Medical software is marketed like Wordstar or Lotus 1-2-3 product oriented regulation may be appropriate. I do not suggest ignoring the potential risk. My proposal is instead to adopt a regulatory system oriented towards the user of the software, rather than the producer, and fix the liability for defective software at the same point. Such a proposal would involve registration of each user location.

This proposal would 1) focus regulation on the parties actually controlling the use of the software. It would clarify responsibility for control of the software and the potential uses to which software would be put. 2) Liability would be strictly imposed on the using hospital, as the place best able to evaluate what level of oversight is needed. By concentrating liability at the user level there would be an increase in competition, rather than a reduction, since the financial viability of the producer would no longer be an issue. 3) The users are already subject to regulatory control. They are familiar with the requirements of the regulatory authorities.

I am not suggesting that medical software be exempt from either regulation or liability. However, in the case of this unique product, the public interest would best be served by imposition of strict liability at the level of the user, combined with a modest level of regulation on the same party. This combination would provide the optimum mix of protection of consumers with minimum restrictions on the development of this revolutionary technology.
LIABILITY AND REGULATORY ISSUES IN MEDICAL COMPUTER SOFTWARE

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I have been invited to address the committee on the issue of liability in regards to the use of medical computer systems. The medical computer liability field is in its infancy. To my knowledge there are no decided cases. The fear of liability is used for every purpose from promoting the use of computer systems to arguing against them. It is my opinion that liability is only one of several closely related critical legal issues involved in the introduction of computer systems to clinical medicine. None of the major issues can be addressed in isolation.

The three issues are:

1) Liability for the use or non use of medical computer systems.

2) Government regulation of Medical computers as medical devices under the Food and Drug act.

3) The interrelationship of artificial intelligence and expert systems with state mandated limitations on the practice of medicine. I have included a separate written statement on this issue.

The areas of liability and regulation are directly related. There is no doubt in my mind that the decisions reached by this committee and the Food and Drug Administration concerning the regulation of medical computer systems will have a direct effect on the liability issues.

The most important changes in the legal system are due to the much wider need for information which computers provide. The information is of many types. There is information about the patient, about the illness and about the scope of treatment. With computerized medical information systems, comparisons are possible among physicians, hospitals and specialties. The use of expert systems raises even more dramatic possibilities of change.

The topic of this presentation is liability. For the purpose of this presentation the widest possible definition will be used to include not only physical injury to the patient, but also invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress and
other non-physical injury. This presentation is designed, not to
give a primer in the law, but to describe the background of
medical information systems and how they can lead to a liability
problem.

The medical computer liability field is in its infancy. The
few cases which have become known have not gone to trial.
However, the explosive growth in medical computer systems has
occurred with little input from the legal sector.

In many malpractice cases there are difficult factual issues
of proof, causation, and responsibility. In the case of a
computer caused medical injury, the facts are even more cloudy,
and the answers even more uncertain. Computer systems are not
standardized items, and even similar systems have crucial
differences. Software is ephemeral, it is often changed in the
field by users, and can be altered without trace. A program is
often the product of many hands, who leave no trace of their
individual efforts. It is worth noting that S. 100, the Kasten
products liability bill now before Congress, would not apply to a
computer program. The act defines a product as a tangible item
with intrinsic value. Computer programs are not. It is possible
that an entire jurisprudence must be developed to deal with the
unique aspects of computer related injury.

CONCEPTS OF LIABILITY

In a 1981 article in the AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND
MEDICINE I wrote extensively on the liability for personal
injuries caused by a detective medical computer program. (1)

In conducting research for that article, it was striking how
many people automatically assumed that negligence, rather than
strict liability would be the appropriate test for injuries
caused by computer programs. They seemed preoccupied with the
intangible nature of the program, and that the output of the
program was a service. There is a strong argument that computer
programs are products, subject to strict liability. Despite
their intangibility, programs show all of the other
characteristics of a product. They can be owned, they exist
through time, they can have errors, which can be corrected. They
can be passed from person to person.

In some sense, programs are like books, but unlike books in
most circumstances, they can be the direct source of injury. In
this sense they are essentially the instructions to a machine.
Like the crankshaft on a car, the instructions are set the machine
will do what it is told.

Once it is accepted that computer programs are products,
liability will be strictly imposed if the other requirements are
met. The most important requirement is probably that the defect
first issue is to define what the computer system does; there are basically three possibilities. First, the computer system can act as a background resource for the physician. In this case the patient and the liability follows the typical malpractice approach of reasonable care. In the second case the computer system interacts directly with the patient. Traditional strict liability is appropriate for devices which are directly computer controlled such as cat scanners or intensive care monitoring. It is the third case which poses the output which a physician relies on without further checking. This is where the computer is producing the result upon which a physician relies, and similar items. In these systems reliance on the data is automatic, and errors can be catastrophic. In such a situation a strict liability standard for errors is appropriate.

A second major issue is to define what constitutes a "defect" in a computer system. Errors tend to be of two types, the most egregious mistakes, it can take a thorough investigation to determine what type of error is present. Unlike many other products, it is often difficult to separate a design from a built to blueprints. They are built to a system design which is continuously changed. Computer systems are not normally changed continuously as the system is being installed. Many are one of a kind installations where the design and production phases are merged together. Systems are often put into service for field testing despite the presence of errors. Sometimes testing the system does not reveal the bug, only using the system. Since error correction is labor intensive, it is corrected, over time, as the system is used. The term "maintenance" which in most fields is simply keeping the machine up to specifications, is used in the computer field to describe the continuous error removal process.

A logic error can arise in a very simple way. For example, at one hospital the computer system provided the complete bed assignment system. Beds are a hospital's stock in trade; hospital divided its services into two groups, those with beds, such as surgery, and those without beds, such as radiology. The bed allocation system was connected to the pharmacy system, which floor. When a patient was transferred directly from one bed to another. The bed control and pharmacy records were to a non-beds service, the bed control and pharmacy records were changed to show the new location. When a patient was transferred from surgery service, the bed control and pharmacy records were changed to show the patient's temporary status, but pharmacy was unchanged because the patient was expected to return. The problem occurred when the patient was transferred from internal medicine to radiology, and
then to surgery. The bed control system was updated, but the pharmacy system was not. As a result, the pharmacy continued to send drugs to the old bed, which was now occupied by a new patient. In this particular case the error was discovered.

Programming errors tend to lead to false data reporting, or system breakdown. In a system prone to errors, the staff often checks strange results. There are more problems with a system that runs so well the users stop challenging potential errors. Cleaning up a program can result in a less attentive staff.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS

Since writing that article, I have had more experience working directly with medical information personnel. I spent 1984 on sabbatical, first at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and later at the Center for Medical Computing Science at the University of Frankfurt. It is possible that potential problems are even more severe than first believed, primarily due to the nature and method of software development and use, and to the changing role of information in the medical system.

Certain systems by their distribution and inherent nature are the most likely to be involved in litigation. These include patient record systems and treatment support systems such as nursing orders and pharmacy. These are generally referred to as medical information systems. The most important current developments are going on in the area of expert systems. These systems are very new. Ten years ago even the most advanced university medical centers were only beginning to install medical information systems.

Several developments in information systems have changed this environment. The development of faster, less expensive, general purpose machines has led to an explosive growth in the number of computers. Network and communications software allows those computers to be connected together in a wide variety of different combinations. Special languages, such as MUMPS, the Massachusetts Program Multi-Programming System, were developed to serve the medical community. Information systems were pioneered in research-oriented university medical centers, in part because of the need for research data. Military and Veterans Administration hospitals are currently implementing their systems. The great bulk of conventional hospitals do not yet have systems, however, the pressure to install them is accelerating.

A new profession has also arisen. Most traditional data processing managers were trained in business or accounting. In the medical area they have shown a limited ability to create systems which support patient care. Instead the pioneers of clinical information systems were computer scientists and
There is now an American College of Medical Informatics, almost exclusively composed of physicians and computer specialists. The German term "INFORMATIKER" can be used to describe these professionals. They are oriented toward the automation of patient data and the changes in medical care which can result from that automation. It is this group which is causing the revolution in the use of computers in medicine and the one least known to the legal community. Informaticians believe that transmission and use of medical information fundamentally changes the concept of medical care. Medical records, which used to be the physician's notes of his personal knowledge, now become the chart of the patient's entire life. Access to this information allows the members of the health care industry to provide care in totally different systems. Second opinions, monitoring of health care, referrals, consultations, and transfers of patient from provider to provider come to rely on the information system. Informaticians see medicine as critically dependent on the movement and flow of information. To them, information is a positive good. Their ultimate goal is a sophisticated information system which can handle most or all of the physician's tasks.

Virtually all existing medical information systems are hospital based. This means that medical information systems are directly connected to the fundamental changes now occurring in American Hospitals. Hospitals used to be workshops for individual physicians; increasingly they are becoming the direct provider and decision maker in medical care.

