The central failure of conventional, or positivistic inquiry has been the inability to handle deception in research and the violation of societal ethics, moral and legal caused by such deception. Moral dimensions include tests for whether the research would be approved by reasonable persons, whether it might pass the test of publicity, and whether or not it affords discretion in restraining from intrusiveness. Legal tests investigate whether the research protects individuals from harm, from lapses in informed consent, from deception, and from violations of privacy and confidentiality. Conventional inquiry has given rise to deception as a way to prevent ambiguity of research results. Ambiguity, however, has not been avoided, and costs have been added to the research. Deception can be avoided by utilizing emergent-paradigm, or naturalistic inquiry instead of conventional inquiry. Naturalistic inquiry focuses upon realities as multiple, divergent social constructions. The emphasis on utilizing the interaction of researcher and respondent allows participants to retain their locus of control, to make informed decisions regarding their participation, and to have a say in shaping the processes and results of the research. Naturalistic inquiry does bring about a new set of problems, but the ethical concerns raised concerning deception in the positivist inquiry are removed. (BAE)
 Ethics: The Failure of Positivist Science

Yvonna S. Lincoln
Vanderbilt University

and

Egon G. Guba
Indiana University


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Introduction

When so many sets of professional standards are in place, why bring up for reconsideration the question of ethics in social science inquiry. The answer is threefold. First, the social sciences are now engaged in a heated (and sometimes bitter) debate surrounding paradigm allegiance. The existence of a new paradigm, and its contention for legitimation and even primacy over older positivist science, makes questions of ethics problematic. A profoundly new epistemology demands a separate, distinct, and utterly fresh consideration of what it means to do ethical inquiry.

Second, questions of ethics have plagued social science researchers and evaluators from the start. Issues of what constituted moral behavior toward the subjects of legitimate inquiry turned on the delicate point of when and at what point legitimate inquiry became illegitimate and perhaps immoral.

Finally as Martin Bulmer (1980) has framed the problem:

Ethical concerns in social research are in a real sense timeless. The choices, dilemmas and anguish of action in the course of empirical inquiry persist and resist definitive resolution, even if each age tends to rediscover them afresh. (p. 125).

The maturing of social science has not brought on a concomitant maturing of professional standards. Rather, the increasing complexity of society has provoked new questions and suggested issues which are not covered by even recently-developed standards of professional conduct:

With the passage of time, however, the moral implications for society of natural, medical and social science research have become much sharper. Ethical and related concerns about nuclear physics, genetic
engineering, organ transplants and real-world social experiments have become major public issues. The public scrutiny of scientific work, including social science, is correspondingly keener. Regulation of research is increasing, and social scientists are increasingly likely to find their research activities circumscribed in various ways. Apart from the intrinsic importance of such issues, they are a test of the social relevance, responsibility, usefulness and moral stature of social science, as well as a challenge to us to explain and justify our activities to the wider society. (Bulmer, 1980, p. 124, emphases added).

The idea that social science should render products (research results, evaluations or policy analyses) which fulfill the criteria of relevance, responsibility, utility and morality is a radically new one. If Bulmer (1980) is correct, then social scientists face the constraint of being unable to pursue "truth" strictly "for the sake of truth." This represents a major break with paradigmatic assumptions regarding the legitimate role of the scientist, a point to which we shall return later. Nevertheless, the rediscovery of such issues is intimately bound to the paradigm challenge for three reasons: first, because definitions of the terms moral and ethical tend to be culture-bound; second, because the "limits of what is permissible in the name of social science" are undergoing change; and third, because the distinction between what is public and what is private has become increasingly blurred in an information society.

If each age does indeed tend to rediscover questions of ethical and moral behavior afresh, perhaps it is because aging in a culture lends sophistication and wisdom. A portion of that sophistication and wisdom encountered now is intimately bound with the situation described in our
earlier work (Lincoln & Guba, 1986): the evidence of a major paradigm shift in the sciences and the arts, and concomitant re-thinking of personal and social values within that context. Another significant presaging has been the stern criticism of traditional science. The perspective which has often been brought to bear (Keller, 1983; Schaef, 1981) fruitfully has been that of feminism, and the comments from Keller highlight a concern which is expressed as feminism, but which have power, both for social science, in general, and in light of the axioms of naturalistic inquiry:

To quote Mackinnon (1983) once again, "Feminism does not see its view as subjective, partial, or undetermined but as a critique of the purported generality, disinterestedness, and universality of prior accounts" (pp. 534-535).

From this point of view, it may seem natural for feminist critiques of science to begin with a challenge to traditional conceptions of scientific objectivity--with a critique of the uses of the concept of scientific objectivity to insulate the scientist from social responsibility, to devalue feeling and emotion, and to legitimize the domination of nature or of other (less objective) human beings...the logic of the personal as political supports a...critique from the perspective of those experiences which have been denied--namely, from the perspective of the personal, the emotional...It seeks to locate the scientific subject in the very rhetoric which denies its own existence. (p. 16)

The remnants of this traditionally masculine view of science as objective and disinterested viewing have led to occasionally harmful encounters for research "subjects," especially as they have seen themselves
as dupes, the unwitting objects of deception, outright lying, and sometimes injurious practices. The large variety of books and articles on the topic of ethics in social science research abound with examples of deceitful, damaging, disadvantageous or physically and emotionally hurtful incidents, most carried on "in the interest of science," or in the interests of that much vaguer entity, "truth."

The problem of ethical behavior, responsibility and morality are somewhat more difficult for the naturalistic inquirer than for the traditional scientist, largely because of the particular constructions and axioms which are hallmarks of this form of inquiry. The objectivity criterion, dismissed as unachievable in the scientific paradigm, and as unusable, unserviceable, and counterproductive in the naturalistic paradigm (indeed, in this paradigm, it is a totally counterproductive intent) has probably contributed to the tendency to allow deceptive practices in the name of science or toward the pursuit of truth. The emotional displacement of the "subject" of scientific research as something less than the scientist has allowed--and even encouraged--treatment which could not be condoned under the naturalistic paradigm.

