The following papers (with authors and respondents) were presented at the annual conference of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society: (1) "Education as a Liberal Field of Study" (Walter Feinberg) Respondent--Eric Bredo; (2) "The Meaning of Foundations: An Alternative Paradigm for Assessing the Effects of Foundational Studies" (George W. Noblit) Respondent--Paul Bitting; (2) "The Meaning of Schooling: A Paradigm for Teaching Foundations of Education" (J. Don Reeves) Respondent--J. Gordon Chamberlin; (4) "Sympathetic Critique of Donald Vandeberg's Methodology and Moral Principles" (Roderic Owen); (5) "Education, Schooling and Theoretical Consciousness" (David Kennedy) Respondent--Howard Ozmon; (6) "Augustine's Theory of Wisdom: A Renewed Vision of Educational Purpose" (William F. Losito) Respondent--Ernst Marshall; (7) "The Empirical Beast: Containment vs Rejection" (Virgil S. Ward) Respondent--Sam Holton; (8) "Beyond the Philosophical Edition: Deconstructing Educational Philosophy" (Tom Buford) Respondent--Frans Van Der Bogert; (9) "Integrating Value Orientation and Social Science Research toward the Improvement of Instruction" (Beatrice Sarlos) Respondent--Gene Agre; (10) "Reasoning about Values" (Rocco Porreco); (11) "Educational Reform in the United States: Are We Asking the Right Questions?" (Frank Lowney) Respondent--E. Sidney Vaughn; "Democracy's Implication of Education" (Robert Heslep) Respondent--Peter Carbone; and (13) "What is 'Appropriate' Curriculum?" (Tom Hawkins) Respondent--Joe Congleton. (JD)
Beyond the Empirical Tradition: Reconstructing Educational Inquiry

PROCEEDINGS
of the
Thirtieth Annual Meeting
of the
South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society

Appalachian State University
Boone, North Carolina
October 18 - 19, 1985

Published by the
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January, 1986

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Editor's Preface

The 1985 annual meeting of the South Atlantic Philosophy of Education Society met at Appalachian State University in Boone, North Carolina, on October 18 and 19, 1985. Sessions were well attended, and the discussions were lively and informative. During off hours, the local mountain scenery and autumn colors added an extra special touch. The quality of the meeting and the local setting was, perhaps, behind one member's observation that he gained more from regional SAPES meetings than from the meetings of the national societies. To be sure, that is a compliment not to be taken lightly!

The reader of this Proceedings will notice that the papers are arranged as they were delivered at the meeting with the exception of the Keynote Address, delivered by Professor Walter Feinberg of the University of Illinois. The theme for the 1985 meeting was "Beyond the Empirical Tradition: Reconstructing Educational Inquiry," and Professor's Feinberg's address certainly spoke to that point. He forcefully argued that the field of educational studies, in which philosophy of education plays so important a role, is a liberal field of study, and that it can be enhanced by conceiving of social reproduction as its special focus of inquiry. Feinberg's address was a fitting keynote, and it provided ample food for thought to highlight the theme of the meeting.

Readers will also notice that there are no papers for some presentations on the program. As is customary, some presenters do not choose to submit a paper for publication, as is their right. Occasionally, some presentations are discussion sessions for which a paper is not appropriate. Such was the case in both instances for the 1985 meeting, and this accounts for the lack of papers for some program entries in this Proceedings. Nonetheless, what is included will amply illustrate the quality of the meeting and its several concurrent sessions.

Your editor would like to ask your indulgence on the following two concerns: First, the decision was made to continue publishing the Proceedings in a standard 8 1/2 x 11 size with a wrap-around paper binding secured with glue. Members should consider if this is a desirable method to continue. Second, plans are underway to develop a style sheet establishing strict limitations on the kind of paper to use, the size and style of type, and the length of both written presentations and responses. These considerations would make the job of editing easier as well as help control the costs of publication. Members are invited to make suggestions and lend advice on these matters.

Samuel M. Craver, Editor
Virginia Commonwealth University
January, 1986
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1985

10:00 - 12:00 p.m., Room 109, Edwin Duncan Hall
Meeting of the North Carolina Foundations of Education Association

11:00 - 1:00 p.m. - First Floor Lobby, Edwin Duncan Hall
S.A.P.E.S. Conference Registration

1:00 - 2:30 p.m. - Conference Papers
Concurrent Session A, Room 109, Edwin Duncan Hall

   George W. Noblit, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
   Respondent
   Paul Bitting, North Carolina State University

   J. Don Reeves, Wake Forest University
   Respondent
   J. Gordon Chamberlin, Greensboro College

Concurrent Session B, Octagon Room 02, Edwin Duncan Hall

1. "Sympathetic Critique of Donald Vandenberg's 'Methodology and Moral Principles'"
   Roderic Owen, Mary Baldwin College
   Respondent
   Richard Phillips, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

2. "The Morally Educated Teacher"
   John U. Davis, Bethany College
   Respondent
   Hugh Wease, East Carolina University

2:30 - 2:45 p.m. - Break

2:45 - 4:15 p.m. - Conference Papers
Concurrent Session C, Room 109, Edwin Duncan Hall
1. "Education, Schooling and Theoretical Consciousness"  
David Kennedy, Doctoral Student, University of Kentucky  
Respondent  
Howard Ozmon, Virginia Commonwealth University  

2. "Augustine's Theory of Wisdom: A Renewed Vision of Educational Purpose" William F. Custer, College of William and Mary  
Respondent  
Ernst Marshall, East Carolina University  

Concurrent Session D, Octagon Room 02, Edwin Duncan Hall  

1. "The Empirical Beast: Containment vs. Rejection"  
Virgil S. Ward, University of Virginia  
Respondent  
Sam Holton, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  

2. "Beyond the Philosophical Tradition: Deconstructing Educational Philosophy"  
Tom Buford, Furman University  
Respondent  
Frans Van Der Bogert, Appalachian State University  

4:15 - 4:30 - Break  

4:30 - 6:00 - Keynote Address - Octagon Room 02, Edwin Duncan Hall  
"Education as a Liberal Field of Study"  
Walter Feinberg, Professor of Philosophy of Education  
University of Illinois at Urbanna-Champaign  
Respondent  
Eric Bredo, University of Virginia  

6:45 - 7:30 p.m. - Social Hour at the High Country Inn  
7:30 - Hawaiian Luau at the High Country Inn  

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1985  

9:00 - 10:50 a.m. - Conference Papers  
Concurrent Session E, Room 109, Edwin Duncan Hall  

1. "Integrating Value Orientation and Social Science Research Toward the Improvement of Instruction"  
Beatrice E. Sarlos, Loyola College of Baltimore  
Respondent  
Gene Agre, University of Maryland  

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2. "Hermeneutics and Its Relevance to Educational Inquiry"
   Marcie Boucouvalas, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Northern Virginia Graduate Center

   Respondent
   Kenneth Wooldridge, Doctoral Student, Virginia Polytechnic Institute

Concurrent Session F, Octagon Room 02, Edwin Duncan Hall

1. "Reasoning About Values"
   Rocco Porreco, Georgetown University

   Respondent
   John B. Haynes, James Madison University

2. "Educational Reform in the United States: Are We Asking the Right Questions?"
   Frank Lowney, Georgia College

   Respondent
   E. Sidney Vaughn, Virginia Beach Public Schools

10:50 - 11:00 a.m. - Break

11:00 - 11:50 a.m. - Conference Papers

Concurrent Session G, Room 109, Edwin Duncan Hall
"Democracy's Implication of Education"
Robert Heslep, University of Georgia

   Respondent
   Peter Carbone, Duke University

Concurrent Session H, Octagon Room 02, Edwin Duncan Hall
"What is 'Appropriate' Curriculum?"
Tom Hawkins, University of South Carolina at Spartanburg

   Respondent
   Joe Congleton, East Carolina University

11:50 - 12:00 p.m. - Break

12:00 - 1:00 p.m. - Business Meeting - Room 109, Edwin Duncan Hall
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There is a view, common among academics and educators alike, that education is but an applied area of study, one in which the methods of the traditional disciplines are used to address school related problems. Education is taken in this way because it is said to have no methodological principles or conceptual domain that it can call its own. Unlike disciplines such as physics or chemistry or economics, which are thought of as pure disciplines with an applied wing, education is thought to be unbounded. It cannot claim to be examining bodily motion, or the interaction of elements, or market behavior. Similarly, it is argued that educational studies is deficient because it can lay no claim to a unique methodology. Experimental design, statistical methods or ethnographic techniques do not belong first to education. They are methods developed in other areas which are sometimes useful in addressing issues and problems that we find in schools. Because educational studies are said to lack both a conceptual domain and an identifiable method, they are thought to have no coherent research program. Rather, they must take their problems from the schools as the schools give them to it. Thus it is concluded that with education we have a "discipline" without a method, without substance, and without coherence.

I state this position strongly not simply because I want to take issue with it and argue that the study of education, while applicable to the practices of schools, is consistent with the notion of a liberal field of study, but also because this is a view that dominates the thinking about education that is found in many of our most important academic institu-
tions. Too often education exists on the periphery of academic life and is perceived as a field comprised of renegades from the schools and outcasts from the disciplines.

To take objection to this view is to begin to define a direction for the study of education, a direction which one can already find in the ongoing work of many educational scholars, but which requires articulation and development. In this paper I want to address the question of the place of educational studies within a university. I begin by looking at the question of the relationship between a discipline and its method and domain. I then address the question of the domain of educational studies as I have been trying to conceptualize it and sketch some of its major features. Finally I draw out some of the implications of this domain for the practical aspects of education.

It is useful to note that the ideal of a discipline against which educational studies has been measured and found wanting is, in fact, an ideal, which accepted disciplines meet only to varying degrees. In some disciplines, such as philosophy, the nature of the conceptual domain is often a central issue of debate. Ironically, without a prior understanding of the boundaries of the discipline, it is difficult to decide just who can and who cannot legitimately participate in that debate.

Other disciplines, economics in one of them, have been able to stipulate a realm that meets with broad consensus among its practitioners. Yet the borders of a conceptual realm, even when well defined, may not always map well onto the activities of practical life, and disciplinary neatness may be accomplished at a considerable cost. Consider, for example, the ups and downs of a plan recently proposed by the economist Alain Enthoven to hold down the rate of increase of hospital costs. Enthoven's plan seemed
to fit well into the view of rational, market behavior that has been adopted by the Reagan administration, and it was met by favorable acclaim by key administration officials. Yet as the plan was debated within the administration some elements of it, such as a ceiling on the tax write-offs that businesses could claim for health insurance, were seriously questioned and were likely to be dropped. Enthoven saw this behavior as irrational. His plan was not meant to be implemented piece by piece. Its effectiveness depended, according to him, on viewing each of its elements as part of a coherent whole. From his point of view, he was seeing irrationality at work. Yet one suspects that from the administration's point of view what was occurring was not irrational. Rather, the boundaries of economic rationality had spilled over into the field of political rationality.

The question then arises: do we then pass the problem over to the political scientist to understand, as if we were running a relay race passing a baton from one runner to the next? If we decide to do this, then we still have the problem of deciding whether politically rational behavior consists of generating the broadest support for the plan as Enthoven conceived it, or, whether it consists of retaining only those elements of the plan for which support is likely? The answer to this question will depend upon the conception of rationality that particular political scientists bring to bear on the issue.

Some social scientists have tried to argue that there is but one, broadly based concept of rational behavior. For example, some have argued that the behavior of groups, whether it be economic, social, or political behavior, can be reduced to the behavior of individuals as governed by the laws of positive and negative reinforcement. I find this conception of rationality useful for redescribing events, but as a concep-
tion of rational behavior it is wanting. This is because what constitutes positive or negative reinforcement is not the foundation of an explanation—an invariable law of human nature. It is rather the product of a human interpretation. In one culture pork is an important source of nutrition. In another, to eat it is sacrilegious. Human beings have a remarkable capacity to turn what behaviorists identify as positive reinforcers into negative ones and negative reinforcers into positive ones and this in turn is what often needs to be understood.

It is useful when thinking about the nature of a discipline to remember that the boundaries of disciplinary rationality do not always correspond to those of practical rationality and that when the latter oversteps the limits of the former our understanding is not always improved by passing the problem to the next discipline. This observation does not provide education studies with an advantage over other areas. It simply raises questions about the presumed disadvantage.

If the relationship between a discipline and a domain is problematic, then so too is the relationship between a discipline and a method. For example, not so long ago some renegade economists claimed that if we really want to know about market behavior we should try to understand, through observational studies, just how people think and behave when they act in the market place. This would be a rather novel approach for the dismal science and one can imagine the next generation of economists trading in their now outdated computers for the newest technological innovation—a credible informant and tramping off to an Indonesian tribal village with Clifford Geertz to learn the techniques of participant-observation. The example may be far fetched but the point is not. There is at best a loose connection between a discipline and a method. Historians use
statistics, anthropologists use history and often by so doing their own disciplines are enriched.

The difficulty is not that real disciplines have a clear-cut domain and education does not. Nor is it that for each discipline, except education, there is a single, clear and identifiable method. Domains are not sealed in cement and distributed one to a discipline. They are convenient ways that have been developed for marking off and thinking about the natural and the cultural worlds. They are no doubt bounded in some ways, but the boundaries are best thought of as open in texture allowing for nourishment, growth, and division to take place. Similarly, a method is a tool. Its function is to serve a particular purpose, but its use and refinement may extend well beyond the purpose for which it was originally developed. A method may originate because of the problems that arise in a given discipline at a certain time, but it does not emerge with a deed of ownership that it presents to its developer. One discipline does not borrow the methods of another because without a title of ownership, no discipline can stand in the position of lender.

The difficulty of establishing educational studies as a liberal field comes not from want of method or lack of domain, but from equally important, yet sometimes conflicting expectations. The first of these is the scholarship required to add perspective to and improve our understanding of the processes and aims of education as it functions in social life. The second has to do with the social responsibility to maintain and improve the institutions of schools. While these tasks are related, they are not the same. We should expect that some of the scholarly perspective will be drawn from a better understanding of the practice of schooling, just as we should also expect that a deeper understanding of the activity and aims of
education will help to refine that practice. Yet to understand education requires more than an analysis of what happens in schools, and sometimes what is of immediate practical value for schooling does not require a great deal of scholarly sophistication. In theory this expectation is not different from that which we have about legal scholarship. We expect that the thoughtful study of the law will inform the judicial system and help provide some of the insights needed to improve it. Yet legal scholarship extends well beyond the law as it functions in the courts of one's own time or location. In doing so it provides a context for understanding the present legal system. The difference between educational and legal scholarship lies in the fact that educational work has too often been judged by its promise for immediate payoffs. It is more appropriate, however, to acknowledge that the activities of the schools are but one of the practices that such scholarship seeks to understand and that as part of an organized, compulsory system of education, schools are relatively recent educational innovations.

When attempting to articulate a domain for educational studies it is useful to observe that academic domains are constituted in different ways. Some domains, especially those of the natural sciences, are constituted by focusing upon a single attribute or characteristic of an object. Here we are interested in an object only insofar as it is a manifestation of that characteristic. In classical physics, for example, the actual object is irrelevant (it may be an apple, a rock or a planet) except say insofar as it is a manifestation of bodily motion. There are other domains which are constituted as an attempt to understand an object in its fullness and uniqueness, and to capture the contours of significance that the object itself holds. These disciplines often comprise what Dilthey called the
cultural sciences. Each of these ways of constituting a discipline carries with it methodological implications, and the problems of confusing one with the other is well illustrated by Clifford Geertz, drawing on an example developed by Gilbert Ryle.

Consider . . . two boys rapidly contracting the eyelids of the right eye. In one this is an involuntary twitch; in the other, a conspiratorial signal to a friend. The two movements are, as movements, identical; from an I-am-a-Camera, "phenomenalistic" observation of them alone, one could not tell which was twitch and which was wink. Yet the difference, however unphotographable, between a twitch and a wink is vast; as everyone unfortunate enough to have had the first taken for the second knows. The winker is communicating and indeed communicating in a quite precise and special way. . . . The winker has done two things, contracted his eyelids and winked, while the twitcher has done only one, contracted his eyelids. Contracting your eyelids on purpose when there exists a public code in which doing so counts as a conspiratorial signal is winking."

Educational scholarship has tended to vacillate between these views. Sometimes the emphasis is placed on methods that are thought to have significant power to generalize and predict while at other times the emphasis has been to capture the unique contours of a particular learning situation. For the most part, however, in both types of study, the school and its activities have been taken as defining the domain of educational research, and each study has difficulty transcending the school's definition of an educational problem.

A more fruitful way to constitute the domain of educational studies is to attempt, through the identification of a common function, to capture the universal features which are represented by the practice of education while also recognizing the various forms that these features may take in specific situations. After all, even the most committed ethnographers must presuppose some shared, intercultural categories as they go about trying to understand the uniqueness of social life. In other words, there must be some taken for granted, categories which allow us to describe even the
most unique social units and which allow us to classify certain people as members of that society rather than simply as an aggregate of individuals. For example, to recognize that a certain ceremony is to be taken humorously or ironically rather than seriously or literally, is to place it in a general category which transcends the specific and unique culture in which it is being performed.

It is the attempt to identify the universal aspects of educational practice that constitutes the important feature of those studies which look upon education as the process of socialization or cultural transmission. However, these studies represent only a partial understanding of educational practice and are mistaken in viewing the study of education itself as simply a part of sociology or anthropology.

Studies of socialization and also those of cultural transmission have tended to take as their problem the way in which an individual becomes a member of a group. Traditional socialization research begins by accepting the structure of social relations as fixed and unproblematic. The focus of understanding is directed at the individual and seeks to analyze just how that individual takes on the behavior and roles that society defines as appropriate. Whereas the society is perceived as fixed and unchanging, the individual is treated as if adaptable to any structure that can develop a sufficient socializing apparatus.

What is missing from this account is the fact that society itself is continually recreated, although not always in the same form, through a shared understanding in which all of its members, to one degree or another, and within different frameworks, participate. The production of a society is a function of the development of such shared understanding and this production is the primary function of education, first as a social
activity and only later as a social institution. Thus, while it is productive
to view educational studies in terms of an analysis of a universal feature
of social life, individual socialization is only a derivative aspect of that
study. That is, educational studies is conceived of here as the study of
the way in which a society reproduces itself over time and the various
patterns of understanding that comprise the product of that reproduction.

In order to understand what this entails we can return briefly to look
at the notion of socialization and distinguish it from that of social repro-
duction. One distinction is obvious. Individuals are socialized, but a
society is reproduced. When we are studying social reproduction, we are
examining the normative structure into which individuals are socialized. If
we look again at the process of socialization, we should begin to see where
it intersects with that of social reproduction.

When an individual is socialized what has occurred is that the person
has learned a given role or set of roles along with the behavior that is
appropriate to that set. Yet socialization also involves learning how one's
own role functions in relationship to others and learning that in any spe-
cific situation appropriate role behavior is defined relationally. A simple
example is drawn from the fact that behavior appropriate for the corporal
in the presence of the private is not always appropriate in the presence of
the captain. This means that one of the key factors entailed in learning
the set of behaviors that define a given role is learning when it is appro-
priate to exhibit a specific subset of that behavior. What this suggests,
however, is that when socialization occurs what is learned is not just a set
of behaviors, but a set of socially shared categories and definitions that
are understood relationally to one another, such as worker to owner,
husband to wife, mother to daughter, and so forth. What remains to be
understood after the sociologists have done their work is the patterns of understanding out of which role behavior is generated. It is this pattern and the processes used to reproduce it that I take to constitute the domain of educational studies.

The study of education as social reproduction is the study of patterns and processes through which a society's identity is maintained and within which social change is defined. The practice of education in this sense has two functions. First, there is the reproduction of skills that meet socially defined needs. Second, there is the reproduction of consciousness or the shared understanding that provides the basis of social life. This shared understanding includes the sense that people have of the interrelationship and purpose of different skills as well as a sense of the way in which the bearers of different skills, as they occupy different social positions, are supposed to behave in this or that context. The task of educational scholarship, however, is not restricted to simply reflecting such forms or understanding them in precisely the same way as those who participate in them fully. In contrast to the unreflective and naturalistic understanding of the participant, the function of educational scholarship is to reflectively understand these relationships as social constructions with historical antecedents and thereby to initiate an awareness that these patterns, or at least some of them, are objects of choice and possible candidates for change. Thus, educational scholarship adds a reflectively critical dimension to the social activity of education.

A comprehensive analysis of education for any given society would include an examination of the structure, production and distribution of knowledge as well as the scope of knowledgeable activity and the level of knowledge which is presumed attached to given social roles. Thus, the
study of education as social reproduction examines both the way in which knowledge is produced and the way in which it is distributed in a society. For example, physicians and nurses are presumed to share knowledge over essentially the same range of activity, that is the scope of their knowledge is similar. However, the presumed knowledge of the disease process and its treatment is thought to differ in terms of level, a difference which is reflected in the formal education and status of the two groups. Whereas the concept of scope describes the nature of the field over which knowledge is exercised, the concept of level differentiates the roles within a field and provides an understanding of the variations in status that are attached to different roles. Hence, using health care again as an example, while one of the major functions of physicians is to prescribe medication, they are usually not prohibited from dispensing it, at least in small doses, and the institutional assumption is that the knowledge involved in dispensing is available to physicians if they would choose to make use of it. The role of the pharmacist, however, is restricted to dispensing on order from the physician and the institutional assumption is that the act of prescribing is beyond his or her trained capacity. One can often understand the conflicts between established and aspiring professions as involving attempts to alter perceptions about the scope or level of knowledge possessed by a given group. Such conflicts often involve a challenge to the institutionally sanctioned presumptions about knowledge. Hence in arguing the case for greater professional autonomy nurses deny that physicians and nurses share the same scope of knowledge. Physicians are said to be proficient in clinical judgments related to crisis intervention, while nurses are seen as experts in the social and cultural factors which affect the way in which patients cope with disease. Similarly, pharmacists attempt to affirm their
independence over physicians by claiming a greater level of understanding about the interactions of drugs. Such challenges are really attempts to rearrange the skills associated with a given role and hence to change the way in which the role is perceived.

The educational system, both formal and informal, functions to reproduce and distribute or redistribute skills as they are clustered into roles and thereby it serves to maintain or to alter the work relations in society. Included with the reproduction of skills is the reproduction of ideas about the ownership of knowledge and the reproduction of ideas about the rights and responsibilities of those who possess certain forms of institutionally granted knowledge. This aspect of education may be seen as the reproduction of consciousness.

Thus, the reproduction of consciousness is the other side of the reproduction of skills. It is the factor that enables the clustering of skills into specific roles and the clustering of roles into specific classes to persist in societies where it provides the normative vision that justifies the existing distribution. In other words, a consciousness is reproduced which codes the exercise of the rights, privileges, duties and obligations associated with the possession of a certain set of skills as just, fair, and acceptable (or, in unstable societies, as unjust, unfair and not acceptable). The term "knowledge code" is intended to suggest that education imparts, in addition to a set of skills, a certain mode of consciousness, a way of thinking, about the network of such skills. We learn, for example, what is high and low status knowledge and we also learn, either through manner, mode of expression, dress or physical environment, how to appraise and communicate to people with differently valued skills. We learn the range of activity over which a person with a certain level of
knowledge is to be granted authority. Thus, a knowledge code ideally binds together the reproduction of skills and the reproduction of consciousness and its formal articulation is to be understood as an interrelated body of arguments and beliefs about the relative value and interrelationship of different skills. Formal education can be understood as a consciously designed and institutionalized system of instruction that functions to maintain a given knowledge code and to further the pattern of intellectual development that is associated with it.

With this basic sketch behind us, we now turn to look at some of the different kinds of projects that may be suggested by it. The struggle between the medical and nursing professions, mentioned earlier, is a useful place to begin. The attempt by nursing to establish greater independence from the medical profession can be understood in part as an effort to redefine the knowledge code involved in health care delivery by disengaging the knowledge base of nursing from that of medicine, reclustering the skills associated with the role of the nurse and reworking the professional consciousness of nurses and physicians.

The difficulty that nurses have had in establishing their own professional identity can be understood largely by the institutional assumption that nursing knowledge is but a subset of medical knowledge, an assumption which is now being challenged by many nurses. The developments now occurring provide an opportunity for educational scholars to analyze the process whereby a group sets out to consciously redefine its essential knowledge base. The issues that this attempt involves are many; there are questions about the reworking of basic definitions of health and disease; there are issues about the relative worth of clinical, scientific, and social science knowledge in health care; there is the question of the
way in which professional dominance and male dominance intermingle in the relations between occupational groups; and there are questions about the implications that an emerging professional identity has for formal educational structures.

One way to think more generally about the issues developing in health care is to recognize that different groups and individuals, depending upon the nature of their developed skills, stand in different relations to a knowledge code and view it through different frames. Because of this, a knowledge code has built into it a potential instability. Most segments of society will be expected to take on faith the fact that the definition and distribution of high status knowledge is justified, but with the exception of the initiated, most will only be able to view such knowledge from the outside. As long as there is a general acceptance that the clustering of skills and the definition and distribution of high status knowledge comprise a natural process or are of functional benefit to all, stability will likely remain. As in the cases of many nurses who still identify closely with the medical profession, this stability is an indication of a tight bond between a code and its relevant frames.

Yet because a frame provides a perspective for viewing a knowledge code, it is always possible that the dominant code or some aspect of it will be denaturalized and looked at as just another framework, one that belongs to and simply rationalizes the position of the dominant social group. It is interesting that some medical students whom I have interviewed view the basic medical science courses in this way, as simply an initiation rite without functional value. Were this perception to be held on a large scale it would be a sign of a crisis of confidence within the profession, and the potential instability of a knowledge code might begin to erupt from
within as it becomes disengaged from those who are expected to be the prime bearers of that code.

The instability of a code is not, however, simply a function of the way in which it is tied to its relevant frames. It is also a function of the way in which those who are antagonistic to a dominant code are able to communicate their individual frameworks to one another. Such communication is often the major weapon of informal cultural groups, occurring both in the classroom and the workplace, and it often takes the sophisticated skills of an ethnographer to decipher. When there is good reason to believe that there is not a radical difference between the official meanings of the dominant code and the shared meanings of the relevant frames, then it seems appropriate to apply standardized research procedures. However, when such congruence cannot be assumed, then it is difficult for standard procedures to capture the event. For example, the efficiency engineer can describe in detail the formal, task-directed behaviors of the workers on the shop floor and when the workers share the basic goals of the enterprise this may be all that is required. When such goals are not shared, however, what the efficiency engineer cannot capture are the swaggers and posturing which his or her very presence triggers. Indeed if timed correctly, the engineer will simply take these as the natural behavior of working-class people. Yet it is precisely this posturing that serves as the network through which these people may communicate to one another their shared framework of antagonism. The presence of the engineer of course is, for them, simply the symbol of the object of this antagonism, i.e., the basic goals and purposes of the organization. The other side of this process involves the design of formal bureaucratic organizations which are often structured in such a way as to minimize the possibility of lateral communication.
By identifying the domain of educational studies as that of social reproduction, it is possible to focus the concerns of educational scholarship and to cement its interdisciplinary character. The study of education as social reproduction shifts the basic unity of these disciplines from a strictly pragmatic one that is called into operation to repair dysfunctions in the schools to an organic one in which each discipline focuses on a different moment in the reproductive process. The problems of schools are not forgotten, however, because in contemporary society they comprise a major vehicle for social reproduction.

Under such a conception, educational philosophy might be concerned to analyze the formal coherence of the knowledge code while exploring some of the conceptual ambiguities and problems which might be concealed by it. Educational history could attempt to explore the forces that were instrumental in its development while studies in literature could explore the way in which, through metaphor and other communicative structures, a code is extended from one area of study to another. The social sciences might be concerned to understand the way in which the present code extends or limits possibilities for different segments of the social order while the behavioral sciences might attempt to elaborate the way in which present forms of reproduction and the present distribution of skills influence the frames through which the existing code is perceived.

The important consideration, however, is not the particular way in which the various disciplinary traditions might decide to distribute the conceptual domain of education. It is rather that by recognizing that there is a reasonably clear domain for educational studies that the work of these disciplines and their problematics are altered. A clearer understanding of the domain provides educational studies with a more coherent program regardless of the particular discipline or method needed at a given time.
Moreover, an understanding of the variety of frameworks that children bring with them to school has some important implications for understanding classroom behavior and for helping to improve the teaching process. For example, different frameworks will often entail different rules about the context in which truth telling is appropriate and even what constitutes telling the truth. In some situations where there is a presumption of shared antagonism and illegitimate authority, saying what happened will not be seen as telling the truth, but as an acknowledgement of submissiveness. Whether saying what happened will be taken as truth telling will depend on who says it, in what setting and to whom it is said. This is the case in the classroom, the shop, and the corporation. For example, in the corporation certain matters may be shared on a private level, and may be widely, but privately acknowledged to be the case. However, to utter these matters publically is not taken as truth telling, but as indiscretions, or signs of untrustworthiness. The reason this is so is not too difficult to analyze formally. There are important practical differences between: (1) my knowing something is the case; (2) my knowing that you also know it is the case; (3) my knowing that you know that I know it is the case; and (4) you and I knowing that it is publically known that together we know it is the case. Each of these stages comes closer to forcing choice and action. It is important for teachers to understand these formal aspects so that they are not prone to label children with a somewhat different set of truth telling rules as simply deviants. In other words, teachers need to know what may be at stake in certain instances where truth telling and displays of other values are being called for.
That the understanding of classroom behavior can often be improved by understanding the interaction between an official code and its relevant frames can be illustrated by looking at a study by Paul Willis of working class boys in an English school. The focus of Willis' ethnographic account was a small subgroup of troublemakers who called themselves The Lads. With the exception of The Lads, when order is maintained in the school, as it is with most, it is because the students' own cultural framework allows them to accept the basic knowledge code as articulated by teachers. The official, but sometimes implicit message of the school, is that if students respect the teacher's authority, the teacher will provide them with worthwhile (usually theoretical) knowledge which will lead to a meaningful credential, which will then lead to a promising job. For The Lads, however, this exchange breaks down. For them one damn job is the same as any other (as one of them put it after a lecture on becoming an interior decorator, "Got to be someone who slops on walls"), hence the credential is meaningless, the knowledge literally useless and the respect bogus. For most students in the school, order, discipline, and truth telling as teachers define it are part of the bargain. For The Lads they are viewed as complicity with an illegitimate authority and a violation of their own group norms.

Willis' study is but one example of the kind of research project that fits into the model of education as social reproduction. Yet the process by which subordinate frameworks influence the way in which different groups come to relate to the dominant knowledge structure is an area that educational scholarship has only begun to explore, and even Willis' insightful treatment of the lads' working class subculture calls out for an analysis on other levels.
Willis believes that in their understanding of the world of work, the lads display many insights into the oppressive nature of capitalism. The author calls these insights, "penetrations". Penetrations reveal an understanding into the deeper requirements and determining forces of capitalist society. These penetrations do not, according to Willis, provide the kind of theoretical understanding which, through an analysis of the mechanisms of domination, would provide the perspective and strategy required to act on such insights. To put it somewhat differently than Willis does, the insights that he perceives as truths about capitalism are not perceived by the lads in this way. To the lads these are truths about life itself. Capitalism, while central to Willis' analysis, is really only incidental to the lads' own understanding. Thus when they observe that someone has to do society's nasty work, or that one job is the same as any other, they are not intending to provide a critique of capitalism. It is rather Willis who sees these observations as such a critique. To the lads, their observations are rather expressions about life itself. In other words, their understanding of work is not perceived by them as an insight into capitalism, but rather as an insight into the natural law of social organization. What stunts the lads' understanding and enables their own insights to be used to place them on the shop floor is their own inbred functionalism. This is what in fact limits their penetrations. Willis correctly perceives these as limitations. However, it remains to analyze their conceptual source and to provide a critique of their moral authority.

Willis' study is an example of the way in which an analysis of one aspect of the reproductive process points to the need to examine other aspects. His work is not ultimately an analysis of the lads' subculture. It is a critique of capitalism and an exploration of the mechanisms that it
employs to reproduce class inequality. Yet the implicit conflict between the lads' functionalist acceptance of capitalism and Willis' critique of it provides the material for a different kind of analysis, one which explores the possibilities for a reclustering of skills that are available in contemporary society. In other words, educational scholarship requires a critique of the social product of reproduction as well as an exploration of the mechanisms, whether cultural or economic, through which reproduction takes place.
Footnotes


In his presentation Wally has done three things:

He has discussed the current situation of educational research and schools of education.

He has suggested a new conception of the mission and object domain for the field of educational studies.

And he has furnished some concepts and examples of their use in exploring this object domain.

I would like to give my interpretation of these proposals and offer some comments on them.

First, he suggests that colleges of education commonly lack a clear mission and sense of identity. The problem is not primarily a lack of an object domain or set of methods. Rather, we are caught between the traditional academic disciplines and the practitioners in the field, or between theory and practice. If we define ourselves in terms of the traditional disciplines, then we give every other department on campus a license to poach and destroy any claim we might have to a distinct identity. On the other hand, if we define ourselves in terms of practical service to the schools, we lose the capacity for independent scholarship and become driven by the immediate demands of school teachers and administrators.

This is a familiar dilemma, and it does seem that many colleges of education have lost the ability to manage it. In their external relations with those in the traditional disciplines they often agree that they are inferior, roll over, and ask to be beaten, or else they remain very still lest anyone notice them and start asking nasty questions with budgetary implications. In their internal relations, it is often every faculty member or department for themselves with rewards being determined by paper count or body count. The prevailing sense is of goallessness or goal displacement.

If this is correct, how can our field be revitalized? I think the point of Wally's paper is to attempt to bring us to our senses about this loss of purpose and to suggest what might be a fruitful reconception of the field.

As I understand it, Wally argues that we need to reconsider the social functions or mission associated with the educational enterprise as a whole in order to better understand our own particular mission. More specifically, he suggests that the principal function of education is its contribution to the reproduction of social structure, hence our
derivative mission should be to develop knowledge of how educational institutions serve or might serve this function. In other words, he proposes that we consider education from an institutional viewpoint in an attempt to gain such a broad perspective.

There are echoes of both Jurgen Habermas and Alasdair MacIntyre in this suggestion. Habermas sees different types of study as constituted by cognitive interests, while MacIntyre, in his critique of Winch, suggests a type of functional analysis as a way of finding a point of comparability in cross-cultural studies. However, rather than pursuing these parallels I would like to pursue one between Wally’s approach to this issue and a prior philosophical debate regarding the nature of teaching.

In that debate the question, "What is teaching?" was approached in different ways. Is teaching merely what people labeled "teachers" do? Or is it whichever activities actually bring about learning, regardless of who performs them? Or is it, finally, an activity that is intended to bring about learning, whether or not it accomplishes its end?

Applying the first definition—which defines teaching in terms of what "teachers" do—to the field of educational studies would be like saying that the field is whatever we--those of us with jobs in the field--do. This is too formal and empty a definition to be of much use. It gives no rational grounds for our doing what we do other than the fact that we were the ones who did it previously. Not much support for a unique identity here.

The second approach, which would define us in terms of our effects, also creates problems. Defining educational studies in this way would suggest that "real" educational scholarship is that which actually improves practice. The trouble with this definition is that it gives no grounds for the autonomy from immediate practice that is needed for an exploratory activity such as scholarship and research. Sometimes research fails in its search for promising new ways of doing things. This shouldn't imply that it was not "real" research or scholarship, but simply that it didn't work out.

The third definition, which is in terms of the aims guiding the activity, seems more satisfactory. Defining educational studies in this way broadens its conception beyond those who are currently labeled "educational researchers", because educational studies so defined might be done by anyone when acting with the appropriate intentions. It also provides for critical distance from existing practice, since educational research may not be successful in fulfilling its intent of improving education.

I think Wally is making a similar suggestion, namely that the field of education is constituted by its function or social mission, and our field of educational studies is in turn constituted by a secondary intellectual mission ("cognitive interest") deriving from this primary one. While he would rather use terms like "social functions" instead of "individual intentions", the point is similar in that the field is constituted by certain goals. It isn't just that those of use who are in it happen to
have certain goals, but that the field is defined in terms of these goals.

Adopting this approach means that the very definition of the field—what makes it what it is—includes goals. It cannot be satisfactorily defined in purely value-neutral, goalless, terms.

This conception of educational studies has just the useful features that Wally points out. It does not limit the field to a consideration of existing schools, and it provides the possibility of critical distance from existing institutions because they might not be fulfilling their missions.

While I like this general approach, I find I disagree regarding its specifics. Wally suggests that the principal function of education is social reproduction, so we should make educational studies the study of the relations between education and social reproduction. As a sociologist I am naturally pleased to see him define the field in a way that corresponds so well to the core focus of my subdiscipline. However, fairness forces me—however reluctantly—to point out some of the limits of this approach.

Suppose, for example, that I suggested that in your marriage or other close relationship you should always look at things from the standpoint of the relationship as a whole rather than that of individual personalities. You should consider all of your actions in terms of their effects on the maintenance or change of your relationship and you should see your spouse’s actions as having similar origins in relational considerations. Such a viewpoint would be similar to that which Wally proposes for education as a whole, namely seeing it in terms of its contribution to the maintenance or change in patterns of social relations.

