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This monograph discusses the relationship between theory and practice in teaching, suggesting that the two concepts are falsely and erroneously separated and exploring what an alternative conceptualization might look like in teaching. The first section considers the critical notion of teaching and includes discussion of the concepts of conception and execution, embeddedness of theory and practice, the scientific view of teaching, and reflection-in-action in teaching. The second section discusses an openly ideological view of teaching, addressing the development of a critical perspective. Examples of this perspective are illustrated in the third section. References are included. (CB)
A Paradigm for Teachers' Critical Pedagogy: A Handbook

W. John Smyth

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Teachers' theories of action

A rationale for teachers' critical pedagogy: a handbook

W. John Smyth
Deakin University
This book forms part of the ETL825 Teachers' Theories of Action course offered by the School of Education in Deakin University's Open Campus Program. It has been prepared by W. John Smyth for the ETL825 Teachers' Theories of Action course team, whose members are

**Course team**
- Judy Mousley
- W. John Smyth (chairperson)
- Rob Walker
- Judy Wells (course developer)

**Consultant**
- David H. Tripp

The course includes
- Jennifer Nias, *Seeing Anew: Teachers' Theories of Action*
- David H. Tripp, *Theorising Practice: The Teacher's Professional Journal*
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Overview of a changing scene

The nature of the relationship between theory and practice in teaching is one of the least understood and most contested notions in education. To continue to talk of ‘closing and bridging the gap between theory and practice’, (McCutcheon 1985; Wadd 1982) is to misconstrue the form of that relationship and to legitimate and perpetuate a historical division of labour between those who ‘know about’ and those who ‘do’ teaching—between so-called educational experts, and teachers. Carr (1980) claims that despite substantial efforts to explain how theory should relate to practice ‘nothing seems to have changed and teachers continue to cling to an image of theory as incomprehensible “jargon” that has nothing to do with their everyday problems’ (p. 60). For their part, people outside schools have become impatient at the ‘ignorance, apathy or indifference of teachers’ (Carr 1980, p. 60) and it does not help matters either to talk in terms of moving away from a ‘discipline-based’ view of theory, to ‘problem-based’ or ‘integrated’ approaches as ways of attempting the theory–practice rapprochement. The separation still exists, and indeed is built in to the very conceptualisation of what is meant by theory used in this sense; endeavours of this kind amount to no more than cosmetic attempts to avoid challenging and ultimately eliminating the dubious assumptions on which the distinction itself exists (Carr 1980). What this monograph seeks to do is to expose the false nature of this separation and explore what an alternative conceptualisation might look like in teaching.

Speaking of the separationist view Berlak and Berlak (1981) cite the perspective of some academics that ‘the experts in teaching are not teachers but scientifically-trained administrators, or educational scholars who study schooling scientifically’ (p. 235). What this amounts to is a low status group (teachers) who are subordinate to and dominated by others (researchers and administrators). Rowbotham (1981, p. 56) for example, claims that there is a class-related issue of power attaching to the notion of theory in which the working class has a deeply-rooted suspicion and distrust of matters theoretical based on ‘a defense against being made to feel ignorant and humiliated by intellectuals’ use of theory’. Whatever its basis, the idea that teachers are only capable of dispensing the ‘“soft” human virtues of patience, understanding and idealism’ (Berlak & Berlak 1981, p. 235) and are incapable of rigorous and disciplined thinking about their own work, is a viewpoint that deserves to be countered in the strongest possible terms. To be set against claims like these is the argument
made by Kohl (1983) about the need for teachers to actively assume the responsibility for theory making (and theory testing), or accept the fact that these will be made for teachers by academic researchers and others only too willing to fill the vacuum. Kohl (1983) claims that this will be inevitable if teachers bargain away their educational power by giving up their responsibility as intellectuals. In his opinion, 'when teachers fail to develop and use educational theories... they open the door to stifling curriculum proposals devised by stodgy academics with no real sense of what goes on in the classroom' (p. 28). He bases his claim on the view that there are always movements afoot committed to taking power away from teachers and placing it in the hands of one kind of special interest group or another. But, as Stenhouse (1983) has been at pains to point out over some years, outsiders' knowledge is vastly different in nature and intent from that of teachers'. As he put it:

The provisional knowledge created in the educational academy may be seen as a second-order curriculum of knowledge about educational practice offered to teachers and potentially to students. Knowledge expressed as generalizations, more or less reliable, contributes to the teachers' and the students' understandings of the world in which they have to act. However, few such generalizations offer guidance as to how to act since they cannot by definition as generalizations take account either of the professional biographical development of teacher and student or of crucial contextual and temporal variables (p. 212).

Although this discussion alludes to primary and secondary teachers, essentially the same issue has surfaced in higher education. There is a viewpoint which says that because of budgetary constraints, higher education teachers should be divided into those who do research, and those who don't. The claim is that a distinction should be made between 'scholarship', in which all higher education teachers must be engaged, and 'research' in which only a minority can actively be involved. The argument goes something like this:

... 'scholarship' means keeping up-to-date with one's subject by reading new books and papers, attending conferences, and so on, while 'research' means developing the intellectual agenda of one's subject by writing the new books and papers, [and] being up on the stage rather than down on the floor at conferences... (Times Higher Education Supplement, 25 April 1986, p. 36)

The point to be taken in all of this is that we need to be careful about discussion that aims at dichotomy, particularly when issues of the relationship of theory to practice are involved. The fact is that we live in a world in which there are forces continually at work seeking reductionist and separationist ends under the rubric of rationalisation and efficiency (Shor 1985). Another way of viewing this same process is in terms of the disempowerment and dependency created in one group, while at the same time enhancing the power, independence, prestige, and status of another. This is an issue that will be returned to in more detail later in the monograph.

The importance of 'the historical'

If there is to be any chance of changing the present arrangements in education, it is important to have an understanding of how it came to be. As Collingwood (1956) argues, if we wish to understand and transform
present events, we need an appreciation of how fragments of the past live on into the present. One thing the broad sweep of history does show us is that attempts at so-called ‘reform’ in education have not regarded teachers and the kinds of knowledge they possess very highly. Something of the recent background on how reforms have been played out in schools generally, and in Australia particularly, may help in clarifying the theory–practice question. However, as Dow (1985) correctly points out in relation to educational reform, ‘because each Australian state controls its own educational system, generalizing about the country as a whole is extremely difficult and dangerous’ (p. 216).

There have been a number of distinct phases in the recent attempts to reform schools. Butt (1984) claims that initial attempts were of a kind that ‘relied on outside ‘experts’ designing curricula to be implemented by teachers, with schools, school systems and teachers being bypassed in order to develop technological solutions to the ‘best’ forms of pedagogy and curriculum. Within this scheme, teachers were reduced to the level of technicians with little scope for their own ‘ideals, intentions or style’ (Butt 1984, p. 3). Scheffler (1968) summed up the scene in the 1960s, and it has changed little two decades later:

> It has, indeed, become increasingly fashionable in recent years to construe the teacher’s work as that of ‘a minor technician within an industrial process, the overall goals . . . (of which are to be) . . . set in advance in terms of national needs, the curricular materials pre-packaged by the disciplinary experts, the methods developed by educational engineers—and the teacher’s job . . . just to supervise the last operational stage, the methodical insertion of ordered facts into the student’s mind’ (pp. 5–6).

In many ways the attempt at ‘teacher proofing’ represented ‘the low point in the history of pedagogical innovation’ (Butt 1984, p. 3), based as it was on the implicit assumption that teachers were not competent or to be trusted to implement the new curricula. The proponents of this scheme sought to devise simple ‘how to do it guides’ that would ensure teacher compliance to a methodology deemed superior to any that teachers could devise on their own. Apple (1983) claims that in the United States, and we could claim that in Australia too:

> . . . during the late 1950s and 1960s, there was rather strong pressure from academics, capital, and the state to reinstitute academic disciplinary knowledge as the most ‘legitimate’ content for schools. In the areas of mathematics and science, especially, it was feared that ‘real’ knowledge was not being taught. A good deal of effort was given to producing curricular programs that were systematic, based or rigorous academic foundations, and, in the elementary school material in particular, teacher proof. Everything a teacher was to deal with was provided and prespecified (p. 614).

Given the considerable autonomy teachers have always had behind the classroom door, it was not surprising that this exercise in ‘teacher proofing’ failed rather dismally. Apple (1983) expressed it in these terms:

> . . . when the material was introduced into many schools, it was not unusual for the ‘new’ math and the ‘new’ science to be taught in much the same manner as the old math and old science. It was altered so that it fit into both the existing regularities of the institution and the prior practices . . . [of] successful . . . teaching . . . [This] is at least partly tied to the resistance of a female work force against external incursions into the practices they
had evolved over years of labor (p. 615).

... the 'mere' fact that the state wishes to find 'more efficient' ways to organize teaching does not guarantee this will be acted on by teachers who have a long history of work practices and self-organization once the doors to their rooms are closed (p. 616).

As I have argued elsewhere (Smyth 1986d), teaching is fundamentally different from industrial processes in that teachers are not working with inert materials that respond according to some pre-determined rules. Rather, students are continually engaging in dialectical encounters with their teachers, and through this, coming to share in, and so create a common culture.

Having tried unsuccessfully to change the curriculum materials, effort was directed at trying to remedy the perceived defects in teachers that prevented them from implementing the new curricula. The solution was seen to lie in 'in-servicing' teachers so that they could acquire the new skills and behaviours necessary to use the new curricula. The rationale was that 'you need to change the people before changing the structures'. This strategy was based on the unsubstantiated presumption that teachers had a series of deficiencies that could be rectified by a series of 'one shot' in-service workshops. It was too simplistic a view and was destined to a similar fate to 'teacher proofing' the curricula. More recent reforms have concentrated on attempting to 'sell' teachers innovations and develop a sense of 'ownership' of ideas through action research and school-based curriculum development. The notion was that teachers would experiment with new ideas, try them on for size, iron out problems, and develop their own new ideas. But, as Butt (1984) notes, there were still a lot of unanswered questions:

... questions about insider/outsider relationships... How much power does the teacher have? How far can developer intentions be adapted?

Does it still remain a manipulative device aimed at implementing other people's intentions, overcoming teacher resistance and gaining commitment through compliance. These questions keep coming back to haunt us (pp. 5-6).

Based on his study of primary social studies teachers, Smith (1985) found that proposals, aimed at changing teachers in the direction of becoming more radicalised, were inadequate because of their neglect of teachers' interests and values, and because they failed to take account of structural factors.

While these elements in general can be seen in Victoria, there are also respects in which there are notable differences. For instance, as Dow (1985) notes: 'Australia never became hooked on overseas (or its own) attempts to foster innovation through pre-packaged resources ... ' (p. 215). Statements like this need to be tempered by the realities of what actually happened in schools. For example, in the late 1960s in Australia there was a spate of curriculum materials projects that started from the presumption that 'teacher resources are inadequate and the learning outcomes will at least to some extent be achieved from the interaction of the pupils with the materials' (Fensham 1972, p. 144). Included in these were science projects like PSSC (Physical Science Study Committee), BSCS (Biological Sciences Curriculum Study), JSSP (Junior Science Secondary Project), ASEP (Australian Science Education Project), and social science packages like MACOS (Man: A Course of Study) and SEMP (Social Education
all of which were adaptations of one kind or another of ‘teacher proof’ curricula devised in England or America. There is still a discernible legacy of these activities, as Hannan (1986) pointed out recently when reviewing the twenty years of school-based curriculum development in Victoria. He had this to say of the de facto situation he discovered:

While it is strictly true that no textbook or reading kit is actually prescribed by some one in head office, it is observable that certain books and kits might as well be prescribed because thousands of classrooms use them. Obviously, even if there is little or no demand for prescription, there is a big demand for materials that give the backbone of a course. And teachers actually seem to prefer using the same materials as other teachers use (p. 16).

While acknowledging the importance that teachers place upon the experiences and pedagogical judgments of their peers, there are also other explanations. As Apple (1983) argues, since Western societies have a recent history of being caught up in fiscal crises, it becomes easy to provide mass education in commercialised packages, with mass produced materials becoming de facto mechanisms for effectively exercising centralised control over schools, and in the process, intensifying the trivialised nature of teachers’ work. Schools, therefore, become politicised and contested sites as teachers are de-skilled and ‘robbed of their creativity and initiative’ (Dow 1985, p. 215) with an increasing intensification in the trivialised nature of their work.
Towards a ‘critical’ notion of teaching

With this kind of background it comes as no surprise to learn that teachers are construed in some quarters as not having theories about their work. In part this is grounded in the belief that there needs to be a separation between those who think about teaching and those who actually do it. Put as bluntly as this, it sounds quite arrogant. The notion that there are some groups who are equipped through intelligence and training to articulate what another group should do and think, is an anti-educational view. Typical of this uncharitable view of teachers is the kind of viewpoint expressed by Lortie (1975) and others, who claim that the actions of teachers are characterised by reflexive conservatism and a lack of a technical language that prevents them from tapping a pre-existing body of practical knowledge. Perhaps the way forward is for educational scholars to concern themselves less with judgments of this kind, and work instead with teachers on their own terms (Smyth 1986c). Yates (1985) expressed it in this way:

... it is my belief that neither teachers nor lay people generally hold a belief that teachers do not have their own particular knowledge; it is only academics of a certain type who presume its absence. (Submissions of teacher unions to inquiries into teacher education, for example, are full of claims of this knowledge and disdain for the knowledge the academic institutions hold about teaching) (p. 128).

Notwithstanding the sensibility of these ideas, regarding teachers as being bereft of ideas about the form and nature of their own work has still characterised attempts at educational reform. Elliott (1976-77) put it neatly when he said: ‘Reformers fail to realize that fundamental changes in classroom practice can be brought about only if teachers become conscious of the . . . theories [implicit in their practice] and are able to reflect critically about them’ (p. 2). It is not difficult to locate reasons for this less than encouraging view of the capacities of teachers, when we recall the long history of portraying schools as bureaucracies of one sort or another. Recent discussion of the historical legacy of the role of the teacher has uncovered two inherited aspects of our culture that have powerfully shaped the way we have interpreted and understood the nature of teachers’ work. Bullough, Gitlin and Goldstein (1984) label these ‘the tradition of public service’ (or the unquestioning submission to bureaucratic authority) and the ideology of ‘technocratic mindedness’ (or the supremacy of technical rational values). First, there is an extensive body of literature in this
country (Tronc & Harris 1985; Connell 1985) as well as overseas (Grace 1985; Karier 1982) that portrays the teacher as historically conforming to the image of the public servant. What this literature says is that for reasons of efficiency and control there are dangers in allowing teachers the power to establish the ends towards which they work; even their freedom to work out instructional methods is limited only by the inability of science and research to define and prescribe the most effective strategies. Even though the humanistic language used today generally tends to mask it, teachers are still often construed as being submissive, unquestioning, as having no political interests beyond the classroom, and concerned only with the implementation of somebody else's agendas (Hargreaves 1984). Second, there is a technocratic ideology that regards schooling as essentially value free, and where protracted social questions relating to morals, ethics and politics are construed as nothing more than another species of technical decisions to be implemented by instrumentally-thinking bureaucrats (Bullough, Gitlin & Goldstein 1984, p. 343). This unquestioning faith in the ability of educational experts to solve the problems of schooling reveals a yawning chasm between those who know about teaching, and those who do it.

