African history is a relatively new discipline and its sources, methodology, and content may be unfamiliar to those trained in European or U.S. history. Through presentations by African scholars, this document offers new strategies for integrating Africa into world history courses. Each presentation is followed by commentaries from experienced history teachers on how the issues presented can be used in the classroom. Bryant P. Shaw, in "Isolation and Progress: Africa and World History," points out how the limitations of history textbooks can be overcome by adopting new approaches to the subject. Jan V. rsina explains the historiographic dimensions of African history in the presentation "One's Own Past: African Perceptions of African History." A. J. R. Russell-Wood confronts the misconceptions, problems, complexities, and unknowns of African history in "African History: New Perspectives for the non-Africanist Historian." George E. Brook's presentation, "A Schema for Integrating Africa into World History Courses," offers materials, maps, and methods of organization for teaching African history. In "The African Diaspora in World Historical Perspective," Joseph C. Miller emphasizes the importance of students' understanding the process of slavery and the slave systems for the diasporan aspect of African history. Philip D. Curtin establishes how the disease environment played a major role in shaping African history in "Disease and Africa in World History." A world history syllabus, examinations, and a bibliography are provided in the appendices. (SM)
AFRICA IN WORLD HISTORY: A TEACHING CONFERENCE

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AFRICA IN WORLD HISTORY: A TEACHING CONFERENCE

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The conference also required the collective effort of many other individuals. The Superintendent of the USAF Academy, Lieutenant General Winfield W. Scott, Jr., the Dean of the Faculty, Brigadier General Ervin J. Rokke, and the Head of the Department of History, Colonel Carl W. Reddel, strongly supported the concept and execution of the conference. Major Spencer Way II, and Captain Paula G. Thornhill coordinated and supervised countless and complex administrative details for the event. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas P. Coakley, Associate Professor of English, and Major Stephen D. Chiabotti, Associate Professor of History, helped proof and polish the proceedings. Ms. Nellie Dykes supervised the typing of the manuscripts and proved a spirited, dedicated, and professional assistant.

As is customary, the editor assumes all responsibility for stylistic matters and for the arrangement of the papers and discussions.

B.P.S.
USAF Academy
February 1987
PREFACE

Since 1968 the United States Air Force Academy has taught a survey course in world history to every cadet. The rationale for this course is rooted in the Academy's mission: to produce career officers for the United States Air Force. Our graduates may serve anywhere in the world; therefore, they must appreciate the variety and value of the world's cultures, and the historical implications of contact between these cultures. World history provides an academically rigorous and intellectually sound vehicle to help achieve this aim.

Besides its fundamentally military character, the USAF Academy is also part of a wider academic community and welcomes the chance to share instructional expertise. Hence, since 1982 the Department of History has sponsored three world history teaching conferences. These meetings have provided important opportunities for professional, mutually beneficial exchanges with historians from civilian colleges and universities.

The 1986 teaching conference on "Africa in World History" is the latest in this series of efforts. The rationale for selecting this topic derived from the frustration which many world history teachers experience in dealing with Africa in their world history courses, and from the willingness of six eminent scholars to participate in this endeavor.

The conference was not intended to provide approved solutions or simplistic answers to the challenge of integrating Africa into world history. Its purpose was rather to view Africa from the perspective of world history, to raise questions, and to stimulate thought and discussion on this issue among all participants--speakers, commentators, and audience. We hope that we met with some measure of success. We trust that readers of this volume will perceive new avenues of approach for including Africa in world history courses, and that those conducting basic research in African
history—or in the history of any of the world's areas—will do so with a greater awareness of the implications of their work for world history.

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There's no doubt about it: incorporating Africa into a world history course presents special challenges. African history is a relatively new discipline whose sources, methodology, and content may be unfamiliar to those trained in European or American history. Teachers and students alike are liable to bring to the classroom misperceptions about African history and skepticism as to its usefulness.

Those committed to the discipline of world history must confront these challenges directly. For each of us, this responsibility manifests itself in different ways. At the Air Force Academy, we feel this obligation acutely, because our cadets may serve as professional military officers anywhere in the world and we cannot allow them to remain ignorant of its second largest continent. More generally, if the discipline of world history is to maintain its conceptual and academic viability, teachers and students must deal with all the world's areas, even those with which they are not familiar. After all, as humanity's birthplace, Africa has the longest history of any of the world's continents. On yet another level, the historical inquiry into how other human beings adapt to their particular environments, and how they perceive themselves and set their goals within those environments, has much to teach us about what it means to be human. Finally, the successful incorporation of African history into the discipline of world history directly challenges the notion that Africa is a historical void, a plastic continent whose historical significance was always shaped by the heat and force of external stimuli, and to whom change always came from the outside. The implications of such a notion are stunning, for the denial of the significance of a people's history constitutes a denial of their place in the human community and of their very humanity. One need only witness the bitterness engendered by racism and imperialism to appreciate the implications of this type of intellectual apartheid.

Faced with these challenges and obligations, teachers naturally turn to world history textbooks for ideas on how to integrate Africa into their courses. Just how
practical are such texts in this task? Some are more hindrance than help. I don't claim to have comprehensively surveyed all the major world history text, but I am struck by the prevalence of two particular themes in the more popular ones. The first theme emphasizes Africa's isolation; the second focuses on the transforming effect of the western impact on Africa. Both are important for their implication that sub-Saharan Africa, as far as world history is concerned, has no history worth studying—if it has any history at all.

The desiccation of the Sahara Desert, beginning in about 2500 B.C., was unquestionably one of the most influential events in African history. World historians have long been quick to seize on Africa's ensuing "isolation" as a theme for discussing Africa in world history. Hegel contended more than a century ago that sub-Saharan Africa's geographic isolation bred backwardness and barbarism. Africa (outside of Egypt), he noted, had no historical interest of its own, for we find its inhabitants living in barbarism and savagery.... From the earliest historical times, Africa has remained cut off from all contacts with the rest of the world; it is the land of gold, forever pressing it upon itself, and the land of childhood, removed from the light of self conscious history and wrapped in the dark mantle of night. Its isolation is not just a result of its tropical nature, but an essential consequence of its geographical nature. It is still unexplored, and has no connections whatsoever with Europe.... In this main portion of Africa, history is in fact out of the question.

For Hegel, the temperate zone was world history's theater; Africa's "firey heat" was incompatible with "spiritual freedom" and what he termed a "fully developed mastery of reality."2

In 1963, Hugh Trevor-Roper echoed Hegel's remarks, declaring that

Perhaps in the future, there will be some African history to teach. But at the present there is none: there is only the history of Europeans in Africa. The rest is darkness.... And darkness is not a subject of history.3

Six years later this well known historian still felt confident enough to refer to Africa as "unhistori-"4
Even the more perceptive and influential world historians are not much help here. William McNeill, for example, treats sub-Saharan Africa as an area totally peripheral to world history. His cryptic references to sub-Saharan Africa characterize it as a region "on the outer fringes" of the world ecumene, consisting of "semi-civilized Negro kingdoms based in the rainforest of west Africa," and as an area which, in 1850, "constituted by far the largest single barbarian reservoir left in the world"; moreover, he refers to the "obstacles of geography, reinforced by African tropical diseases and by political rivalries among the Europeans powers" which "preserved a degree of autonomy and cultural independence for African barbarian and savage communities to the second half of the nineteenth century."5

By the mid-1970s the discipline of African history was considerably better established than in the early 1960s, when McNeill's work appeared. Nonetheless, remnants of the image of "unhistoric Africa" persisted. For example, Leften Stavrianos' third edition of The World Since 1500 described precolonial Africa as a schizophrenic continent consisting either of a few well developed West African empires stimulated and sustained by trade, or of undefined "primitive tribal peoples."6 Colonial and independent Africa was characterized as "apathetic," "lethargic," dominated by "dynamic" Europeans, yet ready at any moment to revert to ancient "tribal" warfare.7 (Happily, these stereotypes were removed from the book's fourth edition.) Underlying this view is the assumption Africa faces a Hobson's choice between western "modernization" or disintegration into those atavistic "unrewarding gyrations" which characterized the continent from time immemorial. "Progress," in short, comes to isolated Africa only from the West. Besides conforming to the notion of "unhistoric" Africa, this assumption ignores both the situational and dynamic nature of internally generated social and political change.8 It also ignores the well documented fact that heightened ethnic awareness—or "tribalism"—often results from competition for the "benefits" of Western political, economic, and technological modernization.9

The notion that meaningful change came recently and largely, if not entirely, to Africa from the West, and that there is a total bifurcation between "traditional" and "modern" societies, are made explicit in R. R. Palmer's 1950 edition of The History of the Modern World. Palmer contends that
...the greatest social development of the eighteenth century with the possible exception of the progress in knowledge, was the fact that Europe... became incomparably more wealthy than any other part of the world. The new wealth... was produced by the increasing scientific and technical knowledge, which in turn it helped to produce; and the two together, more wealth and more knowledge, helped to form one of the most far-reaching ideas of modern times, the idea of progress.  

In their 1984 edition, Palmer and Colton emphasize that "... most of what is now meant by 'modern' made its first appearance in Europe," that Europe created "the most powerful combination of political, military, economic, technological, and scientific apparatus that the world had ever seen," and in doing so "radically developed an overwhelming impact on other cultures in America, Africa, and Asia, sometimes destroying, sometimes stimulating or enlivening them, and always presenting them with problems of resistance or adaptation.”11 In their view, "modern" is different from, more "advanced" than, and profoundly destructive of "traditional" societies:

"In most modern countries there have been pressures for increased democracy.... In a modern society old customs loosen, and ancestral religions are questioned. There is a demand for individual liberation.... Everywhere there is a drive for more equality in a bewildering variety of meanings... movement of some kind is universal. Such are the few indexes of modernity... (and) they appeared first in the history of Europe..."12

World history in this context is the development of these "indexes" in the West and their diffusion to other areas of the world: "But whatever their backgrounds, and willingly or not, all peoples in the twentieth century are caught up in this process of modernization or 'development,' which usually means acquiring some of the skills and powers first exhibited by the Europeans."13 Only because the colonized were "forceably" introduced to the West did they come to "feel a need for modernizing and industrializing their own countries."14 And under modernity's weighty impact the "traditional" begins to crumble, and in the worst cases nothing replaces it. World history, then, deals entirely with European initiatives and the implications thereof; Africans are history's objects, irrelevant and peripheral to the mainstream of world history.
Other authors of world history texts, while more kind, still subscribe to this traditional-modern dichotomy. Wallbank and Taylor, for example, regard highly the complexity and variety of precolonial African political, social, and economic organizations, laws, governments, and intellectual and artistic achievements. Following the "trade and state formation" thrust which has characterized much of African historiography, they contend that Europe was isolated from and ignorant of Africa instead of the other way round. Yet they too mention that the late nineteenth century found Africa "helpless" in the face of the European imperial advance, that urbanization and wage labor weakened kinship ties, and that "tribal life" is crumbling in the face of modern economic imperatives, new systems of land tenure, and new legal systems. "As a result," they note, "some (Africans) became 'detribalized' and often bewildered as they were alienated from their traditional culture but unable to understand fully and be part of the new."

More recent world history textbooks appear to take greater advantage of the scholarship in African history. Anthony Esler, for example, emphasizes that "the history of Africa had been closely interwoven with that of Europe and Asia for many centuries"; that East Africa was part of the Indian Ocean trading complex from the beginning of our era; that "purposeful" change was present in Africa prior to 1500; and that sub-Saharan Africa, though isolated, was in 1500 "a world unto itself, living by its own rhythms and growing according to its own patterns of social evolution." Although Asians and Europeans were ignorant of events in the interior, nonetheless "political growth and development were mushrooming in the centuries around 1500." Here, then, is an affirmation of the existence of African history prior to European contact; the validity of this history is evident in Esler's frequent comparisons of African empires with those of their European and Asian counterparts. Further, he implies strongly that Africans responded to commercial opportunities in ways similar to those found in the West, and he infers that such responses altered political and social ideologies in a manner which contradicts the notion that precolonial Africa consisted of static, separate, and hostile "tribes."

Unfortunately, Esler misses an important opportunity by dropping this theme instead of pursuing it into the early and mid-nineteenth century, when increased European commercial contacts produced a profound economic and social revolution.
in equatorial Africa well prior to the European occupation—a process which forcefully illustrates the dynamic nature of changes in African political and social ideology. Africans, too, could be economically and politically "imperialistic"; examples abound of Africans competing both with each other and with Europeans to establish commercial and political monopolies. In short, Africans had the capacity to retool their own economic, political, and social ideologies in response to changing circumstances; Africa's history is therefore not simply the history of what the Europeans did in Africa, and world historians must take this into account if they are to maintain the integrity and credibility of their discipline.

Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the European impact on Africa was significant and that Europe brought western-style "modernity" to that continent. It is also true that Africans could not expel the colonizers and that some of the colonized were physically or psychologically crushed, as Chinua Achebe's novels remind us. Yet it is quite another thing to conclude that Africans were an inert mass who did not or could not react to the European presence, who did not care to react to it, who did not have their own opinions about what the European presence meant, or who did not manipulate the Europeans for their own ends.

The reliance on "isolation" and "progress" as organizing principles for incorporating Africa into world history raises much larger questions. Should "world history" be coincident with the history of the "dynamic" European middle class, expanding markets, nation-states, the growth of technology, and what westerners see as the purposeful, progressive spread of western civilization? Is internally generated change less "significant" than change produced from external stimuli? And where does one draw the line between "internal" and "external"? Certainly all history—and especially world history, as William McNeill reminds us—requires coherent organizational criteria. I am not advocating the complete elimination of "westernization" as an organizing principle of world history. I do plead for the recognition that this paradigm—as like all paradigms—has limits, that such limits are not merely of academic importance, and that the implications upon which this paradigm is based, or the assumptions which teachers and students may extrapolate from it, may undermine the conceptual integrity of world history as a discipline.
It is useful to remind ourselves, and our students, that "modernization" (defined as an enhanced capacity to exploit or manipulate the physical environment) is not necessarily coincident with "progress" if political, social, and economic environments are not also "modernized" concurrently. Examples abound. The industrial revolution provided horrifyingly effective weapons for World War I—but European political and military sectors were not sufficiently "modernized" to cope with these technological advances. Western political processes and structures may provide the vehicle for legitimate self rule, but they may also lend themselves to chauvinism, imperialism, war, and demagoguery. The increasing control we exercise over our disease environment has brought unquestionable benefits—but these advances have also strained our political, social, economic, and ethical systems. Modern education and literacy are wonderful tools, yet they may also help alienate students from their land, depress agricultural productivity, and stimulate hyper-urbanization, unemployment, and political instability.

Two recent treatments of world history suggest new directions which may overcome the limitations noted above. In an extraordinarily interesting essay, David Cohen concedes that one of the major issues in reconstructing African history consists in determining "how far voices exterior to Africa shape the presentation of Africa's past and present." Yet he demonstrates how, among the Luo of Kenya, individuals within a society integrate and adjust to external influences and put such knowledge to very practical use—whether such influences come from across the village or across the ocean. His essay is eloquent testimony to the dynamic nature of African society and to the ability of such societies to make conscious choices about what they would accept, reject, or change. This process, he contends, is an extraordinarily complex one, "incapable of being conceptualized in terms of a continental process, but rather contextual in nature." In an interesting counterpoint to Achebe's novels, Cohen suggests that the "old customs" do not loosen or crumble; rather, they are redefined, as they have always been redefined when there was a need to do so, even before the European intrusion. This redefinition process suggests that while the diffusion of western "modernization" may pose significant problems for "traditional" societies, these societies possess elaborate internal mechanisms for coping with change, even for stimulating it. To
view the "European impact" without reference to these mechanisms grossly distorts the historical record.

A second very useful book which successfully skirts the limitations of the "impact of Europe on Africa" paradigm is Eric Wolf's *Europe and the People Without History.* Wolf's thesis is that humanity constitutes a "manifold, a totality of interconnected processes, and inquiries that disassemble this totality... and then fail to reassemble it falsify reality." Further, he notes that past attempts to understand the world through concepts like separate nations, societies, and cultures are bound to fail for "there are interconnections everywhere." "Both those who claim history as their own and the people to whom history has been denied emerge as participants in the same historical trajectory."

Given the current high level of scholarship in African history, "isolation" and "progress" can no longer provide a credible foundation for accommodating African history and world history. Filling the vacuum created by the bankruptcy of these themes demands much hard work on the part of both practitioners of world history and historians of Africa. The former have the enormous responsibility to be aware of the latest scholarship in African history while the latter must make their scholarship intelligible to those without the very specialized training required of Africanist historians. The presence of so many world history teachers and six very distinguished scholars at this conference is a step toward fulfilling this mutual responsibility. While we strive to understand the connections between Africa and world history, let's also remind the historians of Africa that our treatment of the continent in world history courses ultimately rests on their scholarship--and they should "inquire" accordingly.
Notes


18. Esler 56.


23. Cohen passim.


27. Wolf 23.
ONE'S OWN PAST: AFRICAN PERCEPTIONS OF AFRICAN HISTORY

Jan Vansina
University of Wisconsin-Madison

During the last generation, our knowledge about Africa's past has grown—at first by leaps and bounds, later more steadily and now at a stodgy annual rate, except for archaeological discoveries. Most of the early research was carried out by citizens of the former colonial powers and North Americans. Working within the framework of epistemologies common to history in general, influenced by ideological debates of importance in their own societies, such scholars produced the first standard interpretation of Africa's past. They were, after all, the first band of scholars to systematically reconstruct it. Some African scholars participated since the onset of this enterprise, but at first they were engulfed by the general movement.

Of late the situation has changed. Universities developed on the continent, and more and more undergraduates, then graduates and then doctors were and are being trained in the continent itself, and hence conditions for autonomous nuclei or schools of interpretation have been created. No longer are African historians of Africa so rare, that, as in 1958, they have to explain at historical conferences what they do and why they are there, a situation A. Kagame of Rwanda caught when he presented himself as an "underdeveloped scholar."

Moreover, today the number of young professionals as well as research activity is declining in Europe and Great Britain. In the United States the number of teachers remains steady, but the number of students is declining and African history is becoming just one more field within the overall discipline. It is important to realize that the focus of research on Africa lay in this country from the later 1960s through the 1970s. According to Professor P. D. Curtin, 350 historians of Africa were active here in 1970 and some 600 by 1980. Even though some of them were not really involved in research, they outnumbered all other specialists in African history all over the world.
But this is no longer true. By now there are also some 600 historians in the 50 to 75 universities and institutes of higher learning in Africa. Above all, the number of B.A.'s and M.A.'s in this field runs at hundreds if not thousands a year and I estimate new Ph.D.'s at a much higher rate per annum than the 35 or so which were the peak in this country in the early 1970s. So the bulk of research activity has shifted in fact to the continent itself, a natural situation. And yet others know little about this because so few African scholars publish in journals accessible outside their countries and few publish books. This is a consequence of the general poverty that afflicts most African countries. Research results appear only in sporadic mimeographed series, multiplied in runs no bigger than the confidential prints of major Western governments. This certainly is a hindrance to international communication in the field. Moreover, for the past few years a "book famine," as Professor Ajayi of Nigeria calls it, has been developing in countries with nonconvertible currencies, i.e., all those that are not in the franc zone or which are not North African, so that it becomes in turn difficult for African scholars at home to follow developments elsewhere in this field.

But does it matter? Perhaps there is no difference between African and European or American students of African history? To study one's own past must generate different reactions than if one studies the past of someone else. But it is true? After all, were not all early African historians, those that are now heroes for the later generation, trained in Europe and in America? They certainly have absorbed the common international academic culture, which is primarily based on values and practices current in Europe and here. It should not come as a surprise then that in a recent work C. Neale claims that the differences between African and Western practitioners of African history are minimal. To her the differences between historians of East Africa and historians of West Africa are more pronounced than those she can find between Africans and non-Africans. In her view, West African professional historians of every origin did not use history to restore national pride. They left that to publicists. They were not mesmerized by the need to refute European views of the colonial age according to which history begins with the arrival of the Europeans. They merely insisted that African societies and cultures are the outcome of protracted and complex histories, which they set out to recover, regardless of whether this was adding fame or shame to the
record, because they accepted the axiom that historians are not judges. She uses
the works of the school of Ibadan (Nigeria), the oldest nucleus of historians in West
Africa, as her evidence. This she contrasts with a defensive stance in East Africa.
There the historians of Nairobi or Dar es Salaam, whether they were East Africans
or Europeans, were, she finds, much more defensive. They turned European claims
upside down, but in so doing they still remained captives of the framework created
by European colonial historiography. They insisted on cities and states, on early
nationalism and resistance, on colonial collaboration which really was arming one's
hand for later resistance, and on the other themes common in western
historiography.

For all her arguments, Neale's stance is overblown. Her comparisons are
limited to three centers really, all using English as a common language. She omits
any mention of Francophone or Arabophone Africa and she overlooks common
themes, even between Ibadan and Dar es Salaam or Nairobi, contrasting with
western stands. The great rift among the African elites has been the rift between
language communities which the political scientist Ali Mazrui has labeled the Afro-
Saxons and the Afro-Latins. He might have added the Afro-Arabs. In scholarship,
the distinction between scholars using English or French has run and still runs very
deep, so deep that for instance a Nigerian knows more about Sierra Leone or Zambia
than about neighbouring Cameroun and the Camerounian is well up on Senegal, but
not on Nigeria. Moreover, the styles and traditions of scholarship varied. In
caricature: French scholarship dealt with grand ideas, Anglo-Saxon scholarship with
empirical documentation. Anglo-Saxon scholarship wrote about social systems and
trade in detail. French scholarship wrote about mentalités and world-views and the
impact of ideology on historical interpretation. Certainly this was reflected among
the African founding fathers (no mothers!) of the discipline.

For example, the first book length study of an Anglophone historian, the
founder of the Ibadan school, is K. O. Dike's Trade and Polities in the Niger Delta, a
stolid, meaty work which earned the accolade of "professional." On the
Francophone side the first may well be Cheikh Anta Diop's Nations nègre et culture
which started the Dakar school. It did not earn any accolades in historical circles
but roused a storm. Whereas Dike meticulously documented politics and economics
in a well defined area, the Niger Delta, Diop took on all of Africa and claimed that Africa created Egypt and Egypt created civilization, including Christianity, using civilization in the common parlance of the quartier latin. Africa as the mother of Europe was a grand vengeance on cultural imperialism. It used the same techniques, the same appeal to a wide but undefined range of disciplines, and the same disregard for detailed proof, which we find in the expositions of European superiority and in the popular racist writings of an earlier age. It also stirred similar chords in the hearts of its readers and the same storms within responsible academic milieux. Today, Dike’s work is an often ignored foundation stone in a wall of solid monographs, but Diop, who until his death in 1986 continued ever since 1955 to barnstorm African campuses, still resonates on Francophone campuses, despite its rejection by professional historians. African historians reject its outrageously cavalier handling of sources, but they find its epistemology appealing: they like the questions raised. With this dichotomy then did African historians start the period. But not all early authors fit in this scheme.

One of these was A. Kagame of Rwanda who after long work (begun in 1936) wrote his *Inganji Karinga* (the Triumph of Karinga), published before 1957,\(^7\) summarized as *Histoire du Rwanda* and later much expanded in both Rwandan and French versions. Kagame was not a trained historian but he was a scholar and his standards are as respectable as any. His work glorifies precolonial Rwanda and justifies this especially in terms of ethical values. Kagame’s avocation as a Catholic priest strongly influences him here, but there is more. He held that African values differed profoundly from European ones and sometimes were ethically better, sometimes worse. Still the notion that all civilizations were relative and each was as good as another and deserved the same respect, is the core of his message. This was not Diop, nor was it Dike. Unlike either, he did not write first for Europeans, but first for Rwandans. Hence his use of Kinyarwanda.

As for the differences stressed by Neale, they were minor. Some East African historians such as B. Ogot\(^8\) stressed the value of histories concerning people who never built states, thus challenging one of the implicit criteria of Europeans concerning the notion of civilization. As to the focus of East African historians on problems of nationalism and resistance, these are to be seen in the context of a
milieu in which European settlers loomed much more largely than in West Africa. They would later be echoed by Algerian, Angolan, and Mozambican historians.

In the 1960s, the desire to write African history through African eyes and a pan-African nationalism remained the hallmarks of all historiography, in works written by Africans or others. That Westerners interpreted Africa's past in this fashion is not surprising. After all, the idea of nationalism is European in origin insofar as it is not simply the desire common to all communities to make their own decisions for themselves. So if the specific direction was new: to write history from the African point of view, the epistemology: to write from the point of view of insiders—was not. The discourse was directed to a common public: academics, whether they were in the former colonial metropolises where African historians still earned their Ph.D.'s or at home, and additionally only for an elite public in the African capitals. With this focus all works also neglected questions relating to the role of Africa in the world as a whole.

The differences between African historians and others remained small, smaller than the rifts between Afro-Saxons and Afro-Latins. Thus when J. Ki-Zerbo published his Histoire de l'Afrique noire d'hier à demain begun in 1962, completed in 1969 but published in a textbook series in 1972, its preface was the work of the late F. Braudel, the prow figure of France's school of the Annales. Despite the quotation from Lumumba that opens the work ("One day history will have its say. Africa will write its own history"), the difference was not evident at a glance and the quotation is paralleled by one from the Tarikh as Sudan about the use of the past in the present as a fount of useful knowledge.

Yet, underneath, the differences between Africans and others were there. One only has to compare this work with the standard English textbook of the 1960s, R. Oliver and J. D. Fage's A Short History of Africa. The respective tables of contents brings this out. Both devoted about half of their books to the period before 1800, but for the later period the stress on resistance and the early awakening of nationalism in Africa in Ki-Zerbo's history is absent in the English work. His attention to epistemology has no counterpart in Oliver and Fage's work. Ki-Zerbo omits northern Africa, and in that respect Oliver and Fage were more in line with
pan-African views. Also, despite Ki-Zerbo's obvious efforts, traces remain of an imbalance in his work whereby West Africa is more on center stage than the other parts of the continent. On the other hand, and although both were destined to be textbooks, Ki-Zerbo's was twice as long as the English text, even without North Africa. Obviously schools in Africa needed more information than schools without. Now some of these differences can be attributed to the Francophone/Anglophone rift. Yet, as we shall see, most have persisted and now appear to be linked with specific African/western differences. Moreover a closer look at Ki-Zerbo shows deep differences of appraisal of historical situations. A semiotic analysis of the concepts used in both books reveals this, just as does the photographic appendix in Ki-Zerbo's book. Its presence cannot just be laid at the door of differences between French and English textbook traditions. And the contents and captions show it in their avoidance of "exotic" topics and the underlying message that this is our own past, in which we recognize ourselves.

But by 1970 the nationalist trend ran into difficulties. Already French Marxism had produced its interpretations of African history focused at first on the colonial period with works such as M. Merlier's *Le Congo de la colonisation belge à l'indépendance* and on a debate about the translation of Marxist concepts into African realities. The first peak was J. Suret-Canal's *Afrique noire occidentale et centrale* published in the same year as Ki-Zerbo's work. Less than a fourth of this work was devoted to precolonial Africa and most of that was treated as a static panorama of customs. Suret-Canal had not broken away from colonial historiography. History still began with the Europeans. He merely reinterpreted that model. But he stressed the role of Africa in the world economy more than his predecessors had done. The view of precolonial Africa as a *tabula rasa* is important because all major European works in that vein adopted this position and much of the later development in Marxist historiography had to struggle with this flaw. In part the situation was attributed to a lack of data. But usually it was attributed to the fact that for very many centuries Africa's basic social formations and modes of production had not changed. Even today, after fifteen years of Marxist efforts, precolonial Africa still is not well integrated. And of course Marx himself had only vaguely sketched Asiatic and other early modes of production.
It is remarkable that very few African scholars chose to write strict Marxist history. No major work written by an African in this vein exists, even though Marxism is the official ideology of more than a score of states. This stands in sharp contrast to another major new school of the 1970s, Dependency Theory, developed in Latin America and imported from there into Africa by the Guyanan Walter Rodney, whose most famous work is *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. This found a profound echo among historians especially at Dar es Salaam, where Rodney taught, and later in Mozambique. This new perspective was timely as the early 1970s saw the ruin of the high hopes for a bright future that had been the common faith of all the upbeat histories in the 1960s. But most African authors soon began to feel uncomfortable with some facets of the new trend. Dependency Theory tended to put Africa in a global perspective but in a light that recalled earlier positions of colonial historiography. Of course, now Africa was a victim, but it still was dependent. Of course Africa should claim its reward for having fueled, as dependistas saw it, the wealth of the first world; nevertheless disturbing questions about the why of such a dependency in precolonial times were left, and the answers were not so far removed from the colonial charges of incompetence. Above all, in contrast to the earlier trend, Africa now seemed never to have any achievements to boast of or to have ever controlled its own destiny.

Such gnawing doubts would have led to the demise of dependence theory, even if its prophesies had not proven false. But what in fact led to its demise, and to a certain disenchantment with Marxist theory as well, was its habit of putting Africa in such a global perspective that these theories erased any specificity of regional experience. They alienated one's past and ran counter to the deep layers of historical consciousness of the populations and their elites in all African countries. This explains why only after a few years university professors in Dar es Salaam, Maputo, or Conakry as well as Dakar, began to modify them, to make them more specific and in fact, although not in words, to abandon some of their more crucial tenets.

Marxism outlasted the dependency school in Africa, if only because it was a much richer theory. It led to the practice of writing social histories, to sweep away images of the "Merry old Africa," to question standards of living, even in the periods
of so-called glorious ages. It made history more critical. But African authors soon abandoned detailed involvement in typologies of mode of production or stages of evolution. And recent African historiography has even dropped the emphasis on class struggle, at least in the precolonial period.

The present day trends in the history of writing of Africans are well documented in the UNESCO General History of Africa to which I now turn. At its very first meeting, the OAU commissioned UNESCO to undertake this task. The planned volumes would be a basic reference for all textbooks for all countries in Africa. Work began in earnest in 1971, a dozen separate symposia on knotty questions were held, and the volumes began to be published by 1981. Today, half of the eight massive tomes are published and all but one are at the presses. To overcome language barriers, publications are in French, English, and Arabic (although Arabic has lagged). Translations in Portuguese, Spanish, and even Chinese have appeared. One goal is to make certain that there is communication between all Africans, whatever European language they may use. Furthermore, abbreviated versions are being prepared in Swahili and Hausa and more African languages may follow. This grandiose idea represents in part a wholly new venture in historiography, if only because the editors are a group of over thirty scholars. African conceptions of the importance of history and how to tackle its writing have by now influenced the creation of many more UNESCO histories.

The overall framework for the UNESCO volumes and the tables of contents for all volumes, except the last one (1935-1985) were laid down in 1971, including the ideologically important choices for periodization. Once this framework had been erected it was never again questioned. An average of thirty chapters and thirty or more authors per volume was foreseen. Most of these authors are African. The framework is clearly pan-African in outlook and emphasizes Africa's place in the world, not as a dependent long-suffering partner, but as a dynamic, equal partner. African initiatives and inputs by Africans elsewhere in the world are stressed, not just African reactions to the rush of outside events.

The plan devoted five volumes to Africa's precolonial history, one to the nineteenth century, and two to the colonial and post-colonial periods to 1985. As in
Ki-Zerbo's book, the first volume contains a long discussion of epistemology and methodology—in fact some 400 pages or half that volume.

With the passage of time and the recruitment of authors, the growth of new interests and the emergence of new perspectives among African and other historians is recorded in these volumes, and in the case of Volume VII is still being recorded. Gradually more and more African authors became available and the divergences between their points of view increased. Indeed some critics of the published volumes have complained about this diversity or the lack of the kind of unified stance that characterizes the *Cambridge History of Africa*, where a handful of scholars linked to the London School of Oriental and African Studies wrote most of the volumes. That work definitely reflects a single point of view in which "trade and state" are the major precolonial focus while the colonial period is seen as the birth of a new era in which the modern states of Africa gradually emerge and the continent is welded to a unified world. Other critics praised the variety of points of view in the UNESCO series, because it gives one a good feeling for the importance of interpretation in the historian's craft. Whatever the merits or demerits of the situation, this feature was foreseen from the outset and felt to be a necessary consequence of any large scale international collaboration. As long as the interpretation was well supported by evidence, chapters were accepted.

And so we find in these volumes African authors of the "trade and state" school, a few straightforward old fashioned "kings and battles" types, some "dependence theory," and more Marxist views especially in later volumes dealing with the recent past, but also adherents of the globalizing *Annales* school (in which global refers to the impact of all factors on a regional history) and even products of typical localized historiographies such as Ethiopian studies, for instance. Every tendency in African history worldwide is to be found here, just as a huge supermarket offers all the brands. At first glance there is no difference between African authors and others.

And yet cleavages have been significant enough to arouse the protests of Professor R. Oliver, one of the two editors of the *Cambridge History of Africa*. With respect to the colonial period, Oliver first ascertains that European historians...
have focused on the economic, political, and diplomatic aspects of the scramble and interpret them as intra-European rivalry. African historians, and this includes specifically the UNESCO history, have privileged the consequences of the partition, the military conquests, and African resistance. This he says derives from the use by both sides of different sets of data. He then, however, blames the African historians for distortion of data. European historians tend to present the colonial period as consisting of a brief time of conquest followed by a very long peaceful spell, punctuated now and then by rebellions against the recognized new legitimate authority, whilst African historians exaggerate the military dimension and present all tiny manifestations of resistance as if they were part and parcel of a single vast movement of rejection lasting until the First World War.

African historians do not recognize, Oliver complains, that the colonial powers were as instrumental in the birth of modern Africa as Rome was in the birth of western European cultures. And they certainly do not. J. Ajayi, one of the editors of the UNESCO volumes and director of the volume dealing with the nineteenth century, once declared that the colonial period was but a brief interlude in African history; Ki-Zerbo entitled his chapter dealing with the period after 1940 as "History Begins Again" in contrast with the first chapter about the colonial period, "Africa Torn from the Africans," also suggesting the idea of an interlude. The modern states are the direct descendents of colonial territories, but only in the most superficial sense. What matters now seems mostly from longer continuities.

Oliver also did not stress another major discrepancy concerning the place of the continent in the precolonial world. African authors stress the internal dynamics of the continent, the continued independence of decision-making right to the eve of the partition, while others tend to stress the impact from the outside. Thus even in the matter of the slave trade, African authors underline that Africans were masters in their own house and could not be forced to sell slaves, while others stress the demand factors in the European economic area more. Few African authors think that colonialism was inevitable while most European historians believe just that. Thus it is symptomatic that the UNESCO history has no "Age of the Slave Trade" and "Age of European Expansion" as this implies that the main initiative lay outside. This strongly contrasts with the usual headings in western textbooks, such as, for
instance, J. D. Fage's A History of Africa of 1978. Quite recently B. Ogot even argued that the emphasis given to the slave trade in African history was misplaced. Episodes of slave trade and enslavement had occurred in most parts of the world and yet their histories never stress them. Which history of a Slavic country for instance speaks about an age of the slave trade? Of course such a statement is extreme and many West African historians might not agree, nor would those who blame what they see as a break in internal development due to the losses caused by the slave trade. Nevertheless, the point comes across.

There are real differences of outlook between the bulk of African historians on the one hand and the bulk of western historians on the other. Naturally some westerners fall in the first group and some Africans in the second. Thus Tshimanga wa Tshibangu's Histoire du Zaire of 1976 is a throwback to colonial handbooks of the 1950s, complete with icons of explorers, portraits of Belgian leaders, etc. Real differences exist between the bulk of one group and the other. Are they more important than differences among African historians, for example, on the basis of ideology or affiliation to a general Francophone or Anglophone tradition? Perhaps not, and perhaps until the web of all historians working on Africa remains unbroken.

But deeper cleavages may well appear soon. A new generation of African historians is asking new questions and feels uncomfortable with the existing trends. Basically there are two points of unease. One is the clash between the intuitive consciousness of the past common to most populations in Africa, especially the rural, but even the urban population on the one hand and academic history on the other. The second is the total lack of resonance in the political discourses of what goes on in the academic historical discourse, something highly unusual in the world. Most often the ruling elites read history books. Some of the younger scholars ask, "What history for which Africa?" to echo the subtitle of a recent book on African Historiographies.

African historians have found little sympathy with the broad public in part simply because they write in languages that are not accessible to most. But popular perceptions, often still couched in oral traditions, do influence students. Today's
students are much less divorced from the general urban and rural population than in the days of university studies abroad and boarding schools at home. Popular consciousness thinks in terms of precolonial ethnic groups, in terms of heroes and villains and personalizes historical processes, crystallizing them in meaningful anecdotes. What history students have retained from this is a propensity to study the history of their people, their ethnic group. However much all departments are trying to eradicate this, they fail to do so, and the history of one's own group is still a favorite subject under the colors of "the regional settlement of area X or Y" rather than the older "the history of the so and so." There is absolutely no reason to believe that this trend will die cut and a fortiori that a tradition of writing national history within each country will wither. To the contrary, one sees a continual strengthening of national histories as all students in a department work on this or that B.A. and later M.A. project, naturally from local resources, and on topics of regional, local, or at the most, national relevance. This trend is there to stay. It is one which hardly engages any foreign historian at all and will attract even fewer of them in the future, as long research stays become rarer.

