The policies initiated by broadcasters for campaign coverage during the 1924 presidential election influenced the treatment of political candidates on the air and helped set the stage for inclusion of the equal opportunities clause in the Radio Act of 1927. AT&T, RCA, and General Electric formed policies to treat candidates fairly in allocating air time and assessing charges. Radio covered the conventions and the campaigns in an equitable fashion, thereby setting a precedent for subsequent elections. In addition, candidates were afforded equal opportunities to use broadcast facilities, and costs for the same services were uniform. The media companies also initiated policies to provide fairness in coverage. The National Association of Broadcasters urged its members to provide equal time to both major political parties and their candidates. Conventions of the major parties were covered at no charge to the broadcasters for the rights to the radio coverage. Only the costs associated with the broadcast itself were assessed to the stations which carried the events. Political speeches and the other broadcasting needs of the candidates were paid for by the candidates or their political parties. As a result of these 1924 practices, today conventions and other public forums are covered without charge to the candidates, while candidates pay for other materials such as political advertising. (Sixty-two footnotes are appended.) (Author/BD)
CAMPAIGN POLICIES, BROADCASTERS, AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1924

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ABSTRACT

In the 1920s broadcasters set policies which influenced the treatment of political candidates on the air. During the 1924 Presidential election, the National Association of Broadcasters, AT&T, RCA, and General Electric formed policies to treat candidates fairly in allocating airtime and assessing charges. These "equal opportunities" policies helped set the stage for the inclusion of the equal opportunities clause, Section 18 (now Section 315), into the Radio Act of 1927. This paper examines the policies broadcasters initiated in the 1924 election for the coverage of campaigns.

In 1924 radio covered the conventions and the campaigns in an equitable fashion and, thereby, set a precedent for elections to come. Candidates were afforded equal opportunities to use broadcast facilities, and costs for the same service were uniform. AT&T and RCA-G.E. initiated policies to provide fairness in coverage. The NAB urged its members to provide equal time to both major political parties and their candidates.

Conventions of the major parties were covered at no charge to the broadcasters for the rights to the radio coverage. Only the costs associated with the broadcast itself were assessed the stations which carried the events. Political speeches and the other broadcasting needs of the candidates were paid for by the candidates or their political parties. Today conventions and other public forums are covered without charge to the candidates while candidates pay for other materials such as political advertising. Practices begun in 1924 set precedent for elections to come.
Campaign Policies, Broadcasters, and the Presidential Election of 1924

Section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, the equal opportunities provision for political candidates, has been one of the more controversial aspects of broadcast regulation since its incorporation as Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1924. Assumptions have been that broadcasters as a whole in the 1920s did not agree with the tenets of the doctrine and were forced to acquiesce to its inclusion solely because a law was needed to eliminate the chaos then present on the airwaves. Newly-analyzed primary resource documents indicate otherwise. This paper examines this evidence and the influences broadcasters had upon the development of policies developed to cover the first "broadcast" conventions and the Presidential race of 1924.

This paper examines the use of radio by major party Presidential candidates in 1924 and provides insights into the policies initiated then by industry leaders to cover political campaigns. It explores the specific questions: How did radio cover the conventions and campaign in 1924? Did broadcasters allow all candidates equal access to the airwaves during the 1924 campaign? What policies were initiated by the broadcasters, especially industry leaders, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and the Radio Corporation of America, in their attempts to cover the 1924 conventions and campaigns? Review of contemporary newspaper and magazine articles, government and industry memoranda
and correspondence, corporate interoffice communiques, notes and minutes of confidential meetings of both business and government on radio, and public pronouncements by industry and government leaders provide the answers to these questions. Specific archive collections used for this article are found at the National Archives; the Library of Congress; the Smithsonian; the AT&T Corporate Editorial and Historical Division in New York City; the Mass Communication History Center in Madison, Wisconsin; the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library at West Branch, Iowa; the National Association of Broadcasters Library and the Broadcast Pioneers Library in Washington, D.C.; Owen Young's papers in Van Hornesville, New York; and the papers of the American Civil Liberties Union at Princeton University.