The development of the diagnosis related group system has caused a fundamental change in the system of paying for medical care and created a new demand on the medical information system. Under prospective patient reimbursement rules, administrators now need real-time information on patients currently in the hospital, how they are being treated, and how much that treatment costs. The medical information systems are crucial to this effort. Hospital administrators use them to determine which physicians use the most resources. Auditors use them to control reimbursement. Competing demands can lead to system overload. The need for new types of systems has created extraordinary potential for significant legal problems. Problems with medical information systems do not just happen. They are caused by dramatically different perspectives on the key priorities of the medical system.

There are three important groups in a hospital working with a medical information system: administrators, physicians, and informaticians. Each sees the system as something different. The physician sees it as a helper, a new type of nurse or clerk who will provide information and carry out orders without changing the physician's fundamental control over the system. The administrator sees it as a control system. He can control the
physicians because he now knows what they are doing. The
informatiker sees the system as the centerpiece of health care,
allowing physicians and other professionals to be “plugged in” as
needed. The informatiker likes bigger, better, faster and more
complete systems.

All of the participants are oriented towards their own goals
for the system. The system is more than a distributor of
information. The reality is that information is a new center
of power. Normally the physicians have power based on
professional authority, and the administrators have power based
on financial control. Both of these groups can use their power
in obvious fashions. The informatiker’s power is control over the
medical information system, but to get the system up and running,
the informatiker needs cooperation from both of the other groups.

As a result, the informatiker must tell different things to
different people. To the physician, he promises a helper who
will serve the physicians’ interests. Therefore the
informatiker first develops subordinate systems, such as clinical
lab, nursing, bed assignment, and reporting systems. These
systems do all the paperwork which physicians normally detest.
What the informatiker knows, but the physician does not always
realize is that the same information is the source of control for
the administration. The informatiker must keep this secret until
the system is installed, or the physicians will oppose the system
installation. These conflicts in internal goals are rarely
brought to the lawyer’s attention.

Despite the rapid reduction in the cost of computer
hardware, computer power remains a scarce resource. Therefore
someone has to allocate access to the information system, and
determine what information is kept, and in what form. It is in
these resource allocation decisions that the potential for
malpractice is the highest. The pressure from the various
interest groups can lead to compromises with severe unintended
results. Two examples of typical problem areas are given in the
appendix.

Liability standards will take a substantial time to develop.
One major area of concern is liability for failure to use a
computer system. I think this type of liability could arise in
fundamentally different ways. The first would be to fail to use
a computer system to check on specific problems which can be
found in standardized medical databases, such as drug-drug
interactions, or the latest contraindications to various types of
therapy. The other area is the ordinary failure to maintain
accurate patient records of the type which a computer system
could provide. Allergies, patient histories and prior
complications are all easily stored in computers, but can take
substantial time to recall in a manual system. Automated medical
information systems are clearly the state of the art, and without
them a hospital or doctor would be vulnerable under the leading case of the T.J. HOOPER.

To sum up the liability exposure, the problem is real and immediate. Short of passing a general products liability bill, which I do not suggest, the most direct effect this committee can have on the liability issue is in its instructions and oversight to the Food and Drug administration regarding the regulation of medical computer systems as devices. The liability and regulatory issues are intertwined because both legal concepts serve the same conflicting goals: how do we promote the advancement of medical technology while maintaining the maximum of patient protection, both physical and financial?

The primary question in both areas is what legal approach should be used to control clinical software? I am not persuaded that the current Food and Drug Act actually covers software. But I am confident that the product oriented approach of that act would be both ineffectual and hostile to the development of the technology. The legal system should not attempt to define in advance what direction this technology will take. However, the liability and regulatory policies should be coordinated.

There are certain basic principles which should control all legal efforts in this area. First is protection of patients from the unreasonable risk of injury. Second, there should be a search for relative improvement in medical care, not absolute perfection. Third, any system should avoid entrenching existing institutions, whether governmental, industrial or professional. Fourth, in any implementation of a computer system there must be a financially responsible party. Fifth, in terms of patient therapy there must be a party clearly responsible for the proper operation of the system.

Compliance with these principles is difficult under the current legal system. Under the current regulation of medical devices and drugs, the federal government controls the manufacture and labelling of devices and drugs, and the states, where the producer is strictly liable, but the user is subject to a test of negligence. For all of the reasons I mentioned earlier, the technological development of this field has made this distinction obsolete. For example, a hospital worker sits down at a terminal. It makes no functional difference whether the computer is located in the same hospital, across the country, or in another country. Likewise, it makes no difference whether the system is produced in his hospital, or purchased on the outside. It is of no importance if the system is one of a kind or one of a group. Yet both the regulatory and liability systems fasten on these irrelevant distinctions to impose widely different levels of regulation and liability.
The primary policy choice for this committee is between the product-oriented concept of the current medical device legislation act, and a user-oriented regulatory approach suited to the nature of this technology.

The primary problem with the product-oriented approach is that it tends to stifle all of the attributes which make computer software such an exciting technology. Product-oriented regulation tends to limit developments in a field to those companies which are both adept at the technology and sophisticated in dealing with the regulatory authorities. We can get the medical equivalent of the Pentagon's $600.00 hammer because ingenuity in dealing with the regulator is the key business attribute.

Second, product regulation tends to centralize production in a small number of firms. The first handful of firms approved can divide up the market. Regulatory approval is a substantial entry barrier. There are only a small number of viable hardware producers in the computer field, compared to the vast number of software houses. This is due to the different economies of scale in starting up operations. The regulatory burden could be crippling to small, innovative companies. It is precisely these innovative companies which are the strength of the computer field. Many of the most innovative producers are universities and hospitals. There is a tradition of sharing breakthroughs and software which could disappear if regulated.

Third, regulation of the software tends to limit the flexibility of the user in adapting the device to local conditions. While the food and drug act provides for customization of the device to a patient, it does not provide for customization to the institution, which is often critical in clinical software. Modifications of systems by producers in light of system failures or increased knowledge would be slowed by the need for regulatory approval.

Fourth, under the current concept, liability for defective software is diffuse. Small companies may not be financially viable. Insurance in this area is becoming unobtainable. The liability exposure is determined by traditional strict liability with contractual disclaimer and indemnity.

Fifth, some software will be exempt from regulation, because it is created by the using hospital. Software can also disappear from the regulatory system because of the demise of the producing company, while the software is still in use.

These deficiencies can best be addressed by recognizing that software is a fundamentally different item from a scalpel or an x-ray machine. Perhaps when software is distributed in a mass market setting such as Wordstar or Lotus 1-2-3, product oriented
regulation would be appropriate. I do not suggest ignoring the potential risk. My proposal is instead to adopt a regulatory system oriented towards the user of the software, rather than the producer, and fix the liability for defective software at the same point. Such a proposal would involve registration of each user location.

This proposal would 1) focus regulation on the parties actually controlling the use of the software. It would clarify responsibility for control of the software and the potential users to which software would be put. 2) Liability would be strictly imposed on the using hospital, as the place best able to evaluate what level of oversight is needed. By concentrating liability at the user level there would be an increase in competition, rather than a reduction, since the financial viability of the producer would no longer be an issue. 3) The users are already subject to regulatory control. They are familiar with the requirements of the regulatory authorities.

I am not suggesting that medical software be exempt from either regulation or liability. However, in the case of this unique product, the public interest would be best served by imposition of strict liability at the level of the user, combined with a modest level of regulation on the same party. This combination would provide the optimum mix of protection of consumers with minimum restrictions on the development of this revolutionary technology.

APPENDIX

Two discrete situations which exist at the opposite ends of the medical information environment provide excellent examples of potential problems.

The first problem is the accuracy, timeliness, useability and friendliness of the medical information. In this area all three groups have the same goal of providing accurate information. However, the groups differ in what information is needed. Administrators want the information that allows financial control. Physicians normally want the information needed for their next decision. Informatikers want systems which run smoothly, don't overload, and don't break down. Problems can crop up in the most trivial way, but with potentially severe consequences.

In one information system, every tongue depressor and aspirin was in the information system, but management had determined that there was no room for blood pressure measurement or other patient data. In another system the pathology laboratory saved the fact of every test, but not the result. Possibly these two converted billing systems fall outside the
arena of patient information systems, but when access to unimportant data is available by computer, while vital data is kept by hand, serious questions can be raised concerning the standard of care at the institution.

At one major development center for medical information systems, the system designers allowed any system user to send the only copy of the patient's chart to any room in the hospital. There was no provision for verification of arrival, or insuring its return to the record room. When it was suggested that the loss of the Hospital's only copy of what it did to a patient could involve substantial liability consequences, the suggestion was met with disbelief.

Additional problems arise from the ease with which computerized medical records can be altered without a trace. Backup tapes can be used to archive the state of the data at a particular time, but they must be protected. However, it is very time consuming to search for this type of information, especially on tape.