The trend is, of course, natural. With each passing year national consciousness in relation to neighboring countries increases in Africa and this trend deepens. Although efforts such as the UNESCO history exist to keep pan-African ideas alive, still one foresees that Sengalese students will soon not be really as knowledgeable about Zambia as they are about Gambia and will continue to mentally view Africa as West Africa with a sort of Bantu island next to Madagascar! In line with this trend one witnesses a great interest in Iron Age archaeology all over the continent, which contrasts with the lack of interest of most western historians for this type of information. The observer is reminded of the formative years of national history in nineteenth century Germany or Yugoslavia with their emphasis on oral, literary, and archaeological heritage. This also means a continued emphasis on the precolonial past, along with colonial history. Indeed, many history departments in Africa undergo stress between the two chronological tendencies, concomitant prerequisites of skills and differences of outlook. Elsewhere in the world most emphasis is laid on Africa's recent past. After all, this is more accessible in terms of sources (archives) to both graduate students and faculty, requires less specialized training, and fits
more easily in global frameworks. I foresee the day that, with the exception of archaeologists, almost all specialists in precolonial African history will be Africans.

Finally it is evident that the hiatus between historical production and general awareness of history cannot continue. Kagame was an early bird indeed. More and more historians are bound to write in languages widely accessible to the general public and less geared to a reference group of international academics. The interest shown recently by Zairian historians in these questions will develop. Programmatic statements may well be followed by new initiatives.

In the last decade a whole host of new foci have arisen in the historiography of the West. Topics such as the history of the climate, calamities, health, demography, women, agriculture, the family, fascinate many now. Such questions of environment, minorities, gender, and changing family structures are widely debated national issues in these countries. But in most African countries they attract but limited attention, even in some countries recently devastated by drought. Even the overwhelming interest in southern African history in western historiography and link~r there to concerns about racism and fascism finds only an attenuated echo in Africa, apart from the Frontline States. Southern Africa is of interest, but it is often impossible for African scholars far removed from the area to contribute much original research; the problem is often felt to be remote, more academic than other immediate concerns within the framework of national history. This points to a very general but banal point. Historians, like anyone else, are deeply influenced by issues current in their own societies.

As the greater mass of research about Africa's past is now being carried out in Africa, the time that western academic consensus was the obligatory "reference group" for all scholars is on the way out. Normally African scholarship should become the "reference group." This may not happen for lack of publication outlets and as the result of the "book famine" in Africa. Rather, one foresees a lessening of communication between the communities of scholars and hence the emergence of multiple reference groups within Africa more and more divorced from Western reference groups. This is bound to lead to increasing differences of outlook.
Provided that all communication is not lost between the different groups of scholars engaged in the study of Africa's past, the forecast is not gloomy. Indeed it is precisely in such circumstances that the old certainty gives way to the new uncertainties to lead in time to epistemological transformation. Contention is painful for the participants, but it is fruitful in a quest for deeper meaning and greater wisdom.
Notes


3. Neale 104.


11. (London: Penguin, 1962). This has been reprinted with minor changes until well into the 1970s.

12. Illustration is stressed much more in French textbooks for secondary schools than in English textbooks, and that is also true when contrasting such textbooks in Francophone countries of Africa with those used in Anglophone countries.


20. (Bukavu: Ceruki, 1976). Typical for the earlier pattern of colonial history are: the short shrift given to precolonial developments and the stress on early states, the long developments on the diplomatic origins of the state and the campaign against the slave trade, and the presentation of the colonial period as a peaceful, uneventful period of state building.


COMMENTARY
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As the first commentator of this conference, perhaps I should preface my remarks with a brief clarification of the nature of the charge given by Major Shaw to the commentators. Unlike the usual modus operandi whereby the commentator's task is to edify, framework, challenge or take-to-task the scholarship and context of the presentation, ours has been, in Major Shaw's words, "to address the pedagogical dimensions of the issues raised in the paper." That is, how can the content be used in the classroom, or even should it be? We are also to act as provocateurs and facilitators of discussion along those lines, so our comments will in some measure be offered as food for thought and discussion rather than pontification!

Despite my charge, let me preface my remarks by applauding Mr. Vansina's considerable tour de force in explaining the historiographic dimensions of African history. Even if never used in the classroom, it would seem to me that any teacher teaching about African history should have a firm grasp of the way African history has been written, both by Africans and by others. Without it, teachers are vulnerable to presenting material with a certain viewpoint without even knowing it. Woe be it for this poor teacher, at least in the public schools, but even at the college level (where students can be argumentative and sometimes sensitive to a viewpoint especially if it isn't theirs), to defend himself against outcry from opposing ethnic and ideological directions if he is unaware of the general direction he himself has presented. And, in fact, in public schools we are expected to routinely parade a variety of viewpoints in order to insure social, ethnic, and ideological equanimity. Hence, the need to be familiar with the African historiographic predispositions.

In addition, it seems to me that teachers must acknowledge to their students (sometimes softly) that history is not truth, and that while we might espouse the wisdom of study and experience, we are only seekers, not proselytizers. Historiography is a literate and organized way to go about this. And, it is an excellent background for the intelligent choice of textbooks and ancillary materials.
The first pedagogical issue raised by Mr. Vansina's historiographic essay is that of content. Is this content important for the classroom—important enough, that is, to spend one, or several days discussing it—or even rewriting our curriculum to fit the African view? My answer to the former would be definitely in the affirmative. I submit that there is no such thing as history without orientation; if there is, it is an array of facts without meaning. Certain courses are more prey to mythology than others. The Soviet Union, for instance, I have assumed cannot be taught without attention to the Soviet viewpoint which has filtered either pro or con into our writing about the subject. Thus, it seems to me that it is extremely important to understand how the Africans see their own history, if only to understand how we see it and present it.

Besides that, I think students are fairly illiterate about historiography in general. While they know of archeology and primary documents, both much in vogue these days, they have paid scant attention to the part which narrative and organization play in history. The historian does not simply describe what the archeologist has found nor repeat what the document says. The organization and methodology are important to the outcome. As William McNeill points out, the verbal capacity of man takes on a life of truth of its own, so that the narrative framework must be noted to students.

In terms of rewriting curriculum I would note Mr. Vansina's conclusions that there is more variety within African scholarship than between African and western scholarship. Thus, it seems more effective and pertinent to illustrate diversity where appropriate than to simply rewrite curriculum on the African mode.

After listening to Mr. Vansina, I am convinced that Africa falls within the category of a "must" course for inclusion of historiographic study for the following reasons:

1. The importance of being historically literate about Africa as well as being knowledgeable—that is, African histories and their historians are as important a cultural aspect of Africa as are its art, foods, and religion. When one studies about Greece, who does not hear of Herodotus and Thucydides?
2. Students should be as aware as the teachers of the historian's craft of the historian's sources, his objectives, his style, his viewpoint. In this regard, pointing out the differences between African historiographies and other historiographies, as well as divergences within the African historiographic community, is revealing. B. Ogot's challenge to the western definition of civilization, and the charge of misplaced emphasis on the slave trade in the UNESCO volumes, are pivotal in the first instance. A comparison of the Dike and Diop schools would illustrate the latter.

3. Africa's lack of indigenous written sources and the consequent impact of European historiography makes it even more pertinent to address the question of historiographic viewpoint. Since the very framework of history is western in nature, is Africa's history being fit into a bottle of the wrong shape? Perhaps the consequence here is the chasm between academic history and local history which Mr. Vansina has pointed out. Noting this in the classroom will certainly touch the hearts of many high school students who also see history living in the mind of the teacher, but not their own.

Of more importance to the future is the retroactive writing of African history by African historians. Will precolonial history be so fabricated to fit the contemporary scene that it will become mythological? Students need to be aware of this problematic process.

4. In presenting the chronological historiography of Africa, one learns much through the back door of its history. For instance, the African historiographic cycle illustrates the original impact of colonialism and hence language captivity on the Ibadan and Dakar schools. Communism and modernization are reflected in the Marxist and dependency schools. As Africa reaches to find its individual identities, the national schools have emerged with their concomitant disinterest in social and ecological questions, an ! pan-African history.

As to the question of how to use this material in the classroom, there are probably as many options as teachers. I offer only a few as food for thought:
1. As an introduction to a course in African history, much as it has been used as a prelude in this conference. In this regard, the point would be to framework the ensuing curriculum with the idea of viewpoint, to introduce students to historiography and historiographic methodology, to inculcate historiographic literacy in the course, and to give an introductory framework for the subject matter. However, in using this method, I have found it advantageous to go back and pick up the threads of this presentation as I move through the course.

2. As a document study whereby historians from different schools of thought (e.g., Ibadan and Dakar), different periods (e.g., Ki-Zerbo and UNESCO), or from different world areas (e.g., Tymowski-Soviet and/or Brazilian and English), are contrasted. In this regard, it might also be interesting to contrast a local African oral history with those of academic historians.

3. As part of a study of African culture and thought using the historiographies as cultural artifacts.

4. As the very nexus of a course in African history—that is, history through comparative historiography. In this regard it might be interesting to use the UNESCO volumes as a basis and then to organize it somewhat along these lines:

I. Precolonial

A. UNESCO--Impact from outside--demand factors.

B. Ogot--dynamic and independent history--slave trade minimal.

II. Colonial

A. UNESCO--consequences of partition; rebellions.

B. Oliver's *Cambridge History of Africa*--partition as European, life peaceful.
II. Postcolonial

A. Oliver--African transformed.

B. Contrast with other countries.

IV. Contemporary

A. Contrast among African historians.

B. Contrast with other countries.

In a world history course the historiographic material might be worked in as follows:

1. As a link from the study of the colonial and imperial ages and African history. In this case, the historiography of a western historian could provide the channel into modern Africa from the African viewpoint.

2. To develop the idea of cross-cultural transfer in the modern world, particularly the idea of modern historical frameworking based on western styles rather than on chronicles, epics, or stories.

3. As part of an anthropological study engaged in a discussion of the role language development, centralization, and literacy have on historiographic viewpoint. Or it might be used as a study in comparative geography whereby the cross-cultural movements in the steppe are contrasted with the isolation of the continent.

4. In thematic studies such as a study of nationalism, historical viewpoint of the colonial period, modernization, etc.

Whatever the tack taken, it is probably important to recognize that the objective in any study of historiography remains to illustrate how method
determines outcome; how history is myth, and fact not truth; how historiography itself reflects a country's history; and most important, as Mr. Vansina has said, to understand how the Africans perceive themselves.

In reading Mr. Vansina's paper, I could not help but reflect on the implications contemporary African historiography has for the kind of world history we are trying to generate and teach. This, in fact, might be the most important issue raised by Mr. Vansina's paper. How can African historiography fit into a world history course rather than into a course on Africa or Africa as a chapter in a world history course? Where does it fit? Is the periodization into precolonial, nineteenth century, and post-colonial eras espoused in the UNESCO volumes appropriate for a study of Africa in world history? Should Africa be addressed as a separate culture as we address Mughul India or the Islamic world? Should African history be considered part of world history or separate as the Africans today wish to see it? If woven in with other histories at the appropriate chronological times (e.g., African kingdoms with the Islamic world, and African nationalism with the European colonial world), the danger lies in seeing them as an appendage to western history. If they are not somehow woven in, they are in danger of appearing as a separate and particularized history. What about themes? Would it be better to weave in the African story as we study trade flows, disease, imperialism, nationalism, and so on?

On the one hand, present African historiography tends to reject the very notion of pan-African history. There is, moreover, an aversion to simply being drawn into the story as it is pertinent to the themes of the western world. On the other hand, no world historian wishes to depict Africa as the hub around which all other world history revolves, nor does he or she thrill to the idea of particularized African history.

After pondering Mr. Vansina's paper, I am inclined to the following meek conclusions:

1. The African propensity to ignore North African history somewhat legitimizes the western approach of placing that history within the context of European and Islamic study.
2. For good or ill, the contours of modern African historiography are shaped by western tradition, though the content and viewpoint now emerging are more individualistic. For this reason, African perceptions of themselves as reflected in the historiography can be closely connected with the colonial and imperial age, and in fact can only be understood in that context. Linkage here seems unavoidable whether from a path of colonialism into African history or vice versa. When truly original history does emerge in the future, other venues of understanding and organization will certainly present themselves.

3. I am inclined to want to weave the story of precolonial North Africa into the story of Classical and Christian civilizations, the sub-Saharan kingdoms into the study of Islamic Africa, colonial Africa into the story of colonial and imperial Europe, all of which has been done in most writing and texts to date—hopefully attentive to the indigenous factors which those civilizations brought to the world scene, and without the tendency always to lead into Africa from Europe. In this regard, I submit that most texts today omit one important thematic story pertinent to Africa and that is the great Bantu migrations of the early Christian era. Linkage to the nomadic movements of the same (approximate) time in Europe could be advantageous in turning the venue to Africa. I am certain that other avenues into and out of African history will be presented to us by later speakers.

The propensity for African history to move in a nationalist direction has some disturbing implications for world history and its teaching. It may perpetuate the tendency of teachers to teach African history from the national, regional, and European viewpoint (since African dismissal of pan-Africanism as European may filter into our course). It may perpetuate our view of an exclusive and inaccessible "Dark Continent."

On the other hand, its very attention to particularity and the apparent future monopoly of precolonial African history in African hands may, in the long run, enrich our general body of knowledge about Africa and give us another approach to integrating Africa into world history. In other words, particularization may be the foundation for better generalized formulations. And when African historians do get back to the international viewpoint, they may have something to say which is truly
their own. Let us hope so. In the meantime, it behooves teachers to point out that national history is certainly a quantum leap from local history; it is methodologically a monument reflecting the living changes in Africa today, and it is the basis for a dialogue among historians on a world scale.

As far as the World History Association is concerned, Mr. Vansina's remarks, which at first seemed dampening to integrative efforts, sparked several thoughts and suggest avenues of opportunity for us. For instance, the Association might:


2. Encourage precolonial research and archeological study by American historians, too.

3. Promote the integration of African perceptions and historiographic writing more clearly into our textbooks.

In conclusion, I submit that here is ample justification and necessity for including African historiography in a world history course, and that there are many ways to do this effectively. The purpose of this inclusion would be to give students an understanding of historiographic methodology and literacy, to illustrate how organization and narrative has ideological predisposition, and most of all to add depth and richness to a student's understanding of Africa by seeing its history through African eyes—and in the process, opening his eyes to his own. I further conclude that the problem of presentation of African history is not solved by present and future historiography, but that a trip through African historiographic literature is enriching and essential to meaningful African study, both within an African and a world context. Without it, the snatches of, and routes into and out of African history presently found in world history, seem a bit bizzare. Finally, I would like to thank Mr. Vansina for what I consider primary in good history teaching—and that is the enlightenment of the teacher.
AFRICAN HISTORY: NEW PERSPECTIVES
FOR THE NON-AFRICANIST HISTORIAN

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A glance at the map shows that Africa and South America share physical characteristics which determined settlement patterns, nutritional habits, social mores, and affected the rhythm of human life. Common to both continents are tropical rain forests, seasonal rains, savanna, tropical scrub, thorn forest, moderate to very high desertification, short and mid-grass prairies, and rich resources whose exploitation depends in part on mankind's ingenuity and technical experience in locating and extracting them and in part on human orders of priority. Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions have impinged on human settlements in both areas, and harsh terrain has made communications difficult. Whereas rivers provide access to the interior of Africa, with the exception of the Orinoco, Amazon, Magdalena, and the river systems emptying into the Rio de la Plata, South America can not count on fluvial transportation. With the exception of the highland regions of the Andes, Africa and South America have the same range of climatic variations. Vegetation, distribution of mammals, and eventually human settlement in the two continents were to be effected by two events in prehistoric eras. The first was the movement of tectonic plates which affected land routes around the world; in the Americas, the creation of the Central American Isthmus opened South America to placental mammals from the north; in Africa, the Sahara desert closed much of Africa to Eurasian species. Two other developments—melting of the ice bridge across the Bering Strait and dessication of the Sahara—led to both continents being isolated from developments in continental Asia on the one hand and, on the other, from the then "known" world. Thus did the Americas and sub-Saharan Africa come to be removed from inter-connecting zones of East Asia and the Mediterranean. This isolation was not absolute. Chariotry, navigational breakthroughs, and, later, camels, were to link sub-Saharan Africa to the rest of the world, but only with the coming of the Europeans was there to be similarly sustained linkage between South America and other continents.
Prior to the arrival of Europeans, both continents shared other points in common: empires, urban nuclei, technology, sophisticated art forms, well defined social organization, and religions which played a major role in everyday life. There were tribute systems, modes of exchange, commercial networks, and definable allocation and distribution of labor. But both Africa and South America were characterized by diversity which, in terms of human organization, ran the gamut from closely controlled social units to large numbers of peoples who were essentially stateless and beyond the authority of any central administrative entity. It was this very diversity which proved so disconcerting to Europeans of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as they came into contact with civilizations as refined and, in some instances more refined, than their own.

Renaissance man proved more capable of comprehending and "coming to grips" with scientific, geographical, and natural phenomena revealed by the so-called "age of discoveries," than in finding his cultural and psychological bearings when confronted with hitherto unknown peoples, with value and belief systems, mores, religions, and cosmogonous systems different from the European model. Europeans reacted in one of three predictable ways. The first was to incorporate the new sensation into a framework of the known or experienced. Thus did Vasco da Gama in Calicut fall on his knees before a statue in a Hindu temple on the assumption that it must be the Virgin Mary. Likewise, Spanish annotators of the Codex Mendoza chose the word mezquita to designate an Aztec temple. The second reaction was rejection of the unknown as pagan, barbarous, and uncivilized. The third alternative was that demonstrated by Antonio Pigafetta, chronicler and confidant of Magellan, who was entranced and intrigued by the Tupi-Guarani and the Patagonians whom he questioned about their religion and mores. Pigafetta described these cultural and social characteristics with a rare degree of objectivity, and without being blind to what would have been perceived as shortcomings or aberrant behavior from a European perspective.

The perspective which I bring is not that of a specialist on Africa, but rather of an historian whose interests lie in South America, comparative colonialism in the Americas, and the Portuguese and Spanish seaborne empires. As project director of a world history slide collection, I have confronted some of the methodological and
organizational problems faced by authors of histories of world societies, of modern worlds, of modern world systems, or of the human achievement. The selection of visual materials to illustrate the contribution of a country, of a people, or of an individual, is as fraught with potential pitfalls in the decision-making process as is the selection of documentary evidence. No matter how scrupulous the researcher may be in selecting and evaluating evidence, often the fragmentary or partial nature of the data will result in misrepresentation and imbalance. Adverse climatic conditions have destroyed artifacts of fibrous materials whose preservation would have contributed greatly to understanding of early peoples in the America and Africa. Even in the case of well documented civilizations, there may be an imbalance in the archeological record resulting from the choice of building materials and their ability to survive ravages of time and the elements. Thus the woodcarving skills of the Mayas are represented by but a few door lintels. The undoubted technical skills of indigenous peoples in what is now southern Chile and Argentina in constructing canoes capable of traversing those perilous channels, find their only record in history thanks to early Spanish accounts, or to efforts to preserve what remained of their cultures by nineteenth century European missionaries. It is ironic that historians are greatly indebted to those Spanish friars who strove so earnestly to chronicle those selfsame peoples and civilizations of Central America that their contemporaries no less earnestly sought to destroy. In the case of Africa, there is more illustrative material available on the very early history, on the kingdoms of Kush, Nubia, Axum, and Nok, and on the period of European colonization, than on the empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai, on Kanem-Bornu, and on the Hausa states. This also applies to the history of Islam in Africa prior to the jihads of the nineteenth century.

As a visitor to the Republic of Cameroon in Central Africa, the most severe cultural shock I experienced was the apparent absence of all physical evidence of a historical past more distant than the nineteenth century. Museum collections constituted the only exception to this generalization. The neophyte to African history rapidly becomes acutely aware of another no less disconcerting aspect, namely that the bulk of research and writing on the history of sub-Saharan Africa has been undertaken, not by African scholars, but by Europeans and North Americans. To some degree this intellectual imperialism is now being remedied, as
evidenced by the volumes appearing under the aegis of UNESCO, although even here it is noticeable that the majority of the African contributors received (perhaps inevitably) their training as historians outside of Africa. It is most encouraging to note that most (if not all) of the authors writing for "The Growth of African Civilization Series" (Longman) are not only African-born but are currently teaching at universities and colleges in Africa. Chapters or sections on African history are by now essential and well integrated components in textbooks of world history, which makes all the more remarkable the appearance from the pen of Daniel Boorstin of The Discoverers, whose subtitle is "a history of man's search to know his world and himself." That "man" here is restricted to Caucasians and gender specific, is evident from the "personal note to the reader" where the author announces his object as being to celebrate the heroic deeds of (inter alia) Columbus, Cook, Copernicus, Paracelsus, Newton, Darwin, Pasteur, and Einstein. In short, this is the world view from the "literate West," and Africa merits a mere two subheadings in the index. Published in 1983, it was heralded by critics as a "new and fascinating approach to history" (Barbara Tuchman), "A sumptuous, totally engaging panorama...chronicle of human ingenuity" (David McCullough) and a "narrative of the grand intellectual venture of humankind" (Wall Street Journal). That The Discoverers should have become a national best seller, despite what has surely become an anachronistic intellectual and Eurocentric stance vis-à-vis the past and the world, carries the sobering lesson that the legacy of colonialism is not extinct among writers or readers of history.

Recently Philip Curtin commented that "Historians seem to be trying to answer one or more of three broad questions: How did people come to be as they are? How did the world come to be as it is? And how do human societies change through time?" This reiterated the comment made over 20 years ago by the then Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, Hugh Trevor-Roper: "We study it (history)...in order to discover how we have come to where we are," and he observed that the quintessential characteristic of history is "purposive movement." For the historian seeking to discover these antecedents in the past which can cast light on the present, Africa is rich in examples. Olduvai, Koobi Fora, and Hadar have forced rethinking as to the origins of humankind. The presence of major iron smelting centers in the sixth century, and even earlier, at Meroe, and in northern
Nigeria, has led to a reassessment of the African contribution to the early history of technology. We now know that Africa was part of a trade network to the Mediterranean and Europe, to Egypt via the ports of the Red Sea, to India via the Persian Gulf, and that Asian and Polynesian traders brought bananas, coco-yams, and plantains to East Africa. Within Africa, trade routes existed from the Nile to the Niger and across the Sahara. And all of this before the establishment of the first major empire in Africa, that of Ghana, in the ninth century. No history of Islam, that religion which embraced so much of the known world from the Maghreb to Xi'an, would be complete without reference to the Islamic center at Timbuktu, and scholarly and ambassadorial exchanges between sub-Saharan Africa and Morocco, Tunis, or Cairo. An understanding of Islamic jihads and their leaders—Usman dan Fodio (1754-1817), 'Umar ibn Sa'id Tal (1794-1864), and Seku Ahmadu (1775-1844)—is integral to the study of fundamentalist religious movements. Much of the history of Europe was written in the framework of Africa, ranging from early Portuguese, French, and Dutch trading settlements to the later English, French, Danish, and Brandenburg trading companies. Phrases such as "the scramble for Africa," "the white man's burden," and "civilizing mission," were to become as much a part of the European idiom as was the human, ecological, mineral, and agricultural exploitation of African resources by Europeans. It should not be forgotten that Africans fought and died in two World Wars, victims of rivalries between European powers. Ambitions and aspirations of leaders of European nations found their outlet in Africa. If Europeans exploited Africa, as had also occurred in the Americas with the indigenous peoples centuries earlier, such exploitation was not an exclusively one-way process. Much in the same way as native Americans took advantage of rivalries between the Dutch, Portuguese, French, and Spanish to further their own ends, so too in Africa did indigenous peoples have their own agendas and saw in the Europeans unwilling tools to accomplish tribal goals. Indeed, so central was the African component to geopolitical policymaking of European powers, in the nineteenth century especially, that it would be difficult to name any of the more powerful nations of Europe which did not have an economic, military, political, or religious stake in Africa. Barbary pirates' excesses were to outrage American captains, and from 1801-5 and again in 1815 the fledgling nation of the United States intervened against Tripoli. Perhaps the most remarkable feat was the establishment by Americans of a new nation in
Africa. With a capital modeled on Washington, D. C., Liberia—together with Ethiopia—was the only nation in Africa to successfully resist subjection to colonial status by European powers and retain its independence.

From the Latin American perspective, only the obdurate would deny the African contribution to world history. The Jesuit Antonio Vieira, who championed human rights and preached against the exploitation of blacks and Amerindians in seventeenth century Brazil, wrote: "Brazil has its body in America and its soul in Africa." Indeed, Angola and Brazil were often regarded as a single unit for administrative purposes in Portugal's south Atlantic empire. From Brazil to Africa went tobacco, gold, manioc, and corn. From the sixteenth century onwards, rare was the commercial house which did not count agents in Brazil and Dahomey or Angola. It has been suggested that Palmares, a conglomerate of villages of runaway slaves which resisted destruction for most of the seventeenth century, was born of a political system derived from a mélangé of Central African models and was an African state in the Americas. Islam was the force which united those African-born Hausa and Yoruba slaves whose repeated uprisings in Bahia in the first third of the nineteenth century were culminate in the Revolt of the Males in 1835. Forgotten because of the fascination exerted over historians by the slave trade and abolition, is the migration from Brazil to Africa of freedmen of color and the establishment in Africa of Brazilian communities, of which that at Lagos has been the best studied. The legacy is readily apparent from the photographs of Pierre Verger illustrating the virtual interchangeability of architecture, dress, cuisine, personal adornment, religious practices, and social mores between Bahia and cities on the Bight of Benin. In 1843, Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcellos announced in the Brazilian Senate: "Africa civilizes Brazil." While undeniably true, to limit this influence to Brazil would be to deny the far-reaching nature of African participation in a global trade network, or its contribution to Latin America over four centuries. West African ports and islands of the African Atlantic were tied into trading patterns not only with Brazilian ports, but with islands of the Caribbean, Spanish ports of the circum-Caribbean region, and ports of North America. Ports of East and West Africa were locked into interconnecting commercial networks which ranged not only to Europe and the Americas, but also to ports on the Malabar coast, Malacca, Macao, Nagasaki, and the Philippines. With the exceptions of Argentina, Uruguay, Chile,
and Bolivia, the African contribution is an essential part of the histories of the republics of Latin America. The African legacy is readily apparent in religion, music, dance, vocabulary, culinary skills, dress, and physical appearance of populations, in these nations today.

The case can be accepted as proven that a study of the history of Africa meets at least one of the criteria advanced by Professors Curtin and Trevor-Roper, namely: "How did the world come to be as it is?" Indigenous peoples of Africa and the Americas experienced a process of colonization by European powers which was characterized in both continents by its intensity and its duration. To Europe of the nineteenth century, no less than to Europeans of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the globe was populated by peoples who were "barbaric," "pagan," "heathen," and "backward," and whom it was the Europeans' duty to "civilize." The language differed, as did the instruments used to accomplish this "mission," but there was remarkable similarity in attitudes towards the known and unknown world exhibited by Portuguese and Spanish during the so-called "age of discovery" and by the new imperialists of the nineteenth century when Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal--driven by the potent mixture of nationalism, avarice, and conviction of their own moral superiority--engaged in the grab for lands in Africa. Phraseology and terminology of the time reflected these aspirations: "protectorates"; "informal rule"; "spheres of influence"; "real" occupation; the "opening" of China. That this was accomplished with brutality and insensitivity is undeniable, but it is time to challenge the black legend that the tools used to accomplish their goals were exclusive to the Europeans. The histories of Africa and Latin America illustrate vividly that nationalism, ethnic chauvinism, forced labour, forced migration, doctrines of race or national superiority, sentiments of what later came to be referred to as manifest destiny, clear divisions between "haves" and "have nots," exploitation of a rural peasantry by a ruling minority, heavy tribute or taxation, inequitable allocation of land and of access to and distribution of resources, despotic rule, torture, cruelty, bloodshed, impermeable divisions of class and caste, and discrimination based on origin, national or tribal allegiance, religious beliefs, and sex, were present in Africa and the Americas long before the arrival of the Europeans.
Furthermore, the non-Latin Americanist or non-Africanist may have the impression that it was only with the arrival of Europeans that the Americas and Africa were subjected to an imperialist phase characterized by competition for land, for resources, and by the urge to dominate. A leafing through the Codex Mendoza for the Aztecs or descriptions of Inca imperialism will belie this erroneous impression for the Americas. In Africa, the years 1000-1500 A.D. witnessed major empire building throughout the continent, but most spectacularly in the Sudanic region of West Africa where the empires of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai, came into being. Even before 1000 A.D. the kingdoms of Ghana and Kanem were powerful. In the case of Mali and Songhai, under the inspired leadership of Mansa Musa (1312-37) and of Mouhammed Touré (1493-1528), respectively, these empires saw the promotion of Islam, scholarly and commercial contacts with Morocco, Egypt, and Spain, as well as with sub-Saharan Africa, international trade, and the creation of efficient and extensive bureaucracies. The Songhai empire (1493-1591), extending from the Atlas Mountains to southern Cameroon, rivaled the Aztec and Inca empires in terms of geographical extent, diversity of population, and natural resources. Vigorous commercial competition characterized the Hausa kingdoms, the smaller kingdoms of the Akan, and the Swahili city states. If Ghana and Mwenemutapa were alluring to Europeans greedy for gold and trade, it was the Coptic Christianity of Ethiopia which intrigued dignitaries of the Catholic Church in Rome and secular and religious leaders in Lisbon. To the student of empires and of nation building, the history of sub-Saharan Africa is fertile territory and offers the potential for comparative history.

Perhaps attributable to the perception of Africa as a playground for European imperialism, is the common misperception of viewing Africa as a homogeneous entity. Here Philip Curtin's question: "How did people come to be as they are?" is both poignant and relevant. In the modern world, it is unlikely that any nation or people can remain immune for long to extraneous influences. No longer are we surprised by a McDonald's on the Champs Elysées or in the Ginza, and with some reason the leaders of modern China fear that the younger generation will be Coca-Colaized or Calvin Kleined. Whereas such influences might previously have been limited to those exerted by contiguous peoples or nations, with the advent of international maritime trade in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the coastal
peoples of Africa were exposed to influences from Europe, Asia, and the Americas. In the case of Africa & Asia, already there had been prior contacts through religion, trade, and diplomacy. Such contacts had been built up slowly, matured, and evolved over centuries. But incursions by Europeans into the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and beyond imposed a new schedule on the amount of time which could elapse between initial contact and the exertion of powers. These two phases became telescoped almost to the point of being concurrent. The arrival of the caravels signaled a new age of intense pressure exerted by Europeans with a hitherto unknown sense of immediacy. The introduction of firearms by the Portuguese was to have as disruptive an effect on the internal politics of West Africa as in Japan torn by civil strife where arquebuses were dubbed tanegashima after their original place of manufacture. Africa has suffered from the double jeopardy of first, being perceived to lie below Europe, victim of a geographical projection as well as of European imperialism, and second, being an amorphous entity as regards the human population and its history. Although the early Portuguese, no less than the imperialists of the nineteenth century, were aware of tribal differences, the distinctions they drew were not between peoples but rather of a topographical or geographical nature: deserts, forests, savannas, and highlands. Somehow the people of Africa had become lost and were only infused with life in the context of European hegemony or as picturesque additions to the landscape.

Here it is that the most cursory reading of the history of Africa, or of the many Africas which would be nearer the mark, reveals that whereas in some instances Africa may have surrendered, or be surrendering, its position of isolation vis-à-vis other parts of the continent or the wider world, loss of isolation should not be taken here as synonymous with loss of autonomy, distinctiveness, individualism, or self-identity. This is an important lesson learned from the history of Cameroon; namely, that within an area of 183,568 square miles there is an extraordinary diversity of peoples (some 200), languages, social mores, religious practices, familial arrangements, economies, institutions, and persons of authority. The experience of a small kingdom such as Bafut reveals how groups, peoples, clans, and communities can preserve their cultural identity, political integrity, be true to their historical tradition, and preserve their uniqueness while being fully participating members at the national level. So too can African nations maintain their autonomy while being
partners in a world system of interrelated and interconnecting zones without forfeiting their individuality. To the historian of Africa this is an important lesson. It is as much in the individuality of the many Africas, as in the collective past of the continent, that the key to understanding this vast continent lies. It would be as erroneous to refer to Africa as a single entity as to refer to the 20 republics of Latin America as speaking with a common voice, or to delude oneself that any one of the republics of Africa or Latin America is more than a collection of its individual parts, or that despite superficial similarities each part is made up of components whose composition and configuration are distinctive and imbued with a historical tradition which would distinguish it from look-alikes elsewhere.

Western historians are not entirely guiltless of having contributed to the stereotypical notions of Latin America or Africa. Boorstin's The Discoverers\textsuperscript{4} is the most recent manifestation of an Eurocentric vision of the world apparent from such titles as "The Expansion of Europe," "A History of the Expansion of Christianity," "The Exploration of the Pacific," "The Spanish Conquistadores," "The Explorers of North America." Western historians were inclined to view the European expansion as the effect of a civilization on the march, as in the words of Sir George Sansom: "It (the invasion of the Asian world) was the expression, the inevitable expression of a civilization on the march."\textsuperscript{5} Born of this attitude were such pejorative ethnic, geographical, or political designations as "the dark continent," "deepest Africa," "the unknown continent," "the white man's grave," "banana republics," "yellow peril." In this context the appearance of K. M. Pannikar's, Asia and Western Dominance\textsuperscript{6} was a landmark, in that it was perhaps the first attempt by an Asian scholar to see and understand European activities in Asia. Donald Keene's The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720-1830,\textsuperscript{7} Adolf Reichwein's China and Europe,\textsuperscript{8} and Benjamin Keen's The Aztec Image\textsuperscript{9} place peoples and cultures other than the European in the role of protagonists. For China, Joseph Needham not only redresses the balance in his Science and Civilization in China,\textsuperscript{10} but suggests the impact of Chinese scientific and technological invention on Europe, as instanced by his fascinating suggestion that the Mongolian style of new cartography which employed a grid scheme may have been transmitted to Europe by Arab travelers to the East or intercourse between the Arab colonies in Canton and Sicily. In the case of Latin America, a body of literature is appearing from the pens of historians and anthropologists such
as Evelyn HuDeHart, Sandra Orellana, and Nancy Farriss, where emphasis is on Indian responses, ranging from outright resistance to passive acceptance, painful accommodation, or survival through the application of traditional collective strategies for survival. The classic of the genre remains Nachan Wachtel's La Vision des Vaincus, which views the Spanish "conquest" of America through Indian eyes and discusses the place the Indians found for the Spaniards within their traditional worldview. Despite such new perspectives on what is still referred to by economists, sociologists, and political scientists (but mercifully less by historians, some of whom 20 years ago might not entirely in jest have designated tropical history as "swamp history") as the Third World, stereotypes of Africa as "underdeveloped," "isolated," and "backward" have been slow to die. When Scott, Foresman and Company launched their World Civilization series, this was an assertion of the validity of world history. Those volumes on nonwestern history (6-9) were written not in terms of confrontation between East and West, but with the focus on nonwestern peoples. And yet the authors of the volume on The Non-European World, 1500-1850 felt no qualms at calling their chapter on Africa and the Americas "The Simpler Societies."

The neophyte to African history rapidly learns that those forces which contributed to the rise of civilizations in the East and the West were equally present in Africa, and that in Africa there was an authentic dynamic which preceded the European intrusion, which prevailed during the period of European imperialism and colonization, and is present in independent Africa today. Nor was the sophistication or degree of political or social achievement or of technological accomplishment any less among the peoples of Africa than those of Europe, Asia, or the Americas. But it is incumbent on the historian to recognize two important factors when approaching African history from a non-African background: first, that an evaluation of the African achievement should not be made against a chronological framework derived from Europe, Asia, or the Americas; second, that qualitative and quantitative indices developed by historians for the study of eastern or western societies may not be applicable to Africa. Such basic concepts as space, time, and the setting of priorities, may differ startlingly from those accepted in the West or East. The organization of societies, religious and cosmogonous systems, the structure of the family, domestic arrangements, allocation of labor, commercial
exchange, and hierarchy and authority, are sui generis. There can be little doubt but that there was exploitation of the peasantry by privileged classes or families in pre-colonial Africa and pre-Columbian America. Viewed from the twentieth century, it is difficult not to allow our views of forced labor to be tainted by the experience of slavery and the institution of slavery as present in the Americas. Acceptance of a "western model" (usually based on plantation slavery in the Caribbean and continental America) has led to the establishment of a set of criteria which are, for the most part, totally inapplicable to non-American societies. The conceptual framework provided by Igor Kopytoff and Suzanne Miers viewing internal African slavery as (in their words) "an institution of marginality," is of great significance. The concept of "rights-in-persons," emphasis on the relationship of the individual to the kin group, and their inquiry into varying methods of socialization into servility in Africa, compel the non-Africanist to reexamine previously held views on what constitutes exploitation. When looking at pre-Columbian and colonial America or pre-colonial and colonial Africa, it is easy for the historian to fall into the trap of resisting acknowledgement that those whom we would regard as the exploited did not so view themselves. On the contrary, in some instances such "exploitation" made perfect sense as an essential component in the coherent vision of the world as they saw it.