Duckworth (1984) claims that what is most disturbing about this civil servant conceptualisation of teaching is that teachers end up 'selling themselves short' on the rich and illuminating ideas they hold and possess. Schools fail to see their crucial role in enabling people to view themselves as 'fit' to contribute to public discourse aimed at an understanding of the need to individually and collectively struggle for a more just world. This failure to acknowledge the importance of what teachers know as a knowledge-base, is to the disadvantage of students, as Duckworth (1984) points out:

The assumption seems to be that teachers are a kind of civil servant, to be "trained" by those who know better, to carry out the job as they are directed to do, to be assessed managerially, to be understood through third-party studies (p. 17).

In conceiving of teachers as civil servants, with no professional understanding worth paying attention to, we miss the enormous potential power of their knowledge.

Even more serious: in considering them as civil servants, we fail to develop that knowledge and understanding still further... To the extent that they are conceived of as civil servants, to carry out orders from above, teachers are deprived of the occasion to bring to bear on their work the whole of their intelligence, understanding, and judgment. To that extent, the students are deprived of those qualities, and the educational enterprise is impoverished (p. 18).

The heart of the problem, therefore, lies in the fact that teachers' own practices are often not treated as important, imaginative and productive sources of knowledge. Expressing a more optimistic and enlightened view of teachers, Hull (quoted in Floden & Feiman 1981, p. 276) claims that on the contrary:

Many teachers are engaged in a high level of problem-solving in their everyday interaction with children. They may not think of themselves as 'intellectuals' because they are not accustomed to talking in detail about what they do. But, in fact, their level of intellectual activity is very high and their skilful practice depends on well-developed mental co-ordinations.
It is important to listen to such people, and to take what they are doing seriously, to support them in their own inquiry, and to find ways of sharing what they have learned with others.

Floden and Feiman (1981) make much the same point, with the proviso that, while teachers may not operate according to the rational and predetermined schemata of those outside classrooms they nevertheless have important ways of making sense of the daily realities of their teaching:

Although teachers do not engage in conscious and systematic deliberation, they still have good ways of thinking about what they are doing, even if those ways do not closely approximate the a priori models. Teachers develop heuristic strategies for dealing with the fast-moving complexity of the classroom; some of these shortcuts are better than others. Teachers are rational in their actions, not as defined by an a priori model of action, but as defined by choosing appropriate means to reach their goals (p. 275).

McCutcheon (1985) offered a useful way of describing the notion of teachers’ theories of action, when she said of them:

[They] are the set of constructs, beliefs, and principles on which practitioners base decisions and actions. Practitioners develop these theories through their experiences and reflections, and to a lesser extent through reading or hearing about generic theory. Such theories illuminate and guide practitioners’ work because they comprise interrelated sets of interpretations about what should be taught and learned, how to improve and evaluate teaching and learning, and how to deal with daily tasks of managing curriculum development, classes, and work (pp. 47-8).

Part of the difficulty here lies in the fact that these theories are often tacit. We know that teachers are unable to fully express what they believe or know, and that the realities of teaching and the social solitude of schooling militate towards the maintenance of this situation (Lieberman & Miller 1978).

As McCutcheon (1985) pointed out the indeterminancy and uncertainty of teaching itself is a major factor:

Each day practitioners face a host of complex, context-specific problems about which there are no easy, certain answers. No singular ‘right’ course of action is available, although practitioners can envision certain courses as better than others. In facing these problems they must take action. Underlying these actions is a personal guiding theory. By pausing to reflect, by reaching inward and attempting to understand that personal theory of action, teachers and administrators exercise the most powerful aspect of practice. By analyzing students’ written assignments, oral responses, and activities, teachers can determine whether particular courses of action work well (p. 48).

‘Conception’ and ‘execution’

What lies behind the claim that teachers do not have theories about their teaching, is the issue of power and social control over teaching manifested in the enforced separation of function. Under conditions where the ‘expert’ tenders to the ‘inexpert’ it is not surprising that there is a wide discrepancy between the opportunities afforded teachers to question the efficacy of what they do (Apple & Teitelbaum 1985, 1986), and the disproportionate influence outside experts are able to wield psychologically, bureaucratically and ideologically over the work of teachers (Smyth 1986e). Implicit in this enforced separation of expert from inexpert in teaching is the
The conception-execution dichotomy resulting from the experts' place in curriculum indicates that, for the most part, teachers will address 'how to' rather than 'what' questions. Implicit in this role definition is a reduction of teaching to the management of persons and things. Teaching, understood as management, is primarily concerned with the proper application of rules and procedures to effect desired preestablished changes in student behaviour. This emphasis makes the work of the teacher essentially technical in nature, which further limits the necessity for reflective thought about ends (p. 350).

In some quarters this has been interpreted as an attempt to wrest control over teaching out of the hands of teachers, and to invest bureaucrats with powers to decide educational matters. This is given legitimation through periodic bouts of 'teacher bashing' (Mullins 1985) from quarters as diverse as 'journalists, parents, community leaders, academics of all stripes, educators, novelists, administrators, and ... even teachers themselves' (McPherson 1985, p. 88). This is an interesting phenomenon for several reasons. For one, almost everybody in the community has a minimal education and therefore feels competent to judge the worth of the activity of teachers. We have all been consumers to some extent, and besides, at least on the surface, teaching looks like a relatively uncomplicated and non-problematic activity. While as consumers we would balk at marching into the technical division of a petroleum refinery and suggesting that an alteration should be made to the catalytic cracking ratio, we have no such inhibitions about feeling competent to pass judgment on the nature and worth of schooling. While the reasons for this distrust of teachers is beyond the scope of present discussion, suffice to say here that there are a host of complex reasons, not the least of which is that teachers are viewed as 'powerful villains' (McPherson 1985).

The argument in some quarters is that teachers are not to be trusted, and as a consequence must be controlled closely and minutely in whatever they do. Evidence for this can be found, for example, in the recently axed 'Quality Education: Teacher Efficiency Review' report in New South Wales. The intent of that document was to create procedures whereby teachers would be subjected to the scrutiny of an outside group of inspectors who would check on 'quality control'. Discussions about 'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' in schooling, reputedly in the interests of 'quality education for all children', are another way of disguising measures aimed at control and ensuring a compliant teaching workforce; who, after all, could possibly be opposed to the need to ensure safeguards in the interests of all pupils? As a teacher put it recently:

The current sport of teacher-bashing is very damaging to our whole society. Those who play the sport appear to have little awareness of the consequences of their actions... The critics have overlooked the real crisis which has come upon us. It is not a crisis of competence, it is crisis of ideals—exactly the same crisis that has hit many other professions (Mullins 1986, p. 13).

Unfortunately, the argument is not so simple. Grace (1985) claims that procedures to eradicate 'teacher incompetence' often masquerade as a front for social, ideological and political considerations, and can vary, as
recent experience demonstrates:

On the one hand a liberal reformist strategy in education has emphasised the objective and technical aspects of these procedures and has looked towards an increasing refinement of them as the crucial means for the realisation of the meritocratic principle. On the other hand, from various conflict perspectives such procedures have been regarded as primarily devices for the legitimation of the cultural and social status quo. Here the emphasis has been upon the ways in which assessment and evaluation procedures in education although apparently open and meritocratic can be viewed as effectively reproducing social relations, the personality dispositions and the distribution of cultural capital necessary for the maintenance of existing social arrangements (p. 3).

### Embeddedness of theory and practice

Implicit in the separation of theory from practice and the idea that there are those who 'theorise' about teaching as distinct from those who are involved in the 'practicalities' of teaching, is the notion of de-skilling (Braverman 1975). According to Braverman, people in an occupation become de-skilled when real decisions about the nature of the work is taken out of their hands and made elsewhere. For teachers, that means shifting the emphasis from questions of what is worthwhile teaching, to questions of how best to meet requirements set by somebody else. It takes the form of measures requiring teachers to demonstrate that students have met pre-determined standards through externally determined curriculum guidelines and frameworks, and by uniform testing and prescribed examinations aimed at ensuring that the required content is covered. At the school and classroom level it tends to emerge in the form of principals and others endorsing and judging as appropriate, teacher actions that amount to smooth and efficiently run classrooms, where content is covered with a minimum of fuss and distraction.

What is fundamentally at stake here is the question of who has the right to define what counts as knowledge about teaching. Put in slightly different terms, in teaching, theorising is reserved for those having the 'right intellectual and academic credentials' (Carr 1982, p. 27), while practice is 'a second class activity for those too stupid to think at a theoretical level' (Sprinthall & Sprinthall 1980, p. 348). It also has to do with the deliberate historical division of labour that 'testifies to our current belief in the value of a functional hierarchy in which power to make decisions derives from an occupational slot. In other words, the lower you are in the scheme of things, the more you function only to carry out someone else's decisions' (p. 348). We would do well to dwell on Thelen's (1972) questions: 'Where did the idea come from that engagement in action is anti-intellectual? that is does not involve theorizing?' (p. 176-7).

Carr (1982) claims that in teaching we have an impoverished view of what it means to theorise. He claims we suffer from:

- a deeply ingrained image of educational theory as a miscellaneous collection of maps, guides, itineraries and rule-books produced in some far-off land and then exported to the 'world of practice' so that its inhabitants can understand where they are, what they are doing and where they are supposed to be going. What this image conceals, of course, is not only that these consumers have themselves produced and already possess a map of their situ-
ation, and rules and guiding principles about what they are trying to achieve; it also disguises the fact that since these theoretical products are the outcome of non-educational activities, they will always reflect the use of non-educational concepts and categorizations and so re-draw the map of the 'real world of education' in non-educational ways (p. 26).

Part of the problem lies in the lack of embeddedness of theory in practice, and vice versa. Again, to draw on what Carr (1982) has to say about the nature of this relationship:

Once it is conceded that to undertake... a practical activity like education, involves engaging in some recognisable set of practices, and once it is acknowledged that these practices are not... free from theoretical preconceptions, then it becomes apparent that 'educational theory' is not something that is created in isolation from practice and then has to be 'applied', 'implemented' or 'adopted' through a 'sustained effort' on the part of the two reluctant parties. 'Education' is not some kind of inert phenomenon that can be observed, isolated, explained and theorized about. There are no 'educational phenomena' apart from the practices of those engaged in educational activities, no 'educational problems' apart from those arising from these practices and no 'educational theories' apart from those that structure and guide these practices. The only task which 'educational theory' can legitimately pursue, then, is to develop theories of educational practice that are intrinsically related to practitioners' own accounts of what they are doing, that will improve the quality of their involvement in these practises and thereby allow them to practice better (p. 26).

At the heart of this argument is the belief that for far too long there has been much muddled thinking about the relationship between so-called theorists and practitioners, spurred on by the fallacy that those who 'theorise' are uninvolved in the 'practices' of education, and conversely those who 'practice' are untouched by 'theory'. Carr's (1984a) argument on this is quite compelling:

For this to stand any chance of being true, teaching would have to be some kind of mechanical behaviour performed by robot-like characters in a completely unthinking way. But teaching is not like that. Rather, it is a consciously performed activity that can only be made intelligible by reference to the quite complex ways of thinking in terms of which teachers understand what they are doing. And it is this 'way of thinking' that provides the theoretical background against which teachers explain and justify their actions, make decisions and resolve real problems. Anybody engaged in teaching, then, must already possess some 'theory' which guides their practices and makes them intelligible (p. 1).

None of this is to suggest a merging of theory and practice along the lines of theory 'implying', 'deriving from' or 'reflecting' practice, for as Carr (1980) notes, the relationship is a transformative one in which:

... by subjecting the beliefs and justifications of existing and ongoing practical traditions to rational criticism, theory transforms practice by transforming the ways in which practice is experienced and understood. The transition is not, therefore, from theory to practice as such, but rather from irrationality to rationality, from ignorance and habit to knowledge and reflection (p. 66).

Beyond a scientistic view of teaching

This is no mere academic argument. What is at issue is the right of prac-
titioners to be emancipated from the stifling effects of unquestioned habits, routines and precedents, and in their stead to develop ways of analysis and enquiry that enable the exposure of values, beliefs and assumptions held and embodied in the way practitioners experience and lead their lives. Implicit in what is being discussed is the distinction between two competing sociological views or ways of knowing about teaching: on the one hand, a 'scientistic' approach to teaching involving the collection of facts to be used to predict and control teaching, and on the other, a 'critical' approach committed to the notion of practitioners developing theories of their own which help them to interpret, understand and eventually to transform the social life of schools. In both cases teachers try to lead their lives in ways that accept both the social as well as the physical nature of their surroundings. As an experienced practitioner, Lampert (1985) attests to the daily difficulty of trying to reconcile these; on the one hand, attending to technical aspects like classroom control, while at the same time having a deep concern for the effect of those actions on the social lives of students. Often teachers find themselves trapped in apparently irreconcilable dilemmas in a no-win situation. Dingwall and McIntosh (1978) put a finer point on it when they refer to the different modes of enquiry involved in each:

Friendships, relationships, institutions seem to be as real as grass, flowers and trees. Scientistic sociology accepts this. [Critical] sociology questions it... If you say that social surroundings are as much 'things' as natural surroundings then you can study both in the same way. If not, then you need to use rather different ways of looking at them (p.8).

The fundamental difference is between 'behaviour' and 'action' as forms of social life in schools. Whereas behaviour refers to automated reactions generated or triggered by some stimulus (the way in which biological systems behave), action involves intentionality and purposeful intervention by participants in shaping the course of events. Without wanting to push the dichotomous view to extremes the distinction is really between scientistic sociology, which portrays humans as objects responding to one another as one system to another, according to rules and lawlike behaviour which describes and explains, compared with critical sociology which envisages humans as conscious human agents, acting out their own free will on the basis of their own free choice.

To adopt a critical view of schools is to endorse a view about the importance of the social relationships within teaching. It necessitates asking questions like: beyond the bricks and mortar, 'what is a school?' It involves an acknowledgment of schools as having no material existence—they are not 'things' separate and distinguishable from the teachers, children and parents who comprise them. Schools as organisations are made up of social actions, and when we speak of schools we can only really speak about them in terms of patterns of actions that are visible to insiders and outsiders. Reality is the reconstructed descriptive accounts which school people have of their own and one another's social actions. If such people define situations as real, then the consequences are real also. What counts is what people in school situations think is going on, not what theoreticians around them tell them is going on.

Another way of viewing the same question is through the quest for professionalisation in teaching. Darling-Hammond (1985) argues that this
means not only matters that have to do with the status and compensation afforded to the members of an occupation, but 'it involves the extent to which members of that occupation maintain control over the content of their work and the degree to which society values the work of that occupation' (p. 205). Her thesis is that unless we prepare teachers in ways that enable them to exercise professional judgment, and then allow them to do that, then there will be little hope of improving educational quality. One of the features distinguishing professions from other occupations, so the sociologists tell us, is the claim to an esoteric body of knowledge not readily accessible to others. Coupled with this is the notion that the members define and enforce their own standards of practice, or as Barber (quoted in Darling-Hammond 1985) put it: 'An essential attribute of professional role is autonomy and self-control regarding the development and application of the body of generalized knowledge in which they [professionals] alone are expert' (p. 212). This is not to suggest that rules of competency necessarily constitute a hallmark of professionalism. In teaching, for example, efforts to do that have occurred outside schools in universities and research centres under the guise of the search for a science of education. Adler (1985) points out that this strategy has an inherent contradiction:

The quest to develop and refine principles of teaching and learning often, in practice, contributes to and promotes the powerlessness of practitioners. The researchers' search for a scientific, cognitive base for education may have consequences for practitioners very different from those embodied in the language of professionalization. The development of rules and procedures for effective teaching can have the contradictory effect of taking from teachers a part of their craft (p. 11).