There is something quite appealing in this vision, for it gets away from our culture’s propensity to make individuals primary and relations secondary. For instance, we tend to see relationships in rather shallow terms as means to individual ends rather than as ends in themselves. Adopting a relational view also helps avoid the common error of seeing relational problems as caused by “sick” people rather than by “sick” interactional patterns.

However seeing things in strictly relational terms invites the opposite error, namely treating individuals as mere creatures of their relationships. People have stakes in their own lives which may differ from their stakes in their current relationships. Similarly, some problems are primarily personal rather than relational, and are not susceptible to change by changing relationships. For this reason, insisting on a social relational interpretation of a problem may be just as much in error as insisting on an individual one.

I’m no Dewey scholar, but I like Dewey’s symmetrical treatment of the individual and society. He suggests that the aim of education is both to socialize the individual and individualize the society, placing neither term prior to the other. In general, I think this accurately characterizes the educator’s position in most situations. We treat kids
in ways that we think will prepare them for their likely futures while simultaneously sheltering them from practices of which we disapprove so as not to reproduce these practices. Social reproduction alone does not capture the essentials of this process.

The point is that a single level of analysis or angle of vision is not enough. We need both individual and social viewpoints, or more, in order to have a full-bodied vision of education, just as we need at least two distinct angles of vision in order to see a single three-dimensional object. In each case the two viewpoints are inter-dependent and mutually defining. One does not require Hegelian dialectics to appreciate this, merely an understanding of how two functions or two processes may each be defined in terms of the other, making them mutually constituting. The popular M.C. Escher drawing of two hands, each of which is drawing the other, gives a concrete visual metaphor for this process.

I believe Wally has tried to settle the problem of goallessness and goal displacement by proposing a single, broad viewpoint for the field as a whole. While it is useful to call us to our senses and remind of us of our missions, I don't believe a single viewpoint is needed as the viewpoint from which to make sense of our efforts. As Nelson Goodman put it "Ironically, then, our passion for one world is satisfied, at different times and for different purposes, in many different ways." The issue is not one viewpoint or another but rather how to mutually define different views so that those who adopt them may work together effectively and with mutual regard in the service of education.

This conclusion by no means detracts from the importance of the issues that he wants to pursue. The institutional viewpoint is all too often neglected. Those of us in higher education in particular serve, in part, to define knowledge for the society as a whole. What we include in the curriculum helps define "expert" knowledge and, by implication, what is excluded is "common" knowledge. The very structure of the curriculum defines the similarities and differences among types of knowledge. By ritual certification we also define those who can legitimately claim to possess different types of expert knowledge.

I also find these issues interesting. But here too I have an objection or two. The impression given is that knowledge codes—which I take to be institutionalized definitions of knowledge such as are implicit in the curriculum—are bad and oppressive. This may sometimes be the case. Certainly the removal of many issues from informal control and their placement in the hands of experts has at times been a mixed blessing. However, in other cases one could argue that it has been very successful.

The point with respect to Wally's paper is that a finer-grained analysis of when such institutionalization goes awry would be useful, rather than leaving the impression that there is something wrong with institutionalization or formalization in and of itself. Consider a common type of error in our field, which occurs when information gained in a narrowly defined or controlled situation is applied to situations in general. We take scores on certain paper and pencil tests and call

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them "intelligence" or we find how we can successfully communicate our expectations to rats and call it "learning theory." In both cases a narrowly defined situation is seen as necessary in order to do "science", but the overgeneralization of the results while ignoring the limited contexts in which they made were derived, seems to have had more to do with seeking the prestige of "science" than with doing it. In the end this gives us all a bad name as well as leading to popular misconceptions of science itself.

In cases such as these I would argue that the broad phenomena that we think of as "learning" or "intelligence" were distorted when defined in such a narrow way. There is dissonance between what those in the field implicitly claim to be studying by adopting these labels and what they in fact study. The problem is not with defining and institutionalizing fields of study—with setting up a knowledge code—but with doing so in a deceptive, useless, or otherwise inappropriate way. Sometimes what starts as a seemingly useful representation later becomes more a matter of vested interest than fruitfulness. Whatever the particular case, an analysis of knowledge codes and their social effects might be profitably sharpened by considering the grounds for a particular codification rather than leaving one suspicious of codification itself.

Finally, to return to the larger theme of Wally's paper, our own self-definition as a field, in the long run it behooves us to define our own field in terms that have more to do with its coherence and utility than mere status seeking or the maintenance of academic monopolies. In this way I think Wally's analysis could profitably be brought back around to its own beginning and a further consideration of our own quandary.

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1 Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Boston: Beacon, 1971).
The Meaning of Foundations:  
An Alternative Paradigm for Assessing the Effects of Foundational Studies  

by  
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We live in an era of accountability that threatens to require a justification (in some instrumental fashion) of our inclusion in professional education programs. I say 'threatens' because it seems that studies of education now reveal its organizational form to be "loosely coupled" and operating more on a "logic of confidence" rather than a norm of close inspection. Thus it may be that our institutions will respond more ritually than substantitively, and our justification will be wrought (as it is now) in faculty meetings, halls, and offices.  

Yet Charles Coble, Dean of Education at East Carolina University, thought the issue sufficiently salient to ask us how we (N.C. Professors of Foundations) would evaluate our contribution to professional education programs. The query was friendly, and promoted an intriguing dialogue. This paper is my thinking in response to the query. I, of course, reframed the question, and purposively have chosen to approach the issue from an "alternative paradigm" (to positivism). I will argue that we must not surrender our fate to an partially inappropriate mode of (instrumental) evaluation, but develop modes that teach us the meaning of our work even as we impart the same. I will also propose an empirical strategy, realizing that the threat in this is that we ignore the idealist's point. I am enough of idealist to believe that if this inspires some discourse and dispute that it has fulfilled its purpose.  

The Meaning of Foundations  
The dialogue over what foundations is and what it does for professional
education is rather elaborate. While it is dangerous to try to typify such a state of affairs; my reading is that we argue over:

a. whether foundations is, or should be a discipline

b. whether we should be more aligned with the base disciplines or with education

c. what we should call our pursuit (educational studies, policy studies, foundations)

d. whether we should teach primarily knowledge or emphasize inquiry skills

e. whether we should be more behavioral or ideational

f. whether we should be exploring enduring truths, examining current issues, or preparing for the future

g. whether a philosophy or an eclectic orientation is best

h. whether we will arrive or succumb to an encroaching rationalism

i. and I submit, whether we should be normative, descriptive, analytic, or some combination thereof.

Some level of agreement, beyond NCATE standards, seemingly must exist for us to continue with all these arguments. My reading, admittedly biased and selective, is that we are as close as we all ever be to agreement that:

a. informed ideas (and maybe theory) are essential to the education professions

b. a technological orientation not only threatens foundations but also the education professions

c. comparative understanding (either in time, culture, subculture, class or ideology) is necessary

d. critical thought (be it right, left or assumedly value free) is desirable

e. humanism (albeit not secular) is acceptable

f. integrated curricula are better than segregated studies

g. attitudes and values can be affected by a course of study
and

h. few want us.¹⁸

Others, no doubt, will have different lists of debates and settled issues. The existence of the debates about the meaning of what we do, not their exact nature, is evidence that the unifying theme in foundations is the search for meaning, whether that takes the form of knowledge or understanding.¹⁹ Some would argue we should "demystify"¹⁹, others that we pursue the course to become a discipline²⁰. In the end, these are both but strategies to discuss the meaning of our studies.

Foundational studies, of course, are diverse. We represent many disciplines; and at least the two cultures of science and the humanities²¹. Taken together, we are both analytic and humanistic, about both knowledge and understanding. If we treat ourselves as a collective discipline we would clearly express the paradigm of the "conceptual humanists": a focus on ideas, discourse as the guarantee of intellectual integrity, and conditional regard for "science" as a mode of inquiry.²² As a collection, we seemingly are more than many of us can be individually. Further, I contend that this is the way our students perceive us. I hear prospective teachers say we are "so negative" because we "demystify". Given any position, we engage in a dialogue with it. This is sufficient to challenge the less reflective thought patterns of the prospective teachers about teaching. Yet it is also true that the experienced teacher or administrator often return to us in a reflective mood. Everyday practice has given them questions as well as resolutions. Suddenly we are more relevant — our concerns can be connected with their experience. The students take classes from a number of us and synthesize their own perspective about the meaning of foundations for their practice. They find us in retrospect a large
debate that informs, but not prescribes, their professional performances.

Students also experience some range of content: law, ethics, theory and research strategies as well as philosophy, history, psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, economics, etc. Some of this is taught as explicit knowledge (e.g. the state of law concerning corporal punishment; philosophical schools of thought, techniques of behavior modification). Some of this is taught as "personal knowledge." In the former, facts and perspectives may be recalled, but the latter cannot be made explicit in any simple fashion as the individual takes it on as his or her own.

The meaning of foundations then is: a faith in discourse; a respect to alternative ways of knowing; a varied knowledge content; a more reflective understanding of the meaning of education; and an informed, personalized, and internalized mode of practice.

Accounting for Ourselves

The threat of this accountability era is its rationalistic assumptions. Preparation programs must justify themselves by their output, rather than their quality. The ultimate question of the rationalist approach in the evaluation of educators is what effect does training have on practice. An empirical linkage is sought. To the extent foundations gives tacit knowledge, faith, respect and understanding, demonstrating any linkage is like to be difficult. Explicit knowledge, of course, may be tested, but after a period of time recall is limited. I do suspect that effects of foundational studies on standardized tests, such as the NTE, can be discerned, in part as explicit knowledge and in part as a form of cultural literacy about the teaching profession. I am suspicious of these types of approaches. Even though we may "prove" our worth, we also assume the rationalists' approach. Someone should develop this line of
reasoning, but I submit foundational studies collectively will be misrepresented as a result of it.

The alternative to this approach is new only in popularity. Since the 1960's, a resurgence of an interpretive alternative has been evident. The alternative has many forms. Geertz has probably one of the most developed theses on interpretivism. Critical theorists have been trying to supercede both positivism and interpretivism. "New paradigm" inquiry draws from a range of nonpositivist traditions (humanistic psychology, phenomenology, critical theory, etc.) and gives a fresh rendition of action research as a participative, interested, and value explicit way of knowing. It may be true that it is incorrect to treat the alternative paradigm as a single entity. Yet I tend to believe that there is considerable overlap in interpretive, critical, and new paradigm approaches. Further, each embraces a common set of research techniques now generally referred to as qualitative methods. I think it somehow the natural state of affairs that within interpretivism there are substantive disagreements.

The alternative paradigm approach I will argue for is essentially based in the interpretivism of Geertz and draws selectively on the ideas of critical and new paradigm approaches. The alternative paradigm is often expressed in terms of the rejection of positivism and thus it is often true that the full nature of the approach is not clearly expressed. Spicer, I believe, puts it most concretely when he argued concerning the methods of an applied ethnography:

In the study there should be use of the emic approach, that is, the gathering of data on attitudes and value orientations and social relations directly from the people engaged in the making of a given policy and those on whom the policy impinges. It should be holistic, that is,
include placement of the policy decision in the context of the competing or cooperating interests, with their value orientations, out of which the policy formulation emerged; this requires relating it to the economic, political, and other contexts identifiable as relevant in the sociocultural system. It should include historical study, that is, some disachronic acquaintance with the policy and policies giving rise to it. Finally, it should include consideration of conceivable alternatives and of how other varieties of this class of policy have been applied with what results, in short, comparative understanding.28

This approach is in service of rendering an interpretation, as "a reading of",29 of a social event. Geertz writes:

Interpretive explanation - and it is a form of explanation, not just exalted glossography - trains its attention on what institutions, actions, images, utterances, events and customs, all the usual objects of social-scientific interests, mean to those who institutions, actions, customs, and so on they are. As a result it issues not in laws like Boyles, or forces like Volta's, or mechanisms like Darwin's, but in constructions like Burckhardt's, Weber's, or Freud's: systematic unpackings of the conceptual world in which 'condottiere', Calvinists, or paranoids live.30

It is this focus on the conceptual world that I think renders the interpretive approach especially appropriate to discerning the meaning of foundations to ourselves and others. If nothing else, foundational studies try to create a culture for the practice of education. Taken to heart, this suggests that accounting for ourselves (as foundations of education) should focus on the meaning systems of educators and explore the interpretations educators use to make sense of their work, and what counts as knowledge to these educators.

A Prescriptive Accounting

The meaning of foundations is appropriately amenable to the techniques of participant observation, interviewing, and study of human products (including
As these techniques are now becoming more systemized, it is possible to be somewhat prescriptive about how we should account for the meaning of foundations.

Following Geertz, I would argue that the meaning of foundations should be treated a 'local' issue until proven otherwise. That is, each foundations program must first study its meaning to its students, and then compare results to ascertain what meaning there is generically to foundations across the population of programs.

Following Spicer, one possible prescription for assessing the effects of foundational studies on education would be comparative, historical, holistic and emic. The focus would be on the meaning systems, values, beliefs, legitimations, and logics-in-use of foundational programs and of teachers and the perceptions both of professional and teachers. The meaning systems of both those teaching and the local foundations programs would be compared to seek about regularities between the two. These take the form of analogies and translations. Each account would be holistic: revealing the fullness and integrity of the foundational program and educational practice as constructed by the teacher, and any perceived connectedness between the two. The assessment would be historical to reveal changes in foundational studies and educational practice and the linkages between them as well as how the meaning of foundational studies is transformed in the career of teaching from course-related knowledge and understanding into the way of being of the teacher. The assessment would also be emic, that is, rendered in the ways of those of interest. This include both the language, ideologies, and social routines of the foundations program and the teachers.

Professors, prospective and current teachers, classes, advising sessions,
informal associations, and work routines, would all be observed. Regularities would be sought. Participants would be interviewed on the meaning of foundations. Some attempts may find the "new paradigm", participative research approach to reveal the subtleties of the meaning. Retrospective accounts may be able to put the meaning(s) in context. Logics-in-use can be explored for their assumptions and the bases of these explored in conversations and interviews. Reflectiveness can be directly explored in the same fashion. The meaning of foundations, one way to assess the effects of foundational studies on educational practice, can be deciphered, and we may learn what it is that we do by reflecting on our own experience and the perspectives of others.

A Concluding Caution

The interpretive alternative I have proposed here might at first readings seem to promise that foundational studies would be revealed in its most favorable light. That is what is usually meany by an "appropriate strategy." Yet interpretivists also have experienced that the results of such investigations often challenge our everyday beliefs and legitimations and as such often create some disquiet, especially among those benefitting from the existing set of social relations and beliefs.36 I caution us to expect that we will be challenged by such an "inside" evaluation. It will not resolve what foundations is or is not, rather it will provoke discourse and inform the dialogue. This type of response to an era of accountability will not protect us, unless we are able to constructively act on it.
NOTES

Author's Note: My thanks to the work of Samuel Holton, David Green and the N.C. Professors of Foundations who in 1980-81 reviewed the field.


20. W. Feinberg, "Educational Studies and the Disciplines of Educational Understanding."

21. C. F. Snow,

22. I. Mifroff and R. Kilmann, Methodological Approaches to Social Science (San Francisco: Jossey & Bass : 1978.)


33. E. Spicer, "Beyond Analysis and Explanation."


Foundational Studies in education occupy a place in nearly every teacher preparation program in the United States and Canada. Yet, more than probably is the case with any other field of study, its intellectual dimensions and functional role remain unclear and sometimes poorly analyzed. One of the interesting sidelines of any discussion of the role and dimensions of Foundational Studies is what appears to be its inevitable apologetic tone. Even Professor Noblit concludes his very thought provoking analysis of an alternative paradigm for assessing the effects of Foundational Studies with the caution that the most we might expect of the "alternative paradigm" is continued discourse and informed dialogue. However, there is no need for apology; indeed, insofar as deliberate scrutiny of one's own activities seem to be one of the surest routes we know to enhancing them, I take it that anything that might provoke discourse and inform dialogue is highly desirable. Furthermore, even if our definitional discussions prove fruitful and we reach agreement, I suspect that the very nature of Foundations necessitates frequent re-examination of what it is up to, for my guess is that our discussions will show its contemporaneous focus to be one of its clearest features; and as the scene and context change, it seems reasonable that an enterprise identifying itself so largely on its responsiveness to the contemporary might change accordingly. Thus, Professor Noblit is to be thanked for, at least, provoking the discussion, my task is to assess the degree to which it has been adequately informed.

Noblit offers as a contribution to the dialogue an "alternative paradigm" to our traditional reliance on positivism. This paradigm is to be viewed as
a mode that teaches us the meaning of our work. The word "mean" and its derivatives have a great many uses. There is the need, therefore, to draw from the Platonic warning to first fix our terms when attempting to speak about meaning in its relation to Foundational Studies.

I take my lead for discovering Noblit's meaning of the word "meaning" from certain overtones in its usage. When he suggests that the "meaning of foundations is: a faith in discourse; a respect to alternative ways of knowing; a varied knowledge content; a more reflective understanding of the meaning of education; and an informed, personalized, and internalized mode of practice," I conclude that it is used to suggest its purpose, use or effect not its essence, nature or definition.

It will be argued that if the aforementioned understanding of the term "meaning" (as use, purpose, or effect) is anywhere near the mark then the informative nature of Noblit's "alternative paradigm" is rendered questionable. That is, if it is to be the function of the "new paradigm" to use its participative research methods to discern some generic meaning (or purpose) across programs then, given the current nature of Foundational Studies, its results will be rendered circular and, thus uninformative.

Though it appears that it is not the role of the "new paradigm" to address issues of the "nature" or "essence" of Foundational Studies, Noblit seems to understand that such discussion cannot be totally avoided. His brief discussion of its nature focuses on its diversity; on its being represented through many disciplines; on its being represented through the cultures of science and the humanities and, thus, being about both knowledge and understanding.

If I were to pursue Noblit's modest beginning by asking about Foundational Studies as a genre, and the possible nature of this broad category that seeks to subsume "History of Education," "Philosophy of Education," "Anthropology
and Education," and "Educational Psychology," among others, it seems immediately evident that no simple thread of similarity or relation is likely to suffice by way of reply.

The History, Psychology, Philosophy, Sociology, and Anthropology embedded in Educational Foundations all seem to be of quite different sorts; and if all are correctly viewed to have some kind of purpose for preparation of teachers and other educational specialists, then their purposes differ quite markedly from each other. This might be illustrated through the very way the enterprises are expressed: in "Philosophy of Education," the term "of" as the binding link suggests quite a different set of relations than the and which articulates "Anthropology and Education." Following James McClellan a Philosophy or History of Education would be one among the branches of Philosophy or History dealing with the distinctive practice of education. The very nature of the name "Educational Psychology," on the other hand, seems to imply a much more integral connection between the areas of education and Psychology. Now given the difference in the way each of these areas of Foundational Studies is constituted, it appears unlikely that any single pattern or generic meaning will describe the way it is joined to and serves or illuminates education. The most we may wish to accomplish is a much weaker Wittgensteinian type "family resemblance" rather than the tight relations Noblit appears to seek.

Among the important ways that at least some foundational fields differ from others, as mentioned, is in the sort of purpose they are expected to serve for the professional preparation of a teacher or educational specialist. One would very probably expose a prospective teacher to Educational Psychology for very different sorts of purposes than those which might result from a Philosophy of Education course. Noblit provides a hint to this distinction
through his identification of the "new paradigm" with an interpretive function as opposed to the instrumental or applicative functions served by positivism. This is one of the prominent issues which divides specialists in the Foundations among themselves: Is it the purpose of Foundations to provide knowledge primarily for interpretive or for applicative use?

One of the things which make it difficult to consider such broad questions --even to grab onto an adequate beginning--is the inevitable circular or question-begging nature of almost any attempt to do so. That is, the foregoing discussion suggests that even in our use of the "new paradigm" we must begin with the knowledge that there is something different about Educational Psychology, marking it off from other Foundational fields, say Philosophy or History, in that it proffers knowledge for different purposes. It is my guess that the methods of the "new paradigm" will yield the same results from which it began thus rendering it circular, question-begging and, by extension, uninformative.

Part of the problem, as I see it, stems from the need to establish common linkages, and/or effects. Maybe a different organizational approach to the Foundations is in order. An approach where there would be no need to promise that its offerings will stand in any particular relation to any generic group or enterprise or, consequently, that it has any sort of special professional contribution to make. If there is a need for it to identify with purposes or functions outside of itself then those purposes should fit within the paradigm of liberal learning. Again, reverting to the Platonic injunction, let me begin by saying precisely what I understand by liberal learning.

It scarcely needs repeating that, like the Foundations, there is no current agreement about the matter of liberal learning--indeed, the educational community seems to be fixed on reiterating that there can and ought to be no
such agreement because that would constitute a confining and arbitrary choice which no faculty has authority to make.

But, oddly enough, that one feature which characterized liberal learning from its very beginning is generally and sometimes apologetically conceded to distinguish it still---its "uselessness." In speaking of the education of the young, indeed, in defining it for the Western world, Aristotle says, in his Politics, that, though useful arts are indispensable for the young, they should not be taught so many mechanical skills as to make them narrow, but they should be educated in the free or liberal arts; clearly, education is liberal essentially in contrast to vocational training. Its liberality then and now is its freedom from the constraints of application. It can take a leisurely large, long, and deep perspective; it allows the mind to play over possibilities; it strives for no immediate application. And this may be the only element which the most diverse set of course offerings in the Foundations have in common.

If Noblit were to confront me with the tools of the "new paradigm" seeking to assess the effects of such an approach to "the Foundations" (if we must call it that) I'm not sure I know how I would reply. The results would be quite without guarantee. There will be some students who emerge from such offerings pretentious and unstrung, fit neither for practice nor for contemplation. But if, as a good interviewer, he continues to press and I am forced to reply it would be somewhat as follows: "If there are any effects, i.e., if anything is "meant" by such an approach it must be this: the educator liberally educated through the foundations can articulate reasons, give causes, spell out why's, wherefore's and how's." I doubt Professor Noblit will find my saying that wildly exciting or informative for it simply reflects the meaning he brings to the interview when he connects foundations' effects to: a faith in
discourse; a respect to alternative ways of knowing; a varied knowledge content; a more reflective understanding of the meaning of education; and an informed, personalized, and internalized mode of practice. But in addition, it has the sort of insipid obviousness that a truth much battered about but never quite exterminable does have. So, reduced to a pulp first by the aggressiveness of its enemies and then by the insecurity of its friends the terms will scarcely cause his heart to miss a beat.

And it ought to. If there is one realization which proves itself over and over it is this: that the prospective teacher or educational specialist is first and foremost a human being which cannot find its fulfillment in mere instrumental functions or even in mere consciousness, but which needs--needs--to come to terms with himself, to be clear and truthful about himself and what he is doing, or is expected to do, as an educator. There can be such learning in the field of education and it should be useless and unspecific only because it is at the root of all usefulness and at the foundation of all specialization. So I end as I began, there is no need for apology.
This semester marks the beginning of the twenty-fifth year I've been charged with teaching the one and only Foundations course undergraduate teacher education students take as part of their teacher education program. I began this assignment immediately after completing my doctoral studies. For twenty-four years, I've struggled to find ways to instruct my classes so that my students can gain the understanding I was so excited about achieving in my program. Needless to say, the development of one three-hour course which could encompass what I had studied in around thirty such courses has proven difficult! Time does not permit a listing of all the versions and revisions of that one course. It is sufficient to point out that I have held doggedly to one position, namely, students must have an introduction at least to history, philosophy, and sociology of education in one course. This paper is the latest, and I hope last, attempt to show how these three approaches can be successfully integrated in one course.

Teacher education programs purport to develop professional educators. The distinctive characteristic of any professional is possession of competence based upon knowledge. The teacher who understands schooling is free to address the particular problems of a given situation, to make decisions relevant to that situation, and to act on the basis of the authority which that knowledge provides. The teacher who understands schooling can act with the integrity born of knowing what one is about. The alternative is to accept standardized descriptions of the teaching task, to employ only those skills programmed for particular tasks, and to rely upon one's official position as "teacher" for the authority to act. To send teachers who do not understand schooling into our schools leaves only this latter option open and contributes to the "mindlessness" which Charles Silberman identified years ago as the central problem creating a "crisis in the classroom." Mary Anne Reywid, Charles Tesconi, and Don Warren in Pride and Promise (commissioned by AESA) call for improvement in teacher education through renewed emphasis on "knowledge about education" [italics in original]. Research from the history, sociology, and philosophy of education, they argue, brings important resources to preparation programs by providing a profound understanding
of the actual conditions of professional practice.

The problem confronting the Foundations professor of future educators is two-fold. On one hand, we are confronted by students who profess to know already what we want to teach them, namely, what schooling is, and on the other hand, what we want to teach them in Foundations courses about schooling does not seem to them immediately relevant to what they claim they really want to know, namely, how to be effective teachers. I believe we can overcome this problem if we approach our task through an emphasis on understanding schooling. To achieve the competence characteristic of a professional demands that the knowledge associated with the profession become assimilated so that the professional is able (competent) to perform. This cannot be achieved by adding knowledge about schooling to the student's perception of what constitutes schooling. Rather, the students' perception of schooling must come to consist of that knowledge. Thus, the significance of what "understanding schooling" entails.

Students are aware that school buildings, classrooms, teachers, books, etc., exist, but usually have not considered the existence of schooling. If we are to teach them to understand schooling, we must know what it is they are to understand. As Jane Martin has pointed out, "We never understand a thing per se; rather we understand it under some description." In our context where we are preparing persons to become educators, we are seeking an understanding of schooling in terms of what educators do. Educators are professionally engaged in creating learning experiences. A first step, then, is to point out a contrast between out-of-school learning experiences and in-school learning experiences. Reflecting upon their own experiences, students readily testify to an awareness of being in-school as opposed to being out-of-school. This awareness is evidence to them of a boundary which marks schooling off from non-schooling experiences. Schooling appears to be a separated-off arrangement of learning experiences. When asked what kinds of learning experiences are associated with schooling, students report they experienced learning the content of various subject matters, learning attitudes such as desiring to excel over peers, and learning to live "within the system." In effect, they report three categories of learning experiences which can be described as education, enculturation, and institutionalization. These categories constitute the dimensions of the arrangement of learning experiences known as schooling.

All learning experiences are not to be called schooling, since practically all behavior results from learning. Only when these three categories of learning are experienced as a configuration is the combined experience to be designated as schooling. The term "dimensions" best characterizes the three categories of learning since the categories are what is discernable about the schooling arrangement. The concept "schooling" includes all three dimensions of learning, enculturation, education, and institutionalization, without being synonymous with any one or two combined. Schooling is not simply the institutionalization of education. The learning associated with education can occur without schooling and not all learned in schooling results from educative efforts. Schooling means something
other than just institutionalized enculturation, i.e., learning simply by living, for schooling ordinarily has as its express purpose the doing of education, and the doing of education can be distinguished from what is generally meant by enculturation. In addition to the learning experiences identifiable as education and enculturation, schooling means engaging in activities calculated to promote institutional identity and continuity. Schooling as an institutional enterprise fosters learnings unique to itself in order to ensure institutional maintenance. Without them, schooling would lose its institutional nature and would not exist at all. Still, schooling obviously refers to more than just learning the roles of organizational living. Schooling is all three dimensions and makes no claim to being anything more than an arrangement of these categories of learning experience. Schooling is the only arrangement of learning experiences of this nature. Other arrangements which include these learning experiences such as the family, church, military, etc., may include all three categories of learning but these arrangements possess other dimensions which define their existence. They are not just arrangements of learning experiences. For example, the essential characteristic of family is the relationship among persons who constitute a family. What destroys a family is not the absence of the learning which might occur within the family but the severing of those relationships whereby family is defined. Family is to be understood primarily as a matter of relationships among persons and, secondarily, as an arrangement of learning experiences. Schooling, on the other hand, is to be understood primarily as an arrangement of learning experiences.

The concept of schooling developed refers to what is experienced in a schooling situation. That concept can be stated as follows:

Schooling is an arrangement of learning experiences which are characteristically cultural, educational, and institutional.

While schooling is not synonymous with any one of these experience categories, a case of schooling cannot be imagined which excludes any one of them. In other words, the concept of schooling is employed to refer to an arrangement of learning experiences with cultural, educational, and institutional dimensions. To claim a case of schooling where any one dimension can be denied would be contradictory. The significance of each dimension of schooling as a necessary component for the meaning of schooling can be illustrated by showing the impossibility of calling any situation a case of schooling if any one of these dimensions is missing. Three common kinds of experiences, the learning associated with enculturation, education, and institutionalization, when associated in an integral fashion, i.e., clearly marked off from other experiencing, constitutes schooling. Schooling, then, is understood when it is seen that schooling is a configuration or arrangement of these categories of learning experiences.

To understand that a configuration of these three categories of learning experiences separated from other experiences constitutes schooling is to understand what schooling is. Gaining this concept
enables students to understand that schooling is a phenomena consisting of dimensions which define it but which are not identifiable in terms of the actual properties of particular instances of schooling. For example, there is nothing in this concept to indicate that schooling means trying to achieve some particular purpose as opposed to any other, that schooling must proceed in any certain fashion, that schooling has to be organized along one line or another, or that any particular case of schooling is good or bad per se. Once this is recognized, students are prepared to see that particular instances of schooling are shaped by the properties which, in fact, do exist in those situations. This challenges the "taken for granted" idea that everyone knows what schools are and that no additional study about schooling is necessary for one to become a professional educator.

To move from understanding the concept of schooling to an understanding of actual cases of schooling demands attention be directed to the properties of particular arrangements of learning experiences. The concept of schooling focuses attention on properties associated with all three dimensions of the arrangement. A common error is to believe you can understand a schooling situation by examining the educational program or, at most, the educational program and institutional structures. Adherence to a concept of schooling which includes the cultural dimension assures, for example, that what some have labelled "the hidden curriculum" is not omitted.

An infinite number of illustrations could be marshalled to show how cultural, educational, and institutional factors shape any given instance of schooling. These would include the social class, race, ethnicity, gender, and religious orientation of persons whose teaching/learning experiences are the stuff of the schooling situation, the values promoted by the sponsoring agent of the situation, and the organizational structure of the situation. Institutions imply historicity so past decisions and conditions become ingredients of present arrangements. Thus, a study of the historical development of schools reveals how schooling has been shaped. Policy debates about what schools ought to accomplish as well as assumptions about the nature of man, society, the learning process, and so forth, all shape schooling. The number of possible properties in any schooling situation, the complexities created by their inter-relationships, and the resulting uniqueness of each situation rules out describing in Foundations courses the properties one will find in this or that situation. What can be done in a course of study is to explore the possibilities which might exist in any situation so that students can utilize this knowledge in coming to understand schooling in a particular situation.

Students who understand the concept of schooling possess a portrait of schooling drawn in broad strokes. Courses in Foundations can introduce them to the properties which give substance to that form. Students must learn to become "artists" who can fill in the general form of schooling with those "paints" discovered in a given situation. When they can come to see the properties which compose the dimensions of a particular schooling situation, they can be said to understand that schooling situation.

Foundations of Education type courses provide an opportunity for
students to become familiar with the properties of schooling and to
develop the perspectives necessary for building an understanding of
schooling in particular situations. Left with their own sense im-
pressions and feelings, students lack the objectivity of academic
studies which may contribute to such understanding. Also, they may
overlook many possibilities which could have been suggested by the
courses. On the other hand, the methodologies of academic approaches
to the study of schooling often "squeeze the life" out of existential
situations. For example, the correlational method employed by most
social scientists may measure school outcomes in terms of various
independent variables such as social class, race, attitudes of teachers,
etc., without taking into account the actual processes of education
within a given schooling situation. Such studies may call attention
to some condition being an ingredient in schooling situations but
they cannot indicate in what way, if any, that condition is a factor
in shaping schooling in a given situation. What students have to
learn to do is to explore the possibilities available in a situation
and to "breathe life" into their interpretations as they imaginatively,
and painstakingly, seek to understand schooling in a particular situa-
tion. If understanding schooling in a particular situation means
seeing the properties which compose the dimensions of that arrangement,
then armed with a knowledge of what the possibilities may be and
employing the perspectives developed through this approach, students,
as educators, can proceed to analyze any schooling situation to
discover what its properties are and, thus, understand schooling
in that situation. There is a subjective element here, however, for
an interpretation can never be completely objective nor coverage of
the possibilities comprehensive. Consequently, an understanding of
schooling is enriched when shared with others; and this effort to
communicate interpretations with colleagues, students, parents,
and other interested persons can emphasize the importance of an
understanding of schooling in the doing of schooling.

This paper began with the assertion that teacher education
programs exist to develop professional educators whose distinctive
characteristic is the ability to perform as educators. That ability
is founded upon knowledge. Foundations courses cannot provide all
the knowledge students need to become professionals, but without
foundational studies students are not likely to move beyond their
unexamined personal experience of schooling. Foundational studies
enable students to separate themselves from the settled condition
of their own schooling experiences, and to seek an understanding of
schooling in all its dimensions, including all those properties which
might form a particular schooling situation. A perspective on what
constitutes schooling can be achieved which enables them to seek
understanding in any schooling situation. In the process of accom-
plishing this, a separation from their own being as defined by
previous situations occurs and a new being emerges as students realize
that any schooling situation in which they find themselves is not
already settled but in question. They come to see that armed with
the data, methodologies, and perspectives gained from foundational
studies they can interpret any situation and put into some kind of
order the properties of that situation. To see how these properties
shape that situation is to understand it. Such understanding is
indispensable for working successfully within the situation and is
the mark of a professional

This approach to teaching Foundations courses draws initially upon the students' own experience of schooling, allows for a comprehensive overview of all facets of schooling, introduces students to systematic studies about schooling, and develops those interpretive and critical perspectives which equip students for the role of professional educators.

NOTES


4. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor, 1967). The ideas underlying the approach outlined in this paper have come, in part, from this book; whether Berger or Luckman would recognize them or not is another matter.

WHAT IS SCHOOLING?

A response to Professor J. Don Reeves' paper
"The Understanding of Schooling: A Model for Teaching Foundations of Education"

J. Gordon Chamberlin

Describing the human experience always involves tension between question mark and period. For some people, to live is to ask questions; for others, to live is to have the right answers. Obviously the latter is more comfortable, but it is also more dangerous to human existence. The former is the mark of the philosopher; the latter marks the ideologue, and ideologues in whatever field of human endeavor are dangerous.

We are a group of people trying to be philosophers, and it is heartening to have one of our number, after twenty-four years of teaching, forthrightly raise the question, "what am I doing?" What is this thing I am dealing with? My students are going out to work in schools; how in the world can I help them understand what they are getting into? What is schooling anyway?

As inheritors of centuries of schooling in many different cultures, it takes a brave person to attempt the difficult task he has laid out for himself. In his paper our brave friend, Professor Reeves, shares with us where he is now in his effort to explain schooling to students. I assume that at the same time he is seeking our reactions to his ideas, but I hope he is doing one thing more, that is, using this occasion as a step toward a major work on the meaning of schooling.

I found his paper very stimulating because of the many questions it caused me to ask. The descriptive approach he has employed is a challenge to every reader -- how would you describe schooling?

II

Philosophical activity is marked by two elements: an object of attention and a methodology. The object may be general or specific, all of human existence or such things as science, art, or education. And different philosophers have demonstrated different methodologies. Some ideological philosophers hold there is only one appropriate methodology; we have all had to deal with people like that. Here the object of concern is schooling and the intentional methodology is descriptive. As so often happens in the educational domain the approach begins with goals. Professor Reeves wants to do several things.

1. To show how history, philosophy and sociology of education can be integrated in one course.
2. He wants students to have a profound understanding of professional practice but they want to know how to be effective teachers.

3. He wants to overcome this "problem" and believes it can be overcome by emphasizing "understanding schooling."

4. To do that, he says, they must understand what schooling is, and follow Jane Martin's advice that "understanding is under some description."

5. Taking a sharp turn, he notes students' awareness that out-of-school learning is different from in-school-learning, leading to this passage, in which he describes their reported awareness:

"When I asked what kinds of learning experiences are associated with schooling, students report they experience learning the content of various subject matters, learning attitudes such as desiring to excel over peers, and learning to live 'within the system.' In effect, they report three categories of learning experiences which can be described as education, enculturation, and institutionalization."

From this he draws his "concept" of schooling:

"Schooling is an arrangement of learning experiences which are characteristically cultural, educational, and institutional."

Our question is, is that all that students ever identify as marks of schooling? Could we not all make a longer list of terms our students use in describing their schooling experiences? What he wants them to understand is "what educators do." Would he have received the same answers if he had asked the question that way? Even so, the problem would remain: what is the essence of schooling and how does one determine that essence? How does what it does relate to what it is?

Usually the description of an object is influenced by the context or horizon within which it is viewed and the perspective employed. What students will discover in their first jobs is that schooling means something different to parents than to employers, government agencies, judges and clergy. Will not the breadth of the horizon have a direct impact on the resulting essential characteristics?