The historical baggage, be it methodological, interpretative, conceptual, or of content, which the non-Africanist brings to the study of Africa, will have to be repacked or discarded entirely. There is a proverb in Cameroon: "The family is the living, the dead, and the yet unborn." The thought behind this saying suggests an analogy to a culture and society far removed from that of Africa, namely Japan. The Zen-fostered tea ceremony (cha-no-yu) had, by the sixteenth century, become a fashionable craze and could count among its advocates Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and the founder of the Tokugawa shogunate, Ieyasu, who saw no contradiction between their own militarism and the monastic origins of the ceremony. The Jesuits, Luís de Almeida, João Rodrigues, and Alessandro Valignano, commented on the different scales of values between Japan and Europe as evidenced by cracked tea caddies so highly prized by the Japanese but which would have been discarded in Portugal as useless. They also noted that the cha-no-yu created an atmosphere conducive to courtesy, politeness, modesty, harmony, and meditation. In fact, it represents the
perfect melding of asceticism with aestheticism. Cuisine, botany, landscape gardening, architecture, flower arrangement, painting, calligraphy, and art combine to set the scene and tone. A scroll or flower exists in its own right, but enhances and complements the other objects, and its absence would detract from the whole. So too is it with the history of Africa. It would be as unseemly to attempt to compartmentalize the different components which make up African history as it would be barbaric in the cha-no-yu to treat a flower merely as a botanical specimen or a scroll exclusively as an exercise of the calligrapher's skill. The pathological obsession to reduce knowledge or experience to categories or pigeonholes is very much part of the western historiographical tradition. For the African, lines are not so clearly defined. Kinship, religion, sexual practices, health maintenance, medicine, magic, domestic economy, and authority are ill-defined and permeable and one or more may be part of the others. Distinctions between crafts and fine arts are meaningless, and the concepts of originality or authenticity may be irrelevant to peoples for whom the symbolic importance is greater than the material artifact. This characteristic, which I have referred to as permeability, extends to the historical record itself. The historian of western Europe is well attuned to manuscript or archeological sources. To the historian of Africa, braiding, dances, proverbs, carved wooden panels, decorated calabashes, and musical instruments may be equally important in the production of the historical record.

The non-Africanist is overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of Africa in both physical and human terms. Whether it is the realization that it is only in the last 65 million years that the African plate has become joined to the Eurasian plate—and then only by the thin sliver between what is now Suez and Port Said—or that Africa has been sealed during the period of recorded history, or the commonly held perception that Africa "starts" south of the Mediterranean, the neophyte to African history may be forgiven for believing that there is a branch of history called African history and that the priests of the cult are known as "Africanists." Perhaps this assumption derives from the belief that the history of a landmass which is circumscribed and possesses the geographical integrity of the African continent must necessarily be monolithic. Nothing could be further from the truth. The non-Africanist soon learns that there is no such entity as "African history," except in a sense so broad as to be virtually meaningless. African history transcends
continental boundaries on the one hand, while, on the other, it encompasses many histories within Africa. The study of North Africa is as much a study of the Mediterranean civilizations and peoples as it is of Africa. Without the scientific contributions of Euclid, Erasistratus, Herophilus, Eratosthenes, Ptolemy, and Heron, the achievements of Hellenistic civilization would have been less glorious, and Alexandria would not have been the intellectual capital of an empire extending from Macedonia to the Indus. The superiority of the Carthaginian civilization and prosperity of an empire extending from modern Tunisia to the Straits of Gibraltar, were to excite the jealousy of Rome. The Carthaginian expansion into Sicily, rebuilding of an empire in Spain, and the invasion of Europe by Hannibal which brought his armies to the gates of Rome, were only resolved by the Punic Wars. In short, even at this early date an African component was inseparable from the history of Europe.

The history of Africa is also the history of those countries bordering on the Indian Ocean and beyond. From the date of the early kingdoms, there had been movement of commodities and peoples between Africa and India. By 300 A.D. the presence of outrigger canoes and camels were testimony to contacts with Polynesia and Asia, respectively. An African dimension was an essential part of Ottoman expansion into the Maghrib (both eastern and western) and into Egypt. The spread of Islam to Mali and sub-Saharan Africa linked sub-Saharan Africa to a religion extending from Spain to China. More detailed research on the East African slave trade and on African migration to Asia and settlements, primarily in India, may reveal new aspects of the history of Africa beyond Africa. It is easy to forget that, from the fourth century A.D. until the eighteenth century, there was a continual flux of African slaves into China. The black slave Jamāl al-Dīn Yākūt, who became master of the stable of Queen Radiyya of Delhi in the thirteenth century, was merely the forerunner for the extensive import of African slaves into Bengal in the fifteenth century during the Ilyās Shāhī dynasty. Whereas the history of African involvement east of the Red Sea is rarely treated in undergraduate courses in African history, the African diaspora toward the west has been exhaustively studied.

If the historical boundaries of Africa are more elastic than the map would suggest, the history of Africa within Africa is equally far from uniform. The history
of humankind on the African continent is not a single history but many histories of many Africas. Topographical and geographical divisions (e.g., Northwest Africa, West-Central, Equatorial, Southern) are artificial and, for the most part, meaningless. It has been estimated that there are some 3,000 peoples in Africa. Ethnologists have striven to categorize these, one classification being by the application of the concept of culture areas attempted by Melville J. Herskovits in 1924. That the problem of classification lies in the fact that such culture areas are often too large to be meaningful did not deter George P. Murdock from reducing these to 55 clusters of tribes in linguistic and ethnohistorical grounds and then, by introducing the criterion of livelihood (e.g., hunters, pastoralists, etc.) in some cases rather than ethnic or linguistic affiliation, further reducing these to 11 main groups. In numbers of languages, Africa must be the most polyglot continent with some sixteen hundred languages (not dialects), of which the Niger-Congo (890) and the Benue-Congo (557) families are the largest. This very plethora of peoples and languages poses an extraordinary challenge for the non-Africanist, totally unprepared to deal with such diversity, and yet for whom the challenge lies in reconciling the "big picture" with the minutiæ, the general with the specific, of African history. Breathtaking are the broad sweeps in African history: Bantu expansion from what is now the Cameroon-Nigeria border through the breadth of equatorial Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean; the spread of iron metallurgy; the growth of agricultural technology and plant domestication; the creation and disintegration of vast empires; the devastating impact of European intrusions and the retardation of real economic growth in Africa; and the new imperialism of the nineteenth century which touched all but the most remote regions of the continent. This is the history of Africa painted in oil with the broad sweep of the palette knife. Notes of caution have been sounded by scholars concerning uncritical acceptance of hypotheses based on the broad canvas approach to African history, or overemphasis on alleged differences in, for example, a country as small as present-day Cameroon. But there are the many Africas in miniature, whose depiction requires water paint and a delicacy of individual strokes only achievable by the finest of sable brushes: individual personages; individual ethnic groups; individual families; highly personalized skills, the domain of the few.
So far I have dwelt on perceptions of the non-Africanist confronted by African history. The time has come to discuss the challenges, the manner in which these may be met, and the rewards of studying the history or, as I would prefer to say, the histories of the many Africas. The challenge is both conceptual and methodological. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, for any professional to approach a field which is new to him or her but within the same discipline, as a tablula rasa. While there may be the absence of substantive knowledge of the new field, this cannot be taken to imply that the researcher will not bring to this new field certain attitudes, perceptions, or interpretations, the fruits of training in areas of history other than Africa. While the ideal might be for the non-Africanist to approach the history of Africa as a rigorous intellectual exercise in abstracto, this is unrealistic in practice. But at least the exercise will sharpen the spirit of self-examination as a professional. First, the scholar will be constrained to put aside those foundations, tenets, hypotheses, and interpretations, the products of experience derived from specialization in a different field of scholarly endeavor. Second, and this may appear a gratuitous truism, it is incumbent on the scholar to approach the new field of study with an open mind and recognition of the fact that special efforts will be required to create a language, formulate questions, identify problems, posit solutions, recognize processes of change, and rethink critically concepts and constructs, which are particularly, and possibly uniquely, appropriate to the area under consideration.

In the case of African history, there must be recognition of the reality that such chronological designations as "the classical era," "the middle ages," "the early modern period," or "the modern world," cannot be applied to Africa without reservations or may be totally inappropriate. Can one justifiably encompass, as do Edward McNall Burns, Philip Lee Ralph, et al., in World Civilizations, under the rubric of "the early modern world," artistic Renaissance in Italy, the Age of Absolutism, and the Enlightenment in Europe, together with Mogul India, China under the Ch'ing, Japan under the Tokugawa, and the growing power of Asante civilization, or territorial expansion of Oyo or Dahomey? The pitfalls inherent to applying chronological designations derived from the western experience to nonwestern societies can be resolved by adopting a culture era approach which, for the most part, will be synonymous with the histories of geographic regions.
those adjectives so conveniently attached to "revolution" in the western tradition—technological, agricultural, urban, commercial, intellectual, industrial—meaningful or appropriate in the African context, and is there not a distinction between the concept of "revolution" in different culture areas at different times? Much the same reservations may be made about "feudalism," "absolutism," or "nationalism," and whether these concepts are transferable from society to society across space and time without losing linguistic and conceptual precision.

The use of language can be redolent with Eurocentrism. Historians are notoriously careless in use of a lexicon, or that special vocabulary which pervades history books, which is imprecise and ill-defined: "emergence" (of Hinduism or Christianity), "rise" (of Buddhism), "achievements" (as of the Egyptians or Greeks), "Renaissance" (Chaldean), "formative stage" (ancient China), "crisis" (as in third century Rome), "decline" (as of Rome), "flowering" (as of Hindu civilization or Islam), "foundation" (as of empires south of the Sahara), and "blossoming" (as music in Europe of the Middle Ages). The non-Africanist approaching African history must be ultra sensitive to semantics. Do such words as "family," "father," "brother," "temple," "school," "city," "kingship," "divinity," or "empire" have a meaning or denotation which adequately conveys the social, political, or cultural reality of the African societies to which they are being applied? If I overemphasize the critical use of language, it is because my experience has been that whereas historians are extraordinarily sensitive to charges of subjectivity, partiality, prejudice, or cultural bias, and are trained to be highly critical in selection and use of sources, semantics and the use of language are two blind spots.

There are three other conceptual and/or methodological pitfalls against which the non-Africanist should be on guard. The first lies in the process of historical inquiry itself. In the selection of a subject for research, has the historian approaching the history of Africa permitted himself or herself unwittingly to be guided by the legacy of the past (or by the experience of contemporary reality) in Europe, America, or Asia? If the answer the negative, has the historian approaching African history asked new questions formulated specifically with Africa in mind, or have old questions merely been rephrased? The Latin Americanist may be intrigued
by African antecedents of religious syncretism in the Americas, or what lessons African slavery can hold for students of the "peculiar institution" in the New World, or whether animistic religions in certain parts of Africa have changed so much as to make their manifestations in the Americas more true to the older forms and rituals than those existing in modern Africa. In short, these are questions born of the historical experience in the Americas, but which may be ill-phrased or totally irrelevant when addressed to the African past. The historian must be careful to pose questions, and to seek solutions, within the African context. So different are the ideological, political, social, economic, religious, or human matrices between Africa and the Americas, so different are relationships between people, so varied are associations of ideas and concepts, and so different is the order of priorities, that to do otherwise would be to distort African history.

Second, in finding an answer to Philip Curtin's question as to how human societies change through time, the non-Africanist must recognize that processes of social or political change in Africa may differ markedly from those of Europe, Asia, or the Americas. This difference may show itself in timing, in stages or phases, or in substance. Awareness of these distinctions may free the historian from falling into the trap of measuring change by western standards or assessing success or failure or rate of development against the measure of how far it conforms with, or deviates from, western lines. The northern European model of progression from barbarism to slavery to feudalism to nationhood (or variants on these options) may not apply. For Africa, the most appropriate model may incorporate different strategies and different chronologies, and a different set of governing principles and range of options. The single most important fact for the non-Africanist to recognize is that African societies may have a fundamental organizing principle which is unique and for which there may be no model or counterpart elsewhere. This caution will apply especially to the non-Africanist examining modernization in black Africa who must grapple with the question as to the impact of economic, social, political, and religious changes on belief systems, religious practices, domestic arrangements, and systems of authority while searching for an answer to the question of how much traditional values are determining behavior in the broad sector of newly emerging African peoples.
Finally, the study of African history will compel a reevaluation of judgements founded on the western historical tradition as regards statelessness, or the role of self-perpetuating oligarchies and dictatorships in the political process. In all these aspects of African history, the non-Africanist (and indeed any historian) must refrain from moral judgements derived from the study of other culture areas.

Even the Latin Americanist, who is somewhat inured to apparently irremediable lacunae in the historical record, cannot fail to be impressed by the archipelagic quality of our knowledge of the histories of the many Africas. What I am about to say now is derived primarily from exposure to the history of Cameroon, but may be applicable to other areas of Africa. It is reasonable to start this discussion with reference to the bread-and-butter of the historian, namely sources, and assess these in terms of chronological coverage and quality. For Cameroon there is a void of source materials between the end of the neolithic era, now being revealed by archeologists, and the advent of European colonial powers in the nineteenth century. To be sure, there is a "middle ages" in Cameroonian history—the kingdoms of Kanem, Bornou, and the Sao civilization—and a "modern" period ranging from the sixteenth century to the emergence of the Sokoto and Adamawa empires in the nineteenth century. But so fragmentary are the sources, that the history of this interim period can only be told in broad sweeps. For African history, it would appear that not only is there enormous disparity in the quantity and chronological coverage of sources, but the richness of genealogical and oral data for family histories is in marked contrast to the paucity of data on the political, social, economic, and especially the religious history of Africa. Rulers and ruling families were keenly conscious of the importance of preserving the histories of their families, perhaps motivated less by truly historical concerns than by recognition that the combination of an unbroken historical continuum and the importance attributed to ancestors could legitimize and reinforce dynastic authority.

But the richness of data may be deceptive. A listing—no matter how detailed and exhaustive—of events, deeds, and individuals, in the absence of a verifiable chronological nexus or when abstracted from the broader historical context, is virtually useless to the historian seeking to reconstitute the social, political, economic, or cultural history of a people or peoples. Furthermore, genealogies may
abound with inconsistencies. "Official histories," transmitted orally, may be at variance with the historical record based on manuscript or other sources. Or they may take on the role of "cultural charters," transmitted for individual, familial, or collective self-glorification, by association with a place or leader. Whether a people was central to the mainstream of events and actively participated, or remained on the periphery, can determine the nature and extent of extant historical evidence. In Cameroon, the Fulani, Mandara, and Sao were innovative, politically active, expansionist, and culturally creative, and demonstrated a high degree of sophistication in their political and social organization. The Kapsiki or Mousgoum displayed few of these characteristics, were isolated not only from the mainstream of events but also from each other, and thus remain on the sidelines of recorded history.

This disparity in the quality and quantity of historical evidence is not limited to the pre-colonial period. Those areas and peoples best studied by British, French, or German historians, anthropologists, and ethnologists were precisely those of greatest economic, strategic, or political interest to colonial powers. Through a curious irony, cooperation or collaboration between an African king in the name of his people and a foreign power could ensure scholarly study of that people and thus furnish a historical record which would otherwise have been lost. In Cameroon, alliances between Bali and Foumban and German forces guaranteed to the respective kings not merely substantial palaces built at German expense but ethnographies and histories of their peoples. In contrast, the peoples of the southern Bamileke plateau fell outside the crescent of German penetration. By the time of the French mandate, some fifty years after the original arrival of Europeans, many of their oral traditions had become fragmentary or lost.

A special comment should be made on African literature as historical source. Here I shall not discuss the rich oral literature of Africa which abounds with proverbs, trickster stories, and folktales, which may possess historical content. Nor am I competent to discuss literary works in Swahili, the other main Bantu languages, or Yoruba. African literature affords an excellent medium by which the non-Africanist or non-African can gain a feeling for—and possibly reach an understanding of—assumptions, values, and outlooks, which may lie at the heart of
historical events. So far as I can determine, the first account by an African on Africa was *The Interesting Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Olaudah Equiano or Gustavus Vassa, The African*, published in London in 1789. Certainly no reader of African fiction can fail to note the strongly autobiographical tone and content, although there is a certain irony to the fact that the languages chosen are those of European imperialism, most notably French, English, and Portuguese. Much of this is a literature which might be described loosely as "of protest," but which has a strong undercurrent of regret and disillusionment. Articles in *Presence Africaine* and novels by Mongo Beti (*The Poor Christ of Bamba*) and Ferdinand Oyono (*Houseboy* and *The Old Man and the Medal*), take a critical look at western culture while reassessing those of Africa. The void between the policy and the reality of assimilation, the myth of *France Outre-Mer*, the contrast between the spirituality of Islam and western materialism, race and discrimination, and Negritude, are themes which concern the historian and find expression in African literature of the last forty years. The conflict between modernization and tradition is personalized by Onuora Nzekwu (*Want of Noble Wood*) and Ezekiel Mphahlele and Bloke Modisane describe what it is to be black in South Africa. In addition to Oyono and Beti, other literary figures whose works open a window into African attitudes are Francis Bete (*Ashanti Doll*), Jomo Kenyatta (*Facing Mount Kenya*), Chinua Achebe (*Things Fall Apart* and *No Longer at Ease*), Ngugi Wa Thiong'o (*The River Between*), and Yambo Ouologuem (*Bound to Violence*).

The historian of Africa has to reach an accommodation between a variety of sources, which may be in conflict with one another, namely: oral and written; local and general; accounts in Arabic or indigenous languages, and in French, German, or English; diaries of travelers and reports by trained observers; chronicles which reflect the perspective of the compiler—administrator, missionary, king, explorer, scientist, soldier, trader, healer or doctor, European or African—rather than being objective and unbiased accounts. It may also be incumbent on the historian to reach an accommodation with other disciplines. Archeology can help to establish an ecological or climatic sequence which can provide the context for historical reconstitution, or illustrate the inter-relationship between peoples and their environments, or set datelines for developments in agriculture or technology. The archeological evidence may be as spotty as the historical, victim of climate, natural
conditions, or human negligence, and vary according to the sophistication or even isolation of the host culture. But these factors do not detract from the lessons which archeology can hold for the historian trying to understand settlement patterns and cultural development in Africa. Linguistics is another field of great potential reward to the historian, but fraught with danger not because of the nature of the discipline but rather because of the seductive power which it may come to exert. Linguistic or dialectal distributions may suggest hypotheses on patterns of settlement, migratory trends, or social interaction. The historian may postulate that a people whose language predominates, also enjoys political hegemony. The cautious historian will do well to seek corroborative nonlinguistic data before positing hypotheses. The third area for potentially fruitful collaboration is ethnology. In Cameroon, ethnologists have attempted classifications of ethnic groups and sub-groups, but the overall impression is of a partial mosaic rather than a complete picture. One outstanding example of effective synthesis of history and ethnology is P. N. Nkwi and Jean-Pierre Warnier, Elements for a History of the Western Grassfields. Obviously these suggestions do not exhaust the potential for cross-disciplinary or inter-disciplinary approaches and collaboration between historians and art historians, geographers, economists, political scientists, and even paleobotanists. The point on which I would insist is that the non-Africanist will find an exhilarating challenge in African history, and the historian trained in other areas may be stimulated to employ methodologies and sources which might seem unorthodox but which will enable him or her to ask, and attempt to answer, questions asked by historians concerning change over the longue durée.

This broadening of historical inquiry extends to what has come to be referred to as "comparative world history." By a curious semantic twist, "world" here does not mean global but rather a nonwestern ethnocentric approach. In practice, this may translate into a history in which only minor roles can be found for the Mediterranean, Baltic, or European North Atlantic, where continental Europe is a bit player at best, and where peoples indigenous to Africa, Asia (East, West, and Central), and the Americas, provide dynamic and (to use Hugh Trevor-Roper's word) "purposive" movement. The peoples of Australasia have no place in this "world" history. Philip Curtin has isolated particular phenomena having to do with cross-cultural trade and has demonstrated differences, similarities, and commonalities
among merchants across time, space, and cultures. For the non-Africanist, four other areas for inquiry derived from the African experience suggest themselves as being particularly suitable to such an interpretation. These are migration, agriculture, family and kinship, and emblems of status. This choice is suggested by the belief that all share what are for the most part common features: all occur—or did until recently—without political pressures or changes of government; all furnish examples which predate the period of foreign intervention in Africa; any one of these subjects is so central to the history of Africa as to make its omission a distortion of reality. These are themes which, in the African context, illustrate the robustness, permanence, durability, and stability over time, of customs, values, beliefs, and personal relationships. As such, they are themes which possess an African identity as well as a universal significance, and are thus peculiarly well suited to comparative study.

Comparison across space or time may be a particularly useful tool for the historian who, as in the case of so much of African or Latin American history, is confronted by sources whose inadequacies are such as to permit—for certain periods or regions—a reconstruction of the past which is at best fragmentary and at worst replete with voids. There are obvious potential pitfalls, not least of which is comparing apples to oranges! It would seem to me that cross-cultural comparisons are particularly vulnerable. Even if the historian should be able to control variables, so distinctive are political, social, cultural, and economic matrices, so different the value systems and perceptions, and so distinctive ecological or climatic conditions, that the end result is a series of counterpoints, interesting but isolated points of reference, or similarities, which together make for a forced and necessarily artificial comparison. Africa under British rule was not the same as India under British rule, nor did the new imperialism or the land grab for Africa which motivated Germans, French, British, Belgians, or Italians, automatically bestow the imprimatur of validity on comparisons between these differing colonial experiences. The caveat extends to cross-cultural comparisons of belief systems, religious practices, institutions, and the organization of society. It also extends to the indiscriminate use of illustrative materials which may leave in the mind of the spectator the inference that a valid comparison has been made. To show slides of the Grand Shrin of Ise and of the Atschum at Bafut and suggest that a valid
comparison can be made on the grounds that both illustrate the veneration of ancestors, is not only to ignore the differences between Shinto and animism but also to fail to distinguish between the solar and divine origin of the imperial Yamato family and the earthly origins of the dead kings of Bafut. To put the warning more succinctly, examples of cultural sameness drawn from different societies do not of themselves assure the validity of cross-cultural comparison.

This is not to ignore the fact that, through history, different peoples have honed in on identical parts of the human experience. One such is the public celebration of the transition from one stage of a person’s life to the next, often linked to physical or mental maturity, or to assumption of responsibility. The gaining of marriageable status by women, puberty, the acquisition of skills (smelting of iron, hunting), and conception, birth, marriage, widowhood, and death are recognized ceremonially and often recorded through works of art. Denotation of status and rank is expressed through emblems associated with the authority enjoyed by an individual, members of a family, or a specific group (priests, healers, warriors, artisans in highly prestigious occupations). Sometimes social rank will be expressed by household objects, e.g., spoons, thrones or stools, litters, and pipes, or through architecture as in the configurations of the compounds in northern Cameroon or especially sculptured posts. The statues, masks, figurines, beadwork, anthropomorphic figures, and prestige jewelry of Africa are not merely superficially similar but often unnervingly close to objects from the South Pacific, the Andes, Mesoamerica, India, China, or Japan.

Cross-temporal comparisons are no less a two-edged sword. In the absence of records, be they manuscript or artifacts, the historian of Africa (as too of Latin America) is sorely tempted to turn to the present or to the past to find substitutes for these historical lacunae. People, buildings, tools, crops, animals, culinary abilities, medical practices, agricultural or technological skills, rituals, distribution of labor, religious rites, marketing practices, personal adornment, and even fields or whole landscapes take on the aura of documents to explicate the past. The tanners of Maroua and dyers of Garoua are living evidence of skills unchanged for centuries. The historian may also reach backward in time to archeological evidence. Cross-temporal comparisons are opiates, lulling the historian into the comfortable illusion
that there is an unbroken historical continuum from past to present, but may also be highly suggestive—and even valuable in the opening up of new avenues of inquiry—when supported by corroborative evidence.

The magistrate hearing the case of Regina v. Kenyatta and Others is reported to have said in a tone of exasperation: "I cannot follow the African mind." To the non-Africanist, the study of African history holds a double challenge. First, it compels a reassessment of the nature of history and the role of the historian. Second, it forces the reexamination of methodologies and concepts. The rewards lie in the opportunity to explore uncharted territory, to gain an understanding of nonwestern peoples and, while building on the methodological foundations and observing the traditional bounds of disciplines, to experiment with new sources and new techniques for historical inquiry. The non-Africanist who approaches the histories of the many Africas will gain a special insight into the appropriateness of the Cameroonian proverb: "We participate, therefore I exist; I am because you are."
Notes


Professor Russell-Wood's paper offers "New Perspectives for the Non-Africanist Historian." My invitation to participate here requested that I address "the pedagogical dimensions of the issues raised." I will do so, but this raises the question of a divergency of interests. Mr. Russell-Wood's interest is that of the specialist or generalist historian, whereas I have been asked to represent the interest of the teacher of world history. First, I would like to avoid any quibble about whether the teacher and the historian-scholar are one and the same. They often are, but perhaps oftener they are not. The point here is what hat is being worn and that only one hat will be worn at a time.

Next, we need some definition of the interest that I am representing. What is meant by a world history course, and what might be its content? There are obviously many possible models and approaches, but I hypothetically submit that such a course consists of the main movements of world history, and that by "main" we mean movements of global significance, trends which have affected the destinies of all peoples.

Recently I have been developing a global model, and I list below some of its main movements as a sample of content. I do so with an uneasy awareness that the formulation is open to a charge of ethnocentrism. Unfortunately I have yet to discover a historical vantage point that is above ethnocentrism. However empathetic and imaginative, a historian's questions and content selections will reflect and reveal the values of his culture. Having acknowledged this dilemma, we return to the interest of the teacher, which in this case poses the question of Africa's role in history's macro movements:

1. The spread of a technology of food production.

2. The emergence of an urban culture characterized by complex social and economic systems and usually by literacy (civilization).
3. The evolution of the state, from tribes and city-states to the powerful and efficient governments of recent times.

4. The socio-economic condition of common humanity during historical time.

5. The rationalization of knowledge and the beginnings of scientific thought.

6. The emergence of a hemispheric zone of communication and cultural exchange across the Afro-Eurasian ecumene that grew out of long-distance and cross-cultural trade.

7. The achievement of cultural hegemony by the West and the resulting effects upon local traditions.

And so on down to:

8. The developing world system and its cultural, political, socio-economic, and environmental problems.

These are the interests of the world history teacher, and we are concerned with how Professor Russell-Wood addresses them. Certainly his paper gives some mention of African contributions to such global movements as the spread of agriculture, technological development, civilizational evolution and empires, cross-cultural trade, and the global flows of culture. However, his principal concerns are African historiography and its peculiar difficulties.

In following this trail, he leads the historian from known to little known territory. Of all the world areas, Africa was the last major blank space on the map. Not until about 1900, following a time of very rapid exploration and colonization, was its map filled with names, colors, and boundaries. As with physical exploration, mental exploration has come quickly and late to Africa. And as physical barriers of terrain, climate, and disease delayed exploration, so have cultural barriers made it
difficult to know Africans and their history. For this auditor, one of Mr. Russell-Wood's chief virtues is his explanation of these "cultural barriers." Besides useful information on the progress of African studies, he gives a remarkable and commendable insight into and an understanding of the extent to which the unique qualities of African cultures challenge historians by requiring different historiographical approaches. We learn that the elements of African culture resist classification into the usual social scientific categories such as the social, political, or esthetic, because of their permeability, their tendency to flow in an interrelated fashion, causing cultural elements to mingle in uncharacteristic relationships; the historian can comprehend such subtle situations only by making an arduous effort to grasp African definitions and angles of vision. Further, African studies are complicated by a lack of conventional documentary sources, vexed by unchronological and often contradictory local sources, and fragmentary because of gaps in the record. So great are these problems of sources and understanding, that the historian must join a multidisciplinary team and utilize the findings of archaeology, ethnology, linguistics, art history, and even paleobotany.

Thu Professor Russell-Wood confronts and enlightens us about the misconceptions, problems, complexities, and unknowns of African history. Earlier students failed to perceive the diversities and individualities of the "many Africas," a "misperception" now yielding to correction by an indigenous historiography. If developmental processes have been essentially the same for all peoples, African peoples have experienced these processes at their own pace, living by their own social, religious, political, and value systems. Africans did not simply react to the intrusions of outsiders; at all times they were also pursuing their own cultural agendas and purposes, plus injecting their own constituents into the flows of world culture.

Obviously this creative historical activity will in time significantly affect the teaching of world history, and the generalizations in current textbooks will undergo substantial revisions. As teachers of world history, we will welcome a deeper and more precise understanding of Africa's rich and variegated cultures. But at this time, the information in this paper is of limited value. It is immediately useful for its fine presentation of the interweaving of African and other histories, and many
will leave here with the particular intention of learning more about the eastward flow of things African. But for the most part, what teachers and students seek are the grand syntheses that will eventuate from African microstudies. Perhaps one chief benefit of this presentation for us is that it is a harbinger of good things to come. And certainly another is the implied lesson conveyed by Professor Russell-Wood: we really need everyone's history. World history will continue to be incipient until we gain a fundamental understanding of all of its peoples. Until we factor in the histories of heretofore neglected peoples, there will be no definitive history of this planet.
A SCHEMA FOR INTEGRATING AFRICA
INTO WORLD HISTORY COURSES

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This paper is based on the one semester "Themes in World History" course which I have taught at Indiana University since the fall of 1966. My initial interest in teaching world history was sparked—as was the case for many others—by reading William McNeill's seminal masterwork, The Rise of the West. However, my earliest and abiding motivation to learn and keep learning about the world derives from military service in Korea in 1954-55, when I found myself traumatically uninformed about Asian societies and culture and untrained by three years of college coursework to learn much from observation or experience. Consequently, one of my most satisfying experiences was to return to South Korea in early 1985 to renew my association with Koreans after three decades of study and experience as an African specialist and world history teacher. As I relate to students, "Themes in World History" represents one of the courses I wish I had taken in college prior to entering the Army, and efforts to improve the course constitute my most important ongoing educational undertaking.

The course consists of 27 lectures, a practice map quiz, two mini-exams, midterm and final exams, and a five page paper for undergraduates on the basic characteristics of "less developed countries" ("ldcs"). For many students the deceptively simple questions posed for the undergraduate paper and the difficulties they encounter compiling required information represent their first introduction to "ldcs." The basic information they acquire concerning "ldcs" provides essential background knowledge for the two lecture-discussions (25 and 26) on "The Nature of Underdevelopment" and the related final examination essay question.

*See Appendix A, syllabus and sample examinations.
I emphasize from the first class meeting that one of the principal course objectives is to introduce students to information and concepts about "lDCs" and "newly industrializing countries" ("NICs"), whose citizens comprise more than 80 percent of the earth's inhabitants. I emphasize, too, that some aspects of life for people in such countries may in many ways be better (as well as worse) than students' experiences in the United States, and that one of the important issues addressed in the course is the frequently expressed (and unthinking) opinion that "they should become more like us." A crucial element of the course is to provoke students to reexamine their knowledge and perspectives concerning their own experiences while they are learning about people of other countries.

One of the organizational principles of the course—the long lead-in to contemporary times—is designed to provide students with perspectives concerning historical developments and cultures of "nonwestern" peoples prior to the comparatively recent—and perhaps transitory—technological and military ascendancy of "western" countries. This means that many lectures cover great spans of time and large areas of the globe, which is difficult and frustrating for many students (especially those unused to reading assignments before class meetings). My rejoinder is that any course represents a "departure," not an "arrival"; I hope the course will provoke students' curiosity about many topics which receive only passing mention. They can pursue their interests through independent reading, including novels and travel literature, taking related courses, and seizing opportunities for travel.

Another major objective of the course is to encourage students to make a lifelong habit of reading a leading world news journal such as The Economist (my recommendation) or The Christian Science Monitor. The assignment for the second class meeting challenges students' reading habits, and those who begin reading The Economist on a regular basis soon appreciate the advantages, especially during the last third of the course.

The course meets twice a week for an hour and fifteen minutes. At the beginning of each period, I review the main points covered in the previous lecture or several lectures as appropriate, stating the main issues to be covered in the day's
lecture. I believe that repetition and reinforcement, including reviews of maps on transparencies, are crucially important in helping students gain command of previously unfamiliar information, concepts, and geographical areas. The principal terms used in each day's lecture are listed on the blackboard for reference, and students are informed that these word lists comprise the principal source of the short identification questions on examinations. Lectures are limited to 45-50 minutes, followed by slides with commentary, leaving 10-15 minutes for questions and discussion. As I remark from time to time to stimulate contributions in discussion periods, each student is taking other courses related to different aspects of the course, and some have travelled in areas discussed or have other knowledge to contribute to the rest of us in class discussions.

Maps displayed on an overhead projector are used in all lectures, and there are many map handouts to reinforce the required map learning listed on the syllabus. Geographical knowledge is tested by the practice map quiz and by allocating 20-25 percent of examinations to map questions. Geographical knowledge acquired in the course represents an investment that students will draw on the rest of their lives. Slides shown during lectures are derived from many sources, including the Time-Life series and other illustrated volumes placed on reserve at the library for convenient browsing.

Summaries of lectures follow, with special reference to Africa-related material. Of 27 lectures, five have a principal focus on the African continent, and a half-dozen more include significant material on Africa and Africans related to larger themes unifying the course.

1. **Introduction to the Course** focuses on world perspectives, beginning with the three global maps featured by Buckminster Fuller (see assignment for the second lecture); the highly distorted Mercator projection centered on Europe with which we are all familiar and comfortable; the Antarctic projection which features the Cape of Good Hope and the South Atlantic "spe..d-around" in the age of sail; and the Arctic projection which emphasizes that the closest links for 90 percent of the world's population lie across the North Pole, whether by missiles or commercial airliners. Next I show Joel Garreau's map of the "nine nations of North America"
and comment briefly on the attributes of each "nation," something of an eye-opener for students with complacent U.S.-centric views fostered by limited education about other countries and subliminal nonlearning from TV weather broadcasts which blank out Canada and Mexico. I remark that Fuller and Garreau offer nonacademic insights, and that a willingness to reexamine long held and unexamined mind sets is an invaluable attribute for achieving professional success and personal satisfaction in a rapidly changing world.

I emphasize that no single course—or even 10 courses—can "cover" world history, and that "Themes in World History" attempts to identify major trends and human interrelationships, focusing on what is shared by the world's inhabitants, rather than what makes them different. These include trade relationships, food crops, diseases, religious beliefs, political institutions, technological advances, etc., which have affected the lives of millions and millions of people, both elites and nameless masses. Like all courses, world history attempts to introduce students to concepts and basic information they will add to, and revise, for the rest of their lives. Most of them will visit other countries as tourists, business people, or members of the armed forces; in any case, they will be inextricably involved in world affairs at an accelerating rate in their lifetimes.

Next I go through the syllabus summarizing the main issues and arguments of each lecture and what the examinations will cover. I stress that early and sustained effort in learning the map sites is essential for comprehending assignments and lectures and that it provides one of the long-term benefits of taking the course. Finally, I explain the assignment for the next meeting: each student should make a list of five world trends identifiable now and likely to continue into the foreseeable future. To stimulate students' thinking I suggest several examples: that arms control is a worldwide problem; that popular music and blue jeans diffuse across all boundaries; and that football (soccer) is the international game.

2. The Contemporary—and Future—World invariably provokes wide ranging discussion, and sometimes arguments, between students. One of the objectives of the meeting is for students to learn something about each others' varied backgrounds.
and interests and to identify promising colleagues with whom they may study the maps and review for exams.

I begin with a few brief remarks on my own educational and travel experiences, then ask students to introduce themselves and share one of their lists of five world trends, which I write on the blackboard. Characteristically, many students offer what is current in the newspapers, with American rather than world focused trends, such as concerns about Japanese competition for Detroit's auto industries, U.S. pollution problems, government budget deficits, and so on. I either ask other students to comment on these trends from world perspectives, offer brief remarks or queries to reorient students' thinking (e.g., "What does the U.S. export to Japan?")—which surprisingly few students know), or remark that U.S. legislation on industrial pollution has caused some industries to "export" pollution to "nics" and "Ides" which lack adequate regulations protecting their own people. By the end of the period, each member of the class has related something of his/her background and interests and has acquired some appreciation of the world orientation and perspectives of the course.