It is the very indeterminacy, and the inability to reduce the knowledge to which professionals lay claim, to rules and prescriptions for practice, that gives professionals their strongest argument for autonomy. The non-standardised nature of the work and its resistance to codification, makes it imperative, therefore, that control and review reside in the hands of peers. There are two closely related points that emerge out of this:

Teachers need opportunities to observe and be observed by their colleagues, to jointly diagnose school problems and invent new approaches, to share teaching ideas, to develop programs and curricula, to assess the progress of their school and the students, and to learn from each other.

And:

Ultimately, professionalism requires collective control by teachers over the technical decisions that define teaching work and collective responsibility for the appropriate treatment of students. This means not only peer review of practice, but also peer involvement in the prevention of malpractice. It also means a reconception of administration as a support function for teaching rather than a mechanism for the control of teaching (Darling-Hammond 1985, p. 214).

Speaking of these issues in the professions generally, Schön (1983) claims that there is a 'crisis of confidence' in the field of professional knowledge. Accepted and taken-for-granted ways of applying specialised knowledge to resolve particular recurring problems, no longer seem to work. Professional knowledge located in the traditional disciplines is 'out-of-step' with the changing circumstances of practice and is no longer able to 'deliver'
solutions on important social issues. In particular, ‘the complexity, uncertainty, instability, uniqueness, and value conflicts which are increasingly perceived as central to the world of [current] professional practice . . .’ (Schön 1983, p. 14) are no longer able to be handled simply by recourse to existing bodies of knowledge or accepted ways of acquiring such knowledge.

Those who argue that teaching should have a demonstrated scientific basis to it (Gage 1978; Dunkin & Biddle 1974; Hunter 1984), and that teaching should adhere closely to prescriptions deriving from such research, ignore the degree to which practitioner-derived knowledge is, in fact, trustworthy and relevant. By choosing to focus exclusively on the ‘products’ of other peoples’ research, at the expense of the ‘process’ by which understandings are reached, proponents of such views misconstrue the value of research. By seizing on the instrumental applicability of findings, they place a level of certainty on research that social scientists themselves would deny. According to Buchmann (1984):

In part, good practice is the art of responding to urgency where there is want of perfect certainty and outcomes are unpredictable. But there is a difference between taking something to be a serious possibility to which one commits oneself in thought and action and not changing one’s policies when practical and epistemic circumstances change (Levi 1980). People do not act on what they believe to be false at that time. Yet the need to assume confidently some things in action does not imply taking for granted some unalterable certainty.

Nowhere should the difference between serious possibility and incorrigible certainty be more keenly felt than in schools, places where change is an institutional mission and that swarm with young people. Its moral import derives from teachers in the separate classrooms holding social and epistemic authority in conjunction, having the final say on what is justified belief as an underpinning for classroom procedures and the enacted curriculum . . .

Knowledge must not be confused with the comforts of settled opinion. Trust and doubt are the two faces of knowledge use. For, one cannot use knowledge without putting trust into it, and its days as knowledge . . . are counted where trust is complete and unquestioning. The hesitation to trust is realized in observation, reflection, experiment, and revision—second thoughts that, on the whole, tend to be better than first ones (pp. 430-1).

Across a range of professional areas, teaching included, the nature of professional practice seems to have shifted from that of ‘problem solving’ to one of ‘problem setting’ (or problem posing); that is to say, from a rational process of choosing from among possibilities that best suit agreed-upon ends, to a situation that opens-up for contestation and debate the nature of those decisions, the ends to which they are to be directed, and the means by which they are achievable (Schön 1983). Rather than relying upon discipline-based knowledge, the scene is increasingly becoming characterised by the application of practitioner-knowledge acquired from previous particular cases.

Buchmann (1984) claims we need to be clear about the legitimacy we seek to ascribe to scientific approaches to research related to teaching:

Scientific authority is based on competence in inquiry, which means seeking and asking, not answering and prescribing. The tentativeness of (research) knowledge is like a safety catch that a pretension to usefulness tends to remove. This is so, in particular, because the public accepts scientific findings
not because it shares the scientific conception of reality but because of the social authority of science. Scientific knowledge and judgment are opaque and indisputable for most people... Once scientifically legitimated concepts and the practices they engender have come into circulation, they may persist, regardless of the degree to which they are worthy of adherence. Thus the quest for knowledge utilization may turn innocuous theorizing into lasting folly (p. 431) (my emphasis).

Serious claims to a scientifically derived body of 'research on teaching' (sic), have now all but disappeared (Bolster 1984). As Mishler (1979) notes, the positivist search for universal context-free laws have foundered largely on the grounds of their 'context-stripping methods' (Bernstein 1976; Reason & Rowan 1981). The scene is more likely to be characterised today by statements like: 'Meaning in context: is there any other kind?' (Mishler 1979).

What this amounts to is a quite dramatic shift: from a position where 'scientifically' derived knowledge about teaching was deemed superior, to a circumstance in which artistic and intuitive knowledge may have a claim to being equally appropriate; from an a priori instrumental view of knowledge about teaching, to one that reflects knowledge as being tentative and problematic; and from a view which pre-supposes answers to complex social questions relating to teaching, to one that endorses the importance of problem posing and negotiated resolution (Smyth 1986f).

Reflection-in-action in teaching

What Schön(1983) does is provide us with a fundamental way of rethinking how we view professional practice, and the relationship between theory and practice. His thesis rests on the claim that, where in the past professionals laid claim to 'extraordinary knowledge in matters of great social importance' (Hughes quoted in Schön 1983 p. 4) and in return were granted unique rights and privileges, a number of factors have occurred to change those circumstances. As well as media exposés of the extensive misuse and abuse of these privileges for personal gain, Schön (1983) points to a more important public loss of confidence in and questioning by society of professionals' claims to 'extraordinary knowledge'. By way of example:

A series of announced national crises—the deteriorating cities, poverty, the pollution of the environment, the shortage of energy—seemed to have roots in the very practices of science, technology, and public policy that were being called upon to alleviate them.

Government sponsored 'wars' against such crises seemed not to produce the expected results; indeed, they often seemed to exacerbate the crises (p. 9).

It seems that, increasingly, professionals of all kinds are being confronted by situations in which the tasks they are required to perform no longer bear any relationship to the tasks for which they have been educated. As Schön (1983) so aptly puts it, 'the situations of practice are not problems to be solved but problematic situations characterized by uncertainty, disorder and indeterminancy' (pp. 15–16). Practitioners are, therefore, becoming increasingly engulfed in wrangles over conflicting and competing values and purposes. Teachers, for example, are 'faced with pressures for increased efficiency in the context of contracting budgets,
demands that they rigorously “teach the basics”, exhortations to encourage creativity, build citizenship, [and to] help students examine their values' (p. 17). What is interesting about this dramatic shift and its accompanying novel and complex array of responses, is the fact that some practitioners have been able to find idiosyncratic ways of negotiating these realities; ways that amount to reaching a modicum of manageability. While experientially acquired knowledge deriving from individual cases is not new to most professions, the rub comes in trying to codify it and accommodate to traditional discipline-based knowledge. Schön (1983) refers to the difficulty in these words:

Surely [we] are not unaware of the artful ways in which some practitioners deal competently with the indeterminancies and value conflicts of practice. It seems, rather, that [we] are disturbed because [we] have no satisfactory way of describing or accounting for the artful competence which practitioners sometimes reveal in what they do. [We] find it unsettling to be unable to make sense of these processes in terms of the model of professional knowledge which [we] have largely taken for granted (p. 19).

Clearly, what is required is much more than accommodation. Knowledge of the kind Schön speaks of is not of an instrumental kind to be ‘applied’ to practice—it is embedded in practice, and inseparable from it. Knowledge that comes about through knowing-in-action is, therefore, of a fundamentally different kind: ‘Often we cannot say what it is that we know. When we try to describe it we find ourselves at a loss, or we produce descriptions that are obviously inappropriate. Our knowing is ordinarily tacit . . . our knowing is in our action’ (p. 49). In other words, we often display skills for which we cannot describe the underlying rules and procedures. It is in thinking about what we do while we do it that we begin to act reflexively and turn thought back on action—we engage in reflection-in-action. Generally, we do this in response to some puzzling, troubling or perplexing situation with which we are struggling. In Schön’s (1983) words, the reflective practitioner acts as follows with regard to the circumstances of his puzzlement: ‘As he tries to make sense of it, he also reflects on the understandings which have been implicit in his action, understandings which he surfaces, criticizes, restructures, and embodies in further action’ (p. 50). It is, therefore, through the examination, reformulation and testing of the tacit understandings they hold, that teachers can be said to be reflecting on their practice in Schön’s sense. Erdman (1985) points out that in the world of teaching, it is the grind of daily practice that leads to it becoming increasingly more routinised and less reflective:

This situation reflects both the non-discursive and artistic nature of teaching and its ‘busyness’ (Jackson, 1968). Teachers seldom have time to talk about what they do. Nevertheless, they are profound knowers of the classroom scene; their perceptions and reasoning, motives and intentions can and should be studied (p. 4).

Schön’s (1983) argument is, therefore, a neat counter to the simplistic criticism and outcries for a return to ‘excellence in teaching’ by merely tidying-up on the technicalities of teaching. By legitimating a more artistic and context-specific way of thinking about teaching, Schön provides teachers with a way of countering the claims to return to the widely acclaimed but non-existent universals of effective teaching.

Elbaz (1983) provides an example of how it was possible to work closely
with one teacher over the course of a year as she engaged in this kind of context-specific theorising about her teaching and reflecting upon her action. It is an insightful account because of the possibility it portrays other than the despondent view of teachers as agents of curriculum developers, administrators and researchers who treat teachers largely as objects about whom policies and procedures have to be developed, quite independently of teachers actual practices. The account rings true as one that evolved out of the teacher’s view of herself as a teacher and the knowledge she held about that teaching. Elbaz (1983) used the term ‘practical knowledge’ to describe the decision-oriented nature of that knowledge and the role the teacher actually had in shaping and forming it. Practical knowledge was seen as providing the basis for a conceptualisation in which the teacher became a valuable resource in shaping her own environment and determining the style and ends of her work. Through her study of one teacher Elbaz was able to provide some legitimacy for Schön’s (1983) claim that practical knowledge is largely unarticulated but guided by a range of understandings:

This knowledge encompasses firsthand experience of students’ learning styles, interests, needs, strengths and difficulties, and a repertoire of instructional techniques and classroom management skills. The teacher knows the social structure of the school and what it requires, of teacher and student, for survival and for success; she knows the community of which the school is a part, and has a sense of what it will and will not accept. This experiential knowledge is informed by the teacher’s theoretical knowledge of subject matter, and of areas such as child development, learning and social theory (Elbaz 1983, p. 5).

Working from within a framework that actively disavows the separation of theory from practice, and where ends are not divorced from means, Elbaz (1983) explores the complexities of practical knowledge by looking at the nature of it’s content. This amounts to considering the teacher’s knowledge of herself, including the dynamics of her classroom, and the relationship she has with other teachers and administrators, along with her own political agendas, what she knows about her subject matter as a body of knowledge and skills, as well as her knowledge about curriculum, including pedagogy, how children learn, notions of assessment, and their relevance to students. It becomes clear that while the content of teachers’ knowledge is one thing, it is also important to gain insights on how teachers hold and use that knowledge. Commenting on Elbaz’s study, Johnson (1984) claims that the complexity of teaching makes it necessary to view it in other than reductionist terms:

... the complex interweaving of skills, aesthetic elements, institutional structures, social relations, cultural constraints, historical influences, and conceptual determinants ... somehow produces the fabric of our experience.

... Practical knowledge is not just content, nor is it only structure—it is a contextually relative exercise of capacities for imaginatively ordering our experience (p. 467).

From working with one teacher over a year, Elbaz (1983) was able to find that practical knowledge was held and used in three ways: through ‘rules of practice’, as ‘practical principles’, and as ‘images’.

Rules of practice amount to brief, clearly formulated statements of what to do in a particular situation frequently encountered in practice. The
teacher gave the following as an example of a rule of practice: 'I certainly try very hard to listen very actively to the kids, to paraphrase, to encourage them to paraphrase, and at most times to allow them to express their concerns and to discuss their concerns without judging them' (p.136). Embodied in this statement are a number of rules: ‘listen actively, paraphrase, encourage students to paraphrase, don’t judge. These rules taken together constitute an approach to communication in the classroom’ (p.136).

Practical principles, on the other hand, take the form of more inclusive and less explicit formulations of the teacher’s purposes. They are of a kind that indicate: what a teacher should do in a range of practical situations. For example, the teacher in Elbaz’s study held the view that in the teaching of remedial reading she had to begin with the student’s emotional state by ‘trying “to make the kid happy to walk into that class” ’ (p.137). In relation to the assessment of learning, she believed that ‘whatever I expected from the kids, I had to give them first; we have to teach the kids some things before we mark the kids on them’ (p.137). She believed that in group work ‘what we were preaching [about communication skills] had to be practised’ (p.137). She claimed that changing the nature of activities within a group required not only insight, but also a willingness to take risks, and practice the skills for doing that.

Images represent the teacher’s feelings, values, needs and beliefs of how teaching might or could be, and involve an amalgam of experience, theoretical knowledge, and school folklore. As Elbaz (1983) describes it, ‘the image is a brief, descriptive, and sometimes metaphoric statement which seems to capture some essential aspect of [the teacher’s] perception of herself, her teaching, her situation in the classroom or her subject matter’ (p.137). By way of example, the teacher in this case held an image of herself as ‘a good, energetic teacher’ (p.138); she held an image of the social milieu of her teaching which she encapsulated in fortress-like terms with her as ‘an ally, working together . . . [with the students] to beat whatever system is outside’ (p.138); she held an imagery of subject matter in English literature as being able to ‘offer a window onto the kids and what they’re thinking’ (p.138), quite unlike any other subject.

What Elbaz has done, is provide a way of viewing teaching that carries it beyond the reductionist tendencies that have tended to dominate its thinking to date (see Dunkin & Biddle 1974). She portrays teaching in imaginative terms that acknowledge its contextual texture and complexity. Yet, for all its inherent sensibility, there is a sense in which the teacher’s knowledge is portrayed by Elbaz as being unquestioned and unproblematic. Elbaz (1983) notes her own shortcomings in this matter through the non-dialectical account she presents: ‘The very taken-for-grantedness of such strong and unequivocal imagery forces a reexamination of the way . . . [this teacher], and all of us, look at social relations within the school,’ (p.167).