We have argued earlier that the very term "subject" has created a relationship in which the inquirer/researcher/scientist has been the superior human in human research. Addressing that argument, we have encouraged the use of the term "respondent," to connote the interactive nature of inquirer and respondent, and have even suggested that research ought to move toward consideration of the respondent as active participant in the research process. Regarding the respondent as a contributor to, and shaper of, the research, the research design, and the conclusions of the
research, forces the inquirer into a mutually respectful position, wherein the respondent becomes not an object, but rather the recipient of dignity, caring, and responsibility.

As social science revisits the questions of what comprises ethical behavior in human research, the nature of ethical questions themselves becomes more exacting and subtle. This is largely because we are posing an ever more intimate relationship with those whom we would study. Thus, many of the problems which have been considered in the past under the rubric of research ethics grew out of attempts to both fulfill the criterion of objectivity in science, and the desire to pursue truth at (sometimes) any cost; whereas, the concern with ethics in naturalistic inquiry grow out of precisely the opposite concerns, to wit, the desire to present individual realities, and indeed, subjective truth, and to consider carefully and responsibly whether or not the pursuit of truth in any given instance might bring about more harm than benefit. The criterion of responsibility has become co-equal with those of utility and save-harmless.

We would like to propose for consideration several questions for pondering in light of the emergent axioms for social and behavioral inquiry. Not all of the answers are original, nor is this any attempt to cover them with the fineness and nuances which others have brought to bear. What they are is rather a series of guideposts which ought to serve as directions for the inquirer wishing to utilize the emergent paradigm. Something else which they are not is trustworthiness issues. Deceptive or unethical inquirers can and do unearth perfectly authentic data and useful findings, just as ethical inquirers (that is, those who adhere to canons of ethical research behavior) may ultimately report untrustworthy data (that is, data which are
false, misleading or unuseful). What we are proposing is rather the stances and procedures which may insure that the research endeavor is ultimately also a moral, ethical and responsible enterprise.

This is no mean feat. If, as we have proposed, we are in the midst of a radical and all-embracing paradigm shift, and if, as Bulmer (1980) proposes, each new age, each generation, redefines the boundaries of what is deemed ethical, then what is there to give guidance? When the world was perceived to be static, truth and justice were hard to come by; if the world—or even the social science community—is in great turmoil, then what anchors will there be for the moral judgments we pass on ourselves and our colleagues (not to mention those from whom we might garner information for our researches)? The questions are pressing, and they are before this community in some urgency.

The Problem

The questions which social scientists must address do not lend themselves to easy answers: What constitutes ethical behavior? What is the nature of ethical behavior? Are there degrees of ethical behavior; that is, could one so construct a set of principles such that one is first "loyal" to ethical principles of a profession, then "loyal" to ethical principles toward persons, then "loyal" to ethical principles toward nations, and finally, "loyal" to principles which supercede national concerns? This is indeed the appeal Mosher seems to be making, while the Grievance Committee appears to be operating at the level of professional and international concerns. Are there some principles which are higher than others, in other words?

Diener and Crandall (1978) make exactly this distinction between levels in their discussion of difference types of ethical problems. Wisdom ethics,
they suggest, are rarely realized in the conduct of social research, but they do represent "the expressions of the ideal practices of a profession" (p. 4). These ideals are often stated in publicly promulgated expressions of concerns and limitations, such as the Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Research with Human Participants published by the American Psychological Association (1973). Such wisdom ethics, representing the best thought of a profession on the possibilities of risk and harm, "are often not realized in concrete situations because of human limitations and competing values" (Diener & Crandall, 1978, p. 4); rather they may be thought of as guidelines for anticipating such harm as might befall participants and respondents in research.

A second type of ethical statement contains the rules which "state which acts are right and which are wrong" (p. 4); this set of proscribed and permitted activities embody the content ethics of a profession. Diener and Crandall (1978) make the point, however, that while content ethics, like wisdom ethics, are publicly stated values, they are not always publicly shared values. Rules such as the cautions on deceptions, to borrow the example they use, may not be accepted by all scientists or inquirers.

Finally, they have described what they call ethical decisions, which "emphasizes the process by which decisions are made as well as the final choice" (p. 4, emphases added). Ideal or permitted ethics can only finally be markers along a treacherous road in the harm-benefit game. Ultimately, the inquirer must make individual judgments which are a reflection of his or her own value structure, the internalized ethical codes of mentors and trainers, and the situation in which the inquiry is to be conducted. "The ethical decisionmaker," they point out, "is one who realized that his
choices are related to values and weighs these values carefully when making important decisions. /since/ there may be /and/ few moral absolutes /and/ most moral decisions must be made individually in each case (p. 4).

In each of these arenas, however--wisdom ethics, content ethics and ethical decisions--Diener and Crandall (1978) have specified no overarching principle which guides the research. In the absence of such a principle, it may be fairly assumed that the principles are those of conventional (scientific, rationalistic) inquiry. And there's the rub.

The axioms of scientific inquiry mandate that the task of the researcher is the "search for truth," the approximation or description of "reality." The conventional inquirer assumes that "reality" is out there, awaiting investigation, confirmation and ultimately, description (in the form of laws and principles guiding its operation in quintessential form). The description and formulation of reality or a reality model, is, in itself, the crux of the problem with ethics in social science.

With the mandate for a search for truth in his hand, the social scientist is free to argue--and convincingly--that his or her research requires and indeed justifies the necessity to deceive. It justifies the deception on account of the scientist's need for a higher order or "truth"--a "reality" which must be approximated in descriptive terms, so that its laws may be uncovered, and ultimate prediction and control of the natural and social universe achieved. Such a mandate for the convergence on some "real 'reality" licenses the scientist to commit deception in pursuit of his or her goal. There is, in the argument of Diener and Crandall, a set of wisdom ethics which operated to undermine ethical process decisions in the conduct of research.
Presumptions about the nature of reality reinforce and indeed demand the second assumption of conventional inquiry, to wit, the necessity and indeed desirability of treating research subjects (respondents) as though they were objects. The objectification of human beings in the process of searching for "truth" (read: trying to discover the nature of "reality") has led, as the feminist Keller has (1983) argued, to the depersonalization and devaluing of human life. The posture on reality assumed by conventional scientific inquirers rests on "... the logical positivist presupposition that laboratory observations could provide unassailable knowledge if only we were able to produce a uniform psychological reality and do away with error variance... (in the hope that) the experimenter (can)... infer unambiguously the existence and direction of causal relations by ruling out alternative causal explanations" (Baumrind, 1985, p. 170). The flaw in this reasoning for our intents and purposes lies in the assumption that "such unassailable knowledge" may be obtained, or at least approximated. Baumrind (1985) argues that "... the claim that observations can provide value-free, objective knowledge has been challenged by philosophers and scientists at least since Heisenberg's (1958) principle was enunciated" (p. 170).