3. Paleolithic Times to the Neolithic "Evolution" begins with visuals depicting the movement millions of years ago of global tectonic plates separating the continents. During a brief discussion attention is drawn to the Red Sea as part of the Great Rift Valley which includes the deep lakes in eastern Africa. The main issues treated in the lecture include recent scholarship concerning australopithecines in East Africa and Ethiopia, the long evolution of the hunter-gatherer way of life through Paleolithic and Mesolithic times, and the primary role of women in the domestication of wheat and barley in the "Fertile Crescent." The lecture emphasizes that there is evidence of proto-domestication, i.e., protection and encouragement of valuable species, among many groups on different continents, and that full domestication was pursued only where there were manifest advantages over collecting, as with wheat and barley in the "Fertile Crescent," millet along the Yellow River, yams and bananas in South Asia, maize and manioc in Mesoamerica, and millet and yams in sub-Saharan Africa. To stimulate student reflection on these matters, I ask them to list familiar wild foods they may gather in southern Indiana, such as berries, nuts, and roots, which in many parts of the world provide important
dietary supplements and are appreciated as "hunger foods" to be exploited when crops fail or in other emergency circumstances.

Regarding Africa, I briefly mention that millet and sorghum were domesticated in sub-Saharan Africa in the period of desiccation following the Atlantic Wet Phase, c. 5500-500 B.C., and that yams and rice probably were domesticated centuries later. I note also that the relatively easy exploitation of the African continent's rich resources of flora, and especially fauna, caused many groups long to disdain a cultivating lifestyle---issues I return to in lecture 14.

4. The "Secondary" Neolithic: Tigris-Euphrates, Nile, Indus, and Yellow River Valleys discusses the shared characteristics of the four great river valley civilizations. Similar developments occurred along the Tigris-Euphrates (from c. 4000 B.C.), Nile (from c. 3300 B.C.), and Indus (from c. 3000 B.C.) river valleys, the latter two sharing characteristics derived from the first, including irrigated cultivation of wheat and barley in alluvial soils, the use of draft animals, significant population growth, increasing social specialization, long distance trade, and state building.

From c. 2400 B.C., the Yellow River was used to irrigate deep and fertile loess soils; wheat and barley, which were cultivated along with millet, diffused across Eurasia. The founding of the Xia Dynasty dates to c. 2100 B.C., the use of animal traction came comparatively late (in approximately the fourth century B.C.), but otherwise, patterns of population growth and social specialization in the Yellow River valley were similar to developments in the other great river valleys.

Africa-related material reiterates information from the previous lecture on the Atlantic Wet Phase with reference to the Nile valley, and focuses on the Nile and Red Sea waterways which linked Egypt from earliest times with the "Land of Punt" (Yemen and Eritrea) and Sudan, where Kush developed around 2000 B.C.

5. Eurasia to c. 500 B.C.; Indo-European Migrations introduces students to the far flung migrations of Indo-European speaking groups from the area north of the Black and Caspian seas. "Battle Axe Folk" moved into western Europe after c. 2500 B.C.
Following the development of chariot warfare in Azerbaijan, Kassites conquered Mesopotamia in c. 1700 B.C., while Aryans invaded the Indus River valley in c. 1500 B.C. Horse nomads introduced chariotry across Eurasia, reaching the Yellow River valley by c. 1500 B.C. Chariot technology and warfare tactics spread to other groups, including Semitic speaking Hyksos who conquered the Nile River valley by c. 1680 B.C.

Discussion of the Hyksos invasion relates that Egyptians adopted chariot warfare and drove out the Hyksos, then conquered Kush and imposed Egyptian rule for some eight centuries—promoting economic, social, and cultural exchanges along the length of the Nile valley.

The last part of the lecture treats the spread of cavalry warfare across Eurasia after c. 800 B.C. and includes discussion of the Persian Achaemenian Empire and raids into China by Ural-Altaic speaking horse nomads—Huns, Mongols, Turks, etc., who would threaten Eurasian states for the following two thousand years.

6. Mediterranean Civilization: Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans begins with the period following the destruction of the Minoan civilization on Crete and the sea raiding associated with the Mycenaean Greeks and the "Peoples of the Sea" which contributed to the downfall of Egypt's New Kingdom. By c. 1100 B.C., Phoenicians pioneered a three thousand kilometer maritime trade route across the Mediterranean Sea to obtain silver and tin at Cadiz in southern Spain, (probably) copper at Lixus in northern Morocco which was mined at Akjoujt in Mauretania, and (possibly) gold derived from West African deposits. Carthage was founded c. 814 B.C. at the strategic juncture of the Mediterranean with the permission of Berber "landlords" inhabiting the area. The Phoenicians' subsequent violations of landlord-stranger reciprocities alienated the Berbers, whose alliance with Rome during the Punic Wars contributed significantly to the Carthaginian defeat.

From the eighth century B.C., a rival Greek trade diaspora across the northern Mediterranean competed with Phoenician commerce and led to conflict. Carthage and other western Phoenician settlements were sporadically cut off from eastern Mediterranean markets and the Phoenician homeland until the fratricidal
Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) depleted Greek naval power, enabling Phoenician mariners once again to rage the length of the Mediterranean. The third century B.C. was a period of unrivalled prosperity for Carthage and other Phoenician settlements, until the rising power of Rome led to the disastrous Punic Wars (268-241; 219-202; 149-146). Rome subsequently conquered lands encircling the Mediterranean Sea to establish a "common market" extending from Scotland to the Middle East, with sea and land routes maintained and protected and commerce facilitated by Roman administration, laws, and currency.

Besides initiating discussion about trade diasporas and landlord-stranger reciprocities to be employed in subsequent Africa-related lectures, this lesson addresses Akjoujt's copper mines, West African gold deposits, and Berber chariot routes crossing the Sahara from the seventh (?) to the third (?) centuries B.C., when progressive desiccation of the Sahara ended trans-Saharan links until the second (?) century A.D. These topics are reviewed in lecture 14.

The practice map quiz at the close of the lecture informs students whether they have mastered the map work adequately. The quiz also serves to motivate them for the forthcoming mini-exam which contributes to their final grade.

7. Eurasian Social and Cultural Interchanges provides students with some familiarity with the ancient and transcendent cultural influences which have shaped Eurasian societies to the present day. The lecture includes discussion of the Hindu religion and caste system which evolved in India following the Aryen invasion of the Indus valley in c. 1500 B.C.; the teachings of Buddha (d.c. 235 B.C.), the spread of Buddhism along land and sea trade routes linking South and East Asia, and the adaptations of popular Hinduism; Alexander the Great's Eurasian conquests and the spread of Hellenistic influences; Chinese social and cultural concepts, notably tien and li, and the enormous influence of the teachings of Confucius (c. 551-479 B.C.) which were incorporated into the imperial examination system that lasted until the early twentieth century.

The early spread of Christianity is summarized and includes missionary efforts as far afield as Ethiopia and western India. Invoking the "they should become more
like us" course theme, comparison is made between the gradual and community-oriented approach undertaken by Christian evangelists working among Germanic groups in the western Roman Empire and the uncompromising individualistic approach of nineteenth and twentieth century western European and American missionaries dispatched to the Americas, Africa, Asia, and the islands of the Pacific. Questions raised include which social groups are more likely to convert to a new religion or ethos, what syncretism is and how "western" one must become to be accepted by Christians.

8. The Closing of the Ecumene: China and the Roman Empire constitutes the first of two lectures focusing on trade routes and emphasizing longstanding economic, social, and cultural links across Eurasia. Short range relay commerce in numerous commodities made possible long distance trade in luxuries associated with the "Silk Road" exchanges between Han Dynasty China (202 B.C. - A.D. 220) and the Roman Empire. Commerce was facilitated by the deployment of cataphracts--horses bred large to carry armored warriors--by the Kushan and Parthian states as defense against raids by Ural-Altaic speaking horse nomads living in northern grasslands. Social and cultural exchanges are emphasized, particularly the exchange of epidemic diseases across Eurasia and the spread of Buddhism among Chinese and neighboring peoples.

Eurasian commercial exchanges were disrupted from the third century A.D. by the depredations of Huns and Germanic speaking groups, population movements which were in part due to climate desiccation. The security of trade routes was not fully restored until the T'ang Dynasty (618-907) and the Ummayad Caliphate (644-750).

9. The Closing of the Ecumene: Outrigger Adventurers and the Growth of the Indian Ocean Trading Complex complements the preceding lecture by focusing on the relay and long distance commerce of seafarers which linked the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, and Mediterranean Sea. The first part of the lecture recounts the far flung voyages of Austronesian speaking mariners who sailed from Indonesia eastwards after c. 2500 B.C. to populate the islands of the Pacific. They also diffused South Asian cultigens and domestic animals and later
ventured westwards across the Indian Ocean to East Africa and Madagascar, introducing such cultigens as yams, bananas, plantains, and coconuts, while transporting cargoes of cinnamon and other commodities which Arab traders relayed northwards to the Roman Empire.

Maritime exchanges linking Eurasia and East Africa are delineated: ancient Sabaean commerce in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea, with commercial links southwards along the East African coast by the beginning of the Christian era; Greek voyages down the Red Sea from the time of Alexander the Great (r. 334-323 BCE), followed by Roman trade with the Persian Gulf, India, Burma, and East Africa by the second century A.D.; the rapid expansion of Persian seafaring during the early centuries A.D., with direct voyages to Canton in southern China by the sixth century; Indian commerce westwards across the Arabian Sea and eastwards to South Asia, diffusing Hinduism and Buddhism and other social and cultural attributes of Indian civilization; and a "second wave" of Indonesian voyages and migrations to East Africa and Madagascar dated to the eighth (?) and ninth (?) centuries, a period also characterized by growing trade between Arabia and the Comoro Islands, Indian commerce with East Africa, and Khoisan interaction with Bantu migrants. This discussion is expanded in lecture 13.

The mini-exam (20 minutes) administered at the close of the period promotes review of the material covered thus far and helps prepare students for the mid-term exam three weeks later.

10. The Era of Muslim Ascendancy discusses the division of the Roman Empire during the fourth century; the invasions of Germanic groups and Huns and the disintegration of the western Roman Empire during the fifth century; Caesaropapism and the conversion of Slavic groups in Russia; Byzantium's protracted conflict with the Sassanian Persian Empire; the rise of Islam and Muslim conquests during the seventh and eighth centuries; and the transition from the Ummayad to the Abbasid caliphates.

Africa-related material is introduced during discussion of doctrinal disputes among early Christians: that the Monophysite controversy predisposed the Christians
of Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria to accommodate Muslim invaders; and that the "daughter" church in Ethiopia would maintain its links with the Coptic Church in Egypt. A discussion of Arab conquests emphasizes that Muslim control of North Africa resulted in a monopoly of the supply of gold from trans-Saharan trade to the illusion of Europe, a theme expanded in lecture 14.

11. **Eurasia c. 700 A.D. to c. 1500 A.D.** treats sequences of interrelated developments: the Franks and Charlemagne; Viking and Magyar attacks on western Europe; the Seljuk Turks' expansion into India and the Middle East after c. 1000; the Crusades (1095-1291), with emphasis on the expansion of Italian trade with the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa; discussion of the remarkable economic, social, and demographic developments in China during the T'ang (619-907) and Sung (960-1279) dynasties; Japan's dynamic Nara Period (645-784); Mongol "unification" of Eurasia during the thirteenth century, and the aftermath, e.g., the Ottoman Empire (1284-1921), the end of Tatar rule in Russia in 1480, and the founding of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).

Africa-related elements in the lecture include a discussion of the growing Italian trade with North Africa which exploited the two centuries of disruption caused by the Banu Hilal expulsion from Egypt in 1045; European gold purchases stimulating significant growth in trans-Saharan trade; reference to the Mameluke state in Egypt and its defeat of Mongol forces in the Sinai Desert in 1260; Chinese overseas ventures during the T'ang and Yuan/Mongol dynasties culminating in Cheng Ho's two voyages to East Africa between 1417 and 1422 during the Ming dynasty, and China's subsequent decision to discontinue such expeditions.

12. **The Transmutation of Europe--and the World** features the economic, social and cultural changes which occurred in Europe during the Renaissance and Reformation and how these have had worldwide consequences. Following a review of David Riesman's concepts of tradition-directed, inter-directed, and other-directed, the lecture surveys some of the far-reaching developments in Europe after c. 1000 A.D., such as improvements in agriculture and stockbreeding; clearing of forests, swamps, and tidal areas; expansion of commerce; significant population increases; the growth of cities; and the rise of monarchies. McNeill's *Rise of the*
West, which summarizes these developments on page 539, delineates the contrarieties, incompatibilities, and polar antitheses built into the fundament of European civilization, and offers stimulating passages for reflection and discussion.

Renaissance Italy, stimulated by the Crusades and new trade links, exhibited remarkable developments: the growth of commerce and banking; lay education in the vernacular, including the introduction of Hindu-Arabic numerals and reckoning; town clocks and regularly scheduled work habits; and the transformation of art and literature with a new "humanist" outlook. In Italy and elsewhere in Europe these developments contributed to the breakdown of tradition-directed ways of life and to the development of inner-directed, achievement-oriented individuals exemplified by developments in portrait painting, commemorative statuary, autobiographical literature, and, later, novels exploring individuality and the appreciation of childhood as a distinct way of life.

Discussion of the Reformation emphasizes the importance of the printing press in diffusing the Bible and religious literature in vernacular languages, noting that Protestant leaders such as Luther and Zwingli preached that salvation was a matter of each individual's relationship with God. This removed priestly and saintly intermediaries and encouraged a complex of values characterized as the "work ethic" with individuals striving for worldly success even as they aspired to personal salvation.

The last part of the lecture previews the introduction of these social patterns and cultural values on tradition-directed societies throughout the world, most notably where such patterns were imposed as part of the colonial experience. That European imperialism contributed to rapid changes in "nonwestern" societies is counterpointed by discussion of the unsolved problems of "western" societies, as reflected in the fragmentation of family and kinship networks and the social and personal tensions associated with such "civilization diseases" as high divorce rates, ulcers, heart attacks, cancers, suicides, mental and emotional instability, and profligate use of alcohol and drugs. Left unresolved for future discussion is whether the people of "nics" and "Ides" should want to become "more like us": need Africans, Asians, Latin Americans, and others adopt "western" child raising methods,
educational systems, religious beliefs, music, art, and other social and cultural patterns along with industrial technology, computer linkages, banking practices, etc.?

13. **East Africa and the Indian Ocean Trading Complex to c. 1500** builds on previous lectures concerning Indian Ocean commercial networks, diffusion of cultivars, and other social and cultural exchanges. The lecture recapitulates information about Austronesian, Sabaean, Greek, Roman, Arab, Persian and Indian seafaring, then focuses on the Eastern African side of the equation: an overview of Bantu migrations; the development of Swahili communities, their links with the Indian Ocean trade complex and with coastal and interior trade routes; and commerce and state building in the area between the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers associated with Great Zimbabwe and Mapungubwe. The considerable growth of Indian Ocean commercial links after c. 1000 included the reconnaissance voyages to East Africa by Cheng Ho in 1417-1419 (?) and 1421-1422 (?), only three-quarters of a century prior to the arrival of the Portuguese.

The second part of the lecture discusses Ethiopia and the Horn, treating in sequence Kush, Sabaean trade and settlement in Ethiopia, the development of Axum/Ethiopia and its competition with Kush for the trade of the upper Nile valley; the development of Greek and Roman trade down the Red Sea and the spread of Monophysite Christianity in Ethiopia; and the survival and flowering of Ethiopian civilization following the rise of Islam.

14. **West Africa and trans-Saharan Trade to c. 1500** first recapitulates and expands upon the earlier discussion of the Atlantic Wet Phase, c. 5500-2500 B.C.: the domestication of sorghum and millet after 2000 B.C., and, some time later, of rice and yams; and the Berber chariot routes traversing the Sahara from the seventh (?) to the third (?) centuries B.C., when the Sahara became too arid to cross. Following mention of the Nok culture and the probable introduction of iron working to West Africa during Phoenician times by blacksmiths from North Africa, the lecture traces the development of relay commerce linking West Africa's ecological zones, focusing on the significance of Jenne-jeno and other trading communities that were founded along the bend of the Niger from the third century B.C. onwards. The development
of the West African commercial matrix was prerequisite for the initiation of camel-
caravan trade across the Sahara from the third (?) century A.D., as rainfall increased and ecological conditions improved.

The second part of the lecture treats West African landlord-stranger reciprocities which facilitated coastal, riverine, and overland commerce in such commodities as salt and dried fish from coastal areas; malaguetta pepper collected in the forest zone; kola, iron and iron manufactures from the savanna-woodland zone; and, after c. 1000 A.D. (?), cotton cloth produced in the savanna zone. European trade with North Africa, which developed in the wake of the Crusades, increased demand for West African gold and other commodities, contributing to the expansion of commercial networks which facilitated the spread of Islam by Mande and Hausa trade diasporas. Horse-warriors exercised a major role in state building, as related in discussion of the shared attributes of such sudanic empires as Ghana, Mali, Songhai, Kanem-Bornu, and the Hausa states. Final remarks are directed to the development of Ife and Benin and the extraordinary art created by Yoruba, Bini, and neighboring peoples.

15. The Americas to 1492 A.D. begins with the migrations of Asian hunter-gatherers across the Bering Straits during the time of the Wisconsin glaciation (peak c. 40,000 years ago), then reviews and amplifies material from lecture 3 concerning the domestication of maize, manioc, and other American cultigens. These and subsequent developments are discussed in the context of the five historical stages poised by Gordon R. Willey and Philip Phillips with equivalent terms used for other parts of the world: Lithic (= Paleolithic); Archaic (= ?solithic and Neolithic); Formative; Classic; and Post-Classic.

After relating some of the remarkable developments in Mesoamerica during the Classic and Post-Classic periods, the last part of the lecture deals with probable and possible contacts between the Americas and other parts of the world prior to Columbus' voyages: Eskimo migrations from c. 3000 B.C.; probable Austronesian contacts to explain the diffusion of the sweet potato across the Pacific; Viking settlements in Greenland and North America from the tenth century until the onset of the "Little Ice Age" in the fourteenth century; and quandaries regarding possible
Asian contacts (tantalizingly depicted in the photographs "Trans-Pacific Riddles" on page 83 of McNeill's *Rise of the West*), and similarly debated trans-Atlantic contacts from Africa.

16. **Age of Reconnaissance I** introduces the transitional period when western Europeans began to exercise an increasingly dominant role in world affairs. McNeill’s "three talismans of power" (European bellicosity, naval and military technology, and acquired resistance to Eurasian epidemic diseases) serve to introduce students to the first phases of European activities in the Atlantic and Indian oceans.

The lecture relates how the Portuguese were constrained to adhere to West African landlord-stranger reciprocities; achieved considerable influence over the elites of the Kongo state; subdued Swahili communities; and achieved mastery over Indian Ocean shipping lanes by means of superior naval forces and control of strategic bases such as Mozambique Island, Socotra Island, Hormuz Island, Goa, and Malacca. By contrast, the powerful Ming Dynasty compelled the "ocean-going barbarians" to submit to regulated trade at Canton. Lightly populated and "underdeveloped," Portugal produced few items of interest to African and, especially, Asian societies, and its transitory affluence was derived from plunder and from monopolizing sea routes previously shared by Swahili, Arabs, Persians, Indonesians, and other seafaring groups.

17. **Age of Reconnaissance II** begins with Spanish conquests in the Americas and the tragic consequences for Amerindian societies of pandemics that decimated populations in many areas. These processes irrevocably changed the social and cultural fabrics of the people concerned and thereby facilitated the imposition of Spanish rule and concomitant social and cultural transformation.

The remainder of the lecture treats European trade and settlement patterns during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, as Dutch, French, and English challenged the Portuguese and Spanish and competed with each other throughout the world. African middlemen welcomed and profited from European competition; the Mughal Empire expanded during the same period as European
coastal emporia increased in number; the Dutch progressively monopolized the spice commerce of Indonesia; China carefully supervised the activities of European traders and missionaries; and, following a period of relatively unrestricted European contacts with Japan, the shogunate proscribed Christianity, banished Portuguese, limited Dutch trade to annual visits to Nagasaki, and in 1637 ordered all Japanese living abroad to return home, thereby instituting a period of isolation which lasted until the mid-nineteenth century. In discussing each area, special emphasis is accorded the global dissemination of European, Asian, African, and American cultigens and domestic animals.

18. Interlocking World Economies: the South Atlantic System delineates interrelationships involving the populations of four continents: European settlement and exploitation of the resources of the Americas, contributing to the destruction of native American populations; and the importation of some ten million captive Africans to work on plantations, mines, and on other tasks. Africa-related material includes the fateful congruence from the 1630s of rising European demand for slave labor and of drought and famine conditions in western Africa which had economic and social consequences that contributed African "push" to European "pull." We discuss who was enslaved in African societies, and why. The final part of the lecture briefly describes the protracted efforts to suppress the Atlantic slave trade, with African labor thereafter remaining in Africa to produce primary products for world markets, a theme developed in lectures 21 and 22.

19. The Transformation of World Social and Cultural Patterns comprises two lectures which are the first of several that "cut through" to the present and future. The first emphasizes the progressive and pervasive influence of scientific and technological advances and the adoption of increasingly rational and systematic patterns in all aspects of human activities, first in Europe and later in other parts of the world. Examples include the change from the Julian to the Gregorian calendar in 1582; the development of government bureaucracies and military organizations and their routine procedures; music notation and publication; elaboration and increasing application of legal systems, including territorial claims by rulers and states; the notion of the "social contract" and the assertion of citizenship, with ramifications for the "age of democratic revolution"; agricultural innovations and
improved stockbreeding; the growth of the factory system and working proletariat, including child labor; and attempts to reconcile science and revealed religion. Concomitantly, there were significant exceptions, including such emotional and "irrational" manifestations as the growth of fundamentalist religious movements, the espousal of patriotic self-sacrifice on behalf of one's nation-state, and the virulent growth of racism, which later provided impetus to European imperialism during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The lecture concludes with a brief survey of the pervasive influence of the "idea of progress"--for Europeans and for the peoples they colonized, evangelized, and increasingly influenced in many ways.

The undergraduate papers on "ideas," due at this meeting, contribute an essential element of the students' preparation for the last third of the course.

20. The second lecture on The Transformation of World Social and Cultural Patterns surveys world demographic trends since c. 1000 A.D., when Europe's population began to increase until just prior to the spread of the Black Death in the 1340s. Population expanded again from the close of the fourteenth century and at an accelerating rate until the last part of the nineteenth century. The huge population growth contributed significantly to overseas migration and settlement, and to frustrations and dissatisfactions associated with the persecution of minorities and the ferocious religious warfare of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Statistics for England and Wales exemplify Europe's accelerating population growth: a doubling of population between 1800 and 1850, from 9.0 to 17.9 million, and almost a second doubling between 1850 and 1900, from 17.0 to 32.5 million--statistics which do not include the millions who emigrated to the United States and other countries during this time. These and other statistics and graphs are used to make a salient point: that owing to the circumstances of European ascendancy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Europeans could freely migrate to other parts of the world; such opportunities now are denied Latin Americans, Asians, and Africans whose populations are going through a similar demographic evolution.
The last part of the lecture discusses current worldwide birth and death rates and notes the implications of different rates of population growth and distribution among age groups, e.g., Holland and Japan as compared to Mexico and Zimbabwe. The lecture also emphasizes the accelerating rates of urbanization throughout the world, especially in "nicks" and "ldcs," and the implications that may be drawn from these circumstances.

21. The Age of Imperialism I recounts Europe’s commercial and military expansion from the latter part of the eighteenth century to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, focusing on the following: the British East India Company and its increasing control over India’s territory and exports; the ongoing development of European weaponry and, no less important, of European military organization, drill, and supply systems (expounding on the theme of rational and systematic patterns of organization in all aspects of Europeans’ lives); British merchants and manufacturers supplanting those of Spain and Portugal in Latin America as a "reward" for aiding revolutions (which serves to introduce the theme of core-periphery relationships, exchanges of manufactures for primary products, and the stifling of home industries); the Opium War and subsequent European demands for treaty ports and spheres of exploitation in China; France’s involvement in Algeria, West Africa, Mexico, and Indochina; and European shipment of millions of destitute Indian and Chinese laborers to different parts of the world. The final part of the lecture discusses Japan’s transformation during the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912), which presaged the defeat of Russia in 1904-1905.

22. The Age of Imperialism II surveys the European partition of Africa during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, prefaced by a summary of European motivations and rationales. Overwhelming weaponry combined with effective use of African auxiliaries enabled Europeans to incorporate hundreds of African polities into some fifty colonies, including and separating groups formerly friends, enemies, and unknowns. Africans and other colonized peoples were to become progressively more closely linked to European metropoles and world markets and to experience far-reaching social and cultural transformations—just as was happening in similar and different ways to Europeans and Americans, and which was characterized as "progress."
The theme of European and American cultural imperialism is delineated through discussion of the "civilizing mission," including reading several passages of Kipling's "White Man's Burden," which is dedicated to America's colonization of the Philippines. This last is effectively counterpointed by quoting General Frederick Funston, who expressed a desire to teach American history at Luzon University after the "pacification": "I'll warrant that the new generation of natives will know better than to get in the way of the bandwagon of Anglo-Saxon progress and decency."

Chinua Achebe's Things Fall Apart communicates the confusion and desperation of nonwestern societies attempting to cope with the insidious and multifaceted challenges of European conquest and colonial rule, while George Orwell's Burmese Days illuminates "the dirty work of empire close-up," including the arrogant racism endured by Asian and African peoples under colonial rule.

23. The World since 1900 I features nonwestern peoples. It also treats parenthetically the (reasonably) well known concomitant developments in Europe and America. The nature of colonial rule is described, with colonial peoples progressively more tied to metropoles and world markets. Africans and Asians (and Latin Americans) were compelled to produce primary products by means of taxation and forced labor schemes and were coerced into becoming "target laborers" separated from families and kin. In such circumstances, migrants formed voluntary associations and followed the leadership of experienced and learned relatives and friends in their home areas, contributing to far reaching changes of many sorts. A few, the future "new elite," had the opportunity of primary (and rarely secondary) education in missionary and government schools, and were accorded increasingly responsible auxiliary positions in teaching, colonial administration, and business enterprises. Members of this "new elite," together with labor leaders and urban head men and women, were to provide leadership for the liberation movements after the colonial powers were fatally weakened by World War II.

The last part of the lecture covers developments in Japan and other Asian countries: Japan's defeat of Russia in 1904-1905, and subsequent imperialism; China's 1911 revolution and the chaotic conditions afterwards, compounded by the Japanese invasion in the 1930s; and political movements in India up to World War II.
The onset of World War II (a second European attempt at suicide) is briefly discussed against the background of the enormous costs of World War I and the disillusionment of the subsequent Great World Depression, which caused many Europeans to submit to totalitarian governments imposing unprecedented levels of government intervention in economic, social, and personal spheres.

Regarding assigned readings, Nectar in a Sieve may unfold too slowly for some students, but makes a considerable impression on others. William Arens' anthropological insights on American football attract attention and provide a springboard for a general discussion of cultural perspectives.

24. The World since 1900 II covers the period from World War II to the present, again focusing on nonwestern peoples. The first part of the lecture recounts the strategies and successes of liberation movements after World War II, beginning in Asia with the independence of the Philippines in 1946 and India and Pakistan in 1947, followed by other Asian countries (with exceptions), North African countries in the 1950s (except Algeria), and lastly, sub-Saharan African countries in the 1960s and 1970s (with exceptions). Special attention is given to the characteristics of the "new elite" who led the liberation movements, notably their espousal of "modernization" and the "idea of progress" and their promises of rapid economic development—more change, not a return to the circumstances existing prior to the imposition of colonial rule.

Discussion and analysis next focuses on the continuation of core-periphery relationships, with former colonies still linked to former governing powers and world markets as producers of primary products and purchasers of manufactured goods. The five-yearly renewals of the convention between members of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 60-plus members of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Caribbean (ACP) countries is presented as a case study in modern world relationships, and is discussed against the background of falling primary product prices in the 1960s, the enormous rise of petroleum prices in the 1970s, and the ensuing world depression.

Final remarks describe some other major world trading patterns, including those of the Soviet Union with Eastern Europe, Japan with South Asia and other parts of the world, and the United States with Latin America, Europe, and Asia.
25. The Nature of "Underdevelopment" I is the first of two lecture-discussions highlighting core elements of the course. Before the class meeting, I hand out a number of colorful travel advertisements taken from such magazines as The New Yorker. I begin discussion by asking students what is shown and what is not shown in the arresting photographs which depict attractive couples at beaches and resorts in lush tropical lands—fantasies in which the local inhabitants seldom intrude, and then only as smiling, nonthreatening waiters, souvenir shopkeepers, and the like. What are not depicted or mentioned are some of the prevailing circumstances in most such countries, such as widespread poverty and unemployment, high birth and death rates, and other attributes characteristic of "ldcs."

These attributes are then discussed by writing the headings "economic," "social" (including demographic), and "cultural" on the blackboard and listing and discussing students' contributions. This approach involves a class in a way no lecture can, provides students with the opportunity to draw upon course readings and their research papers on "ldcs," and allows questions and amplification by the teacher. What is the discipline of "economics" all about? What does "poor" mean? What is "capital"? Commentary on cultural attributes is especially important when presenting different perspectives to students—for example, allocation of time for leisure and work; large families vs. 1.8 children; sharing vs. frugality in gaining social approbation; and "nepotism" vs. close, dependable kinship networks.

26. The Nature of "Underdevelopment" II begins with a review of the principal economic, social and demographic, and cultural characteristics of "ldcs," then adds a new category to the blackboard: "Strategies for Development: How Does One Go About 'Developing' a 'Less Developed Country'?" It is useful to begin by emphasizing that these are relative terms, that there are many "underdeveloped" areas in "developed" countries, including the United States, and that economists' principal concern is to increase productivity in order to obtain for people a greater range of choices and satisfactions.

The lecture-discussion which follows is keyed to terms listed on the blackboard, e.g., "plans: a government making economic decisions instead of private decisions"?"
entrepreneurs." I note that important data are often unavailable, or unreliable; that there are crucial shortages of skilled people to implement plans; who provides "aid" and loans, and why; that women and their involvement in agriculture and other important concerns are generally neglected by national and other foreign "experts"; the concept of "comparative advantage" vs. the "real world" of competing in protected markets; the advantages and disadvantages of marketing agreements, such as OPEC and the International Coffee Agreement; the goals and experiences to date of economic communities such as ASEAN, ECOWAS, and SADCC; ramifications of the "Green Revolution," including the consequences of high oil prices in the 1970s, and greatly reduced prices in the 1980s; salient issues involved in the "North-South Dialogue" and the "Laws of the Sea" negotiations; the advantages and disadvantages for "ldes" and "nics" of admitting multinational corporations to attract investments and new technology; the necessity (?) of having strong governments force people through inevitable hardships, and so on. These issues engage students in debate which utilizes knowledge gained while preparing reports on "their" "ldes," from reading news journals and course assignments, and from other courses. Where appropriate in the discussion, students are challenged on the issue of "whether they should become more like us" and are reminded of the daunting experiences of Europeans and others who underwent "development" in the past. Students likewise confront current difficulties many "nics" and "ldes" face with respect to uprooted migrants with high levels of unemployment subsisting in wretched living conditions, increasing pollution problems, etc. Issues such as these stimulate lively discussion.

If the course schedule permits an extra session, students invariably get "caught up" in a project involving groups of three to four people creating a "plan" for a notional country with specified resources and attributes. Each group lists its plan's allocations on the blackboard and briefly presents its arguments for allocating investment funds. The plan is critiqued by members of other groups.

27. Contemporary World Political, Economic and Social Relationships is generally treated as an extension of the preceding two lecture-discussions, or may be more structured by repeating the format of the second course meeting--providing students an opportunity to discuss leading contemporary and future world trends as they are now perceived. Debates with fellow students are considerably more
informed and sophisticated than at the beginning of the semester, which is gratifying for the students.

The required take-home essay question on the final examination serves to pull together what students have learned in the course concerning "Ices" and "nics" (see example examinations).

The opening remarks of this paper alluded to my experiences in Korea, that when I arrived in 1954 I was unprepared by my education—primary, secondary, and college—to know much about another country and its culture, or to learn from observation and experience. American educational systems have been slow to adapt to a rapidly changing world. The findings of the American Council on Education in 1977 that only three percent of American undergraduates were enrolled in any course concerned with international affairs or foreign peoples and cultures, and that less than five percent of individuals preparing to teach kindergarten through twelfth grade had any exposure to international studies or training, indicated that Americans will long remain ill prepared to participate in an increasingly integrated world. From what I have been able to learn, there have been no significant changes since the Council's report, while, by contrast, there has been remarkable improvement in media coverage of world affairs since the 1960s. Even hometown newspapers have greatly expanded world news coverage (if not in-depth reporting), while curricula and requirements at schools, colleges, and universities remain largely unchanged—even as the teachers and students increasingly participate in a variety of global linkages.

There is no one way to introduce students to World History perspectives, and the best way will always be what works best for a specific teacher and a given class. Most important is improving communications between teachers. All of us who teach world history are learning on the job, preparing ourselves to teach courses we were never offered in college and trying to acquire knowledge, perspectives, and insights we were never taught. Our shared purpose is to prepare the next generation of Americans to live in the world of the 1980s, and 1990s, and beyond. To this end we can all learn much from each other; I look forward to shared exchanges.
Notes

1. I am greatly indebted to E.C. Rivron for assistance preparing the paper. Information, ideas, and organizing principles are derived over many years from sources and individuals too numerous to recount. For amplification of arguments and perspectives, plus bibliographical notes, see the essays in my Themes in African and World History (Bloomington: Indiana University African Studies Program, 1983).

2. Overhead projector transparencies recommended for the Africa related lectures include the following maps prepared for use at Indiana University, as well as visuals derived from:


   Phyllis M. Martin and Patrick O'Meara, eds., Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), maps 1, 3, and 4.


   Thurston Shaw, Filling Gaps in Afric Maps: Fifty Years of Archaeology in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University African Studies Program, 1984), plate IX.

COMMENTARY
Ms. Heidi Roupp
Aspen High School

Actually, I'm something of an imposter. I was not a history major; I got my education in speech and drama. Late one night in 1977 as we were painting scenery for "Inherit the Wind," a student said, "You know, Mrs. Roupp, when I get out of school I would just love to go to Tokyo and see how those Chinese build automobiles." At the next school board meeting this quote and an all-too-apparent lack of global understanding led to the formation of a required world history course for sophomores. There I was, mandated to teach, as William McNeill says, a global account of how things got the way they are--but I had no materials, no experience, and precious little academic preparation in history.

I am typical of a number of individuals currently teaching history who lack adequate subject matter background. When a high school teacher gets his/her first job, it will include between two and four class preparations, lunch duty, chaperoning the freshman dance, and collecting money at the Saturday football game. There is almost no opportunity for on-the-job learning. Dr. Brooks provides that opportunity as well as the materials, maps, and methods of organization which are invaluable to a beginning teacher. More colleges and universities should provide similar opportunities if one of our educational goals for American citizens of the next century is a better understanding of the world in which we live.

The art of teaching is also a responsibility of colleges and universities. Mortimer Adler believes that students learn through reading, coaching, lecture, discussion, and writing. Teachers learn these processes best by experiencing them; however, all too often, undergraduate history courses are lectures to 150 students identified by their social security numbers. Education majors need seminar experiences to enhance discussion, research, and writing skills. The best history professors should teach both history and the art of teaching. Conferences like this one, with teachers from high schools, colleges, and universities, are a necessity if we hope to improve current classroom performance. More teacher participation can
be encouraged if recertification credit is offered in conjunction with conference activities.

We also need to consider the students now in school. High school sophomores were born in 1969. While most of them know about the Vietnam War via "Rambo," they don't remember Watergate. And far more significant than Watergate is the cheerleader sitting front row center with her retinue of admirers, or the black-leathered dude sprouting purple hair, last row, left corner. Some seem to have been to every beach in the world but are shocked to discover that their vacation costs more than a year's salary for the waiter who served them. Students' motives for studying history are always diverse. Motives range from the immigrant who wants to make something of himself to the egotist who says, "I'm studying history because it will make me a more interesting person." Moreover, composition of the student body is changing. Between 60 and 70 languages are currently spoken in the Colorado Springs public schools. A graduating senior will have spent more hours in front of the television than he will have spent in school. Having watched about 20,000 television murders and having such a range of personal experiences, students find their history text a bit lifeless. Yet the text is the single most important source of information in the classroom.

University of Minnesota professor Robert Graves in a recent study asked, "Could schoolbooks be better written, and if they were, would students remember more of what they read?" His conclusion, the title of a news article reported by Bruce Desilva in the Denver Post, was, "Textbooks can be rewritten so students recall more." Graves selected two passages from A History of the United States, a 1972 text published by Houghton Mifflin, which was similar to current texts in quality and style. Graves selected three teams of writers to "do whatever you think necessary to make the passages more readable, understandable, and memorable." The teams consisted of two University of Arizona text linguists concerned with "how the structure of written language affects clarity," two University of Minnesota instructors of English composition, and two former editors of Time-Life Incorporated. Each team's revision was presented to 100 high school students of similar background and academic achievement. After reading the material, students
were asked to write down everything they could remember. The results were compared to the results of the control group which read the original text:

Students who read the revisions by the text linguists remembered two percent less than the students who read the original versions.