Political Broadcasting: Concerns for Control

Concerns over controlling messages disseminated via the airwaves had been raised in the liberal press, in congressional debates and hearings on various radio bills in the early 1920s, and by the broadcasters themselves. In early 1924 The Nation complained that broadcasters reflected the conservative views of the time and that they readily censored those individuals espousing more radical views:

'Mechanical trouble' in the broadcasting apparatus seems to be a disease with symptoms curiously similar to those of censorship. Three times recently radio speakers have been cut short. Each time the victim has thought that the trouble was censorship, and the radio company has explained it was 'mechanical trouble.'
One of these speakers had disapproved of prohibition; another had attacked New York drama critics; and a third had defended married women's rights to retain their own names and to hold jobs outside the home.

Radio companies, especially AT&T, were greatly concerned that the presentation of such controversial issues would create unfavorable audience reactions. AT&T's officials thought guidelines might be needed. AT&T wished its station, WEAF, to be the leader in the radio broadcast industry. To do so, officials recognized they could not afford to broadcast anything which was not acceptable to the vast listening public. Therefore, even though WEAF was a "toll station," a station which sold its time on a common carrier basis, AT&T retained the right of censorship over all presentations and reserved the right not to give reasons for refusing to air programs it deemed undesirable.

With such broadcaster-imposed policies came fears of radio operators' censorship over candidates and controversial speakers. During hearings in March, 1924, on a bill to regulate radio, Rep. Ewin Davis, a Tennessee Democrat, asked AT&T's director of broadcasting William Harkness:

*You can readily see, can you not, that one candidate might monopolize the radio field by obtaining contracts that his speeches and his propaganda, if we may use that term, might be carried and the other fellow not permitted to employ the same method of reply?*7

Harkness said few, if any, of the over 500 broadcasters then on the air would allow that to happen and added that most broadcasters would treat candidates fairly. Politicians, however,
remained skeptical.\textsuperscript{8}

Other broadcasters, cognizant of the politicians' concerns over monopoly and censorship, shared Harkness' views. During the first convention of the National Association of Broadcasters on October 11, 1923, the small group of independent broadcasters debated the question of whether politicians should be allowed access to the medium. The group decided to accept the suggestion of John Shepard III of WNAC that a political party applying for airtime be required to bring a speaker from the opposing party for the same broadcast slot and that both be given equal time.\textsuperscript{9} In that way, access to the airwaves could be fairly distributed for political coverage. In addition, the broadcasters did not wish to be perceived as playing favorites in the election. The NAB conferees recognized that all viable candidates should be afforded equitable treatment.\textsuperscript{10} Notes from the organization's meeting in September, 1925, suggest the NAB members followed this policy in the radio coverage they offered during the 1924 campaign.\textsuperscript{11}

In short, by early 1924, broadcasters were aware that they could be perceived as playing favorites in the political arena and had begun to establish their own policies to treat candidates fairly. At the same time station operators, notably AT&T and RCA, had begun to investigate seriously the possibilities for broadcasting the conventions, the campaign, and the election results.
Preparations for the Conventions

An AT&T interoffice report provides extensive documentation of AT&T's coverage of the 1924 campaign. The primary purpose of the document was to spell out explicitly the measures used in 1924 for reference in later election coverage. In December, 1923, it was unclear who would pay the cost of convention, campaign, and election coverage: AT&T, the national committees of the political parties, or the broadcasters who wanted the hookups to AT&T's proposed network. Through negotiations with radio stations and the national committees of both major political parties, AT&T decided assessing the radio stations for the convention coverage they desired was proper. Charges for airing other aspects of the campaign, especially coverage of speeches, would be assessed the candidates. This latter procedure is similar to today's practice of charging candidates for paid political announcements.

With the possibilities of setting up a network in mind, AT&T company officials organized a comprehensive plan to meet the needs for both convention and campaign coverage. For AT&T the primary consideration in any plan involving the use of Bell's long lines was the availability of lines that would not interfere with the normal, common carrier traffic handled by the Bell system.