We would argue that not only is such unassailable knowledge unable to be obtained (since it does not exist), were it able to be obtained, the costs of obtaining it might be too high. The naturalists' argument on "unassailable knowledge" is that there is no such animal. Reality is a multiple, divergent and theoretically endless set of constructions about the nature of the world, and the location of an individual's place within that constructed context (Lincoln, 1984; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The scientist, wishing to control stimuli and data in an experimental context sets about
work in a laboratory situation; the naturalist goes looking for evidence about human behaviors in natural settings, where behaviors occur naturally, that is, as a result of individual selection of stimuli. The situation is best captured by Baumrind (1985):

Whereas laboratory methods construct situations and contexts for persons and then assess how they respond to these extrinsically constructed situations, persons in their natural settings typically construct or select their own social worlds (from) among the options available. (p. 171)

Because of this problem, "... it can be argued that laboratory conditions create the very ambiguity they are intended to dispel" (p. 171).

But false findings (introduced error resulting from the "unnatural" laboratory environment) are not the only price to pay. Even traditional conventional inquirers are now arguing that there are costs to deceptive research practices which are not worth the game. Reese and Fremouw (1984) posit that "The ethics of science deal with the integrity of data; unethical practices undermine science as a body of knowledge ... (While) The ethics of research deal with the protection of human rights; unethical practices do not undermine science as a body of knowledge, but they undermine society at large through the implications of the research findings or society as embodied in human research participants through the methods used" (p. 863). Society attempts to bring normal ethics and normative ethics into conformity by the institution of peer review boards, institutional committees to oversee the protection of human subjects and federal and state regulation of the human research process, but "the assumption that ethical conduct has been adequately legislated through peer review or federal regulation is challenged" (p. 863).
Regulation rarely serves its overriding function because:
legislated review boards are more concerned with legalistic due-process compliance than with ethical behavior; they confuse accounting with accountability, etiquette with ethics, responsiveness with responsibility, and religion with faith. They are concerned with form rather than substance, and by legislation they are barely qualified to determine whether proposed research is good science (p. 871).

Thus normative societal ethics rarely get translated into the normal ethics of science.

The implications of this disjunction are heavy. When deception is practiced in the name of science, subjects' (scientific participants) "rights to autonomy, dignity and privacy are necessarily violated" (Baumrind, 1985). In this violation, Baumrind argues, there are three types of costs, each of which is onerous, dangerous and too high to be borne: costs to the subjects themselves, costs to the profession, and costs to society as a whole.

Costs to the subjects include the undermining of trust in respondents' own judgment and undermining of trust in fiduciaries, and psychological stresses related to having been duped (including the unwillingness to admit to having been duped and engaging in destructive obedience). Costs to respondents also include the loss of self-determination, and the loss of individual locus of control. The harm done to the profession include " . . . (a) exhausting the pool of naive subjects, (b) jeopardizing community support for the research enterprise, and (c) undermining the commitment to truth of the researchers themselves" (Baumrind, 1985, p. 169). Costs to society include the undermining of "trust in expert authorities . . . increased self-consciousness in public places, (a) broadening of the aura of mistrust and
suspicion that pervades daily life, inconveniencing and irritating persons by contrived situations, and desensitizing individuals to the needs of others . . . " (p. 169-170). Taken together these costs serve not only to destroy the credibility of social science, they serve to subvert the social principles upon which societies rest, and which permit intentional and civil public action.

Thus the necessity imposed upon social scientists to search for a "truth" (which does not exist) licenses the traditional or conventional scientist to deceive human respondents in the pursuit of that truth, but the costs of such public deceit are slowly being rejected by social scientists themselves as too high and ultimately counterproductive to the research enterprise itself. As a consequence of the criticism, social scientists are asking whether or not those costs might not be avoided.

We would argue that such costs might not only be avoided, they may be utterly reversed.

What Is the General Nature of Ethical Behavior?

Sissela Bok, who has written extensively on moral choices with respect to both lying (1978) and concealment and revelation (1982), has posed three considerations for ethical behavior. The first of those, credited to John Rawls, is the argument for publicity, that is, the dilemma must be made public, and brought under public consideration. "According to such a constraint," she argues, "a moral principle must be capable of public statement and defense" (1978, p. 97).

Justification . . . means to hold up to some standard, such as a religious or legal or moral standard. Such justification requires an audience: it may be directed to God, or to a court of law, or one's peers, or one's own conscience; but in ethics it is most appropriately
aimed, not at any one individual or audience, but rather at 'reasonable persons' in general. (1978, p. 96, emphases added)

Thus an ethical decision must be explored in a situation of public scrutiny, and it must be accomplished with a public of reasonable persons.

In order to identify those whom might reasonably be considered reasonable persons for a test of publicity,

We must share the perspective of those affected by our choices, and ask how we would react if the lies we are contemplating were told to us. We must, then, adopt the perspective not only of liars but of those lied to; and not only of particular persons, but of all those affected by lies--the collective perspective of reasonable persons seen as potentially deceived (p. 98).

Two of the criteria for ethical behavior (moral principle), then, would be that the test of whether or not deception (or concealment) is acceptable is the public justification, before those whom one can define as reasonable persons, including those who are likely to be deceived.