Students who read the revisions by the English composition teachers remembered two percent more than students who read the original passages.

In sharp contrast, students who read the revisions by the former Time-Life editors remembered 40 percent more than students who read the original versions.

Graves concluded that "schoolbooks can be written better and that better writing can improve students' understanding and memory of what they read by significant amounts and that professional writers...should be involved both in writing textbooks and in helping school systems choose them."

Students always inquire, though not always in the manner adults anticipate. The introduction of a new historical topic usually prompts "Why are we studying this?" followed by "So what?" High school history must be relevant. The World to 1500 by L. S. Stavrianos provides an excellent model in the section "What It Means for Us Today" to meet the "So what?" challenge. For example, the class right before lunch is the perfect time to display a Big Mac and fries and a collection of foods eaten by a hunting and gathering society. Students can research and discuss life expectancies and health problems related to diet. The lesson serves as a conduit for later consideration of how agricultural surplus changes the structure of society.

The latest ski fashion poster provides an opportunity to illustrate global interdependence. An Obermeyer design is drawn in Aspen, patterned in Hong Kong, zippered in West Germany, treated with wind resistant chemicals developed in Japan, manufactured in Hong Kong, and shipped to the U.S. in a Liberian registered freighter. This introductory exercise demonstrates the importance of trade and cultural diffusion.
A cooperative effort between high schools and colleges can improve high school history. Besides offering world history for prospective teachers, colleges should increase history course requirements for teacher accreditation. Individuals cannot hope to become master teachers without an extensive knowledge of subject matter. World history would gain an additional impetus at the high school level if an advanced placement test were available. Above all, students deserve accurate textbooks written to enhance interest rather than readability, a multi-media blitz of fascinating supplementary materials, a manageable curriculum like the one presented by Dr. Brooks, and a competent history teacher to serve as a mentor. The rest is up to them.
Africans appear to fit awkwardly in world history courses constructed around the usual logic of literate "civilizations" or "modernization." Although specialists can now explain how Africans erected nonliterate civilizations, and indeed pursued a form of economic "development" analogous to modernization, though based on premises different from the axioms of western history since the Greeks, the parallels between the African past and events elsewhere in the world still escape most of the uninitiated. Beyond the Africanists' incompletely fulfilled responsibility to present their insights in forms accessible to nonspecialist audiences, Africa's participation in the ongoing stream of global events has remained obscure also because of deep-running parochial tendencies inherent to the discipline of history. In Africa's case, this particularism takes the form of a widespread heritage from nineteenth and early twentieth century racialist worldviews that emphasized somatic contrasts more than historical similarities. Commentators since then, Africans as well as outsiders, friends and skeptics alike, have retained this stress on Africa's uniqueness even as they have tried to destroy the erroneous old racial prejudices. Thus, legitimate pursuit of Africa's "own history" has perpetuated an exotic image of the continent that baffles world historians trying to fit it into global teaching schema.

The African diaspora--that forced migration of tens of millions of enslaved natives of the continent to the Americas, to the Mediterranean basin, and to Asia from Arabia to Indonesia and even China--accordingly comes to the fore as one event capable of bringing Africa into the mainstream of a more familiar global history. With a certain sense of relief, non-Africanists can pick up the story of African captives, though usually only the minority who boarded slave ships on Africa's Atlantic coast in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, and follow them to destinations comfortably well within the experience of the United States, sometimes also to the British Caribbean, and perhaps to less familiar parts of Latin America as well. My purpose here is to present an Africanist historian's view of this
diaspora in a world historical perspective that may help to reduce what I see as
other exotic, Eurocentric, and anomalous overtones in the way historians make a
token bow toward including Africa by integrating this tragic uprooting and
enslavement in their surveys of the world.

The extent to which the African diaspora involved far more than North
America becomes apparent on an introductory level when it is recalled that the
slaves who went ashore in the British mainland colonies or the United States
numbered something less than six percent of all those reaching the New World alive.
Less well known but arguably even more important is the fact that the entire
Atlantic fleet of ships bringing slaves to the Americas probably carried fewer people
out of Africa than did caravans making their laborious way across the Sahara Desert
and dhows darting across the Red Sea or the Indian Ocean to destinations in Arabia,
the Persian Gulf, and Asia. I need only mention these Old World branches of the
African slave trade as a whole to alert teachers of world history to this
straightforward need for comprehensiveness and balance.

A more subtle issue of perspective arises out of an anomalous quality often
attributed to the American diaspora that extends the eccentric role assigned to
Africa itself into the movement of Africans into better known areas of the world.
In looking at the trade in Africans across the Atlantic and their integration into
colonial American societies, many historians have lingered on the emotional western
heritage of slavery and racism, especially in the United States. They too often
suspend dispassionate historical analysis of the diaspora to condemn harsh slavers
and to praise noble and suffering slaves. In doing so, they fall back on moralizing
terms derived from abolitionist propaganda of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. Africans abroad, because their enslavement violated an utterly
fundamental commitment to freedom in the creation of some New World societies
and because they usually lived as a dark-skinned underclass in colonies and nations
dominated by light-completed elites, have seemed to them to have suffered
uniquely from abuses of a singularly harsh character and to have survived only
through endurance and determination of truly heroic proportions. This
melodramatic interpretation does not blend smoothly in a history otherwise
composed of narratives of less compelling moral force plodding along elsewhere.
around the globe. More important, by stressing the injustice of bondage and the extraordinary triumph of the human spirit that do indeed run throughout the history of the diaspora, world historians neglect other themes that bring Africa and Africans back to the center of the global stage costumed in less exotic, more dispassionate, and therefore more accessible aspects of the experience of enslavement.

I would therefore like to consider the African diaspora in a balanced global perspective by outlining some general principles that would guide my history course about the world and then derive some specific themes of the prescribed sort that may help to reduce the sui generis quality of both African history and the history of slavery and the slave trade, since the two are in fact closely linked. I aim thus to draw Africa and the African diaspora firmly within the history of the world as undergraduate students can and ought to encounter it in the classroom.

Introductory Comments on Historical Themes

Though I have never taught a course in world history, I hold some strong opinions about the kind of themes that bridge the gulf between what happened in Africa and our image of the past elsewhere. As an Africamist and comparativist historian, I regularly teach students whose idea of the world derives narrowly from what they have learned about the United States, and sometimes modern Europe. I also share the reservation expressed by two Indian historians (quoted by Professor Schrier in the published proceedings of one of the obviously lively predecessors of this conference in 1983*) that a subtle Eurocentrism and elitism pervade many instructional models centered on "civilizations" or European-cored "world-systems" or, certainly, around the notion of "modernization."

I understand the appeal of frameworks like these, which a cynic might describe as enlightened global Eurocentrism. They do in fact broaden most students, and even instructors trained primarily in European or--most parochial of all--United

States history. They convey an awareness that other parts of the world have coherent histories, and they describe their experiences approachably because they employ terms that Americans instinctively respect—picking out elements like what we pride ourselves on having done, or contrasting them by showing, if only implicitly, how they lack our good sense. But that approach, of course, contains uncomfortable resemblances to the unenlightened Eurocentric globalism of world power politics. More to my point, it also largely excludes Africa and distorts the experience of the diaspora. As an Africanist and a historian, my strategy of integrating Africa into broader historical patterns draws less on the stable values of our culture, and for two reasons.

As a historian, I think we miss an opportunity to expose students to the distinctive strengths of a discipline built on the analysis of change through time, told in sequential narratives, if we organize our courses around quasi-static concepts like "societies" or "civilizations." Both those notions emphasize continuity and structure, not change. Even the so-called "transition from traditional to modern structures," though seemingly focused on change, does not come very close to portraying the transition as anyone actually experienced it. In practice we perceive change as a series of gradual, sometimes imperceptible increments rather than as an abrupt conversion from some earlier static "traditional" context to a more dynamic and expanding "modern" one, a transformation thus rendered as an experience so wrenching that we are left struggling to explain to our students how anyone could have lived through it. Dichotomous idealized contrasts of this sort, including the Marxist equivalent, "revolution," convey little feel for the continuous kind of experiential changes that are truly historical.

What we as historians contribute intellectually to the social science-dominated academic environment in which students live is our reliance on change itself as a vital aspect of reality and as a powerful explanatory variable. We also handle change in distinctively humane ways, if not narrowly by studying human value systems, at least by keeping constantly in view how the people we study apprehended what we aim to interpret and explain. Though we rightly take account of imperceptibly long and slow Braudelian trends, we do not stop by merely noting them as such but instead continue on to show how the longue durée affected events
at levels that human actors understood. The historian's method of stimulating comprehension thus rests not just on relating events in chronological order but primarily on emphasizing how everything is continually becoming; how the present always exists in tension with a very different past even as it also trembles on the edge of dissolving into some still unknown future; how processes of creating contain the seeds of destruction; or how it is a very different matter to define an institution than it is to defend one, as generations of aging liberals have discovered as they have become conservatives.

Finally, historians distinctively explain by placing events in their contexts. Unlike social scientists, we do not lift what happened out of its time and place for theoretical treatment as an abstract concept or an ideal type. The history of the African diaspora itself offers good examples of how sociologists or economists have reduced historical phenomena to abstractions, since slavery itself is still a subject emotional enough to invite reification and isolation from the politics, mentalités, realistic alternative forms of labor organization, and other historical circumstances that historians would keep in the foreground to explain how slaves and masters behaved. Precisely this removal of slavery from its contexts has helped to promote the exaggeration and stereotyping that have characterized much writing on the African diaspora until the very recent past.

Hence, we best organize our historical interpretations, including world history courses, around the becomings, transitions, and dialectical tensions between establishments aging unwittingly to a disappearing past and innovators working in the dark toward formative new ways of living, in a series of continuing presents understood as ongoing battlegrounds between what has been and what might yet be. We can leave to our colleagues in other disciplines all theoretical equilibria or stable end points or internally static periods.

We can teach in this historical way on a global scale in terms of processes, dynamic tendencies that recur sufficiently often through time and space that they together undergird a comprehensive narrative of how we, and everybody else around the world, got to where we are now and—perhaps most important of all—how the world continues to evolve in the present. The resulting stress on change is
important far beyond the technical properties of our discipline: what could be more "relevant" to even the most careerist of our students, investing today in education to prepare themselves for professions meant to return dividends for decades into the future, than a strong sense for what is seldom apparent to the young, the transitoriness of most of what we experience?

As an Africanist, I see one corollary of special urgency in my proposal for a truly historical approach to the world's past. We must define historical processes that genuinely transcend cultural specificity—including their way of doing things, as well as ours. In this way we may accommodate the sometimes surprising forms in which other people have accomplished ends that our students may begin by recognizing only in the particular shapes they have assumed in our own recent experience. To return to the example to which I alluded as I began, economic "development"—in the sense of increasing per capita material output and consumption—is a world historical process surely worthy of our attention. But my personal research on Angola during the era of the slave trade suggests that Africa does not belong in the modernization-theory dustbin of "traditional" societies lacking these tendencies, merely because Africans chose, quite rationally with the resources at their command, to intensify their exploitation of their environment by assembling human dependents—junior kin, wives, clients, subjects, and slaves—rather than by exploiting fossil-fuel or other technologies typical elsewhere in the world.

To seek another African equivalent of something often depicted as absent there, why not accept "ritual" as the way people without writing, or who lack methods of observation and detection more penetrating than the human eye, reasonably devised to control what they could of their surroundings, something we self-flatteringly distinguish among ourselves as "technology"? They pursued the same ends as we have, but they proceeded with quite different means. Similarly, why not reduce the conventional contrast between what we term a pervasive "religiosity" in Africa and "rational" beliefs in science, or capitalism, or socialism among ourselves to emphasize their similarities of faith as well as the differences of method? Though part of the burden of acting on this corollary of cultural transcendence falls on Africanists, who must learn to present their subject in terms
that avoid superficial contrasts that leave nonspecialists without a conven-
means of integrating the continent into world historical schema, a remainder falls to
the nonspecialists, who must not assume that the West is as exceptional as the usual
literacy-dependent world history definitions of civilization make it appear.

Another advantage of phrasing world historical processes as culturally neutral
concepts is that they make everybody else's particular ways of getting on with
things more teachable. By starting from functional equivalence, we show how other
people accomplished tasks that are familiar, even if in fashions different from ours,
thus rendering remote experiences and achievements intelligible to students who
rightly want to learn about the world in terms that are meaningful to them; if they
were not a bit inexperienced and parochial, why else would they come to us in
search of something broader? In short, we need processes that demonstrate how
people everywhere have confronted similar essential human dilemmas and why
others' wonderfully various solutions generally made sense, and when they did not,
how and why they—or we—paid for the mistakes. Arms races, expansions and
disintegrations of imperial systems, the formation and ossification of institutions,
frontiers, and many other recurrent (though not necessarily universal) processes of
this order occur to me as promising opportunities, even without much systematic
thought.

Describing the history of the world in terms of these processes need not
merely substitute one kind of social science stasis for another by reducing the past
to an unvarying assemblage of repetitively whirring cogs. Some of the tendencies
around which I would tell the history of the world have cropped up since time
immortal, but others have made their appearance in a rough (nonevolutionary)
sequence, and they emerge and recede from prominence in kaleidoscopic
combinations. Human beings invented each of them as they solved old problems in
time and space from hunting and gathering times through the rise of modern
capitalism.

I hasten to add, out of respect for the difficulties that we all face in finding
published works on which we ourselves can draw to prepare our courses in world
history, not to mention the even greater problems of locating materials suitable for

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our students to read, that I recognize the impracticality of some of my suggestions for the present moment. Though I may thus be issuing a call for research and writing more than presenting a realistic agenda for teaching now, world historians are supposed to take the long view of things. On a personal level, I should admit, too, that I am presenting nothing more accomplished than a rough overview of some ideas that I am just now working out for circulation in a form meant to serve instructors in just the sort of world history courses this conference aims to support.

Africa and the African Diaspora

Three culturally neutral processes, sufficiently prominent to interest our students but also fertile enough to yield some real understanding, draw slave trading from Africa and the enslavement of Africans abroad into a world history course: economic growth and structural change ("development"? "progress"?) would be one, imperial expansion through conquest and commerce would be another, and the consolidation of new communities out of disparate and isolated human individuals (a deliberately broader notion than "nationalism") might be a third. I make no claims for the comprehensiveness of these three, and readers will immediately think of other possibilities: emigrants' contacts with alien disease environments, or inequality and exploitation, for example. Though "individual civil freedoms" would be far too modern and ethnocentric a notion to illuminate, as opposed to condemn, the slavery I intend to discuss outside of the North American context, a reformulation of that notion as the social recourse individuals may have had to protect themselves would be applicable. All these, and many others, are relevant, but I have only limited space, and world historians are agreed, too, that substantial simplification may become necessary in our shared endeavor.

Looking at economic development and slavery in world historical perspective, or, it might be more accurate to say, looking at the world from the perspective of African economic development, it is becoming commonplace to observe that economic growth and/or major structural changes over the last three thousand years or more—"progress" as David Brion Davis has termed it—frequently brought strangers together in concentrated masses and that a critical, though sometimes small, portion of these alien laborers frequently turned out to be slaves. Slaves were prominent there not least in economic sectors where activities of a year-round
nature prevailed. One finds examples in the domestic, artisan, municipal service, administrative, and semiprofessional occupations of the urban Mediterranean from the Greeks through the Renaissance, or in the military slaves of many Muslim regimes of western Asia, North Africa, and even India, or in slaves employed in mines or other continuous production processes, including the industrial aspects of early sugar plantations.

Sub-Saharan Africans joined widely in this general Old World political and economic advance through merchant capitalism, imperial consolidation, and slavery, particularly in the Sudanic and northeastern portions of the continent in commercial contact with the centers of the classical and Islamic worlds. Specialists working on the famous "medieval empires" of the western Sudan now emphasize the traders, military elites, and retinues of slaves at the cores of Ghana, Mali, and Songhai. A similar combination of parties built the contemporaneous kingdom of Kongo far to the south, beyond the range of the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean trading systems of the time, and the reliance of soldiers and merchants on slave retainers, typical elsewhere in the world, shows up at only slightly later dates in other polities throughout the continent of Africa. The far from static "traditional" societies in Africa thus followed the simultaneously glorious and dolorous patterns of "progress" emphasized in Moses Finley's ironic demonstration that the ancient Greeks intensified slavery for others even as they invented "freedom" for themselves.

Africans "developed" their polities and economies by drawing primarily on forms of energy that we might characterize as a "manual technology," contrasting in its use of human hands and backs with the animal, hydraulic, or fossil-fuel technologies that assumed greater (though far from overwhelming) prominence in other parts of the world but not differing in process or effect. In Africa, one gained power and wealth by controlling people. Since enslavement represented a particularly efficient means of placing an individual at the disposal of another, slavery became a preferred means of intensifying production beyond the needs of Africa's largely independent farmers and herders--to provision royal courts, to support trading diaspora, or to exchange goods broadly across ecological boundaries between dry steppes, moist savannas, and wet forests. Successful traders and producers in this environment who invested their wealth in further productive
capacity bought slaves, or they sought dependents of other sorts. Thus what looks at first glance like slavery spreading throughout Africa against the trend toward other methods of organizing labor and improving alternative kinds of productive capacity in Europe turns out also to show how Africans were embarking on the same accumulation of merchant capital and eventually investing it in more advanced "manual technology," that is, greater human dependency.

African slave-powered economic development followed other politico-economic patterns typical everywhere before the fourteenth or fifteenth century or so. Slaves were brought in from afar to supplement other workers, often more numerous, usually local, and engaged on a seasonal or occasional basis under arrangements other than slavery, at the centers of imperial systems. Importers of slaves then tended also to acquire their captives through direct violence, to the extent that the enslavers initiated the processes of capture as distinct from passively and pacifically relieving strangers of their prisoners of war, starving cast-offs, criminal outcasts, or castigated misfits. Slave systems resting on violent seizures around the peripheries of imperial domains, with the slaves concentrated in their heartlands, continued to support noncapitalist processes of political consolidation and economic growth in many developing areas beyond the Mediterranean, including parts of sub-Saharan Africa, long after the fifteenth century.

The influx of slaves around the Mediterranean reversed after the fifteenth century to become an outflow toward the peripheries of European imperial and then commercial systems of vastly enlarged size. The Italians, and later other Europeans, carried old processes of commercial capitalist accumulation farther than any of their Middle Eastern or Asian predecessors had previously managed, added commercial methods of expansion to military conquest and plunder, and concentrated monetized trade, currencies, and paid wage labor near the center. It was the Europeans, not the Africans, who at that time became eccentric to world historical processes involving slavery, as they did also in other ways more often emphasized.
This reversal proceeded in a series of steps reflecting the process of converting older noncommercial methods of organizing local societies and economies within Europe to a more commercialized system operating on a world scale. Sub-Saharan Africa at that time contributed its share of slaves to southern Europe, as well as to the empires of western Asia and North Africa, and to its own political and economic institutions—but no more than a share of the overall movement of captive populations toward nodes of "progress" wherever they appeared. The slaves the European Christians acquired by exchange, rather than by warfare, they at first brought mostly back into the urban hubs of Mediterranean Europe—Venice, Barcelona, Seville, Lisbon—as they had always done. But merchants and bankers there built up capital resources to the point that they also could just barely influence agricultural and mineral production in remote, often virgin, lands. They then began to send their captives out to the colonial possessions they were acquiring, especially to support the production of sugar. Cane growing appeared first as a result of Christian military conquests in the eastern Mediterranean and only slowly became associated with capital-intensive agriculture and plantations as it passed through the western Mediterranean, the Atlantic islands off Africa's western coast, and then Brazil, before its transfer to Barbados to mature in the eighteenth-century Caribbean with sugar grown and boiled exclusively by Africans in the classic combination of colonization, sugar, black slaves, and plantations.

Treating this complex as a static institution—sugar, slaves, plantations—misses the logic of the process by which slave labor became prominent only gradually in the Atlantic islands phase of its development. Moreover, in no colony where slaves and sugar eventually predominated did they date from the start of European settlement. Timbering, cattle grazing, placer mining, and small settler farming preceded slave-grown plantation sugar in a local sequence, or process, that recurred nearly everywhere, even in the last Caribbean stages of its consolidation. Non-slave exploitation of forests, grazing lands, or alluvial mineral deposits came first because they required only low to modest levels of capitalist investment. Full sugar slavery appeared only as the culmination of a progressive transition from military conquest to commercial agriculture backed by substantial wealth.
The same transitional process from raiding to trading lay behind European slave-buying in Africa. Early in the sixteenth century underfinanced Portuguese traders simply relieved the African ruling elites of criminals or other people whom they regarded as surplus. Later Europeans advanced to stimulating slaving and slavery by providing weapons, and eventually financial backing in the form of trade goods advanced on "trust" to African collaborators, often upstarts in local African terms without substantial wealth or followings of their own, who would use the guns and goods they obtained from European traders to seize and sell people of almost any background. Africans thus began exports of slaves by merely extending ongoing political processes based on agricultural production and other local resources without investing in major structural change. But they changed those politics in the process of importing and in the end committed substantial resources to creating new mercantilistic processes of enslavement much more dependent on contact with the Atlantic trade. Thus slaving and slavery in Africa became commercialized in a process similar to the eventual linkage of slavery and sugar in the New World. The frontier of European mercantilism touched both shores of the Atlantic alike as Europeans--first Italians, then Flemish and Dutch, finally the English--acquired capital resources sufficient to replace early low-cost contacts with more expensive forms of production and exchange involving slaving and slavery.

Nor did the resulting plantations in the New World contrast strongly with Old World methods of organizing slave production as the uniformly and uniquely harsh regime that they have often been made to appear. Rather they ranged from heavy dependence on disciplined gangs of slaves to subtle combinations of enslaved Africans and varying forms of nonslave labor, even allowing considerable autonomy and including noncoercive incentives for the slaves. Plantations varied, for example, according to the other types of seasonal labor around them. With corvee and peasants on call for occasional work around the Mediterranean, with Indians available for seasonal tasks in sixteenth century Hispaniola or Brazil, or small independent farmers sending cane in to the big slave-worked sugar mills later in Brazil, planters tended to own only the minimum number of slaves necessary to meet the continuous portion of their labor needs. In this case, they specialized in buying males, worked them relentlessly, made only limited efforts to breed their own labor forces, left their slaves little time for cultivating provision grounds of
their own, and employed supplementary nonslave labor at harvest and boiling time. But where nonslave labor was not to be found—in previously uninhabited Sao Tome, or later on Caribbean islands emptied of Indians by disease—masters had to maintain workforces of slaves large enough to cover the periods of peak demand in the annual labor cycle. This strategy left time in labor routines at other months in the year for slaves to grow their own provisions and even to market surpluses, balanced sex ratios among the slaves, and encouraged family life. Taking context, timing, and process into account thus softens the usual overdrawn contrast between Old World plantations and slave systems, including those in Africa, with mixed forms of labor and with partly self-supporting families of slaves, and anomalously harsh and rigid conditions of life for slaves in the New World diaspora.

Conversely, the Old World African diaspora also contained precedents for intensive exploitation of enslaved African males at times and places having similarly specialized and rapidly expanding sectors in the global historical growth of merchant capitalism. As early as the eighth and ninth centuries in sugar fields, date groves, and pearl fisheries in and around the Persian Gulf, or certainly on clove plantations on Zanzibar and the adjoining east African island of Pemba in the nineteenth century, Muslim merchants concentrated slaves for intensive production under harsh conditions that, shorn of their paternalistic Islamic ideological rationale, presented significant similarities to even the most extreme forms of the slave-sugar complex in the West Indies.

Slavery in Africa acquired a range of functions similar to the uses made of slaves anywhere else in developing parts of the world, from mining to plantations, to urban service, and to concubinage as it spread widely in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In this "Atlantic phase" European merchant capitalism hastened and intensified processes of political consolidation and economic reorganization long familiar in the northeastern African regions in touch with the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean and extended them to western and southern portions of the continent, where the Dutch and French and British eventually committed capital resources to the trade in quantities vastly greater than their Muslim predecessors had ever managed.
Africans were so enmeshed in these larger currents of world trade that, like sellers of slaves anywhere else in the world, they consigned captive labor to whatever world area constituted the principal accessible pole of mercantile growth. Masters in Africa could retain their slaves for local purposes—political, reproductive (for the women), or productive—or sell them on four or five continents by sending them into trading networks leading to the Atlantic coast, or in western Africa also sell them to Saharan merchants in touch with Mediterranean and Middle Eastern markets, depending on where or how they saw their advantage. Later, industrialization in places as far away as Britain revolutionalized the labor systems of nineteenth century western Africa. Its Atlantic export market disappeared with international abolition of the maritime trade after 1807, and the internal African price of slaves dropped to the point that masters could acquire more imported goods by keeping slave laborers and employing them to produce vegetable oils and other early industrial raw materials for export, or even by putting them to work on local plantations growing food for political courts, towns, and a thriving specialized craft and commercial sector, than by selling their slaves abroad.

Abolition and industrialization thus, in effect, transferred the slave labor sectors of Europe's economic peripheries from America back to Africa. Atlantic Africa assumed the role, formerly played by the New World, of producing for the European market without absorbing more than marginal amounts of scarce cash, and enslavement proliferated there as it had earlier spread through the Americas in the comparable New World phase of integration into the world economy. The so-called "peripheries," whether African or American, thus contributed commodities worth cash without requiring the enormous investment in technology, European currencies, and wages necessary to sustain capitalism itself in the single global process of concentrating commercial wealth in Europe.

Industrialization and the first stages of European military expansionism in the tropics in the early nineteenth century also indirectly stimulated a parallel regeneration of ancient African slave diaspora from northern and eastern parts of the continent to the Muslim Middle East. In more than ironic contrast to the contemporaneous "age of emancipation" proclaimed in the European colonies around the Atlantic, cheaper slaves from West Africa and revived Muslim economic and
political fortunes stimulated exports of captives through the Sahara, across the Red Sea, and into the Indian Ocean higher than ever before. In North Africa, Egyptians undertook programs of political consolidation, military expansion, and intensified agricultural production in part by trading far up the watershed of the Nile and then raiding there for male slaves for their own domestic markets and for women to sell on into the urban markets of the central Ottoman empire.

The same global chain of changes and adjustments detoured through Asia from Manchester to reach the very heart of eastern and central Africa. British textile mills destroyed European markets for Asian cottons after 1800. Indian cloth merchants then redirected their commercial initiatives toward East Africa through a branch of the Omani ruling house displaced from the Persian Gulf to Zanzibar by British imperial expansion in the 1820s. In Zanzibar the Omani sultans prospered by sending Indian-financed goods far into the interior of the adjacent mainland from the 1840s and 1850s to exchange for ivory valuable in Asia and for slaves to tend clove trees locally and to supply Ottoman markets for imported labor. The resulting eastern African slave trade represented an Indian-financed extension of West Africa’s turn toward slave-worked plantations to produce export commodities, with exports across the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean as partial by-products.

The nineteenth century slave trade to the central Islamic lands thus recalled the urban slavery of the first phases of Christian commercial expansion in the Mediterranean three or four centuries earlier, with corresponding slave-worked plantation systems in East and West Africa beginning to dot the fringes of its economic sphere. A further Old World parallel to the New World diaspora marked the branch of Indian Ocean slavery that reached southern Asia. Michael Craton has explained how mainland North American slavery originated as an almost incidental consequence of the much larger seventeenth century African trade centered on the sugar islands of the Caribbean. English slavers unable to sell their full cargoes in the West Indies merely sold off the remainder in the North American colonies as they sailed down the Gulf Stream on their way back to Europe. In nineteenth century Persia and India, scattered colonies of African slaves formed similarly as Muslim merchants carried them on beyond the principal markets for East African captives in Ottoman cities as part of their broader Indian Ocean trade.
Muslim commercial capitalism in the later 1800s thus brought slaving networks to parts of Africa as yet untouched by Christian mercantilism in a continuation of the same worldwide process of restructuring production and labor to feed raw materials into industrial plants in Europe and (by this time) America that had got its start a half millennium earlier in Italy. Characteristically for the early, relatively weak stages of mercantilism anywhere, the Muslims relied on violence and enslavement rather than on the credit-stimulated slaving or cash-paid indentured servitude and "free" emigration typical by then of the still richer West, much farther along the process of commercializing its economy than the rest of the world. Thus the recurrent trans-cultural process of slaving and slavery within Africa, in the Christian colonies of the New World, and in Muslim Europe and Asia both before and after the better known Atlantic phase of the African diaspora fits into global history as one noncapitalist method of intensifying production in outlying economies and societies reoriented toward the centers of capitalism without absorbing monetary resources at a moment when capital still remained too scarce to bring remote parts of the world into line by itself.

The very raison d'être for slavery thus lay in economic growth, or change, in the colonial territories as Europe struggled toward capitalism. Growth began when capital-short innovators staffed new and expanding economic sectors by bringing in outsiders, frequently enslaved, to work in noncapitalist environments. This was the process of state formation that recurred in Africa in the Sudan, near the Atlantic coasts, and inland from Egypt and Zanzibar for a thousand years from the ninth through the nineteenth centuries. In the Mediterranean, weak merchant challengers often had to get started without prying local labor away from still powerful older landholding interests. By resorting to slaves, they could avoid potential conflicts with strong conservatives and even could facilitate structural change itself by getting the new sectors off the ground long before they could have otherwise attracted serfs, clients, family members, or other retainers away from entrenched lords and masters. Hence the association often noted between slavery and "progress."

In the Atlantic islands and the New World, though the utility of using slaves frequently came from a proximate absence of alternative local labor supplies, where
Amerindian populations died out from exposure to Old World pathogens against which they lacked immunities, the underlying issue of effecting change without confronting older labor holdings arose indirectly. Surviving Indian populations in Spanish America were often protected by the Crown or controlled by entrenched landholding and mining interests. In parts of the English colonies the effective alternative was indentured servants brought from home. Imports of slaves left the rural men and women then being driven off their lands in England available to merchants and manufacturers who put them to work in domestic economic sectors that later led the Industrial Revolution.

The Experience of Slavery

Process and change also illuminate the experience of slavery from within, contrary to emphasis on the immutability of the slaves' helplessness and heroism nearly always stressed in descriptions of their bondage as a quasi-static institution. Slavery was a process in time in which originally helpless and vulnerable new slaves learned the culture of their masters, assimilated as individuals into the new society, and formed new (and growing) communities, both among themselves and between themselves as a group and their masters. When slaves were transported far from their homes, as they nearly always were, they were inexpensive to control upon their arrival as isolated individuals on the opposite side of an ocean or desert, culturally disabled, physically weakened, and psychologically disoriented, so much so that their masters could absorb the high costs of the enormously wasteful process of their uprooting and transfer via the slave trade. Subservient new slaves thus paid some of the start-up costs of their masters in the high savings phase of the Rostowian "start-up" toward economic growth.

Enslavement served not as a permanent status but rather as a channel through which moderate numbers of individual captives, or their immediate descendants, passed on their way to assimilation into the lower ranks of nearly every form of society in world history before the rise of the American plantation colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (and later the African and Middle Eastern Muslim plantations as well). Slaves had been regularly moved into humble positions in the corporative social structures of Africa and early Islam, on the feudal manors of medieval Europe, and into the patriarchal families of the Mediterranean from
ancient Greece and Rome on through later Muslim cities and Christian Spain and Portugal and their American possessions. Slavery there was primarily for small numbers of personal servants who became skilled in the mechanical arts or practiced in the arts of love. Acculturation was more important than civil status, since a slave's experience in her or his master's culture and society more than formal manumission brought a measure of autonomy and respect. Success for them led to manumission into some form of continued dependency rather than to the individual autonomy we usually think of as "freedom."

Slavery as an assimilative process functioned best where economic growth proceeded at moderate rates. When new slaves arrived in small numbers and the resident slave community consequently remained modest in size, enslaved newcomers eventually progressed smoothly on toward absorption into the general society. Later arrivals took their places as the slaves, and the resulting few skilled, acculturated, and native born freedmen and women did not greatly threaten established interests. No large distinct stratum of slaves took shape when these societies grew only slowly. Thus, many of the Africans sent to the Muslim Middle East, to the Christian Mediterranean before 1000 or so, and even to much of Spanish America throughout the colonial period seem to have disappeared into a melange of humble castes and classes, no longer readily distinguishable by their race or by their African cultural heritage.

With the diversion of African slaves to American plantations in the seventeenth century, this slow paced process of urban assimilative slavery was overwhelmed in varying degrees by large numbers of new slaves who arrived so fast that the vast majority of them never had the opportunity to die as freed men or women. Assimilation in the old style continued principally in Spanish American cities through the eighteenth century. In Brazil, though surrounded by masses of raw new slaves, it survived in the seaports and on some established estates, to die out finally only with the arrival of European immigrants who displaced slaves from most urban occupations beginning in about the 1840s. But in the Caribbean it became an attenuated anomaly centered on a few dusky mistresses, amidst hundreds of thousands of plantation hands. It virtually disappeared earlier in mainland North America owing to competition from enfranchised northern European settlers for the
skilled positions usually taken by experienced slaves, leaving only a tiny stratum of accomplished, native born, English speaking, black Christian freedmen, denied the opportunity granted nearly everywhere else to blend into lower classes of clients and retainers by the egalitarian political ideology of the United States.

More generally in the New World, plantation economies grew with unprecedented rapidity on credit supplied by Italian bankers, Dutch merchants, English trading companies, and eventually the City of London, and merchants in Nantes and Lisbon and elsewhere. Huge imports of slaves flooded expanding sugar zones, South Carolina rice fields, and the Chesapeake tobacco region, and the mines of south-central Brazil and stopped the usual assimilative process of slavery dead in its tracks, leaving the prominent African cultural and somatic heritage so obvious in these French, English, and Portuguese colonies. In times of similarly rapid economic growth in Old World areas, large groups of new slaves had occasionally built up in numbers that Peter Wood aptly termed a threatening "black majority" in South Carolina, but never on the scale or pace that seventeenth and eighteenth century European merchant capitalists were able to sustain in the Americas. The central Italian grain sector had expanded in this way to feed the urban masses of Rome in the second century A.D., creating one of the few Old World "slave systems" recognizable by modern standards. Muslim engineers may have brought large numbers of Africans to reclaim flooded lands and to grow sugar near the head of the Persian Gulf in the eighth century, but revolt among these slaves ended that project prematurely. One wonders also how many slaves congregated as miners near the African Gold Coast in the sixteenth century. In nineteenth century West Africa and in Zanzibar, grain and spice production grew rapidly enough to create large majorities of recently arrived slaves. But before the age of European merchant capitalism relatively few slaves had to bequeath the unmitigated bondage of newcomers to their heirs.

In the New World masters dared not free significant proportions of their numerous new captives for fear of being overwhelmed, especially in the United States where manumission potentially meant full citizenship and the vote: there were just too many of them needed to sustain the rates of economic expansion attained. However, this mass slavery with no exit remained efficient, and even
practicable, only while expansion continued. With ships disgorging untrained newcomers, average skill levels stayed low, and the overall degree of acculturation remained minimal. Masters could afford the police and discipline costs as long as new slaves arrived in quantities that kept the proportion of ignorant novices high relative to the experienced veterans. In boom times, slave populations remained divided between ladinos and bozales and were inexpensive to dominate and did not press in threatening numbers on the gates of civil (or cultural) assimilation. High mortality also helped to keep slave populations from maturing beyond manageable proportions everywhere in the American tropics through most of the eighteenth century, since death took away many captives before they had lived long enough in their new surroundings to have learned the ropes thoroughly. Africans thus trapped in American captivity worked out cultures of slavery different from the cultures of their masters, so that some assimilated not toward manumission but rather toward continued slavery.

But where mortality rates dropped, as in North America early in the eighteenth century, or where economic growth stagnated and the arrival of new slaves slackened after years of massive imports, as happened repeatedly in mining and rice or sugar growing areas, the raw newcomers then became a minority of slave populations that for the first time tended as a whole toward acculturation but were kept in captivity for fear of their numbers. There the surviving experienced slaves gained collective strength by forming families and communities among themselves and also by moving along the usual path toward acculturation, speaking their masters' language, practicing Christianity, and learning skilled trades. Except that they found their way to civil assimilation blocked.

Masters adopted various strategies to relieve the pressure that these experienced and organized slaves could exert on their chains, even outside the United States. In parts of Brazil owners selectively manumitted the most ambitious, accomplished, and acculturated of their captives, often children of mixed European-African parentage, creating what Carl Degler accordingly dubbed a "mulatto escape hatch." Sometimes masters interrupted the irresistible demography of assimilation in slack plantation economies by uprooting a portion of their unneeded labor again and sending it off to new mines or distant plantations entering phases of rapid
growth, thus forcing the slaves to start the process of integration all over again. The Brazilian gold and coffee booms in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and, conceivably, the inter-island trade in the West Indies from British plantations to new production zones in French Saint-Dominque and Spanish Cuba not only saved older economies by disposing of troublesome slaves who could not be manumitted, but also set back the consolidation of strong creole-led slave communities.