Elbaz (1981)* describes the complexity of the situation:

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This kind of account can serve as a starting point for a critical understanding of the ways that schools 'help create and make legitimate... forms of consciousness that are dialectically related to a corporate society like our own' (Apple 1980). In this study this form of understanding was not actively sought for two reasons. First, the primary concern was to bring into the sharpest possible focus the teacher's active role in using knowledge. Second, the study itself is the product of a 'form of consciousness' that left little room for this kind of understanding: in looking retrospectively at the way in which... [the teacher] and I participated... I became aware that we both had systematically ignored a number of issues of great interest to both of us... Neither [of us]... were able to admit the presence of these constraints... to our own selves or to each other.... I may be thought to have the prerogative of going back over the data with a critical eye to detect social and political constraints at work. I would suggest, however, that such an effort would constitute a manipulation of the teacher that reflects the way our conception of research is itself molded by corporate ideology (pp. 67-8).
An openly 'ideological' view of teaching*

The 'commonsense' and 'practical' views of what constitutes teaching as presented by Elbaz have a major shortcoming in that while they acknowledge the importance of how teachers' theories need to be grounded in the self-understandings and interpretive categories of teachers, what they fail to recognise is how the practitioner's own understanding may become distorted by various non-educational forces and pressures and how the practical realization of those values may be impeded by institutional structures and political constraints (Carr 1984b, p. 4). How often do we hear earnest and hardworking teachers respond, when challenged as to why they do something the way they do: 'It's the only way, under the circumstances'. What is needed is an inquiring or questioning approach that involves 'allowing things which had previously been taken for granted to be seen as problematic, and opening oneself to new perspectives and sources of evidence' (Day 1985, p. 137). Put in slightly different language, what is needed is a 'critical' view of teaching that involves asking questions like:

- where did ideas I embody in my teaching come from historically?
- how did I come to appropriate them?
- why do I continue to endorse them now in my work?
- whose interests do they serve?
- what power relationships are involved?
- how do these ideas influence my relationships with my students?
- in the light of what I have discovered, how might I work differently? (Smyth 1986b, p. 3).

None of this is to suggest that reflecting on the commonplace nature of what is normally taken for granted is not an unnerving experience, particularly when entrenched and even cherished beliefs about teaching are being subjected to scrutiny and challenged. As Apple (1975) put it, acting critically does not involve being negative, carping or disapproving:

It requires a painful process of radically examining our current positions and asking pointed questions about the relationship that exists between these positions and the social structure from which they arise. It also necessitates a serious in-depth search for alternatives to these almost unconscious lenses we employ and an ability to cope with an ambiguous situation for which answers can now be only dimly seen and will not be easy to come by (p. 127).

*Based on ideas contained in Smyth (1986a)
It amounts to acknowledging Giroux's (1981) point that, 'teachers may not be aware of the nature of their own alienation, or may not recognize the problem as such ... this is precisely the point of critical theory i.e., to help teachers develop a critical appreciation of the situation in which they find themselves' (p. 218). Construed in this way, theory becomes a form of critique which enables teachers to acquire a capacity for self-understanding, and of the political struggles involved in bringing about changes.

Becoming critical about teaching and the social theories that support it amounts to moving from narrow 'how to' questions that have a limited utilitarian agenda, to 'what and why' questions, that regard techniques not as ends in themselves, but as part of broader valued educational purposes. For example, asking questions such as: What is worth teaching and why; why is it that we insist on external rewards and punishments to make students learn; why do we define 'good kids' as 'quiet kids'; why do we insist on equating 'workbook work' with 'reading'; why do we regard 'on-task time' as synonymous with 'learning'; why should 'getting through the material' be the prime goal of teaching? These are notions we implicitly accept in our practice without bothering to explore or challenge their veracity. We need to ask why we subscribe to these values.

To take an example; where we use 'ability grouping' in our teaching we need to ask questions like: are we using it as a utilitarian way of handling diverse student skills and abilities; and, are we aware of the way in which it stigmatises children? Likewise, with respect to the expectations we hold of our students, we need to enquire as to whether these are realistic. Unless we do this, we may find as Goodman (1984) did that: We often make children do things that no one would expect adults to do in their jobs. Most adults get to talk to each other when they work, but not kids. Most adults also don't like being told exactly what to do, where to go, how to think, or what to think every minute of the day, but this is exactly what we expect from kids in school (p. 16).

Philosophically, the approach being suggested here has implications extending beyond teachers merely articulating or theorising their practice. For example, there are important questions about the nature of educational research, and who has the right, and under what circumstances, to engage in educational inquiry. At stake also, is the ideological nature of that inquiry, its relationship to the distribution of power, and how such inquiry can contribute to a more just and equitable world. We are, as Lather (1986) points out, 'in a postpositivist period in the human sciences, a period marked by methodological and epistemological ferment' (p. 2). We are in an era where interesting questions are being raised about the importance of explicitly value-based emancipatory research in the human and cultural sciences which is openly ideological in nature, and where people who had traditionally been treated as the 'objects' of research are empowered to take charge of their lives.

Associated with this growing disenchantment with positive science and a realisation of its severe limitations in the human and cultural sciences, is a move away from the search for definitive and all-embracing answers to perplexing social questions likely to have currency in all situations. The idea that there are 'grand theories' (Skinner 1985) which will unlock the complexities of social situations, is no longer one that has much general
There is thus a social and discursive dimension to the creation of knowledge which keeps it out of the hands of specialists. In being avowedly values-based, investigation, inquiry and knowledge of this kind is able to be quite explicit about its non-neutrality. Residing as it does in the hands of those who might otherwise be labelled as dispossessed, it enables such people to examine their circumstances so as to see not only the tensions and contradictions that exist, but how these came to be, historically. Lather (1986) summed it up neatly when she said, ‘emancipatory knowledge increases awareness of the contradictions distorted or hidden by everyday understandings. It directs attention to the possibilities for social transformation inherent in the present configuration of social processes’ (p. 4).

What is, above all, most interesting about this approach to knowledge creation, apart from its openly political stance, is that there is an embeddedness about what is being attempted. It makes sense to people because the ‘larger issues are embedded in the particulars of everyday life’ (Lather 1986, p. 11). Theory does not have to be ‘applied’ to practical situations because there is no separation of one from the other, to start with. To put a slightly more expansive interpretation on this, Giroux (1981) argues that: ‘theory cannot be reduced to the hand-servant of experience, empowered to provide recipes for pedagogical practice. Its real value lies in its ability to establish the possibilities for reflexive thought and practice on the part of those who use it’ (pp. 220–1). It is not that a priori theory is being rejected, but rather that is is being prevented from distorting the logic of evidence. As Lather (1984) put it: ‘Data must be allowed to generate propositions in a dialectical manner that allows an a priori theoretical framework, but which keeps that framework from becoming the container into which data must be poured’ (p. 17). The relationship between theory and practice is therefore a dialectical one; such that theory emerges out of practice, and practice is informed by theory.

What I am arguing for here, and what I have proposed elsewhere (Smyth, in press), is really a ‘liberating’ view of teaching that frees teachers from dependence upon conventional axioms about teaching and the habitual taken-for-grantedness that unconsciously characterises teaching.
Here, I take Berlak's (1985) view of liberation:

People are liberated to the extent that they are, at the same time, increasingly free to choose from a range of alternative perspectives on themselves and their social worlds. This freedom of choice requires the ability to see one's own views of what is good or right, possible or impossible, true or false, as problematic, socially constructed, subject to social and political influence (p. 2).

Viewed in this way, teachers take on the characteristics of 'intellectuals' rather than those of 'technicians'. As Kohl (1983) put it, teachers should be intellectuals as well as practitioners. For him an intellectual is:

... someone who knows about his or her field, has wide breadth of knowledge about other aspects of the world, who uses experience to develop theory and questions theory on the basis of their experience. An intellectual is also someone who has the courage to question authority and who refuses to act counter to his own or her own experience or judgment (p. 30).

Giroux (1985) goes even further than Kohl and, drawing on the ideas of the Italian social theorist Antonio Gramsci, argues the case for teachers to enact the role of 'transformative intellectuals'. He claims that because teaching is a form of intellectual labour rather than an instrumental or technical process, as teachers we need to take an active part in raising questions about what we teach, how we teach, and the broader social goals we strive to achieve through our teaching. For Giroux, teaching is transformative in that as teachers we have a moral obligation as reflective practitioners capable of integrating thinking and practice, to actually shape 'the purposes and conditions of schooling' (p. 379). We cannot do this, Giroux claims, unless we take as our fundamental starting point the notion that schools are 'economic, cultural and social sites that are inextricably tied to issues of power and control' (p. 379). Beyer (1984) put it in these words when he said:

By seeing schools as a sort of 'cultural laboratory', available for critique, interpretation, and discussion, ... [we] begin to understand both why schools operate the way they do, and who benefits from this method of operation. Instead of schools and classroom activities being presented as predefined and given, this approach promotes the view that schools offer socially organized arenas susceptible to critical, reflective analysis and intervention (p. 39).

By emphasizing the socially constructed nature of schooling, and hence the need to make problematic what we take for granted, the possibility for alternative action is opened up (p. 40).

When teachers are encouraged to take the kind of 'critical' stance where moral issues are inseparable from educational ones, they become capable. Because of their engagement with practice, of offering an informed commentary on, and critique of, current policies and practices (Hartnett & Naish 1980, p. 269). In the process, they are able to give insightful accounts of the nature of school systems, what they aspire to achieve, how power is used, and how it might be redistributed.

Another way of putting this is to say that teaching can be construed in dialectical, rather than hegemonic ways. Dialectical, as used in this context "is a convenient term for the kind of thinking which takes place when human beings enter into a friendly (meaning: well-intentioned, cooperative, genial, and genuine) dialogue in order to find a synthesis, or
when they engage in reflection and self-reflection (Proppe 1982, p. 18).

The notion of dialectical takes its fullest expression in 'praxis' (Small 1978) where the unity of theory and practice is bound up with the inscapable moral and political nature of human activity. The notion that we do not merely know the world, but in knowing it, change it, effectively puts aside the distinction between knowing and acting. In deliberate and conscious social practices, the individual acts upon and changes others, but in the process is transformed. In knowing, we are related to and change both the world around us as well as ourselves. Praxis is, therefore, the word used to refer to the relationship where theory and practice are different sides of the same coin. It is the critical nature of praxis and its concern with 'consciousness', 'evaluation', 'choice' and 'decision' which distinguishes it from other habitual routines and unreflective ways of life. Actors in social contexts cannot, therefore, be spectators or onlookers. It is in uncovering the taken-for-grantedness of existing communicative and social relationships, that participants are liberated from power relationships that have become frozen and unquestioned over time. Praxis is, therefore, about the removal of impediments and the transformation of people through the 'emergence of new faculties and capacities or the development of existing ones' (Small 1978, p. 218).

To talk of teaching in 'praxis-like' terms and to construe it dialectically is to jettison the dominant, hierarchical, and instrumentalist approaches, and to posit in their place a view that is more inclusive of what might currently be considered oppositional viewpoints about teaching and learning. Such a dialectical perspective would involve participants in self-formative processes whereby they are able to analytically reconstruct accounts of their own histories, while locating themselves in it, and being able to see how elements of their past, live on into the present. Such a view would begin to acknowledge that:

Both personal beliefs and values are relative in the sense that they can never be final, can always be superseded. They are absolute in that, even as error—as approximations—they contribute to further possibilities of understanding... As we become aware, our perceptions are recognized as simplifications of reality. We realize we systematically ignore details, discrepancies, and distortions. Every act of perception simplifies the object. We come to know through successions of these erroneous simplifications (Proppe 1982, p. 17).

A dialectical view of teaching would, therefore, focus on the specifics of teaching, so as to be clear about the relationship between teaching and the social and political ends towards which it is directed—so that teaching could be seen as part of a broader social purpose.

**The arena of the problematic**

While there is a body of practitioners who, through their actions endorse many of the notions implicit in a dialectical view of teaching, there are still unresolved questions as to what should be regarded as the 'arena of the problematic' in teaching—teaching strategies, the moral bases of teaching, or the social ends towards which teaching is directed. As Tom (1985) expressed it:

To make teaching problematic is to raise doubts about what, under ordinary circumstances, appears to be effective or wise practice. The object of our
doubts might be accepted principles of good pedagogy, typical ways teachers respond to classroom management issues, customary beliefs about the relationship of schooling and society, or ordinary definitions of teacher authority—both in the classroom and in the broader school context (p. 37).

In what follows I draw on the work of Fay (1975) in order to be more explicit about what it means to be openly ideological or 'critical' about teaching. I want to elaborate as well on the sense in which this involves 'theory', as a way of analysing teaching so as to locate those features of it 'which can be altered in order to eliminate certain frustrations which members in it are experiencing' (Fay 1975, p. 92). Theorising, in the sense in which it is used here, comes about as teachers come to understand what they know about their teaching (through the collection of data), and out of this creating new and informed meanings about what that information reveals to them about why teaching is the way it is, and why they personally endorse those particular relationships.

To take an example. It is an unfortunate reflection on the state of teaching that teachers appear to have so much to do that simply getting through the content of a course sometimes becomes an all-absorbing objective in itself. How often do we hear the response from experienced and capable teachers when challenged as to why they don't teach in more innovative or creative ways, 'Look, I just don't have time to be creative or imaginative'. Apple (1983) argues that we should not blame individual teachers for this state of affairs, for the problem extends considerably further. With the pressure of tightening educational budgets, a heightened sense of vocationalism fed by community expectations at the upper secondary level, it is not surprising to find an inexorable intensification of teachers' work. This amounts to:

'one of the most tangible ways in which the work privileges of educational workers are eroded' ... from no time at all to even go to the [toilet], have a cup of coffee, or relax, to having a total absence of time to keep up with one's field ... It is also part of a dynamic of intellectual deskilling in which mental workers are cut off from their own fields and again must rely even more heavily on ideas and processes provided by 'experts' ... We can see intensification most visibly in mental labor in the chronic sense of work overload that has escalated over time (p. 617-18).

This argument is consistent with that developed in the opening section of this monograph where a long-range view was sketched of teachers as an occupational group not faring well in terms of professional self-control.

Adopting a critical perspective, means, therefore, engaging in moral discourse about our self-understandings and 'situating' teaching in the broader arena of ideological and social conflict. As Apple (1979) notes:

... education as a field of study does not have a strong tradition of such 'situating'. In fact, if one were to point to one of the most neglected areas of educational scholarship, it would be just this, the critical study of the relationship between ideologies and educational thought and practice, the study of the range of seemingly commonsense assumptions that guide our overly technically minded field (pp. 13-14).

Neither, it could be argued, do we have a particularly robust record of regarding teaching ideologically, at least in so far as that term refers to
the abstract assumptions, beliefs, ideas, values and unconscious predeusions that subtly guide our social actions (a bit like the 'rules of the game' within a social structure). Just as Mannheim (1966) claimed that the most important thing to know about a man is what he takes for granted, the most salient issues in society are often those that are regarded as settled, non-problematic, and which go uncontested. Likewise, in the world of teaching, it is in the communication patterns and the social relationships that constitute the fabric of daily experience (Beyer 1984) that we need to search for the limitations and boundedness in our thinking. Reflecting upon and acting critically upon our teaching involves trying to disentangle the distortions created by a separation of means from ends, resulting from 'false consciousness' or ideology. What is at stake is more than personal change—it involves 'transformations' (Mezirow 1981) that are linked to the social, political and cultural context in which teaching occurs. Viewed in this light, teaching becomes a political rather than a technical act, with questions about the nature and consequences of inequality and social justice occupying the central domain they deserve within schooling. For those who argue that schools are and should be apolitical, Berlak and Berlak (1981) respond with the claim that:

... all schooling, whatever the content or organization, however fragmented or unified it may be ... is political. It is political in that it either encourages or does not encourage persons to develop and use their critical capacities to examine the prevailing political, social and cultural arrangements and the part their own acts ... play in sustaining or changing these arrangements. If the curriculum ... fail[s] to encourage critical inquiry into everyday problems of teaching and learning, a de facto political position has been taken (p. 253).