By April, 1924, AT&T had determined that it would be impractical to connect more than 12 cities in the eastern half of the country because of the lack of equipment, trained personnel, and cost -- an estimated $12,000 for six days. For that price AT&T would broadcast the entire convention, not just the
highlights as it had originally planned. Complete coverage would enable stations in the network to decide what portion of the broadcast they would carry. The plans called for an AT&T announcer at the convention to supply a running commentary on features of interest in intervals between speeches and other events.\(^{15}\)

AT&T sent this information with the charges it planned to assess each station to the Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee. The Committees then sent letters to the various stations in the 12 cities, which had been indicated "suitable" by AT&T. These "suitable" stations were the high quality "Class B"\(^{16}\) stations, which used equipment made by AT&T's manufacturing arm, Western Electric. Because of the profits involved in manufacturing and selling this equipment, the better signal quality of the Class B stations, and its own prestige, AT&T wanted these larger, well-equipped stations to carry the conventions.\(^{17}\)

As the preparations for the conventions proceeded, however, suspicions and distrust of broadcasters threatened the proposed coverage of the Democratic convention. Stanley J. Quinn, vice chairman of the Executive Committee of the New York Democratic National Convention Committee, outlined these concerns in a confidential memorandum to Lewis Pierson of the Democratic National Committee. The memo focused on radio's coverage of the Democratic Party and ended up in the files of Owen Young. Young, as chairman of the board of RCA and president of General Electric,
could initiate changes in both RCA and GE stations' radio policy. Through his contacts at AT&T and Westinghouse he could also influence their policies.18

In the memo Quinn warned Pierson to tell "his friends in radio" that the Democrats were beginning to believe the radio industry was hostile to them. Quinn indicated that developments over the broadcasting of the convention were partially to blame.19 The memo stated that newspapers had carried a story stating that the Republican National Committee had been offered $25,000 for exclusive broadcasting rights to its convention. The Democrats did not realize that these monies were the amount offered by a newspaper, the Chicago Daily News, and not by the radio companies. The Democrats had misinterpreted the paper's action and began asking AT&T and RCA to pay for the right to broadcast the Democratic convention. Both companies stated that, as a matter of principle, they would not pay for the privilege of carrying the event.20

According to Quinn's memo, a conference was held among representatives of the Democratic committee, RCA, and AT&T. The companies' representatives expressed their distaste for setting the precedent of paying for the privilege of broadcasting a political event of national significance. Such events should be carried as a public service. Quinn told William Harkness and E.S. Wilson of AT&T and David Sarnoff of RCA that they could avoid setting such a dangerous precedent by making a contribution to the Local New York Entertainment Fund. If the companies donated
$10,000 collectively toward the entertainment of New York's visitors, Quinn said, the Democrats would open the convention's proceedings to all broadcast companies, free of charge.21

AT&T's representatives decided not to make a "contribution" while RCA contributed $1,000. AT&T later countered Quinn's suggestion with an offer of its own to broadcast the entire convention for a fee to be assessed the Democratic National Committee. The costs to the committee would be $10,000 for the first six days with an additional charge of about $1,100 for each successive day. When this offer was forwarded to Cordell Hull, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Quinn noted that Hull wanted to omit broadcasting of the convention altogether.22

Quinn wrote Pierson that he saw danger in the radio companies' risking the ill will of both conventioneers and the public by limiting coverage of the convention. Someday, he cautioned, the radio companies would need the backing of Democratic legislators and stated that the time to secure the lawmakers' good will was before, rather than after, the election.23 Quinn also warned Pierson that the Democratic National Committee and various unnamed, influential Democrats believed the radio industry was an adjunct of the Republican Party. The whole situation was a serious problem for continued growth in the radio industry.24 Pierson passed the memo to Owen Young, a registered Democrat, who helped establish policies to ease the Democrats' fears.