The single advantage in dealing with the problem of information accuracy is that no one really wants bad data. It is essentially a management problem, but it may be up to the counsel to inform the management they have a problem.

The second problem is protecting the patient's interest in the privacy of medical data. Patients have normally expected that their medical data was kept secret. In the past this was true more because of the difficulty of locating, copying, and interpreting the data than any great investment in privacy. Unlike the accuracy of the data, all of the groups which work with data have some reason to be against true data privacy. To the administrator, data privacy means less control. To confront the physician on issues of cost, he needs all the information the physician has, and he needs to be able to distribute it freely.

To the physician, data privacy means the computer is less useful; it is harder to give orders from the office or to check on a patient from home. To the informatiker, data privacy means a clumsy system which cannot be easily connected to other systems.

For all groups, data protection costs money which could otherwise be spent on something else. So it is typical to do what the law requires, but no more. As the technology develops, it becomes easier and easier to evade the spirit of the law, while staying within its boundaries. In many cases there are no statutes whatever, which leads the hospital to conclude that there are no legal checks on its actions. There is often no appreciation of common law rights of privacy.

At one of the nation's most distinguished medical centers, there is a development center for medical computing. The
hospital has 64 different computer systems. Most are virtually unprotected, but one system is password protected and encoded: That is the physician’s salary system. Other hospitals seem systems staff routinely have access to all patient data, and top to their control. Researchers at major medical centers expect virtually unlimited access to patient data.

The problem is that the potential liability exposure arises from a legal requirement which is not a high priority item for achieving each group’s own internal goals. Even where there are extensive statutory requirements, such as government systems subject to the Privacy Act, protection is almost nonexistent. In a presentation to 70 Veterans Administration programmers and system managers last year at a conference, not a single one had heard of the Privacy Act or thought it had anything to do with their operations.

In all of these cases there is a common thread. There had been a complete breakdown in communication between the legal staff, who had no idea what was going on, and the technical people who design and operate the systems. It is this breakdown which is so critical. The medical area has more than its share of prima donnas, who resent any outside investigation of their domains. Computer systems staff tend to think of the machines as theirs, and that they should control who gets what information. Administrators tend to think of hospitals as a business, where people at the top can have any information they want. Physicians people looking over their shoulder. All professions had their origin in the exclusive control of information by a small group. Technological change has deemphasized the expert’s role as the mere accumulator of information, and emphasized the role of the decision maker. The information systems which support or replace the decision maker must be held to the highest possible standard.

REFERENCES

The introduction of medical information systems has not yet changed the legal structure of health care. However, the development of systems that can challenge all or part of the physician's medical judgment will require changes in the definition of the practice of medicine. Such changes must take into account both the rationale for regulation and the potentials of modern information systems.

I. INTRODUCTION

Under the existing structure for the regulation of health care, physicians have an effective monopoly on primary medical decision making. Physicians have jealously guarded their control over the system.11 Recent developments in computerized record keeping and decision making have the possibility of providing both closer control over physician decision making and possible automated substitutes for physician decision making. The introduction of medical informatics requires a focus on the legal requirements of the practice of medicine, and examination of alternative systems employing medical information systems.

For the purpose of this article "medical decision making" is the process of diagnosing and determining the appropriate treatment for diseases. Decision making must be distinguished from the technique of treatment, however skilled.

2. CURRENT CONTROL STRUCTURE

2.1. Professional Autonomy

The hallmark of medical decision making in the U.S. is professional autonomy. Individual physicians make decisions on types of treatment with little or no prospective review and only modest retrospective review. In addition, physicians control the vast majority of all health care delivery either directly or indirectly. The role of government is distinctly limited. Its supervision over physicians is effectively limited to the licensing exams, which are administered largely to graduates of accredited American medical schools. Direct quality reviews of
Physicians are rare. What little review takes place is normally not directed to patient care, but to reimbursement and is conducted primarily by insurance companies. Physicians therefore have an extremely favored status in the law. The legal system limits competition while affirmatively conducting very few reviews of physician activity.

2.2. Social Control

The justification for professional autonomy is normally a demonstrated superiority of the professional decision making process. Decision making is the heart of any profession. All professions would prefer to be self-defining, with the profession determining what is a professional decision. However, because of the need for the legal system to police infringements on the professional sphere, the legal system sets the limitations on the autonomy of professional decision makers. For example, the legal system decides what is the practice of medicine, dentistry, or law. Determination of the boundaries of professional decision making is not static; it changes with social needs, political power, economic development and technological innovation. One of the most dramatic shifts possible in any profession occurs when a determination is made that professional judgment is no longer needed in any given decision. For example, the movement of a pharmaceutical from prescription to non-prescription status is an indication of the limited need for professional judgment.

In our society, the determination that a professional decision is no longer required tends to be made by regulatory authorities as a question of social policy. The social question relates to the particular risks a society wishes to run. For example, aspirin is universally available in the United States, but can only be sold in pharmacies in Germany. On the other hand, many remedies promoted in Germany by the "heilpraktiker" practitioners and pharmacies would be banned as quackery by the Food and Drug Administration and the American Medical Association. The scope of professional judgment is a matter of social, and therefore legal policy.

The legal structure of the practice of medicine arose in the early part of this century at a particular stage of medical technology. The development of "scientific medicine" gave the medical practitioners a tremendous tool to exclude the lay public from medical decision making. The authority of the physician was based not on professional privilege, or the arcane nature of the medical knowledge, but on the demonstrably superior results of the scientific practitioners.

2.3. Effect of the Regulatory Structure

In the face of this superiority there were dramatic changes in the structure of medical care. Some alternative therapies were considered useless, others dangerous. Many medical schools were
closed, and the remaining schools developed a rigid academic structure. Specialization developed, and specialists adopted the principle that no one outside a given specialty could judge the work of the specialist.[5]

The medical staff of the hospital, a group of peer-competitors, became the key review system to determine which other practitioners would have access to the hospital, and which therapies were effective. Despite the term "staff", the physicians were private practitioners, not employees. Through the organization of the medical staff, private practitioners were able to use the hospital's facilities without fear of outside review.[6] There is some evidence that accurate medical records were a by-product of the development of the medical staff.[7] Without accurate records, there was no way to perform the quality control which justified the otherwise anti-competitive conduct. Staffs were often closed to competitors, and alternative practitioners, such as midwives, were barred from the premises.[8]

The legal system, for the most part supported this development.[9] All states adopted licensing rules, with administration and control largely in the hands of the medical profession. Competition among physicians was suppressed by limitations on advertising.[10] Staffing regulations were developed to exclude licensed physicians of competing schools of thought from practicing in municipal hospitals.[11] The locality rule in medical malpractice gave a tremendous boost to local medical societies, by allowing them to control the local standard of care.[12] Special product liability doctrines emphasized the preeminence of the physician by limiting the manufacturer's duty to warn. The physician was a "learned intermediary" who made decisions for the passive patient.[13]

Even the most private decisions, such as abortion, were not left to the individual but required a physician's approval. In the landmark case of Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court declared this most personal of decisions to be a medical decision decided by the physician, rather than a personal decision by the patient:

"This means, on the other hand, that, for the period of pregnancy prior to this 'compelling' point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the state, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated... To summarize and to repeat: For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician."[14]

This remarkable passage indicates the high point of legal deference to physician decision making. The court was willing to
say, as a matter of constitutional law, that a decision that was so private that it could not be regulated by the state, could not be made by the woman herself, but was a "medical judgment" for the physician.

This decision is indicative of the power accorded to physicians in the social structure of health care. Only the individual physician knew the patient’s needs and conditions. Only the physician could make the difficult decisions necessary to treat the condition. Only physicians of the same locale, school of medical thought and specialty could question the decision of the treating physician. Finally, any challenge to the physician’s decision took place after the fact, not during treatment. Physicians have come to accept this current situation as permanent. However, the development of medical information systems threatens the underpinnings of the entire physician centered system of medical decision making.

3. USE OF COMPUTERS IN MEDICAL DECISION MAKING

3.1. System Capabilities

Medical decision making is essentially an information based technology. It has an enormous potential for use of computer systems. Computers can store vast quantities of medical knowledge. They can sort, retrieve and analyze that data in novel ways, and can increasingly do it in real time, prior to key decision points. Computers can also perform a number of complex diagnostic techniques. Virtually all the modern imaging technology in medicine, CAT (computerized axial tomography), NMR (nuclear magnetic resonance), and ultrasound scanning, depend on computers to produce the image. This means that automated information is available directly to an information system, which may be able to directly process the result. Computers can monitor vital signs on a continuous basis and administer drugs in a controlled manner. Laboratory testing in many clinical pathology laboratories is fully automated.

3.2. Effect on Physician Control

These advances, though significant, would not threaten physician control of the health care system. Physicians have long used technicians and assistants to extend the physician’s reach. Physicians have benefitted financially and organizationally from controlling an ever larger number of assistants and machines. Physicians have controlled the system because the regulatory system accepted the superiority of their medical decision making.