A third criterion for ethical behavior--and a far more subtle one--is the dimension of discretion which Bok (1982) is quick to point out is related to, but rather distant from the "conventional use ... to connote good manners and a concern for appearances (p. 41). Rather, the experience of discretion is the intuitive ability to discern what is and is not intrusive and injurious, and to use this discernment in responding to the conflicts everyone experiences as insider and outsider. It is an acquired capacity to navigate in and between the worlds of personal and shared experience, coping with the moral questions about what is fair or unfair, truthful or deceptive, helpful or harmful. Inconceivable without an
awareness of the boundaries surrounding people, discretion requires a sense for when to hold back in order not to bruise, and for when to reach out ....

The experience of secrecy and of the perspectives of insider and outsider to secrets mirrors a central aspect of moral relations between and others more generally. Learning to handle secrecy with discretion blends with and reflects moral development. In each, one must come to see oneself and others as capable of moral choice and as owed respect. (pp. 41; 42).

Discretion, as an element of ethical behavior, is perhaps the least possible component to assess, to define, to encompass, to do other with than recognize when we s't. Nevertheless, ethical behavior demands this form of prudent and cautious reserve. Bok emphasizes that any ethical principle which contained at least the first two elements would be very like that which we know as the golden rule: "What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor," according to Rabbi Hillel.

However, constrained the the moral guidelines Bok enjoines, there are also legal criteria which govern treatment of humans in research settings. Diener and Crandall (1978) remind us that these are four broad areas of legal concern for the inquirer. Those four are well covered in the literature, so will only be reviewed here for the sake of reminding readers that they are considered distince categories of possible risk or harm. It is also worthwhile to point out that Webb's (1966) and his colleagues cautions regarding "moral boiling points" of inquirers are as crucial today as when their original work was published. the answers we might pose to moral and ethical questions are not absolutes, and as noted earlier, there
is not firm agreement in the social science community about what constitutes "bottom-line" prohibitions. So, for instance, while we might, and do, take a firm stance on the issue of deception (for a series of reasons which we hope will be at least partly explicitly and wholly intuitively clear), others who are involved in similar research endeavors might not share our perspectives. Bulmer was quite correct in his assessment that the choices "resist definitive resolution."

The first area of concern has to do with harm. Whether the harm is psychological, psychic, physical, or merely the stress of being at risk, generally accepted principles dictate that subjects (for scientific inquiry) or respondents (for naturalistic or cooperative inquiry) not be harmed or placed in risk of harm. This includes the lawful harm which can result when subjects lose, or are cajoled or deceived into giving up, their rights.

The stories of physical harm done to research participants have been well-documented in the literature; books on ethical considerations in the social sciences are full of such gruesome accounts. We would argue, however, that it is a rare case today where subjects are brought to physical harm. It is much more often the case the participants—or even the targets of social science programs or experiments—are subjected to more subtle psychic harm. For instance, members of disadvantaged groups may be allotted to "control groups" for the purpose of discovering what effects trial programs have. In theory, it sounds like good social science experimentation: group A gets the "treatment" (hardly a value-neutral term in itself), and group B gets "no treatment." Laying aside for the moment that group A might not desire the treatment, or that the treatment is unresponsive to group A's felt or expressed needs (a problem in non-groundedness), or that the treatment may be
delivered in such a way as to deprive members of group A of their rights or simple human dignity, how does social science policy justify withholding a treatment which may be efficacious in addressing some social problem from group B? Group B, upon discovering it was part of a control group, senses its disenfranchisement, understands it has lost the right to self-determination, is angry because it has not been asked for the personal interpretation of its own needs to policymakers, and is rightfully and justifiably irked to be treated as laboratory animals. Social experiments conducted in this manner thus bring down harm on both target groups: the one for not having been asked what its perceived needs might be, the other for being denied what might have been an auspicious or gainful intervention.

There is a great temptation to label this situation stereotypically by commenting that you can't please everybody all the time, and some people you can't please hardly any of the time. But there is something much more delicate at stake here. At issue is whether, as a society, we wish to address social ills (and the pendulum appears to swing both ways), and how we shall go about designing and delivering interventions to accomplish such tasks.

Interventions which attempt, for instance, to renovate neighborhoods that accomplish that end by destroying in intact communities may be viewed by a majority of people (not merely those immediately affected) as not worth the cost. The research on "slum neighborhoods" is a good case in point: when one sees a ghetto as a "slum," then urban renewal serves the purpose of protecting the face of a city; when one understands a ghetto as a closely-knit community, however, with highly articulated social roles and statuses, then urban renewal (in the sense of tearing down houses, apartment complexes and other buildings) is a community-effacing, neighborhood-destroying
policy. The question of whose values are served, or whose values are identified and preserved, is a serious one in light of the potential for harm, especially harm as we have broadened it.

The second area of concern is that of informed consent. With federal regulations and published guidelines now available to suggest (or require) which can legitimately be considered informed consent, consent ethics has in place a series of permissions and proscriptions regarding what is considered informed consent, from whom it might be obtained (for instance, in the place of children), and what is reasonably considered informed (that is, how much does the inquirer need to let the potential participant know). The rub here, it would seem, turns on what is considered informed from the perspective of the inquirer and what the participant might consider informed. In many places (universities, for example), only the broadest description of the research project is required to be given to prospective participants. In most cases, this is quite sufficient, as the research intended is not likely to harm (or, for that matter, to benefit) the participants in any foreseeable way. But descriptions of research projects can sometimes (and have been) rather deliberately misleading; and there is the 'moral boiling point' problem of whether or not, in the interests of not "biasing" the research results, whether or not participants may be deliberately misled or deceived. Clearly, if respondents or participants are deceived then the criterion of informed consent has also been violated, since one cannot make an informed decision regarding participation if one is misled regarding the purposes of the research.