The dilemma of an enormous unassimilable population of acculturated slaves assumed its starkest form in North America. There indigenization of the slave population proceeded fastest of all, owing to the ability of Chesapeake slaves to begin reproducing themselves already in the eighteenth century. When the United States abolished further imports of newcomers at the end of the eighteenth century, slavery in the South was destined to continue on the unprecedented basis of holding communities of native-born acculturated Americans in bondage feasible only for raw immigrants. Only the threat of sale down the river to the antebellum Cotton Kingdom reduced the high costs of policing resistant slaves in Virginia and Maryland and broke up the interpersonal ties that were making continued enslavement of American blacks a peculiar form of the institution, indeed, even in new cotton plantations in the southwest, by the middle of the nineteenth century—an almost complete denial of the acculturation that the slaves had in fact achieved, with obvious deep contradictions when viewed in terms of the normal processes of slavery.

Meanwhile in most Muslim areas of the Old World, slaves from Africa (and elsewhere) continued to assimilate as domestic servants divided among many different family units or became wives, clients, and retainers following the course of acculturation usual for captive immigrants. Where they congregated in a few places in numbers approaching the American scale, like the plantations of Zanzibar or some areas in the western Sudan where local mercantilism expanded agricultural production, death rates were high enough, and emancipation in the early years of colonial rule in Africa followed closely enough on the period of massive enslavement in the late nineteenth century that the incompatibilities that had matured in North America seldom did not have long enough to come to the fore.

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The Atlantic Slave Trade as Process

To summarize a complex story, marginal producers in Europe, often merchants and manufacturers falling behind the advancing pace of economic development there, sought to convert European goods of very low cash opportunity cost—surpluses, faulty wares, outmoded lines—into American commodities of high currency value, typically colonial produce up to and ideally including the monetized metals, gold and silver, themselves, through the medium of buying and selling slaves. Theirs was the strategy of capital accumulation identified as central to the process of slavery throughout history. These merchants and bankers in Europe in turn lent financial support vital to the extraordinary growth rates and scale of black slavery in the Americas via the Atlantic slave trade, just as Zanzibar's similarly intensive slavery rested on Indian mercantile capital in the comparable stage of mercantilist development in the Muslim world.

The unprecedented size of slave trading in the Atlantic came in part from the willingness of European merchants to advance captive labor to planters in exchange for liens on future crops. Some of the rigidities of New World slavery derived from the drain on specie and credit that the resulting planter indebtedness imposed on many American economies, particularly in their start-up phases or when tobacco or cotton prices declined. Planters, sometimes secure in illiquid land, equipment, and even slaves but who owed every pound or livre they could acquire to lenders in Europe, could hardly find the cash to invest in wages for free workers in the colonies, even though they might be able to mortgage still another crop for more slaves and supplies to protect the value of what their backers had already invested. The monetary indebtedness necessary to achieve expansion and change thus hindered masters from moving beyond the slavery on which they had built their holdings when rates of economic growth slowed to normal.

Paradoxically in view of the scale and speed of export growth in the New World slave economies, in Europe the slave trade often represented an opportunity principally for the smaller, marginal merchants. Minor seaports, inefficient or badly located producing sectors unable to compete in the main could ship to Africa, buy slaves, and sell them in America to tap specie and rich colonial crops and profits
otherwise under the control of richer competitors. Thus the English entered the
business of slaving as weak interlopers on sixteenth century ocean routes controlled
by much more powerful Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch shipping. British slaving
later matured not in London, the financial capital of the emerging empire, but
rather in the outports, Bristol and then Liverpool. In France, it was Nantes, not
Paris, the national capital, or Bordeaux, gateway to the French Antilles, that
thrived on the Africa trade. In the United States, the principal commercial centers
at Baltimore or Philadelphia, or even in New York, allowed obscure Rhode Island to
lead the way to Africa and back. And the entire country of impoverished Portugal,
the most determined and persistent slaving nation of them all, acted as an
international outport for more prosperous merchants from all of northern Europe
wishing to sell goods for slaves in Africa and to clothe and equip them in Brazil. It
is tempting to view United States slavers in the years after the War of 1812 as
playing a similar game of catch-up in the fleeting nation by supplying labor illegally
to Cuba.

Slaving ventures also sometimes helped carry infant European industries
through slack periods in a constantly changing economic environment that might
otherwise have fatally drained limited capital committed to ongoing overhead
expenses. The English arms manufacturers in the late seventeenth century provide a
likely example, as they could ship cheap muskets to Africa whenever outbreaks of
peace in Europe threatened their financial health. New England rum, Brazilians
selling third rate tobacco on the Slave Coast, anyone who held the Spanish asiento,
and virtually all industry in Portugal provided other examples of this process of
booting up new or marginal economic sectors through exporting to Africa. Whatever
the value of the slaves themselves to planters, the accounting profits that aspirant
manufacturers and traders claimed on buying and selling Africans were relatively
incidental to their larger strategies of dumping cheap goods in Africa to gain a
wedge of black labor to pry open lucrative American markets otherwise closed to
them.

Slave trading thus operated like slavery itself in terms of global historical
"processes": it was a risky, peripheral business through which upstarts could get the
jump on established commercial interests, and some of these slavers did rather well

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by the humble standards of their own backgrounds. It allowed merchants on the fringes of European capitalism to keep up with the accelerating pace of economic activity in other, wealthier domestic sectors and on occasion to ride out short term downturns in the business cycle. The famous "Eric Williams thesis," to the effect that slaving and slavery contributed profits to the economic transformation of Europe, applies less to financing the main directions of growth than to providing critical support for its weaker components. As a result, the process of consolidating capitalist social and economic organization spread more surely, more widely, more rapidly, and with less dissent from excluded regions and industries in Europe than it might otherwise have done.

Concluding Comments

Though other historical processes of transcending generality could, of course, illuminate the African diaspora, this partial sketch of two thousand years of slavery and slave trading centered on Africa suffices to suggest both the unexceptional experience of Africans in the New World and the peculiarities of the American South's blockage of normal processes of slavery in the context of the New World's extraordinarily rapid capitalist economic growth. In the Americas the assimilative aspect of this widespread method of mobilizing labor for political and economic expansion--entirely typical of global history before the eighteenth century and not unknown in other parts of the world for a century and more thereafter--broke down, largely because of the huge scale of importing what European merchant capitalism had made possible, and also owing to the unusual accompanying concessions to political "liberty" made in northwestern Europe and the United States.

A speculative concluding reflection on the same global scale may indicate why Africa remained the major source of enslaved labor for western Asia, Europe, and its American extensions during this long phase of European history, even after other sources of slaves in Asia and America dropped out of the picture, and thus complete the case for Africa's insertion into the processes of world history. Africa was accessible because it had large populations living near the Eurasian markets for new labor, and the havoc wrought by drought in both hemispheres of the continent by the seventeenth century suggests (contrary to the prevalent assertions of "underpopulation" in much literature on African demographic history) that more
people lived there by then than the ecological resources of the continent could support in the long run, especially when strained by warfare. Traders could also transport ordinary male labor from Africa to Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Americas by water with relative efficiency, and the less efficient trans-Saharan caravans carried mostly women of a value high enough to cover the elevated mortality sustained as they crossed the desert. Finally, Africa was sufficiently part of the common Eurasian epidemiological pool that Africans in the diaspora were able to withstand exposure to the disease environments in which they lived in Asia, southern Europe, and America. Africa's qualifications as supplier of slaves to the world thus derived from its position solidly within, not outside, the global historical processes.

To the extent that Africa departed from these general tendencies, it complemented trends in the adjacent parts of the world in ways that also promoted exports of slaves. Few of its inhabitants belonged to the communities of faith proclaimed by Islam and Christianity, who theoretically enjoyed exemption from enslavement by their co-religionists. Compared to Europe and maritime Asia, Africa had the least comprehensive commercial and political institutions. It was therefore extremely responsive to the early and weak emanations of Muslim and Christian mercantilism associated with slaving everywhere in the world. Economic development within Africa resulting from these commercial contacts proceeded on the basis of currencies not counted as money in Europe and Asia, and it generated numerous slaves, only some of whom—perhaps a minority—went out into the diaspora. Central Africa was even more vulnerable to European investment on this count than Sudanic West Africa, where, by the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries, large areas had already experienced commercial development linked to the regional desert trade and to the Muslim routes north across the Sahara. The Africans' adoption of largely manual technologies left many people lacking efficacious means of defending themselves against mounted warriors, who roamed wide areas near the Sahara taking captives for sale, and later also against marauders bearing imported firearms nearer the Atlantic.

Hence it was Africa that became the steady supplier of slaves to the portion of the Mediterranean basin accelerating toward economic growth down to the end of
the nineteenth century, sent others to open up plantation islands off African shores and to Asia, yielded up the millions who supported the New World boom between 1450 and 1850, and still enslaved millions more at home to support internal economic and political growth down to the present century, all without draining gold and silver from Europe at critical early stages in the growth of specie based commercial capitalism. Whatever the directions in which enslaved persons moved out from Africa, the several trades in slaves and the numerous resulting slave systems consistently exhibited patterns of historical change typical elsewhere around the globe. The New World diaspora stood alone not in its institutions of slaving and slavery but rather in the rapidity with which these familiar processes accelerated or slowed. None of these processes, from the Bank of England to the banks of the Niger, made sense without taking events in Africa into account. Thus not only change itself but also rates of change, the speeds at which change changed, provide profoundly historical avenues to integrate Africa and the African diaspora into world history courses, highlighting the generality of global historical processes and the worldwide scale of historical change, while still respecting the particularities of the African and the American experiences.
Some Recent and Relevant Readings


William D. Phillips, Jr., *Slavery from Roman Times to the Early Transatlantic Slave Trade* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), for straightforward coverage of ancient slavery, the only comprehensive work in English on European slavery from 500 to 1500 A.D., and an introduction to much else.


Frederick Cooper, *Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), provides the basic study of slaving and slavery around Zanzibar.


Other Works Referred to in the Text


I would be pleased to supply a copy of my course syllabus on the "Comparative History of Black Slavery in Africa and the Americas" upon request.
COMMENTARY

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In the interests of hearing from the audience, I'm going to make just a few general comments addressing the implications of Professor Miller's paper for our thinking about and teaching of world history.

I'm beginning to think that maybe I teach in a different world than some of you. Less than half of my freshmen have ever been on that beach we've mentioned, let alone anywhere else! (laughter) However, I think that if we're honest, many of us would agree that our students probably don't have a well developed sense of the rest of the world. Unfortunately, the sense they do have is often a bit misguided.

One of the things about the rest of the world that they do know (and this is both good and bad) is that a diaspora brought people from Africa, Asia, and a wide variety of other places into our country. It is this "diasporan" aspect of world history, it seems to me, with which we must deal. For good or ill, the impressions that our students have of Africa in large part stem from their impressions of Afro-Americans; the impressions our students have of Asia largely derive from the impressions they have of Asian-Americans. The diasporan aspect of world history is, therefore, a very important one.

Let me suggest several things. First, it's crucial that our students come to understand, as Professor Miller has suggested, the process of slavery and the process of slave systems for the diasporan aspect of African history. Students must come to understand some of the similarities between the slave systems and the institution of slavery as it existed virtually everywhere in the world. My students, at least, look at Africans and Afro-Americans and say, "Now, these folks are different. They not only look different, they behave differently, they act differently, they do all kinds of different things. To tell us that human beings are essentially the same goes against the evidence we have of what other people are like." Hence I think it's important to focus on the kinds of processes about which Professor Miller speaks; these may enable us to understand better the commonalities of the human experience.
It also seems to me that we should consider how the diasporan acculturation process which Professor Miller mentioned affects us directly, as Americans, in our common culture. This is not simply a matter of making Africans into what we wanted them to be, or of integrating them into American society to the degree that seemed appropriate. It is a matter of recognizing the simple fact that we have gained things from Africans. I'm not talking here only about the things that Melville J. Herskovits referred to as "Africanisms"--the survival of African cultural elements in this country; I'm talking about the things that are part of our common culture. Jazz is one of these. My students are always fascinated when I explain to them the origins of the term "juke box" and the background of West African dance in this country. In addition, my students, who come from the edge of Dixie, include among their favorite foods (certainly in New Year's meals) black-eyed peas. When I explain to them the African origins of this crop, they are amazed. I delve into a number of areas like this because I think it's important for students to see how African items from the diaspora have come into the common culture. There are suggestions now that even such things as cooking techniques--deep frying, for example--came into American society through the cooks of the African slave experience. While some of these ideas do remain open to debate, I'm convinced of the importance of using them to help our students understand the commonalities of the diasporan experience.

Finally, we must help students consider the differences between peoples and help them understand that there are particular reasons why Africans behave as Africans, why Chinese behave as Chinese. We must help students understand that there is nothing essentially "wrong" with such differences, even though we share commonalities of the human experience. We should understand, as Professor Vansina suggests, that Africans have a different view of themselves. A. Kagame, whom Professor Vansina mentions, points to the element of time as one of the crucial factors in this: Africans, western Europeans, and Americans view time in different ways. By this, I'm referring not just to what the clock is now telling me--that it's time to stop--but also to the sense of time which we understand as linking the past, the present, and the future. If students understand why different societies link these elements of time together in different ways, they can better accept the reality which they see of the diaspora and of the world in general. This
does, of course, require us to teach in the affective as well as the cognitive domain. We should introduce our students to the writing of Leopold Senghor and to the Negritude school which explains how the unities of the diasporan experience come in the state of feeling rather than thinking, in understanding and empathy rather than rationality. In this fashion, we can help them appreciate the internal coherence of African and Afro-American behavior that they may otherwise have ignored.

Professor Miller's remarks and our general consideration of diasporas in world history should point us to some fundamental questions. To what extent should we teach our students about the commonalities of the human experience? To what extent must we help them understand the reasons for the differences in the human experience? Can we do both? I believe that the African diaspora demonstrates in positive ways both commonalities and differences that will help our students have a useful, functional appreciation for the world in which they must, whether they like it or not, live.
DISEASE AND AFRICA IN WORLD HISTORY

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Disease used to be a neglected theme in world history; in some respects it still is. It's not so much neglected as taken for granted. Everyone knows that disease is an important factor in people's lives—and deaths—but it's often taken as one of the ills of man's lot here on earth, hardly worth special notice in the sweep of events. Spectacular epidemics like the Black Death necessarily attracted historical attention, but a half-century or so ago, historians began to pay attention to more ordinary illnesses. Some from the biological side, like Hans Zinsser in his Rats, Lice, and History, looked to the spectacular. Historians of medicine, like Henry Sigerist in Civilization and Disease, dealt with broader and more continuous patterns. Others with a similar medical background, like Percy M. Ashburn in The Ranks of Death, took on the role of disease in a major historical episode—in this case the conquest of the Americas in the sixteenth century. The biological mechanisms of disease also attracted attention, as in the now-classic work of Sir Macfarlane Burnet. More recently William H. McNeill traced disease through a long run of time in the perspective of world history. It is far easier today than it would have been only a few decades ago to bring the roles of disease into the teaching of world history.

The worldwide and long-term patterns of interaction between people and parasites can provide a point of departure. Present-day epidemiology holds that our species has carried out a long-term and exceedingly elaborate process of continuous adjustment to the various parasites that live with us. Parasites in this connection include viruses, protozoa, bacteria, insects, and fungus. Like other living things, they are continuously changing as part of the evolutionary process. Since their generations are immensely shorter than ours, their rate of change and adjustment is immensely faster. During the Second World War, for example, American chemists developed chloroquin phosphate, the most effective anti-malarial known so far. By the time of the Vietnam war, Plasmodium Falciparum, the most lethal of the malarial parasites, had evolved new varieties immune to chloroquin. Human beings
in turn adjust to the changing disease environment partly through medical protection, partly through evolutionary changes in genetic makeup, but more rapidly through changing immune responses. Every parasite that invades the body leads to the production of antibodies to counterattack. Each disease therefore tends to leave the surviving victim with some degree of immunity against future attack. This happens even if the attack is sub-clinical, with no very clear symptoms because the immune system's response was so effective. And immune individuals in a society protect their neighbors as well as themselves; if a group contains enough immune individuals, the parasite cannot spread freely, and the whole society gains what is called "herd immunity."

These underlying patterns of interaction have a long-term role in history. As humankind spread out across the surface of the earth, people encountered new physical environments and new parasites. Before the Agricultural Revolution that began about 10,000 B.C., intercommunication between human communities was hard to maintain. Their parasites and their immunities diverged continuously. Places like the Americas or Australasia that were cut off from the main centers of intercommunication in the Afro-Eurasian landmass developed their own parasites. At the same time, they lost or never gained the immunities of the world they had left.

With the Agricultural Revolution, the pattern of diverging disease environments gave way to convergence. With cities and denser populations, diseases spread along the trade routes, or with invading armies. This pattern of diverging, then converging disease environments was exactly parallel to the similar pattern of diverging human cultures followed by convergence after the coming of agriculture.

This worldwide pattern affected Africa in a number of different ways. When urban civilization first developed in Mesopotamia and the Nile Valley, North Africa entered the generalized Mediterranean disease environment. By the year 1000 or so, this area had virtually all of the familiar endemic diseases of the present time, though not always in precisely their present forms--the full range of "childhood disease," smallpox, tuberculosis, malaria, and so on.
South of the Sahara, however, the situation was different. One source of difference was the year-round warmth and dampness of the humid tropics. This helped to make tropical Africa the home of a whole set of diseases that rarely or never spread far to the north of the Sahara. These included yaws, schistosomiasis, and trypanosomiasis in varieties that attacked both man and domestic animals. It included hyperendemic faicirepum malaria, carried by the most effective vectors found anywhere in the world, and, later on, yellow fever. It included a number of comparatively exotic diseases like onchocerciasis or "river blindness"--a disease that depends on an interaction of the parasites with two hosts, man and the simulium flies found along water courses. In some places in northern Ghana 10 to 20 percent of the population over four years old is blind from this cause. Other diseases are also more serious in the savanna country north or south of the forest belt--malaria, for example, which is not associated with swamps in Africa as it is in Europe--or cerebrospinal menengitis, which swept across the savanna country in periodic epidemics.

Along with these diseases specific to a tropical environment, Africa had the full range of diseases common to the Mediterranean basin. The only prominent exceptions were smallpox, which was not endemic in the far south until Europeans introduced it in the seventeenth century, and cholera, which came with the nineteenth century pandemic that also reached Europe and America.

Africa was nevertheless somewhat different from the fully communicating zone of the Mediterranean world. Internal communications were comparatively weak. The result was a pattern of many localized disease environments, with localized immunities. As a result, anytime before the early twentieth century, when Africans moved away from home, they suffered much higher rates of morbidity and mortality. Morbidity and mortality also increased when strangers with exotic diseases arrived from the outside world.

These conditions of semi-isolation from larger and more diverse disease environments began to change by stages, beginning for East Africa as early as the second century B.C. About that time, mariners began to travel regularly between Malaya and India, India and Arabia, and southward down the African coast. These
changes brought Africa within range of the intercommunicating worlds of South Asia and the Mediterranean. Ethiopia had a part in these maritime advances. In the early centuries of our era, the kingdom of Axum rose to power in the highlands above the Red Sea. Ties to the intercommunicating world were so close that, when Rome turned Christian, Ethiopia followed.

But the inland penetration of these new influences was limited. Indian, Arabian, and Egyptian traders—to say nothing of the Indonesians that were to settle Madagascar—could move freely up and down the coast and the offshore islands. They built stone towns, but, for all their commercial activity, few of the maritime traders went inland into what was to become Kenya and Tanzania, though they did establish commercial contact with the goldfields of the future Zimbabwe.

This suggests that the immediate hinterland of the east coast was even more of a barrier than the Sahara was. And so it was! Once camels came into use in the Sahara after about 500 A.D., transportation across the Sahara became comparatively efficient. In East Africa, the barrier was not aridity but disease—not human disease but trypanosomiasis that made it impossible to use pack or traction animals over the long pull from the coast to the relatively fertile highlands of Kenya, Uganda, and western Tanzania. The trek into the highlands was not impossible; it was simply very, very expensive. All goods had to be carried by human porters, as they were until railways arrived in the 1890s.

In West Africa, disease also helped to isolate the sub-Saharan from the intercommunicating zone of North Africa, but the barrier was not the desert. It was the malaria of the savanna country just to the south. The two most important vectors, *Anopheles Gambiae* and *Anopheles funestus* are not only the most efficient carriers anywhere in the world; neither of them needs swamps or permanent water. *A. Gambiae* can lay its eggs in any small pool or footprint filled with rainwater, while *A. funestus* needs only a slightly larger pool. This means that *A. Gambiae* comes on strong at the beginning of the three-month rainy season, with *A. funestus* taking over toward its end. Both go into semi-hibernation during the long annual dry season, but they do some biting all year long. Recent studies in Mali showed that 59 percent of all mosquito bites were infective during the rains, dropping to 36 percent
in the early, fairly cool dry season, and on down to only 6 percent in the hot and dry season of our spring months.\(^7\) The point here is that it was, and continues to be, virtually impossible to avoid an infective bite. Local people became infected as infants. Many died, but those who survived showed no clinical symptoms, though they were infested by the parasites as long as they continued to be reinfected regularly. Strangers who entered the region from the outside were certain to be infected and were likely to die within a year or so.

This applied even to strangers from North Africa, which was also a malarious region, but a very different one. The most dangerous Anopheles were absent there, and the dominant species of Plasmodia were the comparatively mild \(P. \text{ vivax}\) and \(P. \text{ malariae}\). \(P. \text{ falciparum}\) occurs seasonally in late summer, but it appears to be a different strain from the varieties common in West Africa.\(^8\) North Africans could therefore cross the desert in relative safety, but wet-season residence in the savanna was extremely dangerous (as the French discovered in the 1880s when they tried to use Algerian and Moroccan workers on the Senegal railway).\(^9\) The North Africans had long since learned that lesson. They tended to stay on the desert edge, leaving the commerce of the savanna and forest zones to local African traders.

The European maritime revolution of the late fifteenth century brought Europeans as well to the fringes of tropical Africa, with results equally disastrous for the outsiders. A quantitative survey of mortality among Royal African Company personnel on the coast in the early eighteenth century showed that only about 10 percent of those who went out for a three-year assignment lived to return to England.\(^10\)

Rapid death for incoming strangers on the African coast was part of a revolution in disease environments that followed the Maritime Revolution. Europeans were able to reach Africa by sea and to return home because they had discovered the world wind system—the uniform alternation of easterly trade winds in lower latitudes with prevailing westerlies further north. By the early sixteenth century, they could reach any coastal point in the world. Where they went their diseases went as well. They themselves died on the African coast, but elsewhere
their diseases killed off many of the nonimmune populations outside the Afro-
Eurasian landmass.

The first to go were those of the American tropical lowlands, where the
common European diseases like smallpox and measles came along with the new
varieties of malaria from tropical Africa. As a result, the population of the Greater
Antilles was wiped out as a community, though it left some genetic input for future
generations of Afro-Americans. Elsewhere in the Americas, the population declined
by at least 70 percent over a century or a little more--when new immunities made
it possible for these Native American populations to grow once more.

Much the same thing happened in the Pacific and Australasia. In Tasmania,
where contact only began in the 1770s, the last native Tasmanian died in 1876. In
Australia, the native population dropped by 75 percent between about 1788 and
1900. On the North Island of New Zealand, it dropped by 83 percent between the
1770s and the 1890s. On the island of Hawaii, it also dropped by 83 percent between
the 1775 and 1900s.11

These demographic disasters across the ocean affected Africa as well. The
death of so many American Indians left empty land, which was ultimately
repopulated by people from the Old World disease environment--from Africa to the
tropical lowlands, from Europe to the more temperate Americas and Australasia.
The mechanism for moving people from Africa to the Americas was, of course, the
slave trade--well enough known not to be recounted here--but obviously crucial to
the course of history in tropical Africa from the mid-seventeenth to the mid-
nineteenth century. And world disease patterns were one of its fundamental causes.

Then, in the nineteenth century, as the slave trade was phased out--as Europe
and North America were building industrial economies--the role of disease in world
history took a new turn. The age-long pattern of high birth rates and high death
rates began to change beyond recognition. The change began with Europe, and the
best evidence is from England, where the population doubled between 1816 and 1871
without severe pressure on living standards.12 Any change of this importance must
have been complex; it included interrelations between industrialization and society

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that are not well understood. One problem is the importance to be assigned to improved medical knowledge. Authorities once believed that it must have been crucial to population growth. More recently, Thomas McKeown suggested that medical technology was unimportant until nearly the twentieth century—that the growth of human population before the eighteenth century was held back mainly by a scarcity of food—and it grew afterward mainly on account of improved nutrition. 

Dropping European mortality rates and increasing European population had important side effects for the tropical world generally and Africa in particular. In Europe and North America, mortality rates for soldiers who stayed home dropped about 85 percent for France, Britain, or the United States between the 1820s/1830s and the last five years before the First World War. Over the same range of time, death rates for men serving overseas in the tropical world dropped more and they dropped faster—93 percent in Algeria, 94 percent in India, and 99 percent for British troops in West Africa. Although these death rates remained higher than those for troops serving in Europe, they were down to levels European war ministries thought tolerable. At a time when the new industry gave Europe overwhelming superiority on the battlefield, the new mortality rates of European troops in the tropics meant that victory could be cheap in lives as well as treasure. The combination may not have caused imperialism, but it certainly made imperialist adventures more attractive.

Africa was a special case in point. It had been known as the "white man's grave"—and with some reason. The mortality rates for European soldiers in West Africa are hardly credible. British enlisted personnel in the Sierra Leone Command over the period 1819–36 died at the rate of 483 per 1,000 mean strength. That was exceptional, but common death rates were nearly as bad. Between 1819 and 1849, the French troops in Senegal had annual death rates in successive decades of 143.5, 189.2, and 67.1 per 1,000.

In the nineteenth century, some widely publicized expeditions drew European public attention to the cost of activity in Africa. In 1841, the British government sent a humanitarian exploring expedition to the Niger River, equipped with the most
modern steamboats and medical knowledge. After only a few weeks upriver, it came back to the coast with most of the European crew dead. Their annualized losses came to the improbable-sounding figure of 2,500 per 1,000 strength.\(^ {18}\) That ended the prospect of extensive European activity in West Africa for the next thirty years. The Dutch and Danes sold or abandoned their coastal trading posts; and, in the mid-1860s, the British considered doing the same.

Then, in the early 1870s, a bare six years before the scramble for Africa was to begin in earnest, the British managed to reverse Africa's bad disease reputation. After an Asante invasion of the Gold Coast in 1873, the Army and the Colonial Office decided that medical and material progress had now made it possible to use British troops in Africa at bearable cost. They made very elaborate preparations for a war that was hailed as a "doctors' war, engineer's war." By keeping the troops aboard ship till the last moment, by making careful logistical preparations, the expeditionary force advanced from Cape Coast to Kumasi, burned the Asante capital and returned to the coast, its conditions of victory met.

Government spokesmen and press agents claimed a final triumph over the African climate. Lord Carnarvon at the Colonial Office boasted that the expedition's loss of only 23 men dead per 1,000 thousand was less than the normal mortality expected in London.\(^ {19}\) Still more important, continental Europeans as well as the British believed the good news. The French military medical journals were full of admiration for the British achievement,\(^ {20}\) and the scramble for Africa went forward with high hopes for cheap victories.

In fact, the victory of the doctors and engineers was to come before the end of the century, but the claims of 1874 were premature. Carnarvon's London death rate of 25 per 1,000 included infants and old people. The true death rate of British troops at home at that time was less than eight per 1,000. The elaborate preparations for the attack also included frequent steamers to take home the sick and wounded. In addition to the 23 per 1,000 who died on the Gold Coest, 114 per 1,000 were invalided home--where some died at sea and others after arrival. Finally, the expedition was only on shore two months; the annualized death rate was therefore 236 per 1,000, not 23. Nevertheless, European expectations rose, the
The conquest of Africa proceeded—and, in the end, public health measures before 1914 actually made it possible to keep European troops in West Africa for less than the annual mortality of those in Europe 50 years earlier.

Once the Europeans had conquered Africa, the very fact of a European administration began to change the disease environments all over the continent. The Europeans recruited workers for the railroads—sometimes voluntary labor, sometimes forced. They did the same with plantation labor. As workers moved, the semi-separate environments began to break down, and Africa passed through its own demographic disaster—much less serious than the death of the Amerindians, the Australian Aborigines, or the Maoris, but serious enough.

Research is still under way, but the main tendencies are clear. Hartwig and Patterson outlined the current hypothesis nearly ten years ago. Briefly, during the colonial impact on Africa disease took two opposing forms. In the earliest periods of colonial conquest and its aftermath, new diseases, new epizootics like rinderpest, and the movement of populations into new disease environments combined to bring about what appears almost everywhere to have been a real decline in total population. It moved unevenly across Africa, in timing with the colonial conquest, though some new disease patterns arrived even before the European armies—like the cholera epidemics which reached both West and East Africa as far south as Madagascar in the mid-century. Cholera was a new disease to Africa, with far higher death rates among Africans than among Europeans. For Algeria, where the conquest began in 1830, French demographers as early as 1874 began to note the loss of Algerian population from the combination of cholera, typhus, and famine that followed the armies. Elsewhere, especially in tropical East Africa, the most serious decline came over the period of about 1880 to 1920.

The second influence of the European presence came from the introduction of public health measures. European medical practice rarely reached ordinary people in the early colonial period, but piped water supplies and sewage disposal had a profound impact on water-borne disease. Later on, anti-trypanosomiasis campaigns were important in reducing sleeping sickness, and similar results followed with other diseases as well. As a new African disease environment finally took shape by about
the 1920s, new immunities took hold and African populations began to grow again, as they would probably have done regardless of public health measures. With the increasing influence of public health--most spectacular in the eradication of smallpox--the way was cleared for one of Africa's most serious problems today: explosive population growth beyond the local capacity to feed the population.
Notes

1. (New York: Editions for the Armed Services, 1935) and many later editions.


14. Deaths per thousand strength:

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<th>1820s/30s</th>
<th>1910-14</th>
<th>Percent decrease</th>
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(U.S. and British results differ on account of rounding. Sources are British Parliamentary Papers, 1837-38, xi (138); Great Britain Army Medical Services, Annual Report, for 1914; Benoitson de Chateauneuf, "Essai sur la mortalité dans l'infanterie francaise," Annales d'hygiène publique et de médecine légale, 10:239-316 (1833); France, Ministère de Guerre, Statistiques médicales de l'armée métropolitain et de l'armée coloniale, reports for 1910-14; Thomas Lawson, Statistical Report on
the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United States, 3 vols. (Washington: 1840-60); United States Army, Annual Reports of the Surgeon General, 1910-14.

15. Deaths per 1,000 strength:

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<tr>
<td>India:</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>94.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>British West Africa:</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>6.64</td>
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16. British Parliamentary Papers, 1842, xxvii (385) 5-7; see also P. D. Curtin, "Epidemiology and the Slave Trade," Political Science Quarterly 83 (1968): 190-216.


20. See, for example, Léon Colin, "L'expédition anglaise de la côte d'or; étude d'hygiène militaire et de géographie médicale," Gazette hebdomadaire de médecine et de chirurgie 11 (2nd ser.): 37-40, 52-54.


22. René Ricoux, *Contribution à l'étude de l'acclimatement des Français en Algérie* (Paris: 1874) 110, estimated a population loss among Muslim Algerians at 20,000 or about .06 percent per year from 1830 to 1866, and as high as 3 percent per year between 1866 and 1872.
COMMENTARY
Robert E. Roeder
The University of Denver

Professor Curtin's paper has certainly established that the disease environment played a major role in shaping African history and, indeed, the history of the world. I'm sure that of the many, many points he made, each of us was struck by some more forcibly than by others. I found particularly striking the explanation which disease provides for the failure of the East African coastal towns, which existed for over a millenium, to develop hinterlands. The explanation from geographic factors has never made sense to me, because certainly far more forbidding geographies have been penetrated, and because traders tend to create hinterlands. The general point—that in Africa the disease environments created barriers between groups internally, and not only between Africans and non-Africans, but between one set of Africans and another—strikes me as an important insight. The West African example and the explanation of why the merchant diasporas stopped at the desert's edge—a point developed in much more detail in Professor Curtin's cross-cultural trade book—highlights the disease factor in that complex explanation. Finally, the use of disease factors to explain why the European penetration of Africa was inhibited for so long, and why it took place when it did, seemed to me to be of compelling persuasiveness. In sum, I think this is a powerful exposition of the importance of disease factors in African history and, at least by implication, in history generally.

I think I should issue some personal caveats (stimulated not, I hasten to add, by Professor Curtin's remarks, implications, or even unintended suggestions) about what some of us might mistakenly draw from the paper. These caveats are based, quite simply, on my own mistakes in trying to deal with disease factors in a college classroom. Discussing these matters, I've found, does not always teach the lessons you really want to teach, and considerable care is necessary. I remember the day I covered McNeill's hypothesis that syphilis did not constitute a "return gift" from Amerindians to Europeans, but rather developed in Europe itself as a result of the introduction of better food and particularly better housing and clothing. According to McNeill, these higher standards of cleanliness allowed a mutation of a bug much
like yaws, which was endemic in medieval Europe, into syphilis.* One very intelligent but also somewhat bearded, scruffy, and barefoot gentleman in the class raised his hand and said, "Do you mean history teaches that cleanliness is next to idiocy?" Well, that really was not the lesson I wanted to teach.

There are some dangers in a careless and too quick use of the disease factor. Certainly we want to avoid microbial determinism. There were barriers, but under certain circumstances they could be overcome. The trans-Saharan traders themselves may have found the disease barrier impenetrable, but as Professor Curtin's book illustrates in some detail, that barrier didn't stop them from finding ways of getting their goods through, of conducting trade through other intermediaries, and of obtaining the gold and other items they desired. Second, even if one doesn't fall into a strictly deterministic pattern and accepts that humans can overcome these and other kinds of barriers, one can sometimes rely too easily on a monocausal explanation. I think that the example Professor Curtin gives of how the Asante expedition of the 1870's was misinterpreted by press agents and the Colonial Office is an interesting one here. It wasn't the absolute fall in death rates which shaped subsequent actions; much more crucial was the interpretation of this statistic by European press agents. So one has to consider not only just one factor but a multiplicity of factors, as we continuously remind ourselves. The compelling force of the disease factor when it's simply presented sometimes makes us overlook this.

We must also be aware that viewing disease as a barrier to penetration vis-à-vis certain kinds of development does not represent the total role played by diseases in human history. This aspect of disease history is the one which I believe has been most investigated and about which it's easiest to find information. However, besides information. However, besides preventing the development of institutions, certainly diseases must have shaped them as well. I'd be curious to learn how disease may have shaped certain African institutions.

Despite these caveats, it is very important to deal with the disease factor, and this paper demonstrates how disease may be used to illuminate crucial and otherwise unintelligible matters. It does seem to me that it is important to do so. Humans had to face formidable barriers in the environments—the disease environments particularly—of Africa. These barriers did not blight cultural development, but they did make it different. This raises the question of what to do with different paths of historical and cultural development in a world history course. Such paths vary considerably from what might be discerned as one tries to create a list of the main developments in civilization, particularly "civilization" in the singular. (These very brief comments bear not only upon Professor Curtin's paper, but on others we've heard in the past two days.) After all, in any world history course—no matter what its extent and level—there are going to be very great constraints on time. What do you put in, what do you leave out, and even once you decide to include a continent, what of all the many things you could say about it, do you need to say? One needs criteria of choice.

It seems to me there are at least four major kinds of answers to the question of how to deal with a historical experience that's quite different from the mainline Eurasian experience of "civilized" societies. One path that we've heard Professor White propose is to say that world history really should be a global history, and that it should deal with those major developments that affected, if not the whole world, the Eurasian civilized world. This is both an old view and, in some ways, a new one. People are coming up with new lists of what the major developments are, but the view itself is certainly no more recent than McNeill's book in 1963.* It does have the appeal of providing an identity for world history. This is why world history is different from other kinds of history. It has a specific subject matter and it does provide an appealing economy in criteria of choice. The consequences for African history, however, of adopting this principle of inclusion and exclusion were suggested by Professor Vansina yesterday. If you leave out North Africa, Egypt, and the other parts of Africa historically and geographically connected to Eurasia, then

the West African historical experience does seem to differ from the experience of lands to the north. Certainly, as we've heard in many different ways over the last two days, Africa was never totally disconnected; it always participated, sometimes more directly, sometimes less directly, in some of the sweeping changes affecting the Eurasian ecumene. It seems to me, however (and perhaps this will allow me to carry out the function I was assigned of being provocative), that Africa was seldom the generator, seldom the initiator and driver of those changes. Africa reacted and was sometimes (but not always) victimized by the changes, but it was seldom the point at which those sweeping changes were generated (excepting North Africa).