Medical decision making can now be examined and challenged in a way never before possible. The development of information systems both allows sophisticated analysis of medical judgment and the creation of "expert" systems that simulate or replace that
The ultimate effect of the automation of medical decision making will be to clarify the nature of medical judgment itself. Computers are relentless in stripping away the mystique of professional skill, when no real judgment is involved.

The threat to physician control comes if the computer can actually compete with the physician in judgment. Physicians resist this idea. The physician thinks of professional judgment as something uniquely human and professional. When all else in medicine is being done by machine or technicians, the physician expects to maintain control because of the superiority of professional judgment.

3.3. Medical Judgment

Physicians sometimes assert that automation of medical decision making is impossible, because there is some "judgmental" factor beyond machine understanding. Interestingly enough, this is an argument for more, not less control over physician decision making. Assume that some physicians are better decision makers than others for reasons which we cannot currently determine, but the superiority of their decision making is demonstrable. In a rational society, such decision makers should specialize in decision making, and other physicians, perhaps more skilled in technique, should be required to submit to the decisions of the specialized decision makers.

The obvious first use of computers is to identify these superior physicians. By collecting and comparing the treatments and outcomes on a wide variety of patients, it will be possible to develop and maintain norms for treatment. Physicians will be called upon to explain patient outcomes that deviate from the normal range. Due to the vast quantity of data to be analyzed, the speed with which records must be accessed, and the need for accurate statistical information concerning the effectiveness of various therapies, such comparisons would be impossible without computerized medical information systems.

The next stage is to directly intervene in clinical care. Computer systems allow monitoring on a "real-time", continuous basis. Instead of post hoc case review by peers in the medical staff, the information system can check any decision against the established norms prior to treatment and query the physician to explain any deviation. The system can be programmed to act as a "second opinion," require a consultation, forbid the use of resources to carry out the procedure, or simply note a caution for the record. [15] The physician will be constantly required to prove that his medical decision making is superior to that of the information system. If a given physician is demonstrably inferior to the computer generated norm, he will be replaced by another physician who is superior, or possibly even by the machine itself. Like the legendary John Henry, who challenged the steam drill, the physician will be forced to justify his
superior decision making capability on a continuous basis.

3.4. Substitution of Computerized Decision Making

A final step would be to use and rely on the computerized system in place of the physician. Such replacements have happened in some other technical areas. Stationary engineers were once required for all steam plants. They have been replaced by servo mechanisms. Inertial navigators guide submarines. The replacement of physicians by computers would involve complex problems. Perhaps the most important is whether the physicians will control such systems.

Some tasks are beyond computers at the current stage of development. Computers can control the heating, air conditioning and other services of a skyscraper, but they cannot change light bulbs. Because some tasks are beyond any computer system, physicians assume that any computer system will be their subordinate. This is simply not true. No matter how complex the task, it is the decision to initiate the task which determines control over the system. Physicians cannot perform kidney dialysis, only machines can. Proper analysis of the potential and limitation of medical information systems will require an in-depth analysis of medical decision making, with particular attention to the portions which can be performed by computers. In addition computers have capabilities not only to model the human decision making process, but to use completely different decision methods and rules to arrive at the same result. It is possible that the process of ordering the medical knowledge into a form that is usable by computer systems is the critical step in determining whether legal restrictions on who can practice medicine will apply.

3.5. Knowledge Engineering

Computer systems run most efficiently on formalized knowledge structures. Knowledge engineering takes the inchoate mass of data in a field and structures it. Relationships between individual units of data are developed, and suitable decision rules are derived from the information. This process lays the groundwork for advanced decision making, either by human specialists, or computer based artificial intelligence systems.[16]

Knowledge engineering can cause a radical shift in the interaction of professionals with the informational component of their work. Knowledge engineering tends to clarify the decisions made by professionals, by indicating those areas where a given set of facts leads to a single unambiguous conclusion, or a given set of probabilities. In such an area, the professional is merely a repository for knowledge, not a decision maker.
Consequently, formalization of the knowledge in a field can lead to dramatic changes in the scope of professional decision making.

4. LEGAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL DECISION MAKING

The ultimate argument by physicians to control the medical information system is to assert that they are the persons licensed by the state to perform medical decision making, and therefore such decision making must be subordinate to their professional authority. Such reasoning fails to take into account the rationale for such authority and the possibility for change.

Under most state licensing laws, only physicians can "practice medicine". The statues are typically written in very broad form, with the practice of medicine defined as diagnosing and treating disease. Traditionally the regulation of medical care is part of the police power of the state, the general power to regulate the health welfare and safety of the people. As such, it is a broad power which is limited only by certain narrow constitutional doctrines. However, the driving force for the autonomy of the physicians was a determination that they provided better decision making. In those areas where that was not so clear, legislatures have been willing to override medical decision making.

One of the most dramatic changes has been in the area of informed consent. This concept, which grew out of medical malpractice law, has as its foundation the concept that the patient is the key decision maker, not the physician, and that the physician has an obligation to put in the hands of the patient the needed information for deciding at least the general strategy of the medical treatment. Importantly, informed consent is oriented towards the dignity and personal autonomy of the patient, not the superiority of the patient's decision making. [17]

A second area in which the control system of the state has been limited is in the conflict between state regulation and the first Amendment. The application of at least a limited right of freedom of speech has allowed doctors to truthfully advertise their qualifications and therapies.

An attempt to expand the right of privacy to cover the physician/patient choice of therapy was rejected by the Supreme Court in the area of laetrile, a purported cancer cure. A suggestion that patient autonomy defined a right to use whatever medical therapies the patient desired was rejected by the court.

Finally, despite the sweeping language of the medical practice statutes, it is clear that physicians do not have a monopoly on all diagnosis and treatment. Over the counter drugs and diagnostic tests are dispensed to patients, normally on the basis that patients can understand the use of such drugs. Legislators
usually have no particular interest in preserving professional monopolies as such.

5. RATIONALE FOR CHANGES IN LEGAL RULES

There is no exact formula for determining whether a particular legal rule will change due to technological development. The legal system responds to a wide variety of political and social forces. However, some of the better arguments can be derived from past conflicts. Some factors which would tend to convince legislators to deregulate medical decision making would include:

5.1 Personal Autonomy of the Patient

Our society has made a direct commitment to patients that they will have control over the medical treatment they are subjected to.

5.2 High Level of Medical Certainty

When there is no great dispute that a particular combination of symptoms leads to a specific diagnosis or treatment, there is little need for the "judgment" of the physician.

5.3 An Acceptable Level of Risk of Error.

Our society does not expect perfection, but any system would have to be at least as reliable as a qualified physician.

5.4 Cost/benefit Improvement

To challenge the inertia present in any regulated area, either true cost savings or improved service must be demonstrated.

5.5 Acceptable Alternative Regulation

Some method for acceptable premarket clearance for any such system would have to be developed. This does not necessarily mean government regulation. Private approval by accepted testing labs might be accepted.

5.6 Financial Responsibility

Appropriate structures would have to be developed for the financial consequences of mistakes in the system.

6. CONCLUSION

It is clear that in the industrial revolution we have accepted that machines are normally better than men at manual labor. The information revolution exposes those parts of professional judgment which are simply "intellectual factory work." - Unless
the physician can continue to improve his decision process it is possible the physician will become a type of auxiliary to the medical information system. The physician will carry out the technique of surgery or other therapy, but will not make the fundamental medical decisions. This technical transformation will require appropriate legal response.

NOTES AND REFERENCES


[2] The word "Heilpraktiker" defies translation but represents the practice of botanical healing, perhaps similar to naturopathy.

[3] FELDSTEIN, supra note 1


[12] STARR, supra note 5, at 111.


Using a Computer Based Medical Information System: MEDICAL CARE 962-969 (1978)

The COSTAR system checks for the presence of Beta hemolytic Streptococcus infection and whether appropriate antibiotics were ordered. The system is described as concurrent because the audit takes place while the patient can still be effectively treated. The system has been extended to hypertension, urinary tract infections, pre-natal care, and influenza vaccinations.


[17] Schloendoff v. Society of New York Hospital 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914)

[18] See Note 10 supra


This paper has been submitted to the Fourth World Congress on Medical Informatics Copyright (1986) Vincent Brannigan, College Park MD
Mr. VOLKMER. Thank you.

Before I go to Dr. McDonald, I forgot to ask all three of the previous—and they're still here, so I'd ask them—the previous panel—to answer this question. The question is, have any of you been ever asked to serve on any of the advisory panels to the FDA?

Dr. Myers, have you?

Dr. MYERS. No, but I did some months ago have a telephone call from them to pick my brains. This was at the time they were first, as far as I could tell, beginning to think about what they should do, and in a broad sense they picked my brains.

Mr. VOLKMER. All right.