Indeed, the third concern for Diener and Crandall (1978) is that of deception. Is it morally permissible to deceive prospective respondents or
participants regarding the nature of the inquiry undertaken? Bok (1979) has analyzed multiple reasons why people defend lying or the intent to deceive. First, she contends, researchers defend the right to lie in order to avoid greater harm. Such lies are often told to the sick and dying, often with the justification that knowing the truth of one's condition would cause the victim more suffering, more anguish, or, occasionally, to die even more swiftly. But the recent work on death and dying (see, for instance, On Death and Dying, by Elisabeth Kubler-Ross, 1969) suggests that such lies only serve to pervert or thwart the natural process of coming to terms with death, and that as such, they serve neither the terminally ill or their anguished families. Primarily, such lies serve mainly to "protect" physicians and nurses from having to deal with phases of anger, denial, grief, and serene acceptance of inevitable physical processes. In that light, they are hardly defensible lies.

A second reason often promulgated for lying is the provision of some benefit or social good. In this instance, the structure of the lie revolves about "the interests of science" (please note that such a phrase is heavily freighted with the positivist constructions regarding the search for "truth"), or "the public's right to know." The search for understanding (notice we do not use the term "knowledge") of the social and natural world is most assuredly a worthy end. It is also the case that Jack Douglas's admonishment regarding how much really "shady stuff" is going on in the world is probably a good reason to continue to support the public's right to know. But there are some problems with each of these excuses for lying. In the first instance, the phrase "in the interest of science" covers a multitude of sins. Science is too broad a term to accept carte blanche;
whose science? operating under whose value system? with what safeguards?
And are we talking about the social world, or the natural world? Or is it some mix of the two, as in the case of recombinant DNA research, which opens the possibility of creating new organisms to accomplish certain desired tasks (for instance, a microbe which will "clean up" oil spills), or repairing (or utterly altering) genetic structures in all of the animal kingdom. It is counterintuitive to suggest that each new "advance" in the natural and physical world makes life easier for all mankind. To the contrary, scientific "advances" often catch society with its moral, ethical and philosophical pants down. What we can do medically, technologically and genetically has far outstripped our careful and considered opinions about what we should be doing.

Equally tragic, the public's right to know--on its face, a well-intentioned and worthwhile social goal--has created problems of its own. The daily dose of war served up on dinner-hour television--served up both live and dead from war-torn Vietnam--is credited with creating the conditions for a massive public resistance to the war effort itself. It the interest of the public's right to know, public opinion was slowly and with grim persistence, unalterably reversed. The first really big media war created the conditions for its own extinction. Horrified by the destruction which seemed not, in fact, a world away, and finally mobilized by the spectacle of seeing its own children shot as they protested the injustice of such a war, the American public repudiated the war. The public surely had a right to know, but its reaction to what it began to know created a wholly unexpected and unwelcome response, not only for the administrations responsible for the war, but also for those who fought it, the veterans.
The public's right to know can serve as a two-edged sword, even for those who adamantly believe they are serving quite another cause.

Bok (19) also contributes a third justification often used for lying, that which serves the interests of fairness. Those lies, it is often demurred, allow some segment of society to redress a wrong, to right an injustice (the Robin Hood motivation), to punish someone whom society seems culpable, or to protect someone's privacy. It is difficult to know how a lie ultimately might redress a wrong (on the theory that two wrongs do not finally make a right), but it is somewhat easier to understand how some kinds of social lies can protect the privacy of individuals. It is under this very dictum that researchers and scholars "change the names to protect the innocent" in their final reports. The minor alteration of names, place descriptions and the like allow for the publication of research results without the general public's knowledge of the exact research site (in most instances). Such lies, to the extent that they do not warp the results and conclusions, are a part of the social contract of the research community, and few take exception to such a lie. In fact, it is considered de riguer in social science research, just as we allow--by common consent--police cars to remain unmarked in the interest of serving the larger social good of trapping those who would speed on the streets and highways.

The fourth justification for lying, Bok says, serves the larger end of maintaining veracity, whether front or face, or of protecting the truth (although, once again, it is hard to see how a lie can, in any logical sense, protect the truth), for the sake of a theory (also unjustifiable, since theories are built on the possibilities of disconfirmation), or for the sake of undoing a false impression about a field (one wonders whether the original impression were quite so false in the first place).
The fourth area of concern is for the privacy and confidentiality of research subjects, respondents or participants (depending on which paradigm is operant). As in the case of informed consent, federal guidelines and regulations promulgated recently have stabilized the boundaries of some of the more glaring concerns. But today's answers will not service tomorrow's questions, and the high technology transfer of information via computer networks will necessitate new guidelines possibly as early as yesterday. In the meantime, the general rule is that individuals are entitled by law to privacy with respect to their persons and information about themselves which they would not want in the public domain (although certain public persons—such as politicians, entertainment people, and others who have brought themselves under scrutiny—appear to have fewer rights, under recent rulings by the courts), and they are entitled to have certain records about themselves remain confidential (records such as medical claims, grades, scores on school-administered tests, and financial records, to name a few), and be released only at the owner's permission. The linking of computer and information banks across the country has made this right a problematic one to enforce. Credit data in particular is relatively easy for financial agencies to glean; the advent of credit cards and national credit check agencies has virtually insured that financial data may be shared among those with the "keys" to the banks in the twinkling of an eye. Nevertheless, in the face-to-face contact which is usually established between the naturalistic inquirer and the respondents to or participants in his or her research, privacy and confidentiality within the limits of human guarantee are to be expected and honored. To do otherwise constitutes a violation of the principle derived in the first part of this chapter: it robs
participants of their dignity, and subjects them to loss of privacy and possible (of not actual) harm.

The foregoing four areas of concern--harm, informed consent, deception and privacy and confidentiality--represent potential unethical behaviors with respect to respondents and participants in research. There are also issues which surround unethical behaviors by scientists toward other scientists, or toward their own professions or disciplines--in short, behaviors which do not necessarily bring harm to research respondents, but which bring discredit to other members of their profession. Those behaviors include, but are most assuredly not limited to: reporting of false or "fudged" data, reporting of work which is not one's own, theft of the results of other researchers' work, and the like. The assumption that we make, however unjustified, is that such unethical conduct will at some time or another come to light. In traditional and conventional inquiry, instances of the first behavior come to light when research cannot be replicated by other scientists attempting to confirm findings.