A second old way of deciding how to deal with "different" historical experiences is to base the course structure on the notion that something like equal time should be given to all culture areas—the original Stavrianos kind of approach. This does have some virtues. It provides an avenue for placing ignored peoples in the course; it will help students understand today's world by giving some background for all parts of that world. However, the consequence of this approach for African history seems almost patronizing. We're putting those people in there not because we can think of any reasons they are important in world history, but because we think we ought to put all peoples in the course, however unimportant, uninteresting, backward, etc., etc. I certainly don't think that's accurate history, and it's not a very good way to proceed, because it tends to falsify history—not only for Africa but for any other area. Moreover, such an approach tends to view the culture as a single entity, as the history of one area, when in fact that is hardly true—certainly not for Africa and probably not for anywhere.

A third somewhat newer possibility is based upon recognition that world history and the history of civilization are not the same thing. "Civilized" peoples (i.e., urban societies based upon peasant agricultural populations as the main providers of resources) only constitute part of the world's cultures. Until very recently (certainly no earlier than the cessation of Mongol dominance over Eurasia five or six centuries ago), the other parts—what the civilized people called the "barbarian" parts—not only were there, but had a dynamic relationship with the civilized parts and sometimes prevailed in contests of force over those civilized parts. Indeed, change in the civilized parts was in no small measure a function of
the interaction between "barbarians" and non-barbarians. An interesting new textbook by Anthony Esler seems to be based upon this perception.* It includes in a very systematic way peoples who aren't organized in "civilizations," and it shows the dynamism of their interaction—the important effects not only of the civilized upon the barbarian, but the barbarian upon the civilized. This would seem to have considerable virtue as a means of integrating African history into world history. It provides a way to look at all the wonders of the world (and man is chiefest among them) and not just at the wonders of "civilization." This may be mistaken and resented by African historians as a new form of patronization of Africans; that is certainly not my intent in suggesting it.

Finally, there's another criterion that would provide, for me, an important way of integrating Africa history into world history, if I knew more about African history. Hence, I'm going to conclude this last point with a question. While I think the main concern in a world history course should be with those developments that are of global significance and which changed the way men lived pervasively, if not globally, I also think that we should explore certain changes and developments that were not followed by the rest of a world; such changes are, quite simply, both fascinating and possibly significant to us as we seek to make further change in our own world. My favorite example of this is the Japanese experience in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In the space of barely fifty years, probably the most pervasively militarized premodern society the world has ever seen was transformed into a pacific society in which internal peace lasted for two further centuries. During this fifty years, a society that had adopted the use of a new military technology—firearms—on a scale that at least equalled and probably exceeded that of any European nation, totally eliminated firearms. Indeed, the Japanese had some peculiar circumstances in which to work this out, but it seems this might be worthy of study in a world history course today—if only to cast doubt on the assertion that we are helpless victims of technological determinism.

Now I don't know where one might find a similar example in African history. I suspect that it might be found in the history of Africans creating rather large societies--I guess maybe "tribal" is the right word (protostate is a word I don't like to apply to this)--in which it's difficult to find anything that very closely resembles the bureaucratic or feudal structures of "civilized" Eurasian states. In other words, I think maybe the most interesting part in African history is not the existence of early civilizations and states, but the fact that there weren't very many of them until late; nevertheless, Africans found a way through centuries on end to unify large numbers of people over considerable geographic areas. Is this a profitable avenue to explore?
REJOINDER

Professor Curtin: I'll make this very fast. The commentary was well stated and most of it holds up; I'll not worry about the parts over which there might be some disagreement. In defense of the importance of African history against the "greater civilization" idea, you have to keep in mind that if you don't consider all the evidence in any problem, you're going to get some wrong answers. If you look at the history of the places you assumed to be great civilizations and then use that as a core for putting together African history, you get a distorted view of what happened. If, instead, you start out with an African institution and use that as a basis for looking at the rest of the world (which I did in a book called Cross-Cultural Trade and World History), you get a different view of world history where the built-in ethnocentricity derived from our older view of history has to disappear.

We also tend to forget that Africans were, after all, inventing and discovering all kinds of things, but their inventions often didn't spread. For example, people learned in the history of medicine that a man named Ronald Ross discovered this mosquito vector of malaria, and he did indeed; but the people in the Usumbara Mountains in East Africa had known about it for centuries. In fact, their word for "mosquito" and the word for "fever" are the same word. They knew that if you went down to where the mosquitoes were, you'd get sick, so they stayed up in the mountains where they were healthy. They didn't tell everybody else, so the news didn't spread--but they knew about it! (laughter)
SUMMARY

AFRICA IN WORLD HISTORY: A TEACHING CONFERENCE

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The question at hand is how best to summarize a very diverse set of papers. What ideas and insights have I derived from these papers that will assist me, as a teacher of African history who is concerned with the wider context in which African history belongs, in improving my teaching about Africa and its place in world history?

In taking up this task, I should note at the outset that I am not a teacher of world history, and indeed, have never taught world history at the college level. The closest I have come to teaching world history was in my first few years at the University of Florida being assigned to teach the course on modern western civilization. I did attempt to bring Africa into that course where appropriate—but western civilization is not world history (though too many still approach world history as if it were a slightly expanded version of western civilization). For the past fifteen years or so, I have dealt almost exclusively with African history, including an introductory course on Africa in World History which I first offered in 1982. Last summer I also directed a six-week institute for Florida secondary social studies teachers, funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities, on "Teaching Africa in the Context of World History and Civilization." Thus as a teacher I have been concerned with fitting African history into the wider context of world history, in order that my students will be able to understand Africa not in isolation but in connection with the history of other parts of the world.

To return to the matter of summarizing the papers—one way would be to comment individually on each of the five papers and how they relate to the overall theme of teaching Africa in the world history context. This will take place to some extent in the course of my comments. The principal focus of the summary, however, will be to deal with what seems to be the two essentially different
perspectives which the papers provide about Africa’s place in world history, perspectives that are more or less at odds with each other.

Stating these two basic perspectives will undoubtedly simplify matters more than the authors of the papers might find fully agreeable, and, I would hasten to add, such simplification does distort matters to some extent. Nonetheless, let me state what I consider to be the two principal perspectives:

1. The first perspective is to place African history in the context of world history and to argue that the study of African history contributes to and benefits from a world history perspective. This approach stresses topics, themes, and processes that tie African history to world history or at least which Africa has in common with the so-called Third World or former colonial world.

2. The second perspective stresses that Africa is sui generis and thus does not conveniently fit into the conventional scheme for teaching world history. There are at least two dimensions to this perspective which emerge from the papers as presented. One is that the fundamental structures (organizing principles) of African societies are unique. The second approaches the issue in terms of historiography and argues that African historians are increasingly viewing Africa in ways that depart from the concerns of their western or even the older generation of western-educated counterparts and thus are writing history that is different from that which is being stressed in the West.

The first perspective is clearly the more congenial and the second is clearly the more challenging and difficult. There is a general desire among western historians of Africa and African historians who either work in or are closely affiliated with the West to downplay the uniqueness of Africa and to stress the commonalities of African history with the history of other parts of the globe. This is part of a wider tendency, represented by efforts such as the series of conferences the Air Force Academy has been sponsoring and which Lieutenant Colonel Shaw emphasized in his opening comments, to make world history truly that and not simply an expanded version of western civilization. Professor Brooks makes this point in his comment that one of the organizational principles of his course is to
show on a world scale over time the relatively modest role of the West until its "comparatively recent technological and military ascendancy" (which is now on the wane). Professor Russell-Wood notes in a similar vein that comparative world history may indeed be "a history in which only minor roles can be found" for Europe and where the major actors are "the peoples indigenous to Africa, Asia, and the Americas." Finally, Professor Miller suggests that if Africanists "present our subject in less exotic terms," the continent is less difficult to integrate into a world history schema where the West, and not Africa, appears to be exceptional. The effort, then, is to show that Africa is not exotic, that Africans are not different from the rest of humanity. Underlying this effort is a clear, sustained intellectual effort to refute and counter the racism and ethnocentrism so long dominant in the West.¹

The second perspective poses a challenge to those who adhere to the first. If Africa is, after all, fundamentally different, then does the stress on common themes and processes create as much distortion as the "Africa is exotic" approach it has sought to counter? On the other hand, to accept that Africa is different could easily lead scholars back to the exotic trap that still remains very much alive (Professor Russell-Wood's comments on the reception accorded to Daniel Boorstin's The Discoverers underscore the continued intellectual appeal of a view of the world from the "literate West"). This dimension of the second perspective, however, is to a considerable extent a debate within western scholarship.

The more basic potential crisis stems from the possible divergence of the study of history within Africa from the study of the history of Africa in our own society. As Professor Vansina points out, up until now the division between Afro-Saxon and Afro-Latin historians has been deeper than that between African and western historians (though significant differences did exist below the surface). For a variety of reasons we are now beginning to see a more profound parting of the ways between western and African historians. Should western historians of Africa attempt to remain fully attuned to the approaches of African historians, they may again find themselves on the periphery of historical scholarship in their own countries. On the other hand, should they continue to seek, as they have so long sought, to influence the mainstream of western historiography they may well find
themselves cut off from their African colleagues. This is indeed a profound dilemma.

In my concluding remarks I will again return to the implications of these two perspectives for the study of and teaching about Africa in the context of world history. For the moment, though, I would like to explore a little more fully each of these perspectives.

Three of the papers, those by Professors Brooks, Curtin, and Miller, examine ways in which the history of Africa fits into the context of world history. Professor Brooks takes the broadest approach in presenting a schema for introducing Africa into world history courses. His perspective is definitely from outside the West, and he explicitly seeks to have his students come to understand that it is not incumbent on the rest of the world to "become more like us." He approaches his course on the basis of broad topics, five of which have a principal focus on Africa. Here, then, is one way of integrating Africa into world history: the selection of broad topics, some of which include reference to Africa (e.g., "Mediterranean Civilizations: Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans"), and some of which are exclusively or largely devoted to Africa (e.g., "East Africa and the Indian Ocean Trading Complex to c. 1500").

A second way for incorporating African history into world history courses also appears in Professor Brooks' schema--his use of recurrent themes. One of these themes is that of the trade diaspora which he utilizes in developing a number of the more specific topics. Professor Curtin also suggests themes related to disease--e.g., demographic disasters such as those which befell the indigenous populations of the American tropical lowlands when they faced an end to isolation and encountered new immigrant populations with diseases for which they had no immunity. This is a theme that is very much a part of European expansion and also involved Europeans who settled in the tropics where they encountered similarly hostile disease environments. Professor Russell-Wood also suggests various themes in his paper, as witnessed by his comments that the history of sub-Saharan Africa provides a rich array of examples of empires and of nation building which can be used to develop these themes in the world history context.
The thematic approach does differ from the topical approach in that themes can cut across topics and can be used to integrate the material for students. Thus, for example, the role of disease epidemics is not a topic for a world history course but rather a theme that can be used to tie a course together and to help make students aware that they share, or their parents shared, problems or confronted issues that earlier generations in diverse areas of the globe have faced (e.g., the AIDS epidemic of the 1980s; the post World War I influenza epidemic; the Black Death of the Middle Ages).

Yet a third approach to the perspective of placing Africa in the context of world history forms the conceptual core of Professor Miller's paper—history as process. "We best organize our presentations around the becomings, transitions, and dialectical tensions between what was and what may yet be. We can teach world history in terms of processes." Here, I am differentiating process from theme, because a thematic approach can be essentially static—e.g., to note how epidemic diseases have had a major impact on the course of history at various times and in various places. On the other hand, the treatment of something such as "Disease and Africa in World History" can also be handled in terms of process, as Professor Curtin does. In the broadest sense, we can see his handling of this topic in terms of the ongoing worldwide, longterm process of interaction between people and parasites going from the early pattern of divergence of parasites and immunities followed up by a later pattern of convergence that began with the agricultural revolution and picked up speed with the advancing milleniums and then centuries.

Themes can involve process, but without examining themes in terms of process, they remain essentially static and descriptive rather than dynamic. Thus Professor Miller's treatment of slavery does not take it as a given but rather considers it in terms of the ongoing changes that took place in context of the three processes—economic growth, migrations, and the consolidation of new communities. Furthermore, while the notion of slavery is foreign to our students ("It's something that happened in the past, so why should I be concerned with it?") the process of economic growth is one with which these students are familiar.
Turning now briefly to the second perspective, that Africa is sui generis and cannot be conveniently fitted into a schema for teaching world history, I wish to take up the first approach of Professor Russell-Wood. It is important to note that he differs from the others who have presented papers in that he is a Latin American specialist and not an Africanist. The great value of his paper is that as someone outside the field of African history he poses what for him are the particular problems confronting efforts to incorporate Africa into the framework of world history. His perspective is one that is no doubt shared by many other non-Africanists. The heart of his argument is that African history presents such conceptual and methodological challenges that "the historical baggage... which the non-Africanist brings to the study of Africa will have to be repacked or discarded." Above all else, "African societies may have a fundamental organizing principle which is unique and for which there may be no model or counterpart elsewhere."

The conclusion that emerges from Professor Russell-Wood's paper is that Africa constitutes such a difficult field in its own right that fitting it into the world history context is an extremely difficult and perhaps impossible task. Professor Russell-Wood seems to place his emphasis on structures and institutions which he finds so vastly different from those with which he is familiar in the Latin American context. An impasse could readily develop over whether or not the history of African societies can be fitted into the broader context of world history. One way to avoid such an impasse is to emphasize processes instead of structures and institutions. Viewed in this light, African societies no longer appear to be so unique and distinctive.

Professor Vansina's paper takes a different tack—that of discussing how African historians view their own past and the degree to which this view (or multiplicity of views) differs from that (or those) of western historians. The challenge is fundamental, in that for American scholarship on African history to be valid in the final sense, it must have validity within Africa as well. Similarly, for world history to be valid in its treatment of Africa, it must find acceptance in both western and African historical circles.
Until the present, African historians and western historians have been in communication and more or less agreement with each other (despite the differences in emphasis on the importance of the colonial period or the age of the slave trade). Deeper cleavages, Professor Vansina suggests, may well soon appear. African historians are more and more involved with local and sub-national history and are increasingly likely to use indigenous languages in writing up their research. Furthermore, topics of recent importance to western historiography (e.g., the history of the climate, demography, and the family) attract only limited attention in Africa. Western historians of Africa may thus find themselves in a quandary--to remain in the mainstream of western historiography or to try to remain attuned to historical scholarship within Africa.

CONCLUSION

Where do these two perspectives leave us? For me, an approach that utilizes process will allow teachers of world history to integrate Africa into their courses on the same basis as they incorporate the history of other major world areas. In this way, too, as I have already suggested, they can get around the concerns of Professor Russell-Wood for specific forms in Africa that are different from those elsewhere.

A growing divergence between western and African historians poses a more fundamental challenge. Two points are important to consider in this connection. First, a strong local (and parochial) historiography is not unique to, and may even be late in coming to Africa. Most states in this country, for instance, possess large numbers of historians with distinctly and even exclusively local concern--but they coexist with another body of historians, usually in the leading universities and colleges, who are full members of the wider national and international scholarly community. Such a pattern could well be emerging in Africa. The second point is that for Nigeria, which has the largest single group of historians, the evidence very much suggests that there is a strong desire and effort on the part of historians to remain part of the wider body of historical scholarship (academic exchanges, publishing, external examiners, and so forth). Perhaps, then. Professor Vansina's forecast is too pessimistic.

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Finally, I would like to suggest that historians face an almost impossible job anyway. We must view the past from the perspective of our own era, and the questions we pose are shaped by our own experiences. Yet the past belongs, as Peter Laslett entitled his book, to the world we have lost. In this sense, the African past, the Asian past, the Latin American past, the past of the United States and of Europe become more and more similar the further back we go in time.
Notes


**DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS**

**Question:** I have a question and a comment; let me start with the question first. If we remove Europe as a common reference, what type of world history are we going to have? Can we study African history by relating it to pre-European Latin American history or pre-European Asian history—that is, by looking at different sets of models and chronologies? As for my comment, I believe we already have several central themes which weren't clearly stated, but which can be used to synthesize world history. We can talk about migration, for example—about the similarities between the French, German, Scandinavian groups in coming to America, and about the type of cultural accommodation these people had to make. We can also talk about Africans going to other places. We can discuss movements of agriculture. As Dr. Vansina has already stated, the improvements that we find in Africa today came from the Americas; they did not come from Europe. This allows us to view the vitality of Africa from an American as opposed to a European perspective. If we remove that Eurocentric focus, what type of world history do we have?

**Professor Vansina:** I'd like to pose a counter-question: what world history do you want in a course for whom? It's important for the province of world history and world history courses to keep our students in mind. If we do that, some of the comments that were raised become easier to handle. We must first keep in mind our public and the goal of the course. Having done that, we find that Africa really does become obstreperous and difficult for a world history course, because one is faced with the problem of handling Africa as a continent or not. Basically, we don't; Africa is usually included in a world history course when it overlaps with the intercommunicating zone vis-a-vis Asia and Europe, and this makes a lot of sense. As you've heard, teachers want the grand syntheses that allow them to put together such courses, and such syntheses exist, say, for the Islamic world. But from the point of view of the rest of Africa, what you've done is to say: "Look at this

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*Editor's note: This section represents an edited compilation of the three separate discussion sessions held during the conference.*
wonderful continent"--you're only talking about half of it by now--"Look at this wonderful continent that doesn't fit in," because what easily fits in has already been dealt with. I think that the treatment of that part of Africa left over after you have considered the intercommunicating zone is not very happy one from the point of view of an Africanist; but I can understand that you cannot do much else in a world history course, with the frame, goal, and units that are set for it.

Where Africa really is a challenge is in the categories of thinking that are used in such courses. In two ways we have a division of labels in social science and the humanities that we take for realities, and they're not. First, "society," "economics," "family," "religion," and so on are products of the mind, not products of reality; this is where African data are a big problem. Second, even our sources and our labeling are not realities: we say "written sources," "other sources," "archaeology," "linguistic sources," and what have you. In fact, we mix all of these sources. For example, if you use a source, or a synthesis derived from a source, which is medieval European and based on Latin documents, you are using a lot of language philology, but you don't realize it. I think that one advantage of Africa in a world history course is to prod teachers to question some very basic concepts all over the world. Is it really true, for instance, that in China you can separate religion from the state, or religion from the economy? Obviously you cannot.

Now it is true that you don't have grand syntheses for early African history that can easily be used. I think you will get one at the end of Volume III of the UNESCO History of Africa (but that's copping out). That volume will tell you how many great cultural and social traditions arose in Africa approximately between the beginning of the era and 500 A.D. for some parts of the continent, and between 600 and 1100 A.D. for other parts. This will provide you with the type of material that you can put into a world course either in a comparative way or on its own.

Let's put it this way: man's and woman's mastery of different environments in Africa is still very important in the world today. Speaking at this very general level, Africa in food production--i.e., the invention and domestication of all sorts of foods--is absolutely important. The solutions were often original. Some crops, like sorghum, continue to be very important crops today. In urban studies, when you
discuss the notion of civilization you should realize that West Africa acquired urbanization by about 400 A.D., which is the earliest date we have now for walled cities. There are no Islamic influences in there—Islam didn't exist yet—nor are there North African influences; this is indigenous to West Africa. Between 400 and 900 A.D. West Africa is urbanized, and the urban centers are linked. That's important, because your criterion of literacy is not there; it is not essential to urbanization. This forces you to reflect on all urbanization and on all civilizations. So that's certainly a good example to use. When you talk about states, you can have several African cases where you show how, in different parts of the continent as well as in cases outside of that continent, state structures are products of...e to seven hundred year histories of growing complexity at all levels on which humans function. There again, using one African example would be a very good corrective to the usual fare we find.

Well I don't know if I have answered all the comments and I won't come back to the historiographical ones, but it seems to me if you come away from here with the idea that Africa is the irritant and that whatever else you have in this course, Africa is not going to fit, then instead of being frustrated you have to ask, "What's wrong with the rest" rather than "What's wrong with the African data." (applause—laughter)

Question: Can you elaborate a little more on your assessment of Cheik Anta Diop?

Professor Vansina: I think that Cheik Anta Diop's actual book and publications are unacceptable for the following reasons. His claims are that Egyptians were black, and because they were black they are the ancestors of Africans. He left out the question whether Egypt was founded by blacks coming further south or whether blacks further south came from Egypt. In his later thought, it's quite clear that he took on the older theory—very much hated elsewhere in Africa—that everything noticeable in Africa comes from Egypt. Well, you can study whether or not people were black and how black they were at various periods in Egyptian history. You can do it, and people have been doing it. In all periods there have been black and less black people in Egypt; we know that. The objection we have is, of course, that this
has nothing to do with culture and civilization and society. That's one fundamental area where we think Diop has stood European racism on its head, but the basic idea has not been discarded. A second point is that he thought about one civilization, as if he were a Frenchman (laughter); he talked about one civilization, which begins in Egypt, goes from there to Greece, from Greece to Rome, and from Rome to France, ultimately. (laughter) Of course you can understand the satisfaction of a West African saying to Frenchmen, "Well, you know, we are the ancestors of your civilization." But this is not science; it's a good argument to fight with, but it is not science.

Why, then, are serious African academics today still interested in Cheik Anta Diop? Well, they're interested in some of the questions he asked. They're interested in finding out what are the equivalent of "civilizations" in Africa; what we should understand by "civilization;" what West Africa has really contributed to such things as Islam in general, or to Europe in general. For example, the monetary basis on which Europe functioned during the Middle Ages is of West African origin. It is in that light that Cheik Anta Diop survived. But in practice such theories, for instance, that all African languages are descendant of Egyptian are abandoned by everybody because the data are not there. Moreover, even if "e data were there, historians would still have serious problems as to what that actually proves. Suppose you could say that American English is descendant of ancient Egyptian. What does it prove? After all, American English is Indo-European in origin, but no American historian has ever made a big point of relating United States society and culture in the last three centuries to societies and cultures of the third millennium B.C. in Iran. (laughter - applause).

**Question/Comment:** Has there been any kind of dialogue, deliberate or accidental, among historians concerned with what we inelegantly call "nonwestern history"? I think it's symptomatic that, other than in an exclusive kind of way, we don't have a word for the history of all those people who are not European, American, or western. Have nonwestern historians thought to have a dialogue with women historians? Many of the conceptual and methodological problems between these two new approaches to history are virtually identical. Both concern a history that includes us all. Both approaches are concerned with the difficulty of dealing
with different kinds of sources and with the lack of sources that traditional historians are used to having. We're concerned that the periodization developed for traditional history doesn't fit our particular approaches, which are new and different. We're trying to deal with similarities and differences of experience; we're trying to keep a balance between that which we share in terms of common human experience, and that which is particular, individual, independent, and idiosyncratic.

**Audience Comment:** The purpose of the World History Association has been to initiate just that kind of dialogue. All around the world all historians are struggling with the same kinds of problems—problems of periodization, of organization, of categories, etc. I'd also like to add that the United States is not the only country that is a prisoner to ethnocentrism.

**Audience Comment:** I think that we use our terms in a far too narrow and exclusive sense. Let me talk about "diaspora" as an example. We talk about the African diaspora, but what about the European diaspora? Why not talk about the Jewish diaspora? Why not discuss the Asian diaspora we're witnessing today? If we look at the women's history, we can also see this basic population movement. I think if we debate some of the terms we have and relate these terms to different groups, we'll begin to see the commonalities—that's the advantage in looking at these issues in inclusive terms. One way to facilitate this inclusiveness is by team teaching, by using people with different area specialties. It's extra hard work, but it's quite enlightening both for the people involved and for the students.

**Question:** A question for Professor Brooks. I noticed from looking over his syllabus that he asks his students to locate many of the things that I ask my students an introductory geography class to locate. I wonder why his maps contain almost no American rivers, seas, and bodies of water. Unless his students and the students with whom you're dealing in other institutions are a whole lot better educated than mine, they don't know where the Mississippi River is, or they don't know where the Gulf of Mexico is; they might know what a beach looks like, but they sure can't find it on the map! (laughter)
Professor Brooks: Yes, my students are just like yours. My colleagues in American history are appalled by the idea of giving map quizzes. (laughter) Regarding my course: the course always emphasizes the interrelationship between continents and peoples; hence, in Latin America and North America there are relatively few place names because these areas are treated in only about two lectures. Elsewhere, the emphasis is on relationships which extend across continents and across oceans. That's why the Mississippi River isn't there.

Question: I was informed on the day before yesterday that I had to teach a six-week unit on Africa next fall for the eleventh grade. I would really like to learn of some appropriate sources from some of the people who were lecturing today.

Audience Comment: I think a good survey book for the high school level for that short period of time is Bohannen and Curtin's *Africa and Africans*, but it's out of print.

Professor Curtin: It is out of print. We wanted to rewrite it systematically and thoroughly so that it would be brought up to date. Basically it's a pretty sound book, but it was written in a different era. I think that it will be available sometime in the future, but not soon.

Professor Davis: I think one of the most difficult things for a high school teacher to do is to find adequate material to teach a six-week Latin American or African course, or for a course on any other area peripheral to the main concerns of the public.

Audience Comment: My concern is really not finding something for the students; it's finding something for myself.

Professor Davis: There is a short bibliography in the registration packet.* I believe that a recent issue of the African Studies Association *Newsletter* published

*See Appendix B.
a two or three page list of basic library holdings for covering Africa in general. The list is targeted at junior college and large high school libraries.

Professor Miller: This may not be very helpful for this part of the country, but there are nine major African studies centers in the U.S. Each one of these centers has a professional outreach coordinator whose full time responsibility is to be in touch with teachers like yourself.

Question: Where is the coordinator for the midwest?

Professor Miller: You could look to the University of Wisconsin. Northwestern University, Indiana University, Michigan State University, and the University of Illinois.

Audience Comment: We're in the empty quarter! (laughter)

Professor Miller: Here one might look to the University of Wisconsin-Madison as probably the closest place; there's also Berkeley, Stanford, and U.C.L.A.

Question: I'd like to ask Mr. Brooks if he ever made assignments on a globe rather than on a flat map, and what was his experience with this?

Professor Brooks: The answer is no. I'd appreciate hearing if it worked! I'd really like to do this.

Audience Comment: You can buy an inflatable globe, like a beach ball, have students look at it, and then throw it over to somebody else. It's really kind of interesting.

Audience Comment: A pneumatic projection! (laughter)

Audience Comment: When we assign students to buy books, why not assign them to buy a globe? It's cheaper and if they walked around the campus with a
globe under their arm, they're bound to attract attention to world history.
(laughter)

**Question:** This is a question tangential to the comments, but I think it is pertinent since world history is involved with public projects in the world at large. About eight years ago a group called "The Hunger Project" announced with tremendous publicity that they were going to abolish hunger by the year 2000. Last year they announced (perhaps with not quite as much publicity) that their definition of "hunger" consisted in an infant mortality rate of 50 or greater in a given country. I guess that's 50 per 1000. Their goal was to bring infant mortality rate of all countries down to 50 and then there wouldn't be any more hunger. I'd like to ask Professor Curtin to comment on this.

**Professor Curtin:** I'm sorry to say that I don't know about this project. I don't for a moment, however, think we're going to get the infant mortality rate down to anything like that figure, because the rate is partly dependent on hunger and partly dependent on disease. The most serious disease today, the one which kills the most people, is malaria. We've gotten almost nowhere in dealing with it as a mass disease, and it has come back again and again to parts of the world where we thought we'd cleared it out. The general prognosis on malaria is that it certainly won't be ended by the year 2000. Perhaps a successful vaccination or some such thing would be possible, but this is the only thing that holds out any hope at all now. And malaria is not a disease that's connected with nutrition as much as other diseases are. Good nutrition will help prevent some diseases--measles for example. The death rate from measles depends a great deal on the childhood nutrition. Malaria is one of the diseases that is not connected with nutrition, and it's the biggest killer there is.

**Question:** I'd like to ask Professor Curtin a couple of questions. First, did disease play any part at all in the settlement and subsequent history of southern and South Africa? Second, do you think AIDS will affect the history of Africa in the same way that other endemic diseases have?
Professor Curtin: Let me take the first (and easier) question first. I didn't talk about this because you can't talk about everything, but beginning in the seventeenth century smallpox played much the same role in southern Africa that the whole range of European diseases played in the New World. It is generally considered that smallpox is responsible for wiping out the Khoi Khoi, not as a people, but as a community; they no longer were able to keep going past the middle of the eighteenth century. By the early nineteenth century it is interesting that the Khoi Khoi mortality from smallpox for those who were enlisted in the Hottentot corps (one of the Khoi Khoi units recruited by the British Army) is almost exactly the same as that of British soldiers coming out from Britain. By that time, the Khoi Khoi had gone through the bad years and developed the immunities that approximate those of British soldiers serving in the same place; this is a self-correcting process over a period of time. The other place where disease plays a large role in South Africa history is later on, when mine workers are moved into the Rand from further north, or down from the mountains from places like the Lesotho. Such individuals ran very high disease rates and transmitted some diseases back home from their experience in the mines; hence you had at that period a similar demographic catastrophe of a smaller size than the one in East Africa or Algeria.

The other question about AIDS is something on which I'm going to have to beg ignorance. Historians' guild regulations say we're not supposed to talk about the future. Even so, very little is known about this disease. Some now assume that everybody who tests positive for AIDS will die sooner or later of this disease, if he doesn't die first of something else. This isn't a great deal of help in saying what the future will be, even for the cohort who are now infected to some degree with the disease. I really don't know.

Professor Vansina: I'll be very brief. First, it seems that AIDS is definitely of African origin because it has been identified in frozen specimens from the Kinshasa medical bank dating from 1951-2. Second, it is also clear that the virus existing in Africa was obviously not very dangerous for a very, very long time. As far as we know now, a review of historical records shows that certain types of sarcoma linked more to AIDS than to other causes have been found at a slightly higher incidence in Africa, again in Central and East Africa; however, these types were unremarkable.
What is alarming is that these types of sarcoma have risen in the last two years, but nowhere to the levels that should induce one to great panic. It is obvious that the disarray over this disease in Europe and America, especially in nonmedical circles, is feeding expectations which are unwarranted and quite spectacular. The real problem now seems to be that the medical and research establishments both in this country and in France know what they want to do—but what they want to do poses stringent and serious problems with regard to the functioning of society; part of the problem consists in aligning social and medical objectives.

I want to make two final comments. First, the outlook for the control and conquest of this disease is fairly good; however, nobody wants to make any statements, given that as soon as any medical person makes a statement, it is inflated beyond recognition and unwarranted hopes are put on it. They don't do it anymore. All these research centers have had their fingers burned in the last six months. The last statement has to do with sources. Now of course I am not completely knowledgeable and my sources do come in large part from the public domain, but they do come in part from medical journals and medical reports in at least five or six countries. It is not difficult to find at least that level of information if you are seriously interested. But please, don't rely on magazines and newspaper articles.*

Question: The last presenter identified a central question of this conference: Is Africa different, or isn't it? I would like to ask panel, especially Professors Curtin and Vansina, if they think that this formulation of the question could provide a pedagogical focus for Africa in world history. Could one raise this as a question without necessarily definitively answering it all the time, and could this provide a reasonable focus for incorporating Africa into a world historical context?

*January 1987. Several related retroviruses exist in Africa. At least one of these retroviruses causes AIDS and is responsible for the current epidemic which seems to be the most severe anywhere in the world. Cities are more affected than most rural areas. Southern Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and northern Tanzania, as well as the Kinshasa area, are the most stricken. Estimates and reports vary as to the number of cases but usually range in the millions.
Professor Curtin: Let me first express a certain amount of unhappiness with this particular way of proposing the question "Is Africa different?" It suggests overtones of a lot of things that I thought we'd begun to get rid of. One of them is the idea of the substantivist in economic anthropology that the laws which seem to govern economic behavior don't run outside of the West, and therefore you have to look anew at each society and at each different place for its own special cases. I don't have much sympathy for that. Neither do I have any sympathy for the racist point of view that used to explain why Africa is different. I don't think Africa is all that different from any other partially isolated society. I'd much prefer to stick with the view that there are places in the intercommunicating zone which change in response to ecumenical problems that occur through the whole zone; likewise, there are places outside the zone which tend to respond with their own answers to their own local problems. These latter places don't necessarily change at a slower pace, but they don't change in ways that are closely related to what goes on in the intercommunicating zone. We need to understand why and how all human societies change through time. This means we need to understand the human societies that are in the intercommunicating zone as well as those that are outside it; both are part of the human experience. My response is that I don't think it's useful to ask "Is Africa different?" Of course it's different. Every place is a little bit different.

Professor Vansina: It seems to me that if you're going to ask who is different from whom in a world history course, you'll never get a course together. Everybody is different from everybody. Now I omitted to say, as others have done, that I never taught a world history course, but I have been teaching general anthropology courses and I've been teaching them as an historian would; we come close. Perhaps what you want to do is to find, if you can, what looks like differences—for instance, differences in ways of centralizing or not centralizing societies, and yet obtaining unified action—in one part of the world (and since I'm an Africanist, of course I'm going to find it in Africa more easily), and then check and see where you find such differences elsewhere in the world. Using the language of Professor Davis, I'd rather use "process" as the fundamental way of thinking about such a course; I'd use a view of what society and culture are, an anthropological view, as a theme. I would then develop the topics of my world history course so that they form a discourse about the world, its people, and how they came to be what they are. That discourse
does not necessarily have to be chronological. I don't have to start with the birth of the universe and end up with the elections of November (laughter). Now I realize (because I've done it for such things as economic anthropology) that this is very difficult; you have no textbooks that you can easily assign, and you have to think it out. But in the end, ways of showing what is different and what is not different can by themselves lead to something fruitful only if you show how different processes occur in the face of different or similar problems.

Professor Davis: I'd like to ask Professor Vansina if he might elaborate on that further. I think what he has to say is fine for us who are professors at major research universities granting Ph.D.s and thus with favorable teaching loads, but what recommendations and suggestions would he make to the secondary school teacher or the community college teacher that doesn't enjoy the luxury of time out of the classroom which we at the university level possess?

Professor Vansina: This seems silly, but I've done it and it works. I would use the *Encyclopedia Britannica* thoroughly. The "Macropedia" is very good on the whole, and it allows you to check many things closely and quickly. Of course in community colleges you also have colleagues in anthropology on whom you can try things out; in high schools it's not that easy. But encyclopedias are, in my opinion, the most neglected source of information that we have—the most neglected because every school has them and almost no one takes them seriously. That's one resource. The usual run of textbooks is the other one. As historians, you can take the McNeill textbook or the Stavrianos' textbook, you read it through, and ask, "Well is that really true? Is it useful?" If it's a question of accuracy, just check the encyclopedia and try to find if it's really true, or if other people agree. On the topics, however, and on the structure of the course, I'm afraid that it is a hard job. You have to think it out for yourself. It is in the end your own view as to what society and culture is all about that will structure your course. No one can really do that completely for you.

Professor Brooks: I wonder if we haven't always overburdened ourselves in the sense that many of us feel guilty that we don't do a better course or we feel responsible to try harder, when in fact everyone's worked themselves into the
ground. I believe (and perhaps I'll write something about this in the next few months) that world history should perhaps be an interdisciplinary endeavor. I come to this conclusion in a variety of ways. First of all, the major themes in world history are often extremely difficult to discuss. Professor Curtin handles disease admirably, for example. Perhaps not quite as difficult is talking about diffusion and world food crops. More difficult for us, as specialists in history, is art and music, a discussion of worldwide religions, and then of course the long-range perspective.

For the more recent period, and generally overlooked in world history courses because it's so difficult to handle, which of us can give an informed lecture, say, on the United Nations and its agencies? Which of us can really inform students how the modern world economic system works, the shipping conferences, how airlines are controlled, and so forth? What about the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and other absolutely crucial issues? If students ask us, we, in effect, almost have to beg off. I think world history for the 1990s probably has to move to interdisciplinary courses which are best run by historians—but wherein we will go to colleagues in high school, universities, and business schools, colleagues who are informed about art, botany, biology, or other fields who would be glad to work up a lecture and come and assist us. I hope someday my course will go from a one semester to a two semester course in which I carry on many of the same themes, but in which I will bring outsiders and partly relieve my burdens both in time and in a sense of responsibility for those areas that I don't properly cover now.

**Question:** Why haven't the Africanists taken an approach like Donald Lach did in his book *Asia and the Making of Europe*? Why haven't you taken the approach of "Africa in the making of whatever"? We're always so defensive and trying to apologize for what we seem to believe in.

**Professor Curtin:** I'll take a small crack at that. I don't think we have been defensive. I think that there has been an attitude among some Africanists and Africanist historians, like Basil Davidson, who did have a kind of an "Gee whiz!" approach to the things in Africa, saying "Look, they had empires down there just like Charlemagne's!" as though that's somehow unexpected. I think that went out 10 or 15 years ago. People remarked during this conference that now they not only know that there were empires like Charlemagne's in Africa; they can also say "What's so
good about living in an empire like Charlemagne's?" (laughter) and they begin to look for other things in Africa that are more unique. The Africans may have made a greater contribution to the human well-being with such things as a stateless society that can operate without permanent leaders in a position to oppress their fellowmen. This is more admirable and now gets more attention. But I think that the old accusation that was put against African societies--why didn't they invent the alphabet, and the wheel, and all these other things--is easily enough answered. Nobody invented all those things. They were diffused back and forth across the face of the earth, and they were invented in all kinds of places. I don't think we need to answer that question. It's an "out" question now. It has been answered.