Dr. Gardner.

Dr. GARDNER. No.

Mr. VOLKMER. None.

Mr. Baker.

Mr. BAKER. No.

Mr. VOLKMER. All right. Thank you.

Excuse the interruption, Dr. McDonald.

Dr. MCDONALD. Thank you.

I'd like to just point out that although I am on the public relations committee for the American College of Medical Informatics, I was invited as a citizen to testify, and this is not necessarily the beliefs or views of the whole college.

Second, I'd like to correct, or at least modify a little bit, some of the implication maybe you drew from the written testimony, and that I don't think that the technology is too mature to use. I think it's too mature to standardize or regulate. I think it would be a little bit like when the Wright Brothers got out of their plane they said, "Okay, now we're going to set up the FAA, and you're not really qualified to fly this plane; get off."

They still used those planes back in those days, but there wasn't enough awareness; we didn't know the business, and I think this is a very, very, very young field, and I think there's a lot of romanticism and myths which are kind of being targeted for being fixed, and until we see how it evolves we don't know what needs to be fixed, and I guess I would say that the FDA's kind of approach to this is a testimony to the doggedness of organizations, and that even though it may not be possible, they're going to go ahead and do it. They'll try to do something. They'll come up with an answer, a regulation, even though it may not really match any kind of really absolute reality.

One other background piece of information is that we talk about the expert as sort of the knowledge about the field as being the expertise, and it's sort of—that's the romantic part. We kind of think of medicine as being Sherlock Holmes. That's sort of the essence of medicine. But a whole lot of the medicine is gathering the facts. It's sort of the dog work before.

I'd like to make an analogy. We could automate an automobile to drive through a street; if the driver typed in, "There's a truck three feet ahead of me and"—you know, full details as he drove along specifying exactly what's there, the car could easily be programmed to get around all those vehicles if he gave the position, size, and location of those other objects, but that would be blatantly impossible because people couldn't spend the time typing in all this
stuff to get from A to Z, and the big part of the medical computing problem is getting all the facts about the patient accessible to the computer.

With that background, let me go to my prepared statements. I'm going to try to answer all four questions that were explicitly asked: How should medical information systems be verified and regulated? Two, what should be done to assure timely re-certification of such systems? Three, who should be allowed to use such systems? Four, what should be done to protect confidentiality?

The first question, I think, begs a question, and that is, why regulate them at all? Some would answer, "because we’re on the brink of a radical new kind of computing brought about by artificial intelligence techniques and that"—and this is the second one that’s important—"existing legal, ethical, and marketing forces are not adequate to assure proper use of these systems."

A critical examination of the history of medical computing and the current realities of the research in artificial intelligence refutes this line of reasoning.

First the history. Artificial intelligence is not the only technique for doing intelligent things with computers. Computers have been doing intelligent things in medicine, using statistical decision theory, mathematical control theory, and plain old programming, for the last 15 or 20 years.

In 1964, Homer Warner published a landmark report about computer systems that could diagnose congenital heart disease with 90 percent accuracy. Dr. deDombal from Leeds, England, has used a similar approach with excellent results in the diagnosis of the acute abdomen since the early 1970's. In the midseventies Howard Bleich and coworkers from Beth-Israel Hospital developed a very proficient consultant about acid-base disturbances; very accurate. In the midseventies investigators at Massachusetts General Hospital; the University of Utah; my own institution, Indiana University; implemented rule-base systems that review patients' computer-stored records (and Dr. Reed described some of these) and remind physicians about a patient's condition needing attention. These are all built with plain old programming, no words or talk about artificial intelligence at those times.

In clinical trials, we and others have shown that physicians increase their use of the intervention suggested—in our case it was preventive care—by a twofold to fourfold increase among eligible patients.

Interestingly, in our experience physicians only increased what they already meant to do. We didn’t teach them to do anything new. The new kinds of things they refused to do. So it’s kind of an activator rather than a convincer.
Diagnostic programs have been around since the midseventies. In fact, computer diagnosis with the electrocardiogram has been very successful, and this is a commercial venture that Dr. Baker didn’t mention, because it’s not tied to artificial intelligence, but is now employed in over 10 percent of all electrocardiograms analyzed in this country done by computer and very accurately.

Computer-controlled drug infusion machines are also quite successful. They can reach a target goal, such as normal blood pressure, much faster and with less overshoot than conventional manual methods. They use the same control theory that pilots use or computers use in 747’s to land the planes, and that’s how I understand why we don’t bounce so hard when we land or 747’s like we do on the smaller ones.

In the absence of any relevant regulations, the medical profession has been very cautious and critical in the acceptance of this kind of intelligent computing. In fact, computers [physicians] have largely rejected the above-mentioned consulting programs because they required considerable physicians’ time to input patient data. Physicians are excellent arbiters of time, and they’ll do things that save them time and they’ll not do things that cost them more time.

Diagnostic programs that do not require human data input, such as the EKG analyses, have been well accepted, and these have remarkable diagnostic accuracy, a 98- to 99-percent accuracy. However, the vast majority of these now commercially sold are sold with physician, human cardiologist, overreading. The computer puts it out, and the human double reads them. They start out with less of this, and it’s almost gone to almost 100 percent. This highlights the cautiousness of the profession. History therefore argues that malpractice concerns, ethical standards, and tradition impose substantial and conservative controls on the adoption of intelligent computer systems by medical professionals. This is certainly not an out-of-control situation that cries for external regulation.

In addition, though artificial intelligence has made and will continue to make important contributions to the field of medical computing, it’s not a magic bullet that will rapidly solve the remaining barriers to intelligent computer systems in medical practice.

One barrier is the slow speed of the physician-computer interface. If the physician has to spend 20 minutes talking to the computer about his patient to do something he could do or get out of his consultant in a couple of minutes, he won’t do it. Use the computer.

In addition, there are difficulties in transferring clinical data among computer systems, for example, from a laboratory system to a decision support system. These are really very difficult barriers
which do require some standardization, and there are efforts now underway under the ASTM [American Society for Testing and Materials] Subcommittee [to develop such standards] and the AMA has been involved in that.

In addition, there is substantial ignorance about what physicians are really doing when they decide and where in the process computer support will be most helpful.

Finally—and this may be antireligious—there is a genuine dearth of empirical data on which to base detailed rules about care for patients. We pat ourselves on the back, we in the medical profession, for all the progress we've made in the past 50 years, but we're still looking through a mirror very darkly—very, very darkly; and I don't think in terms of the medical knowledge of what diseases are that we don't know more than 5 or 10 percent of what we need to know to take care of patients. Legionella is not a new disease. It was around since at least the early 1900's. We just didn't know about it. We called them [the cases of Legionella] all pneumonias.

Considerable research, such as that supported by the National Center for Health Services Research and the National Library of Medicine, are required to solve at least the informational problems I've described above.

Hype also surrounds discussions of artificial intelligence, and Walter—and I'm not sure I'll be able to spell this right—Metiscela from TRW (TRW is one of the most experienced large programming project companies, and they're one of the few that are able to stay very reliably within their estimation of time and materials to finish programming projects) has found that AI offers no more reasoning capability than conventional computer algorithms and that humans are required when reasoning is needed, particularly for unexpected events. I would submit that physicians or some other bright human is going to be required to oversee what computers do on complex diagnostic decision processes, though they may find very, very helpful the outputs from various systems and support programs.

In this context, the notion that physicians will turn to a computer's advice exactly as they would turn to a human consultant, I think, is science fiction, and this is discussed in more detail in the written testimony.

In short, I think there's no current need for standards or regulations in medical computer software whose outputs are interpreted by a medical professional. Wrong or out-of-date textbook information has the same potential to misdirect the physician, yet we haven't tried to standardize or regulate textbooks.

The history of medical computing suggests an existing strong critical and conservative process in the acceptance and adaption of such systems. The field is still in its infancy, so it's much too early to talk about what's really needed and what to regulate. Further, any regulation is only likely to stifle the development of this one

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43 Dr. McDonald asked that this be changed to read "... very, very darkly... In terms of..."

44 Dr. McDonald altered this sentence to read "... though they may find the outputs from various systems and support programs very, very helpful."
technology which I think is going to be a Godsend to cost savings, (to answer an earlier question in terms of efficiency). The medical field is way behind most industries in the use of information systems to improve efficiency in their process.

Regarding the second question, regarding how often databases should be updated, this, I think, should be answered by those who use the systems. Remember that physicians have had 9 to 15 years of post-high-school education in biology and medical sciences. They're well aware of the limitation of their informational sources and have always operated accordingly.

Market forces have been adequate to determine the frequency of updating of classical medical textbooks. There's no reason to expect that similar forces will not operate efficiently on computer support systems.