Our histories assure us that schools were being conducted in China long before the Greek and Roman patterns which we call ancient, so the sheer volume of patterns of schooling to be considered is staggering, particularly when all of them have left trace elements in the bloodstream of contemporary schooling. Our philosophical studies assure us that the tree of knowledge is festooned with a great variety of interpretations of education as schooling, often in directly conflicting ways. Our sociological studies document the fact that school structures and functions change, often rapidly, as they reflect the expectations of different groups. For instance, state laws assume that schools function in loco parentis. What does that have to do with the concept of schooling? Or, in this country, at least, schools have become general welfare agencies for the young, providing food, health services, counseling and recreation. Does this change the concept?
Our first set of questions have to do with scope and methodology, but they lead, of course, to the three categories he stipulates, each of which poses more questions.

The first is particularly significant because in popular usage education means schooling. It is often difficult to distinguish between the two, and this is one of the reasons I hope Professor Reeves will go on to do a major work on this. It is just as important in this field as it is to distinguish between religion and church, or politics and parties.

In identifying "education" as the first dimension, Professor Reeves first uses the term in reference to students' "learning the content of various subject matters." Later he holds that "schooling ordinarily has as its express purpose the doing of education, and the doing of education can be distinguished from what is meant by enculturation." However, what it is that distinguishes the two is not made clear. The only explanation I found in the paper was in the sentence just quoted, which began, "Schooling means something other than just institutionalized enculturation, i.e. learning simply by living."

Surely schools engage in enculturation but is that a distinctive dimension of education. To me, every social activity involves enculturation -- that is, expressing and encouraging cultural patterns of the existing society. How can one think of any human activity devoid of enculturation? All subject matter inevitably incorporates cultural aspects.

By including both as distinctive characteristics of schooling Professor Reeves seems to be saying that education is something more than enculturation, and perhaps when students speak of "subject matter" they mean academic disciplines which could be taken as systematic (organized, institutionalized) ways of examining different domains of the overall culture.

With a further step, one might contend that education goes beyond enculturation by helping learners encounter the "other" -- other facts, other understandings, other people, other subjects than those into which they have already been enculturated. In this sense schooling would be enculturating by an encounter with other cultures, even within the pluralistic society, rather than assuming that the school's function is to reinforce the present cultural experiences of students or their parents. From this perspective schooling would be an organized encounter with the "other," and this would be most obvious in the provision of a person who symbolizes the other, a "teacher." This might be the basis for John Scudder's contention, in his new book, Meaning, Dialogue and Enculturation (the traditional sermon always has three points!) that dialogue is an essential characteristic of education in schools.
Institutionalization raises somewhat parallel questions. On the one hand Professor Reeves refers to the fact that schooling is an organized activity within some kind of institution, but limits it to institutions in which "arrangements of learning experiences" is the primary function. Thus schooling institutions, he contends, are distinguished from others "such as family, church, military, etc."

A problem is raised, however, by the so-called "Christian schools" now increasing in number. Are they doing "schooling" or not? On the other hand, Professor Reeves introduces institutionalization as a part of his trinity in response to the observation of students that they are exposed to "learning to live within the system." If by system they refer to the particular school system of their community, that would be one meaning, but if by "system" they refer to the general institutional structures of society, that involves quite another meaning. Would not both be aspects of enculturation?

Another kind of question is raised. As Socrates, meeting within students under the trees, engaged in schooling? Or to turn the equation around, could there have been an institution of schooling without a Socrates? Is an educator, a teacher, necessary for schooling to take place?

Finally, some questions about the way Professor Reeves uses the term "understanding." He notes that students come into his classes and identify from their own background distinctive "kinds of learning experiences," and he creates them with reporting three categories of learning experiences which he says describe schooling. It would seem that in saying this he recognizes that they are telling him how they understand schooling. They already understand it. But apparently what is not what he thinks they should understand. He becomes quite normative about it, saying, "What students have to do is to explore the properties which compose the dimension of a particular schooling situation." In other words, understanding is a kind of process.

Even so, their understanding will also be an interpretation of their experiences of schooling. Is this not what we all do all the time, explore things using the properties we see as appropriate to what we are exploring. Since particular situations keep changing, our understanding, as a continuing process, yields changed understandings (interpretations) as products of that activity. Professor Reeves really is saying that there is a right way to develop one's understanding (process) of schooling in order to yield (product) an authentic understanding of schooling? Or is he saying that a foundations course should help students become more self-conscious in using the two dimensions -- the three dimensions and the three disciplines -- in clarifying their concept of schooling and in examining particular situations so their professional activity will be more relevant. I think he means to be doing the latter, even though the paper often seems to be saying the former.

Professor Reeves is on his way with a very stimulating approach, and for his stimulation we say, "thank you sincerely."
In September, 1985, Education Secretary William Bennett was reported to be pressing on with the current administration's push for public schools to teach moral and civic values. Bennett is quoted as stating, "Clearly, our schools should not attempt to inculcate sectarian beliefs, or support one religion over another. But just because our public schools do not teach religion does not mean we wish them to be places devoid of respect for religion, for the Judeo-Christian tradition, or for the values that so clearly emerged from it." Bennett goes on to claim that the values of "patriotism, self-discipline, thrift, honesty and respect for elders" should be taught, adding that "to be specific, one should know, for example, that there is a moral difference between the United States and the Soviet Union." In one sense, Bennett's opinions on moral education and the role of morality in the public school system are far removed from Vandenberg's sustained analysis of the methodology and moral principles necessary to construct an educational theory. Vandenberg's thought draws from a long tradition of educational philosophy and, more specifically, rooted in existential approaches to understanding human interaction and moral principles. Bennett, however, is head of one of the largest governmental agencies in charge of education in the world; while Vandenberg (now living in Australia) is a scholar, known to a small circle of academicians and perhaps some practicing educators. Bennett is in tune with many of the specific social, political, and economic agenda-items of the Reagan Administration. Vandenberg, on the other hand, begins his 1983 book by citing Martin Luther King, Jr., and Eleanor Roosevelt, and his thesis rests upon an absolute principle more reminiscent of the Jimmy Carter presidential reign: respect for human rights.
Let us pose this question: Of whom will the general public and a wide spectrum of practicing educators, teachers, counselors, and administrators think when they hear such key words and phrases as "moral education," "values," "civic culture," "Judeo-Christian principles," etc.? Surely not Donald Vandenberg; perhaps some may still recall "Values Clarification" (branded as secular humanist by Bennett and others?) or even remember John Dewey and his preeminent (if sometimes ambiguous) focus on moral principles and civic culture. Many will equate moral education with the specific platform items of one branch of a contemporary political American party or with the mission and curriculum of private Christian schools (the exact connotation of "Christian" being left wide open). This (if it is the case) is an unfortunate, even dangerous state of affairs. The ideals of moral education and the role that affirmative moral principles can play in shaping the curriculum and other educational structures and policies is far too important to be so restricted in its connotation. It is, then, in this sense that I offer a sympathetic critique of Vandenberg's chapter in his book Human Rights in Education. Vandenberg deserves not just sympathy, but his fundamental approach to educational theory deserves much more consideration and publicity. Essentially, he affirms the ideal that above all else, questions of educational practice and policy must be considered in terms of moral principle.

Rapid changes in culture, life style, and technology have often led to cries for moral education. Most recently, the seemingly overaccelerating pace of change has actually been celebrated in such works as Naisbett's Megatrends, Toffler's Future Shock and The Third Wave, and Peters' Search for Excellence. Such classic dire warnings of inhumane, technically evil worlds as Brave New World, 1984, and Darkness at Noon seem to have receded in impact and popularity. Vandenberg, however, belongs firmly in this latter category. He is in line with a lengthening list of--if not anti-technologists--at least severe critics of unexamined technological expansion. In the post World War II tradition of Lewis Mumford, Aldous Huxley, Alan Watts, Theodore Roszak, and the Limits to Growth researchers, Donald Vandenberg is fearful of the continuing, uncritical absorption of all technology. He believes that humankind is adopting a technological mind-set--that we are becoming the dehumanized victims of our own technical creations and mechanistic ways of thinking. In short, Vandenberg, too, is responding to a time of rapid cultural and social change, and in his role as a philosopher of education he is asking us to stop and reflect on education, human values, moral principles, and especially human
rights and dignity.

With respect to the role morality and moral education can play, these two, Bennett and Vandenberg, represent very different types of reactions to contemporary cultural change and upheaval. The more common response over history has been the cry for moral education to preserve or even restore the values and principles of an earlier, less troubled, and better understood age. One may turn back to classical Greek times for a powerful example. Xenophon (435-354 B.C.), a philosopher and one-time follower of Socrates, departed radically from his mentor when he advocated that the Athenians adopt Spartan educational methods and curriculum. Xenophon, and those he represented in Athenian society, were vehemently opposed to the new Socratic learning as threatening to the morals of society; they advocated a return to "the simpler times in which virtue was based not on knowledge but on good habits." Markedly different is an approach that recognizes the impact of broad social and cultural change and attempts to formulate a new educational ethos preserving the best of current practice and thought but also by preparing for a different future. Surely this has been part of the great appeal of John Dewey's philosophy. Dewey began with the premises that our society is an industrial democracy and that theorists should formulate an educational program capable of developing the intellectual and moral characteristics necessary to cope with that current social reality. Vandenberg contends that the most pressing social reality is rampant technological expansion, threatening in the immediate forms of nuclear armament escalation and environmental pollution as well as in the more subtle senses of altering our consciousness and undermining our respect for human dignity. The book Human Rights in Education is his attempt to reassert the foundational role that moral reasoning should play in all educational planning; it is not an attempt to reintroduce the moral values of an earlier age.

More specifically, Vandenberg's goal is to create and systematically defend a theory of education grounded in a moral commitment to freedom and human dignity. Human rights theory is formulated in the context of such educational concepts and questions as "authority," "discipline and punishment," "pedagogic love," "education as a human right," and "neutrality." In a culture dominated by technology, he contends that all involved in education must make a special effort to emphasize the moral and intellectual characteristics of individuals and human beings. His claim that there are fundamental moral characteristics that the school should develop in a non-ideological context is critical and controversial.
Indeed, Vandenberg is especially anxious to avoid charges of subjectivity or partisanship. "No special theory of knowledge, ideology, or program is needed to develop intellectual or moral traits other than those indigenous to good schooling when expressed in terms of human rights." In a sense, this thesis is the crux of his chapter "Methodology and Moral Principles" which in turn serves as a pivotal introductory chapter for the entire book.

Although Vandenberg is at pains to defend the notion of a nonbiased, objective moral methodology, he devotes little space to defending the underlying notion that moral principles do have a critical role to play in shaping education. This and the premise that it is technological expansion that poses the overwhelming challenge to humanity must, essentially, be accepted at face value by the reader. Is this fair? Recently, members of the Virginia Educational Studies Association were treated to a presentation by Dr. Faustine Jones-Wilson, President of the American Educational Studies Association. Dr. Jones-Wilson identifies three critical issues in society which must be accounted for in the work of all foundations scholars: the nuclear arms race, race relations, and the duty of dissent. Others may contend that it is the decline of religious faith and spirituality or the redistribution of material wealth, or the dominance of male, hierarchical ways of thinking and acting that are the critical factors challenging society today. It is, of course, highly unrealistic to expect that we can be provided with a single definitive listing of the most important social and cultural trends. It is not unrealistic, however, to expect each philosopher who ventures down this path to build as strong a case as possible—defending and elucidating his/her interpretation of the wide-ranging factors altering history, culture, as well as human nature itself.

Also, do moral principles have a critical role to play in formulating educational theory and practice? Perhaps many of us who teach philosophy of education believe so, but this is not a safe assumption either among ourselves or with the population-at-large. Abraham Flexner proposed a strictly intellectual, research orientation for higher education focused on attaining truth and free from the "diversigns" of either vocationalism or character building. Today some argue for education that fulfills the vocational and technical needs of government and industry, seeing no need to extrapolate on deeper purposes and meanings. Moreover, educational theorists with an analytic bent may be inclined to dismiss the significance of the question itself—insisting instead that we narrow the focus,
identify the initial concepts, and analyze them. It is odd that in a chapter on methodology Vandenberg does not address himself to such concerns. Nevertheless, *Human Rights in Education* is admirable as an exemplary study in terms of this conference's theme: "reconstructing educational inquiry." Vandenberg engages both in conceptual analysis and value inquiry; in successive chapters he first elucidates the question, then analyzes the important concepts, moves on to justify the moral significance of the concept, and concludes by examining questions of educational practice in terms of human rights. Although often classified as an "existential/phenomenological" philosopher, in this work he has adopted a strategy more appropriately labeled "normative ethical inquiry." There is no attempt to discover or systematize facts, develop empirical generalizations, or formulate explanatory theories about the teaching of human rights or the absence or presence of respect for human dignity in schools today. This work is concerned, however, with tangible concepts and ideals that have direct implications for shaping "practical policy." It is an inquiry that develops into a specific, rationally justifiable proposal for making choices in the design of education. In this normative study, Vandenberg presents his systematic view of the major principle, respect for human rights, by which educators ought to think and plan. We need more educational theorists who are willing to "think big," to make specific, concrete proposals—and yet strive to maintain conceptual clarity and a high level of reasonableness—if not outright "objectivity."

A brief review of major approaches to understanding moral knowledge is offered by Vandenberg. He conventionally identifies "intuitionism" (simple, direct awareness of value), "rationalism" (values identified and understood through reasoning), and "empiricism" (values derived through empirical generalization) as three theories of ethical knowledge and then opts for an eclectic stance: "aspects of all three theories need to be accepted to have adequate knowledge of value."9 Perhaps many of us can sympathize with Vandenberg as he attempts to move on with his practical, normative analysis—avoiding the danger of becoming bogged down in metaethical concerns. Yet, this attempt to sidestep the issue does weaken his argument. Vandenberg writes, "The question of an education for human dignity in a technological society, however, does not call for a direct investigation into value nor an attempt to contribute to the discipline called 'ethics.'"10 Although it does not call for a direct investigation, it does require a more detailed exposition of the underlying assumptions and ethical theory or at least recognition that this is a critical and questionable link in his
argument. In part, one can easily imagine that Vandenberg was grappling with a question faced by each of us: Who is my audience? Other philosophers of education, practicing educators, the public-at-large? Again, to the extent that it is his goal to place his normative proposals on the table for consideration by theorists and educators at many levels then, Vandenberg may be at least partially excused.

To return to the matter of objectivity—this, too, is a critical link in Vandenberg's analysis. Can one "transcend ideology" and offer an objective methodology of moral principles? Clearly this is Vandenberg's intention and, in large part, he does so by citing and using Lawrence Kohlberg's psychological construct on the moral development of individuals. Kohlberg's highest level of moral reasoning (stage six: understood in terms of universal moral principles, human rights, and justice) is the guiding principle in Vandenberg's analysis. Individuals operating at "stage six" have moved well beyond motivation based on the threat of punishment or self-gratification, neither are they concerned solely with social approbation or maintenance of a positive self-image. Such individuals have respect for rules and laws in themselves; yet they also understand the contextual and relativistic nature of laws, morals, and social regulations, and at the highest stage they transcend a utilitarian, "for-the-common-good" perspective to personally and intrinsically affirm universally-valid moral principles. Of course, philosophers of education have spent a great deal of energy debating and critiquing Kohlberg in the past decade and a half. Yet Vandenberg makes no reference to this growing literature of dialogue and debate—instead contending that his thesis "assumes only that the cognitive process Kohlberg places at the highest level is the most reasonable one."11 Is it? Certainly, yes, if the only framework for comparison is Kohlberg's own scheme. However, even apart from the myriad of questions and concerns focused on adopting an ideal identified and developed through psychological research, is Kohlberg's stage six focus on justice and universally-valid moral principles (which are formal, objective, hierarchical, and achieved through rationality) the very best objective grounding for developing an educational theory? There are viable and significantly different alternatives. For example, William Perry, another cognitive-developmental psychological researcher and theorist, also offers a sequential, hierarchical construct with each position a necessary "building block" for the subsequent one. However, his highest stage, "commitment in relativism," describes an individual who recognizes that despite the circumstantial nature of identity
and intellect and the sometimes overwhelming diversity of moral values, one must be willing to accept responsibility for developing his/her own personal values and commitments. In Perry's words, "(an individual) experiences the affirmation of identity among multiple responsibilities and realizes commitment as his ongoing, unfolding activity through which he expresses his lifestyle." Carol Gilligan, to provide another alternative, argues that women have a "different voice"; in direct reaction against Kohlberg she proposes a higher ethic based on the way women perceive social relationships and structure their world. In similar vein, Nell Noddings, author of Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (1984) rejects obedience to law and rules as a guide to moral behavior and proposes meeting and knowing others in the context of caring: "from this requirement there is no escape for one who would be moral." In short, the use of Kohlberg's sixth stage as a guiding principle in the attempt to develop a non-partisan, "ideologically-free" philosophy of education is inadequate.

One final concern with the chapter "Methodology and Moral Principles" is the lack of clear distinction between: a) the use of moral principles and reasoning in developing an educational theory; b) the important moral principles which should serve as continuing guides to educational policy and practice; and c) actual moral education. This paper undoubtedly reflects the same confusion. At this point suffice it to state that although these are three overlapping areas, they are separate issues; for example, one could contend that certain moral principles play a critical role in formulating educational theory but reject most, if not all, forms of direct moral education. To conclude on a positive note: Vandenberg's work, although easily criticized on some points, is (if you'll excuse this Autumn playoff analogy) in the right ballpark. His ideas and methodology provide a fruitful and ethical springboard for dialogue. The focus on moral principles, the attempt to rationally defend his chosen ideals, and the determination to recognize and act upon contemporary social and cultural reality are worthwhile and admirable qualities. By its very example, such an approach teaches us to be wary of those who would use the language of morality and moral education as propaganda and cite certain select instrumental moral values apart from a broader context of underlying principles and far-reaching ideals.
NOTES


4. Ibid., pp. 30-31.


6. Ibid., p. 34.


9. Vandenberg, p. 36.


11. Ibid.


13. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1982).

EDUCATIONAL INQUIRY HAS—AS THIS CONFERENCE'S THEMATIC EMPHASIS IMPLIES—indeed been marked by the "empirical tradition". And great indeed—if, at this historical moment curiously powerless—in the desire to get, move, or simply arrive beyond it. For my part, getting beyond it is contingent upon, to use a term of which Wittgenstein would probably disapprove, getting to the bottom of it. I want to ask: what assumptions about how we know things, and, therefore, who we are and what we may become make people so comfortable with the empirical tradition? This paper answers that question with the following thesis: what happened to us in the realm of deep-cultural assumptions is that modern Western science has raised its particular co-text-specific method to the status of a universal genetic epistemology, i.e. a philosophical and psychological truth. This, in turn, has meant a corresponding set of ontological, axiological, and of course anthropological beliefs, which, in turn, determine a form and a style, not only of educational inquiry, but of the very settings and operations which are the objects of that inquiry. It is this set of assumptions which nourishes the empirical tradition at its roots. Both our attitudes to children (and I am not sure whether I would include the majority of college students in this category or not) and to environments and curricula are the material and programmatic reifications of this set of assumptions.

These assumptions run so deep in the Western psyche that, it seems to me, we can only approach them with something analogous to the classical therapeutic expectation of psychoanalysis: that it is in "seeing", in understanding through bringing to language, reclaiming from an unconscious space or level, that we move beyond them. But even here—and in keeping with this paper's central assumption—it must be understood that it is not we (those of us, that is, who want to in the first place) who can pick ourselves up and "move beyond" the empirical tradition. It is probably a classic case of language bewitchment to think so. The notion of self-consciously, and with the cool (or even
the hot Marxian) instrumentality of the technocrat dismantling educational inquiry and reconstructing it on the other side of the empirical tradition involves exactly that assumption set with which this paper, and the tradition from which this paper draws, are quarreling. Rather, the sources of real transformation are always just beyond the best efforts of our will. Lasting change is often born in failure, or in last recourses, and its eventual pre-eminence secreted slowly over lifetimes, in a practical and historical matrix of which the emergent properties are, ultimately, incalculable.

How—to take up my first argument—the method which has been raised to the status of a genetic epistemology is called theory, and there is not time here to trace its historical presence in the West. I would refer for this background to Heidegger's archeology of substance metaphysics, and point to the crucial roles of Descartes and Kant in articulating for the modern West a philosophy of what Heidegger called Subjektität, or "subjectism". Subjectism is a paradoxical ideal, in that in separating the subject as pure consciousness from the object, it necessarily posits an object as in itself, that is, as being-in-itself apart from the knowing subject. This being-object—it has been called, ironically, the "Great Object"—is what theory posits and is after, whether through an infinite series of approximations, or in a more positivistic mode. Thus, subjectism and objectivism go hand in hand.

Theory's way of knowing and willing the object depends on abstracting it out of its fundamental relationships to the subject within a world—a world that is, before the abstraction, a completely interconnected context of dynamic relations. In order to do this, a "leap" is required of the subject, a deliberate bracketing of the experience of the lived body and its vivid present, i.e. of those very dynamic relations. The knower must render himself a "partial self", he must radically separate himself from any pre-theoretical knowledge of the object. From this separated vantage point the theorizer then reconstitutes the object as part of a new, separated context, a context of his, the subject's, own making. Working from this analytically reduced framework, he constructs a model of the object and its relations, composed of what Ernst Cassirer called, quoting Hertz, "inner fictions or symbols" of the "outward objects"; and, he said, "... these symbols are so constituted that the necessary logical consequences of the images are always images of the necessary natural consequences of the imaged objects. The images of which we are speaking are our ideas of things; they have with the things the one essential agreement which lies in the fulfillment of the stated requirement, but further agreement with things is not necessary to their purpose.
Actually we do not know and have no means of finding out whether our ideas of things accord with them in any other respect than in this one fundamental relation." The value of these images, Cassirer continues, "lies not in the reflection of a given existence, but in what it accomplishes as an instrument of knowledge. A system of physical concepts must reflect the relations between objective things as well as the nature of their mutual dependency, but this is only possible insofar as these concepts pertain from the very outset to a definite, homogenous intellectual orientation. The object cannot be regarded as a naked thing in itself, independent of the essential categories of natural science: for only within these categories which are required to constitute its form can it be described at all." The fundamental concepts of theory are, then, "fictions" which, "since they are created by the logic of science, are subordinate to the universal requirement of this logic, among which the a priori requirements of clarity, freedom from contradiction, and unambiguousness of reference takes first place." Thus, Cassirer adds, "science renounces its aspiration and its claim to an 'immediate' grasp and communication of reality." A universe of ideal mathematical entities, related to one another by exact laws, takes the place of the perceptual world, the life-world, which is relegated with all its fe-tures to the status of a mere subjective phenomenon or appearance.

Cassirer's analysis—which, by the way, is not a critique, but a Kantian philosophy of science—makes it clear that the theoretical object is an object of the actual positing of being, i.e. its constitution or "construction" by a transcendental ego, from the point of view of the prediction, and in keeping with Bacon's great preliminary formulation of modern science, control of that object. This is why Hans-Georg Gadamer can say of the idea of being-in-itself that "that which exists 'in itself' in the sense of modern science is determined by the particular nature of self-consciousness and the capacity to make and the desire to alter that is part of the human mind and will." For the paradoxical ideal subjectism/objectivism, the presentation of the being of objects can not, as Richard Palmer has put it, be a "self-disclosure of something, since it is caught up in the overpowering act of objectification of the subject." The subject's relation to the object, which is both radically separated from and yet dependent for its identity on the subject, is an act of will, or ordering, the mastery of the object by its mediation through an axiomatic system by which it is determined in advance. In this fashion, the world becomes, as David Linge has said, "the object or field of objects in proportion as man, the thinking subject, becomes the center, guarantor, and calculator of beings."
Now, this knowledge ideal—the ideal of knowing nature in a more geometrico—is rendered a genetic epistemology in Piaget, who has developed to great lengths a theory that consciousness itself is theoretical. For Piaget, who is also in the Kantian tradition, perception—"lived experience," sensible experience—cannot even be called consciousness, but is merely aggregates of "operational behaviors" which must be transformed by the "epistemic subject," the "center of functional activity." Knowing involves the negation of the immediately given, which is incomplete, and lacks any positive sense, and its transformed, reconstituted representation as an intelligible object among an order of objects. Cassirer puts it succinctly: "... nature comes into being through a theoretical interpretation and elaboration of sensory contents." And so we have a psychology in which consciousness and the theoretical process are identified genetically and phenomenologically.

This psychological reification of subjectism is, in turn, reified in a developmental ideal, also epitomized in Piaget. His concept of successful maturity, the terminus ad quem of the Western developmental ideal, is the "formal operations" by which a transcendental subject mediates his relation to a world through a set of logical schemes or interpretive structures, all of which are abstracted from experience and co-ordinated in the service of the epistemic subject. They are, in fact, a sort of mental technology, through which experience is ordered into a pre-given set of systematic relations: tools by which a separated ego organizes and controls a world transformed in its own image. Objectivity, in this sense, means that all perceptual and experiential aspects of the object are overcome in its construction through reflective abstraction, by which a harmonization of virtual perspectives replaces any particular concrete perspective on it, and it is known without "prejudice," as (approximately) pure object corresponding to pure subject.

This epistemological ideal is, in turn, reified in an analogous axiological ideal, exemplified in Kohlberg's work, where the notion of "autonomy"—the analogue of "objectivity"—comes to dominate the moral sphere. Here too development is seen fundamentally as the individual disembedding from a context, and re-creating the world of others in a moral order based on legal rights of other disembedded individuals. In such a view, the society or group takes on an adversarial aspect, is seen as threatening to impose upon, manipulate and rob the individual of his dignity. Society, on this account, is analogous to nature in its threatening aspect, the "heart of darkness" against which man pits his prosthetic technological devices. The individual masters the social environment for his own purposes by re-ordering it, conquering it exactly as he subdues and re-
orders nature.

If theoretical man is our anthropological ideal, and the mark of theoretical man is the disembodied ego who stands over against a world which he re-orders in his own image, then this means two things about our attitude toward educational thinking. First, it confirms what has been called the "deficit model" in our view of children. Second, in that education may be defined as the pursuit of a cultural ideal of a people, it gives us some insight into the goals and assumptions that motivate our thinking about educational settings.

Our view of children, given our view of the human person as primarily oriented toward rationality and autonomy, both cognitively and morally—as, that is, "making himself"—must necessarily be critical. The child tends not only to be heteronomous, he is in many ways what the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty called a "collective being", who lives in a state of "syncretic sociability": he "does not limit his own life to himself", and he finds it difficult to "separate what he lives from what others live as well". He "is in direct touch with things across a personal-universal vision", a vision which, in fact, Piaget has called egocentrism. Egocentrism means, not that he assimilates the world to his own point of view, but that he has no point of view, he "is the situation", he resonates completely with what surrounds him: "... it is the attitude," says Merleau-Ponty, "of a me which is unaware of itself and lives as easily in others as it does in itself—but which, being unaware of others in their own separateness as well, in truth is no more conscious of them than of itself." The child is a being not so much for-others as in-others. In addition, he is a being in relation to an origin. He tends to know himself in his origin, which, typically, is the family and its setting. Thus, he is as much allocentric as egocentric, in the sense that he finds the sources and boundaries of his life-world beyond himself.

So the first thing about our attitude to educational inquiry, given the philosophical anthropology of Western man "come of age", will be a view of the child which distorts it in its own image. The implicit epistemic assumptions of "autonomous man", because they are so far from the child's world, make it even easier for the child to be experienced, not as a Thou, but as an object (however "sweet")—an object which, according to the theoretical model, is best approached through its abstraction from its own context and reconstitution in an order of objects corresponding to the instrumental will of the theorizer: in this case learning theory, theories of development, instructional theory, etc. This, the method of the social sciences is, as Gadamer has pointed out,
the lowest order of hermeneutical experience: "There is a kind of experience of the 'Thou' that seeks to discover things that are typical in the behavior of one's fellow men and is able to make predictions concerning another person on the basis of experience. We call this a knowledge of human nature. We understand the other person in the same way that we understand any other typical event in our existential field, i.e., he is predictable. His behavior is as much a means to our end as any other means." Our "end" is, in this case, the production of an "autonomous adult", a separated individual.

Our second point—the effect of the autonomy ideal on our thinking about educational settings—must be made in the context of a distinction between education and schooling. Education is the broad term, signifying the reproductive life of a culture and a society (in fact, Tolstoy simply called it "culture")—a culture's way of, in Wittgenstein's terms, introducing new members to its forms of life, which are expressed and played out in its particular language game, that is, its particular forms of the inter-relationship between thinking, talking and acting, or, in his own words, "language and the activities with which it is interwoven".14 Schooling, on the other hand, is the primary, honored form of education in the modern West, as the most cursory look at the rise of the school in the 19th century nation-state will attest.

Now the language game "schooling"—at least in its modern Western configuration—is characterized by just those qualitative aspects that characterize theoretical consciousness: a setting detached from the everyday life-world, and reconstituted in an ordered context of language and symbolic activity; a world re-ordered according to a normed model of the object and its relations. The approach to curricula, to the teaching relationship, and to the organization of collective life—all are, in Gadamer's words, "schematically reduced, in that it is only what is typical and regular that is taken account of ..."15 Further, the experience of the school for the child is in the form of a demand that he operate intellectually in the absence of a concrete situational context, as Bruner, Oliver and Greensfield et al. have demonstrated in their cross-cultural inquiries into culture and cognitive growth.16 In the modern school, where the central, paradigmatic task is learning to read and write, the overarching sign of literacy—what Walter Ong calls "the separation of the word from the living present" in its transformation from sound to sight—is the honored task. And the other forms of life that Ong finds associated with the rise of literacy—linearity, ordered time consciousness, "distance", precision, "separating the knower from the known", introspection, the sense of knowledge as quantifiable, the development of a sense...
of personal privacy, a new visual rather than multi-sensory orientation, a new desire for finality and closure, a new narrative sense, etc.17—all of these, if they are not genetic aspects of theoretical consciousness, are certainly found in association with it. They are the invisible edifice of consciousness, of which the visible edifice of the modern school—the model world of bells, neutralized and systematized space, rigid bureaucracy, and taxonomically organized curricula—is one manifestation.

In the experience of schooling we learn above all, as Bruner has pointed out, "to reject those acts that do not lend themselves to a linguistic rendering or accountability, and perhaps to rule out of imagery those features of experience that have no enactive counterpart or words or sentences that render them communicable."18 To learn there to re-order our experience according to abstracted, superordinate modes which are hooked into our language, and to ignore or gloss over the unity of the perceptual world and its imagistic, concrete modes of presentation to consciousness. It should be remembered that the image is not only the etymological, but the genetic root of imagination, and it is imagination that is the life of a culture. Furthermore, the child is inherently imagistic: he lives the concrete, perceptual unity of image, affect and motoricity that reflection breaks. He thinks, not through a superordinate harmonization of virtual, schematized perspectives, but in the concrete unity of the symbol. The symbol, says Piaget, "is the very structure of the child's thought."19 It unifies in an image the totality which is implicit in each particular, and expresses the meaning, the significance inherent in perception itself, rather than a meaning bestowed by our subjectivity-will. This is also the function of art. It is a function which is almost systematically discouraged by modern schooling as we know it.

Perhaps it will be objected at this point—if not before—that it is not only inevitable, it is desirable that reflection should break the naive unity of experience; that all cultures render experience into language; and that, rather than theoretical consciousness, I am describing literate consciousness, the irony of an attack on which is made plain enough by my presence here, and this methodically thickened prose emerging systematically from the page. The modern school of the nation-state sprang up, as history will demonstrate, when literacy became necessary to the increasing complexity of economic life in the West:

Well yes, this is all true too. But whatever the etiological identity of consciousness and its corresponding world view—whether they are simply products of our technologies, or whether technologies (that of the word included) are, on an important level, symbols of our consciousness—clearly, consciousness and world view have a history. And if
we take our bearings in that history, there is some agree-
ment that what Bruner et al call the "fundamental cogni-
tive change" demanded by "technical societies" has brought
us, in the no doubt involuntary course of its developmental
vicissitudes, into what on a broad view can only be described
as peril. Not that states of social, cultural, political,
and even ecological peril are anything new. But when we
search for the roots of our present peril, we seem to find
at least some of them in the very instrumentality, the em-
phasis on knowledge as a form of separation, abstraction,
reorganization, mastery, control and ordering for use which
was, starting with Bacon, our great hope. And the modern
schools have become factories which produce that form of
consciousness, in subtle and not-so-subtle ways; while the
colleges of education seem these schools in a manner analo-
gous to the manner in which university physicists serve the
arms race, or the chemists the nerve gas industry—in a manner
which, if it is theoretical and methodical, yet is profound-
ly unreflective, is indeed sub-moral. It seems to me that
we have reached what I would call a dialectical moment in
the history of Western consciousness, a moment in which the
separative autonomy ideal must be overcome in a movement
that is both a return and a transformation in the rediscover-
ery of a further heteronomy, wherein we recognize again a
form of knowledge that transcends the opposition between
object and subject, transcends mastery as the sign of our
most fundamental relation to the world.

No, certainly we do not want to do away with reflection,
or outlaw the scientific method, or people who tend to see
the world more theoretically than otherwise. It is undoub-
tedly true that the moment of separation in the West which is
theory has not only saved millions of lives, and alleviated
untold human suffering (and will continue to do so), but
has above all revealed to us, dialectically, what must over-
come theory. We want to begin to teach from and for those
moments of what Gabriel Marcel called "secondary" reflection.
This notion of secondary reflection in fact captures the
sense of the current dialectical moment as a need for a move-
ment beyond, which is also a recuperation. I quote Marcel:
"Reflection occurs when, life coming up against a certain
obstacle, or again, being checked by a certain break in the
continuity of experience, it becomes necessary to pass from
one level to another, and to recover on this higher plane the
unity which had been lost on the lower one. Reflection
appears in this case as a promoter of life, it is ascendant
and recuperatory, in that it is secondary reflection as op-
posed to a primary reflection which is still only decomposing
or analytic."20

How does one teach or plan educational settings, or
even consider the educative relationship from this moment,
as opposed to the moment of separation? How do we find and inherit in the practice of other forms of relation between self and experience—and self and self—than abstraction and predictive control? We want to begin to explore the possibility of educational settings which are not stripped-down "worlds apart", machines which process (or attempt to process) the young, but which, rather, reintegrate the worlds of adult and child, of citizen and family member, of work and play, of doing and being, of autonomy and heteronomy. And of course the height of irony would be to attempt to do this by means of a "program".

Rather, we need to be de-programmed, to decentralize, to take up education apart from modern schooling. Normal schooling in America today is so completely schematized in the image of the structures of theoretical consciousness that anyone who questions those structures must look elsewhere, to other educative forms within the culture, or to alternative group settings for children. This point has, of course, been made before in the literature of deschooling. What I want to add to the argument is a sketch of a few fundamental notions that might help guide the sort of educational inquiry that would, in turn, help think about the qualitative growth of a decentralized, emergent educational landscape.

First, the Heideggerian notion of "world". World is a "structural whole of interrelated meanings and intentions" which is "prior to any separation of self and world in the objective sense." Theoretical consciousness attempts, through models, to lift the educative experience out of the world, and to reconstitute it in an instrumental, "productive" form, one from which the separated self can turn and master the world according to the model. But this is futile: even an anti- or supra-world like the typical school is still a world: world is an element that cannot be organized out of reality; it is something that is always already there.

Second, within world, knowing and learning are active relations—a taking-up, or what Wittgenstein called "practicing" the world, whose "picture (Weltbild) forms, he says, not by "learning rules", but by a logic that "cannot be described", within a system that is "not so much the point of departure as the element in which arguments have their life"; a system anchored in a ground—a world—that "I cannot touch". Not only can I not touch or include its ground, but my knowledge of the world is the event of the disclosure of our mutual inherence in pre-objective being. World cannot be mastered by theory. Every theoretical construction is a schematization that further obscures its ground. World can only be co-existed. As Merleau-Ponty said, "To comprehend is not to constitute in intellectual
immanence. . . to comprehend is to comprehend by co-existence, laterally. . ." The sort of reflection by which we comprehend world is not abstractive or theoretical—it does not restructure the object to suit the method. It recognizes that the phenomenon always goes beyond the realm of the empirical. What is known and what is learned in a world can never be predictively controlled, and knowing and learning operate primarily and predominantly on levels which are never purely cognitive. Intelligence, as Merleau-Ponty pointed out, "is only another name designating an original type of relation with others (the relation of 'reciprocity') and . . . from the start to the finish of the development, the living relation with others is the support, the vehicle, or the stimulus for what we abstractly call the 'intelligence'." 23

Third, the world of the child is never just the child alone, but the circular rapport adult-child/child-adult. "What we call child," Merleau-Ponty said, "is our representation of the child", and he adds later the notion of "... this phenomenon of mirrors which intervenes between adult and child. They reflect each other like two mirrors set placed indefinitely facing each other. The child is what we think him to be, the reflection of what we want him to be." 24 To approach the being of the child within this relation means abandoning the methodical, objectifying relation to him which the social sciences take up, and even struggling to avoid Gadamer's second level of "experience of the Thou" which, he says, is typical of the "educative relationship", whereby "one claims to . . . understand the other better than the other understands himself." 25 Rather, we take up into practice the "logical structure of openness"—which is implicit in all experience—towards the child. In the structure of the question which is carried out in the moment of our own "radical negativity", we open ourselves to the claims of the other, and in the fusion of horizons that results, understand the being of the child apart from our designs upon him, our constitution of him according to an existen
tological or developmental ideal. 26 This involves first allowing the claims of the child—e.g., his syncretic sociability and his imagistic, symbolic consciousness—to affect us in their radical truth, that is, in their expression of our own deeper knowledge structures. Second, of specific importance for educational inquiry, in our conversation with the being of the child, there emerges the truth, or logos of the phenomenon adult-child, that common meaning which expresses the essential structures of the relationship out of which all educational settings and encounters come. What emerges are what Merleau-Ponty, following Husserl, called "essences", or the "sense" or intelligible structure of the lived experience adult-child/child-adult. What emerges from our moment of negativity before lived experience are not "exact", but "morphological essences". 27 They can be described but not
determined axiomatically, that is, by theoretical reconstruction by the subject. They cannot be constructed.