By June, 1924, the companies Owen Young headed, G.E. and RCA,
had adopted policies to promote fairness in the coverage of both political candidates and controversial issues. Martin Rice, manager of broadcasting for G.E., wrote a subordinate that unless both sides could be presented with, what he termed, "absolute fairness," the stations would not carry controversial topics or the messages of political candidates.25

Rice noted that the G.E. stations asked for manuscripts of political addresses to be delivered through their facilities. The G.E. radio station managers believed if such messages were aired, their stations would be compelled to invite representatives of other points of view on the same subject to speak during the same broadcast. Otherwise, Rice stated, the public would see G.E. as endorsing the views presented by the speaker and favoring certain candidates. But, Rice added that he believed the public viewed the airing of a political meeting exactly as it happened as equitable to all involved. The carriage of the speeches of select candidates, however, could be viewed by the public as favoritism. Rice and other RCA-G.E. officials wanted to avoid such allegations.26

In compliance with this policy statement, RCA-G.E.'s actions in coverage of the conventions, the candidates' speeches, and the election show the companies afforded equitable treatment to the candidates. The policies AT&T adopted and followed during the 1924 campaign also provided equal opportunity for political candidates.
Broadcasting the Conventions

Both AT&T and RCA broadcast the proceedings of the Republican convention in Cleveland June 10-13 and the Democratic convention in New York City June 24 through July 9. For the conventions the radio coverage set-up was almost identical.

According to its interoffice report, during the Republican convention AT&T placed its announcer, Graham McNamee, and two observers in positions where they could easily watch the proceedings.27 In addition to the WEAF network, which included Westinghouse's KDKA, WMAQ in Chicago and the G.E.-RCA stations WJZ and WGY covered the convention. Major J. Andrew White, WJZ's star announcer, handled on-the-scene coverage for the RCA stations. Both he and McNamee provided vivid, picturesque descriptions of the proceedings and the nomination of President Calvin Coolidge as the Republican candidate for the presidency.28 As with AT&T, the RCA stations covered nearly all of the convention's proceedings. Most sessions were scheduled for early afternoon and evening coverage. According to WJZ's logs, when the sessions ran long, scheduled programs were cancelled to carry the convention.29

The Republicans stationed no censor by the radio pick-up mikes, so during the convention the radio audience heard a militant faction led by Senator Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin fight to inject progressive planks into the Republican Party platform. When its actions failed, the faction bolted and set up a third party.30 This independent party, the Progressive Party, fought an uphill battle throughout the campaign to reach parity
with the two major parties. According to the AT&T report, the Progressive Party approached AT&T concerning the broadcast of its convention in Cleveland July 4-5. AT&T, however, could not accommodate the request as the company was in the midst of broadcasting the Democratic convention.31

Radio operators learned much during the coverage of the GOP convention, and, consequently, were better prepared when the Democrats met at Madison Square Garden in New York on June 24. Most observers expected the Democratic convention to follow the pattern of the Republicans'. But, the Democrats met for 16 days instead of three; a deadlock between the two top contenders for the nomination, Alfred E. Smith and Charles McAdoo, lasted 102 ballots. On the next ballot John W. Davis was chosen as a compromise candidate.32 Twenty stations carried the convention; eighteen were in the AT&T network while RCA stations WJZ and WGY experimented with interconnection by Western Union wires.33

Receiving sets were installed in the hall for the conventioneers and the press, according to AT&T's memo. So complete was the coverage provided by AT&T, the memo bragged, that some visiting reporters located in the Press Club in the basement of the Garden relied upon McNamee's reports for their stories. In addition, sets in the candidates' suites kept them advised of the status of the proceedings.34

Unlike the Republicans, the Democrats stationed an official censor near the speaker's microphone. The Democratic National Committee had reserved the right to switch the mike out of the
circuit at any time, if information they did not wish the public to hear was being aired. The committee had also obtained an agreement from the broadcasters that they would not broadcast accounts of any divisiveness within the party. But, neither the announcers nor the speakers had to carry the dissention of the Democratic Party to the public; the roar of the crowd brought the infighting of the factions to the radio listeners. With the close of the convention the Saturday Evening Post commented:

The Democratic Convention was held in New York, but all of America attended it. (Radio) gives events of national importance a national audience. The radio is even more merciless than the printed report as a conveyer of oratory...It is uncompromising and literal transmission...All the familiar phrases and resources of the spellbinder sound very flat and stale over the air. Radio constitutes the severest test for the speakers of the rough-and-ready, the catch-as-catch-can school, and reputations are going to shrink badly now that the whole nation is listening in. Silver-tongued orators whose fame has been won before sympathetic audiences are going to scale down to their real stature when the verdict comes from radio audiences.