Unfortunately, the emphasis on de novo research, research which breaks new ground rather than confirming or disconfirming older research, has tended to shield researchers from the careful, sometimes plodding and painstaking work which is required for verification or disproof. In naturalistic inquiry, the confirmability audit should offer some redress against counterfeit researchers, but experience with the audit is limited, and like replication in scientific inquiry, it is likely to be rarely undertaken, even in the service of authenticating results.

In any event, we are less concerned with unethical behaviors perpetrated by individual scientists against members of their own community (although that is a serious problem) than with the inequities inflicted on
hapless research participants. The possibilities of crimes against the rights and dignity of individuals appear to multiply faster than citizens can find means of redress. Therefore, the responsibilities for maintaining an ethical posture like that of Caesar's wife still remain with men and women of conscience who are trained social scientists. With them rests the responsibility to avoid, if possible, untoward consequences of their research activities.

**How Do We Avoid Unethical Behavior in Social Science?**

Given the moral guidelines promulgated by Bok (1975) above, and the legal issues explicated by Diner and Crandall (1978) in the foregoing section, how do we confront or sidestep the problems engendered by positivist social science?

The simplest answer is to move to the contending alternative paradigm for social science research.

A legitimate question would be: how does that help us to avoid the desperate quicksand of troubles inherent in the positivist terrain? The answer is equally straightforward. The problems suggested above have two dimensions: the warrant to deceive embedded in the injunction for the conventional scientist's search for truth, to wit, deceptive behavior is justified when and if it leads to greater knowledge of social reality, and if it provides for the protection of human subjects; and human subjects, for the purposes of social science inquiry, may be in whole or in part treated as "objects" of the scientist's investigations. Naturalistic inquiry avoids both of those pitfalls, and in the process, responds to criticism from both the social science community itself, and from social scientists who wish to work within another paradigm for inquiry (cf. Reason & Rowan, among others, 1981).
Naturalistic inquirers respond to these problems in two ways. First, naturalists hold that there is no "reality" out "there;" that social realities are social constructions, selected, built and embellished by social actors and individuals from among situations, stimuli and events available to them. As a result, the naturalist is not interested in pursuing some single "truth" (which s/he does not believe exists, in any event), but rather is interested in uncovering the various constructions held by individuals and shared, occasionally, among members of stakeholding groups in a social context. These constructions represent the meanings attached to events, situations and persons by human beings in their effort to impose order on social phenomena. In that sense, the constructions are intensely personal, idiosyncratic, and consequently, as plentiful and diverse as there are persons to hold them.

In confronting the axiom that there is no single truth, but rather multiple, divergent and whole-cloth constructions, the naturalist is ill-served by engaging in deception. Deception merely serves to confound the participants in research, who become at a loss as to what kinds of responses the naturalist needs. Since it is the constructions themselves which are of interest to the naturalistic inquirer, and since deception serves only to obfuscate the naturalist's search, the naturalist seeks to avoid deception. Suddenly, deception ceases to eliminate supposed bias and contribute validity, as it supposedly does in conventional inquiry, and begins to frustrate the very search it has been intended to aid. If the inquirer is interested in constructions, then it is pointless to lie to and deceive respondents. One cannot "discover" individual and group constructions if individuals and groups do not understand the point of the research.
The second way in which naturalistic inquiry thwarts the mandate to deceive granted by conventional inquiry is in the special relationship implied by the interaction between the inquirer and those inquired into. Naturalists reject the idea that the researcher-researched relationship ought to be objective and distanced. The relationship between the two is monistic, rather than dualistic. It is furthermore a relationship between equals, built on mutual respect, dignity and trust. It is entered into as what Reinhari (1978) calls a "lover model" (mutual exchange and regard) rather than as what she called the "rape model" (researcher takes what s/he wants and leaves).

If scientists have no license to treat others (usually, their subjects) as "objects," then a wholly new relationship must be forged. That relationship has to be built on the basis of mutual exchange, the preservation of human dignity, privacy and confidentiality, and joint negotiation of research purposes, strategies and interpretations. This means nothing less than the form of inquiry which is increasingly termed "collaborative" or joint inquiry (Reason & Rowan, 1981), wherein the researched become co-equal partners in the research effort, and where they have equal say in the interpretation and distribution of results of the inquiry. The power of agency and the locus of control never leave the province of the researched, and their decisions regarding the information about them (and the real or possible harm that such information might bring to them) remain theirs to negotiate in the present and the future.

Because of these two axiomatic beliefs—that reality is not a singular entity, warranting some possibly deceptive search for its nature, and that human beings interact to produce knowledge, and respondents may not be
treated as objects—naturalistic inquiry demands that no deception ever be employed in the service of social science research. That does not mean, however, that there are no problems resulting from utilizing naturalistic inquiry as a paradigm for research.

Among those dilemmas (and we have by no means identified or dealt with all of them) are the special nature of intense, face-to-face contact with participants; the difficulties with maintaining or preserving confidentiality and anonymity; the relationships of trust which may or may not be built, and which may have to be constructed in very short time frames; the powerful pressure for completely open negotiations in light of anonymity, confidentiality and privacy difficulties; and the framing of the case studies themselves—what should be included and what excluded, given the wealth of data, the dearth of time, and fiscal constraints. Each of these deserves some mention, although the treatment will necessarily be incomplete.

**Face-to-Face Contacts**

Since naturalistic inquiry depends on the recreation of respondents' realities, gathering and testing those realities necessitates human instrument, person-to-person data collection (Guba & Lincoln, 1981). Dobbert (1982) contends that humans are polyphasic learners who absorb information both coded and uncoded, implicit and explicit, intended and unintended, through simultaneous multiple modalities—the olfactory, auditory, visual, kinesthetic, tactile, positional, cognitive, and emotional ones; and with the ethologist... that humans are primates who learn through exploration, manipulation, activity and interaction. (pp. 14-15, emphases added)
This activity and interaction, however, places both researcher and respondent in jeopardy. That jeopardy revolves about the highly personal relationships which are built as each gives, takes, shares and teaches the other. Such highly personal interactions create vulnerability as knower and known exchange roles, barter trust, and reconstruct identities.