The Brazilian educator Paulo Freire (1972) argues that there is no such thing as a politically neutral educational process—education either prepares individuals to adjust to the existing society (both cognitively and attitudinally), or it prepares them to transform it. Whichever of these we adhere to, that of fitting people into the status quo, or alternatively so they can struggle to change existing arrangements, they are both ultimately political acts. For Freire, any proclamation about the purported neutrality of education serves an ideological or political function.

**Developing a ‘critical’ perspective**

Depending upon your viewpoint, there are fortunately (or unfortunately) no magic recipes on how to go about developing a critical perspective. Responding to the claim that the critical approach lacks a ‘blueprint’ for a better society, Giroux (1981) proposes that such a prescription is inconsistent with the intent, and that, furthermore, ‘the goals of emancipation are not like shopping lists that one draws up before going to the supermarket, they are goals to be struggled for and defined in specific contexts, under specific historical conditions’ (p. 220). It remains with the social actors themselves to engage in the dialogue of what that more just society might look like.

There are, however, some philosophical statements (Comstock 1982; Fay 1975, 1977) that provide some orienting ‘pointers’ on how the unexamined and taken-for-granted in teaching can emerge into centre stage (Smyth 1986a).
For Comstock (1982), the critical approach begins with the 'life problems of...individuals, groups, or classes [of people] that are oppressed...' and alienated from the social processes they maintain or create but do not control' (p. 378). In teaching, given the long history of various forms of inspection, teacher evaluation and quality control (that more recently go under the guise of school improvement), it is not difficult to cast teachers in the oppressed role envisaged by Comstock. The press is quick to air generally unfounded claims (Cohen 1986) of teacher incompetence and falling standards. As the targets of such accusations teachers, as a professional group, can either passively accept them, in which case they become co-conspirators in their own oppression, or they may view themselves as having the power, through their own analyses of what is occurring, to actually change those imposed dominant views. Giddens (1979) put it crisply when he said, 'all social actors, no matter how lowly, have some degree of penetration of the social forms which oppress them' (p. 72).

Giroux (1981) sees real dangers in a lack of faith of people to reflect upon and change the oppressive circumstances in which they find themselves. Take, for example, the recent attempt by the New South Wales Education Department, fed by a media outcry over declining standards, to introduce repressive measures to control teachers, and the response of teachers themselves. Alongside all of the usual chest-beating rhetoric by the educational authorities on such matters, there was a measured, perceptive and penetratingly analytical public response from a classroom teacher, who said of the alleged 'crisis' that existed in schools: 'In teaching, this crisis has its own manifestations and incompetence is not among them. Cynicism and frustration are' (Mullins 1986, p. 13). He goes on to argue that teachers are 'deeply dispirited...The profession of teaching has lost conviction in its own importance' and an 'accumulation of two generations of spiritual dejection' has produced a 'compounding...crisis of self esteem' (Mullins 1986, p. 13).

To work at uncovering these kind of understandings about the social dynamics of their own settings, teachers may find it helpful to have a 'critical friend' (or friends) to assist them in coming to see how the perplexing conditions in which they find themselves, came about historically. To act critically requires that teachers identify themselves, both individually and collectively, as potentially active agents who have a stake in altering the oppressive circumstances in which they are technicians implementing somebody else's curriculum, pedagogy and evaluation. In part, this means realistically facing up to institutional shortcomings, while simultaneously moving towards increasing the limited power they currently exercise over their own lives. Actually gaining more control, means thinking and talking about power relationships within, as well as outside schools, so as to move away from the notion of power representing hierarchical domination of one group by another. Power needs to be viewed as a dialectical relationship. As Giddens (1979) put it:

Power relations...are...two-way, even if the power of one actor or party in a social relation is minimal compared to another. Power relations are relations of autonomy and dependence, but even the most autonomous agent is in some degree dependent, and the most dependent actor or party in a relationship retains some autonomy... (p. 33).

Unequal power relations in schools (between individuals and groups) are
established and constructed through the lived experiences of people in schools. As such, they can be 'disestablished' and 'deconstructed' according to the way in which people choose to live, work and penetrate the objects of their struggles (Smyth 1986b). Thinking and acting in an 'empowered' way (Fried 1980a; 1980b), compared with a passive or dependent way, enables people to take charge of aspects of their lives over which they have been constrained or prevented from exercising such control in the past. What this amounts to is 'emancipatory knowledge' (Lather 1986) of a kind that increases awareness of contradictions concealed by the ordinariness of everyday life. Attention is, therefore, focused upon the possibilities for transformation that lie hidden and not understood, in the present arrangements. Adopting an inter-related rather than a hierarchical view of power, means that change becomes possible; it is essentially an optimistic view of what is traditionally portrayed only in pessimistic terms.

For Lather (1982), the skills teachers need for empowerment are of the same general kind that both Berlak (1985) and Shor (1980) claim are needed as well by students, to overcome the 'neglected intellectualism' that has come to characterise much of modern schooling. The antidote, according to Lather (1982), is a form of 'conceptual literacy and critical thinking within a sense of community that combats our culturally induced tendencies to excessive individualism'. It is the same kind of self-monitoring that Rudduck (1985) argues for as the way teachers can re-structure familiar situations so as to reclaim a sense of professional progress. It is a way of teachers attaining new levels of competence and confidence through liberating curiosity and releasing excitement, made imperative by the nature of the times we live in. In Rudduck's (1985) words:

... now more than at any time the teaching profession needs, as a counter to increasing bureaucratic demands, a sense of professional excitement that can draw attention back to the professional core of schooling—the mutuality of teaching and learning as an interactive process (p. 283).

Below is a particularly striking example of a teacher (Thomas 1985) reflecting on the theory of action that lay behind his teaching, and of the struggles he encountered early in his career as he tried to work against the reductionist culture of education, and to posit in its place a more humane view of what it meant to be involved in learning. It is a particularly apposite example of what an 'emancipatory pedagogy' (Gordon 1985) looks like, as a teacher exercises his powers of reasoning to free himself and his students from 'the mental restrictions imposed by the mainstream culture on the way we perceive things' (p. 400). As he found, these restrictions are not always obvious: 'These mainstream restrictions are often hidden, since the culture dominates our views of what is good, what is proper, what is knowledge, and who should have power' (p. 400). These issues are worth thinking about as you read Thomas's (1985) disclosure below, remembering that it comes from the era of the early 1960s when the 'science of teaching' was well entrenched, and behaviourism was rampant (a situation that has not change markedly in some quarters):

In those days, B. F. Skinner had reached the pinnacle of his influence and had persuaded us to divide instruction into neat little packets, each of which had to be duly 'reinforced'. The timing of such reinforcement was thought
to be critical—down to the second, lest for lack of swift praise the implanted learning become extinguished, like so many sparks falling on cold ground. Our method left no room for wonder or perplexity, no place for wisdom or sudden insight, because learning had been acclaimed a science, and science abjured whatever smack of mysticism or romance.

The first lesson I ever taught fell sadly short of the anticipated ideal. I had been assigned to teach that dark corner of American literature represented by Jonathan Edwards. Faced with the grim preachings of this dour cleric, I decided what his writing would have to be dramatized if it were to stick. The lesson began with a recent newspaper account of a man who had been killed at a crossing by a speeding train. What was now fact, I suggested, might well have been predestined all along; the man and the train aimed to collide at the appointed time, irrespective of their individual traits or wills. Knowing nothing of their futures, the [train driver] and his victim were powerless to change the inevitable course of events. My seventh graders took that possibility in their stride since it had already occurred to them on separate occasions, but they entertained serious doubts about their fate being irremediably prescribed.

The ground being prepared, I now moved to set the scene, drawing the blinds and asking my students to raise their desktops in simulation of high Puritan pews. Reversing my coat and setting a lectern atop the desk, I mounted to deliver in muted Edwardian tones the fire and brimstone of ‘Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God’.

It was a stunning lesson, if I may say so, however flamboyant. When the sermon ended, the students sat gaping and transfixed in their pews. I closed the book, the bell rang, and we were jolted back into our accustomed routines. In my twenty some years of teaching, I do not think I have managed to surpass the impact of that first class. Unfortunately, my supervisors were not so well pleased. There had been no fewer than ten of them sitting at the back of the room, all scribbling madly, anxious to demonstrate their critical training so that they might be authorized to judge rather than to teach. No sooner had the class ended than the arduous critique began.

At first I was cool and confident, secure in the belief that my lesson had hit home. But they were relentless in their queries. What had been my objectives? What had the children learned? How did I propose to measure this learning objectively? Somewhat taken aback, I struggled to explain what had seemed to me self-evident. The students had experienced what it was like to be a Puritan, how ruthless and discomforting the doctrine of predetermination could be, how graphic and powerful Edwards was in describing their predicament. But all of this seemed to no avail, and as the minutes crept by, I began to think that Edwards’ congregation had not been so badly off. Sensing my gradual retreat, my inquisitors grew more aggressive. What skills had the students employed and what had been my strategy for reinforcing them? Was I aware that I had used slang? They swept aside my halting responses and pressed me hard for answers. ‘But what did the students learn?’ In desperation I cried, ‘I don’t know, but they’ll never forget it’. Their victory complete, they let me go (pp. 220–1).

This example raises a host of questions to do with the levels at which it is possible to examine teaching. While not meant in any sense to be a prescriptive form for action, in the section that follows Comstock (1982) and Fay (1977) identify multiple layers at which teachers can simultaneously work at uncovering the contradictions within, while changing the structural conditions of, their teaching. Here they are.
Seeing the nature of ideological domination

Drawing upon Fay (1975), the starting point in unravelling the complexity of teaching lies in teachers as a group (indeed, like any oppressed group) being able to articulate that they have certain unfulfilled needs, desires, ambitions and aspirations which are thwarted in some way. They need to identify those actions they perform over which they exercise little or no real control, and in respect of which the outcomes are not all accidental. In other words, within teaching there are certain hidden connections between the social theory and the social practice of teaching that need to be exposed. In Comstock's (1982) words, the agenda is that of laying out the dialectical tension between micro-analyses of particular struggles, and how these are reflections of much broader macro-theories that transcend classrooms and schools generally. For example, teachers' and schools' preoccupation with competitive assessment of students is rooted in the general community requirement that schools rank-order students according life chances, and has little or nothing to do with educational attainment. It is a fragment of the more general issue of the contemporary and historical place that teachers have in controlling the evaluation of their own practices. Notwithstanding the apparent freedom teachers have at the level of the individual classroom, bureaucratised educational systems have an uncanny way of controlling the lives and work of teachers, effectively keeping them in their institutional places. Looking at teachers' own view of their work, Connell (1985) puts it thus:

Social control in schools is usually discussed in terms of teachers' control of the kids. Like almost all workers, teachers themselves are subject to a system of supervision (p. 128) . . . The supervision of teachers is part of a management effort to produce a particular pattern of authority and accepted set of practices in the school as a whole. While some teachers have only a cloudy idea of how the school works as an institution, others have it in very sharp focus (p. 130). . . [The process by which this occurs] may be called the political order of the school: the pattern of authority and consent, alliance and co-operation, resistance and opposition, that characterises the institution as a whole. This pattern differs from school to school. . . It is a state of play, not a written constitution. It is influenced by the patterns of power in the larger society, notably by the state of class and gender relations, but is not rigidly determined from outside. Local alliances, conflicts and initiatives affect the shape those larger structures assume within the life of the school (p. 131).

What Fay (1975, 1977) proposes is that teachers speculate on how extant forms of control have practical consequences 'or what transpires in their schools, and how this orchestration affects student'. He claims teachers need to examine the extent to which they are originators of their own actions, versus respondents working through somebody else's agendas.

The reality is that most teachers are not in the habit of thinking and talking about their 'unsatisfied needs' or the 'structural nature of things' that prevent these needs from being satisfied (which is not to suggest that they should not begin to do this). I can best illustrate this from an example with which I am personally familiar. A group of teachers in a post-secondary vocational institution were canvassed to ascertain their 'most pressing professional and educational concerns'. Partly because of the way in which the question was posed to them, but for deeper reasons as well,
the teachers were portrayed as saying they would like to be able to ‘write better performance–behavioural objectives’ for their lessons. While on the surface this may appear to be reasonable enough, there are some worrying aspects to it. Apart from it being a non-credible response, what is of greater concern is the teachers’ compliance with the ‘management pedagogy’ (Giroux 1985) implicit in this form of ‘instructional delivery’. For their response to be believable, we have to accept that these teachers are prepared to unquestioningly treat knowledge in a reductionist way by breaking it down into smaller and smaller parts for standardised consumption, and so that others outside classrooms can exercise control and judgment about whether teaching and learning have occurred. What is interesting is why a group of teachers would acquiesce in this way to their own oppression and domination. Perhaps there is an element of hopelessness in the way they regard their work in a managerially oriented environment? Or, they may be blinded to the fact that this kind of manipulation is even occurring? Maybe it is easier to accept domination, satisfy the needs of your oppressors, and develop your real interests outside the work scene?

Arends, Hersh and Turner (1978) claim that there is a degree of ‘extenuation and mitigation’ involved in such cases. They cite the teacher who commented as follows when asked about her reaction to externally contrived and ‘driven’ efforts to get her to think about her needs:

The actual teaching day concluded, I flopped into my chair in the faculty room for a respite before confronting tomorrow’s plans. While my wits were idling, I was handed a needs assessment to fill out and return. It didn’t surprise me that this needs assessment specified all of the choices or topics available and asked me to rank order them. This format secretly pleased me, because I didn’t have to invent all the possibilities; I only had to prioritize someone else’s. I dutifully performed the ritual, handed in the paper, and returned my thoughts to tomorrow’s planning (p. 198).

Beyond the surface reasons for this ideological domination and teachers’ unwillingness to articulate and resist it, there may be deeper meanings as well. It may have much to do with the fact that teachers have not been encouraged to reflect on their needs and communicate them to others. As one teacher said:

I believe that the ways available to us for communicating individual needs in [teaching] have to be improved. I know in my own case, given a reasonably secure and supportive psychological climate, it is still hard for me to tell someone about what my real needs are. This may be because I don’t know what my real needs are, or because I don’t get timely and appropriate feedback on my work, or perhaps because I don’t attend to the feedback I do get. Perhaps, more accurately, I’m not used to talking about my needs, and I’m very hesitant to share much of myself with someone else who might or might not help me. My needs, therefore, tend not to be communicated unless there is some external reason or some personal crisis. My guess is that my reluctance to communicate needs is a condition widely shared in the teaching profession (Drummond 1978, p. 198).

**Uncovering grounded self-understandings**

How teachers account for their own actions, as well as the terms in which they condone and rationalise the actions of others, such as administrators,
parents and students are central to the meanings teachers ascribe to particular situations. As teachers begin to engage in reconciliations of the understandings they share about themselves as professionals, and about the kind of work they do, they begin to encounter the contradictions and ideologically distorted nature of those self-understandings. According to Fay (1975) the kind of theorising that occurs here must not be 'moralistic or utopian ... [designed only to get people] to simply adopt a new set of ideas which are foreign and threatening to them ...' (p. 98) but rather of a type that helps teachers to collectively understand the structural basis of the particular meanings, values and motives they hold. For this to occur, discussion will need to occur in the 'ordinary language' of teachers addressing questions like:

- what was it that caused me to want to become a teacher?
- do those reasons still exist for me now?
- what does it mean to be a teacher?
- what is the nature of teaching knowledge?
- who creates knowledge about teaching?
- whose interests does this knowledge serve?
- how do I personally work at uncovering the 'hidden curriculum'?
- how can I uncover myths and contradictions in my teaching?
- how does what I do in my teaching alter the life chances of children?