The conventions were not only "attended by all of America," but they also were the proving ground for networking.

As the campaign progressed, political campaign speeches helped AT&T perfect techniques for regional and coast-to-coast network transmissions. AT&T, G.E.-RCA, and other broadcasters continued their policies of equal treatment of the candidates as the campaign proceeded. These policies called for equal costs for comparable airtime and station interconnections to be assessed candidates and for airtime to be allocated equitably among candidates. If they could pay for the time, candidates could buy it. Paid political announcements, or speeches, were here to stay.
Campaign Coverage

During the campaign the Republicans pursued the strategy of ignoring the Democrats. Coolidge sat out the campaign in the White House and left the strenuous barnstorming to his running mate, Charles Dawes. Dawes concentrated his fire on the Progressive Party candidate, Robert LaFollette. Although LaFollette was a moderate, the Republicans insinuated that the senator was a Bolshevik agent and warned that a vote for him might prevent any candidate from winning a majority of Electoral College votes and, thus, throw the election into the House of Representatives. "Coolidge or chaos" was the only issue, the Republicans urged.

The Progressives based their 1924 campaign on the old cry of the evils of monopoly. Theirs was a campaign faced with almost insurmountable odds. They had no state, county, or municipal tickets. The 1924 Progressive movement was not so much a third party as it was merely a presidential and vice-presidential ticket. The Progressives were also crippled by the lack of money; for every dollar Coolidge had in campaign funds, LaFollette had four cents.

During the campaign varying numbers of stations were interconnected for the broadcasting of political speeches by the more prominent members of the three leading political parties. The AT&T report noted that at the request of the Republican National Committee, AT&T prepared a guide for the use of radio in the campaign for Republican state headquarters. The brochure
stressed the vast audiences which could be reached through radio transmission and added that radio should be used wherever practical because of the arduous nature of campaigning. The booklet outlined procedures to be followed to obtain AT&T service and suggested that the requests be made as early as possible. Neither the Democrats nor the Progressives requested a similar brochure. Had they done so, more likely than not, AT&T would have accommodated them. A speech delivered one week after the election by William Harkness, AT&T's director of broadcasting, stated that AT&T's position on the treatment of candidates and political parties was one that focused on equity. He said to avoid discrimination "during a political campaign the broadcaster either must refuse to serve any political party, or he must treat them all on the same basis."44

After the conventions, AT&T supplied radio station interconnections, or networks, to the Democrats and the Republicans for their acceptance speeches. The various political committees made arrangements with the broadcasters for coverage of these events, and the bills for these broadcasts were paid by the respective political candidates.46

By this time AT&T was in the process of creating a permanent network of stations. This network was to be functional by October, 1924, and AT&T wanted to take steps to insure its frequent use.47 Broadcast of political speeches was one way to accomplish this. AT&T expected that such speeches would add to any network's prestige and that coverage would also increase the
interest in radio of those listening to the interconnected stations. This increased listening audience, AT&T recognized, could then be offered to national advertisers. AT&T estimated its proposed network could eventually cover 78 percent of the nation's purchasing power by interconnecting the country's 24 top major markets.

Numerous political speeches followed the acceptance speeches of the candidates. In all, 55 speeches given by individuals in the three major parties were transmitted through AT&T interconnections between the last candidate acceptance speech on August 19 and the final campaign speeches of Coolidge and Davis on November 3. Again, the candidates or their respective parties paid for the interconnections. Stations then could broadcast them for free. A review of the radio stations and networks set up by AT&T shows the incumbent, Coolidge, and the Republicans, the dominant party, interconnected stations more frequently than did either the Democrats or the Progressives. In addition, as the campaign progressed, AT&T's memo noted, its radio coverage permitted the candidates to listen to and to answer their opponents' speeches long before the newspapers reached candidates with the text of the addresses.