Questions about what kind of individuals should be allowed to use these is a difficult one. It certainly would be appropriate to prohibit commercial use of such systems by nonmedical professionals. On the other hand, although I say this with trepidation, I think it would be arrogant and presumptuous to legislate against the use of such systems by ordinary individuals for their own curiosity or interest. Certainly they go to the medical library and they read medical textbooks, and I think the worst that's going to happen is we're going to have an enormous outbreak of the sophomore medical student syndrome.

Whenever the medical students read a chapter on Hodgkins' disease, the incidence of Hodgkins' disease, at least visits for Hodgkins' disease, goes up about 30 percent in the local practice organizations. I had it myself once—twice—in medical school. And the problem is, you can't interpret the findings in the context of how bad, and how serious, and how likely, and how often, and all these other kind of things.

We can be sure that some individual will use and acquire such systems, but the consequences shouldn't be substantially worse than lay interest in medical textbooks and journals intended exclusively for physicians.

A last question deals with confidentiality. Clearly it's important that medical information remain confidential, and technical means are available to provide almost any level of confidentiality required. In fact, there's been a recent Federal report detailing all the range of security appropriate to various kinds of computer systems.

Now the most extreme forms require large passwords, like 10 or 15 typed characters, changed each day, so you have to memorize a new one each day; narrow restriction of access by passwords, so you only get certain limited kinds of information; and special shielding of rooms containing CRT's and computers to prevent monitoring by microwave snoopers. This [microwave snoopers] is apparently a fairly easy technology, that you can see the signal coming on the CRT by pointing devices at it. They [the standards] also require encryption of all stored information and elimination of any dial-up lines.

\[46\] Dr. McDonald changes this to read "... that lets you see ..."
But when trying to decide about security, we have to consider the costs. Obviously there are dollar costs. Security keycard readers on every terminal could easily add 20 to 30 percent to the total cost of hospital information systems, in which you are now talking in terms of 500 or more terminals. The cost of protective shielding to prevent microwave snooping could be prohibitive. I mean, you might have to shield the whole hospital and all the buildings and all the rooms.

There are other costs, and the most difficult problems—and these are really the opportunity costs—the most difficult problems physicians face taking care of acutely ill patients is obtaining past information about the patient. I remember too well the hours it could take to obtain a hospital chart when I was an intern at Boston City Hospital. Today, a large chunk of every physician’s day is spent finding, organizing, and assimilating information about individual patients.

What we really need is faster and easier access to medical information, particularly if we’re going to make medical care less costly. Yet the security protection we place on medical systems—the more we place on it, the more difficult it can be to obtain the data, and even small barriers can make such systems very difficult to use by physicians.

I don’t think this is just a matter of politics, of what they’d prefer, but just the daily operational realities. A physician may practice in three or four different hospitals and have only an occasional patient admitted to any one of them. Thus, he may forget his access code. How does he take care of his patient that day?

If security allows him access to only his own patients, how will he take care of [patients] when he is cross-covering for his partner who’s off sick or suddenly had to leave town? If a patient suffers a cardiac arrest now, how do I take care of the patient in that room who I have no access to? How am I going to find out what drugs he’s on?

If security is so tight that it interferes with daily operational realities, the reality is that people subvert it, and in fact in those hospitals that have very, very tight security, what you’ll often see is the general password written on the terminal. You know, they have all the limited, limited, limited, but that kind of takes care of it so people can take care of their problems.46

So some level of security is required. At a minimum, access to programs that can search across patient records and display identifying information should be very, very tightly protected. Tight control should also be applied to terminals that are not in patient care areas. I submit the physical location will tend to prevent access by outsiders in patient care areas just as it does for the manual chart.

We don’t believe it’s practical to limit medical or nursing staff access to only their patients because of the problems of cross-cover- age, rotations, and emergencies. Institutions should have some way of limiting access to medical data about VIP’s or other individuals who may be under special threat of snooping. Similarly, the ca-

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46 Dr. McDonald changed this to read “You know, they have all been limited, limited, limited, but they take care of it so that people can solve their problems.”
bility of restricting access to certain kinds of data, such as venereal
disease, might be desirable.

But we really don't know what the costs are, the values of this
data is; there really isn't much idea about what the risks are from
all this snooping that we worry about. It would be much easier to
determine the level of security required if we had measures of the
real threat. How often do unauthorized personnel try to access
medical records and manual systems? How much could it be worth
to them? Does anyone know?

Billing records contain diagnosis and procedures, and laboratory
results are transmitted between hospitals and Blue Cross insurance
companies across the country over the regular telephone with no
special protection. Current operational procedures—this suggests
the medical privacy threats are not large, but I think we need
some studies, or better understanding, or estimates of what they
really are.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. McDonald follows:]
I am a University Professor at the Indiana University School of Medicine. I have been developing and studying medical information systems, part time since 1964 and as my major research interest since 1972. I practice medicine and take care of patients in wards and clinics on a daily basis, and so have a sense of what physicians want from computers. I have been asked by this committee to address four issues: 1) the methods by which information systems should be verified and regulated, 2) what should be done to assure timely recertification of such systems, 3) who should be allowed to use these systems, and 4) what should be done to protect confidentiality of computer-stored medical records.

The sense of some of these questions suggests some people expect more from artificial intelligence than it is likely to deliver. There may also be misconceptions about the nature of medical practice, and the kinds of tools that physicians need and will accept.

First, it should be pointed out that artificial intelligence is not the only means by which computers can do intelligent things in medical practice. It is one of
many available methods which include: statistical decision
theory, mathematical control theory and just plain old
programming. Moreover, these latter approaches have been
around much longer than artificial intelligence and have
been used long enough in real clinical settings to gain
insight into the kinds of problems they may cause.

The history of medical computing goes back to at least
the early 60's. Progress has been steady but slow. In
1964, Homer Warner published a landmark report about a
computer system that could diagnose congenital heart
disease with a 90% accuracy. This program used Bayes
statistical techniques. Dr. DeDonabed from Leeds, England
has used a similar approach in a computer program that
diagnoses the cause of abdominal pain very successfully.
His program has been used in many countries.

Plain old programming has also made important
contributions. In the mid 70's Howard Bleich and
co-workers from Beth-Iessai hospital in Boston, developed a
plain old program that acted as a proficient consultant
about acid base disturbances. The physician could enter
information about a patient. The computer, in return,
would provide advice about both diagnoses and treatment.
This program was made available in over thirty Veteran's
Administration Hospitals.
In the mid 1970's investigators at Massachusetts General Hospital, the University of Utah and my own institution, Indiana University, implemented rule-based systems that would review a patient's computer-stored record and remind physicians about conditions needing attention. These too were based on plain old programming.

In controlled trials, we were able to show that among eligible patients, physicians increased their use of preventive care such as influenza vaccine, mammography and cervical Pap testing two-to-four fold compared to control physicians who did not receive computer reminders. Our first study of this system was published in 1976.

In the late 70's a major drug company marketed a system for diagnosing pediatric diseases. Physicians could dial up to the remote computer, enter three or four findings to get back a list of possible causes, including the hard to remember congenital syndromes. In the mid 70's, computer diagnosis of electrocardiograms was developed and since has been successfully commercialized. Currently, around 10% of all the electrocardiograms in this country are read by computer. These systems use plain old programming to make their diagnoses.

In the late 1970's, studies of the use of computers to manage intravenous infusions such as fluids, blood and IV medicines were undertaken. Computer controlled infusion
machines are now quite successful. They can reach a target goal, such as a normal blood pressure, much faster and with less overshoot than conventional manual methods. These systems are based on mathematical and control theory, the same techniques computers use to land a 747.

There has been no mad rush by the medical community to install the above systems despite their demonstrated benefits. Physicians hardly used the services of the acid base consultants or the pediatric diagnostic program when they were made available and as a result, these two programs were removed from the "market". Some of the other systems mentioned above have spread to other sites, but the spread has been slow, certainly much slower than the growth in use of imaging techniques such as CAT scans and ultrasound. These observations should assuage any concern that physicians will rush out, buy new diagnostic computers, and apply their advice willy-nilly.

Difficult logistic, practical, organizational, and theoretic problems hinder the adoption of such systems. One such problem is that the interface between physicians and computers is still too slow. The development of faster methods by which physicians could communicate with computers is currently a subject of important research work both in artificial intelligence and other laboratories. Until improved methods are available the physician time
cost of "talking" to computers is too high for long consulting dialogues. Consequently, decision support systems will be most successful when they can make their decisions on the basis of internally-stored data, for example from a computer-stored record. But, building computer-stored records is difficult because of lack of standards for communicating clinical data from one computer system to another, for example from a laboratory system to a medical record system.

In addition there is still a great deal to learn about how to assist physicians in making decisions and when they need help. Finally, there is a real dearth of empirical data on which to base detailed rules about how to take care of patients. Though medicine puts itself on the back for all that it has learned in the past 50 years, we have learned only a small fraction of what there is to know. And consequently, much of what experts say are simply guesses.