**Historical conditions shaping understandings**

The origin of beliefs, values and assumptions is equally crucial. C. Wright Mills (1971) wrote that:

> We have come to know that every individual lives, from one generation to the next, in some society; that he lives out a biography, and that he lives it out within some historical sequence. By the fact of his living he contributes, however minutely, to the shaping of this society and to the course of its history, even as he is made by society and by its historical push and shove (p. 12).

What Mills is saying is that as inquiring individuals studying the societies (both large and small) in which we live and work, our efforts are grossly incomplete unless we concern ourselves with the way biography and history intersect. Put simply, we need to see the extent to which we have done the 'pushing' ourselves, or have been 'shoved'. Which is another way of acknowledging the point made by Mead (1934), that we are simultaneously the products, as well as the creators, of our own histories.

For teachers, this means assistance in investigating and analysing how the ideas they hold have been created. They need to develop an awareness that many of the ideas that continue to exist in teaching, as well as current control over knowledge about teaching, is vested in the hands of non-teachers. It is not hard, for example, to see a long history of a deliberate and thinly veiled policy in educational systems (aided and abetted by universities and educational research and development agencies) keeping teachers in positions of subservience so far as educational knowledge is concerned. This has been reinforced by the bureaucratic ways in which schools are organised so as to perpetuate the myth of accountability to outside constituencies, and entrench even further the oppression of teachers through processes of supervision, evaluation and
rating, ostensibly under the guise of ‘maintaining quality education for all’.

Teachers need to be encouraged to undertake investigations that allow them to see clearly for themselves, how these circumstances came about in their own particular context and how such conditions are not the ‘consequences of immutable laws, but ... [due to] structures and processes constructed by elites with specific interests and intentions’ (Comstock 1982, p. 382). These investigative undertakings need to be sufficiently plausible for teachers to see in the accounts they uncover, events, issues and processes that will enable them to readily identify areas to be targeted for change.

This can be exemplified in what Freire (1972) terms a ‘banking’ concept of education, in contrast to a ‘problem-posing’ or ‘problematising’ approach; there are several assumptions and a host of values within the banking approach (the analogy is with depositing and withdrawing money) that teachers might want to investigate:

1. The teacher teaches and the students are taught.
2. The teacher knows everything and the students know nothing.
3. The teacher thinks and the students are thought about.
4. The teacher talks and the students listen meekly.
5. The teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined.
6. The teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply.
7. The teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher.
8. The teacher chooses the programme content, and the students (who were not consulted) adapt to it.
9. The teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own professional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students.
10. The teacher is the subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects (pp. 46-7).

The point in all of this is really to uncover the ‘why forces’ behind particular social constructions of reality; that is to say, to divulge the sources of that reality. As Deetz and Kersten (1983) put it:

Creation of meaning is not an arbitrary process that occurs through friendly negotiation and talk. The social reality legitimizes particular organizational relations, structure, and conditions, and it is explained by the deep social and material forces. To understand organizational reality, then, is to ascertain why a particular meaning system exists by examining the conditions that necessitate its social construction and the advantages afforded certain interests (p. 160).

**Linking historical and contemporary forces**

If the social process and structures of schooling are not created arbitrarily, then how is it that teachers are often able to live with the incoherence of an unjust world perpetuated by schools? The answer lies in the fact that, like most of us, teachers rationalise existing structures so that the practices of schooling become institutionalised and appear on the surface to be ‘natural occurrences rather than historical constructions’ (Deetz & Kersten 1983, p. 161). The way certain practices and procedures have been appropriated by schools, and codified, gives them an air of authority and
a form of legitimation that makes them appear outwardly to be constructed and thus unquestionable. Common practices that qualify here are:

- lock-step promotion of students
- streaming according to ability
- competitive assessment and grading
- hierarchical authority relationships
- non-negotiable forms of teaching-learning
- teacher-centred approaches
- rewards and punishments as control devices.

It is the ideology, or the taken-for-granted assumptions about the realities of schooling, that causes teachers to encounter these situations as normal, acceptable and unproblematic.

It is precisely because of the unconscious distortions that can exist in any unexamined beliefs, values and assumptions, that the question of ideological issues are important in teaching. There are certain central aspects that have to be attended to in discussing the nature and purpose of ideology (Deetz & Kersten, 1983).

1 Ideology is based on a material reality in the sense of it not being imagined or fanciful.

If, for example, the teacher establishes with a class of students that following 'directions' is important in her class, then certain consequences are likely to follow. In effect she will be saying:

'Follow my directions and I will reward you by allowing you to leave class early to participate in sport' (amounts to an affirmation).

'Disobey my directions and you will suffer detention' (amounts to a sanction).

In both instances the teacher has made it clear what the material consequences will be, and these will presumably guide the way she interacts with her students and the way they in turn respond to her.

2 Ideology distorts reality in that it inhibits an examination of that reality and denies it the opportunity of entering into conscious thought.

In the above example, the teachers' enacted practice of requiring students to follow directions will be affirmed or sanctioned, but the 'origin and legitimacy of these affirmations and sanctions is not examined... [The teacher's ideology]... structurally excludes them from thought' (Deetz & Kersten 1983, p. 163).

The fact that directions have to be followed in class so that schools can be run with minimal disruption and, in the process, a healthy respect fostered for bureaucratic rationality, is part of a broader domesticating mission that goes largely unquestioned. Questioning authority and the rights of those in ascendant positions to regulate the lives of the young, is not a notion that is generally available for contestation in most schools. It is an unquestioned 'given' of the situations to which most of us have been conditioned into accepting as more or less sacrosanct. The structures within which we work, make issues like this 'non-questions'.

3 Ideology has a number of distinct functions:

(a) ideology supports, stabilises and legitimises the existing order.
In the above example, the teacher might say:

'I think we can all see that following my directions is best for all of us, because unless we do this our classroom is rapidly going to deteriorate into chaos. Now, none of us would want that, would we?'

The unspoken agenda here may have more to do with stability, certainty and predictability in classroom life for the teacher (and by implication, the school itself), than it has to do with ensuring that the rights of students are not trangressed in the chaos that would supposedly occur. What is also likely to go unchallenged is the way in which certain forms of authority influence pedagogical style and forms of evaluation. These can have a considerable bearing upon access to life chances for certain categories of students.

(b) it masks contradiction by excluding it, or alternatively, by ascribing a false meaning to it.

Teacher: 'Now, I want each of you to do your own work on this.'
Bill: 'John is copying off me.'
John: 'No, I'm not.'
Bill: 'Yes, you are.'
Teacher: 'You two. Stop your arguing or you will get detention.'

In this example the teacher has established the importance of individual work, then contradicted herself by not chastising John for 'copying off' Bill. The fundamental importance of individual work, picked up by Bill, is lost as the teacher deflects the issue by insisting they cease the argument or risk sanctions. What becomes clear is that individualisation seems to have more to do with social control and obedience (hence the deflection), than it has to do with any kind of educational rationale in the actual practice itself. While the example may seem trite, it serves to make the point that because of our ideology, both individual and collective practices can mask manifold contradictions that conceal the real forces that are at work.

(c) ideology mystifies the nature of the existing order and controls through false consensus. Building on the earlier example of the teacher establishing her right to generate rules and directions for orderly classroom life, she might use the following apparently democratic process:

`Now, we all know how important rules are for orderly life. Who can think of some of the rules we need to follow in this class this year?'

Through student involvement in enthusiastically generating a list of rules, the outward appearances may be given of a humane and democratic process. However, once the rules are determined by what looks like a democratic process, the students will feel compelled to live by them, and will feel constrained by them. They will have been further inhibited if in the generation of their list no thought was given to the questions, 'where do these rules come from, and who says so?'

Another example of the way the teacher gives a false impression of consensus is in the following kind of statement:

'Now, Mary we all know that we start the day with mathematics. Why have you got your English books out?'

Here the unspoken consensus regarding routine practice enables the teacher to avoid using explicit force or coercion by relying instead on
the notion that routines have a self-fulfilling prophecy about them and become controlling in their own right.

What is being argued, therefore, is that much of what teachers do in schools is habituated and originates from social conditions over which they are prevented from exercising deliberate control. Because they are embedded in their actions while they are enacting them, teachers are often blinded to the kaleidescope of events and issues and may be unaware of many of the unintended consequences that arise from these ideological distortions. Indeed, it is in uncovering the fundamental contradictions within their practice that it becomes possible for teachers to see how their intentions are thwarted and unrealisable. Suffice to say here that when contradictions do become evident, they can provide a source of tension resulting in a search for reconstruction and change, but they can as well ‘establish pressure toward ... making clear the limitations and closures that presently exist’ (Deetz & Kersten 1983, p. 166). Often, however, contradictions remain hidden because of the way ideology freezes the social conditions over which people have control and results in them being appropriately rationalised. Engaging in a critique of ideology reveals to participants how they have been deceived, in what sense their ideology has constrained them, and how they might go about acting differently.

It is the ‘action’ aspect I wish to turn to next.

**Acting in educative and empowering ways**

Fay (1977) speaks of the critical perspective in the ‘educative’ sense of enabling teachers to ‘problematisé’ (i.e. problem pose rather than problem solve) the settings in which they work, so as to remove the blinkers that have blinded them from seeing and acting in alternate ways. In his words:

> The point ... is to free people from causal mechanisms that had heretofore determined their existence in some important way, by revealing both the existence and the precise nature of these mechanisms and thereby depriving them of their power. This is what is meant by ... aid[ing] people who are objects in the world in transforming themselves into active subjects who are self-determining (p. 210).

The first step in this educative process of teachers altering the patterns of interaction that characterise and inhibit their social relationships, is changing the understandings they hold of themselves. Fay (1977) claims this means moving from a situation of dependence, to one of autonomy and responsibility. He proposes that through dialogue, teachers problematisé issues they want to localise and work upon in their own practice. Having first grasped a historical understanding of how their frustrating conditions came about, teachers are then able to to initiate and sustain a collaborative process of planning, acting, collecting data, reflecting and re-formulating plans for further action (Smyth 1984, 1986g; Kemmis & McTaggart 1982). Teachers might seek the aid of an outside ‘facilitator’ if they feel this might be helpful, for example, in generating accounts that reflect the problematising process. Alternatively, they may choose to rely only on one another.

Acting in ways that amount to asking questions about their teaching, enables teachers to become active as distinct from passive agents, not just in changing the technicalities of their teaching, but in transforming
the conditions, structures and practices that frustrate their teaching. What is significant here is that action becomes more than just an instrumental way of solving problems. Teachers become involved in a much wider generative process of examining teaching, uncovering issues, and working to re-construe them in fundamentally different ways.

While blueprints are not readily available on how this might happen, the Boston Women's Teachers' Group (Freedman, Jackson & Boles 1983) made some insightful comments when reporting on work they undertook into contradictions within their own practices. They concluded:

Teachers frequently expressed a general sense of efficacy in their classrooms, amply documented by anecdotes . . . that was lacking or allowed to go unnoticed in the area beyond the classroom . . . It was in their attempt to extend the discussion into the areas outside the classroom walls that teachers experienced the greatest resistance—whether this referred to community meetings with parents, whole-school discussions of school climate, or attempts to link one teacher's issues with another's. Pressure from outside support groups, and federal and state programs mandating teacher involvement, afforded the few possibilities for leverage teachers experienced in confronting systemwide reform (p. 297).

What Freedman, Jackson and Boles are arguing for is a sense of being a professional that means more than 'facing the issues alone'—a situation that frequently culminates in the unrewarding consequences of 'bitter self-recrimination or re-orientation from teachers, parents and students' (p. 293). The teachers on this occasion were concerned about moving beyond the bankrupt solution of 'blaming the victim' (Ryan 1971), namely, disaffected teachers. Rather, they saw the problem as one of working upon the contradictory demands made on them as teachers and the institutional structures that created and prevented their resolution. In their words:

Teachers must now begin to turn the investigation of schools away from scapegoating individual teachers, students, parents, and administrators toward a systemwide approach. Teachers must recognize how the structure of schools control their work and deeply affects their relationships with their fellow teachers, their students, and their students' families. Teachers must feel free to express these insights and publicly voice their concerns (Freedman, Jackson & Boles 1983, p. 299).

Clearly, what is needed are examples of where teachers have been able to move beyond themselves and situate their teaching in its broader social and political contexts. Before moving to look at examples of where teachers have begun the difficult process of theorising their practice in the way being suggested here, it may be useful to re-visit, in summary form, the key issues just spoken about. The proposition being put was that to adopt a critical social theory perspective towards teaching was to systematically explain (i.e. theorise) the interconnectedness between teachers' actions, beliefs and feelings, and the social institutions, contexts and structures in which they occurred. Fay (1977) provides a succinct statement, when he says of this kind of theorising that:

... first, social theory must try to explain the sufferings of a class of people; second, drawing on the distinction between action and movement, a social theory will contain an interpretive account of the meanings of actions and practices; third, recognizing the causal role of beliefs, motives, desires and other psychological states and processes, social theory will provide quasi-
causal accounts of the relationships between social structures and kinds of behavior; fourth, believing that the suffering of people results from the inability of their form of life to satisfy their real desires, such theory must give a historical account of how the relevant social actors came to be what they are, i.e. having certain needs (about which they are ignorant) they are trying to satisfy but cannot, given the forms of social interaction in which they engage; fifth, rooted in the assumption that frustrating and repressive social practices can continue to exist at least partly because of the false consciousness of those who engage in them, a social theory must be built around an ideology-critique which seeks to show that the basic categories in terms of which the relevant people think of themselves are incoherent or inadequate and therefore doomed to lead to unhappiness as long as they guide these people's lives; sixth, assuming that ideas can change people's lives only under certain social conditions, a social theory must offer a theory of crises as a way of explaining why the dissatisfaction of the people will have become such that they will be ready to listen to the ideology-critique and to change the social order on the basis of this critique; seventh, it must provide a theory of communication that explains how people can come to have a false consciousness and that lays out the conditions necessary to satisfy for them to be disabused of their illusions; and eighth, it must furnish an action-plan that seeks to show social actors how to act differently and therefore achieve the satisfactions for which they so yearn (pp. 207–8).

In the next section some extended examples are provided of how some teachers live with incoherence and contradiction, and of ways in which some of these teachers confronted their circumstances and worked at changing them.
Examples of the ‘critical’ perspective*

What has been spoken about above is a way of knowing that usefully informs the personal and social lives of teachers, and of how their ways of living and working actually frustrate the attainment of those needs. The goal is a form of enlightenment and self-understanding that actually enables teachers to see the constraints that make life less than fulfilling. By becoming conscious of those circumstances, in discovering the contradictions implicit in their work conditions, by uncovering ways of understanding the causes and effects of false assumptions, and through developing a theory of action, teachers actually begin the process of changing and alleviating the stressful, dissatisfying and oppressive conditions. As Freire (1972) aptly put it: reflection without action is verbalism, and action without reflection is activism.

Case study: students as teachers

An example from Thelen (1972) may serve to illustrate what is meant by enlightened action:

Melvin had always had trouble with math, but he did well enough in other subjects, and was generally well thought of by teachers and students. Over the years various teachers had given Melvin extra hours of consultation and one even went to the length of giving him a diagnostic test to see why he couldn’t learn algebra. Then entered algebra with the bright determination to let bygones be bygones, and for a couple of weeks he got along fine; but then his deficiencies and lack of skills gradually began to overpower him, and by [the semester break] he had little cause for celebration.