"Instead of a logical organization of the facts coming from a form that is superimposed on them", says Gadamer, "the very content of these facts is supposed to order itself spontaneously in a way that is thinkable." On this account, understanding is no longer seen as a "methodic activity of the subject, but as something that the thing itself does, and which thought 'suffers'."28

What emerges from the "seeing of essences" can not be had in a language of pure signs, but only in the event of language, which expresses in its discourse the "proper language of the thing itself". Certainly there are overarching themes of the relation adult-child/child-adult—for example dependency, authority, initiative, tradition, law, and grace, tension, mutuality, dialogue, discipleship, transformation—but these may be said differently, for apart from the belief system of theoretical man there is no longer a language of pure signs, a Language that transcends language. In the same way, there is no longer a School, but only settings which are living expressions of the adult-child/child-adult relation. And these settings cannot be known abstractly beforehand, as geometrized, instrumental forms, but only in their particular form of emergence of the relation, in their expression of the relations inherent, unalterable significance.

In summary, we could say that the empirical tradition is the outgrowth of a particular, culturally maintained relationship of the individual to nature, self, and other; a relationship characterized by separation, mastery, and predictive control. Such a relationship embodies the Cartesian res cogitans/res extensus split, and elevates the transcendental ego to a cosmotheocras—whether the divine status is reached gradually by infinite approximations, or, in a more romantic vein, by evolution. The implicit assumption of this paper has been that this relationship is a manifestation of the hubris which is at the roots of the form of crisis in which we find ourselves in the late 20th century West: that it is, so to speak, the bourgeois equivalent of Faustian consciousness. And the schools are an instance of its cultural dominance, one of its training grounds. And business-as-usual educational inquiry one of its least illustrious handmaidens. And the move beyond its hegemony? Well, we can only open ourselves to its emergence, and not hold back when it offers.
NOTES


Mr. Kennedy's paper is both thoughtful and well-written. He perceptibly demonstrates some of the assumptions that underlie thought (scientific and otherwise) and pinpoints the nature of theory which underlies thinking itself. In light of these investigations Mr. Kennedy challenges some of the notions which underlie our view of the child and the learning process.

I agree with Mr. Kennedy that the theoretical constructions that determine thinking are tenuous but they are necessary constructs and can be enhanced through both scientific and philosophical thinking. Bertrand Russell once railed against the notion that in mathematics one must start with assumptions, but that is the way it is. Assumption can be refined and improved, but they are still assumptions.

Mr. Kennedy's paper points to the limitations of philosophical and scientific thinking and not their benefits. It is true that our view of the child is based on a limited perspective--but as Mr. Russell said--that is the way it is.

The paper also leans to a more existential view of learning which extols creativity, art and subjectivity. All of these are important things in the learning process that need to be fostered. However, this does not preclude an empirical base, which, with all its limitations has steadily made education as much a science as an art. It has conditioned much of our thinking, but we can be aware of this, and accept such ideas accordingly.
Augustine's Theory of Wisdom:

A Renewed Vision of Educational Purpose

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The first prescription of the recent Carnegie Foundation's report on secondary education reads, "Every high school should establish clearly stated goals -- purposes that are widely shared by students, administrators and parents." Similar recommendations have traditionally appeared in literature and reports calling for reform in education at all levels. Each generation and each institution must recreate its own educational vision, even when there is a relative stability and broad cultural consensus with respect to educational purpose. Educational institutions tend toward psychological entropy and curricular incoherence, unless they continually are engaged in the development, maintenance, and criticism of an educational vision worthy of commitment.

The need to recreate an educational vision is particularly acute as our society evolves into a post-industrial world. The recent history of our technologically dominated civilization has left our culture in confusion with respect to substantive human values. One persuasive social critic, Neil Postman, has observed that modern society has created an environment which is "self-centered...inimical to linguistic expression...discontinuous in its content, immediate in its gratification, present-centered, and nonanalytical." Postman goes on to claim that such a cultural environment helps explain the present fragmentation of educational purpose; the end result of our formal schooling is "a person with no commitment and no point of view but with plenty of marketable skills." The abundance of recent commission and foundation reports for educational reform is a recognition of the enervated condition of education, particularly publicly-supported institutions.

The process of creating, maintaining, and revising an educational vision emerges from critical reflection on extant cultural values. Because of our unique cultural situation, it is likewise necessary to examine our historical traditions for sources of educational ideals. Even a cursory examination of these traditions reveals the thematic vision of wisdom as pervasive in much of our educational literature. The Greek and Jewish concepts of wisdom as integrated in a Christian synthesis by Augustine dominated educational thought through the Middle Ages. The writings, for instance, of Isidore of Spain, Venerable Bede, Alcuin, and Scotus Erigena all bear the stamp of Augustine's educational ideas. The theme of wisdom endured until the Renaissance, when the emphasis on scientific, non-theological knowledge effected a gradual reduction and secularization of the concept. Threads of the theme were assimilated into Western educational thought, but the vision of knowledge-for-wisdom was superseded by knowledge-for-production in
our subsequent educational tradition.

In the following section, I will try to provide a brief overview of Augustine's theory of wisdom. The inherent purpose is to propose the wisdom theme as expressed in Augustine's writings as an initial point for reflective departure in the process of developing a worthwhile vision for contemporary education. The wisdom theme is a particularly rich source for contemporary reflection, because it presents a integrated vision of educational purpose which is coherent with a transcendent view of human nature and social reality. And Augustine is an exemplary representative of that tradition because of his masterful effort to forge a theory of wisdom which synthesized the ideas of Plato (via Plotinus) with the Hebrew literature. To be sure, I am not suggesting that Augustine's theory be adopted intact as the framework for a contemporary educational vision. In particular, Augustine's unifying role of Christian faith in his theory would not be acceptable as a foundational concept of educational purpose for publicly-supported institutions in a religiously pluralistic society. But we can appropriate insights concerning wisdom from Augustinian thought, in much the same way as he appropriated Greek and Roman ideas into his Christian synthesis. And Augustine's intense personal struggle to understand and commit himself to wisdom can inspire our efforts to do similarly amidst our modern confusion.

Wisdom Theme in Augustine's Life and Thought

The quest for wisdom theme threads its way systematically through Augustine's life and prolific writing. In his classic autobiography, The Confessions, he describes his personal crises in the quest for wisdom. Augustine cites the circumstances which prompted his serious intellectual and spiritual journey toward understanding ultimate truth. At the age of eighteen, Augustine came across and read Cicero's Hortensius as part of his normal course of study:

Quite definitely it changed the direction of my mind, altered my prayers to You, O Lord, and gave me a new purpose and ambition. Suddenly all the vanity I had hoped in I saw as worthless, and with an incredible intensity of desire I longed after immortal wisdom. I had begun that journey upwards by which I was to return to you.

The remainder of The Confessions narrates the intense inner struggle of Augustine as he tries to incorporate into his life the insights acquired from his inquiry. On the journey, he recognizes that he must control his natural appetites, reject the intellectually attractive views of Manicheism, and give up a prestigious post as a professor of rhetoric. The quest toward
wisdom was not always a direct ascent. Augustine acknowledged several years later that his earlier optimism in achieving wisdom had been tempered:

And now -- that you may grasp my whole meaning in a few words -- whatever may be the nature of human wisdom, I see that I have not yet understood it. Nevertheless, although I am now in the thirty-third year of my life, I do not think that I ought to despair of understanding it some day, for I have resolved to disregard all the other things which mortals consider good, and devote myself to the investigation of it.

While Augustine's autobiographical writings provide a dramatic and compelling narrative of the educational journey toward wisdom, he explicitly describes the characteristics of wisdom and its educational prerequisites in other writings. In particular, he outlines his educational views in The Teacher (c. 389), The Instruction of the Uninstructed (399), and Christian Education (426-427). But one can find important expressions of Augustine's educational theory of wisdom throughout his formal writings as well as his published letters and sermons.

Augustine's grand intellectual vision, like that later of Aquinas, was to synthesize reason and faith through the rational reflection on the revealed truths of faith. Within this context, the person possessing wisdom has spiritually and intellectually reconciled the truths of reason with an understanding of spiritual reality. Education is the means and process by which we achieve wisdom. The effort to integrate different entities, sometimes in paradoxical ways, thematically characterizes Augustine's thought. All forms of intellectual integration, however, are derived from and contribute to the belief that reason and faith are ultimately reconcilable, even though their relationship necessarily remains mysterious to human understanding. In Augustine's view, wisdom represents the integration of human development (intellect, will, emotions, and body) with human purposiveness. And education is an integrative means for synthesizing spiritual and intellectual progress, individual and social purpose/interaction, individual effort and Divine Illumination, and sacred and profane studies.

**Characteristics of Wisdom**

Wisdom is a necessary prerequisite and component of happiness, according to Augustine's view. Wisdom is necessary because happiness consists in possession of the supreme good which is apprehended through wisdom:

Everyone becomes happy in virtue of his pursuit and possession of the supreme good, and there is never
the smallest argument that is what we want. Since
to be happy, it is also, therefore, agreed that we
want to be wise, for nobody is happy without wisdom.
This is because nobody is happy except by virtue of
the supreme good, which is perceived and grasped in
that truth which we call wisdom.

Wisdom consists essentially in an understanding and contemplation
of eternal, spiritual reality. An understanding of the absolute spiritual dimension of reality is to be distinguished from an
understanding of the temporal world:

Action by which we make good use of temporal
things, differs from contemplation of eternal
things; the latter is counted as wisdom
(sapientia), the former as knowledge (scientia)....
Therefore, if the correct distinction between
wisdom and knowledge is that the intellectual
understanding of eternal things belongs to wisdom
and the rational understanding of temporal things
to knowledge, it is easy to decide which is to be
preferred to the other.

Augustine's view of wisdom is at once integrative and paradoxical.
The emphasis on contemplation and understanding identifies wisdom
as an intellectual attribute; yet Augustine characterizes wisdom as
a quality integrative of all human faculties, including the will
and emotions. While wisdom is an attribute of the individual human
being, at its deepest level human wisdom is a participation in the
Divine Wisdom as incarnated in Jesus Christ.

An understanding of the spiritual moral order which is
inherent in the temporal order is central to Augustine's analysis
of wisdom. In one place, he defines wisdom as "a standard of the
soul (modus animi) by which the soul measures itself so that it
neither runs into excess, nor restricts itself to something less
than its full measure." Augustine explains that moral knowledge
is so central to wisdom because good action is instrumental to the
development of human nature and attainment of happiness:

We should not suppose that it is necessary to
happiness to know the causes of the great physical
convulsions, causes which lie hid in the most
secret recesses of nature's kingdom. But we
ought to know the causes of good and evil, as
far as we may know them in this life, so that
we may avoid the mistakes and troubles, of
which this life is so full.

Indeed, since adequate moral knowledge is necessary for the good
life in any context, God has implanted the "notion of wisdom" in
all human minds—even those of the pagan and fool. Wisdom is "near at hand and everlasting to everyone in this world who loves the truth and turns toward it." 13

One of the more puzzling attributes of wisdom in Augustine's analysis is its unity. He was convinced that ultimate truth is absolute and unchanging, because it is an attribute of God. Hence, Augustine vigorously attacked those he thought were in doctrinal error about theological dogmas, such as the Pelagians, Donatists, and Manicheans. But Augustine was also acutely aware of limitations of the human mind and the different social-cultural contexts in which human thought occurred. To reach an intellectual resolution with respect to this important question, Augustine employed the analogy of different individuals looking at the same phenomenon:

One man willingly looks upon the towering height of a mountain and rejoices in that sight; another looks at a level expanse of a plain; still another delights in hollow valleys; another in green woodlands; another in the restless level expanse of the sea; and someone else loves to look at all of these or combines some of their beauties to add to the enjoyment of looking.

Through the use of this analogy, Augustine reasons that there will be differing although valid perspectives on the same truth. Nonetheless, there is an ultimate, objective reality (doctrinal and moral orthodoxy) which characterizes all authentic human expressions of truth. Thus, wisdom as a human attribute can be richly pluralistic, but its ultimate content is identical and unchanging.

In sum, Augustine presents a theory of wisdom which emphasizes the understanding of eternal, transcendent reality, particularly moral truths. The attainment of wisdom is constitutive of fulfilling human happiness. The quest for wisdom is inherent in human nature. Despite wisdom's unchanging nature, it has plural forms of human expression. Any intellectual analysis of wisdom fails ultimately, however, because wisdom will always be an opaque, mysterious, and paradoxical human participation in the Divine Life.

Education and the Acquisition of Wisdom

Within the Augustinian perspective, the primary purpose of education, whether formal or informal, is to facilitate the acquisition of wisdom. Vocational training and other forms of learning have a legitimate place in the process, but the overall purpose of education is to develop an understanding and love relationship with God, the absolute source of truth and goodness.

Augustine characteristically integrates in a paradoxical manner the various components of the educational process. The
human teacher and the social context (learning community), as we shall see momentarily, are important in the educational process; nonetheless, Augustine emphasizes the dialectical interior relationship between the individual and God as the focal point where wisdom is developed. On the one side, a individual must enter into himself introspectively and strive with all of his energy to understand and incorporate truth into his very being. To turn the eye inward is to expand thought immeasurably:

Descend into yourself, go to the secret chamber of your mind. If you stay far from your own self, how can you draw near to God. For it was not in the body but in the mind that man was made in the likeness of God.  

The interior quest for wisdom is an intense individual struggle:

What else therefore do we do when we study to be wise, except to concentrate our whole soul with all the ardor we can upon what we touch with our mind, and as it were place it there, and fix it unshakeably...  

Paradoxically, the learning process consists in the supreme discipline of the intellect and will, yet wisdom ultimately is a gift from the Divine Teacher. God illumines the intellect to understand the ultimate truths and enter into a loving relationship with Him:

But in the course of our daily life there are other objects that arise in various ways from our spirit itself or are, after a fashion, suggested to the spirit by the body, according as we have been influenced by the flesh or by the mind.... But distinct from these objects is the light by which the soul is illumined, in order that it may see and truly understand everything, either in itself or the light. For the light is God himself, whereas the soul is a creature; yet since it is rational and intellectual, it is made in his image.  

The understanding which constitutes wisdom is a gift of God for which human volition and faith predispose. Other individuals can play an important role in this dialectical process. Others, which we will call 'teachers,' can help correct the individual when he is misled into false opinions:

Then, when he [teacher] brings his own experience to bear on teaching others, he first looks to see what they already know for certain, so that he may
lead them on from this to what they did not know or were unwilling to believe... The result is that, through those truths about which people agree, they are drawn to approve other truths which they had previously denied. In this way a truth previously considered false is distinguished from falsehood when it is found to be in agreement with a truth which has already been understood and accepted...

Augustine's appreciation for the importance of the individual teacher and learning community emerges from his own life experience. Augustine had an eminent career as a professor of rhetoric. More importantly, he served as an intellectual leader for his monastic community and friends, the Christian Church, and the contemporary Roman Empire. Augustine's monograph, The Teacher, is an accurate and sometimes intimate description of his teaching of his gifted son, Adeodatus. And Augustine was frequently the recipient of insights from good teachers. He records with gratitude the value of instruction he received from Ambrose, Monica, and lifelong friends such as Alypius and Nebridius.

Augustine's views on the content of education asserts a complementarity and an integration of secular and religious knowledge. To be sure, for him the most important form of knowledge is an understanding of God and eternal truths. Nonetheless, Augustine sees a vital role for the classical, secular liberal arts. The mastering of knowledge in the liberal arts is an effective instrument and predisposes the intellect to attain wisdom, when they are studied in the context of faith:

The man who... reduces all that has been spread abroad throughout so many subjects of study to a simple, sure and certain unity, fully deserves to be called educated. When such a person inquires into divine matters, it is not in vain... all the liberal arts are learned partly for practical use and partly for the understanding and contemplation of reality...

Augustine provides examples of how the liberal arts, either taken together or separately, can contribute to the acquisition of wisdom. The overall purpose of the liberal arts, according to Augustine, is the development of rationality, and perfected rationality does lead to or predispose toward wisdom. For example, the study of and acquisition of logic can help the soul (intellectual faculty) develop reasoning capabilities for the testing and production of truth:

This is the discipline which teaches us how to teach and to learn; through dialectic, reason
makes a display of herself and problems what she is, what she wills and what she has the capacity to do. It is the subject which knows what knowing is, which not only wishes to make man knowledgeable but also has the power to bring it about.

In every respect, then, Augustine attempts to synthesize human and transcendent experience in his educational views. The development of true wisdom occurs in the mysterious, interior relationship between the individual and the Divine Teacher. The human context, particularly that of teachers and a learning community, are nonetheless important catalysts for learning. And the ultimate content is spiritual reality, but the study of the physical world and liberal arts can predispose the intellect for understanding truths of faith.

Summary and Conclusion

There is much to commend Augustine's writings on wisdom as a starting point for the reflective effort to reconceptualize our vision for public education. Augustine, in synthesizing the Greek wisdom tradition with the Judeo-Christian view, was instrumental in conceptualizing a rich description of human perfection and educational purpose which pervaded thought in the middle ages and has become incorporated into our modern intellectual heritage.

Unlike modern conceptions of education, Augustine's view of education presupposes and asserts a transcendent, integrated view of human nature, learning, and human purpose. Moreover, Augustine's view of the educational quest for wisdom is concretized in his autobiography, The Confessions. The intensely personal narrative of The Confessions presents a vision of the wisdom quest which is stimulating to both thought and action.

To be sure, Augustine's theory of wisdom is not the definitive word on educational purpose. At least in the area of learning theory and psychology, modern social science has far surpassed his primitive notions. And many of his theological views, both doctrinal and moral, would not be acceptable to many, particularly as his views are taken to apply to public education in a pluralistic setting. The point is that we need a source outside of our own limited cultural horizons to gain perspective and create a new, meaningful paradigm of educational purposiveness. The wisdom tradition is a rich resource for reflection; and Augustine's writings are a good starting place for the reasons mentioned above. But the examination of our tradition should not end there. It should at least prompt us to read, reflect, and incorporate into our new wisdom model the ideas of thinkers like Descrates, Locke, Rousseau, Newman and Whitehead. The reflective process on our educational tradition is in itself a worthwhile project and it will
certainly enrich our new visions of purpose for public education.

Notes


12. St. Augustine, Enchiridion, 16, in Howie, p. 27.


At the beginning of his paper Professor Losito sketches out for us a vivid picture of the decline of a conception of education that gives importance of place to wisdom. As he says "the vision of knowledge-for-wisdom was superceded by knowledge-for-production", or in Neil Postman's words, which he quotes, the product of educational institutions in our culture today tends to be "a person with no commitment and no point of view but plenty of marketable skills". Thus do education and our culture at large seem in need of improvement and revision in the light of their critical examination. On the other hand, it might at first seem that to turn for guidance to a thinker of the pre-modern world, such as Augustine, is to give way to a temptation to the academic, obsolescent, and arcane. The above line of reasoning suggests a series of dichotomies to contend with, such as that between education for technological skills versus education for enrichment of self and society, education for cultural change versus education for the conservation of tradition, education for production and profits versus education for its own ends, and so on.

In what follows I should like to make and briefly elucidate two points to support and supplement Professor Losito's thesis that Augustine's theory of wisdom is relevant and important to the contemporary educational context. These points are, first of all, that such dichotomies in question are mostly false or mistaken ones,i.e., succinctly said, we can have both education for wisdom's sake, and all that seems to go with that, such as a good educational grounding in the humanities in the public schools and in our colleges and universities, entails a sacrifice as to what "really counts",i.e., a vocationally and technically oriented education. This view of the matter is reflected in educational studies reports, the thinking of the general public, in the course and program choices of students, and so on. The last of these is the
example perhaps closest to home for us teachers, i.e., the frequently voiced curriculum preference of our students today for something "practical" and "job-oriented", and the pressures this brings to bear on the aims and content of our teaching. Thus, while perhaps acknowledging the value of the "well-rounded education", students often claim that it is something they simply have to forego in order to pursue their career aims.

But it seems to me there is ample evidence that this dichotomy is a false one. Owen B. Butler, Chairman of the Board of Proctor and Gamble, has said publicly that what the business world wants of American education, or of today's college graduates, is not a plethora of technocrats and M.B.A.s, but human individuals possessing two basic qualities, what he termed "character" and the capability for expression and literacy. That is to say, these are "the basics" that we as teachers in this country can and should provide, and the business and technical world will provide the rest. This is something I have heard said at Co-Operative Education meetings and conferences for years by representatives of business and industry, and a point of view amply documented by educational studies that draw upon their insights and conclusions. Thus out of the "horse's mouth" of the business world, so to speak, the prevalent notion is denied that the broader-based, more humanizing qualities need to be sacrificed in order to attain specialized, technical expertise. Accordingly, here "back to basics" does not mean back to vocational fundamentals but back to the roots of our humanity, the development of "the basics" of our moral and cognitive existence, which in turn form the foundation of a thriving socio-economic existence.

I think that Augustine's view accommodates this reconciliation of aims. In what follows I shall discuss Augustine's theory of wisdom as it pertains first to the requirement of character and then to that of literacy, and finally as it pertains to other than these practical considerations. There is a tendency to regard Augustine as being a Christian Platonist who radically divides reality between the eternal and temporal, the spiritual and material, the "City of God and the City of Man, and so forth. But as Professor Losito points out for us, Augustine's theory of wisdom combines a conception of wisdom as being a contemplation of eternal things with one according to which it is also a quality integrative of all human faculties. In other words, wisdom concerns both human integrity and transcendence, the need for the self to be whole and also to reach beyond itself to a larger whole. Regarding integrity if we take Owen Butler's qualities of character and literacy as part of its makeup, wisdom is essential to more practical educational aims.

First of all as to character, Augustine accepts the view from both of the traditions that he draws upon, the Judeo-Christian and Hellenic-Hellenistic, that wisdom and righteousness or virtue are essentially and reciprocally related. Wisdom brings us to a knowledge of the good, and the realization of the good as virtue is, in turn, necessary for happiness, the object of which is also wisdom. Be our list of character traits or moral qualities that of faith, hope, and charity, the Greek virtues of justice, courage, and self-control, or some more contemporary-sounding list, such as drive, determination, respect for an-
other's rights, and so on. Augustine's theory of wisdom gives them their due. Education in pursuit of wisdom is important to the development of character, which in turn is necessary to worldly success as an essential qualification for achievement within the business and professional realm.

There is a deeper point here as to the connection between character development and education that I would like to briefly draw out, and in doing so I shall enlist Augustine's aid. The separation between intellect and life that John Dewey railed against is not to be found in Augustine's viewpoint. For Augustine wisdom and knowledge, and therefore education, are all "practical" in his use of the term, which is, to pertain to human choice and conduct. Thus knowledge is instrumental, for as he says:

"Let knowledge be applied as a kind of scaffolding which there may mount up the edifice of charity, which shall all endure for ever even when knowledge shall be destroyed."

Etienne Gilson summarizes this important point about Augustine as follows:

"Speculation abounds in Augustine, but its aims are always practical and its term of reference is always man. The knowledge of truth may be essential to happiness, but in Augustine truth is pursued only because truth alone can make man happy, and it is pursued only to the extent that it can make him so."

Thus regarding wisdom, Augustine writes:

"Dost thou hold wisdom to be anything other than truth, wherein we behold and embrace the supreme good?"

For modernity this is scarcely a rhetorical question. We have in effect largely separated truth and the good, and let wisdom fall by the wayside. How we got here is a rather long story, which has been retold recently by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book, *After Virtue*. The outcome has been that values have lost their basis in what we think we can claim to really know, and thus matters of value have been separated from those of knowledge. This predicament was proclaimed, for example, on the European continent in the nineteenth century by Kierkegaard, who maintained that life's important choices, such as that as to religious commitment, can rely only on a "leap of faith", and Nietzsche, who asserted that "God is dead" and with that deminished the foundation of our values has perished. And in England in the early twentieth century G.E. Moore claimed to demonstrate that any attempt to deduce ethical conclusions from purely descriptive premises is unsound and a case of the "naturalistic fallacy", and A.J. Ayer, claimed to show that all ethical utterances, since unverifiable in principle, are cognitively meaningless and only emotive in significance. I do not think these developments in the history of philosophy have been just a sideshow for the intellectuals. It has, I think, affected our culture and the nature of education deeply. Given this separation between knowledge and values, we feel reluctant, if not chagrined, to attempt cultivate character among our students. After all, our job is to convey knowledge to them and not to impose values, to give them the facts and not to confront their feelings, and so on. Something like Augustine's conception of wisdom is surely relevant
here, for we need somehow to recover the bond between knowing and acting, educating and edifying.

Turning now to the question of literacy, the need for it for career success and its connection with wisdom should be evident. Indeed, what is surprising is that the present schism should ever have occurred between literary pursuits and vocational skills, courses with essay requirements and those having only so-called "objective" tests, and so on. Recently one of my student advisors told me that he didn't need to learn English well enough to write coherent essays because he was going to be a computer science major, in which field he would only have to know "computer languages". Surely this example refutes its own point. Augustine also corroborates the value of literacy in several ways. The act and ability of self-expression is one of our most important means of achieving the integration of our diverse faculties. Though it brings intellect, will, and emotion into the same field of focus, in expressing what we think, want, and feel. It is not just training in reading and writing skills that is necessary to this, but also exposure to standards of literary excellence through the study of literature and to a world of ideas and values through the study of the Humanities in general. On both of these counts Augustine is a worthy subject of study today, as an important figure in our literary-intellectual heritage. In turn respected those traditions upon which he drew and helped to perpetuate through his own unique synthesis.

I hope I have succeeded in making the point that Augustine's thought, and in particular his conception of wisdom, is relevant to today's educational needs, that such a conception has use in bridging the breach between education for career goals and for wisdom's sake. In conclusion, I would like to say something about wisdom and transcendence. Returning to the point that Professor Losito has made regarding Augustine's theory of wisdom, it includes both a view as to the integration of our faculties and the fulfillment of the human as such, and one as to that beyond us that is wisdom's object. If wisdom's transcendent object must be regarded, as Augustine of course did, as being none other than the Divine Being, and indeed in specifically Judeo-Christian terms, this component of Augustine's view is less applicable to today's educational context for as Professor Losito states it, "Augustine's unifying role of Christain faith in his theory would not be acceptable as a foundational concept of educational purpose for publicly-supported institutions in a religiously pluralistic society". But human transcendence can take many forms, and the sort of transcendence perhaps most important to education and society today is that which forces the individual and our culture at large to confront other possibilities, to reflectively consider other points of view than that embedded in a pursuit of vocationally and economically defined objectives. In other words, the relevance of wisdom to character and career must be complemented by wisdom's all to that which lies beyond such goals. What better then than the study of such as Augustine, who offers an alternative vision to that of modernity. The point is eloquently made by Professor Losito, so I shall conclude by simply quoting him:

The point is that we need a source outside of our own
limited cultural horizons to gain perspective and create a new, meaningful paradigm of educational purposiveness. The wisdom tradition is a rich source for reflection; and Augustine's writings are a good starting place.

NOTES


THE EMPIRICAL BEAST:
CONTAINMENT versus REJECTION

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In historic perspective, Western people appear to have shifted during given eras from predominant absorption in one or another of the "world views" (or epistemological values), the rational as distinct from the empirical, with a tendency in each era to be punitive and rejectant of the contrary persuasion. In contemporary thought there appears to be an emerging disposition to turn from the obsession with quantitative value and method that has prevailed through much of the present century, in American educational thought at least, and to press once again for the "humanistic" view of things, in which at least equal value is accorded the "interpretive" modes of viewing reality, and in which sensitivity to the "knowledge" conveyed through the arts is weighed against the objectivity and the technology of scientific observation. Both views have proven their worth in human affairs, and preservation (containment) of each appears to be the wiser course, this of course within the context of education transformed to reckon with contemporary advances in philosophic thought, with the emergent conditions, unprecedented in magnitude, of sociocultural tensions, conflicts and disparities, and with newly developing understandings as to the nature and potentialities of the human mind or reckoning with the changing countenance of knowledge as progressive inquiry reveals it.

On balance, it appears that the ancient dream of universalized education (cross-cultural; international) for all mankind, here termed simply "human education," looms forth today both as more than ever mandatory -- if personal integrity and a functional degree of social cohesiveness are to be maintained; and, as well, more than ever feasible within developed frames of understanding, so as to constitute both opportunity and compelling obligation.

Three expressions, set forth in propositional form for clarity and emphasis, embody the general thesis of the presentation; and a discussion, necessarily brief of course, by way of explication, interpretation and argument is offered for each such statement.
Proposition 1:  
The Historic Proportion of  
Contemporary Social Disparity  

... That in the light of history, the 20th century, even more than during the European Renaissance, appears to be witnessing such radical sociocultural changes as to threaten those levels of social and intellectual cohesiveness which have hitherto kept semblances of order among nations and peoples at least of the Western World. Divisions are now so deep, wide and diverse that established logical, epistemological and axiological conventions are being strained to maintain instrumental value as to the psychological integrality of persons and as to social control among ethnic groups, nations and economic strata. Moreover, provocative arguments are even being developed, taking for granted the obsolescence of accustomed ways of inquiring, observing and acting in regard to human affairs, to the effect that new conceptions of reality are now necessary, with order and disorder standing in radically changed relationships among physical and social phenomena.

Discussion: Proposition 1  
(explication, interpretation, argument, to which reaction is invited)

Disruption and conflict on a global scale appears, whether necessary or not, to have become a way of life. In ordinary experience, current news, intensely vivified and personalized through the direct immediacy of audio-visual and electronic media, is freighted with all the ancient anathemas of war, famine and pestilence; and with newer concerns as well, such as drug abuse, street violence, international terrorism (often used as an instrument of diplomacy). Seemingly intractable conflicts surface from almost everywhere, involving social issues of considerable practical consequence -- gender equitability, right to life, human rights, moral values; the expansion of consciousness and action on the part of underprivileged and downtrodden peoples; global interaction effects from economic affairs within given geographic sectors; and so on.

On what should decidedly be the positive side in human experience, vast explosions of knowledge (biogenetic engineering; electronic communication space exploration; interplanetary transportation) are occurring so rapidly that their spontaneous assimilation into ongoing patterns of everyday life is apparently impossible,
with added tensions and divisions as a consequence. Margaret Mead's familiar observation that "technology changes culture," has attained increasing relevance in human affairs.

Beyond the purview of everyday perception these deepening disparities are acknowledged in the sophisticated observations of philosophers and social critics and reflective scientists. Korzybski's insights, for instance, in which as a semioticist he set forth powerful depictions of the relations between "Science and Sanity" (1933)²; and Wendell Johnson (People in Quantraries, 1946)³, making it clear that normality and abnormality may divide, hanging upon the nature of the words (and their meanings) which are used to depict a condition not necessarily there until suggested -- these and other such understandings appear to prefigure the observations now reasonably well substantiated between the nature of mind in terms of psychological integrality and wellness, and the nature of knowledge in terms of its relationship to intellectualized views of "reality" and of derivative priorities among social values.

Further to the point, Gerth and Mills⁴ seminal work in 1953 on the relationships between human character (or personality) and social organization and function came in with force, and endures as a monumental treatise; and but a little later (1966) Berger and Luckmann⁵ served to generalize this genre of thought into the marvelously useful construct of the "Social Construction of Reality."

But it remained yet for the gradually emerging body of understanding which has assumed the rubric of "information science" or "theory" to produce by far the more provocative potentialities for the perception of psychosocial phenomena and for analysis and experimental usage through electronic calculating machinery of psychological processes hitherto addressed only through intuitive projections. Concepts like "artificial intelligence" became common truck among researchers, and an impressive mass of inquiry began to take place under the aegis of industrial and business sponsors such that older generations of educators and psychologists were substantially precluded from going discourse. It remained then for works like Campbell's Grammatical Man⁶ to reduce this truly remarkable history of thought and technology to a synthesized language and discourse falling within the range of inquiring students with less than main interest or aptitude for the raw technical stuff.

And, further, lest it be considered that the contemporary intellectual (philosophic and scientific) revolution might be now completely launched onto an essentially transformed plane of inquiry and investigation, there comes Sawedo and Caley⁷ to suggest that residual within all this apparent disorder there is the possibility of a new concept of order taking place in the philosophy of science, which extraordinary projection heralding as "dissipative structures," is (again) brought by these thinkers to a level
of discourse within the grasp of practicing educational theorists and reflective educational researchers.

In conclusion of this first discussion, then, it is respectfully submitted that the claim for the emergence of a revolutionized human condition is in fact warranted; such that any really satisfying and promising resolution of the problems at hand appears to lie beyond a positive reconciliation, important though that is, between the opposing epistemological views suggested in the title initially submitted for this paper; and that the speaker, with due apologies, has in the course of development, succumbed to the larger persuasion, to be termed below "human education."

Proposition 2:

Untapped Potentials for Personal Integrality and Social Cohesiveness

That advancements in understanding of the nature of mind and of the nature of knowledge, and of interactions between the two, constitute resources as yet unemployed in the construction of psychological and epistemological foundations of communicative process (form and substance) essential to and putatively sufficient for the experiential fulfillment of the personal life of individuals, for the resolution of intergroup tensions, and for the orderly conduct of national and international affairs.

Discussion: Proposition 2

The history of science offers strange contrasts; and it is remarkable indeed that despite the massive disintegrative conditions indicated in the first discussion, brilliant advances have been made in many of the sciences, and especially in those relating most directly and importantly to the sociocultural phenomenon of education. The summary yield to date in man's planned discovery about himself and his society i.e., those sciences synthesized so ably in works like Peter Farb's Humankind, are so extraordinary as to suggest a different order of understanding; and it is these gains which lead to and offer support for the position that transcendent initiatives in education are once again indicated. Developments in both the psychological sciences and in epistemological thought are immediately applicable to this aspect of the present exploration.
New understandings as to the nature of the human mind (organization, function, adaptability), taking place less within the boundaries of "academic" psychology than under the newer rubric of the "cognitive sciences," are of first note. The names of Piaget and Chomsky invoke the monumental power struggles between modern giants wrestling with the classical problem (Locke and Leibnitz, for instance) of whether the stuff of mind comes into being entirely through sensory experience, or whether there are preformational structures indigenous within neurological tissue and chemistry which render the acquisition of certain forms of knowledge, that of language, for instance, or that of spatial configuration, more prone perceptually than other forms within our capacity for experience. We know more about the origin and etiology of mind, that is, without presuming to know it all, and can therefore control the developmental process both more precisely and more flexibly.

Howard Gardner's persuasive recent work on "human intelligences" (Frames of Mind, 1983) lends further compass to the challenges and potentialities which are ours for the taking:

As compared with one hundred or even with thirty years ago, talk about the development of intelligence, the realization of human potential, and the role of education is very much in the international air. These topics are being explored not only by lobbying groups but also by such unexpected (and unexpectedly formid-able) institutions as banks for economic development and national governments. Rightly or wrongly, the powers-that-be in the worlds of international development and national sovereignty that become convinced that the ingredients for human progress, success and happiness are closely linked to better educational opportunities for their client citizenry and, particularly, for young individuals. . .

To take account further of advances on epistemological fronts, it is sufficient for the present purpose to consider only certain classification schemes through which conventional subjects of typical school curricula are re-positioned into more generic fields of knowledge. British philosophers (Paul Hirst, R.S. Peters) have made interesting moves of this nature; and the American educational theorist, Philip H. Phenix, has offered an especially appealing system under the rubric of "realms of meaning," in which the full range of knowledge available for purposes of education is encompassed within six realms or domains. In the process of linking different fields of inquiry together on the basis of the methods through which they are adduced, Phenix constructs certain rather strange rubrics ("empirics" for embracing the life sciences as well as the physical and social; "synoptics" to join history with philosophy and religion), these tending to make perfectly good sense once explained. In elevating ordinary subject matter thus to the more generic level of
epistemological class, a development of this sort tends to transcend the particularity of cultural locale and to bring the potentialities for educational design, again, more to a plane amenable for universal consideration.

It is fortuitous that emergent thought in both psychology and epistemology, not here to take account of the sociological factor which certainly is considerable as well, are reaching confluence. The latest annual review of educational research (AERA, 1985) divides its yield into two general categories, Section I reporting advances as to "Cognitive Modifiability," and Section II, reporting on "Knowledge Production and Knowledge Transfer." In this volume, Jack Lockheed submits in the introductory chapter (p. 4):

Today new theories from cognitive science are establishing a base for revolutionary changes in educational practice. Previous behaviorist theory denied us access to the processes of thinking and learning, much as classical physics denied knowledge of the subatomic world. Modern cognitive psychology, on the other hand, provides the tools we need to change not just the responses students give to our questions but, far more importantly, the processes they use to generate their responses. In education, it may take yet another decade to fully reconcile the clinical approaches within that of computer modeling, but that delay should not impede instructional developments.

