

Step 3. Identify issues on which both sides disagree.

Step 4. On any point of disagreement, determine reasons for the disagreement.

Step 5. Identify any other factors that must be analyzed concerning the issue in dispute.

Step 6. Use the arguments you have analyzed to construct your own opinion on the issue.

Using the Steps

Once you have read Handouts 2 and 3 apply the above six steps for dealing with conflicting viewpoints by answering the following questions:

1. Are Handouts 2 and 3 in agreement about anything in regard to the national deficit or defense spending? If so, underline the key sentences that indicate agreement.

2. Was there any point raised in either reading that was not addressed by the other reading? If so, underline twice the key sentences that summarize the points made.

3. According to Handout 2 has defense spending increased or decreased in recent years? According to Handout 3 has defense spending increased or decreased in recent years? On what other points do Handouts 2 and 3 disagree? Circle the key sentences that indicate disagreement.

4. Put a star at the beginning of all the sentences in Handout 2 that give a reason for cutting defense spending. Put a star at the beginning of all the sentences in Handout 3 that give a reason for not cutting defense spending.

5. Suppose you wanted to learn more about the impact of defense spending on the federal deficit. For what points do you need more information? Where might you look for information? What kinds of sources might you consider?

6. What is your opinion on this issue? Is reducing defense spending an effective way to reduce the federal budget deficit?

From Economics and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
President Reagan began his second term of office by calling for a balanced federal budget. But, the president did not ask the Pentagon to cut back on spending as part of the administration's overall effort to reduce the federal deficit. The administration claims it has already cut the military budget. The truth of the matter is that in 1986 Defense Department spending is going up, not down. The administration's plans call for $31.2 billion more to be spent on defense in 1986 than was spent in 1985. In 1986, spending by the Defense Department is expected to rise over 8 percent. Meanwhile, the administration's plans call for reductions of $65.6 billion in spending on education, health, and other social programs.

Statistics make it clear that spending on defense, not on domestic welfare, has been the culprit driving up the federal debt. For example, in 1980 the deficit was $74 billion. And how much did the Defense Department spend that year?—$131 billion. By 1986 the administration estimates the deficit will rise to $180 billion. Meanwhile, defense-related spending will skyrocket to $277.5 billion. Until defense spending is brought under control it will be impossible to reduce the deficit.

However, a great part of what the Pentagon spends is uncontrollable because it is tied to existing weapons contracts. At the end of President Carter's administration these uncontrollables made up 27.2 percent of defense spending. But in 1986 38.2 percent of defense spending will be uncontrollables. The uncontrollables are increasing because the Department of Defense has not spent all of the money appropriated by Congress in previous years. Unspent appropriations, largely for new weapons, have jumped from $92 billion in 1980 to an estimated $279.6 billion in 1986.

"Stretchouts" are another problem. The Defense Department continues to stretch out the rate at which it is buying new weapons by spreading purchases out over a number of years. This allows the Defense Department to spend less each year. But total costs go up because of inflation and inefficiencies that take place when production of weapons is stretched out.

The Defense Department claims it has cut its budget. This is because the Defense Department calculates its budget in a way no other federal agency is permitted. The Defense Department allows its officials to begin budget calculations at unrealistic, high levels known as baselines. Any spending on a level below the baselines is then called a "cut."

The Pentagon has made no cuts. In fact, defense outlays are at the highest level since the end of World War II. Not even during the Korean War and the war in Vietnam were Pentagon outlays as high as in the 1980s.

Congress will have its hands full trying to cut back defense spending in order to come up with the savings needed to reduce the federal deficit. If Congress is really serious about curbing the deficit, defense is one of the few areas that will provide the savings Congress needs.

(Adapted from "Military Spending Boosts the Deficit" by Gordon Adams and Laura Weiss in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April, 1985, Vol. 41, No. 4, page 16.)

From Economics and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
Deficit Problems Are Not Due to Defense Spending

Today, it is often said that nothing can be done about the federal budget deficit without cutting defense spending. This simply is not true. In his second term of office President Reagan has shown how the deficit can be reduced without significantly cutting defense. Despite this, there are many important people who do not want to cut the deficit without cutting defense. We must ask why that is so.

A majority of the American people have a distorted idea of the size of defense spending. In a 1984 poll only 6% of the participants quizzed responded correctly to the question "How much of the GNP (Gross National Product) is spent on defense?" Defense expenditures in 1984 were 6% of GNP. But 57% believed defense spending was over 20% and 9% believed it to be above 50%. With such mistaken ideas about the size of defense spending, some people naturally think it impossible to cut the deficit without cutting defense.