The start of action was a conversation among Melvin and four other boys who were engaged in some gastric rearrangements to make Joe’s car run on [heating] oil instead of gasoline. The boys had been chatting about their different ideas and gradually edged into their feelings about algebra. Melvin had troubles and complained how he got little help from the teacher, even though, he conceded, she seemed really to be trying to help. Two other boys told of having similar experiences. Then Charles said that he got the best help from Joanna, another student in the class. This led to a round of adolescent sniggering, and the subject was changed. But you will see that this conversation planted the seed. Melvin had expressed a concern, and it is important to note what sort of group he was able to express his concern to. Melvin had gotten reassurance that others had the same kind of problem—and this kind of reality-testing with friends is, so far as I can see, always

*Based on ideas contained in Smyth (1986b)
necessary to begin action. Finally, we note that Charles planted a suggestion, which was, however, not picked up.

The next day during algebra there was a study period for the students to work on homework problems. Melvin struggled with the problems for a few minutes, and then fell to musing. Then he asked the teacher if he could sit with Harry instead of by himself. She acquiesced, and the two boys worked together for the rest of the period. The following day Melvin turned in all the homework, and most of it was correct. The teacher learned later that Harry had helped Melvin for two hours after school and had rather enjoyed doing it.

The class droned on toward Christmas with mounting apprehension about the semester examination. The teacher selected eight students who seemed to her to stand in most deadly peril, and she suggested they come in for coaching after school. Then a thought struck her, and she asked Harry and Joanna if they would come too and help the group. The coaching sessions worked well, and Harry and Joanna began to feel like professional consultants.

At the next meeting of the student council, there was a written proposal from Harry, Joanna, Melvin and Charles and it carried a penciled approval from the algebra teacher. The proposal was that the student government through its representatives, and with the help of the teachers, identify a number of students who could serve as consultants to other students needing help in various subjects, and that the means be found during the school day to set up the 'consultations'. The members of the council reacted variously. Some thought it was a fine idea and were all for setting it up right now, whereas others felt that is was the sort of thing that should be done informally, and therefore the council should not interest themselves in it. The group, argued back and forth for a while, and then Mr Boone, their adviser, suggested that he thought they'd better get some facts to go on. How many students did the teachers feel could profit from such help if it were available? How many students would go to get such help? Could 'consultants' be found and would they be willing to serve? (pp. 162-4).

The instigating event in this example amounts to a felt concern (by Melvin) which is tested out with others (Charles and Joe), and when legitimised, provides a basis upon which explorations begin on how to alleviate the frustrating circumstances and the social context that gave rise to them—namely, an unconscious pre-occupation by the teacher with a teacher-centred approach to learning.

There is an element of discomfort, even threat, in what I am suggesting. There is also the notion that teachers might act 'in spite of the risks, out of a concern for social justice or even a deep regard for the integrity of their students' (Giroux 1981, p. 213), and that this might involve an interpretation of their teaching role as being one that goes considerably beyond survival skills and following rules, even to the point of defying administrators. Most of us, unless we feel uncomfortable, shaken, or forced to look at ourselves and our circumstances, are unlikely to change. It is far easier to accept our current conditions and adopt the line of least resistance. There is the other aspect as well which has to do with making our experiences public. What this amounts to in a practical sense is telling stories about our experiences. In the foreword to Kohl's (1984) book Growing Minds: On Becoming a Teacher, Featherstone claims that one of the problems with the world today is that:

... we don't know enough—about institutions, about how lives get lived over
time, about how people learn to make their living and what they do all day. People feel funny telling you how they spend the working day, as though they might bore you with shoptalk. And yet other people's work is one of the great topics of conversation, like sex or religion or politics. Unless we begin to hear each other's stories, we'll keep walking around like strangers in an airport. And we will certainly not provide the young with the guidance they need to end up doing something worthwhile that suits them (p.ix).

Here are some of the stories of teachers I have worked with, as well as teachers others have worked with. Although they may appear anecdotal, the important point to remember is the consciousness-raising process engaged in by these teachers as they began to question and try to justify to their students, to themselves, and to their colleagues, why it is that they do what they do. This was generally preceded by an uncomfortable feeling that things were not quite as they might be. In some cases it took the form of some dilemma, paradox or contradiction.

**Case study: 'hanging on' while 'letting go'**

The classic dilemma confronting one teacher was how to 'let go' while simultaneously 'hanging on' to control. For him, his experiences as a teacher, and the professional norms he had been socialised into accepting, presented some quite severe constraints on what he could do. In his words:

> My whole lesson was filled by my attempt to 'teach' the lesson. The students were not allowed a break for the entire lesson. I am wondering if the level of cognitive application I expect from the students is too great. Is there a need for me to back away? Yet, all my teaching experiences have led me to believe that I must be totally in control.

While he had uncovered the issue, he had not yet begun to ask why it was that he had become entrapped in this situation, and was unable to see it for what it was.

**Case study: classroom order or equal opportunity?**

Lampert (1985) used the label 'pedagogical problems' as a way of describing things that were perplexing her about her own teaching. She gives an example:

> In the classroom where I teach fourth-, fifth-, and sixth-grade mathematics, there are two chalkboards on opposite walls. The students sit at two tables and a few desks, facing in all directions. I rarely sit down while I am teaching except momentarily to offer individual help. Thus the room does not have a stationary 'front' toward which the students can reliably look for directions or lessons from their teacher. Nevertheless, an orientation toward one side of the room did develop recently in the fifth-grade class and became a source of some pedagogical problems.

> The children in my classroom seem to be allergic to their peers of the opposite sex. Girls rarely choose to be anywhere near a boy, and the boys actively reject the girls whenever possible. This has meant that the boys sit together at the table near one of the blackboards and the girls at the table near the other.

> The fifth-grade boys are particularly enthusiastic and boisterous. They engage in discussions of math[es] problems with the same intensity they bring to football. They are talented and work productively under close supervision, but if left to their own devices, their behavior deteriorates and they
bully one another, tell loud and silly jokes, and fool around with the math materials. Without making an obvious response to their misbehavior, I developed a habit of routinely curtailing these distractions from the lesson by teaching at the blackboard on the boys' end of the classroom. This enabled me to address the problem of maintaining classroom order by my physical presence: a cool stare or touch on the shoulder reminded the boys to give their attention to directions for an activity or to the content of a lesson, and there was no need to interrupt my teaching.

But my presence near the boys had inadvertently put the girls in 'the back' of the room. One of the more outspoken girls impatiently pointed out that she had been trying to get my attention and thought I was ignoring her. She made me aware that my problem-solving strategy, devised to keep the boys' attention, had caused another, quite different problem. The boys could see and hear more easily than the girls, and I noticed their questions more readily. Now what was to be done?

I felt that I faced a forced choice between equally undesirable alternatives. If I continued to use the blackboard near the boys, I might be less aware of and less encouraging toward the more well-behaved girls. Yet, if I switched my position to the blackboard on the girls' side of the room, I would be less able to help the boys focus on their work. Whether I chose to promote classroom order or equal opportunity, it seemed that either the boys or the girls would miss something I wanted them to learn (pp. 178–9) (my emphasis).

Case study: football cards or mathematics?

Berlak and Berlak (1981) give the example of a teacher, Mr. Scott, who discovers the nature and complexity of contradiction in his work. It is worth quoting in some detail here because of the point it makes about the difficulty he also experienced in disentangling the realities of his teaching:

Mr. Scott from his vantage point in the middle of the room scans the room, his eyes passing over individuals, pairs and trios, some of whom appear to be working diligently while others every now and again become engaged in intense conversation. His eyes fall on Steven and Bruce moments longer than the rest. These boys, who yesterday had been seated on opposite sides of the room, are today seated together, intently examining one of their football cards, engrossed in what appears from a distance to be a particularly vigorous and extended exchange of ideas, their mathematics work as presented on a set of cards cast aside, temporarily forgotten. Mr. Scott leaves his place at the center of the room, approaches Mary, and responding to her request, reads a portion of the story she is writing (p. 126).

Reflecting on the incident afterwards Mr. Scott was able to relate this incident to other important pieces of information about himself as a teacher and what he held to be important educational values:

Steven, for instance, is a very creative boy and he can't settle down to work; he's got to be left alone before he produces his really best work... I separated the football fanatics and they became miserable, so I let them sit together again. I didn't want them to be miserable... I have yet to come to terms with myself about what a child should do in, for instance, mathematics. Certainly I feel that children should as far as possible follow their own interests and not be dictated to all the time, but then again... I feel pressure from... I don't really know how to explain it, but there's something inside you that you've developed over the years which says the children should do this... For example since I've been here
I've been annoyed that some children in the fourth year haven't progressed as much as say some less able children in the second year in their maths, because they've obviously been encouraged to get on with their own interests. But I still feel that I've somehow got to press them on with their mathematics (pp. 126-7).

Berlak and Berlak provide some insights into what is happening here:

Mr Scott this morning walks past Steven rather than telling him to get back to work. One could view this as a null-event since Mr Scott did not do anything to Steven. However, this 'non-event' stands out for several reasons—because he treats Steven somewhat differently than the others and differently than he did yesterday. It also stands out because Steven isn't doing his maths, and Mr Scott, in word and deed, considers maths an especially important part of the work of the school. How can we make sense of this non-event? ... But as Mr Scott tells us about Steven's 'creativity', about the misery of the football fanatics when they were separated from one another, about the press he feels to get the 'fourth years' to progress, as he tells us what in his view lies behind what he did, we discern his response to Steven as part of a pattern. This pattern includes both his bypassing of Steven and his later confrontation of him ... (pp. 127-8).

[Mr Scott] is responding with some degree of awareness to a wide range of contradictory social experiences and social forces, past and contemporary, both in his classroom, his school and beyond him in the wider community. He has internalized these contradictions and they are now 'within' him, a part of his generalized other. We infer these contradictions by observing his behavior and listening to what he says about it—'something inside you that you've developed over the years which says children should do this' and 'I didn't want them to be miserable'—and from his frequent admissions ... that he accepts of his own accord the Head's views on standards in mathematics, and also agrees with him that 'children need a haven'.

[These contradictions ... are] dilemmas that are 'in' Mr Scott, in his personal and social history, and 'in' the present circumstances ...

These contradictions and the 'internal' or 'mental' weighing of these forces that sometimes occurs are joined in the moment he looks at Steven, then by him, and focuses his attention on Mary (pp. 128-9).

As he goes about teaching at any given moment, Mr Scott is pulled and pushed towards numbers of alternative and apparently contradictory behaviors. One set of alternatives is whether to allow Steven to discuss the football cards—or to chastise the child, or in one way or another remind him that he must complete his maths—but at a given moment Mr Scott cannot both remind and overlook (p. 131).

Now, all three of the scenarios I have just quoted are instances of teachers who have successfully begun the difficult process of 'overcoming the limits of experience' (Buchmann & Schwille 1983). These instances serve to highlight the point made by Buchmann and Schwille about avoiding too literal an interpretation of the dictum that 'first hand experience is the best teacher', notwithstanding claims to the contrary that 'being there', 'doing it' and 'seeing for oneself' are of the essence of educative experiences. Behind this 'down to earth' view is what Buchmann and Schwille term a 'bucket theory of mind' which says that whatever our senses tell us about what is happening around us can be relied on as being given and objectively true and is not, therefore, open to refutation or question. It amounts to endorsing the notion that 'the "real world" teaches people to think and act rightly' (p. 31) and not to challenge the way the world is or ought to
be. Immersion in the concrete and practical is fraught with all manner of problems because of an unquestioning acceptance of matters at face value characterised by the view that 'learning from experience means learning to adhere to practices and standards that remain unchallenged' (Buchmann & Schwille 1983, p. 35). Bordieu (1971) labelled the constraints that experience imposed on social and political possibilities, the 'paradox of finitude'. He claimed that 'the individual who attains an immediate, concrete understanding of the familiar world, of the native atmosphere in which and for which he has been brought up, is thereby deprived of the possibility of appropriating immediately and fully the world that lies outside' (p. 205). For teachers, this can take the form of isolation from one another and the burden this imposes on exchanging interpretations and making sense of experience. As Lipsky (1980) put it, teachers become 'highly subject to street-level bureaucrats' definition of the situation' (p. 53) because of the difficulty of comparing their situations with those of colleagues.

None of this is to suggest that the limitations of first-hand experience cannot be overcome if 'one plans experiences carefully, anticipates what they have to offer, and selects experiences that vary in some systematic fashion' (Buchmann & Schwille 1983, p. 42). Jackson (1971) expressed it in slightly different terms when he spoke of experience being 'the best teacher', with the caveat that 'we must not just have experience; we must benefit from it. This means we must reflect on what happens to us, ponder it, and make sense of it—a process that in turn requires a certain distancing from the immediate press of reality (p. 28).

What is highlighted in these examples is that teachers sometimes need another pair of eyes with which to view the ordinary events of their teaching. The very ordinaryness of it, the habit and the routine, make it difficult to develop a challenging and questioning perspective. Rudduck (1985) put it this way:

The everyday eyes of ... teachers, have two weaknesses. Because of the dominance of habit and routine, [they] are only selectively attentive to the phenomena of [their] classrooms: in a sense [they] are constantly reconstructing the world [they] are familiar with in order to maintain regularities and routines. Second, because of [their] busy-ness, [their] eyes ... and only to transcribe the surface realities of classroom interaction ... [The] teacher has temporarily to become a stranger in his or her own classroom (p. 284).

As teachers, we don't have to have taught for very long to realise that classrooms, and classroom activities, do not provide very good reflecting surfaces within which to see ourselves at work. The kaleidoscope of events often preclude us from getting a clear and stable image of ourselves and our teaching. What we need are some triggers or instigating events that allow us to get into an analysis of our teaching. One of the ways we do this is often through what is loosely termed a 'problem-based' approach that involves starting from 'a problem, a query or a puzzle that ... [we wish] to solve' (Boud 1985, p. 13). Historically, there have been sound reasons for the re-emergence of this as a way of education and learning in the professions generally. Boud points out:

The resurgence of interest in problem-based learning and similar ideas in recent times has followed a period in which there has been a marked increase in the attention given to the academic as distinct from the vocational aspects
of courses which prepare students for the professions. Many of the health professions, for example physiotherapy and nursing, have been incorporated into large tertiary institutions and have developed degree programmes which have in many cases shifted the focus of preparation away from the practical to place much greater emphasis on the basic sciences. Traditional professional areas such as medicine and law have questioned whether the academic emphasis of the university is necessarily the best way to prepare students for these professions and whether university courses should take greater cognisance of the practical and professional dimension of learning. In all cases the profession directly or indirectly expressed concern that the academic discipline orientation of the tertiary institutions did not value practical and professional knowledge sufficiently (p. 13).

The difficulty with the 'problem-solving' approach is that in articulating the problem, quite severe limits can be placed on the the possible avenues for action; it all depends on who selects the problem—the individual concerned, or somebody else. In the worst of possible scenarios, it can result in convergent rather than divergent ways of thinking and acting. Schón (1983) put it in terms of 'naming' and 'framing':

When we set the problem, we select what we will treat as the 'things' of the situation, we set the boundaries of our attention to it, and we impose upon it a coherence which allows us to say what is wrong and in what directions the situation needs to be changed. . . . [W]e name the things to which we will attend and frame the context in which we will attend to them (p. 40).