Artificial intelligence has made and will continue to make important contributions to the field of medical computing. But it is not a magic bullet and will not simply sweep away the above problems. Considerable research, such as that supported by the National Center, and National Library of Medicine, are required to develop the ideal consulting system. Moreover, artificial
intelligence will not be the only approach applied to decision support systems. Statistical techniques will also be important as computer-stored clinical data becomes available in greater amounts with the increasing automation of medical data.

Another possible misconception is the notion that physicians would turn to the computer and take its advice as they would from their consultant colleague. This is science fiction. Let me explain. First, a computer will not know as much about the patient as a physician. The physician gathers immense amounts of information about a patient by simply watching the patient's gait, the quickness of their verbal response, the light in their eyes, the tone of their voice, and so on. In fact, in an instant, the human observer watching a patient walk into their office knows the patient's approximate age and their sex. They also know that the patient is not unconscious, has no significant neurologic disturbance, has not swallowed a cyanide pill, and has not suffered a gunshot wound and so on. It would take a long session between physician and computer for the physician to inform the computer of all of these observations. And physicians simply are not going to spend large chunks of their day explaining the full status of their patients to computers.
In the time it would take to do so, the physician could complete the work of an entire patient visit.

Finally, even if the computer knew all that the primary physician knew about the patient, it may not know as much about the patient as the consultant would. One of the most valuable contributions a human consultant makes is the separate history and physical they perform. A consultant's discovery of an unnoted historical fact, e.g., the small lump on the thyroid may contribute more to the diagnosis than their special knowledge about the diseases.

Finally, there are potential problems with the coupling of physician descriptions of patients to the computer's internal thresholds for making decisions. Physicians often disagree about how loud a heart murmur is, or how deep ankle edema is. Thus, an expert system is likely to differ when different physicians describe the same patient.

In sum, the idea that physicians would take a risk with a patient simply because the computer told them to, is naive. Cardiac arrest alarms often sound for patients who are sleeping quietly or eating lunch. But physicians never run in to cardioshock such patients. When a lab test comes back with an unusual abnormality, physicians don't rush to treat it. They assume it is wrong, and repeat it. By habit and training physicians trust their own observations.
and views far more than those of others. Second and third year residents often disdain the advice of a senior staff member, we can hardly expect that such physicians will blindly take computer advice. The experience of commercial electrocardiogram diagnosis systems -- the only commercial success of computer diagnosis systems -- is instructive. Almost every commercial system offers cardiologist over-read of the computer-read EKGs. More important, the cardiologist over-read is requested in more than half of the electrocardiographic workload of some companies.

None of this is to say that computers won’t provide useful and important help to clinical care. On the contrary, I think computers can radically improve the efficiency and reduce the error rate in medical care. Such systems will have the greatest potential when they can make decisions solely on the basis of information captured from instruments such as electrocardiograms, blood pressure readings and so on. And in these cases, when no human intervenes between the primary data and the decisions, standards may be needed. But for ordinary medical decision making, the computer outputs will only be an assist to the physicians decision process. There are likely to be a great variety of different kinds of assistance systems. Some will provide easy access to precisely the information
wanted from textbooks and journals. The success of these systems might be measured by the relevance and conciseness of the retrieved information. Others will help physicians who are searching for diagnostic or therapeutic ideas in the difficult patient who does not respond to the usual therapies. The quality of these systems might be judged by the comprehensiveness of the options they offer. Still other systems might remind about the dangers of a particular drug, in light of the patient’s clinical history, or about a diagnostic possibility not currently under consideration. The absolute accuracy of these reminders may not be important as long as they offer good ideas often enough to be worth reading. Certainly, diagnostic assistance programs will not have to be 100% correct to be helpful. In fact, almost nothing is 100% in medicine. Physicians are accustomed to high rates of false positives and false negatives from test results. For example, when a mammogram suggests the presence of breast cancer, the true chance of breast cancer is less than one out of four or five. Yet, mammography is a very useful test because it detects cancer early enough to cure. Thus, we can afford to accept some false positives to find the patients with true positives.

Other systems may suggest very specific dosages, or
intervals of testing based on cost benefit calculations. On a simple scale, such calculations are now being done in many hospitals to decide the dosages of some intravenous antibiotics and asthma medications. Such systems do reduce drug toxicity and inadequate therapy. Finally, some decision support systems will contain no baseline medical knowledge. They would be intended to execute rules fed in by the local physician according to personal standards of care.

We doubt that decision support techniques will be in any way equivalent to human consultants. Consequently, we think it is premature to even discuss the development of formal standards for medical decision support systems. We understand too little about the physician's real decision processes, and even less about where they need help in this process. We can envision a great variety of such systems with wide variety of goals and purposes that would confound any uniform standard or regulation designed at this point in time. But we simply don't know exactly what the field will bring. Asking the field to define such standards now would be like asking Orville Wright how he would regulate the airline industry.

Moreover, considering existing legal and ethical forces, such as malpractice, and the traditional caution of
the medical profession, it is quite possible that external standards will never be needed. Certainly, there are strong parallels between the evidence provided by medical textbooks and monographs -- especially those that include flow charts and algorithms, and the guidance provided by a decision support system. Wrong or out-of-date textbook information has the same potential to misdirect the physician. Yet, we don't try to standardize or regulate the textbooks or other published advice. Market forces, physicians, and the publishing industry seem well able to distinguish the good from the bad in their reading. They should be able to do the same with medical decision systems.

Physicians tend to be overly suspicious and untrusting of computer systems and bothered by the time they consume. To impose standards on the field at this juncture could stifle an infant science would stifle the growth. The medical industry has been one of the slowest to use computers to reduce the cost and raise the quality of their "product". An overburden of rules and regulations would only add to the delay -- a delay we can hardly afford considering the medical care currently consumes 10% of the national product.

The question about how often databases should be
updated should be determined by those who use these systems. Remember, physicians have had from 9 to 15 years of post high school education in biology and medical sciences. They are well aware of the limitations of their information sources and they operate accordingly. Market forces have been adequate to determine the frequency of updating of classical medical textbooks. There is no reason to expect that similar forces will not operate as well on the computer support systems.

The question about what kind of individuals should be allowed to use these systems is a difficult one. On the one hand these systems are likely to be designed to specifically assist physicians' decisions, and will assume that the user has the background and experience of a physician. It would be appropriate to prohibit commercial use of such systems by nonphysicians. On the other hand, it would be arrogant and presumptuous to legislate against the use of such systems by ordinary individuals for their own curiosity or interest. And we can be sure that some individuals will acquire and use such systems for these purposes. The consequences should be no worse than that of reading medical textbooks and journals intended exclusively for physicians or alternate health care books now on bookstore shelves.
The last question deals with the confidentiality of medical records. Clearly, it is important that medical information remain confidential. Technical means are available to provide almost any level of confidentiality required. In fact, a federal report details the range of security appropriate to various kinds of computer systems is available. The most extreme forms require large passwords, changed each day, narrow restriction of access by password, special shielding of rooms containing CRTs and computers, to prevent monitoring by microwave snoopers. They also require encryption of all stored information and elimination of any dial-up lines. But when trying to decide how much security is required, one must consider the costs. Obviously, there are dollar costs. Security keycard readers on every terminal could easily add 20-30% to the total cost of a hospital computer system. The costs of protective shielding to prevent microwave snooping could be prohibitive. There are other costs. The most difficult problems that physicians face on acutely ill patients is obtaining past information about that patient. I remember too well the hours it could take to obtain a hospital chart when I was an intern at Boston City Hospital. Today, a large chunk of every physician’s day is spent finding, organizing and assimilating information about individual
patients. We need faster and easier access to our patient's medical information. Yet the more security protection we place on a medical system the more difficult the information will be to obtain. And even small barriers can make use of such systems by physicians difficult or impossible. A physician may practice in three or four different hospitals and have only an occasional patient admitted to any one of them. Thus, he may often forget his access code. How will he obtain his patient's records? If security allows him to access only his own patient, how will he review his partner's cases when cross covering? If a patient suffers a cardiac arrest how will the nearest physician be able to help? Finally, if security is so tight that it interferes with the routine operation of a hospital, people subvert it. It is not uncommon to see general passwords written on the side of CRTs in institutions where the password control is very tight.

Clearly, some level of security is required. A practical minimum might be to tightly limit access to programs that can search across patient records and display patient identifying information. And apply tight password control over terminals that are not in patient care areas. Physical location will tend to prevent access by outsiders in patient care areas, just as it does for the manual
We don't believe it is practical to limit the medical or nursing staff access to only their patients because of the problem of cross coverage, rotations, and emergencies.

Institutions should have some way of limiting access to medical data about VIPs or other individuals who may be under a special threat of snooping. Similarly, the capability of restricting medical staff access to certain kinds of data, e.g., venereal disease tests, might also be desirable.