A final case in point of the present observation resides in the fact that in the current yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Elliot Eisner summons a group of scholars of various backgrounds in philosophy and the behavioral sciences, to provide a survey of some eight "modes of knowing"—aesthetic, practical, spiritual, and other specific formulations—which could serve virtually as a text in applied and exploratory epistemology; and which, employed by way of curricular foundations in schools in this country and elsewhere, appears assuredly to have appeal and relevance cross-culturally, with "learning and the ways of knowing" as a bonding experience.

Thus our sophisticated literature, i.e., the knowledge we have at hand, appears to support radically different approaches to education of the young. It remains then to work toward the building of these bodies of knowledge into designs for human development which will serve the ends of personal fulfillment through socially constructed experience; and in consequence, the end of acceptable degrees of functional compatibility within the human family. To aver that this task is a simple one, requiring say but the laying out of sensible course content in logically arranged sequences in
schools and universities, is not the point of this presentation, as it progresses to the third and final consideration; on the other hand to hold that the task is today still merely visionary, and practically so infeasible that reasonable and competent professionals should not attempt it, is to aver against the human uses of human reason, and to leave yet further untapped the very resources which promise that which we obviously need very greatly.

**Proposition 3:**

**Reconstruction Through Education as an Alternative to Chaos and Conflict**

That among the same philosophic emergents, social forces, intellectual and technological impacts which have made for marked contemporary sociocultural turbulence — this constituting as indicated a state of virtual chaos and inviting revolutionary reconceptions in human ways of knowing, thinking and interacting — lie also the potentials for communicative media to be shaped into the practicable form and substance of human education; that such educational processes incorporate and are predicated upon the time honored ideals of the universalization of mind (personality structure and function) and understanding (all realms of knowledge actively and continuously pursued); and that, given considered initiatives on these now viable conceptual and practicable planes, responsible expectancy is brought about that education, i.e., progressively expanding understanding on the part of people across the world of themselves and others, and of their society and those of others will conduce, not to further disparity, disorder and destruction, but rather to the work of peace and the cooperative advancement of the welfare of humankind.

**Discussion: Proposition 3**

Now should this summary proposition constitute nothing more than a kind of positive utopia, in counteraction to the near-negatively utopian condition with which the present thesis begins, one would be presuming upon a professional conference group. But it is different from a simple vision, and this in important ways which must be explicated.

The argument rests upon three observations each subject according to the rationale developed thus far to appeal in the respective individual's own experience, namely: (a) That the objective of human education in the present sense is morally and intellectually
sensible, now as ever, and probably now more than ever before; (b) that the conceptual substance amenable to human education has been developed to a point newly worthy of application; and (c) that developed technologies of communication, simulation, experimental manipulation, and transportation are such as to warrant new initiatives by way of social construction and social action. Having argued in the previous discussions, the case here involves not further evidence but rather a few harmonious views from reputable and long standing advocates of education on this scale and for these purposes.

First as to the claim in and of itself that education is a feasible and promising avenue to world understanding, two accomplished scholars are cited. Edmund King, by no means a tender-minded student in the tradition of comparative education, but one whose work pervasively cautions against naive idealism, offers the following (p. 358):

The contribution of theology to man's understanding has varied with time and place; so have those of psychological schools, economic theory and political experimentation. In all these varying analyses man has been trying to study himself, to study his own making of himself, and to devise better ways of constructing his future. This making of the future for human betterment is substantially an educator's exercise.

And Harold Taylor whose brilliant imagination serves admirably to clarify, elucidate and elevate the problem, even as he indulges in an essentially intuitive expression of conviction, submits this passage in his "The World as Teacher" (p. xi): 14

The education of teachers to understand the world must therefore deal not merely with formal courses in foreign cultures, international relations, world history, and so on, but with the quality of intellectual, social, and personal experience available to those who are going to teach in the colleges, schools, or anywhere else. This is true whether the field is the arts, the humanities, the sciences, or the field of world affairs itself. Whatever they teach, teachers should be educated in a way calculated to raise the level of their awareness of what is happening to mankind in the world's contemporary circumstance.

And as it is always delightful to witness an eminently competent material scientist to be led through the open use of his reflective capabilities, this passage from Robert Oppenheimer's thought is compellingly persuasive: 15

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... the unity of knowledge, the nature of human communities, the order of society, the order of ideas, the very notions of society have changed, and will not return to what they have been in the past. What is new is not new because it has never been before, but because it has changed in quality ... so that the world alters as we walk in it, so that the years of a man's life measure not some small growth or rearrangement or moderation of what he learned in childhood, but a great upheaval ... The global quality of the world is new; our knowledge of and sympathy with remote and diverse people, our involvement with them in practical terms and our commitment to them in terms of brotherhood ...


In a direct concentration upon the epistemological scene, brief reference is made to three developed bodies of thought and material, in character commensurate with the present thesis and in substance readily amenable to the design of education in the transcendent, cross-cultural vein. These are (single sheet representations appended below): (a) A graphic projection (Custard, and Custard, 1949) of the universe of knowledge summoned to the functional idea of peace through world understanding; (b) a set of ideas (Hutchins and Adler, 1952) from the famed "Great Ideas of the Western World," of which it seems reasonable upon momentary reflection to imagine that there would be counterparts in Eastern thought, and among the educated peoples of the "third world" as well; and (c) a marvelously intricate schematic -- under the rubric of "Zetetics and the Zetetic System of Knowledge" developed over some 25 years by an electrical engineer, Joseph T. Shekociner, at the University of Illinois and released for publication during the mid-1960s.

As to the technological facilities for communication dissemination, the series of philosophical discussions developed around six of Adler's great ideas provides an example of the communicability of ideas abstracted from the commonality of human experience for presentation here and elsewhere on Public Television. It should scarcely require argument that such deliberative adventures can be replicated among leadership groups -- diplomats, university faculties of the arts and sciences among universities and as Harold Taylor would insist, among professional educators and maturing students themselves.

Nor, finally, are we at a loss for organizations which in diverse ways pursue active efforts to implement the principles under discussion -- bare mention alone permissible of a few suggestive identifications: National Peace Association; Planetary Initiative for the World We Choose; the Eleanor Roosevelt Memorial Foundation, etc.
But in all these potentials for educational reconstruction the urge toward conceptual re-formulations are inherent. It has been observed more or less casually that given the notable deficiencies in our own otherwise commendable ideal of massive public education, that we do not really take education seriously. Here it is obligatory that educators take themselves quite seriously indeed, accepting the challenge that they do in fact lie in the eye of the storm of world events. The current waves of criticism and calls for reform should not subside, as similar tides have done before, without that we as professionals -- whether in administration or research or at policy levels in state and federal education agencies; or whether we stand in the position of ultimate necessity as teachers of elementary and secondary school students -- make an effort, commendable and hopefully functionally effective, upon which history can look with favor.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The title of this paper was submitted early, in an effort to meet the initially announced deadline for proposals while the presenter was on assignment away from his place of residence. In the course of development of the presentation, the original intention to discuss the problem of empiricism as distinct from rational approaches to the problems of knowing, evolved toward the notion, broader in scope, represented in the final proposition in the three-fold sequence. Apologies are due for having succumbed to the larger persuasion -- and (for the writer) more interesting persuasion.


Response to the Empirical Beast: Containment versus Rejection

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It is a pleasure to renew an acquaintanceship which will span forty years on February 1, of the next year. Forty years ago, Dr. Ward and I started graduate programs together at Duke University. Subsequently he completed his at U.N.C. and I completed mine at Yale.

I think I am in general agreement with what I presume to be the main contention of this paper that there is a need to recognize the importance of both the empirical and humanistic strains in the study of man. I am not sure however that I am willing to buy into the apocalyptic scenario which has been described in the first part of the paper.

Dr. Ward has really identified at least five propositions. (His first involves three statements each of which is a separate proposition.)

First: The Twentieth century has witnessed radical social changes that threaten social cohesiveness.

Second: These changes have resulted in divisions so wide and deep that existing philosophical conventions are insufficient to permit healthy intergroup relations.

Third: Provocative arguments are being advanced for radically different conceptions of reality in which order and disorder stand in a changed relationship.

Fourth: New developments in psychology and epistemology make possible the resolution of problems of individual fulfillment and of intergroup tensions. (In his discussion of this proposition he describes such developments as cognitive psychology and the reclassification of knowledge under new rubrics.)

Fifth: The same forces which make for chaos can be organized to provide an education which will lead toward "peace and the cooperative advancement of the welfare of humankind."

My concerns are as follows:

With regard to the first statement, I will grant that there is much turbulence in the world mirrored and amplified perhaps by our increased global communication. I do not believe that the knowledge explosion has anything to do with either the social unrest exemplified by "war, famine, and pestilence," or with the personal problems involved in drug abuse.

With regard to the second statement by Dr. Ward, I do not agree that there is any sufficient evidence that our existing philosophical conventions are insufficient to permit healthy intergroup relations. On the contrary I would argue that we have available both in religion and philosophy quite ample bases for group understanding and cohesiveness. (Indeed I think this is what Dr. Ward has suggested in his fifth statement.)
With regard to the third statement, I am not sure what is being said. I presume the concepts of order and disorder are essentially constructs. Ordering is for the convenience of the viewer. If there is a different perception of reality then there will of course be a different scheme for ordering. I am not sure that order or disorder needs to be assigned a value in this particular formulation.

With regard to his fourth statement, I am at a loss as to how to respond. How have new developments in psychology or epistemology had any effect on the resolution of societal problems of individual fulfillment or intergroup tension?

With regard to the fifth, I, like Dr. Ward, am committed to the redemptive power of a sound, democratic education. I don't believe however that reorganization of the curriculum is likely to bring in the millennium. It may enable us to make incremental changes in our personal and social perceptions and perhaps to permit us to behave more intelligently.

Dr. Ward has summarized for us some hopeful developments in intellectual history. Implicit in his title is a desire to temper empiricism (I read behaviorism) with a more wholesome humanism. I doubt if any of us in this room would quarrel with the need to keep our perspective when the doom sayers describe for us the demise of civilization.
We philosophers are being challenged each time we work in our craft. Nietzsche, Derrida, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Dewey, F. H. Bradley and possibly others are signaling an end to philosophical thinking and are looking for another way to think. This means that any practice of the philosophical craft must come to an end, including the philosophical investigation of education. The claim is strong: philosophy of education is impossible. In response to that claim I ask, "Is philosophy of education impossible?" Some thinkers contend that it is. Their point is clear. We are philosophers who are thinking about education, and if philosophy is impossible, then any philosophical thinking about education is also impossible. But is this true? We shall look at what is believed to be impossible, the central thesis of the Western Philosophical tradition, discuss their origin, develop rather cursorily two attacks on those claims, and offer an alternative view of philosophy of education.

First, the possibility of Philosophy rests on two theses. Throughout its history in the West the possibility of philosophy has rested on the belief that there is an ultimate nature of things, a physis, that is reasonable to investigate. It matters not whether that essence is the soul, nature, God, knowledge, or values; it is and it is discussible. In addition, Philosophy rests on the belief that there is a way to this real. Over against all other disciplines Philosophy guides us beyond appearance to designate, to describe, and to prove that our view of the real is correct. Philosophy is rooted in our capacity to reason; we do not sense that nature common to things, we think it. It is through reason that we know the real that is self-consistent, self-dependent, and on which all other things depend for their existence. That real is the archai, the foundation. Knowing it means we can delineate it, to some extent at least, and have reason to believe it exists. But as Paul de Man claims, "To know [erkennen] is a transitive function that assumes the prior existence of an entity to be know and that predicates the ability of knowing by ways of properties. It does not itself predicate these attributes but receives them, so to speak, from the entity..."
itself by merely allowing it to be what it is." 1 The real is presencing and we are acquiring: therein we know. Knowing, then, is acquired presencing. This cornerstone can be summed up in two related ideas: (1) foundationalism and (2) representationalism.

To clarify these presuppositions we can look at the roots of this way of viewing the world. The origins of early Greek philosophy is a debated topic. But it is safe to say that Greek philosophy came into existence within the context of a religious understanding of the world. This religious view is based on mythopoetic thinking. When Thales and the others began thinking they thought about an object provided by religious insight. Olympian mythical religion assumed that there is a physis, a becoming, an alive and developing stuff which has an identifiable pattern, moira. All life, everything is rooted in it.

With a demythologization that occurred by the sixth century in Asia minor, men such as Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes were free to suggest what that physis might be. Peri physew historia was their method, albeit dim and undeveloped. Yet the investigation was rational. Sight has its proper object, hearing its, smell its, and so on. Reason also has its proper object, pattern-characteristics. Like knows like was commonly believed. There is one stuff which explains the many. They believed that there is one substance, it presences, we can know it, we can develop some picture of it in our minds, and it is the basis on which all things are and are known. Foundationalism and representationalism find their roots in the earliest of the Greek philosophers.

Different views of Being have been developed in the Western philosophical tradition. As these views changed so did the views of the nature of philosophy. While it would be interesting to follow Cassirer in working out the object of and method for philosophical study in the metaphysical-religious period, the mathematical period, the biological period, and the scientific-linguistic period--is beyond the confines of this paper. 2 Whatever changes occurred in both the object of philosophical discussion and in the character of the philosophical approach to that object the assumptions of foundationalism and representationalism remained intact. Every view of philosophy was developed with the intent of understanding Being carried out on the basis of the belief in foundationalism and representationalism.

Second, what attacks can be made on these beliefs? They can be placed under the heading of deconstruction. If we understand what deconstruction means as I am using that term we can understand the central point of these attacks. I am following the general point Derrida makes in his definition of deconstruction. He says that deconstruction "signifies a project of critical thought whose task is to locate and 'take apart' those concepts which serve as the axioms or rules for a period of thought, those concepts which command the unfolding of the entire epoch of metaphysics.... But the work of deconstruction does not consist
in simply pointing out the structural limits of metaphysics. Rather, in breaking down and disassembling the ground of this tradition, its task is both to exhibit the source of paradox and contradiction within the system, within the very axioms themselves, and to set forth the possibilities for a new kind of meditation, one no longer founded on the metaphysics of presence.3 While many of his interpreters are literary critics, Derrida, as I interpret him, is writing philosophy. While his focus is on texts his general point is to "deconstruct" Western metaphysics. And his understanding of metaphysics is in general as I described it above. Thus Derrida helps us to focus the attacks made on Western philosophy.

With this background we turn to two attacks made on Western philosophy. Both disassemble the ground of this tradition and exhibit the source of paradox and contradiction, and one sets for the possibilities of a new kind of meditation not found on the metaphysics of presence understood as acquired illumination by Being. Full development of these attacks is not necessary here. Yet even in broad outline their force is sufficient to encourage us to look elsewhere than to the two beliefs or cornerstones. The attacks are developed by F. H. Bradley and by Ernesto Grassi. Bradley claims that any attempt to establish a foundation by designating something as real and all others as appearance runs afoul of "the machinery of terms and relations." Designating any object necessarily implies distinguishing it from other objects. To assume otherwise is to separate product from process, a logically impossible feat. Designation not only requires marking off some object from others but also saying what it is. This means relating qualities into a whole. In the case of separating or joining one is using terms and relations. The metaphysical importance of this is not hard to see. The foundation of substance is not dependent for its reality or its intelligibility on anything other than itself. Yet if we look closely at the activity of designation or description we find that any substance so designated requires relations for its intelligibility. It cannot stand alone; it requires relations for it to be and to be known. Yet that is precisely what the real cannot be; it is independent. Thus, any attempt to designate and to represent some object as the foundation involves contradiction. Bradley exhaustively pursues this line of reasoning in the chapters of Book I of Appearance and Reality.4 Let's turn to a second line of attack on these presuppositions.

Grassi points out that many different views of Being have been advanced in Western philosophy and arguments have been advanced in behalf of each.5 Each claims to have the foundation and the representation worked out. Descartes, for example, contends that we know that we exist and we know that with certainty. That which we know about ourselves and our world is not self-explanatory; it requires (logically) God for its explanation. We can know for certain that God exists. Armed with that epistemic foundation we can proceed not only to explain the nature of the world but also to justify our knowledge claims about the external
world. Grassi contends, however, that any argument for substance or physis rests on a prior seeing. Seeing or ingenium is finding, collecting, and relating. But the seeing is always from some perspective. The perspective is a metaphor, a root metaphor to use Pepper's language. The root metaphor is an image drawn from common sense experience and provides a framework within which seeing or relating occurs and which allows rational demonstration to occur.

For example, Descartes was enamored with the certainty of mathematicians. His root metaphor for philosophy was mathematical clarity and distinctness. His root metaphor for self-dependent and self-consistent substance and the dependent many was God and the Creator-creature relation drawn from Christian theology. Descartes saw; this perspective gave him the insight he needed to defend science and religion against the attack of skeptics such as Michel Montaigne. Even though enamored by the power of his metaphor, he attempted to circumvent the metaphorical underpinnings of his own position in his famous cogito ergo sum. He believed that by reason alone we can demonstrate the existence of the self and that God is. We can know the characteristics of God and we can show that God is the explanation of the many, the guarantor of knowledge.

Much of subsequent philosophy has followed Descartes. Contemplatio or ingenium or theorein are rarely used in contemporary philosophical literature. Putting our complete confidence in cogitare or ratio we have learned to distrust metaphor. Contemplation is for poetry; it is not for philosophy. Indeed, we philosophers must demand as much clarity, precision, rigor, and objectivity as does the scientist. It is his paradigm we must follow. But that is exactly what we reject when following reason alone; we reject a root metaphor. Demonstration, Grassi believes, rests on root metaphors for its persuasive power.

While argument gains its cogency from the metaphor on which it rests, metaphors themselves are not certain in any kind of logical sense. They designate, point, signify; they do not justify. Either you see or you do not. Ingenium precedes cogitare. The metaphor may lose its power and the view rooted in it may become less coherent internally. The view could be beset with great enough anomalies that it collapses. But that collapse may not be simply logical in character. It may be a failure in seeing.

These two attacks jointly lead us to the conclusion that the traditional assumptions on which much of western philosophy rests are unacceptable. From Bradley we learn that the nature of thought precludes the possibility of justifiably designating and describing anything as Substance and showing how it explains all other things. It is self-contradictory for thought to engage in such a venture. To show that such attempts are internally self-contradictory is a telling blow. From Grassi we learn that even if the attempt were satisfactory the victory would be hollow. Any attempt on the basis of reason alone to justify a foundation and
representation is an attempt that rests on a root metaphor. No metaphor is certain. A metaphor is not a proof. It signifies only. The genesis of these anomalies is the assumption that reals are, that we can know for certain that they are, and that we can understand these reals, these secure foundations to which we can appeal in our attempts to understand.

Let's draw a startling conclusion at this point. Philosophy is that discipline that we identified earlier as the study of physis, that discipline that on the basis of reason alone penetrates to the foundation of things to Truth, if you will, and represents the presencing real to us and justifies its findings. We have seen that there is good reason to believe that the assumption that reason alone can secure and delineate a foundation is an assumption which is vacuous. If the object of philosophical study is empty then what need is there for the discipline? Philosophy is useless. Philosophy is dead. If the word "Philosophy" is to be used only in this narrow sense then maybe it could refer to a series of text and type of activity that occupied men in the past. It would be of historical interest only. But being a "friend of wisdom" is not dead, it seems to me. If we can find a use for "Philosophy" on the basis of what we learn from Bradley and Grassi, not to mention Dewey and others, we may be able to set about forming a non-foundationalist, non-representationalist view. Philosophy that is not impossible.

Third, what view of Philosophy can we offer? Earlier we rejected the traditional object of study and in doing so rejected philosophy traditionally conceived. If we can find something about which wisdom is needed and find a way of seeing and thinking appropriate to that something we may find philosophy flourishing and worth teaching. But where are we to look? Bradley shows us that all propositional knowledge internally self-destructs. We can have no foundation, no representation on the grounds of items and attributes (properties and relations) alone. Grassi shows us that all knowing rests on metaphor. Thus in so far as we know at all it is metaphorical at its roots. I suggest that we look to metaphor to help us in forming a view of philosophy. How can we go about this?

Let's turn to the familiar, to what Doug Browning calls the pre-theoretical world of everyday human, personal experience. It is that which is most important to us. Our everyday lives are filled with all kinds of things, from going to the store late at night to get some milk, to brushing your teeth in the morning, to eating cheese and bread and an apple for lunch, to talking with a friend. These are the familiar. Yet if someone were to press us as to why we do these things we would be hard put to give anything more than a practical answer. We buy the milk because the children need it for breakfast, we brush our teeth for clean breath and white teeth, we eat cheese, bread, and an apple for lunch because we don't want to gain extra weight. Our friend presses; what is that for the sake of which we do these things? Our interest is more than simply practical understanding; we also want a
theoretical understanding. Our friend is asking us about our view of the life good to live. We knew before he pressed, and now we don’t know. We do not understand, and we want to understand. This type of questioning can be carried out about any area of our lives; any familiar could, I suppose become unfamiliar.

Even though all familiar can become unfamiliar, is there a familiar that is more important than another? Anything in the natural world can become unfamiliar. While we may be successful in making intelligible the unfamiliar in natural phenomena why would we want to do so? Possibly because of its intrinsic interest. But primarily because such understanding aids in the flourishing of our own individual lives. Scientific understanding is valuable ultimately because of its contribution to human well-being. It is the well-being of our lives that we are interested in. When something about our lives becomes unfamiliar, there is an importance here that transcends any other unfamiliar. If we adults are to guide our lives through our developmental patterns we must know ourselves. "The unexamined life is not worth living," contended Socrates. It does not matter how brilliant you are in "useless" philosophy, in dissecting the texts, if your personal life is coming apart you are not happy and are deeply troubled.

If the familiar-unfamiliar of our lives is of paramount importance to us and the life good to live is now unfamiliar and we want to understand then we have a genuine problem. Is there a way that is the best for our lives? How do we know if our way is best or our conduct is correct? The well-being of our lives depends on our facing this unfamiliar and understanding it. We have then an object of study, and we must find some way of gaining insight into it, of understanding it. We need to find some way of seeing, of relating; we need some way or perspective as a framework for thought. We cannot satisfactorily return to the metaphysics of the past with its roots in cogitare. That way self-destructs--the way of Descartes, among others. Bradley’s arguments are telling. Where do we turn? I suggest we turn to Grassi’s insights for help. He contends that all thinking originates in image, in metaphor. But we cannot argue for a metaphor; that undercuts the point of this essay. Rather we can only point to the way we see and go from there. As Chaim Perleman contends, "...philosophical thought, incapable of empirical verification, develops by an argumentation that aims to how certain analogies and metaphors accepted as central elements in a world view." We need a metaphor. I want to take seriously a metaphor often employed by Socrates.

Socrates believed that the art of living is analogous to the work of the craftsman. The shoemaker picks the kind of leather for the top of the shoes, the type of material he wants for the soles, the kind of stitching he needs, and the design of the shoes. Skillfully he integrates these into a pair of shoes. Yet that which determines his choices at each stage, the selection of the materials and the design, is the function for which the shoes are made. The shoes may be used for hiking or for dress. The use
to which the shoes are put or the function for which the shoes are made is crucial to the whole enterprise of the craftsman. That for the sake of which the shoes are made must be known by the craftsman before he begins making the shoes. Once the shoes are made they must function correctly to be called good shoes. They must do the job they were designed to do. Analogously, the good craftsman of his own life picks the "materials" of his life and the "design" he wants. These decisions are made in light of the function which he wants his life to fulfill. Obviously some functions are better than others. So, the person who is attempting to get his life together must know to what ends he ought to live if he is to live well. The kinds of behavior and style of one's life must be selected in light of the function they are to fulfill, and they must harmonize with the end. There must be an integration (integrity) of ends and means. For Socrates a person who lives well is one who possesses that kind of integrity in his life which results from a symphony of deeds and words, actions and knowledge. The artisan of life must not only possess knowledge of those ends which are best for him to achieve but also he must habitually act consistently with those ends. It is through habitually acting consistent with justified ends that the life good to live is established.

Unfortunately Socrates' view is only partially satisfactory. He sought the physis of the moral life; that Good for the sake of which all actions are done. Foundationalism and representationalism were assumed. Rather than assuming that philosophy necessarily leads to fixed views about how we ought to live, we must at the outset at least accept that view of philosophy that would aid us in living good lives. Since our lives go through transitions from stage to stage, we must ask of philosophy that it aid us as we work through the issues involved in those changes. My view of philosophy as craftsmanship includes that kind of continued search that does not end with final, fixed, absolute answers about the content of a well crafted life.

The philosophical craft involved in creating a life structure is conducted in a rational manner. We live through stages and crises and transitions. Crafting is guiding life toward this pattern. An attempt must be made to interpret the stages of life under investigation. To interpret a stage of our lives is to uncover the belief and value assumptions which underlie it, to evaluate critically the assumptions, and to adopt new ones or retread the old ones. For example, in self-critically crafting a life script of her own, a young woman must understand the nature and implications of the sex roles in our society. When a young woman adopts the traditional role of women in American society she accepts the belief that women do not have equal rights with men. If she self-consciously creates a life structure with which she will be happy, this belief must be clarified and evaluated. Furthermore, any discussion of the possession of rights proceeds on some assumed theory of rights and view of the nature of man. For full understanding and control over her life, the young woman must also investigate those more basic beliefs. While the search may
never "touch bottom," there is no need to do so. The purpose of ever deeper penetration is not only to understand one's own life and that of his fellow human beings but also to craft a defensible life structure. The goal is not final answers but the self-conscious crafting of a defensible life script, including not only the goals of our lives but also the rules and structures that allow for their achievements. Through such activities an understanding may be gained of areas of experience that are the most direct and immediate experiences persons have. What is learned about these experiences are the assumptions that underlie them and the physical, social and cultural forces that have contributed to their development. Such achievement of critical self-awareness is a liberating experience. Once one is aware of his assumptions and has critically evaluated them, he is then able to accept, modify, or reject those assumptions and to exert some control over his decisions.

Finally, the philosophical craft is to be conducted in every area of and at any stage in our lives. Nothing is sacrosanct to the critical evaluation of the philosopher's roving eye whether it is the nature of persons, values, or knowledge. Philosophy has as its province for investigation all of our lives and asks the most searching questions about every aspect of human existence.

A final comment about philosophy must be made. The craft of searching rationally for understanding in every dimension of human experience with the intent of giving life sound guidance is a paradoxical endeavor. On the one hand, philosophy is the most concrete, "down to earth," personal study one can pursue. Indeed, what is more immediate to us than making decisions about sex, marriage, children, work, and education. On the other hand, philosophy is one of the most abstract activities in which one can become involved. In these everyday kinds of experiences are issues involving persons, values, God, conduct, knowledge, and learning. To deal with these topics is to discuss a subject matter that is often distant, obscure, and strange. To become involved in the philosophical craft is to ask questions about our everyday lives that drive to the core of personal dimensions of life, to learn that we often do not really understand ourselves, and to discover that the attempt to understand philosophically is a difficult but liberating task.

In conclusion, to approach philosophy as the craftsmanship of living is to develop a plan of attack on these tasks, and through the analysis of assumptions to penetrate through the limited in scope, but important, issues raised in addressing the specific tasks we face to the general but deep issues of life and existence, knowledge and conduct on which the surface beliefs ultimately rest. If philosophy is seen in this light, you can understand how any person can address philosophically the educational tasks we face in living our lives. This, it seems to me, means that the discipline of philosophy of education is possible.
Notes


DECONSTRUCTING EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: A RESPONSE TO BUFORD.

by

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Professor Buford's title promises me a deconstruction, and the mention of Professor Derrida whets my appetite for a Derrida-style deconstruction. That is, I had hoped to see Buford apply Derrida's method of reading to a text containing pronouncements of educational philosophy. However, Buford makes his own sense of what "deconstructing philosophy" means, so my complaint is not offered as any indictment of his interesting article. Still, since Buford did not do it, I am going to deconstruct some texts. One of the texts is the subtitle of his paper, by which I was initially misled. The other is a windy preamble to a university mission statement.

Before I carry out that project, I should say that I find Buford's own project a sound one. As he sees it, successful criticisms of foundationalism and representationalism have undermined traditional western philosophy. He makes effective use of arguments from Bradley and Grassi to show that paradoxes or contradictions reside in foundationalist and representationalist accounts. There is a need, according to Buford, for a new account of philosophy and a new educational philosophy based on it. He sets out at the end of his article in quest of just such a new account. His proposal there is that philosophy should be understood in terms of the metaphor of craftsmanship, that it should be viewed as the craft of living well.

However, this account of philosophy seems to me to be loaded with some of the very presuppositions it is supposed to get free of. First, Buford remains committed to the view that rationality is a first principle of philosophy. Yet that doctrine was challenged by Grassi. Why does Buford retain this principle while abandoning others? Second, while he turns to a metaphor for philosophy instead of a proposition describing it in order to avoid representationalism, what he says about metaphors makes them sound like representational devices. He says that they "designate, point, signify" and seems at times to want to squeeze propositions out of them. But if propositional accounts are not viable, then we cannot expect to gain anything by squeezing propositions out of metaphors. Finally, the metaphor of the craftman suggests that the product of philosophizing is something complete or finished, like a pair of shoes. But the critics of foundationalism and representationalism would no doubt challenge this view, saying that no work of philosophizing can be complete, but must consist of partial truths only (hence there are no foundations).

Now I'd like to try deconstructing Buford's subtitle. Like many other English speaking philosophers, I am new to the use of the method of deconstruction. Thus, what follows is admittedly an amateurish effort. Still, I have hope that something might be learned from it.

For Derrida, it is texts that are deconstructed, not philosophy (or even philosophies). Hence the term "deconstructing" as it appears in "Deconstructing Educational Philosophy" is out of place. There is a rupture or "slippage" in the text. Derrida asks us to pay attention to this discontinuity. What were the words that might have been chosen to do the work of "deconstructing" but were rejected in favor of it? Derrida wants us to consider what these subordinated or "despised" alternatives
were. Plainly, the paper could have been titled "Resurrecting Educational Philosophy," or "Reconstructing Educational Philosophy." Given that Buford left the work of criticizing traditional philosophy to Bradley and Grassi, and presented as his own original proposal an account of philosophy intended to escape from those criticisms, his paper would very accurately be described by those other titles.

Why is the word "deconstructing" in this title? Is it just because deconstruction is a hot topic these days? Does this word express a lack of confidence about the possibility of resurrecting educational philosophy? Does it admit in advance that Buford's project is doomed to failure? Does it sell Buford's project short by suggesting that it is less interesting than the incisive arguments of Bradley and Grassi?

Buford's account of philosophical tradition is competent and well informed. However, I disagree with his contention that all traditional western philosophy made foundationalist and representationalist assumptions. Skepticism and relativism are aged doctrines, and have appeared repeatedly in interesting varied forms, always questioning these assumptions. I see the skeptical and relativist themes as authentically philosophical ones. To me, philosophy is made of many strands. Thus, I do not regard the arguments made against foundationalism and representationalism as a threat to the whole of philosophy.

I am an complacent pluralist who takes an eclectic approach, going to different philosophers (sometimes those with conflicting views) for a variety of insights, questions, tricks, metaphors or methods. I admire Buford's experimental spirit in his attempt to incorporate Grassi's metaphorical approach into the final pages of the essay. I would suggest that the metaphor of the midwife be considered as a supplement to that of the shoemaker. The objects made by shoemakers are dead but midwives bring living beings into the world. At any rate, we neutralize the sting of criticism when we learn new tricks from the critics themselves. Thus criticism can be more invigorating than deadly to philosophy.

In a similarly experimental mood, I would like to finish these remarks by trying another deconstruction, hoping thereby both to exhibit the usefulness of this method, and to display it in an unthreatening, albeit skeptical, light.

Consider the following statement of educational philosophy from a school I shall call "Imaginary State University," ISU for short: "The primary mission of ISU is to give its students the best possible education." My deconstruction of this text begins with the observation that the word "possible" can be omitted from the text without disrupting its grammar. That is, ISU could have promised its students the best education. What then, is the function of the word "possible" in the text? You might think it is used to make the text more "realistic" (to promise the best education would go too far, so the promise must be limited), but it also empties out the text to which it is added (if a student were to protest that education at ISU is mediocre or bad, the answer lies ready to hand that ISU never promised its students a good education, but only the best possible one).

You may be sure that this text manifests an anxious or confused relationship to education. Self-doubt is projected here by the insertion of the word "possible". It implies that ISU does not believe that its education is the best. Confusion is presented when an unattainable goal
is set only to be reset at a vaguely defined lower level. If ISU knew its own powers more clearly, it could state its mission more economically than this. The text is like the ones people use when they are "at a loss for words" or just warming up to say something else. Seen in the light of another useful metaphor, the text is "spinning its wheels."

What is the use of this deconstruction? I can think of several uses to which it might be put. One use is to initiate more searching philosophical thinking about education. What would the best education be like? Why would a university be afraid to promise its students the best? What assumptions about education currently obstruct our clear vision of it? How often do pronouncements about education cover up ignorance rather than reveal what is known?
introduction

The purpose of my paper is to examine some of the positive and also some of the limiting implications that arise from using social science research findings as the foundation for educational goals in such value oriented curriculum areas as moral education, civics, and socialization efforts. I shall investigate possible logical discontinuities which result from unexamined mixing of empirically generated theories with normative curriculum ends. Such logical mixing may lead to difficulties when it comes to developing instructional strategies.

The paper will be organized into two main parts and a brief concluding section. Part One contains an examination of two types of theory on which educators draw generally, labelled by me scientific-descriptive and heuristic-normative. This examination will constitute the general framework for the paper.

Part Two scrutinizes at some length an example in value oriented education where—in my opinion—a confusion about the correct application of both types of theory discussed in Part One results in severe limitations for practice in the classroom.

The final section concludes, briefly, with suggestions about ways of assuring the correct use of both types of theory in planning and implementation.

PART ONE

two types of theory

A look at the theoretical foundations for developing curriculum goals and subsequent implementation strategies reveals the use of two distinct types of theory. Both are generated according to distinct protocol and command their own, specific logic for judging their adequacy.

Let us take a look at learning theories which provide the foundation for devising what is hoped to be effective instruction, relevant curriculum design, successful disciplinary action, or timely scheduling format. Such learning theories are generated by social scientists, psychologists, to be specific,
through their analysis of observational data that have been collected in adherence to the canons of the scientific method. Similarly, sociologists and anthropologists record empirically the customs of cultures and subcultures. Their conclusions are often used as the basis for developing aims in multicultural education, civic education, etc. Their methods of collecting data are shared by them with all other empirical scientists, and consists of recording verifiable replicable events observable through sensory discrimination.

Although the present state of social sciences like psychology and sociology is not quite as "hard" as the protocol adhered to by physics and chemistry, the general claim is that the difference in protocol is more a matter of degree than kind. In any case, we may say that social scientists in general have been advocating the adoption of their theories as foundations for educational goals and practices because of the scientific validity of their research methodology. Individuals like Skinner and Kohlberg would usurp the job of philosophers of education and use their research findings to determine educational aims in addition to implementation strategies. This aggressive stance is defended by them because they claim to have more verifiable foundations for decision making than do philosophers, especially those who would speculate, rather than analyze empirical data.

Social scientists who generate empirical-descriptive theory are satisfied with the latter if they can prove to have adhered to correctly prescribed research protocol. If resulting educational practices fail, their accusing finger is pointed at the practitioner who is blamed for inferior understanding of the theory and, thus, ignorant practice. Practitioners, on the other hand, who do not obtain hoped for results after having followed the social scientists' suggestions, tend to declare the latter's theories incorrect, ill founded, or bogus.

Both sides generally agree that desirable scientific theory should resemble in its claims the state of things in the natural world, resorting to intervening variables, theoretical constructs, and operationism no more than necessary. Thus, both sides agree that acceptable scientific theory is descriptive of the state of affairs in the real world. I will refer to this view of scientific theory as the MIRROR OF NATURE MODEL.

Freeman Butts, elder statesman of the history of Western education, chooses as his framework for doing history the stages of civilization. He describes how early inhabitants of this planet made the transition from food gathering primates to thinking, speaking, and believing beings who are now at the brink of forming a world culture based on the shared values of technology and communication. In simple terms, this may be paraphrased as a record of man who is viewed as having pulled himself up by his boot straps to ever more complex levels of functioning in a variety of dimensions.

It seems unquestionably the case that human beings are forever striving to go beyond their intellectual, social,
physical, and also moral limits. William James, pragmatically unable to justify his own religious beliefs, finally resorted to calling this dimension as "the more in me (him)" to be accepted beyond possibility or need of scientific verification. Much of educational theory is based on our desire, so poignantly characterized by James as "the more in us", to go beyond our obvious limits, to be more than we are, more knowledgeable, more successful, more human, and more ethical. Were it not for our desire to transcend our limitations, there would be no need for education.