It simply is not true that the defense program today is the principal cause of the deficit. Defense expenditures in the 1980s (calculated as a percentage of the GNP) are smaller than in any year between 1951 and 1972. In the last year of a balanced federal budget--1969--defense was 9% of the nation's GNP. Compare that with 6.6% for 1985. Moreover, according to administration plans, defense expenditures by 1990 will rise to only 7.5% of GNP. Meanwhile non-defense spending by 1990 will rise to a level of 25% higher than in 1984.

Why has the defense program become the indispensable item in trying to reduce the deficit? What seems to be involved for many people is the principle of fairness. For them, if federal aid to education (etc.) is to be cut, then defense should be cut too. But defense is not for the benefit of one group in the way that aid to education is for the benefit of students. Defense is for the benefit of this and future generations of Americans. The real question of fairness is this: Is it fair to risk the security of future generations in order to increase spending on domestic welfare today?

In fact, almost no one who calls for cutting defense says he or she wants weaker forces. Almost all insist they want to get the same military protection--only more cheaply.

One suggestion for providing defense more cheaply is to stretch out the military buildup over a longer period of time. This would reduce Pentagon outlays of money in the near future. But "stretchouts" mean more expenditures later. Also, defense forces obtained later do not provide as much security as defense forces obtained earlier. Planes purchased for delivery in 1990 will not protect the country in 1989. "Stretchouts" reduce national defense.

A cut by Congress in the defense budget is going to cut strength. A cut will be the result of--or at least be justified by--misinformation about the relation of defense to the budget and the national economy.

(Adapted from "Cutting the Lean out of Defense" by Herbert Stein in Wall Street Journal, February 27, 1985, page 34.)

From Economics and National Security. Mershon Center, The Ohio State University.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Following is an annotated bibliography on national security issues that has been prepared especially for secondary school teachers of American history, American government, economics, geography and world history. These resources may be used as background reading in preparation for teaching. Some are appropriate as extra reading assignments for students interested in extending their knowledge about this subject area.

All of these books offer substantial information and background to issues of national security, both historically and in the nuclear age. We have not listed here curricular and other educational materials. For a comprehensive bibliography of those kinds of resources consult: Robin Riddle, ed., Bibliography of Nuclear Age Educational Resources. More information about this book is listed below.

This bibliography includes items with an ED number, which identifies them as resources in ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center). These documents are available in microfiche and/or paper copies from the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). For information on prices, contact EDRS, 3900 Wheeler Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22304; 703/823-0500. Abstracts and descriptive information on these ERIC documents are published in Resources in Education (RIE). Most ERIC documents are available for viewing in microfiche at libraries that subscribe to the ERIC collection.

Allison, Graham T., Albert Carnesale, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds. Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War. New York: W.W. Norton, 1986. This edited volume addresses important questions, including how nuclear war might occur, what the dangers are, and how they can be reduced.

Barash, David P. The Arms Race and Nuclear War. Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1987. This book gives introductory examination of the substance and issues of the nuclear age. It includes a presentation of a "pro and con" approach to selected policy issues such as nuclear deterrence, arms control negotiations and nuclear ethics.

Berkowitz, Bruce D. American Security: Dilemmas for a Modern Democracy. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1986. Berkowitz discusses the significant limits placed on democratic societies in achieving national security, including a number of important issues such as NATO, the realities of U.S. politics, and intelligence errors.

Blacker, Coit D. and Gloria Dufey, eds. International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements, 2nd ed. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1984. This is a description and an insightful history of arms control. Especially helpful is its extensive appendix that includes the actual texts of many agreements.

Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War. New York: The Free Press, 1973. Blainey surveys all international wars since 1700 in an effort to find general causes for war. Although this book is rather difficult, its focus on a broad history of the issue of war and national security over the last 300 years is particularly interesting for the study of world history.


The policy of a state lies in its geography." The main portion is dedicated to geographical factors relating to the Security Perception of the U.S., USSR, and Regional and Middle Powers." Also included are sections on historical context of the contemporary world, economic data, and the military balance. This is an excellent resource for both classroom use and teacher preparation.

Cumings, Bruce. The Two Koreas. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1984. ED 270 273. This seven-chapter report examines the political, economic, and anomalous positions of North and South Korea in the international system.


Gaddis, John L. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. This thorough history of U.S.-Soviet relations traces the issue of containment through the postwar era. It is a well documented and sometimes technical history that is both readable and interesting.

Gregory, Donna Uthus, ed. The Nuclear Predicament: A Sourcebook. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. A compilation of 44 articles and excerpts prepared for the general reader, this sourcebook includes an excellent overview of the history of nuclear weapons as well as a variety of perspectives on what should be done.