Case study: stereotyping students

An example, adapted from Berlak and Berlak (1981) may serve to make the point that looking beneath the surface can result in alternative explanations that reflect the complexity of classrooms as contested cultural sites:

A physical education teacher was concerned about her feelings that she held quite different standards and expectations for boys than for girls. When she had a colleague help her collect information in a particular lesson about what she said and how she interacted with students, the situation became much clearer to her. Her directions to students revealed a different set of expectations based on sex stereotypes. What puzzled both her and her colleague was what caused her to be the way she was. Discussion and reflection on the issue led them to see that there were strong cultural, rather than personal forces at work. The teacher's action was, in a sense, shaped by the cultural expectation that boys are stronger, more agile, and display greater physical endurance and aggressiveness than girls—a cultural image that was powerfully reinforced by the media. Having attained this kind of consciousness about her own actions, the teacher was able to begin to monitor her actions in ways that enabled her to be more sensitive to cultural influences and the way they affected her teaching.

Case study: curriculum form

Another example taken from some of my own research, and confirmed by Bullough, Gitlin and Goldstein (1984), shows how easy it is for teachers to be unaware of the hidden curriculum often implicit in the unquestioned way we enact our teaching. The teaching form can quite unwittingly dominate the kind of relationships formed with students:
A year 7 maths teacher was concerned about the effects of his individualised maths program. While the worksheet aspect he was using allowed students to work at their own pace, he was concerned about the time some students seemed to waste queuing-up to see him about difficulties. He always seemed to have a continuous line of students at his desk.

Information he collected about his teaching confirmed his feelings. Some students spent up to 15 minutes in a lesson, waiting to see him. What the information was able to tell this teacher was that the 'curriculum' form was dramatically affecting the quality of student-teacher relationships that were possible. He could see the reasons for his frustrations. The teaching form and its built-in pressure to deal with students quickly, was causing him to deal with students in terse and impersonal ways. As a consequence he decided to re-organise his way of working with students so that he could spend more time interacting personally with them.

Case study: equality of opportunity

On another occasion, a high school teacher I worked with came up with some disturbing evidence once he began to collect evidence about his own teaching. The issue he uncovered, in looking at his classroom interaction patterns, revealed gross inequities in the ways he treated categories of students. Over a 'successful' teaching career of some ten years he had come to form certain perceptions of himself as an experienced and competent teacher. He therefore had some difficulty in reconciling the image he held of himself, with evidence he collected about his own teaching. He had a vision of himself as a fair-minded teacher who understood and practiced equality of educational opportunity in his classes. He could clearly remember his enthusiasm at a week-long in-service seminar at his school, conducted two years earlier on equality of the sexes. He was understandably shaken to find that the evidence he collected about his teaching revealed him to be actively discriminating against the girls by giving a disproportionate amount of his attention and time to the boys. While he understood and endorsed the rhetoric of equity well enough, there was a slippage between that and his own practice. He was moved to comment:

Did the in-service activity really have such little impact on me? Is the imbalance in my teaching the norm, or the exception? Maybe there is something in all this sexist teaching that I thought I wasn't a part of.

This teacher had taken the first step towards acting reflexively (Beasley 1981) by penetrating the false consciousness of his teaching. But as any social theorist knows, it is not enough to merely understand the world, the crucial part is to change it. While the teacher did take action, as I shall explain, the nature of that action was somewhat questionable. He decided to attempt to reverse his own 'unacceptable' behaviour by 'ignoring the boys entirely, and seeing what happens'. But as he found, having a plan and actually implementing it were two quite different matters, quite apart from whether he had accurately located the 'cause' of the problem:

My plan proved to be more difficult than I first envisaged. I simply couldn't do it ... I tried to ignore the fact that only the boys put their hands up to answer questions ... I coaxed some of the girls into making a response, and as I did, the frustration level of the boys rose noticeably, particularly among those used to being dominant.
The significance of what this teacher had uncovered about his own teaching, along with his naïve but well-intentioned effort to change, are demonstrated in his comment:

If the boys were getting frustrated after a mere fifty minutes, what of the girls who had been struggling in the same way for many years? What of the girls who go practically unnoticed not only in my class, but in those of most others?

This teacher had clearly had an experience that had raised him to a new level of consciousness, about the discriminatory practices he was using in his classroom.

Case study: muttering

When we begin to challenge the conventional wisdom of teaching in the ways illustrated in these case studies, we are often able to arrive at what amount to quite robust 'local theories' about teaching. I am reminded of the Grade 1 teacher I worked with a few years ago who was concerned about a 'quiet and withdrawn' underachieving student in her class. With the assistance of a colleague-observer she collected observations of this child and found that this 'quiet' child did a deal of 'muttering' to herself while on assigned tasks. Curious about this muttering child who appeared to be engaged on work-related activities, teacher and colleague extended their observations to a range of other students. They found that muttering was a prevalent practice, but there was a pattern to it. In the teacher's words:

Our initial conclusions were that able students verbalised problems to clarify them; not so able students discussed their problems with a neighbour; and weak students relied almost entirely on the teacher for support and legitimation.

For example:

'Six plus four must equal ten' (able student to self)
'Are you sure six plus four equals ten?' (less able student to neighbour)
'Miss, I think six plus four equals ten. Is that right?' (weak student to teacher).

Having collected some information, analysed it, and talked about it, teacher and colleague issued a challenge to the widespread view that to be on-task, students need to be silent. They said:

If our theory is correct it has some very serious implications for teachers who demand total silence, or for remedial teachers who put struggling students in isolated situations so they won't interrupt, or cannot be interrupted by others... While the validity of our conclusion can be questioned, the increase in our own knowledge of how some students learn is supported by our evidence.

In this case there are a range of other questions that could and need to be asked. For example, why is it that teachers endorse the view that students are working when they are quiet; where did this notion come from; under what circumstances is it true; if it is not true pedagogically, then why do we adhere to it; are there other reasons why we insist on students being quiet? Could it be that the pedagogical preferences of teachers has much to do with the hidden curriculum of social control in
schooling? In the above example, orderliness and the general smooth and efficient running of the school, may be driving the need to have students completing tasks in a quiet manner. Furthermore, the hidden agenda could be that of preparing students for conditions of solitude when they leave school. The connection between unquestioned practices in schools, such as this one, and the wider social scene in which schools are embedded, cannot be ignored. Jackson (1968) put it in terms of the recurring demand that schools make upon students to ignore those around them:

In elementary classrooms students are frequently assigned seatwork on which they are expected to focus their individual energies. During these seatwork periods talking and other forms of communication between students are discouraged, if not openly forbidden. The general admonition in such situations is do your own work and leave others alone. In a sense, then, students must try to behave as if they were in solitude, when in point of fact they are not. They must keep their eyes on their paper when human faces beckon. Indeed, in the early grades it is not uncommon to find students facing each other around a table while at the same time being required not to communicate with each other. These young people, if they are to become successful students, must learn how to be alone in a crowd.

Adults encounter conditions of social solitude so often that they are likely to overlook its special significance in the elementary classroom. We have learned to mind our own business in factories and offices, to remain silent in libraries, and keep our thoughts to ourselves while riding public conveyances... [But] a classroom is not an ad hoc gathering of strangers. It is a group whose members have come to know each other quite well, to the point of friendship in many cases... Thus, the pull to communicate with others is likely somewhat stronger in the classroom than in other crowded situations (pp. 16 -17).

There is another possible interpretation that can be put on this too; it has to do with slightly more old-fashioned ways of increasing production in the workforce generally. As long as the workforce is disciplined and less prone to time-wasting, this will ensure maximum output. Let us not be coy about the view of industry here. At a recent forum to discuss the future of post compulsory schooling in Victoria, a representative of industry made it clear that:

Australia has one of the most inappropriately educated dole queues in the world... We can do without a watering down of standards and a proliferation of soft options... Basic education and training must be more relevant to industry... with children competing with one another in the way our products have to compete on international markets.

While much ado could be made of this outrageously narrow utilitarian view of education, the point I want to glean from it is that this kind of thinking is around and alive and it can percolate through into the way schools are actually organised and conducted. Shapiro (1984) has noted that:

While there is no simple one-to-one correspondence between what happens in schools and in industry, the accelerating obsession with output, performance and productivity in both places, is surely part of the accelerating zeitgeist of our time (p. 12)... [S]uccess in school means to do what one is told, to obey those with authority, and to conform to bureaucratic rules... The inability to penetrate, critically analyze and apprehend the false and dis-
torting messages of the dominant ideology leaves us helpless in a world where human experience is so often misrepresented or mystified by those who provide us with the shared meanings of our culture (p. 16).

To round off this section of the monograph, I would argue that each of the cases just cited is encouraging as far as it goes. But for me there is a limitation implicit within this analysis of teaching, and I have alluded to it above. In part, the problem lies in the individualistic view of change that the various teachers held. What has been largely overlooked is that the deficiencies and discriminatory practices singled out for consideration, have deep cultural and social origins that make them impossible to resolve personally or in any kind of final sense. There is more to them than simple behaviour modification. To leave issues like the ones raised by these teachers at an individualistic level is to risk a ‘blaming the victim’ approach which, as Freedman, Jackson and Boles (1983) put it:

... defines the problem as an aggregate of disaffected or incapable teachers whose deficiencies are seen as personal rather than as a reflection of the failure of the educational system to grapple with and confront these contradictory demands ... [We] need to look at the institutional nature of schools and how the structure of schools creates such contradictions and prevents their resolutions (p. 263).
Confronting the impediments to deliberation*

It is an interesting question for me as to whether teachers can in fact engage in the kind of systematic and deliberate reflection that involves questioning the fundamental assumptions of their teaching. Wehlage (1981), for example, reached the pessimistic conclusion that 'teachers who seem to have the habit of questioning the clarity of their purposes and the efficacy of their actions, or who constantly probe to discover the connections between certain events in their classroom, are conspicuous by their rarity' (p. 102). But it is not enough, by implication, to write this off as teachers being incapable of engaging in the tough intellectualising that is required. To point the finger accusingly at teachers, is not altogether helpful, especially when the impediments may be of a cultural and a structural kind. Closer attention needs to be given to the ways in which the organisational and cultural structures within which teachers work actively prevent them from thinking and acting in informative ways. It is not that teachers are thoughtless, or neglectful, in not asking questions about the nature of their work and its relationships to the social structures in which it is embedded.

One especially illuminating analysis (Shor 1980) has shown that the major impediment to critical thought is the comforting and soothing nature of everyday life itself. In the normal course of events, the way we lead our lives militates against us asking penetrating questions about how or why things came to be the way they are. As Shor (1980) put it:

... most people are alienated from their own conceptual habits of mind. How come? Why don't masses of people engage in social reflection? Why isn't introspection an habitual feature of life? What prevents popular awareness of how the whole system operates, and which alternatives would best serve human needs? (p. 47).

Shor's (1980) 'regressive modes of thought' and the 'denial of reason' are helpful in seeing why critical social thought is so difficult to enact in our schools, particularly when we consider the four manifestations of this—namely, 'reification', 'beating the system', 'pre-scientific thinking' and 'mystification'.

Reification amounts to a spectator approach to life which, according to Brent (1981), amounts to acting like a window shopper: '... observing things as they are, under the assumption... that unless [you] break windows... [you] have to simply accept what is. Since you can't change

*Based on ideas contained in Smyth (1986h)
the scene behind the window, you make petty deals with the display manager of the store' (p. 827). People become captivated, for example, with trying to 'beat the system'. They expend considerable energy in getting the best discount, in ensuring value for money, or just trying to avoid getting ripped off. The effect, according to Shor (1980), is that people act in ways that amount to remaining frozen in the system as they fight for illusory power. He claims that this 'shrewd watchfulness ... forces thought to be narrow, immediate, and practical, thus crowding out critical thinking ... You wind up devoting huge amounts of time to learning the ropes of the system, and none to rejecting the social model' (p. 59). These are clearly short term palliatives, in situations that call for long term reconstruction.

The tragic part to this lies in the failure to question the system and the models of authority that support it. People become co-opted into supporting their own oppression. They become conditioned into '[policing] themselves by internalizing the ideas of the ruling elite' (p. 55). In effect they develop an overpowering aspiration to 'resemble the oppressor, to imitate him, to follow him' (Freire quoted in Shor 1980, p. 55). They become trapped into believing that the way out of their oppression is to treat others around them in the dehumanising way they themselves are treated (in some quarters called 'horizontal violence'). They cannot see that they have internalised the ways of thinking and acting that caused them to be the way they are.

As well as the rationalisation and half truths of reification, the unanalysed or mystical causes of everyday events amount to pre-scientific thinking; that is to say, blaming it on 'human nature'. It comes in the form of 'well, that's human nature, and we all know what human nature is like'. It is almost as if thinking in this way provides an excuse for not having to engage in systematic inquiry and analysis of culture—it is 'emotionally reassuring' to not have to use critical thinking processes to unpick the tangled web of what makes social life work. Things happen because you 'strike it lucky' or because of 'blind faith', not because of any rational process:

As long as you can indict abstract, untestable 'human nature' as the problem of humanity, then there is no way to do anything about it. This gives you a moral holiday. You are freed from the responsibility of intervening in history to change things for the better. It comforts your own sense of powerlessness to think this way; it's a way of thinking rooted in powerlessness (Shor 1980, p. 61).

The pace at which we are bombarded with stimuli from a variety of sources in modern life means that 'the mind is conditioned to operate at a perceptual speed which repels careful scrutiny' (Shor 1980, p. 63). 'Acceleration' as Shor (1980) terms it, takes the form of electronic media, advertising, commodity packaging, arty billboards, and flashing neon signs—all of which are deliberately designed to create visual overload in us:

The pace of stimuli and demands keeps people off balance and exhausted, yet so addicted to the destructive speed of life that they keep looking for more.

Such addiction to high levels of surface stimulation reduces mass reception of serious printed texts and deliberate verbal exchanges. Minds accustomed to amplified effects feel uncomfortable with the slow pace of
critical thought (Shor 1980, p. 65).

Mystification, or simplified explanations as to the causation of social processes, often take the form of ‘blaming the victim’ in which there is a refusal to see ‘social problems as social’ (Ryan quoted in Shor 1980, p. 68): ‘Instead, individuals are blamed for their failure in a society which allegedly offers everyone opportunity. The person is indicted instead of the system. The answer to deviance, poverty or injustice is to change yourself, not the social order’ (Shor 1980, p. 68).

It is very difficult to have a ‘last word’ in a monograph such as this. One thing is, however, clear: the struggle towards a critical pedagogy of teaching through teachers developing theories about their own teaching, amounts to ‘nothing less than a battle for a new social design’ (Shor 1980, p. 82)—one which involves ‘slowing down perception, through meditation, careful observation, and successively deeper phases of inquiry into a single issue’ (Shor 1980, p. 82). It is also becoming increasingly clear that a critical approach to teaching amounts to a ‘prolonged dialectical process, with advances, reversals, leaps, small steps, twists, and ironic, unexpected turns’ (Shor 1980, p. 83). Or, as Marx (quoted in Shor 1980) put it, social change is like ‘an old mole, burrowing intricate and invisible channels underground, until one day its head bursts through the surface, quite unexpectedly’ (p. 83). The late Lawrence Stenhouse said it most accurately in his comment:

It is teachers who, in the end, will change the world of the school by understanding it (Rudduck & Hopkins, 1985).
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