The inquirer faced with conventional questionnaires never confronts this frightening risk of knowing and being known; nor do his research participants need to provide him or her with slices of their lives. There is a protection in the instrument which lies between traditional scientific inquirers; there is little protection when the instrument is the inquirer.

The unarmed and accessible human in touch with the unarmed and accessible participant is an encounter fraught with every possibility from human interaction.

Anonymity, Confidentiality and Privacy

Although the naturalist is under the same rules and regulations as the conventional scientist, he or she may find particular difficulties in maintaining the anonymity or privacy of research participants. Guba and his colleagues in fieldwork found this to be exactly the case:

It is the nature of naturalistic research and the case study reporting method that both are more susceptible to breaches of confidentiality and anonymity than conventional inquiry. Most naturalists are therefore very sensitive to the ethics involved and may go to extraordinary lengths to protect respondents and sites from discovery. . . .

It seems to be well established that respondents have a right to privacy, and, if they give up that right in the spirit of cooperation with the researcher, they at least deserve as much protection as the researcher can provide.
As we have seen, such protection must be difficult to extend and impossible to guarantee. Even if all the names and places and dates are changed "to protect the innocent," it is quite likely that other locals will be able to pinpoint the agencies and parties involved. And that breach of confidence may have the most serious consequences of all, for it is these other locals who may be in positions of authority or influence with respect to the research participants, and thus may have the most powerful sanctions to apply (Guba, Knowlton, Skrtic, 1984, pp. 111, emphases our own).

As we have made clear earlier (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), one of the procedures for establishing trustworthiness is the member check. Research personnel continuously test data and interpretations with members of the groups from which data are solicited. While researchers can be scrupulous in not revealing actual sources for data (those data may have been collected from other members of the same stakeholding audience), nevertheless expressions or particular views may be recognized as coming from only one or two possible sources. As a result, confidentiality or anonymity may not be able to be guaranteed. As a result, the trust relationships which are built must necessarily be negotiated with full disclosure of the risks which respondents are taking. Every effort can be taken to disguise the words of

1Indeed, in the study to which reference was made earlier, the researchers questioned the extent of the trust relationships which had been built, not because of violations of ethics, but simply because of the brief visits necessitated by contract provisions. Thus, normal levels of community acceptance which might be expected in a full-scale anthropologically-oriented study were probably not achieved.
singular commentators (who may have extremely idiosyncratic interpretations), but locals who are familiar with the viewpoints of others in the community under study may be able to identify others whose viewpoints are well known.

**Trust and Negotiation**

Honest trust between mature adults is only built over time, and we are mindful that some larger, multi-site studies may try to capture broader understandings at the expense of more intense and deeper interpersonal relationships between researchers and their participants. For this reason, social scientists need to elicit the fullest cooperation from those in the context. Achieving this (if it is achievable, in light of the very human need to present oneself at one's best) demands forthrightness, clear and fair explication of the purposes of the research, and authentic presentation of the researcher's self. Normally, self-revelation is accomplished over time and occasionally with great difficulty. Some projects, however, demand such efforts in small segments of time and hence produce intro- and interpsychic efforts on the part of researchers and researched alike. It is not impossible to accomplish good rapport in a short time; it is, however, costly (in psychological terms) to both parties to the research. Researchers cannot, in short time frames, afford the casual contacts which permit trust to build over time and participants cannot afford to be misled about the intents and purposes of the research. The normal constraints of doing fieldwork relying on the human instrument become attenuated if time frames are collapsed, hence the need for powerful self-awareness before entering the field.
Framing of Case Studies

Naturalistic research shares some of the burdens of other ethnographic forms of research (or indeed of any field research): there are more data, more insights and more incidents than could possibly be fully reported. Thus, the problems of inclusion and exclusion confront the naturalist just as they do the anthropologist. What is to be left in and what left out in the final case study or ethnography? How much thick description is necessary in order to determine whether or not research findings might have applicability in another setting? How does one shape cases so that readers have the vicarious experience which is demanded for empathic understanding?

Those who have retreated to claiming the construction of a case study is more an artistic process than a scientific or empirical one have much sympathy. Indeed the choice of what is included and what is excluded can make the difference between a compelling narrative—which evokes sensitivity and compassion for some part of the human condition—and a dry and tasteless technical report. Writing evocatively itself is a talent which must be cultivated; writing in order to present facts in a coherent empirical study which is also evocative is well-nigh an art. Douglas Caulkins (1984) explained that the personal and the anthropological were often separated in early Western European ethnographies by the simple convention of writing two narratives, the one the anthropologist's entry and socialization on the site, and the other the "facts" of the culture under study. Even earlier in the tradition, this was accomplished by the "travelogue" and the ethnography. He has analyzed

x... four positions concerning the nature of narrative in ethnography: first, that narrative is largely absent from the genre; second, that personal narrative in ethnography, previously modeled on travel
writing, has been marginalized; third, that narrative structure is implicit (but in an unspecified manner) in contemporary realist ethnography; and fourth, that narrative is not only implicit in the construction of the text but also in anthropological theories of culture change as well. Clearly, we might collapse these four positions into two: ethnography as a genre of marginalized narrative and ethnography as a genre of implicit narrative. The opposition between these two positions immediately dissolves, however, when we realize that they are invoking different kinds of narratives: the first deals with personal or autobiographical narratives, and the second concerns 'non-personal' narratives which implicitly structure the ethnography. (p. 2-3)

Both kinds of narrative which derive from the analysis must be present in order for the narrative to speak vicariously of the researcher's experiences in the field. The "very common device /used by most early European ethnographers ... of/ demonstrating ethnographic authority while remaining unintrusive /in the text/" probably sacrifices more of the feeling tone of sites and contexts than the naturalist wants to give up (Caulkins, 1984, p. 5). The exclusion of self, then, is one choice which the naturalist will not make. The facts and incidents which bolster arguments and interpretations are another problem.