The school, then, seems to be that social institution which is destined to be appointed--almost anointed--to take the raw material of human freedom and shape it beyond its present state to ever more perfect forms of individual and group existence. To that end all sorts of educational theories have been and are still being developed. What all these theories have in common is their heuristic nature. They are not based exclusively on the kind of insights that are gathered from the scientifically-supported theory that describes man as he is and gives us the type of verifiable conclusions to which I have referred as MIRROR OF NATURE. Instead, such theories are based on a vision of man as he ought to be. "I have a dream", preached Dr. Martin Luther King, whose vision went beyond what he called a "sick" society.

Educational theories, such as multiculturalism, open schooling, and Kohlberg's theory of moral education are recent additions to value-oriented and value-based educational theory in the heuristic vein. They cannot be entirely justified by scientifically derived conclusions. Sociobiologists are clearly showing that in our behavioral makeup we are an "ugly" ape, not really charming when it comes to our treatment of the sick, the weak, the young. Books by the dozen are published to advise women how to dress for aggressive image in order to blend into male-dominated fields in administration and organizational hierarchy, and yet we develop affirmative action curriculum, and strive for equal educational opportunity in the schools. Clearly, contrary to scientific evidence, the schools are pursuing their goal to improve man from what he is into what he should--but has yet to prove can--become.

Generation of the type of heuristic theory I have just discussed is vastly different from the complex process of investigation and reflection. When viewed holistically in conjunction with the educational practices derived from it, a necessary pattern of interplay between scientific/descriptive and heuristic/prescriptive research protocol emerges: The heuristic education theorist bases the development of his theory on a vision or ideal. Such vision is in his head, or heart (for want of a better location). Its foundation can be found in one or a set of values concerning the state of man and/or nature.3

However, heuristic theory, in any field and not just in education, is a follow-up step and not a beginning, as a rule.
The generator of any heuristic theory starts with an inspection of the state of things as they are found empirically. Sometimes, then, he finds them wanting, either because of an already existing and opposing value orientation, or because of a vague dissatisfaction which leads to the emerging new value with which the state of experienced reality now is felt incompatible. The result is a vision of a state of things as they ought to be, not as they are. This, in its final formulation gives rise to the new heuristic theory.

In order to translate heuristic theory—or the new vision—into reality, however, the use of scientific theory is needed again. Its empirically generated data provide insight into the causal network of events in the observed natural world that will bring about the envisioned state. In other words, scientific theory provides information for effecting the desired change from things as they are to things as they ought to be. With regard to acting on heuristic theory, however, we have not yet reached the end of the line in the process of implementing the vision. A final check of the effected change in the state of things against the original vision is necessary.

We have seen before that the adequacy of scientific theory is generally accepted to lie in its verified correspondence with the experienced state of affairs in the natural world. Defining criteria for adequacy of heuristic theory is a much thornier matter. On the most primitive level, the failure of a clearly described or envisioned state of things is often blamed on inadequate scientific theory. Education reformers often blame the failure of their aims on inadequate backup from the social sciences for working out methods and strategies in instruction. Social scientists, on the other hand, counterattack by accusing the heuristic theorist of "unrealistic" goals which are incompatible with scientific evidence about human potential or human nature.

Both sides in the controversy have some points to score. Social science research has generally been inadequate to provide predictable support for the achievement of instructional objectives, even of the non-heuristic kind. However, generators of heuristic theory—in education as in other fields—have not always survived tests of adequacy. In fact, it would be difficult here to define the kind of generally acceptable criterion of adequacy which scientific theory enjoys.

How is one to prove the adequacy of a vision or the claimed inadequacy of a state of affairs as they arise from a given value orientation?

It appears, thus, that the logic of heuristic theory can only resort to justifying itself in terms of persuasion. Although it is couched in strong, imperatival language, its only weapon rests in appeal to reason and sentiment. With regard to moral education, that appeal must be to the conscience.

Heuristic theory, I have tried to show, differs in its logic for validation from the logic of scientific theory in the kind of
evidence which needs to be mustered to gain acceptance. In a pluralistic society such as this nation both enjoys and suffers, heuristic theory must always expect opposition. Therefore, any educational reform of heuristic nature will continue to require constant philosophical examination, and a forum for the debate on values must be kept alive. Heuristic theory will retain its fuzzy edge, as long as we subscribe to political, religious, and aesthetic pluralism.

Because of the built-in fuzziness of heuristic theories of education there has always existed a temptation to streamline curriculum decisions into standardized models which are based on scientifically verifiable data. Everett Kircher, decades ago, warned against such a temptation because of its threat to our freedom of inquiry which then leads to loss if intellectual vitality. To judge by the noisy debates over values education, behavioral strategies of instruction, and performance oriented teacher education, there is no immediate threat to American educational vitality! However, recent trends have brought increasing pressures to eliminate the fuzzy edge around heuristic educational theories and substitute empirically generated theory for developing curriculum ends and strategies for instruction.

**PART TWO**

the case of Kohlberg's theory

We have found, in the past decade, an aggressive example of attempted takeover of educational decisionmaking in the case of Kohlberg's theory of moral education, even in its amended and broadened version as offered by Gilligan's research on the moral reasoning patterns found among girls. I wish to use the same to provide an example of the kind of dangers and limitations to educational freedom and success that are incurred when the distinctions between scientific-descriptive and heuristic-persuasive theories are not examined carefully by those who plan curriculum goals and instructional strategies.

Because of its widespread popularization in educational and philosophical circles I will forego a description of the Kohlberg-Gilligan model. I merely wish to focus on the curricular emphasis in which educators in classrooms of both public and private schools present children with carefully constructed "moral dilemmas" that form the basis for students' choices and subsequent discussion, where the latter are led from the making of decisions of moral nature on the basis of purely selfish motives to an examination of decisions made on the basis of their regard for societal conventions, to a final stage where individuals question the justice of the laws which are relevant to such decisions.

The expressed goal of such moral decision making exercises is to improve the quality and level of moral decision making, to
lead students exposed to such curriculum to the attainment of as high levels of moral thinking as possible. There is certainly nothing wrong with trying to help young people gain facility in reflecting on moral issues and in verbalizing their deliberations. It is even possible—including Gilligan's research on gender differences in the process—to accept that patterns for such reasoning and stages of development thereof can be empirically verified. Questionable, however, is the claim that the top stage should be accepted as the endpoint or highlight for the moral education of individuals of any age. What has been established at best is the fact that human beings tend to progress in their moral dimension according to a certain developmental pattern.

It is disturbing to me, however, that just because human beings have been found to develop morally according to an established pattern (if one accepts Kohlberg's/Gilligan's research findings) elaborate schemes have been justified and devised to help them move through these stages of development as smoothly as possible and to consider such movement as an acceptable and justifiable curricular end. Let me share with you my criticism of such indiscriminate mingling of scientific with heuristic theory.

First, there is my concern over the assumption that, because stage six (or seven) is attained last it is the utmost of which an individual can ever be capable with regard to moral reasoning. The stages, as listed, closely parallel man's evolutionary process in the history of civilization. It is not so many thousand years ago that men made decisions about their moral conduct on no more than the basis of fear for physical well being. Yet, there came a time when obedience to law was built into our moral structure. Who is to say that our moral progress has conclusively culminated in the vision of the just law? It may, indeed, be the most that we can formulate now with regard to moral thought. But it is an empirical fact that we are now capable of "higher" moral thought and deed than our prehistoric ancestors. Kohlberg's scheme is satisfied to "top off" at this present final stage. First, he finds out—empirically—what the pattern of development is. Then, he and his followers proceed to use it to guide the young through its enumerated phases. That may be fine for starters but it appears to only guide them to do what comes naturally. More efficiently and quickly, perhaps, but that is all! Where is the existential stretch in this plan for moral development? The basic foundation for moral values lies in the conviction that we can always go beyond our limitation. That conviction is even backed by empirical fact, as the most casual study of man's civilizational history shows. On the most cursory examination of that history of moral evolution it becomes obvious that the present practice of using Kohlberg's scheme for moral education in the schools can at best provide some guide for instructional strategies, but cannot be accepted as arbiter of the goals on which such a curriculum is built!
Another problem with this transplant from social science research into philosophy of education lies in the tacit assumption that saying (or thinking) assures doing. We often feel sure about our duties and obligations, but cannot rise to the courage of our convictions. Philosophers have characterized this phenomenon as "weakness of the will". So have theologians. Social scientists tend to focus on the collection of data which are accessible to them, in principle at least, if not always immediately in practice. Thus, the kind of investigation that is truly foundational to value-oriented education is omitted, because it cannot be accommodated according to the canons and protocol of empirical research. Philosophers, speculatively inclined ones, at least, need to take up these reflections, although they must know in advance that the edges of their analysis will remain fuzzy. With regard to our example, educational theorists need to focus on the generation of insights which will allow for the development of methods to help develop the kind of strength of character that helps translate moral reasoning into moral conduct.

Finally, our case in point has a most disturbing shortcoming. It is preventing us from considering alternative criteria for measuring the moral progress of individuals. With its intellectualist bias, the model developed by Kohlberg's scientific logic reduces those incapable of superior abstract reasoning to moral inferiority. To question the justice of a law a high level of abstract reasoning capacity is needed to which not everyone may be able to rise. Pascal reminds us that "the heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing". How does one justify such values as "goodness of the heart" as legitimate moral sentiment and how does one integrate it into educational theory without resorting to philosophical analysis and by going beyond the empirical?

Conclusion

In my discussion I have attempted to analyse some of the implications of using empirical research findings as basis for developing curriculum goals within the framework of value-oriented instruction. My analysis has led me to make a distinction between scientific and heuristic theory in general. I do not claim the distinction to be a radical, new, and startling discovery. My intent has been to analyse the logic inherent in each of the two types of theory and to derive from it criteria for judging their respective adequacy by tracing the connections between the two types of theory in the field of education. I hope to have shown that not only are both types needed to develop value-oriented instruction but that there is an appropriate protocol for their use and interdependence. Decisions about effective implementation of curriculum are based on the findings of social scientists toward the development of
instructional strategies. Such findings are means to achieving educational ends rather than determiners of curriculum goals. Philosophical analysis, however, is required to clarify the reasons for decisions about suitable curriculum goals and for reflection on the basic assumptions underlying them. Such analysis, again, has its departing point in an examination of the experienced reality in the human environment at its present state.

The question, it seems, is not which theory should be preferred but what the preferred place of each type of theory should be within the process of educational planning. By understanding the legitimate contribution each can make to the process a more successful integration of them should improve value oriented education in its goal forming as well as in its implementing phases.

References


I would agree with all of Dr. Sarlos' major points if I were willing to concede (1) that Kohlberg and like-minded researchers are scientifically studying moral reasoning, or (2) that what Kohlberg et alia are observing in those classroom discussions of moral dilemmas are in fact instances of moral reasoning.

Professor Sarlos concedes to Dr. Kohlberg that science can in principle form generalizations and theories of what he calls "levels and stages of moral reasoning." But I'm not convinced that science can talk about reasons or even talk about incidents of reasoning. My argument is that reasons are propositions—meanings—abstract entities which cannot in principle be detected by any method of empirical science. And incidents of reasoning although datable and clockable cannot be detected by empirical scientists because as empirical scientists they have no way of determining that any event is an event of reasoning in which a proposition or string of propositions are created by or entertained by the mind. (As an aside I might note that a nominalistic interpretation of propositions wouldn't help Kohlberg in his quest to empirically observe propositions in any inter-subjective manner.)

One currently popular proposed way of getting at such elusive entities as meanings is to posit an ontologically richer world of physical objects and events plus meanings. And then some self-styled hermeneutical scientists tell us that they possess a wonderful Germanic way of observing these propositions or meanings. They tell us that by going around a hermeneutical circle they can intuit meanings roughly like they 'verstehen' mental acts. However, these intuiters don't produce theories or even "nomic" generalizations which could be used for explanations, so I don't see how they might make Kohlberg into a real or complete scientist.

In making these few remarks I fully realize that I haven't spoken the final word on this topic, but I do hope I have made a prima facie case for doubting whether Kohlberg's reported discovery of levels and stages of moral reasoning are scientific discoveries. I agree with Dr. Sarlos that Kohlberg and company seem to see themselves as empirical scientists, but I just am not convinced that they, like all psychologists who claim to study "thinking", don't have some very serious epistemological and metaphysical stumbling blocks in their paths.

I now move on to my second point. Dr. Sarlos and many others have criticized Kohlberg on the point of neglecting the development of moral conduct. Kohlberg has defended his theory by saying that he has a
Platonic view of morality which does not acknowledge a fundamental split between moral reasoning and conduct. This defense has to be taken more seriously than some of his other counter-arguments.

Perhaps there might just be something to the non-Kohlbergian idea that moral thinking is not merely a matter of grinding out one bloodless theorem after another. Perhaps instead, moral thinking is a matter of character which is exercised in part in "seeing" some sort of moral forms, where character is exercised in part in "seeing" some sort of moral forms, where character is more than Plato's "soul", being an integrated set of developed moral sensitivities and caring plus a dominating, temptation-rejecting sense of personal integrity. My thought here is that both moral reasoning and conduct arise out of a common source, character, and that character is neither developed easily nor activated easily, especially not in unwillingly undertaken classroom discussions of so-called "moral dilemmas".

But just having said this in semi-defense of Kohlberg, I now want to suggest that what Kohlberg and allies are seeing in the classroom when children discuss those moral dilemmas are not genuine incidents of moral reasoning. Their mouthings of moral words develop only very slowly from random, semi-exploratory assertions. Perhaps what that classroom babble about who should be thrown out of the lifeboat, etc., really amounts to bloodless talk which merely has the appearance of moral reasoning. Such moral play-acting may be one way in which character development can be fostered, just as shadow-boxing is one way to develop boxing skills, but it may not be the real thing. What this line of argument leads up to is the tentative conclusion that maybe Kohlberg's theory is fine but he is doing empirical studies of the wrong thing if he wants to find invariant properties of genuine moral reasoning.

By way of a conclusion I would like to say that I agree with Professor Sarlos when she says that Kohlberg and others who strive to be scientists cannot use this sort of subject matter to derive Ought from Is. But I would like to suggest that just maybe she is being too generous to Kohlberg et al. in buying the ideas that they are discovering anything through "scientific" methods, or that they are observing moral reasoning when they observe children in classrooms discussing canned riddles labeled by their makers as "moral dilemmas".

REASONING ABOUT VALUES:

DIAGLOGUE WITH A CAT

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I have always wanted to be able to talk to animals. Although I do not believe that they are endowed with intelligence as this is understood by humans, I am intensely curious about the way they see the world and the character of animal rights. What, for example, is an animal's metaphysics? What is reality for him? Certainly he engages in a kind of practical reasoning. Since I see the practical order as identical with the moral order, I would also ask whether an animal also engages in moral reasoning.

This interest of mine is related to my primary interest in ethics and especially to how moral reasoning may be taught to students, avoiding indoctrination or the imposition of values. I am convinced that a person's view of reality and especially his view of what is the good for him largely determines his choices and therefore makes him the kind of person that he is. It is certainly the verdict of experience, as I see it, that a person's perspective of reality is a function of how he defines it in relation to himself and what works for him or is good for him. Is this also true for animals?

The only animal that I have any direct knowledge of is a middle aged tomcat who has been visiting my house for about two years. His first visits were exploratory in the sense that he appeared to be quite suspicious of strangers. He would run away at the sight of my wife or me, cautiously looking back at us over his shoulder. After a while he must have determined that our intentions towards him were not harmful and possibly beneficent. Our putting out a little food for him occasionally was the clincher. It wasn't long before he was regularly appearing at our back door with an expectant look and after some time he trained us to let him in after he yawned widely in the manner of the MGM lion. Some cats probably would call this a kind of operant conditioning.

Needless to say, I had no success in any kind of verbal communication with him. I had the distinct impression that this tomcat was one who would keep his own secrets. However, a couple of weeks ago I did dream about him and in my dream I had a long conversation with him.

I will not vouch for the complete accuracy of the dialogue that occurred between us knowing that it will be colored by my own interests.
and that I have a tendency to anthropomorphize. However, I managed to have pretty good recall. I remember that the cat spoke in a low voice and initially told me that he also had been wanting to talk to me for some time. My dream questioning, patterned after my professional questioning in real life, didn't seem to make much sense to the cat. "How do you define the good?" The cat looked back in disgust. "Do you really have any thoughts about the meaning of life?" With this question the cat began to walk away.

I decided to try another approach. I ran after the cat, picked him up, sat down in my easy chair and began stroking him gently. The cat extended his claws and sank them into my trousers, pulling out a few threads as he retracted them. I told him to cut it out and he replied that he was only showing his pleasure at being able to be on my lap. I explained that his pleasure was my pain but the cat looked at me blankly.

"Do you have any feeling for what is good and bad?" I asked him. "Well," he said, "what is good is what fulfills my catness, or is it cattitude?"

"Now you're talking like a philosopher." I said.

"Perhaps," said the cat, "but can you think of any better way of putting it?"

"No, but I imagine that you put the entire emphasis on your catness, a thoroughly selfish point of view."

"So it is, but no different from how you humans define the good. Would you like me if I were an old, unattractive and diseased cat? Wouldn't you have me put away? Certainly you would never take me on your lap."

At first I was at a loss for a reply but, remembering my Aristotle, I said to the cat: "But isn't the good of a cat to live a life of reason according to what kind of feline virtues that you might be able to develop? We humans talk about courage, self-control, justice and prudence. What about you cats? It seems to me that you personally are courageous—I've seen you stand up to other tomcats and raccoons and come home bloody and yet unbowed. It seems to me that you know how to control yourself: I've seen you walk away from a full dish of chicken scraps. It seems to me that you have a sense of fairness: you don't expect me to do anything for you unless you do something for me. Finally, and most importantly, it seems to me that you are a shrewd cat: you don't waste your time in useless pursuits, or spend a lot of time sleeping and you know how to get what you want."

The cat looked at me with an indulgent smile and in his low voice gave the following explanation:

"You must remember that a cat's world is, to say the least, somewhat different from yours. It's not just a matter of seeing the world differently because we cats are on all fours. It is a matter of our deciding what our fundamental goods are and figuring out the best way to preserve them. As a human, so I'm told, you have a number of fundamental goods including
life, play, intellectual knowledge, beauty, religion, friendship, integrity and practical reasonableness. Now, among cats, I am not known as a great philosopher, but I do know what I would teach my progeny. I think that you will have to admit that, for a cat, life is just about the only good. First of all, this has to do with the preservation of our lives: the premium for a feline life insurance policy would be very high considering the dangers that surround us. Taking care of ourselves, preserving our lives—we only have one incidentally—is a full-time operation. Yes, we do put some value on play: we like to hunt, to run after a ball of twine, to wrestle playfully with other cats. But play is mostly for kittens: as adult cats we have little time for it. As for the intellectual life, we have no time for it: you yourself well know that this kind of life requires leisure, something that we appear to have. But appearances are deceiving: we need our rest in order to engage in the practical activities that define a tomat and keep him alive. As for beauty, we have never put much store in it. In choosing a female companion I am more impressed by her feline vitality than by anything a human would consider beautiful."

He continued: "As for integrity, in the sense of wholeness, yes, I have it and consider it a valuable quality in terms of preserving my life. As you may have noticed, I've got my act together pretty well. Looking at other cats, I can't say that I have any friends other than insofar as they are useful to me. When I was younger I used to play with by brothers and sisters and might consider them friends. But every other cat that I know of would steal my food if he or she could. No I don't have any friends nor do I see any need for any.

"Is there a feline god? Perhaps. But he or she has never had anything to do with my life. You're the closest thing to a god that I know of: you and my owners who don't mind sharing me with you. But, I don't fully trust you either. To you I'm just an animal and I shudder to think what that will mean when I really need help.

"So there is left practical reasonableness which is what you really want to talk about. Yes, we cats have it. I've made mistakes because I wasn't feeling well, wasn't myself. I've done things that I wouldn't do now because I now know better. I've learned from experience. I know how to get around better now than when I was young."

Then I said: "I'm really very happy with your explanation and, strange to say, it is just about what I expected you to say. But let's explore this thing called practical reasoning. What is it and how does it differ from the theoretical reasoning that you apparently have no use for?

"First of all, as you must know, practical reasoning aims at operation, at making or doing something. That's the kind of explanation that you have given. Humans may say that you don't reason, but I think that you are a lot smarter than many of them when it comes to the conduct of your life. You learn from experience and know how to get around. Given your feline limitations you are quite an accomplished creature—I wouldn't say 'person' as that term doesn't quite seem to fit."

"Come off it," the cat interrupted swishing his tail in anger, "get to the point. Don't be condescending! You know as well as I do that my
reasoning, if you want to call it that, strictly follows my interests. I also imagine things: I dream of fresh meat and raw liver at times instead of those chicken scraps and cheap cat food you give me. I have a highly developed sensory apparatus and an imagination which rivals that of humans, and I know how to connect my images in such a way as to plan strategies for achieving my ends. And, I believe you must admit, I'm pretty successful at this."

"Yes, I grant all of that," I said patting his ruffled fur. "Without being condescending, I could say that your practical reasoning is a lot clearer than mine, given the fact that you have more clearly defined intentions. These intentions are similar to first principles in theoretical reasoning as we humans know it. We argue deductively from principles like those of identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle or from the axioms of geometry. In practical reasoning we argue from the ultimate intentions that we have, the most ultimate being that we simply want to be happy . . . ."

"You can say that again," said the cat. "We are not much different in practical reasoning. I suspect that what makes you happy will not make me happy and vice versa. All those football and basketball games you watch on television seem to make you happy, but I'm more interested in stalking mice or birds or just dreaming about these activities. As we said before, your fundamental goods and mine don't coincide."

"But I'm most curious," said I, "about whether or not your practical reason contains any notion of 'oughtness' or, to put it in other words, whether morality enters into it at all. I've been told that cats are amoral, but, noting the similarities between feline and human practical reason, I wonder. I'm curious."

"First of all," said the cat, "let's forget that nonsense about curiosity killing the cat. If I weren't curious, nothing would happen. For example, I wouldn't have met you. Am I aware of morality in the sense that some of my actions are to be considered good and some bad? Yes, I am aware if I have to answer this question from a utilitarian point of view. What is good is what results in the most pleasure to me; what is bad is what diminishes my pleasure and causes me pain. I look at the results to me and I make my decisions on what I might or might not do on that principle and on that alone."

"I suppose," said I, "that your decisions about what you ought to do and what you actually choose to do are identical and simultaneous. I don't want to be insulting but your freedom is quite restricted, isn't it?"

"No more than yours, given my hopes and intentions," said the cat. "I have a pretty clear view of my destiny as a cat and of my place in the hierarchy of things. I don't believe that cats should rule the universe or that they have the kind of destiny that gives them anything like rights. If I have a right to be fed by you, it is only because I do something for you. You may not realize that your house is free of mice because of my presence. I know that you like me because you always reach down to pat me as I go by and you do respond to my appeals for attention. But suppose that you were starving to death? You would consider eating me, wouldn't
you? There are few laws, if any, that really protect me. No, my expectations are completely tied to what I can do for you and how I can appeal to you."

"But let's get back to that questions of morality again. I don't know whether you participate in the training and education of your progeny, but, if you do, what kind of values would you try to instill in them?"

"Of course I participate in educating my children. I teach them mainly what it means to be a tomcat in this particular culture. They must, first of all, know how to get along with humans as this makes for the easy life. The kittens watch me or their mother and how we relate to different people. As you know, in this neighborhood cats are not appreciated by the bird-watchers who live at the end of the street nor by the dog-lovers who live next door."

"In other words, good and bad to you means the kind of behavior which results in the most pleasure and least pain for you."

"How could it be otherwise? You're supposed to be a philosopher. What more is there? Are you going to tell me that humans are better because of their higher nature? By 'higher' you mean stronger, craftier, more inventive, don't you? I would like an answer."

Looking at the cat with more respect than I had previously had for him and with a measure of annoyance, I said: "Not given to theoretical reasoning or abstraction, how could you hope to understand a philosopher's answers to your question?"

With a grin, the tomcat said, "Try me!"

It was hard to know where to begin. After all, many humans believe that the morality of an act should be judged solely in terms of its consequences. Also, many humans firmly espouse the theory that might makes right. Should I appeal to natural law in the sense that man's role in the blueprint of creation is such that he has an end, a destiny that he must be allowed to fulfill. I could tell the cat, I thought to myself, that man has inalienable rights which strongly suggest, imply and even demand that he be not used by his fellow man. Rehearsing the answer in my mind, I declared that man, being what he is, having the nature that he has, is entitled to have the kind of freedom which will enable him to work out this destiny for himself. That being the case, I would argue that morality is not determined solely by results, by circumstance or by intentions although all of these are important. The morality of an action is also determined by what is being done.

But this presents me with a problem. Looking at the human act, how is one to separate the why of an action (the intention) from the what (the so-called object of an action). It simply cannot be done unless one engages in an abstraction, separating them is such a way that the whole analysis is trivialized. The cat would see through that immediately. Couldn't one, however, say that the act is made to be the kind of an act that it becomes by the intention, but that reality is not such as to be completely amenable to our desires, wishes and choices. There is a point at which reality resists
our efforts, not in the sense of just plain stubbornness but in such a way as if
to say that if you make me do this or that you are doing harm to yourself—
you are distorting me; you are making me what I was not meant to be. I
decided to try out this idea on the cat who was still regarding me with
some amusement.

"Cat," said I, "what would you think of me if I tied a string of
firecrackers to your tail and set them off. Would you think that this would
be an immoral act on my part?"

The cat looked at me indignantly. "If I suspected that you harbored
such thoughts, you would never see me around here again. That is
something that little boys do and, like all children, they are known for their
cruelty. Why would you want to say that it is immoral? It is just
something that happens."

"But you have to agree that is not good."

"Sure, not good for cats but perhaps good for the humans in that it
provides them with some kind of amusement."

"But aren't there limits on what I can do for my amusement?"

"Legally, yes," said the cat. "Are you trying to get me to say that
there are also moral limits? If there are, who decides what they are? In
my world the biggest and strongest tomcat decides what is 'good' and what
is 'bad.' Isn't that also true in yours?"

"I would hope not," I said. "If I were to get amusement out of tying
firecrackers to your tail, it would be because I don't think much of you as a
friend or even just as a cat. My friend, Descartes, would look upon you as
a machine. I would not feel guilty about tying firecrackers to a machine if
that gave me pleasure."

"You're trying to tell me that behavior should be judged as moral or
immoral according to what is being done, aren't you?" said the cat.

"Yes, I think so. In a way Plato was entirely correct when he
supposedly identified virtue with knowledge. As someone has said, only he
can make good decisions who knows what things are and what they are
for. A person's vision of reality is crucial."

"And some people would say that cats are amoral because they can't
tell right from wrong. So I guess that I am excused," said the cat with a
grin.

"But you do know the difference," said I with some excitement.
"We're talking about the difference, making distinctions and judgments.
You do think that it is inappropriate, to say the least, for me to be cruel to
you."

"I certainly do," hissed the cat. "It would be a betrayal of what you
purport to be, a friend of cats, and it would be painful to me. Therefore, I
suppose that it would be wrong."
"Then there are some actions which in themselves are unjust, unwise or even cowardly, despite how good my intentions are," I said feeling that I had successfully separated the "why" from the "what" of an action.

"Not so fast," said the cat, "don't forget that why you do something determines the act to be what it is. Now I'm a well-intentioned creature: I won't do anything that hurts me, and what helps or harms me is all that counts. Couldn't you leave it simply to my feline judgment to decide what is good or bad in terms of my selfish interests?"

"Not entirely. Even though you are a pretty wise cat, there are a lot of things you don't know. How well do you know what your true interests really are? You could get a lot more out of me by being a little more friendly and by velveting your claws when I take you on my lap. Again, it's a question of knowledge. If your vision of reality is limited or distorted, you are going to make bad judgments, even when it comes to a matter of self-interest."

Unfortunately, the cat didn't appear to have heard me, or he was just tired of the conversation. He had rolled over on his back his legs extending into the air and gave every appearance of being fast asleep. You may be hopeful that my dialogue ended here, but this is not the case. On the following night my dream continued and this time the cat appeared to be more eager for conversation.

"I want to talk about the moral reasoning and specifically how this may be taught to young cats who occasionally come to me for advice. You may not have realized it, but I am a veritable Socrates among cats," he said.

I was delighted. This was exactly the topic I wanted to explore. How does one reason about moral values and is this a skill that can be taught in our schools?

I replied with enthusiasm: "Great, I want to talk about moral reasoning too. You may remember that in our conversation last night I identified it with practical reasoning and you told me that you teach your progeny what it means to be a tomcat in this particular culture and how to reason to get what they want. It seemed to me, 'Socrates'—if I may call you by that name—that you were teaching them how to be shrewd and not truly wise."

'Socrates' had smiled when I used this name, but he didn't like my inference. "Now you're getting into those philosophical distinctions and definitions which would stop any conversation. 'Shrewd' or 'wise,' what's the difference? Is 'wise' the 'polite' way of saying 'shrewd' among humans?"

"No," I said. "What I have in mind is how to instruct the consciences, as Professor Meilaender says, of our children. Teaching moral values should not just be a matter of just stimulating the intellects of students but it should also involve instructing their consciences. To deal with difficult moral dilemmas by teaching students how to apply different ethical theories to them is, as Meilaender says, to teach them merely how "to be shrewd."
"And how do you instruct the consciences of the young? Are you
telling me that I must indoctrinate them? That would be O.K. for cats to
do since we don't possess reasoning powers, but is it also proper for
humans?" said the cat.

"I see what you mean," I said deferentially, "and I suppose that I'll
have to try to explain how I would go about instructing the consciences of
my students and how this is not indoctrination."

"Yes," said the cat, "I would like to know."

"I think that I would first begin by telling them stories," said I. I
would appeal to their imaginations as fairy tales do. The stories would be
aimed at teaching them to like the good and morally beautiful and to hate
the evil and morally ugly. How would I decide which was which? Well, I
think that mankind, and catkind as well, have at least a generally agreed
upon position in these matters. I believe also that the gods love things
because they are good and not that things are good simply because the gods
love them. The stories that I would choose for children would aim at
developing in them images and ideas of justice, friendship, compassion and
self-knowledge as well."

"That appears to be a good program," said the cat. "In my own way I
try to make the kittens understand that some animals are to be avoided at
all costs, also some humans. My instruction appeals to their likes and
dislikes and I have many stories to tell drawn from my experience. But this
kind of story-telling involves a certain amount of indoctrination."

"Indeed it does" said I. "Instruction of any kind is not purely formal.
It does involve some content. I would make distinctions between desirable
and undesirable modes of behavior. For example, if I discussed with
children their behavior towards cats, I would not question them about what
color they wanted to paint cats but whether they ought to paint cats at
all."4

"Indeed," said the cat.

"Also, borrowing a story from Professor Meilaender who borrows it
from C.S. Lewis,5 part of learning morality may be likened to a story about
someone who had to wear a mask; a mask which made him look nicer than
he really was. He had to wear it for years. And when he took it off he
found his own face had grown to fit it. He was now really beautiful. What
had begun as a disguise had become a reality."

"You're saying that as teachers we may have an agenda for our
teaching which our kittens or your children do not understand and that we
go forward with this agenda because we know that it is all that we can do," said the cat, shaking his head in strong affirmation.

"Reasoning then proceeds from general principle about what is good
and bad and involves a close consideration of how, in a particular case, the
intention, the circumstances and "what" is being done are related to those
principles. That is what is distinctive about moral reasoning. It is related
to what ought to be desired in terms of what humans or cats are; it is not
just a matter of figuring out the most efficient means, for example, of catching a mouse."

I said all of this, realizing that I was lecturing and the cat was beginning to lose interest. But the mention of catching a mouse roused him somewhat.

With emphasis, spitting out his words and swishing his tail vigorously back and forth, the cat said: "But I'm only interested in results. Being of 'i's:ser intelligence' I don't have to worry about figuring out the greater good except in the pragmatic sense of what is most efficient. Apparently we cats can afford to be logical in these matters and you humans cannot."

After the cat said this he began to fade away in my dream until only his mocking face or the outline of it remained—although he was no Cheshire cat. I felt myself waking up and, while in a semi-somnolent state, I tried to recall what I had learned in my dream so that I could repeat it later.

First of all, my strong desire to talk to my cat had been realized albeit in a dream. But had my thinking about how to reason about moral values advanced? I realized that feline reasoning, although it may not be speculative, is practical and as such closely resembles that of humans. But do cats engage in moral reasoning? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that cats judge what they ought to do solely in terms of what they can and must do to keep alive and well. No, in the sense that for them what is practical is identical with what is moral.

Perhaps another way to say this is to compare feline and human freedom. It would seem that men are not forced always to follow the practical imperative. A man may say: "This is the most efficient and personally rewarding course of action, but to follow it would harm a number of other people." The cat would say, "Why not?" But the man might say: "Because my own good and that of my fellow men are one and the same."

Is the difference merely one of the human having a greater intelligence that the cat, the kind of intelligence that brings greater self-knowledge of the good which extends beyond the instinctive urge for self-preservation? Aristotle said that the good of man was to live a life of reason according to virtue, one in which man would choose courageously, temperately, justly and wisely.

The clue appears to be wisdom, but the kind of wisdom that is conditioned by what the good, for man, really is. Truth in this practical order is inextricably bound up with good; thinking in this order makes sense only in regard for choosing which is itself intrinsically related to the good.

But what do I actually do in the classroom? Tell stories, use fables as Chesterton suggests, develop the imagination of the students, get them to like and dislike the right things. However, the full answer to this question will depend on another dialogue with the cat.
NOTES


5. Ibid.
EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN THE
UNITED STATES: ARE WE
ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS?

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Introduction

From a widely agreed upon but ill-defined sense that something is amiss in our educational endeavor, educators, journalists, concerned citizens, policy makers and others have gone off in all directions each in search of a malefactor and the means to excise it. It is clear that we are not all pulling in the same direction, in fact, some of us are not even pulling on the same rope!

Even for Americans, the frenzied and uncoordinated behavior we have seen in this area lately is unusual. The result of this extraordinary diversity in approaching a crucial national question, judging from the public policies that have been generated so far, has been the dissipation of a great deal of precious effort and a great many of our scarce resources. I say "precious" and "scarce" because the historical evidence strongly suggests that serious, national attention to educational matters, and subsequent expenditure of human and material resources, is a decidedly episodic phenomenon in this country. The "Crisis in American Education" theme is one that we have experienced, at some point and at least for a few years, in nearly every decade during the latter half of this century¹. Among these "regular crises" have been two exceptional ones, the "Sputnik" crisis which began in 1957 and the current "Rising Tide of Mediocrity" crisis.

Opportunities to be heard and to have a significant impact on national educational policy are unquestionably greater during these periods and they are especially so
at times like the present. Therefore, in order to play a more effective role in our profession we must position ourselves to take better advantage of this kind of national attention when it occurs and we should begin with the current instance. Because we have "missed the boat" so often in the past, it is important for us to be constantly ready to focus our empirical efforts in more productive directions well before the onset of these episodic crises in order to speedily provide the reliable and appropriate knowledge that sound policy decisions require. In my opinion we have, thus far, failed to do this.

In a crisis, real or imagined, policies will be made. Whether those policies are founded upon reliable knowledge or not is one of the most important responsibilities of our profession. We have a very powerful empirical engine to apply to this challenge and it will produce reliable and appropriate knowledge if we can focus its energy and steer it in the proper directions. The window of opportunity closes all too quickly to rely upon efforts mounted only after a crisis is perceived.

We are failing to play the significant role we could be playing in the current educational reform movement because we have gotten too far ahead of ourselves. In our haste to catch-up with events we have missed a crucial step; we haven't taken care to deal with the fundamental questions first. We have begun developing answers before we are clear about what the question calls for.

The most fundamental question we have to answer has to do with the definition of educational excellence itself; what is educational excellence and what are the signs by which we may recognize it? We can scarcely identify educational excellence, let alone do useful research about how best to pursue it, if we don't agree as to what it is. It is my contention that, instead of doing this essential groundwork, we have uncritically accepted the proposition that we already know and agree about such things as what is most worth knowing and thus what an excellent education is, what having an excellent education does and thus what should be taught and learned in classrooms all over this country. With the confidence that false convictions like this foster, we have shortsightedly attended to matters which focus on how to get schools and the educational system generally to become more willing and more able to effect the
learning of knowledge, skills and attitudes which may no longer be worth learning, if ever they were.

This paper is intended to state the case for returning to square one, to begin anew the essential process of first getting greater unanimity and greater clarity about what we believe is most worthy of being known by children and youth facing a future none of us can see clearly. This paper will also offer some ideas about what is most worth knowing, ideas with which to begin what is hoped will become a very thorough-going and public discussion resulting in some mediation of the frenetic and disjunctive policy decisions now being made and implemented in the educational arena. Finally, this paper will offer some beginning principles and ideas as to how a cogently stated position on the what's worth knowing question might survive, largely intact, the journey from the abstract environment of curriculum theory to the concrete world of our classrooms.