**Question:** As world historians we kind of begin with the huge scale of the human globe. I've been trying to work out how to bring Africa into this. It seems to me a question of scale. Would it be wise to purge, perhaps, the very concept of "Africa" and deal with something like East Africa, West Africa, South Africa, sub-Saharan or Mediterranean Africa--deal with something like that rather than try to deal with this idea of Africa as being one? Then we could display the regions rather than this amorphous thing called Africa, that we're supposed to integrate somehow. That's one problem. I have another question on historiography. It seems to me, from what's been said about what's happening at the local level in Africa, that a lot of African historians are working back towards the local level, that they're dealing with problems that American historians are dealing with in statistical analysis--getting back to study the history of a particular town and particular ethnic groups. It seems to me that would be almost impossible to do in Africa. There's just not enough data, at least not the same kind of data that will exist in America. What different kind of local history, then, do you think will emerge from Africans writing local history than comes from historians writing in the United States?

**Professor Brooks:** I'll take the first half of the question and I think then perhaps Joe Miller would take the second, if he's willing. I agree with you on how to treat Africa and world history, and that indeed is the way that I handle it in the syllabus: East Africa is treated in relationship to the Indian Ocean trading complex; the Horn of Africa fits into the discussion of the Nile Valley and the Red Sea
complex; I link West Africa, as you perhaps saw yesterday, in the trans-Saharan trade and Mediterranean complex; West and West Central Africa all are a part of the South Atlantic system involving four continents. None of my lectures is in effect Africa-specific, except perhaps the first lecture, wherein I talk about the paleolithic times and origins of humankind. That one really has the most African focus and of course the focus very quickly shifts to other continents. Nowhere do I specifically use "Africa for Africa's sake," as it were.

Professor Curtin: I think the one way to answer your question is to ask what we are teaching world history for. It seems to me that we are posing three questions here. First, we're trying to ask ourselves (not just in world history but in history generally) "How did we get to be here? How did we, whoever we are, get to be where we are, and what's our background?" That is of course what U.S. history is mostly about. The second question is "How did the rest of the world get to be here? What's out there, and how did it get to be where it is?" This is one of the questions world historians are trying to answer. The third one is "How have human societies changed through time?" This is a question about human behavior in general. Now the one thing you have to do, whatever history you're trying to talk about, is to keep in mind that you're answering some sub-question of one of those three big questions. You have to keep in mind a problem that you're trying to solve. This means that you shouldn't bring in everything. If you ask yourself the question "What happened in Africa?" you're lost. You can't tell people all that happened in Africa. You have to say, for example, "Well, what happened in Africa that concerns disease, and how is it related to disease in other parts of the world?" Then you're getting at one of these answers about how human society has changed through time. You could do this in the same sort of way as George Brooks; he's in fact asking sub-questions of that same kind. It doesn't make much difference which partial question you pick up, as long as you pick up the one that seems to get at one of those bigger questions; keep in mind you can't cover everything anyhow. So you may get a village study that will give you a detailed example for some purpose. By all means, don't feel you have to talk about the whole of Central Africa, ever.

Professor Miller: I think you've got a very important basic point which is the idea of abolishing this "unitary Africa." I would second what has been said so
far--i.e., if you really get rid of "unitary Africa," why should you substitute similarly unitary regions within Africa? I think you need to be flexible and conscious of the prior questions that you're asking, and then treat Africa as you would any other part of the world in the manner that Professor Curtin suggests. As for the ball that George Brooks hit into my court, I assume he must be referring to the kinds of data that we do have on Africa. I took your question to arise from the kind of community studies and social history that is done in the United States; am I correct? You were wondering about what kind of parallels exist there. Well, of course we don't have the same kinds of written records that you have in the United States except for some areas and for the relatively recent past, but we have lots and lots of oral data. In fact, once you begin to look at the other kinds of available data, once you look beyond what has been a narrow definition of history, and once you look to what the anthropologists have been doing in Africa for most of the century, you'll find an enormous range of fascinating community studies--they're called anthropological monographs. If you can get past the essentially static conceptualizations in most of those studies (and that's their limitation from our point of view as historians), by combining these monographs and studying the process behind the anthropological formulation of the questions you'll find an enormous range of exactly the same kind of community studies undertaken by American historians.

Professor Davis: Let me clarify what I meant by local history. These community studies that you were talking about are not derived out of local concerns. Rather it's one of the principal trends in American historical scholarship that people are not usually doing community studies because they come out of that community, or because they want to explain to the other people in the community something about its history. When I mentioned local history in Florida I was referring to people who, by and large, aren't really concerned about many of the wider historical issues; they are looking at local history from a local perspective. I think Professor Vansina is, to a certain extent, talking about those historians in Africa who for a variety of reasons are not taking a wider thematic or methodological approach in African historical scholarship and applying it at the local level; rather, they are historians who come out of the locality and who deal with the history of that locality principally for the benefit of the people in that
locality. They are not concerned with wider issues. That's a much different issue than I think you raised for Professor Miller, and to which Professor Miller was responding.

Professor Curtin: Just one second more on the same point. We should keep in mind that the local history that's now appearing in Africa is answering the question "How did we get to be the way we are?" and since we're not there, that's not relevant to integrating Africa into a world history course for American students. We don't need to worry about that.

Question: Is there any narrative history of Africa that's reasonably likely to be true? Can one go beyond the last century or two and find accounts that are circumstantial enough to enable one to say "Here is a contingency, things change, institutions change at this point due to some complex concatenation of peoples, causes, forces, etc."? Or do we simply not have the evidence to look at that kind of historical event?

Professor Vansina: The answers are very simple. Yes, there is a history of Africa. There is a narrative history that is far deeper than a century or even two centuries for most parts of Africa. For some parts of Africa (and I'm excluding North Africa) we have accounts that are more detailed by the seventeenth century than any accounts for North America. The so-called Gold Coast in the seventeenth century can be followed year by year, city by city. And yes, we can see very clearly how contingencies shape institutions, how institutions shape contingencies, how ideas interact with needs and so on. It merely is necessary to read some African history to be aware of this. I think that volumes like the Cambridge History of Africa or the UNESCO History of Africa will in fact give you detailed answers.

Question: Within the last year I think there've been at least three new world history textbooks published: Esler, The Human Venture; Craig et al., The Heritage of World Civilization; and Gatzke et al., A History of the World. Have you examined any of these new world history textbooks, particularly with their emphasis on Africa?
Professor Curtin: I've taken a look at one of them but that doesn't make me a specialist. The Esler one looked pretty good.

Question: Has Immanuel Wallerstein anything to contribute to the study of Africa in world history?

Professor Miller: So far, we've only had two volumes of The Modern World System. Insofar as I know, the third volume isn't out yet. Am I correct? Thus far, Africa remains beyond the fringe in modern world system and, as such, its main function is as a rather passive, irrelevant supplier of slaves. That's the reason why, according to Wallerstein, Africa was able to supply the slaves: African markets were not yet really important to a developing world system centered on Europe. I guess the short answer to your question, as I understood it, is to say that Wallerstein's approach has not had much to say to African historians as they're are concerned with Africa. In my opinion, his thesis about the slave trade is wrong. Africa was in fact very much involved with this modern world system before he takes account of it.

Question: I'd like to take us down to a lower plane if I may. It's been suggested many times and at many conferences that historians committed collective suicide when they allowed western civilization to be dumped from the core curricula in the 1960s and 1970s. That may or may not be true. I found myself at that particular time just out of graduate school, a specialist in teaching western civilization. I am a medievalist and I am happy working with the Middle Ages, but now, unlike many people who've spoken at this conference, I'm a specialist in teaching world history. Our bread-and-butter course is modern world history and, therefore, that is what, and virtually all, I teach. I'm disturbed because I feel we're operating at too abstract a level. The textbooks you mentioned are pouring out and more will flow out because world history is increasingly becoming a bread-and-butter course again. There's a movement at the present time to move back towards a core curriculum. I loudly applaud this because that will put the profession back on a sound footing again. People can enjoy teaching African history or Latin American history as a specialty. We'll have graduate classes full of people who will prepare to become specialists in teaching world history, but only if it is teachable, only if from
the intellectual point of view, and from the students' point of view, the darned thing makes sense. Is there any hope that we could make sense of world history on the basis of what you see, or on the basis of what we've heard here?

Professor Davis: I do not think that a return to the core curriculum with world history as the centerpiece will put the profession back on a sound footing if world history is not genuinely world history, but rather is western civilization under another name. We do a severe disservice to our students if we don't help them understand the world that they're going to live in—and the world that they're going to live in is going to be increasingly affected by events outside our own borders and outside the borders of the western world. Second, despite the fact that there were 600 or so trained African historians in the United States by 1980 (is that the figure?), that's still not very many. I'm disturbed by this emphasis on a return to the "tried and true," going "back to the classics," and that these other "exotic subjects" have gotten in our way. We have a challenge when we come to world history. I don't know very much about Asia and I need to learn a lot; it's as great a task for me as for somebody who is a Europeanist. Fortunately, because of my own educational background, I know more about Europe than I do about Asia. I didn't have a course in Asian history; I didn't know anything about Asian history other than a little bit that Professor Curtin included on his course on European expansion. The challenge to us, then, is to make world history a genuine world history course if we are to put our profession on a sound footing. Merely teaching lots of "western civ" and calling it "world history" does our students a severe disservice.

Question: The question is, how do we do that?

Professor Davis: A lot of hard work and, as Professor Vansina said, a lot of individual study and reading. Nobody can hand it to us on a platter.

Professor Miller: Do I understand your question to be "Can we Africanists make Africa intelligible to nonspecialists?"
**Question:** Yes, that's part of it; the other part is can you really integrate it all into something that will make sense?

**Professor Miller:** I would say if we can make it intelligible to nonspecialists, then it will integrate itself of its own accord. I think that as African history (which is only 25 years old) matures, the group of people who started out as very "area specialized" and "exotic style" Africanists will begin to interpret Africa in more nonspecialized terms. That's something that has been stirring for several years, but I think that trend is going to take shape and gather momentum. I think there's another group which, for various reasons, likes to favor the special qualities of Africa. There is a place for that, too; however, so long as the profession as a whole does not remain entirely specialized, then there will be at least some Africanists who'll be working in the next decade or so in directions that will respond to the needs that you rightly express.

**Audience Comment:** I had the privilege about a year ago of participating in a conference sponsored by the National Endowment for Humanities on the question of world history or western civilization--which one should we teach? The conclusion was drawn by Mr. Sullivan, the famous medievalist and author of a western civilization textbook, in his remark that the preponderance of argument is clearly in favor of world history.

Let me comment on what Professor Davis has to say about the division, the tension, between Africa as unique, and Africa as part of the world. It seems to me that we have to respond to students. Our students, even my students in Kenya last semester, are convinced that Africa is unique, that it's different, that it doesn't really have the same things going for it that everywhere else has going for it--or it has more if they're Kenyans, I suppose.

I teach world history. The first half of my course answers the question of why these other peoples seem different. I focus on philosophies, religion, and cosmology to try to get my students to see how people look at things a little differently--how they are answering the same questions but asking them differently because they have a different kind of cosmology. In the second half of my course I don't focus on
the cosmologies; I focus on the questions, on the processes, so the students can begin to see that although we come with different attitudes, fundamentally we end up having to answer the same kinds of questions; that necessity, in fact, is the element which ties us together. The movement from the unique to the common is a way in which we can teach world history, make sense out of it for our students, and make sense out of it in terms of the tensions we've been talking about over the past two days.

**Question:** It seems that cultural anthropologists like Mary Douglas present us with static patterns for dealing with honor, family structure, cosmology, and so forth, that are diametrically opposed to our American students and their views. If there is validity in those cultural and anthropological studies, how do you integrate those kinds of basic structures so that American students can understand them? How do you integrate them into processes?

**Professor Curtin:** I don't think Mary Douglas' work really addresses the fundamental question we're supposed to be asking in the basic world history course. I'd leave it out.

**Question:** I have sensed at the conference, even on the part of many of the panelists and the audience, a tendency almost to beg the questions, to feel unsure of where they're standing, and to assume a type of defensiveness. We're too exclusive in our terminology. I don't think that we've even been teaching western civilization. When we talk about European civilization we forget Austria, Poland, and the Scandinavian countries. We do not talk about European civilization at 500 B.C. Are we, as individual scholars, teachers, or whatnot, prepared to accept the challenge of reexamining whole concepts of historiography and teaching so as to be inclusive, so as not to have a "we/they" dichotomy? Or are we simply to revert to some type of intellectual of exclusiveness and say that "they" are different?

**Professor Russell-Wood:** Let me answer this as well as some other questions. First, I don't see any contradiction at all between a core curriculum and a much broader course in world history. The second point you raise also has institutional and professional impact. Philip Curtin has suggested that, in the universe of utopia,
one field of graduate studies should actually be in world history which, I think, involves a study of several culture areas. What we're really coming down to here is my fear that with world history we may be omitting two very important components from the teaching of history. Although I've been billed here as a Latin Americanist, I actually came to Latin America via Japan and via literature, and therefore I was immediately impressed by the enormous dynamic in history. So often the sense of movement—whether of bullion, trade, animals, peoples, fruits, disease, or technology—is not instilled in our students; they don't have any sense of the centrifugal and centripetal forces which are so quintessential to history. Second, I have the nasty feeling that we are omitting people. Recently I had a chat with a scholar studying women in colonial societies. This seems an extremely challenging prospect because once again we are integrating people into history and into literature. I think it might be of great interest to students, rather than going into the loftier levels of world history, to actually talk about people, about women, about children, and even about recreation. In the United States there has been a considerable amount of studies for the late nineteenth and even the twentieth centuries on public recreation and the use of public space. I don't detect any of this yet in world history, but this might be an area which students can actually grasp.

I'd also like to point out that illustrated material can play a very important role here. One of the questioners actually used the word "see," but I think he was using it more in the understanding than in the visual sense. In teaching Latin American history I emphasize the visual component. Many of my students haven't got the slightest idea what a polychrome vase looks like and would have absolutely no idea what a warrior might look like in Tenochtitlan or in the Incan area. It is essential to show them such people, and I make some suggestions to them. One is that life changes (puberty, physical, and marital changes) is an area where you actually have visual representation on a global scale. Different skills comprise a second area. Actual indications of status or of rank is a third area of global concern. Finally, one might look at authority in a global context. For each of these four areas, you do indeed have visual materials from across the world—from the Pacific right to Central America.
Having said this, I think one should be very careful. I recently attended a lecture where two slides were shown: one of the Shrine of Ise, and the second one actually of a grass house in Bafut. The implication was that somehow these two shrines could be compared in terms of ancestor worship, which is obviously absurd. What I fear is perhaps demonstrated by the map here: we are dealing with "Africa." I am told quite often that I "deal" with Latin America. First, within the land mass of the South American continent there are many Latin Americas. Second, the histories of the societies, peoples, and economies of that region transcend the geographical limitations of the continent of South America. At different times, the historic boundaries of Latin America may reasonably be extended eastwards to Africa and both east and westwards to India and East Asia. Latin America has many faces and speaks with many voices.

Moderator: On behalf of our audience, let me offer sincere thanks to our distinguished speakers and commentators for their hard work and cooperation. I also wish to thank and congratulate all the attendees for their participation and particularly for the effort they've shown in attending this conference. I know that many of you came here from a considerable distance and at considerable expense, and this, above all, bodes well for the future of world history. Thank you very much. (applause)
APPENDIX A

B391
World History

The books listed below serve as texts for the course. Additional readings are assigned from books held on reserve at the Undergraduate Reserve Desk.

4. The Economist is recommended reading for the course. Current (via air mail) issues are available at the Periodical Room of the Library and the School of Business Library.

There will be a practice map quiz on _______, a mini-exam on _______ (10%), a midterm examination on _______ (35%), a second mini-exam on _______ (10%), and a final examination on _______ (45%). Undergraduates are responsible for a short paper analyzing a "less-developed" country. Graduate students have the option of a term paper or preparing a lesson plan incorporating a World History topic. Papers are due on _______ (see handouts concerning papers).

World outline maps (Denoyer-Geppert #24099 or #25099 or Rand McNally Robinson Projection) are available at the bookstore. Bring a map to class for the practice map quiz on _______, and for each examination. You will be tested from the following list. Not all the following are on the map handout, which is intended only as a guide. Use large scale maps in atlases in Library Reference Room to ensure precise locations. You are also responsible for knowing the world's principal ecological areas depicted in the Physical Environment Map at the back of McNeill, A World History (1st and 2nd editions only).

OCEANS AND SEAS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Persian Gulf</th>
<th>Arabian</th>
<th>South China Sea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adriatic</td>
<td>Caspian</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Indian Ocean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltic</td>
<td>Aegean Sea</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ISLANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ceylon (Sri Lanka)</th>
<th>Sumatra</th>
<th>Hormuz</th>
<th>Kilwa (Tanzania)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crete</td>
<td>Socotra</td>
<td>Comoro</td>
<td>Utica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Zanzibar</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Canary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>Balearic</td>
<td>Madeira</td>
<td>Arguim</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Sao Tome</td>
<td>(Cape Blanco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Macao</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RIVERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amazon</th>
<th>Congo/Zaire</th>
<th>Ganges</th>
<th>Senegal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nile</td>
<td>Zambezi</td>
<td>Indus</td>
<td>Yellow/Hwang Ho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigris</td>
<td>Darube</td>
<td>Yangtze</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaxartes/Syr-Darya</td>
<td>Euphrates</td>
<td>Rhine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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CITIES

London
Rome
Carthage
Alexandria
Athens
Axum
Jerusalem
Mecca
Canton/Guangzhou
Benin
Peking/Beijing

Calcutta
Tokyo
Singapore
Istanbul
Sofala
Mexico City
Baghdad
Goa
Vienna
Kano
Elmina (Ghana)

Ceuta
Damascus
Kiev
Marseilles
Venice
Moscow
Florence
Nara
Nagasaki

Cadiz
Lixus/Larache
Leptis
Genoa
Hamburg
Meroe (Sudan)
Dehli
Timbuctu
Malindi (Kenya)

PLACE NAMES

Pyrennes Mountains
Balkans
Cape of Good Hope
Cape Horn
Aztec Empire
Aragon
Castile
Kush (Nile Valley)
Lake Turkana/Lake Rudolph (NE Africa)
Zimbabwe
Akjoujt (Mauretania)
Mesopotamia
Macedonia
Inca Empire
Ethiopia
Hong Kong
Phoenicia

Peru
Ghana, Mali, & Songhai Empires (West Africa)
Monomotapa Empire (East-Central Africa)
Benin Empire (West Africa)
Mongolia
Fertile Crescent
Caucasus
Sahara Desert
Olduvai Gorge
Valley of Tehuacan (Mexico)
Gibraltar
Kongo Empire (West-Central Africa)
Bering Strait
Strait of Malacca

Lectures and Assignments

It is imperative that you read the assignments before class to understand fully the lectures and participate intelligently in the discussion periods. If you are not prepared to comply with this prerequisite you should withdraw from the course.

The illustrations and maps in A World History are an integral part of the text and will amply repay you for frequent perusal and reflection. McNeill's Rise of the West (available in paperback) is an even richer historical masterwork and most rewarding reading. You are urged to obtain a copy and browse sections as they relate to your assignments.

A number of handsomely illustrated studies are included on the reading list. A few minutes perusal of the photographs and illustrations in these works will be of great help in remembering the names and places discussed in the assignments. Systematic reading and browsing will pay enormous dividends in mastering—and
enjoying—the material assigned for the course. Note: some of the Reserve assignments are listed in my name under E431-E432–African History. Journals are not placed on Reserve; use the call numbers.

Assignments

1. **Introduction to the course**

2. **The Contemporary—and Future—World**


   Caiden, N. and Wilkowsky, A., Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries, "Prologue" (i-iv) HC 59.7 C28.


3. **Paleolithic Times to the Neolithic "Evolution"**


   Howell, F. C., *Early Man* (Time-Life), passim. QH368 .H83


   The Epic of Man (Time-Life), 11-65. CB301 .L72 (shelved after Z)

   Went, F. W., *The Plants* (Life Nature Library) Ch. 8. QK50 W43

4. **The "Secondary" Neolithic: Tigris-Euphrates, Nile, Indus, and Yellow River valleys**

   McNeill, Chapter 2

   The Epic of Man (Time-Life), 66-95


   Casson, L., *Ancient Egypt* (Time-Life), DT60 .C34


5. **Eurasia to c. 500 B.C.; Indo-European Migrations**
   McNeill, Chapters 3, 4, 6, 7
   - The Epic of Man (Time-Life), 194-207, 96-159 passim.
   - Bourliere, F., Eurasia (Time-Life), QH179 .B77
   - Watson, India, 30-37 passim.

6. **Mediterranean Civilizations: Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans**
   McNeill, Chapter 5: 127-162/129-165
   - Bovill, E. W., The Golden Trade of the Moors, Chaps. 2,5 passim.
   - Davidson, B., African Kingdoms (Time-Life), 79-99
   - Piggott, S. ed., Dawn of Civilization, 329-357 passim.,
   - Bowra, C. M., Classical Greece (Time-Life), passim. DF78 .B78
   - Hadas, M., Imperial Rome (Time-Life), passim. DG272 .H12

7. **Eurasian Social and Cultural Exchanges**
   McNeill, Rise of the West, 316-386 passim.
   - Bowra, C. M., Classical Greece (Time-Life), 69-78, 157-171 passim.
   - Watson, India, 39-70 passim.

8. **The Closing of the Ecumene: China and the Roman Empire**
   McNeill, Chapters 10, 11
   - Wolpert, S., India, 35-46 passim. DS436 .W86
   - Davidson, B., Lost Cities of Africa, Chapter VI
   - Bacon, E., Vanished Civilizations, 251-278
   - Piggott, S. ed., Dawn of Civilization, 277-300

   Emory, C., and D. Lewis, National Geographic G1 N2 (U) 146, (6 December, 1974), 752-745, 747-778, passim.

10. **The Era of Muslim Ascendancy**
    McNeill, Chapters 12, 13


Esin, E., *Mecca the Blessed: Madinah the Radiant*, passim. BP 187.3 .E75


11. Eurasia c.700 A.D. to c.1500 A.D.

McNeill, Chapters 14, 15, 16; pp. 270-271/273-275

12. The Transmutation of Europe--and the World

McNeill, 295-326.


13. East Africa and the Indian Ocean Trading Complex to c.1500

Bacon, E., *Vanished Civilizations*, "City of Black Gold"


Davidson, B., *African Kingdoms*, 89-94; 129-141; 178-183. DAV 960 (shelved after Z)


14. West Africa and Trans-Saharan Trade to c.1500

Oliver, R. O., and C., *Africa in the Days of Exploration* 1-7; 8-26

Bovill, *Golden Trade*, Chapters 7-10; 16, passim. DT356 B76 1968

Davidson, *The African Past*, 75-83 (Mali: Al-Omari & ibn Battuta)


191
15. **The Americas to 1492 A.D.**
McNeill, 274-278


The Transformation of Western Civilization, "A Word in Your Ear: A Study in Language." Tape Lab, BH 108, catalogue number: Linguistics E09.01


Bacon, E., Vanished Civilizations, 139-158 passim.


Leonard, J. N., Ancient America (Time-Life), passim. E161 .L57

16 & 17. **Age of Reconnaissance, I, II**

Review McNeill, 295-326, Chapters 20, 21, 22

Crosby, A. W., The Columbian Exchange, Chapters 2; Chapters 3 and 4 passim. E98 .D6 C94

Hale, J. R., Age of Exploration (Time-Life), G80 .H18 passim.

Wolpert, 64-100 passim.

Driver, 156-164; 165-173 passim. 34-47 passim.; 112-133 passim. (see page 19)

18. **Inter-Locking World Economies: The South Atlantic System**

Davidson, B., Black Mother, Introduction Part I-III. DT352 .D25


Haley, A., Roots, 1-131; 569-580. E185.97 .H24 A33

19 & 20. **The Transformation of World Social and Cultural Patterns, I, II**

McNeill, Chapters 23, 24, 25, 26, 27

Crosby, The Columbian Exchange, Chapters 5 & 6 passim.


Gay, Peter, Age of Enlightenment (Time-Life), passim. CB411 .G28

Burchell, S. C., Age of Progress (Time-Life), passim. CB417 .B94
21 & 22. The Age of Imperialism, I, II


Ellis, J., The Social History of the Machine Gun, 9, 79-90 passim. UF620 A2 E47

Achebe, C., Things Fall Apart. PR9387.9.A2 T4 1969

Orwell, G., Burmese Days, Chapters I-V

23 & 24. The World Since 1900, I, II

McNeill, Chapter 29


Markandaya, K., Nectar in a Sieve (PR6063: A68N3 1971), Chapters 1-9.


McNeill, 416-437

Stryker, R., Development Strategies, in Martin and O'Meara, Africa. DT3 .A23 1977

Black, C. E., The Dynamics of Modernization, Chapters 1 and 3. CB425 .B57


Breese, G., Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries. 1-23, 39-46. HT151 .B83


Howell, F. C., Early Man (Time-Life), 168-176

Jesus, C. M. de, Child of the Dark, passim. HN290 S33 J52

27. Contemporary World Political, Economic, and Social Relationships

McNeill, 438-453, Chapter 30


Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, 32-48

Bukovsky, V., "The Soul of Man Under Socialism," Commentary 67.1 (Jan. 1979), 34-42. BM1 C72

193

"The Seething Caribbean," National Geographic (Feb. 1981), 244-271, passim. G1 N2 (U)

Desowitz, R. S., "How the Wise Men Brought Malaria to Africa," Natural History QH1 N2 (U) (October 1976). 26-44

"State of the Earth 1986," Natural History (April 1986), 41-68. QH1 N2 (U)
Undergraduates are responsible for a five page paper describing a "less-developed" country. Answer as many of the following questions as you can; if information is not available, explain why. Obtain the latest data possible and cite your sources in footnotes (either social science style or at the end of paper).

When did the country become independent?
What form of government did it have at independence? Now?
Who/what ethnic groups control the government, armed forces, religious and educational institutions?
What are the country's principal exports? Total amounts and %'s.
Who owns the principal resources: mines, plantations, etc.?
The principal economic ties are with which countries?
Does the country belong to a marketing arrangement for its primary product(s)?
What are the consequences of the "Green Revolution"?
What are the consequences of the OPEC price increases?
Role in the North-South dialogue?
Role in the Laws of the Sea conferences?
Foreign Aid: from which countries? How much?
Population and rate of population increase? % living in urban centers of over 100,000 population?

Selections of countries will be made following discussion of the project the third week of class.

Begin your research by reading encyclopedia articles on your country. Next consult the topic index files in the graduate side of the library. Look for recently published general studies; they or the volumes along side them on the shelf should provide all, or nearly all, the reference materials you need. Consult footnotes and bibliographies in the books you read to locate specialized books or articles. Facts on File, The Stateman's Yearbook, and the World Almanac are useful for statistics and specific facts. Be sure to check The Economist (HI E22 (U)) index for recent years; in many cases there will be a special report on the country you are studying, in addition to informative news reports. USFI Reports (Universities Field Staff International) are excellent sources for many countries.

Submit two copies of your paper. The first copy will be returned to you. Keep your xerox and notes to help prepare for the final exam question on "LDCs."
Graduate students have three options on papers, depending on their goals and interests.

(1) Graduate students intending to teach World History at the college or high school level are encouraged to prepare a lecture outline on a subject of special interest. The topic must incorporate a large geographical area and/or time period, such as the lectures for this course. Papers should be five double-spaced pages maximum and include the following: an outline of the main points of the lecture on the first page; discussion of the main points on the following three pages citing the sources for your statements; and page five should list your bibliography, no more than five sources—the most valuable sources you found. The objective of the paper is to identify the most important statements you can make about the topic you have chosen: statements that organize, describe, and highlight the significance of your topic. Include no more than five xerox pages of the maps, charts, graphs, etc., you would use in a lecture presentation either as slides or transparencies. Include the sources and page numbers for the xerox pages you submit.

(2) Graduate students may prepare ten double-spaced term papers on major groupings of "less-developed" countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, describing their interrelationship, e.g., the ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific) countries associated with the European Economic Community, the Andean Pact countries in Latin America, or ASEAN.

(3) Combine (1) and (2), following instructions for (1).

Consult with the instructor concerning your interests and preferences. Topics should be approved by the instructor by the eighth class meeting. Prepare a preliminary outline and 3 x 5 bibliography cards by the fourteenth class meeting. The paper is due at the twenty-second class meeting. Submit two copies; the original will be returned to you.

Note: Graduate students are also responsible for learning about a "less-developed country" (The Undergraduate project), but not for submitting the five-page paper.
Mini-Exam
18 Feb 86

I. (3) Identify the physical environment of the following areas, whether (a) natural grasslands; (b) tropical & sub-tropical forests; (c) desert; (d) field & forest. Write your answer on this sheet.

( ) Eastern United States
( ) North of Senegal River
( ) Eastern China

II. (9) Locate on the map by number:

1. Venice
2. Ceylon/Sri Lanka
3. Ceuta
4. Peru
5. Timbuctu
6. Cape Horn
7. Cape Verde Islands
8. Philippines
9. Zambezi River

III. (9) Identify three of the following in two lines or less on the back of this sheet. Indicate an appropriate date.

Hyksos
Paleolithic
cataphract

Punic Wars
Australopithecines
Kuchan State

IV. (4) Number the following sets of four in geographical order 1-4 from North to South on this sheet.

( ) Hong Kong
( ) Malacca
( ) Tokyo
( ) Bering Strait
( ) Ghana, Mali, & Songhai
( ) Macedonia
( ) Kongo Empire
( ) Moscow

Number the following sets of four in chronological order 1-4 (oldest to most recent) on this sheet.

( ) Australopithecines
( ) Indo-European Migrations
( ) Founding of Carthage
( ) Neolithic "evolution" in Fertile Crescent
( ) Xin/Chi'in Dynasty and Building of Great Wall
( ) Aryan invasion of Indus Valley
( ) Parthian and Kushan States
( ) Greek trade diaspora
Mid-Term Examination
11 Mar 86

I. (5%) Answer on this sheet. Identify the following areas as either (a) grasslands; (b) field and forest; (c) tropical rainforest; or (d) desert.
   ( ) area of Western Europe
   ( ) along the Yangtze River
   ( ) along the Amazon River
   ( ) east of the Mississippi River
   ( ) area north of the Niger River

II. (19%) Locate the following on the map by number.
   1. Persian Gulf
   2. Kongo Empire
   3. Aztec Empire
   4. Mexico City
   5. Singapore
   6. capital of Byzantium
   7. Sao Tome Island
   8. Hong Kong
   9. Nile River
   10. Paris
   11. Cape Verde Islands
   12. Madeira Island
   13. Benin Empire
   14. Bering Strait
   15. Florence
   16. Elmina (Ghana)
   17. Balearic Islands
   18. Mecca
   19. Hamburg

III. (16%) Number each set in geographic order west to east 1-4:
   ( ) Sicily
   ( ) Goa
   ( ) Socotra
   ( ) Cyprus
   ( ) Nagasaki
   ( ) Delhi
   ( ) Peking/Beijing
   ( ) Damascus

Number each set following in chronological order 1-4:
   ( ) Cro-Magon human
   ( ) Austrolopithecines/early hominids
   ( ) Neolithic 'evolution'
   ( ) Unification of Egypt
   ( ) Nara Period
   ( ) Ming Dynasty
   ( ) Building of Great Wall
   ( ) Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty
   ( ) Vikings/Northern raids
   ( ) Ottoman state
   ( ) Mongol control of Russia
   ( ) Division of Roman Empire
IV. (30%) Identify ten of the following in two lines or less; where appropriate indicate approximate dates. Skip lines between answers.

- Aryan invasion of India
- Rise of Harappa & Mohenjo-Daro
- Development of Buddhism
- Seljuk Turks invade India
- Cheng Ho
- Development of Swahili communities
- First Indonesian voyages to East Africa
- Arrival of Portuguese in East Africa
- Phoenician trade diaspora
- Swahili
- 'Magyars
- 'Hilalian invasion
- "Silk Road"
- Ghana, Mali, and Songhai
- Caesaropapism
- Great Zimbabwe and Mpanungubwe

V. (30%) Discuss the most significant aspects of two of the following in one blue book page each. (Take a few moments to make notes and organize your thoughts before writing.

- Vikings/Northmen
- Neolithic 'evolution'
- Indo-European Migrations
- The Mongol "unification" of Eurasia
- The 'work ethic'
I. (10) Name the "less developed country" you are studying and answer two of
the following in three lines or less.

Who/which ethnic or religious groups control the government and armed
forces?

Who/which ethnic or religious groups own or control the leading mining,
plantation, businesses, or other enterprises?

What are the country's main exports? Its major trading partners?

What were the consequences of the OPEC price increases? What are likely
consequences of recent price declines?

II. (9) Identify three of the following in two lines or less. Where appropriate
indicate an approximate date.

three American cultigens/food crops carried worldwide
three Portuguese vases for control of sea lanes east of the Cape
of Good Hope
the "Formative State" in the Americas
the "triangular trade"
the "Portuguese captivity"
approximate birth and death rates in a "less developed country"

III. (6) Answer three of the following in two lines or less.

What "fell apart" in Things Fall Apart?
What was the principal crop grown by people in Things Fall Apart?
Who owned the land?
What was the place of rendezvous for the English in Burmese Days?
What are some of the attributes of the Nacirema people?
I. (4%) Answer on this sheet. Identify the following areas as either 
(a) grasslands; (b) field and forest; (c) tropical rainforest; or (d) 
desert.

( ) area of western Europe
( ) area south of Senegal River
( ) area North of Black Sea
( ) area along Amazon River

II. (20%) Locate the following on the map by number.

1. Ceylon/Sri Lanka 11. Cape of Good Hope
2. Venice 12. Inca Empire
3. Mozambique Island 13. Monomotapa Empire
4. Hong Kong 14. Tokyo
5. Balearic Islands 15. Yantze River
6. Aztec Empire 16. Bering Straits
7. Zambezi River 17. Cape Horn
9. Malacca 19. Indus River
10. Caspian Sea 20. Hormuz

III. (16%) Number the following in chronological order (1-4) on this sheet.

( ) Wisconsin glaciation  ( ) Chariot warfare  
( ) Aztec and Inca empires  ( ) Calvary warfare
( ) Australopithecines  ( ) Cataphract warfare
( ) Neanderthal/Rhodesoid humans  ( ) Caravel

( ) Alexander the Great  ( ) Portuguese 'captivity'
( ) Punic Wars  ( ) Henry "the Navigator"
( ) Ghana, Mali, and Songhai  ( ) Christopher Columbus
( ) Founding of Carthage  ( ) Crusades

( ) Reformation  ( ) Opium War
( ) Black Death  "Partition of African continent"
( ) Crusades  Independence of L.A. colonies
( ) Thirty Years' War  "Opening" of Japan
to outside world
Common Market (EEC) organized
World War I
The Great Depression
Russo-Japanese War

Green Revolution
World War II
The Great Depression
OPEC oil price increases

IV. (30%) Identify in two lines or less ten of the following. Where appropriate give an approximate date. Skip a line between each answer.

- the "Great Inflation"
- three food crops indigenous to the Americas
- the "middle passage"
- two key issues of the "Laws of the Sea" conferences
- birth rates in developed countries during last 100 years
- Ch'ing Dynasty
- three domestic animals introduced to the Americas
- "North-South Dialogue"
- Portugal's "captivity" by Spain
- "comparative advantage"
- "balanced" vs. "uneven" growth
- ACP countries
- Meiji Period
- Swahili
- Mali Empire

V. (30%) Required Essay. Answer all parts (a, b, c). No more than six pages total.

(a) Describe the chief economic characteristics of "less developed" countries.

(b) What are some of the social and demographic problems confronting most "less developed" countries?

(c) How is the "less developed" country you studied the same or different from (a) and (b)?
APPENDIX B

AFRICA IN WORLD HISTORY: A SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Lieutenant Colonel Bryant P. Shaw, USAF
USAF Academy


This report consists of the papers, commentaries and discussion sessions of the teaching conference on "Africa in World History" co-sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Academy's Department of History and the Rocky Mountain Regional World History Organization, 25-26 April 1986. The articles discuss ideas for integrating African history into world history courses at the secondary and undergraduate levels.
Block 12 continued

George E. Brooks
Philip D. Curtin
R. Hunt Davis, Jr.
Marilynn Jo Hitchens
Joseph C. Miller
Malvin E. Page
Robert E. Roeder
Heidi Roupp
A. J. R. Russell-Wood
Jan Vansina
H. Loring White

Indiana University
The Johns Hopkins University
University of Florida
Wheat Ridge High School
University of Virginia
Murray State University
The University of Denver
Aspen High School
The John Hopkins University
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Panama Canal College

Block 18 continued

curriculum, core curriculum, cross-cultural education