During the campaign John W. Davis, the Democratic candidate, toured the West in a railway car especially equipped with loud speakers and radio jacks. These jacks made interconnections with local radio stations easy to effect. During October, Davis' speeches were aired five times by AT&T interconnection. This
coverage included Davis' last speech on November 3, which linked 14 stations from Providence, Rhode Island, in the east to St. Louis in the west.53

For the most part, Calvin Coolidge maintained a front-porch campaign,54 but, when he did go on the air, his broadcasts generally covered a broad geographical area.55 On September 25, he broadcast from Philadelphia over a network of 12 stations. The coverage reached the East Coast and much of the Midwest. On October 23, he delivered a major policy speech to the United States Chamber of Commerce. This 45-minute talk was carried by 22 stations, and its coverage area was the entire nation.56

While Coolidge spoke only twice via radio, other Republican speakers used the medium's interconnections sixteen times on behalf of the Republican Party more often.57 Late in the campaign the Republicans literally took over two radio stations on the East Coast to broadcast the party's messages. They staged three political rallies and kept Dawes on the radio each night to hammer away at the opponents.58 Two of the rallies, one on October 29 and the other on October 30, were carried by a small network of stations with RCA's WJZ acting as the originating station.59 On November 1, a sixteen station hook-up under AT&T's auspices carried speeches of Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes and New York gubernatorial candidate Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and band music to entertain the audience.60

Coolidge's last campaign speech, made the night before the election, urged all citizens to go to the polls. Twenty-seven
stations were interconnected by AT&T coast-to-coast for this event; the potential audience was an estimated 20 to 30 million. AT&T's staff stationed several hundred service personnel at intervals along the land circuit over the Rockies to guard against any interruption of the speech to the West Coast. The next evening broadcast stations brought the election results to the nation: the Coolidge-Dawes ticket won in a landslide.

All in all, during the 1924 election the presidential candidates were treated equitably by the larger broadcasters, AT&T and RCA-G.E. RCA and AT&T initiated policies to provide fair coverage of candidates in terms of time alloted and costs assessed. They also avoided setting the dangerous precedent of paying the political parties for the privilege of carrying the conventions to the American public. Other broadcasters followed the suggestions of the National Association of Broadcasters for the equitable treatment of candidates. The "equal opportunity" policy afforded candidates by the broadcasters was similar to the policy eventually codified in the 1927 Radio Act as Section 18. In 1934, Section 18 became Section 315.

Summary

The new medium, radio, precipitated concerns for the control over the political communication process. Politicians wanted equal opportunities in prominence of messages and in assessment of costs for airtime. Radio officials, especially those in AT&T and RCA-G.E., and radio organizations such as the NAB sought to
establish policies to retain control in their hands over messages being broadcast. Yet, they also wanted to give politicians equitable access to the medium to avoid charges of discrimination.

In 1924 radio covered the conventions and the campaigns in an equitable fashion and, thereby, set a precedent for elections to come. Candidates were afforded equal opportunities to use broadcast facilities, and costs for the same service were uniform. AT&T and RCA-G.E. initiated policies to provide fairness in coverage. The NAB urged its members to provide equal time to both political parties and their candidates. Neither the NAB's members nor the two large radio companies wanted to be accused of favoritism.

In the 1924 campaign one event helped establish broadcast policies regarding coverage of political events: the behind-the-scenes negotiations between the Democratic Party and the large radio companies regarding payment for the rights to broadcast the Democratic convention. This incident established policies regarding coverage of political events of national significance. Broadcasters did not have to pay the respective political parties for the privilege of covering events such as the conventions; however, they did pick up the costs of the coverage itself. Other broadcasting needs of the candidates, such as coverage of speeches, were paid for by the candidates or their political parties. These speeches were the precursor to the paid political announcements of today.