No doubt each of us has followed the current "educational reform movement" with more than cursory interest. There are already a number of good reviews of the reform literature available. One that I found very helpful was put together by the National Committee for Citizens in Education called "Tackling the Reform Reports of the 1980's". Essentially, it is a collection of relevant articles from the April and June, 1984 issues of Phi Delta Kappan. The Education Digest is another good, convenient source for those who haven't the time or the inclination to seek out and sort through the blizzard of recent articles written on this topic. The weekly education newspapers, The Chronicle of Higher Education, Education USA and Education Week, have been full, this year, of all kinds of stories related to the so-called reform movement in education. Just about every professional journal connected in any way with education as well as the mass media, both print and electronic, has looked at and contributed to the discussion. Then, of course, there are the reports themselves. One could spend a great deal of one's time in thoughtful study of these. There are perhaps 25 reports now in hand with more on the way. Some reports are of pamphlet size but several of are book length and many of us have carefully read one or more of these. It would have been very difficult, this past year, to avoid hearing about or reading about or seeing some treatment of one aspect or another of the so-called educational reform movement in this country.
I shall not, therefore, attempt to review this considerable body of literature in any depth but, instead, rely upon your already considerable knowledge of the subject and your access to the sources cited above and, more extensively, in the notes section of this paper. Thus, I shall confine my discussion of the literature to major generalizations that can be readily tested against one's own understandings.

The Case for Returning to Square One

Every reform scheme that I am aware of appears to agree that there is an indefensibly great gap between the potential of American education and what we are actually delivering to our youth. The measures used vary from our relative position in world markets to the capacity of our defense establishment to the average score on this or that nationally normed test to actual observations of contemporary classrooms where more subjective criteria were used. But what is the common, quintessential factor that all of these "signs" represent? Are we clear as to what that is? Can we trace a clear and unbroken trail from that factor to a defensible and widely shared concept of excellence relevant to our various educational endeavors? In other words, when we set about to discover and then reveal to others the state of education in this country through research, are we speaking with the benefit of a common understanding of what an excellent education is and what it is supposed to do? Then, if and when we are, is that common understanding a valid one?

For the most part, all the reports have failed to show how their recommendations will yield an excellent education. This is largely because they have not offered arguments supporting any view as to what the attributes of an excellent education are. Without definition of such a centrally important term, one really cannot assess assertions which take the form, "If we will only require that more time be spent on 'basic' courses, excellence will be ours". Instead, they all seem to rely on the presumption that everyone knows what excellence is and, thus, one need only assert how it can best be achieved and its validity will be apparent by inspection. The implicit assertion of the reform literature is that educational excellence is, for us, simply a matter of will; we need only muster the will to go in what we already know is the right direction. It appears to be, by this view, simply a leadership problem.
However, the reports themselves are very good evidence that, while everyone may think they know what excellence is and think that everyone else shares that view, the concept of educational excellence is, at best, not a consensual one. Some reports stress the role of the teacher, others ignore this in favor of curriculum matters. Some reports recommend more of the same while others call for a different curriculum altogether. Some reports stress the economic and defense needs of the nation while others are primarily concerned with the fulfillment of individual potential. Interestingly, most of the reports have ignored students except to say what should be done to them if they don't measure up. Certainly, not all of the concepts of educational excellence implicit in these varied approaches can be equally defensible nor can they all be compatible with one another. Our concept of educational excellence must be both a shared one and one that we can defend if we hope to be able to adequately capitalize on the cumulative benefits of empirical research and the episodic nature of this nation's attention to educational matters.

Are these people really talking about the same thing? Is it true that everyone knows what we mean by "educational excellence"? Clearly not, and we are not going to escape from this "Tower of Babel" situation until we take care of the essential business of getting closer than we are now to a consensual understanding of what we mean when we refer to educational excellence. Until we do, the empirical research effort aimed at learning how we can best achieve educational excellence will be analogous to the man who "jumped on his horse and rode off in all directions". That is why we must return to square one, defining our terms, and we must do so post haste. The window of our present opportunity will be closed before we know it.

**Defining Educational Excellence:**

**Some Ideas About What's Worth Knowing**

Discussion as to what is worth knowing and thus what constitutes an excellent education should be perennial. To revive that discussion within the context of the current education reform movement, I offer a few ideas on what critical attributes I think an education should have in order to be properly considered an excellent one for the future that the young people of today are likely to face.
I begin with the premise that Jerome Bruner is essentially correct in saying that for an education to be of value it must "serve us in the future", that is, it must have a quality educators call "transfer". Knowledge, skills and attitudes that have a high degree of transfer value are those that empower a person to effect necessary and valuable ends. Generally speaking then, an excellent education is one that empowers a person to the fullest extent of his potential. But what ends are most necessary and valuable? Necessary and valuable to whom, the individual or society?

The ends that seem to me to be most valuable and necessary both to individuals and to human society are: The Need to SURVIVE, The Need to THRIVE, and The Need to ENJOY, in that order. These ends are equally valuable for societies as they are to individuals. That which best provides for satisfying the need to SURVIVE, THRIVE and ENJOY is that which is most worthy of being learned. Assuming that we can identify the kind of educational experiences that will have a high transfer value in pursuing these valuable and necessary ends we will also be producing an excellent candidate to fill the vacancy of our much needed consensual definition of educational excellence.

So how might we determine what is worth knowing? There are at least two difficulties that we must overcome on the way to that answer and they are: 1) describing the nature of the learner who will receive these educational experiences and 2) describing the critical attributes of the times in which these learnings will be used. That is, we must have accurate perceptions as to the nature of these learners and as to the kind of environment they will be challenged with if we are to correctly identify and then effectively teach them, if we can, the knowledge, skills and attitudes they will need to survive, to thrive and to enjoy life in the 21st century and beyond.

So what are we to do, become fortune tellers? Even if we were to set out to become prognosticators of some sort, we would have to come to grips with the fact that the track record of these seers is not an inspiring one and does not suggest a very successful outcome. We need only review the predictions as to what the latter part of the 20th century would be like that were offered to us by futurists just 40, 30 or even 20 years ago to recognize how fallible such predictions can be. No, any method based on foreseeing the future in detail simply will not be good enough.
We do, however, know two things about the future that we can better rely upon to be true. The first is that the future will be different from today. That is, we can reliably predict change. The second thing that we know about the future is that not only will there be change but that there will be more of it with each passing year. The rate of change is accelerating and will probably continue to accelerate far into the future. Thus the applicability of the answers of the past to current problems has decreased with each succeeding generation. True, many of us have managed to "muddle through" thus far but with the accelerating incidence of change and consequent exponential decrease in the time an individual may have to effectively respond to change it is unlikely that our children will do as well if all they have to work with are muddling-through strategies; without a different approach, our grandchildren will likely be even less successful.

As for the person each learner will become, we know that their ability to deal effectively with their environment will directly effect their survival, it will effect whether they thrive or just exist and it will effect whether they enjoy life or just endure it.

There is no currently available means of predicting with detailed accuracy the personal attributes that individual people of the future will possess. However, the historical record clearly suggests that, in essential characteristics, the people of the 21st century will be very much like the people of the 20th, the 19th, and all earlier centuries. This is to say that the basic attributes of human-ness will remain relatively constant as they have throughout the history of our species. We can count on the basic human needs for security, love, esteem, aesthetic expression, accomplishment and so on, to persist in our future as they have throughout our past.

Human aspirations will remain the same but the problems to be solved on route to realizing those objectives will be quite different. An educational enterprise that is oriented toward empowering all our fellow citizens must, therefore, account for and obtain a thorough understanding of the full implications of these two critical factors.

So how can we help our children deal effectively with such a future? We know that they will have the same basic human needs we have but we don't know what
the questions of the future will be, let alone know the answers. We can relate to their general objectives because they are common to ours but the answers we developed for our time will likely have too little relevance for the challenges our children will face. So, is there anything useful we have to offer to them? Yes, we do but it will take some time and effort to correctly identify and appreciate it.

It is not that we have viable solutions to give to the successor generation. What we do have to offer is a way, a process, and that process PRODUCES answers and solutions. The most successful of us have a toolbox of knowledge, skills and attitudes that, because they are so highly adaptable, because they have such a great transfer potential, they are the most valuable things we can pass to the next generation. The ingredients necessary to the task of solving problems are the things most worthy of being known.

In our day, we learned many of these things in irregular and inefficient ways, such as by experience or by emulating good models if we were fortunate enough to have access to them. Rarely were they all learned in our schools. But, faced with a rapidly changing set of circumstances, our children will not have the time to casually learn such things. They will have to learn what they need to know and be able to do more rapidly, more reliably and more thoroughly than we did. With mastery of the appropriate content and processes our children will be able to exercise as much control over their lives as their varied potentials permit. An excellent education, therefore, is NOT just a matter of learning the answers to yesterday's questions, it IS, however, learning how to solve problems involving both matters of fact and matters of value in order to PRODUCE the answers needed for today and for tomorrow.

If a proposed educational policy or plan cannot be defended in terms of its making a discernable, important and cost-effective contribution to each individual's capacity to solve problems about matters of fact and matters of value, then it is not in pursuit of educational excellence and ought not be implemented. This should be so whether we are talking about a daily lesson plan or a state-wide curriculum. We will soon be unable to afford suffering the presence of any "sacred cows". We should not even assume, for example, that there will always be the traditional disciplinary areas of English, science, mathematics and social studies.
What has to be done now is to identify what knowledge, skills and attitudes will most efficiently contribute toward developing each learner's ability to effectively solve problems to the fullest extent possible. What helps a person become a better problem solver and how that capacity is best developed in people thus becomes a major question for teachers, parents, principals, teacher educators, researchers, politicians of every stripe, state and national education officials, and business leaders to consider together. The stakes involved in the educational pursuit are too great for all of us not to be pulling in the same direction and pulling on the same rope. We need to have a common and defensible notion of what educational excellence is if we are to make any progress. If not what has been suggested here, then some other approach should be developed but we must be together on this essential point if the cumulative and self-correcting attributes of empirical investigation are to benefit the pursuit of educational excellence, that is, the effort to empower our children to survive, to thrive and to enjoy.

All of this is fine as long as we confine our consideration of the What's Worth Knowing question to the realm of abstract curriculum theorizing but what about getting such ideas into the classroom where their validity may be checked against the real world? Most of the teachers I know would say, "That's a real interesting theory and it seems to make sense but I can't see how I might implement anything like that in my classroom. How do I translate all of that into something I can use to decide what I am going to do on Monday?"

Getting What's Worth Knowing Into Classrooms

If only we diligently attend to the quintessential task of helping children and youth develop their capacities for problem solving to the fullest extent allowed by their native abilities, educational excellence will have been attained. This deceivingly simple statement obscures the really difficult part of our task, translating theory into practice. Statements as to what constitutes the optimally educated man such as I have offered here have been with us for many years. The Report of the Committee of Ten in 1893 and the Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education are two very early examples and there have been a great many others since. The similarity of these early reports with many of the current crop of reports is not very surprising.
The purpose of assigning task forces and commissions have remained rather stable over the years. One such purpose is to dramatize an issue in the hope of prodding people like ourselves to do something. The effects of these reports over the years has been equally uniform. They have had little substantive effect. I believe that this is largely due to our gross lack of attention to the critically important question of how we might change what IS to what it OUGHT to be? We have seen and heard a great deal, most of it negative, about what IS the case with regard to American education. We have seen and heard a great deal, most of it wildly positive, about where we OUGHT to be in American education. But what we have heard precious little about is how we can get from IS to OUGHT in a way that can be readily implemented and tested.

A significant difference from the usual practice would include a discussion of how one might bring such powerful ideas as those developed here to fruition in actual classrooms and, perhaps more importantly, how we might go about discerning 1) whether or not we were on the right track in pursuing our objectives and 2) whether we had achieved our objectives or not. I believe that we have not been very successful in doing this because we have not yet been able to devise a way to hold these abstract ideas in mind while attempting to deal with the realities of classroom life. At one moment we espouse principles of curricular design and school organization which, we assert, stem from well reasoned, empirical bases and in the next moment we propose and then implement policies affecting schools without being able to see if one squares with the other. We are compartmentalized even in our own minds. We deal with abstract curricular ideas or we deal with practical classroom matters but the two rarely affect one another in any perceptibly connected way. We appear to act as if we had no path to move, stepwise, from one to the other and consequently discover the relationships between the two. Knowing about such relationships would be very helpful, I think, in learning how we should be evaluating teaching and learning: by its direct relationship to what we consider an excellent education to be. Instead, we resort to such poor substitutes as Carnegie units.

We have no evidence that earning any number of Carnegie units will necessarily indicate that an excellent education, one that maximizes our potential to survive, to thrive and to enjoy life, has been attained. While we have guessed that Carnegie units do indicate
educational excellence, we have not been able to offer any logical or empirical evidence to substantiate our claim. We need to discover or invent the means to speak about the abstract concepts and the concrete policies in our field such that we can trace the connection or note the lack of a connection between and among them. Only then will our empirical efforts be directed toward productive ends. As it is now, we may well be learning how best to effect learnings that make little or no contribution to students' capacity to survive, thrive and enjoy life.

Perhaps an idea from the field of business accounting might profitably be put to work here. Accountants like to be able to find an unbroken "audit trail" to see how the prereginations of money effect the profitability and smooth operation of a firm. Assertions about cause and effect can be readily examined through tracing the audit trail. Might there not be a way for educators to trace a path, step by step, from an abstract principle to a specific practice and back? I believe that we can, if we make the effort, discover or invent the nomenclature to describe those unfamiliar steps in between our abstractions and our daily classroom activities. The idea here is that if we can talk and think about it, we may be able to achieve greater success in making our practice more consistent with our theoretical principles in the future than we have in the past.

Using the What's Worth Knowing Argument above, I shall attempt to describe a beginning effort in such a description task. The problem, then, is to find words to describe how we can go from the idea that an excellent education consists of learning to be an effective problem solver to deciding what to do in pursuit of that goal on any given day and to do so in such a way as to reveal the consistency, the lineage if you will, between principle and practice. Only when we are able to do this will we be able to have any realistic hope of being able to implement our conception of an excellent education.

The Audit Trail for WWK

Beginning with the notion that an excellent education consists of learning to be an effective problem solver, it follows that the question, "What constitutes an effective problem solver?" would be an empirical task of the first priority. Certainly we cannot do justice to that question here but, for the
sake of discussion, we may use the following definition: a good problem solver possesses certain identifiable attitudes, skills and knowledge and is able to bring these factors to bear on a wide range of problems in a concerted and effective manner. But what must he know, what skills and attitudes must he possess in order to become the very best problem solver that he can be?

Attitude appears to be primarily a qualitative dimension, which I will discuss separately, but with regard to knowledge and skills, it would seem that the more one knows and is able to do, the better a problem solver that person can be. If we could hope to learn and teach all available knowledge and all available skills, our course of action would be a simple one. However, that is not possible even to a relatively small degree. Further, we note that not all knowledge and not all skills have the same utility to effective problem solvers. Consequently, we must be able to identify the knowledge and the skills which will contribute most to the problem solving abilities of the next generation. What knowledge and skills, then, have the greatest potential problem solving power; by what signs will we know them?

Fortunately, a good deal of work has already been done in the area of describing knowledge and skills hierarchically. I have borrowed extensively from Benjamin Bloom and others12 to construct the following interpretation of the varieties of knowledge and skills available to us and the criteria for deciding which of these is best in light of the what's worth knowing argument developed above. For illustrative purposes I have chosen to use the cognitive domain. Similar constructions would be necessary for the affective and psychomotor domains.

**Cognitive Knowledge**

One can "know that" in at least two distinct and qualitatively different senses: knowing as recalling and knowing as understanding. Understanding permits transformation which is essential to problem solving whereas knowledge that can only be recalled does not. It is highly unlikely that the solution of any important problem could be achieved through the use of knowledge unmodified from the condition in which it was received. Therefore, understanding is superior to recall. Moreover, one can know facts, concepts, principles and/or generalizations, theories and, systems. This list is hierarchically organized from least to most
powerful in terms of transfer potential. Concepts, for example, may subsume a great many facts and can establish relationships between and amongst them. Manipulating just a few concepts can reveal more potential problem solution components than can manipulating a great many more discrete and unrelated facts. Principles and generalizations are greater still and so on through knowledge of (knowledge) systems. The best cognitive knowledge, therefore, is that which is understood rather than merely recalled and is as integrated as possible, that is, is as far along the hierarchy above as possible. Diagram "A" illustrates these relationships. The arrows point in the directions of greatest transfer potential.
KNOWLEDGE

SYSTEMS

THEORIES

PRIN & GEN

CONCEPTS

FACTS

Understand

Recall

Understand

Understand

Understand

Note: Arrows point in direction of greatest transfer potential.
Cognitive Skills

Cognitive skills can also be viewed hierarchically, lowest to highest, as consisting of application skills, analysis skills, synthesis skills and evaluation skills; each succeeding skill subsumes all of the previous ones as well as implying an understanding of the relevant facts involved. These skills must, to be at all evident or useful, be applied to some knowledge. Consequently, these skills may be applied to or utilize facts, concepts, principles and generalizations, theories and systems. Perhaps the most relevant variable in evaluating skills learning concerns the fact that these skills may be received in one of three ways. Which way the skill is received will have a profound influence on the transfer potential of that skill. They are: skills received as recipes, skills received as algorithms, and skills received as heuristics.

A recipe in problem solving is as a recipe is in baking an apple pie. It is specific to the task at hand whether that be baking an apple pie or solving a lunchroom scheduling problem. One need only follow the recipe. However, being able to bake a quiche would require yet another, different recipe or an approach with greater transfer potential. An algorithm might be just what we need.

An algorithm is specific to a certain class of problems, say, baking pies. In this case a problem solver must use a good deal of discretion in 1) deciding that the problem at hand is an instance of the general case covered by the algorithm and 2) making the appropriate adjustments to the algorithm to fit the case at hand. As long as we have algorithms that subsume the problems we are interested in solving we will probably be rather effective problem solvers. However, should we be confronted with a problem for which there is no appropriate algorithm known to us, we may be unable to deal effectively with that problem unless we are able to invent a new, custom-made approach. A heuristic approach would seem to be called for.

A heuristic is generic to all problems, it is a "rule of thumb" that can generate recipes and algorithms suited to any given problem. Nearly any problem can be handled by an heuristic approach. However, since the difficulty of learning about and using these three approaches is proportional to the transfer power each has, it is easy to see that most people will use a
recipe if an appropriate one is available or, if not, use an algorithm. The heuristic approach is the most powerful in terms of transfer potential but also the most difficult to master.

The best cognitive skills, therefore, are those which function at the highest possible levels of each of the hierarchical dimensions of cognitive skill: the skill itself, the knowledge that skill uses or is applied to and the manner in which that skill was received. Thus, skill in evaluating (knowledge) systems received as an heuristic approach is the best that we can do according to this scheme. Diagram "B" illustrates these relationships. The arrows point in the directions of greatest transfer potential.
Attitudes relevant to problem solving effectiveness may be viewed as consisting of our a priori notions about self, others, the physical world, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics. Unlike knowledge and skills, attitudes themselves do not seem to be subject to hierarchical ranking or empirical evaluation. However, we can say something about what attributes an attitude system should have in order to be conducive to effective problem solving. Following the approaches developed by Rath and Simon, Coombs and Meux, and others, a defensible approach to attitudinal education would seem to require objectives centering around achieving attitudinal integration and consistency at ever greater levels of inclusiveness. We cannot properly speak of attitudes that are or are not worth learning. Instead, we must view the a priori elements of an individual's attitude system in toto. In this examination it is not so much what attitudes a person has but, instead, whether those attitudes held are consistent with one another and with that individual's behaviors. The more developed and integrated one's attitude (value) system is, the more likely it is that an individual's attitudes will make a positive contribution to his problem solving efforts generally and especially to the solution of problems involving matters of value. Diagram "C" illustrates these relationships. The arrows point in the directions of greatest transfer potential.
ATTITUDES

Coherent, Integrated Philosophy
Consistency Among Categories
Consistency Within Categories
Discrete Beliefs

A Priori notions about:

Self
Others
The physical world
Epistemology
Ethics
Aesthetics
Even massive efforts at curriculum reform such as we saw in the 60's and 70's, for example, have been evaluated in the negative, not because they were fundamentally unsound in theory, but, rather, because they failed to have much impact in the classroom. I believe that one important reason we failed in this way was that we had not developed the means to navigate from theory to practice and back so as to refine our implementation and refine the theory itself. Theory should inform practice and practice should inform theory. Being able to trace a clear and unbroken audit trail is essential to this process and thus essential to realizing educational excellence.

Being able to show logical and empirical connections like these between what we propose that people learn and their resultant ability to survive, thrive and enjoy life will go a long way toward unifying our research and evaluation efforts and amplifying the utility of their results. It should also dramatically improve the quality of our policy decisions, alleviate the dysfunctional advisory relationships that sometimes arise between teachers and their students, between teachers and theorists and between educators and legislators.

Summary

I have argued that we have not been asking the right questions of ourselves and, consequently, the impetus for educational reform in this country is being wastefully dissipated. Going back to square one and the fundamental question, "What's Worth Knowing?" appears to me to be the only rational course of action. It's better that we be late in doing this than suffer the consequences of not doing it at all. We have wasted too much time and too many resources already.

To that end I have offered some ideas as to what knowledge, skills and attitudes are most worthy of being learned by today's children and youth. It is hoped that these ideas will stimulate further discussion and other ideas about this vital question. Even if it proves too late to capitalize on the current perception of educational crisis we can be sure that another one will be along shortly and we can be ready for the next one.

Finally, I have argued that, as necessary as having a defensible notion of what's worth knowing is, that is not enough; we must also discover or invent the means to faithfully implement sound theory in classroom settings and benefit from the feedback that such implementation efforts can provide. I have suggested that the first
step in accomplishing this is to develop the nomenclature to describe a clear audit trail from general theory to specific practice. Toward this objective, I have suggested a few beginning steps in what I believe to be the right direction. This, too, is aimed at fomenting further discussion.

Return to the fundamentals, go back to square one. Let's get clearer about what we mean by excellence in education, about what's worth knowing. Let's get serious about investigating the connections between theory and practice in education so that each can benefit from the other. It should be the most productive symbiotic relationship ever.

If we will do these things, the prospects for reforming American education in a truly positive direction will be brighter than they have ever been before. I sincerely hope that our resolve doesn't wither in the face of the obstacles before us just as we are reaching the point where we can lead the world in the one activity which distinguishes mankind more than any other, the activity of learning.

NOTES


In analyzing the direction taken by the most recent round of educational reforms, professor Lowney wonders if we are asking the right questions. Rather than provide us with answers, he has instead confronted us with a number of issues, any one of which could easily be the subject of an entire conference. Finally, he offers an instructional model which he feels bridges the gap between theory and practice. Before commenting on professor Lowney's model, and inviting you to do the same, I think it would be worth while to review briefly the premises upon which the model is based. He concludes that:

We need to take advantage of the heightened national interest in education.

We have a "very powerful empirical engine to apply to this challenge."

We haven't taken care to answer fundamental questions before moving ahead with reform efforts.

We have failed to define clearly excellence, let alone devise research strategies on how to achieve it.

We need to rethink the notion of educational excellence and how it might best be accomplished.

Discussion as to "what is worth knowing and thus what constitutes an excellent education should be perennial".

Education must serve the future and should focus on the basic human need to "survive, thrive, and enjoy".

Up to this point, I am in general agreement with most of what professor Lowney has said. Clearly, it would be lamentable if the education profession misses the opportunity to take advantage of the current interest in educational reform. To be sure, the issue of what is worth knowing needs to be a topic of continuous discussion as does means of accomplishing excellence.

As Kenneth Strike noted in his address to this organization last year, excellence has been ill-defined, if not undefined. While I agree with both professor Lowney's and Kenneth Strike's assertions that excellence lacks a clear definition, it seems that excellence has, by default, been narrowly defined in terms of performance on standardized tests. Comparison of SAT and other standardized test results among states and localities is on the rise. In addition, the Southern Regional Education Board has just recently released the results of a pilot testing program conducted in Florida, Tennessee and Virginia. This may signal an even greater reliance on test results as the standard of excellence.

Professor Lowney's contention, however, that we have a
"very powerful empirical engine" to apply to the challenge presented by the reform movement is debatable. While the effective schools and effective teaching research have had a positive effect on instructional practices, broader assessment of the overall impact of the reform movement remains problematic. For example, estimates of school dropout rates differ by fifty percent and estimates of the limited-English proficient population differ by three hundred percent depending on the source of information one wishes to use. Even if a clear definition of excellence is achieved, it will be difficult to assess the impact of the reform movement on excellence with such an imprecise empirical base.

Based on these initial premises, professor Lowney argues that students would be best served by learning an approach to problem solving and in fact defines an excellent education as one that maximizes student ability in problem solving. It is not clear why this particular thinking skill was chosen or why, for example, critical thinking or creative thinking would not be elements of an excellent education. If recent studies using National Assessment of Educational Progress and Education Commission of the States data are accurate, then it may be crucial to include critical thinking and creative thinking skills in an overall plan to improve higher order learning.

Professor Lowney outlines hierarchies of knowledge and skills, suggesting that problem solving is best served by understanding and heuristics. In addition, he presents a hierarchy of attitudes, the highest of which having the greatest potential for problem solving.

This integrated approach to problem solving, including knowledge, skills, and attitudes, has merit yet the connection between this theory and classroom practice is unclear. For example, would this approach be taught separately, be integrated into the present course structure of most schools, or require a complete reconceptualization of the schooling process?

The business accounting approach, which professor Lowney would apply to the evaluation of this program, likewise leaves unanswered questions. It can be argued that an accounting approach to evaluation might, in this case, fail to capture the essence of a program based on higher order knowledge, skills, and attitudes.

Professor Lowney has touched upon key issues with respect to education reform and educational excellence. He has presented a problem solving model for learning which seems promising. However, until the model is described in more detail and until some of the underlying issues related to it are resolved, questions will remain.

NOTES

DEMOCRACY'S IMPLICATION OF EDUCATION

Robert D. Heslep
University of Georgia

Since the eighteenth century, if not before, political and educational thinkers have held that democracy is dependent upon education, i.e., that democratic society cannot survive without education. Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, Horace Mann, John Dewey, James B. Conant, and Richard S. Peters are just a few of those who long have pointed out this relationship. In recent decades some philosophers have addressed themselves to the nature of the relationship; more specifically, they have sought to determine whether the dependence obtains by logical necessity or for some other reason. By knowing whether or not democracy by its concept entails education, these philosophers have explained, one can ascertain whether or not education may be treated as a matter of choice in democratic society.

Two who have discussed the topic of dependence are Richard Wollheim and P.A. White. Even though their discussions are very brief and ultimately inadequate, they are worth examining. First, they take opposing stances. Wollheim maintains that democracy's dependence upon education is logical in character whereas White contends that it is not. Second, there is an explicit connection between the arguments used by them. Wollheim's argument, which was published several years before White's, makes no reference to White's; but her argument explicitly criticizes his. Third, key issues are raised, explicitly and implicitly, by these philosophers. So, by taking a close look at their discussions, one has prospects for identifying a variety of the chief conditions that any argument on the dependence relationship must satisfy.

II

Wollheim's concern with democracy's dependence on education develops as a part of an effort by him to show that analytic philosophy may contribute to political philosophy. His procedure for conducting this larger investigation is to analyze the concept of democracy and then to point out some of the implications of the concept. After considering alternative conceptions of democracy, Wollheim formulates what he regards as the most plausible one, which quite simply is a form of government where the people choose through representatives the laws under which they live. He then
seeks to delineate, in view of this conception, some of the logical conditions of democracy. These he distinguishes from the natural conditions of democracy. The former are the conditions "whose instantiation is entailed by the existence of democracy" whereas the latter are "the conditions that democracy requires for its survival or success." To find the logical conditions, one must focus on "the intimate connection . . . between democratic rule and popular choice," which implies that in democratic rule the choices made by the people must be genuine. If the people of a society are to make genuine choices in ruling, they must 1) have a wide range of alternatives from which to choose, 2) be confident that the policies they choose will be implemented, and 3) be informed and reflective in assessing their alternatives. Condition 1) logically calls for "a developed party system." Condition 2) logically requires that each party will be pledged to transform its positions on issues into policies if it is elected. And condition 3) logically requires "both that the electorate should be able to understand the issues between which it is asked to choose and also that it should have access to all ideas that relate to these issues. In other words, both Education and Toleration are essential not accidental attributes of a democracy."5

It will be remembered that for Wollheim democracy is a form of government where the people choose through representatives, the laws under which they live. To be sure, this view of the matter is somewhat attractive. It is consistent with the views sometimes held by other theorists of democracy, and it rightly emphasizes that popular government is distinctive of democracy. Nevertheless, the view suffers several deficiencies. For one thing, it is overly narrow. While popular government is essential to democracy, it is not all that there is to democracy. The literature in political philosophy, which dates from Plato to the present, tends to conceive democracy as a type of society, not just a kind of government. Moreover, common discourse strongly suggests that democracy is a type of society. People frequently use such expressions as "democratic society," "the democratic state," and "the democratic commonwealth." They also often employ the expression "democratic government." In using it, however, they usually do not intend to identify democracy with a form of government; rather, they normally refer to the sort of government appropriate to a democratic society. One is tempted to say, then, that Wollheim's definition of democracy confuses democracy with democratic government and, therefore, is confused as well as overly narrow. For another thing, insofar as Wollheim has this overly narrow conception of democracy, he is disappointing when he contends that democracy implies education. By the claim he is maintaining only that democratic government entails education; he is not holding that any other aspect of democratic society does or does not imply education. Being interested in all aspects of democracy and not just its government, one should like to know what other aspects of this kind of society must or need not involve education. For still another thing, Wollheim fails to
clarify the notion of democratic government as well as he needs to. While he says that with such government a society's citizens make the laws under which they live, he does nothing to explain whether or not the given society has some purpose that these laws are to serve; nor does he indicate whether or not the laws to be made by a democracy's citizens have to satisfy any political or moral standards.

If Wollheim's view of democracy is overly narrow and confused, his conception of education is obscure. While Wollheim devotes much of his discussion to an analysis of democracy, he does nothing to clarify what education is. He gives no synonyms for the term nor does he furnish a statement of any of the concept's criteria. The closest he comes to clarifying education's meaning is when he implies that education, whatever it is, will enable the members of a democracy to become informed and understanding of the political issues on which they will have to make decisions. This implication, however, is not very helpful. It is well known that "education" has various senses. In the sense of a cognitive perspective based upon the theoretical disciplines education will provide a democracy's citizens with the information and understanding they need for making political decisions, but education in this sense is not clearly necessary for them to obtain such information and understanding. It seems arguable, at least, that a democracy's citizens can be prepared to make political decisions without having to gain a comprehensive understanding founded upon the theoretical disciplines. And if education in the sense of a cognitive perspective grounded on the theoretical disciplines is not necessary for a democracy's members, it well might not be what Wollheim intends by education, which he says is necessary for a democracy's citizens. Moreover, it is not evident that education in the sense of schooling is necessary for a democracy's citizens. Some political theorists have allowed that simple democracies do not need schooling while others have contended that schooling is a detriment to genuine decision making in a democracy. As far as can be determined, there is only one sense of education that obviously satisfies the necessity condition of Wollheim's claim. It is education as socialization. If it is granted that the members of any society have to be socialized to perform their institutional roles in that society, it logically follows that education as socialization is required for each and every democracy. Perhaps this is the meaning that Wollheim intends. If it is, however, it renders his claim that democracy logically requires education quite uninteresting; for it reduces the claim from telling us something special about democracy's dependence upon education to telling us something about the dependence that holds not only for a democratic society but also for any other kind of society.

For White too the issue of the dependence relationship is subsidiary to a more comprehensive question, to wit: "whether in a democratic society there must be any agreement on what is in the public interest." To resolve this larger issue, White begins by
analyzing the concept of public interest. The term "interest" she takes in the sense that "x is in A's interest if it is a means to something good for A. . . ." The term "public" she takes in the sense of being in contrast with what is private. Accordingly, the public interest is conceived by her to be "what is in a person's interest as a member of a community, or a public, as distinct from what is in his interest as a member of a section of the community . . . ." After clarifying her idea of the public interest, White next describes several ways in which it is directly relevant to the critical consideration of educational policies. . . . She then attempts to show that there is one policy about which there can be no choice in a democratic state. That policy is to ensure the provision of a political education. Her reasons for this conclusion are that the policy must be in the public interest and it must be "because for a democracy to survive the citizens must know how to operate the democratic institutions," which they can learn to do only through education. In saying that a policy of political education is necessary for any democracy, White does not mean that democracy's dependence upon such education is "a matter of logical necessity, as Wollheim thinks it is." Her reason for differing from Wollheim on this point is that there could be nonhuman beings who possess "certain innate ideas and capacities constituting the knowledge of how to operate a democratic system" and, hence, for whom political education would be impossible. So, rather than pertaining to just any democracy, White's claim about democracy's dependence on political education applies strictly to democracies whose members are human beings or other beings who, given their ignorance at birth, have to learn how to function as the members of a democratic society. The political education that White views as required for such democracies is to provide members with the values of tolerance, fraternity, justice, and the consideration of interests; the knowledge of particular political and social institutions; and a liberal education covering all the forms of knowledge.

As this summary of her argument suggests, White, unlike Wollheim, gives little attention to the clarification of democracy; in fact, she does not provide even a definition of the term. She does mention some values of the democratic citizen—tolerance, fraternity, justice, and the consideration of interests; but she does not thereby reveal anything distinctive of democracy. The named values arguably are pertinent to citizens of states other than democratic ones. Moreover, while it is true that White does attempt to clarify the public interest, which is an aspect of the democratic state, it is doubtful that she thereby enhances our understanding of democracy.

For one thing, there are problems with her definition of "public interest." Some of them concern her treatment of the term "public." She states that the word is being used to mean "not private"; but by failing to specify the sense in which she intends "private," she leaves unenlightened the reader, who wonders what
meaning "private" has other than "not public." The definition, then, is obscure if not circular as well. Not only, however, is "public" poorly defined; it also is used at times in a way that does not clearly reflect its definition. So, in an effort to distinguish public from private interest, she identifies the former with a means to something good for a community and identifies the latter with a means to something good for a section of a community. The problem here is that the categories of community and section of a community do not always correspond to at least our pre-analytic understanding of public and private. As Rousseau emphasized, there is a difference between what is in the interest of a given society and what is in the interest of the majority or even the totality of the members of that society. Both the former and the latter may be construed as being in the interest of a community, but not both may be construed as necessarily in the public interest. The general will and the popular will may be in conflict. Moreover, it might be that what is in the interest of a minority of citizens will be in the interest of their society (as in the case of the opponents of the Mexican War). If so, the interest of a segment of a community is identifiable with the interest of the community proper and, insofar, a private interest is identifiable with a public interest. Another problem with White's conception of public interest is that it lacks content in an important respect. Even if one agrees that the public interest is whatever is in the interest of a person as a member of a community, one does not know what counts here as being good; one might understand good to be something other than what White takes it to be. Hence, before we accept White's definition of the public interest, we should want to know what White means by "good."

For another thing, a person does not necessarily know anything distinctive of democratic society simply by knowing what the public interest is. While it is agreed that the public interest is a term that may be employed in explaining what democracy is, it also is recognized that the term may be used in explaining what a nondemocratic society is. Aristotle, for instance, clarified monarchy, aristocracy, and the polity as good societies because they were ruled according to what was good for them respectively, i.e., what was in their respective public interests. Accordingly, when White declares that political education is required for democracy because it is in the public interest, she prompts one to wonder if it is not required for other forms of political society too for the very same reason and, therefore, to doubt that she has based democracy's need for education upon an essential feature of democracy.

Relative to Wollheim's notion of education, White's is informative. It is rather vague, to be sure; but at least it is not obscure. Even though White does not furnish a definition of education, she does indicate something of what is involved in it. The education she thinks is necessary for democracy, it will be recalled, includes not only certain civil values and a knowledge
of particular institutions but also an acquaintance with all the intellectual disciplines. Hence, because the political education that White insists is appropriate to democracy rests on the intellectual disciplines, it seems to be primarily a cognitive perspective within the context of a democratic society, which is to say that White appears to conceive education as involving a cognitive perspective. White's discussion of education succeeds also in another respect. Not only does she contend that the citizens of a democracy who need to learn to perform their institutional roles must be educated in all the forms of knowledge, but she provides reasons as to why they must. These disciplines will give citizens knowledge and intellectual skills basic to the understanding of a society's problems, and they will enable citizens to tie together their respective ideas about their society's problems so that they will have a comprehensive understanding of its problems. Yet, while White does specify to some extent the educational content she intends, she fails to clarify in the least another major aspect of education, namely, learning activities. As is well known, nobody can learn anything without engaging in a learning activity. Not every learning activity, however, need be conducive to the learning of an educational content. So, because White does not explain which learning activities are pertinent to the political education she describes, she leaves one wondering whether this education allows for indoctrination, conditioning, physical threat, or other activities that are problematic for education.

III

Even though the foregoing examination of Wollheim's and White's views of democracy's implication of education has found each of them unacceptable, it has a constructive importance for the study of the topic. In brief, it suggests conditions that the study must overcome.