Choices about what to include and what to exclude probably ought to finally derive from the analyses and meta-analyses, in backward-looking fashion. When interpretations are settled, then data and incidents to substantiate those interpretations need to be chosen. Features of the context which call forth behaviors, activities, and values will need to be
presented in order to ground the behaviors and so forth in that context. In other words, if something must be left out in a final report, make certain that it is not a critical piece of data or a singular incident which would further the understanding of where and how the researcher came to his/her conclusions. If you need it to explain the story, then it ought to be in the narrative. The foregoing problems, however, by no means exhaust the problems given rise to by adopting naturalistic inquiry. The notion of "cooperative inquiry" embraces a whole new set of problems. Among those problems is that one captured by the question, "Whose agenda?"

Whose Agenda?

Both Diener and Crandall (1978) and Dobbert (1982) make clear that all social research services have some agenda. The former caution, as part of their general guidelines, that when a study is supported by a funding agency, the scientist must determine the research will be used for beneficial purposes. He should examine the possible applications of social scientific findings and endeavor to make these uses constructive. Before conducting a study the researcher must consider how the information will affect the people being studied (1978, p. 217).

If the researcher does not undertake the study alone, then, some obligation persists to discover why the funder wants the study done at all, and to what ends the results will be turned. Dobbert (1982) is quite clear that this process of sorting out agendas is part and parcel of the ethical responsibility of any social scientist (pp. 76-85). She describes one situation, but says there are "just as bad or worse" for the listening at any professional meeting."
A field worker hired by an agency of any sort to do research and provide recommendation for future policy and actions to that agency has, automatically, at least two clients—the agency utilizing the research and the study's subjects, for whom the policy or actions are intended. Often the situation is even more complex and five-party situations are not at all rare. A government may, for example, hire a research company to study schools in a certain problem area and make recommendations for their improvement. The agency in turn hired a fieldworker who goes out to study the local situation, only to discover that there are two very strongly opposed factions attempting to control the schools in question and that each has a different philosophy, which leads to incompatible plans for their schools. Ethically, the fieldworker in this situation is responsible to both hiring agencies... to himself or herself personally; and to both of the studied groups, who have given time and effort to provide data, with the hopes of having their side of the issue heard.... (pp. 82-83)

Our own experience verifies that such a situation is not unusual.

The ethical concern is exacerbated when agendas to be serviced are laid alongside the axiomatic dictates of reality construction. Whose reality gets presented (in all fairness, each of the multiple realities of the context should be presented; but alongside those should there also be the realities of the investigator? the funders? the contracting agency?) The complexity of the problem can best be represented by the figure following.

(insert Figure 1 about here)

We raised the issue earlier of the appropriateness of moving toward a more cooperative paradigm of research, where both investigator and
participants negotiated interpretations of the data gathered (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). We are not prepared to state unequivocally that as an ethical concern, cooperation and negotiation between researcher and researched is essential both to the maintenance of research authenticity and to the fulfillment of the criterion of discretion affording dignity. When participants do not "own" the data which they have furnished about themselves, they have been robbed of some essential element of dignity (in addition to having been perhaps abandoned in harm's way). And if they are accorded the dignity of ownership, they have rights to shape its use and dictate the purposes to which they will lend their names and information. To do less is to intrude, to violate, and to condemn to indignity.

Conclusion

We have argued that a central failure of conventional, or positivistic, inquiry has been the inability to come to grips with the socially and morally repugnant fact of deception in research and its violation of societal ethics regarding dignity, self-determination and individual human agency. Deception and the warrant to deceive afforded by conventional inquiry has personal, social, and professional costs which are sufficiently high to be rejected even by conventional inquirers, and by those persuaded to emergent paradigm inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), and those engaging in debates regarding the intersection of science and feminism (Keller, 1983), and Marxism and science (Reynolds, 1981).

The ethical concerns embodied in this failure may be seen as either moral or legal, although the two dimensions are not mutually exclusive. Moral dimensions include tests for whether or not the research would be approved by reasonable persons, whether it might pass the test of publicity, and whether or not it affords discretion in restraining from intrusiveness
and injuriousness. Legal tests revolve about whether the research sufficiently protects individuals from harm, from lapses in informed consent, from deception, and finally, from violations of privacy and confidentiality.

Conventional inquiry acquires "permission" to engage in deceptive and injurious research by virtue of its focus upon a supposed single "reality." Convergence upon this reality as the single most important focus of research has given rise to deception as a way of preventing ambiguity of research results. Ambiguity, however, is not avoided and furthermore, costs are added to the research for which the results of research might not be able to compensate.

Those costs to research enterprises which are deceptive can be avoided, utilizing emergent-paradigm, or naturalistic inquiry. With naturalistic inquiry's focus upon realities as multiple, divergent social constructions, the search for a single "reality" is avoided. The emphasis on utilizing, rather than compensating for, the interactivity of researcher and respondent, creates the conditions for participants in research processes to retain their locus of control individually, to make informed decisions regarding their participation and to have substantial agency in shaping the processes and results of the research on their lives.

Avoiding the necessity to deceive the reliance on dominant-subordinate relationships in the research process does not, however, avoid all problems associated with ethical social research. Utilizing naturalistic inquiry brings about a new set of problems, fostered by intense, face-to-face contact with participants; the difficulties associated with defining and maintaining privacy and confidentiality; problematic relationships of trust;
the contradictions inherent in attempting to fulfil the criterion of confidentiality and anonymity while operating from a position of cooperation and joint responsibility in negotiating the research process; and the inclusion and exclusion decisions for data in framing case studies.

Nevertheless, although each paradigm for inquiry resolves one set of problems while raising another, we believe that the warrant to deceive in positivist inquiry raises serious ethical difficulties in social research, and the rescinding of that warrant to deceive in naturalistic inquiry is a powerful commendation for a shift in paradigms.
Figure 1

Agenda Conflict in applied Fieldwork

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* Agenda implies values, design, control and uses of knowledge.

** Combination implies negotiated, participative, or cooperative research paradigm, in which respondents become participants and maintain some or much control over the uses to which results are put.
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American Psychological Assoc. Ad Hoc Committee on Ethical Standards in Psychological Research. Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Research with Human Participants. (1973) Washington, D.C.


* Please check the paper citation on page 10 to see if I have chosen the correct reference from your vita.