In sum, the policies begun in the 1924 campaign set precedent
for elections to come. First of all, the conventions of the major political parties were covered at no charge for the rights to the broadcast. Only the costs associated with the broadcast itself were assessed the stations who carried the events. Second, broadcasters established policies to treat candidates on an equitable basis. Section 315's precursor, Section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, echoed the practices of broadcasters formed in 1924.

Consequently, as politicians and broadcasters discuss the merits of retaining Section 315, they would do well to review the first and only major broadcast campaign conducted without benefit of Section 315. Lessons learned from it regarding the approaches major broadcasters took toward the coverage of candidates may allay fears of politicians that, without Section 315, broadcasters would exclude coverage of candidates they did not favor. The policies examined in this paper reflect those established by the major broadcasters in 1924 and endorsed by the National Association of Broadcasters. Further study should examine in depth local stations' treatment of local candidates and the treatment of candidates in the off-year election of 1926. Such studies will give further insight into the treatment of candidates by broadcasters in the years preceding the development of the equal opportunities provision.
Endnotes

1. The author wishes to thank the National Association of Broadcasters, the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association, the John F. Murray Fund at the University of Iowa, and the office of Research and Graduate Development at Indiana University for their financial support in conducting study.


3. Abbreviations used in the following notes are as indicated:
   
   ACLU - American Civil Liberties Union Papers, Seely Mudd Library, Princeton, New Jersey
   AT&T - AT&T Corporate Editorial and Historical Division, New York, New York
   BPL - Broadcast Pioneers Library, Washington, D.C.
   HHPL - Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa
   MCHC - Mass Communication History Center, State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin
   NAB - National Association of Broadcasters Library, Washington, D.C.
   NARG - National Archives Record Group, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
   ODY - Owen D. Young Papers, Van Hornesville Community Corporation, Van Hornesville, New York
   Smithsonian - Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.

   Each of these library designations is followed by specific information presenting the location of the document within the archive. Usually the citations include specific collection, box, file, folder, and/or date information.


7. U.S. Congress, House, Hearings Before the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries on HR 7357, "To Regulate Radio Communication and for Other Purposes," 68th Congress 1st Session, March 11, 1924, p. 83. (Hereafter cited as "Hearings on HR 7357.")

8. Ibid.


10. Ibid.

11. Minutes of the Third Annual Meeting of the National Association of Broadcasters, September 16-17, 1925, NAB, Reports and Minutes of Conventions, 1923-1926.


13. Ibid.


15. "The Use of Bell Facilities, 1924," p. 6-7 and Letter (William) Harkness to (David) Sarnoff, May 28, 1924, Smithsonian, Clark Papers, CWC 134-1164A.

16. The Department of Commerce had limited the number of licenses it would allocate to the Class B frequency. It had also required the stations to use the latest equipment to qualify for this classification. Because the latest equipment usually required significant capital investment, the stations were usually owned by financially sound enterprises which also carried quality programming. The stations soon became favorites of the listeners.


18. Confidential memorandum, Mr. Quinn to Mr. Pierson, n.d., ODY, Box 90, RCA.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Letter Martin Rice to MacLafferty, June 6, 1924, ODY, Box 127, Broadcasting.
26. Ibid.
29. WJZ Logs, Tuesday, June 10th to Thursday, June 12th, 1924, MCHC, NBC Papers, General Files, Historical Files, 1923-1927, 1930, Box 98, Folder: WJZ Logs, May-June 1924.
36. Barnouw, p. 149-150.
37. Untitled editorial, Saturday Evening Post, August 23, 1924.
40. Ibid.
41. Leuchtenberg, p. 135.
42. Ibid.
44. "Operating a Broadcast Station," Talk given by W.E. Harkness to A.I.E.E. (American Institute of Electrical Engineers), November 12, 1924, AT&T, Box 59, Operating a Broadcasting Station.
46. Ibid., p. 25 and 27.
47. Memorandum Elam Miller to W.E. Harkness, July 17, 1924, MCHC, E.P.H. James Papers, Box 1, File: NBC Background File, 1924-1925 Memoranda.
51. Ibid., p. 33.
53. Ibid., Table I, p. 4-7.
56. Ibid. and Weeks, p. 239-240.