1. Any inquiry into democracy's implication of education must have an adequate conception of democracy. If the inquiry does not, as shown in the analysis of White's argument, it cannot definitely show what democracy does or does not imply about education. In the discussion of White's argument it was maintained that the inquiry should at least define what democracy is; but, as indicated in the critique of both Wollheim's and White's arguments, it should not provide a definition that is overly narrow or general. Thus, democracy should be conceived as a type of political society and not only as a form of government; and contra White, perhaps, it ought not to be conceived as just any society for which the public interest is a principle. Because the inquiry is to construe democracy as a kind of political society, it needs to explain what the purposes of that society are, what its government is like, and what, if any, are the principles on which its purposes and government rest. In explaining these matters, it also should specify inter alia the place that the public interest has in the democratic state.
2. The study of democracy's implication of education ultimately must identify not one but all features of the democratic state that do or do not entail education. If at least one trait of democracy logically requires education, it follows that democracy implies education. But knowing that democracy entails education because the former has at least one trait logically requiring education is not enough from a practical standpoint. The practical point of knowing that democracy does or does not imply education is to know that approval of democracy logically does or does not commit one to approving education for such society. The education entailed or not entailed by a given characteristic of democratic society will not be just any type of education but will be a specific type of education. White, for example, held that political education, not just any sort of education, is required for the survival of any democracy whose members must learn to perform their institutional roles. Thus, if supporters of democracy know only that a given trait of democracy does or does not logically require education, they do not know whether or not they are logically committed to support a type of education that might or might not be logically required by some other feature of the democratic state.

3. An examination of democracy's implication of education has to contain an adequate conception of education. If the inquiry does not, as was held in the critique of Wollheim's argument, it will not be able to conclude definitely that democracy does or does not entail education. In the discussion of Wollheim it was indicated that the examination should include at least a defensible definition of education and, moreover, might distinguish education as schooling, socialization, a cognitive perspective, or something else. In the discussion of White it was explained that the investigation should specify not only the content but also the learning activities involved in education. Finally, in the discussion of both Wollheim and White it was pointed out that, if the investigation views education as schooling or a cognitive perspective and concludes that democracy entails education, it needs to explain why schooling or a cognitive perspective is logically necessary for the members of the democratic state.

4. Finally, the study of democracy's implication must determine what features distinctive of democracy logically require education. If it does not, it will not have the same practical importance that it otherwise might. As already explained, a characteristic of democracy may or may not be distinctive of it. Caring for the public interest, for instance, is a trait not only of democratic society but of other forms of political society. So, by demonstrating simply that one or more characteristics of the democratic state imply education, one shows not so much that democracy itself entails education but that a class of types of political societies of which democracy is a member implies education. The practical significance of this difference should be obvious. If a rational supporter of democracy is told that,
because of traits that democracy shares with other political societies, he is committed to supporting education in such society, he will favor education for it and any other political society which has those traits and whose survival he approves. But if he is told that because of some features distinctive of democracy he is logically committed to supporting education in such society, he will favor education for it and it alone.

To develop an adequate conception of democracy is an arduous and complicated task. The same may be said about the construction of an acceptable view of education. Hence, because any investigation that seriously seeks to discover whether or not democracy logically necessitates education for its survival has to determine both a satisfactory view of democracy and one of education, it will be doubly arduous and complicated. In addition, even if such an investigation does analyze democracy and education properly, it still has to determine which traits of democracy do or do not logically require education, which means that its arduousness and complexity will be increased by yet another factor. So, anyone who wants to study democracy's implication of education should learn from the all-too-brief discussions by Wollheim and White that one has to be prepared to conduct war, not just hasty forays.

NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 265.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 266.
8. Ibid., p. 220.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 221.
11. Ibid., p. 227.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., pp. 233-38.
EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY

(RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR HESLEP)

Peter F. Carbone, Jr.

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It is becoming increasingly clear that we are witnessing a revival of interest in the civic justification for formal education. The nation's economic well-being still figures prominently in the current debate over the quality of public schools, to be sure, and children are still exhorted to complete at least a secondary education in order to increase their earning power. Thus economic concerns continue to exert considerable influence on contemporary efforts to improve the public schools. In recent years, however, thanks in large part to the efforts of R. Freeman Butts,1 there has been a perceptible shift in emphasis from economic to political considerations in discussions concerning both educational aims and the rationale for universal, compulsory education.

The current emphasis on civic education is of course less a new development than a restatement of a tradition reaching back at least as far into our history as the Jeffersonian era. Jefferson's claim that a nation could not expect to be both ignorant and free implied that a viable democratic society is contingent upon the existence of an enlightened citizenry. That notion, though it has been somewhat overshadowed in recent decades by the emphasis on economic advancement as the raison d'être for public education, is clearly acquiring renewed vitality and bidding to regain its position of influence in American social and educational theory. Thus Bob Heslep's paper, "Democracy's Implication of Education," coincides with the reappearance of an educational perspective with deep roots in American history. It is therefore a timely, as well as thoughtful critique of two articles that explore, at least tentatively, the apparent reliance of democracy on education.

Now it is one thing to detect a relationship between democracy and education and quite another to elucidate the essence of that relationship. In light of the frequently encountered claim that democracy is dependent upon education, it is of particular importance, obviously, to determine whether or not the relationship is one of logical necessity. Does the oft-repeated claim that democracy implies education mean that democracy necessarily presupposes education, that without education democracy is impossible? Or if logical
necessity is too strong a claim to defend, may we point to an "organ
canic" relationship between democracy and education, the sort of
relationship, for instance, that Sidney Hook thought he could de-
tect between Dewey's philosophical ideas and his educational
prescriptions? The theoretical significance of the issue is
readily apparent, since the precise nature of the relationship,
box it is determined, should yield suggestions for educational
practice and content. Further clarification of the relationship
may also be expected to enhance the quality of debate concerning
such issues as compulsory education, the mission of the public
schools, the status of private schools in a democratic society, and
so on.

But first we need to inquire into the character of the assumed
relationship. Professor Heslep offers four conditions as the basis
for such an inquiry: (1) we need "an adequate conception of democ-

razy," one that conceives democracy as a certain kind of society as
well as a political arrangement; (2) we need to specify those char-
acteristics of a democracy that carry educational implications and
those that do not; (3) we need "an adequate conception of education,"
which would include a clarification as to whether "education" refers
to more than simply schooling; and (4) we need to determine those
traits peculiar to democracy that "logically require education."

Heslep then ties the four conditions together in observing that
"any investigation that seriously seeks to discover whether or not
democracy logically necessitates education for its survival has to
determine both a satisfactory view of democracy and one of educa-
tion, ..."  

With reference to these four conditions or criteria, Heslep con-
cludes that Wollheim and White fall short of providing an adequate
analysis of the relationship under consideration. More specifically,
he criticizes Wollheim for having too narrow a conception of democracy.
In defining democracy as a form of government in which the people rule
by choosing (through their representatives) the laws under which they
live, for example, Wollheim focuses, as Heslep notes, on the political
aspects of democracy to the exclusion of its societal characteristics.
Moreover, Wollheim furnishes no account of the moral and political
ends which the laws in a democratic society are intended to serve.
Heslep also contends that Wollheim's conception of education is obscure.
Although Wollheim insists that democracy is dependent on education,
he never clarifies just what he means by the term "education." "He
gives no synonym for the term," Heslep observes, "nor does he furnish
a statement of any of the concept's criteria."

In contrast to Wollheim's obscurity with regard to education,
White's views, according to Professor Heslep, are at least informative.
White holds that an education intended to foster democracy should in-
clude exposure to democratic values, instruction in the mechanics of
democratic institutions, and initiation into the various forms of
knowledge. On the other hand, Heslep thinks that White's account is marred by her failure to indicate just "which learning activities are pertinent to the political education she describes, ..." Moreover, White, unlike Wollheim, offers no definition of democracy. Instead, she focuses on the notion of the "public interest" or "common good" in a democracy. But her discussion of the public interest is flawed, Heslep argues, in that she provides no satisfactory account of what she means by "public," except to contrast it with "private." Since she does not explain what she means by "private," moreover, her definition is at best obscure and quite possibly circular. Furthermore, although the public interest seems to be either synonymous with, or a means to, whatever is good for the community, in White's view, she never explains what she means by the term "good." And finally, since "the public interest" is of concern to nondemocratic as well as to democratic societies, it is not a particularly informative concept in terms of clarifying the notion of "democracy."

For the most part I find myself in agreement with Professor Heslep's critique of the articles under review. His exposition of the two authors' positions strikes me as accurate, and his critical analysis of their respective positions is both cogent and instructive. My one reservation stems from the fact that neither Wollheim nor White seeks to provide an adequate account of democracy or of education, or to furnish a satisfactory description of the relationship between the two. As Professor Heslep himself notes at various points in his paper, the two authors set far more limited tasks for themselves. Wollheim, for example, seeks to demonstrate that linguistic analysis and political philosophy are compatible by exploring the meaning of "democracy," with special emphasis on the concept of "popular rule." Wollheim's inquiry touches on such familiar democratic notions as informed consent, reflective choice, and government by deliberation and discussion. All of this leads eventually to the conclusion that education is one of the conditions essential to democratic rule. But he gets around to education only when he arrives at the twelfth and final main point he wants to make in the article. Hence it seems obvious that he is not particularly interested in providing an adequate conception of education or in clarifying the relationship between education and democracy.

Similarly, White's interest is in asking whether or not in a democratic society there is anything that must be regarded as being in the public interest. After analyzing the concept of "the public interest" and certain related ideas, she concludes that education must be so regarded, and then goes on to specify the educational content she has in mind. She does not, however, purport to furnish a clarification, or even a definition, of democracy as part of her task.

Thus I would agree with Bob Heslep that Wollheim's discussion of democracy is too narrow and that he hardly touches on education. I would hesitate, however, to label his views obscure and confused. Also,
I wonder to what extent Wollheim is obligated to clarify the notion of democratic government within the limits of the task that he assigns to himself. By the same token, I would agree that White's discussion of democracy is rather thin, that her definition of the public interest leaves something to be desired, and that she says nothing about the learning activities that are appropriate for political education. Yet, I think her discussion might better be described as limited, rather than obscure.

In other words, I can imagine both Wollheim and White objecting to Heslep's analysis on the grounds that he has criticized them for failing to do justice to topics they had no desire to carefully analyze in the first place. And however narrow the scope of their discussions might appear to their critics, they might add, it is their prerogative to establish the confines of their discussions. Of course, Bob Heslep might well reply that both authors have an obligation to expand their topics if for no other reason than to clarify their own positions. There are arguments available on both sides of the question, but at any rate I think the distinction between trying and failing and failing to try is applicable here.

In view of the scant attention that Wollheim and White pay to the relationship in question, I'm a little curious as to why Bob chose these two authors as the focus of his critique. I suspect that he had little choice because of the scarcity of thoughtful articles on the subject. My impression is that despite the widely accepted assumption that democracy is indeed in some sense contingent on an educated populace, few writers have analyzed the specifics of the relationship at length. For that reason, Bob Heslep's paper is a welcome contribution to the debate. As noted above, it is an effective critique of the articles by Wollheim and White; but perhaps more importantly, it enumerates many of the conditions required for determining whether or not education is logically indispensable to democracy. Perhaps it will stimulate others to explore the question.

NOTES

1. In this connection, see R. Freeman Butts, The Revival of Civic Learning: A Rationale for Citizenship Education in American Schools (Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappa Foundation, 1980). See also the special issue of the Journal of Teacher Education 34 (November-December, 1983) devoted to "The Civic Education of the American Teacher."

WHAT IS "APPROPRIATE" CURRICULUM?

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I chanced across the following brief article in the May issue of Harper's magazine. It is entitled "Please Excuse Johnny from Death Education."

This is the verbatim text of a letter that the Eagle Forum, a "pro-family" group, provides to parents concerned about the moral content of their children's schooling. As the letter explains, parents may now lodge formal complaints against public school curricula under the provisions of the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment to the General Education Provisions Act. Phyllis Schlafly is president of the Eagle Forum, which is based in Alton, Illinois.

Dear School Board President:

I am the parent of who attends School. Under U.S. legislation and court decisions, parents have the primary responsibility for their children's education, and pupils have certain rights which the schools may not deny. Parents have the right to assure that their children's beliefs and moral values are not undermined by the schools. Pupils have the right to have and to hold their values and moral standards without direct or indirect manipulation by the schools through curricula, textbooks, audiovisual materials, or supplementary assignments.

Accordingly, I hereby request that my child be involved in NO school activities or materials listed below unless I have first reviewed all the relevant materials and have given my written consent for their use:

- Psychological and psychiatric examinations, tests, or surveys that are designed to elicit information about attitudes, habits, traits, opinions, beliefs, or feelings of an individual or group;
- Psychological and psychiatric treatment that is designed to affect behavioral, emotional, or attitudinal characteristics of an individual or group;
- Values clarification; use of moral dilemmas; discussion of religious or moral standards; role-playing or open-ended discussions of situations involving moral issues; and survival games including life/death decision exercises;
- Death education, including abortion, euthanasia, suicide, use of violence, and discussions of death and dying;

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Curricula pertaining to alcohol and drugs;
Instruction in nuclear war, nuclear policy and nuclear classroom games;
Anti-nationalistic, one-world government, or globalism curricula;
Discussion and testing on inter-personal relationships; discussions of attitudes toward parents and parenting;
Education in human sexuality, including pre-marital sex, extramarital sex, contraception, abortion, homosexuality, group sex and marriages, prostitution, incest, masturbation, bestiality, divorce, population control, and roles of males and females, sex behavior and attitudes of student and family;
Pornography and any materials containing profanity and/or sexual explicitness;
Guided fantasy techniques; hypnotic techniques; imagery and suggestology;
Organic evolution, including the idea that man has developed from previous or lower types of living things; [Italics Mine]
Discussions of witchcraft, occultism, the supernatural, and Eastern mysticism;
Political affiliations and beliefs of student and family; personal religious beliefs and practices;
Critical appraisals of other individuals with whom the child has family relationships;
Income, including the student's role in family activities and finances;
Non-academic personality tests; questionnaires on personal and family life and attitudes;
Autobiography assignments; log books, diaries, and personal journals;
Contrived incidents for self-revelation; sensitivity training, group encounter sessions, talk-ins, magic circle techniques, self-evaluation and auto-criticism; strategies designed for self-disclosure (e.g., zig-zag);
Sociograms; sociodrama; psychodrama; blindfold walks; isolation techniques.

The purpose of this letter is to preserve my child's rights under the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (the Hatch Amendment) to the General Education Provisions Act, and under its regulations as published in the Federal Register of Sept. 6, 1984, which became effective Nov. 12, 1984. These regulations provide a procedure for filing complaints first at the local level and then with the U.S. Department of Education. If a voluntary remedy fails, federal funds can be withdrawn from those in violation of the law. I respectfully ask you to send me a substantive
response to this letter attaching a copy of your policy statement on procedures for parental permission requirements, to notify all my child's teachers, and to keep a copy of this letter in my child's permanent file. Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely, ____________________________

copy to School Principal

Pursuant to what the Eagle Forum perceives to be the child's and/or parents' rights with respect to what may be included or excluded in/from the curriculum of public schools, a question arises: Where do/ought the parents' or pupils' rights end and the school authorities begin? Put another way, is/ought there to be any belief, belief system, or subject matter containing such beliefs safe from the veto of any parent or child who finds them offensive to their "moral values," "moral standards," or "beliefs"?

To shed some light on this problem, I refer to some work done by H.S. Leonard and C.S. Peirce. Leonard's analysis of the concept belief leads him to offer that "The content of a belief may be called a proposition. Thus belief may be defined as the holding of an attitude of acceptance toward a proposition." And so long as one sustains such an attitude, he sustains the belief. Furthermore, it makes little difference whether the belief is held by anybody else, is verifiable by any person, method, or process of inquiry, or is logically (by induction or deduction) sound—it need only to be held by someone. Hence, a paranoid schizophrenic may believe that he is Adolph Hitler, or some other famous, or infamous, historical figure; or a mathematics student may come to believe that \( A^2 + B^2 = C^2 \); or a theologian may believe in the existence of angels, devils, and deities, etc; or a student of astronomy may hold the belief that the Earth is a rather small satellite of the Sun.

However we arrive at the beliefs we hold, and for whatever reason(s) we hold them, not all of our beliefs are seen to be legally or morally appropriate for inclusion into the curricula of our public schools. For example, the belief of the paranoid schizophrenic person in the above would be prohibited in schools not so much due to its unconstitutionality but rather because the good sense of sane members of the community rule against it; and any school board member, superintendent, principal, or classroom teacher who insisted that such delusions be taught to children would not only lose his job, but would probably be referred to the mental health authorities as a potential menace to himself or others. But what about the other three kinds of belief mentioned earlier? Well, the beliefs of the theologian have been consistently seen to be in violation of the "establishment clause" of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. That is, to place into the curriculum or instruction of public schools beliefs in supernatural entities is to mix "church" with "state" and is thereby legally taboo—so say the courts. This leaves us with the beliefs of the "mathematician" and the "astronomer." Curiously, even though the average school board member, school administrator, teacher, or parent
doesn't fully understand how the pioneers in mathematics or in the
natural (or social and behavioral) sciences arrived at their beliefs—
or the methods they developed for arriving at them—nonetheless, these
beliefs not only are not proscribed by the public schools but are
actually insisted upon; and teachers and curriculum designers do every-
thing within their power to bring the children and adolescents in their
charge to learn as much math and science as is possible.

At this juncture it might be well to ask, Why concern ourselves
with beliefs in the first place? Why not simply dispense with belief
and teach "content" or "subject matter"? Why not, indeed! A moments
reflection would reveal that it is literally impossible to teach or
to learn "content" or "subject matter" without holding belief(s)
about that "content" or "subject matter." C.S. Peirce in his now
famous paper "The Fixation of Belief," published about a century ago,
informed us that "Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions"3
and that every conscious person struggles to rid himself of doubt be-
cause human beings cannot act effectively—if at all—while in a state
of doubt. Doubt, therefore, impairs not only subsequent action, but al-
so subsequent thought; and the only way to free ourselves from these
impediments is to arrive at belief. If what Peirce says is true, then
it would be silly to hold that we could generate a curriculum free
from beliefs; it is logically untenable; all deliberate human action
requires belief as a prerequisite. Imagine, if you will, having
cognitive knowledge about X, but not having belief(s) about X. It's
tantamount to a contradiction: Knowledge, in the "know that,"
cognitive sense, implies belief. So the real question before us is
not whether to teach belief(s), it is rather: which belief(s) to
teach.

With this in mind, we turn once again to Mrs. Schlafly and her
well-meaning cohorts. As I see it, they want to prevent our public
schools from teaching certain beliefs with which they disagree and/or
find offensive to their sense of propriety and hence threatening to
their adopted belief system. Rather reluctantly I must admit that in
some ways, and on some points, I might tend to sympathize with their
concerns. For example, who can say that it is "educative" in the
best sense of the word for an elementary school aged child to learn
about death and dying in a classroom? I certainly cannot, and I'm
not too sure that so-called "expert" opinion on the subject is
consonant. But there is one thing I am reasonably sure of: when it
comes to an attack on those beliefs which are, and have been for some
time, rather firmly established through rigorous scientific research
then we begin to see the emergence of a very real problem which if
allowed to go unchecked promises to undermine not only the authority
of the schools and teachers to determine the subject matter of the
students, but in the long run promises in no small way to erode and
undermine the teaching/learning of all scientifically grounded be-
lief(s), for posterity. Specifically hers, I am referring to the Eagle
Forums and other like-minded individuals and groups being given the
legal power to prohibit the teaching of the theory (belief) of
"Organic Evolution, including the idea that man has developed from
previous...living things." The danger I believe is not so much that our citizens will eventually come to believe that their species (a) did not always exist, (b) is simply another species among hundreds of millions on the planet struggling to adapt to a fragile environment, and (c) may not be all that "superior" to other species of flora and fauna. No, the problem as I perceive it is that if those of us who are responsible for developing the curricula of the public schools sit idly by and allow any individual or group to veto these scientifically-grounded theories that offend them, then our civilization runs the risk of losing not only the work of Charles Darwin and other highly disciplined and honest biologists, but we stand to lose the respectability of the scientific enterprise itself; and that concerns me greatly.

A word of warning is in order then: in principle, if we allow the ignorance and superstition of the medieval mind to dictate the curricula of our public schools today in the name of "protecting students or parents rights," and we are prohibited from teaching "Johnny" the theory of Organic Evolution because it upsets him or his parents' "moral values," must we also, and for the same reason, be coerced into discontinuing teaching him that the Earth is a spheroid, or that infection is caused by microorganisms? I desperately hope not.

Our predecessors have fought long and hard to foster in our citizenry the scientific "habit of mind" through the teaching of the best science in our public schools. Do we now give up the battle and capitulate to the likes of Orrin Hatch, Jerry Falwell, Phyllis Schlafly, and other representatives of what I call the "medieval mentality" we find so prevalent in our society? No! Somebody has to stand up and fight this battle, and we cannot expect the handful of active scientists to bear the burden alone—they are too few in number, and many are probably too busy addressing the problems of their disciplines to realize what is happening in the U.S. Congress or in the public schools of our nation. But before any of us who are scientifically-oriented in our beliefs and the logic we employ to arrive at them think the battle to keep the best scientific logic and beliefs in the public schools is going to be easy, we ought to be aware of the thinking of those who unwittingly, but surely, are giving aid-and-comfort to the "enemy" (those of the medieval mind). Specifically I refer here to a statement made a few years ago by an otherwise logical modern thinker, Professor Kenneth Strike, philosopher and faculty member of Cornell University. This otherwise intelligent man clearly sided with the enemies of the modern scientific curriculum when he wrote: "Public Schools...have no right to compel the children of the creationists to accept, or even to listen to, views they find offensive. At their parents' request, these children might be excused from certain portions of the science curriculum that they find objectionable." I cannot pretend to know what Professor Strike's motives were for making such a statement, I can say however that those of us who do know better need to write and talk about the potential ominous ramifications of such laws as the "Hatch Amendment." Our children, schools, and the future of the scientific enterprise deserve nothing less.
NOTES


4. Ibid., pp. 91-112.

5. Ibid., p. 96.

Like Professor Hawkins, I too have grave concerns with the "ominous ramifications" of such laws as the Hatch Amendment especially the excessively broad and in part erroneous interpretations given it by Phyllis Schlafly's Eagle Forum and others of like mind. I have also been troubled by the potential effects of similar bills now being promoted at the state level. No less than six states have had such bills introduced in their legislatures during the last session.

California has had such a law in effect since 1977. Pupil protection or parent's rights laws are in place in Oklahoma and Missouri. Bills were promoted in Delaware, North Carolina and South Carolina. The North Carolina bill now remains in the Appropriations Committee. Arizona, a state historically under pressure from parents' rights groups almost passed a Pupil's Rights Protection Bill but it was vetoed by the governor. The Arizona Education Association and the state Parent-Teacher organization among others fought heavily against the bill. It is apparent that a parents' rights movement of significant force has been underway for sometime now and is still strong.

Yet, after reading the paper under discussion and reviewing at least a sufficient amount of literature on the subject, I too, like Professor Hawkins, have found myself in a dilemma. I am at once angered by the implications of the Schlafly letter while reluctantly sympathizing with some of its more reasonable points. In addressing the question "What is 'Appropriate' Curriculum?", Tom introduces the discussion with the verbatim text of a letter that the Eagle Forum makes available to parents interested in the moral content of their children's curriculum. Parents are informed that procedures for complaints against such curricula are now provided under the Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment commonly known as the Hatch Amendment. As we have been informed, the letter suggests that districts seek parents written consent before including for classroom instruction any one of 34 topics ranging from alcohol and drugs to student diaries or journals. It is in the context of the Eagle Forum letter, that Tom develops his thesis. Where do, says Tom, parents' authority and in "this matter" the school's authority each begin and end. Addressing more specifically the curriculum question, Tom asks "Is/ought there to be any belief, belief system or subject matter containing such beliefs safe from the veto of any parent or child who finds them offensive to their 'moral values,' 'moral standards,' or 'beliefs'?

In order to clarify the meaning of "belief" or "belief system" the works of H. S. Leonard and C. S. Peirce are consulted. According to Leonard, a belief is defined as "holding an attitude toward a proposition." So long as the attitude is sustained, so long is the belief sustained. Four types of belief are then identified, one of
which is clearly not appropriate for the curriculum—that of the
paranoid schizophrenic. Although the other three types may be more
difficult to determine, Tom, perhaps, too quickly dismisses the beliefs
of the theologian because of the "establishment clause" of the First
Amendment. Such beliefs in supernatural entities placed into the
curriculum is to mix "church" and "state" and is thereby legally
"taboo," according to the courts. The beliefs of the mathematician
and the astronomer are quite different when considered for the school
curriculum. Although school board members, parents and even teachers
don't completely understand the way these beliefs developed, mathem-
atics, the natural, social and behavioral sciences are "insisted
upon" for the school curriculum.

At this point another question arises when considering the nature
of an appropriate curriculum and that is the distinction between
"beliefs and content." "Why concern ourselves with beliefs in the
first place? Why not simply dispense with belief and teach 'content'
or 'subject matter'" Tom concludes that it would be impossible to
teach content without holding beliefs about that content. Confirmation
of this conclusion is then found in a century old essay by Charles
Sanders Peirce, "The Fixation of Belief," which informs us that
"Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our actions and that every
conscious person struggles to rid himself of doubt because human beings
cannot act effectively—if at all—while in a state of doubt. Doubt,
therefore, impairs not only subsequent action, but also subsequent
thought; and the only way to free ourselves from these impediments is
to arrive at belief." According to Peirce then, it would be useless
to foster a belief free curriculum. The question that remains, then,
is not whether to teach "belief(s)" but rather what "belief(s)" to
teach. In other words there is no such thing as a value free curricu-

Returning to Ms. Schlafly, the Eagle Forum and those groups
purported to be seeking legal power to prohibit the teaching of the
"theory of organic evolution," Tom reluctantly admits his sympathies
with some points in the Schlafly letter. The remainder of the paper,
however, is an impassioned plea for the appropriate curriculum, that
is, a curriculum predicated on those beliefs "rather firmly established
through rigorous scientific research." Educators are admonished not
to capitulate to the likes of Jerry Falwell and Phyllis Schlafly but
to maintain vigilance in fostering the scientific "habit of mind" so
strongly supported by Charles Peirce. The paper is concluded with a
stinging attack on those among us who may unwittingly give aid and
comfort to the "enemy" or those of the "medieval mind." Kenneth
Strik, philosopher and faculty member of Cornell University is then
singled out as an example. "This otherwise intelligent man," says
Tom, "clearly sided with the enemies of the modern scientific cur-
riculum when he wrote: 'Public Schools—have no right to compel the
children of the creationists to accept, or even to listen to views
they find offensive. At their parents' request, these children might
be excused from certain portions of the science curriculum they find
objectionable.'" Not pretending to know the motives behind the Strike
statement, Tom leaves us with the challenge to talk and write more about
the Hatch Act.
I wish Tom had probed more into Charles Peirce's "The Fixation of Belief" for in it would be additional help in understanding not only the issue before us but perhaps provide some insight into the motives behind the Strike statement. In the essay Peirce highlights four methods of fixing beliefs. Each one is distinguished and evaluated. They are: (1) the method of tenacity, (2) the method of authority, (3) the a priori or metaphysical method, and (4) scientific method. According to Peirce, most men prefer to adopt the method of tenacity as a means of avoiding doubt, that is they hold tenaciously to beliefs taught in childhood, and turn with contempt from anything that might disturb them. Peirce goes on to say that this method of fixing belief...will be unable to hold its ground in practice. The social impulse is against it. The man who adopts it will find that other men think differently from him, and it will be apt to occur to him in some sane moment that their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will shake his confidence in his belief.... Until we make ourselves hermits, we shall necessarily influence each others' opinions; so that the problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the individual merely, but in the community.

It is here that Peirce finds a more effective method of fixing belief--through the authority of the state. His words are very much in tune with the issue under discussion. Through the will of the state

Let an institution be created which shall for its object to keep correct doctrines before the attention of the people, to reiterate them perpetually, and to teach them to the young; having at the same time power to prevent contrary doctrines from being taught, advocated or expressed.... Let them be kept ignorant, lest they should learn of some reason to think otherwise than they do.

These two methods as described by Peirce, may be helpful in understanding the rationality and motives of those extremely conservative and fundamentalist groups seeking to influence and control what is taught in the public schools. Although skeptical, if not opposed to state involvement on the one hand, these groups seek aid and comfort from the state to create an official authority that to them would restore a world of certainty and a world safe from a changing and perplexing reality. They may or may not be the enemy of the public schools but in making decisions about curriculum they represent a reality with whom educators must contend.

Of course we know Peirce rests his case on the scientific method as does Wm. Hawkins in his paper. As Peirce notes, one starts with the "known and observed facts" and then proceeds to the "unknown."
The rules, however, one follows "may not be such as investigation would approve." It is the test of the method which involves the application of the method and not one's feelings and purposes which will determine success. Accordingly notes Peirce, "bad reasoning as well as good reasoning is possible; and this fact is the foundation of the practical side of logic." 9

Taking a lead from Peirce's interpretation of the scientific method, I will, as the major part of my response, take another look at some "known facts" concerning the background of the Schlafly letter and explore another position on the school's responsibility in determining "appropriate curriculum" in the hope that Kenneth Strike's comments viewed in a different context might produce another conclusion.

The Protection of Pupil Rights Amendment (known as the Hatch Amendment) was passed in 1978. The law was designed to allow parental inspection and approval for research and experimental government programs in the public schools. According to one commentary, "everything seemed to be fine...[until] the wicked ERA was dead." 10 It was then that Schlafly along with other right-wing groups elevated the Hatch Amendment to high visibility by placing the matter before the Republican Party National Platform. By March 1984 the Department of Education held public hearings and the testimony of abuse, carefully edited, was published by Schlafly under the title Child Abuse in the Classroom. It was not until the Department of Education published compliant procedures late in 1984 that Schlafly along with other right-wing leaders distributed a form letter to provide parents with a means to demand that certain materials not be used without parental consent. The letter was mailed to some 250,000 parents by the Maryland Coalition of Concerned Parents on Privacy Rights in Public Schools and was later mailed to 70,000 subscribers of the Phyllis Schlafly Report in January, 1985. 11

James M. Wall in a recent editorial in Christian Century says that there is a "particular problem with the Eagle Forum form letter." Many of the taboo items listed in the letter are not drawn from the Hatch Amendment, but represent an interpretation that "widely spreads the intent of its author, Republican Senator Orin Hatch of Utah." Indeed the senator told the Senate in February, 1985, that the amendment does not deal with classroom instruction but only with non-scholastic aptitude testing and research. Hall says, however, that Senator Hatch, when appearing on a national television talk show with Ms. Schlafly to seek understanding of his legislation, "looked like Walter Mondale trying to avoid criticizing Jesse Jackson before a meeting of the American Jewish Committee." 12

Actually the Hatch Amendment states that students cannot be forced to submit without prior parental consent to federally funded "psychiatric or psychological experimentation, testing, or treatment," requesting information concerning seven specific areas. Among these would be such things as political affiliation and mental and psychological problems. Violations of the law could result in the loss of federal funds.
James Wall suggests that the basic strategy of the New Right is to "find a piece of the Federal government which can be manipulated as a prop and run with it." Amendment says Wall, "while it is more promising for the confused American public and run with it."

Whether Schlafly and her group misunderstand or are intentionally misusing the Hatch Amendment, makes little difference in its outcome. Their activity does damage to American education. The real danger may lie in the reaction of some local educational officials who when faced with "prop and run" may too quickly make major changes in the school curriculum. In reacting, as the old saying goes, they may "throw the baby out with the wash." That would be tragic.

Robert M. Gordon in a thoughtful analysis entitled "Values in Education in the Public Schools," provides a constitutional interpretation which could be helpful to school officials forced to respond to right wing groups. In the article, Gordon examines and attempts to resolve the "paradox" between government interest in promoting "political decision-making," (citizenship education) in the public school and its equally important first amendment interest in not "distorting the marketplace of ideas by transmitting values." In other words, there is always tension, suggests Gordon, between "students' interest in the "freedom of expression" and the state's interest and need to promote citizenship. In an imbalance between the two, however, there is always the danger of the state's inculcation of "orthodox values" in students.

Gordon attempts to resolve the paradox by maintaining that the freedom of expression only allows the state to directly teach those "values that are either express or implied" in the Constitution. Teachers cannot directly teach or indoctrinate students with what Gordon calls "nonconstitutional" or "contraconstitutional" values. To also "indoctrinate on students' interest in 'developing their own understanding of reality.'"

Citing those explicit values in the preamble of the Constitution and those implied throughout the document such as popular sovereignty and individual autonomy, Gordon contends that the proper aim of public education is to see that children believe in constitutional values. By the same token schools would be prohibited from inculcating racism or ignoring the "establishment clause" of the first amendment because these values are unconstitutional. Schools have a duty to teach values of human equality. Values of a nonconstitutional nature, such as truthfulness, respect for authority, thrift, and integrity should be taught, because they are desirable values in society. What is of major importance is the way in which nonconstitutional values are taught or placed into the program of studies.

The use of the "discursive method" in teaching, especially the nonconstitutional values, is better than what at Gordon calls the "directive (prescriptive) method because it is based on "dialogue"
and undominated inquiry." Such a method as the discursive promotes truthfulness, a prerequisite for communication, which in turn is essential in achieving first amendment goals. The directive method is inappropriate because it "requires coercion and imposition of beliefs on unreceptive children." The effort to distinguish between these two methods of inculcating values is at the core of Gordon's analysis of the first amendment provision for "freedom of expression." "Freedom of expression disables government from distorting the process of inquiry by dominating an individual's access to information and ideas useful in the pursuit of a better understanding of reality."16

At this point there is a question arising from Gordon's analysis that appears important to our discussion: Would the placing of topics of a questionable constitutional nature be appropriate in the public schools if they were placed in such a context that they would give students access to information and ideas helpful in a "better understanding of reality, thereby meeting the first amendment provision of "freedom of expression?" Gordon responds to this question clearly in his discussion of the schools and the evolution/creation controversy.

Courts have recognized that opposition to the theory of evolution is sectarian and that efforts to prohibit or limit its teaching may actually constitute inculcating students with religious values. The courts have failed, says Gordon, to take note of "philosophical values underlying the objections to the theory of evolution" or to the method of science. Such a theory involves a "mechanistic" and "nonspiritual" understanding of reality that many people find offensive. Consequently, resolutions to the evolution controversy may involve the religious clause of the first amendment as well as its provision for "freedom of expression." Both values would have to be considered in teaching the theory of evolution or for that matter the teaching about creationism. Scientific literacy is an explicit value found in the Constitution. This is confirmed by its granting to Congress the authority to "promote the progress of science...through copyright and patent protection."17 Obviously an effort to teach creationism in a science class would be invalid because creationism is a religious doctrine, not a scientific one. Gordon goes on to conclude, however, that although it makes little sense to "advance a nonscientific view of science by teaching creationism in a science class" it would be appropriate to include creationism in a different context:

Legitimate constitutional values may be served, however, by introducing students to creationism in the context of the humanities. It would emphasize the importance of religion to human beings, a value implicit in the first amendment; in conjunction with creation myths from other cultures, a value implicit in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and it could illustrate the limitations of the scientific method, thus providing students with information and ideas useful in the pursuit of a better understanding of reality.18
In the context of Gordon's analysis, Strike's statement may appear much more on balance than the way it was represented in Tom's paper. The statement was part of concluding remarks in a commentary article on two Kappan pieces on the creation science controversy. In responding to the notion, creation science, Strike sets out to determine whether creationism is a "workable scientific enterprise." Finding that it is not, he like Gordon concludes that it has no place in the biology classroom. It is entitled, however, to "open evaluation ... in the forums of scientific communities." Since creation science is "clearly religious," issues of religious liberty would be more involved in the dispute in the public school. There are many Christians and Jews who do not find their belief in God challenged by current science. "Creationist have no right to define the religious view of creation." In the same context schools as "agents of the state have no right to undermine gratuitously the religious convictions of creationists." "They cannot compel children of creationist to accept or listen to views found offensive." It was in this total context that the statement which seemed to trouble Tom was made. "At their parents request, these children might be excused from certain portions of the science curriculum that they found objectionable."19 Strike's final remark, however, finds him even closer to Gordon. People with religious convictions have a right to expect science teachers to stick to science for "Evolution can become more than a scientific theory. When given an interpretation, philosophical in nature, in which the universe can express nothing but chance," says Strike, "transcends the scientific evidence and is quasi-religious."20

What is "appropriate curriculum?" The answer is at best difficult if not impossible. In public education, we are responsible for educating all the children of all the people. In a society extremely plural in nature, and repeatedly going through cycles of ideological change, curriculum decisions can never be and should never be final. I agree with Tom, curriculum making by its very nature is not and will never be value neutral. Because curriculum development is a socio-political process, there will always be the critics and organized special interest groups ready to impose their values upon the school. I think that Strike and Gordon offer a well balanced and constitutionally sensitive approach to the problems presented by groups like the Eagle Forum. Education officials would do well to take heed. If we know what we are doing and why we are doing it and are willing to communicate that when the need arises, then maybe we will be able to "throw out the wash" but keep the baby.
NOTES


7. Ibid., p. 103.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 109


13. Ibid.


15. Ibid., pp. 555-556.


17. U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8.

18. Gordon, p. 564.

20. Ibid., p. 558.