Harf, James E., William H. Kincaid, and B. Thomas Trout, eds. Essentials of National Security: A Conceptual Guide for Teachers. Columbus, Ohio: Mershon Center, 1988. This is part of the National Security in the Nuclear Age Series. Written specifically for high school teachers by national security specialists, its ten chapters form a balanced perspective on the basic topics of national security. Some of these include the premises of national security, conflict in the modern era, conflict management, strategy, arms control, policy-making, economics, the military and society and morality and national security.

Hart, Jeffrey A. Using Microcomputer Simulations in the Classroom. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Conference New Orleans, Louisiana, August 29-September 1, 1985. ED 268 034. This paper presents examples of the use of computer simulations in two undergraduate courses: American Foreign Policy and Introduction to International Politics. There is a list of computer simulations available for various mainframe computers and microcomputers.


Holroyd, Fred, ed. Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Analyses and Prescriptions. Dover, Massachusetts: Auburn House, 1985. This edited volume focuses on war and nuclear weapons with excerpts from a number of basic works and documents on the issues. It differs from most similar books on this subject in that it includes a section on Britain and Western Europe.

Kaufman, Daniel J., Jeffrey S. McKitrick and Thomas J. Leney, eds. *U.S. National Security: A Framework for Analysis.* Edited by professors at the U.S. Military Academy, this collection of articles for the more informed reader examines most aspects of national security policy. Topics include the defense policy of the Soviet Union, the politics of arms sales and the roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


Kellas, Ian. *Peace for Beginners.* A Writers and Readers Documentary Comic Book. New York: W.W. Norton, 1984. This popular press book presents an eclectic introduction to the subject of peace. Appropriate for both teachers and students, every page has both text and graphics to present in an interesting manner, subjects as varied as human nature, pacifism, deterrence and nuclear peacemaking.

Krepon, Michael. *Arms Control: Verification and Compliance.* New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1984, ED 270 374. This five-chapter report is geared to the non-expert wanting to know more about the complex topics of verification and compliance with arms control agreements.

Kruzel, Joseph, ed. *American Defense Annual: 1986-1987.* Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1986. This annual publication summarizes the present state of national security studies. It includes chapters on the defense budget, arms control, U.S. defense strategy and other timely topics. Many of the issues are presented with more than one competing viewpoint.

Mandelbaum, Michael. *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. Mandelbaum writes about the history of nuclear weapons and the political issues relating to them with specific reference to U.S. policy. This is an excellent and reasonably brief overview that is useful for the advanced as well as the general reader.

Mandelbaum, Michael. *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Mandelbaum concisely overviews how nuclear weapons have reshaped the foreign policy of nations by comparing the nuclear age with other periods of history since the fifth century B.C. This is an excellent resource for comparing such issues as the British-German rivalry before World War I and modern tariff controversies with U.S.-Soviet relations.

McNamara, Robert S. *Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age.* New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. Written by the former Secretary of Defense during the Administrations of Johnson and Kennedy, McNamara has been closer to the decisions to use nuclear weapons than any other living person. Here he draws on his experience to suggest solutions to problems that the nuclear age presents.


Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress. The Effects of Nuclear War. Totowa, New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun, 1980. This is the study that began much of the attention given to the actual effects of the explosion of nuclear weapons over population centers. It includes detailed projections on the effects of such an explosion on the city of Detroit.


Russett, Bruce. The Prisoners of Insecurity: Nuclear Deterrence, the Arms Race, and Arms Control. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1983. This book provides a clear and concise overview of basic issues relating to nuclear weapons and strategy. Russett does a commendable job of demystifying these issues by clarifying the most relevant political issues, while also providing the essential technical information in an understandable manner.

Schroeer, Dietrich. Science, Technology, and the Nuclear Arms Race. New York: John Wiley. 1984. For the non-technical reader, this book surveys the technical aspects of nuclear arms as well as the effects of nuclear technology on military, political and social strategies. The discussion is aided by the liberal use of charts, graphs, figures and photos.

Sivard, Ruth Leger. World Military and Social Expenditures. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, annual. This yearly compilation of charts, graphics and statistics presents in an arresting manner a wide variety of national security issues. Each year the focus is slightly different. For example the 1985 edition contains graphics on wars and war related deaths in the twentieth century, a map locating nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants in the world, and military control and repression in the third world.


Trout, B. Thomas, and James E. Harf, eds. National Security Affairs: Theoretical Perspectives and Contemporary Issues. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1982. This is a reader with chapters by national security specialists touching on the essential issues of national security with an emphasis on teaching. The introduction is entitled "Teaching National Security" and each of the chapters has been written with the teacher in mind. Topics include U.S. and Soviet strategic thought, the military budget process, arms trade, NATO and others.

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers. Washington, D.C.: ACDA. Annual. Not only does this reference work include extensive data on arm transfers but each year's issue also summarizes a variety of topics relating to military expenditures. There are also several charts and graphs.
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