It would be much easier to determine the level of security required if measures of the real threat to privacy were available. How often do unauthorized personnel try to access medical records in the manual systems? Does anyone know? Hospital record rooms are rarely guarded. Anyone with a white coat can wander in and take a chart out.

Billing records containing diagnoses and procedures, and laboratory results are transmitted between the hospitals and Blue Cross insurance companies and between laboratories and practices all over the country without any special encoding. Current operational procedures, thus suggest that the threats to medical privacy are minimal. But we need better estimates about the kinds of privacy threats that exist and their relative risk.
Curriculum Vitae

Clement Joseph McDonald, M.D.

Born Chicago, Illinois, December 16, 1940.
Married to Barbara McDonald, three children ages 7-11.

Degrees
- University of Notre Dame
- University of Illinois
  M.D. 1965. Academic rank, 1st in class.
- Northwestern University
  M.S., 1968. Focus on computers and mathematics.
  Thesis - Computer Diagnosis of the Acute Abdomen by Computer Pattern Recognition Methods

Postgraduate Medical Training
- Internship, 1965
  Boston City Hospital, Harvard Medical Service
- National Institute of Health Fellow, 1968-1970
  Managed development of the first computing clinical laboratory system at the clinical center in Bethesda, Maryland.
- Internal Medicine Resident, 1970-1972
  Cook County Hospital and University of Wisconsin.
Academic and Professional Positions

1972 - present

Professor of Medicine, Indiana University School of Medicine, Department of Medicine.

Staff physician, Wishard Memorial Hospital, Indiana University Hospital and Regenstrief Health Clinic.

Director of Computer Science Research, Regenstrief Institute for Health Care, Indianapolis, Indiana.

Research Activities

Developed and studied computer-stored medical record and rule-based physician reminder system. Developed database management systems, clinical laboratory, pharmacy and appointment scheduling systems.

Professional Activities

Secretary of Executive Board for Symposium on Computer Applications in Medical Care.

Executive Board, College of Medical Informatics

Managing Editor, M.D. Computing, a Springer-Verlag international journal.

Reviewer for the New England Journal of Medicine, Annals of Internal Medicine, Journal of the American Medical Association and others.
Selected Publications


McDonald CJ: The medical gopher -- a microcomputer based physician work station. Proceedings of 1984 Symposium on Computer Applications in Medical Care; 453-459.


Mr. Volkmer. Thank you very much, Dr. McDonald.

Mr. Belair.

Mr. Belair. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I always tell clients that if they're the last witness of the day, that they ought to make it very, very brief. Of course, they usually don't pay any attention to me, but I will try to take my own advice and make this brief.

Let me commend you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of your subcommittee, for taking an interest in health record privacy. I'm sure it's not for a lack of other things to do, and this is an issue—it's a difficult issue, it's an insidious issue, it's one that does not have easy answers, and it requires a lot of work, and, judging by your questions here at the earlier panel, you're obviously prepared to do a lot of work and have done a lot of work, and so I certainly commend you for your interest.

Let me briefly summarize the state of privacy law today as it relates to health records, and, in a sentence, the state of that privacy law is very poor; it's very unprotective of patient interests in confidentiality and privacy and provider interest as well.

For example, the law ought to provide for a sure and easy and ready way for patients to have access to their health records, and although we've made a lot of progress in that area, the law is still, by no means, a predictor or an insistor on patient access at all times.

We ought to have a law that has very sharp limits on the dissemination of health record information to third parties, obviously the key to much of privacy and confidentiality law, and in fact the law today seldom does.

We need very desperately to have effective controls on the redisclosure of health record information by third parties. Today, as we all know, in this room there are a myriad of third parties who do not provide health care and who, nevertheless, must have access to health records for payment purposes, for research purposes, for employment purposes—and employers are increasingly involved in this in the health care process. Nevertheless, all too often when these kinds of parties get hold of health record information, the controls on their redisclosure and reuse of this information are inadequate.

Automation—there's been a lot of talk, obviously, today about automation. The bottom line, I think, from a privacy standpoint is that automation of health records simply makes it easier to collect the information in the first place, easier to retain it, cheaper to retain the information, and easier and cheaper to say yes to requests for the disclosure of the information.

It doesn't mean by any means—and this is why it's such a difficult issue—that we ought to be opposed to the automation of health records. Indeed, as a couple of the folks here this morning have pointed out, there are some real benefits from a privacy standpoint for automation. It is often easier to protect the information in an automated system, easier to introduce data quality protocols that update information, that have logs that keep track of dissemination, and so forth, but, nonetheless, there is a threat.

For example, when we're talking about the use of computers for diagnosis and diagnostic systems, what that runs the risk of doing
is increasing the amount of information about specific individuals, personally identified individuals, in automated systems. It doesn't have to, but we certainly have that risk.

Another especially troubling area of the law is that the Federal Government, which has such a key role today in health care—as a provider of health care, as a sponsor of health care, as a payer for a great deal of the Nation's health care, as a researcher in public health—the Federal Government is intimately involved in virtually every aspect of health care today.

We ought to be a model, here at the Federal level, for how health record information is collected, and used, and disseminated, and although the Congress has made efforts in this regard—and I suppose the most important effort is the Privacy Act of 1974—the fact remains that we’ve got a long way to go.

The Privacy Act was a bad law 12 years ago. It hasn’t gotten any better; it’s gotten worse. It simply fails to introduce adequate protections on the collection, and the use, and the redisclosure of health record information, and my statement goes into some of these issues in a little bit more detail.

Let me close by addressing, I think, something that we’ve always got to address when we’re talking about reforming law, and I know that Members of the Congress feel this acutely, and that is, “So what? Why do we care about improving, enhancing the protections for patient privacy?”

We care, in part, I think, or ought to, because the public cares. Every public opinion poll that’s been taken on the issue of privacy shows that the public cares most about the privacy of their medical records, more than financial records, more than educational records, employment records—any other kind of record.

Second, there are real adverse effects that flow from the improper disclosure or use of health record information, tangible effects: People lose jobs, they lose promotions, they lose opportunities for insurance, they lose opportunities for credit; there are adverse relational effects: relations with family members, with spouses, or friends are interrupted and, in some cases, destroyed.

Therapeutic effects. The doctor-patient relationship is built, in some measure, on an element of trust that a patient can be candid and forthcoming with his physician and that that information won’t go any further. That underlies the old pledge of confidentiality and the Hippocratic Oath.46a I think it explains why virtually every provider organization—AMA [American Medical Association], the American Psychiatric Association, the AHA [the American Hospital Association] all of the major health associations have either published model confidentiality laws or they’ve adopted positions which are supportive and comprehensive on the question of privacy.

Obviously, too, there are devastating personal effects—stigma and embarrassment, emotional distress, trauma. What we don’t have, as Dr. McDonald so rightly pointed out, is any empirical in-

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46a The Hippocratic Oath states: "... And whatsoever I shall see or hear in the course of my profession... if it be what should not be published abroad, I will never divulge, holding such things to be holy secrets." (John Bartlett, "Familiar Quotations," 15th Ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1880), p. 79.)
formation. We don't know what the cost is; we don't know what the incidence is; we don't know how pervasive it is. We've got lots of anecdotal information, and I put some of it in my prepared statement.

I used to be the general counsel of something called the National Commission on the Confidentiality of Health Records, and that's a now defunct organization, but we used to get over 100 complaints a month from patients about the invasion of their privacy, and I just pulled the first 5 off the top, and they are mentioned in my statement.

A Sulphur, OK, woman who lost her marriage when it was improperly disclosed that she'd been tested for VD; a Kansas City woman who lost her job after her employer was told that she suffered from severe depression; a Russellville, AL, woman who suffered a severe emotional distress after pictures of her breast implant surgery were improperly disseminated and circulated; an Evergreen Park, IL, woman who was denied entrance to the sisterhood after the mother superior was told by a Catholic hospital that this woman had been under psychiatric care; a Cushing, OK, woman who suffered severe emotional distress—and I had some personal communication with this woman at the time. She was one of the grand dames of Cushing, OK, 90 years old, and it was disclosed improperly that she was being treated for syphilis. There is an awful lot of damage that's out there. We cannot quantify it yet, and we need to.

By way of conclusion, let me just reference an article that appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine that's mentioned in my statement. Dr. Mark Siegler kept track of the number of individuals affiliated with a hospital who get to look at a typical patient's health record while the patient is in the hospital. He counted 76 individuals, from the doctors on down to the candy-strippers, and his conclusion, based on that and some other factors that he took into account, was that privacy as it relates to health information is dead, it's a myth.

I think that's a misdiagnosis, at least a premature diagnosis. It isn't dead, but it certainly is ill, and we need to take a good, hard look at the law. That can be done in a way that's progressive, in a way that does not stop the kinds of initiatives that we heard about here today. It takes thought, it takes cooperation, we have to be clever about it, but it can be done, and the NCCUSL has now adopted, and the ABA has unanimously endorsed, a model State law that addresses many of these issues.

The NCCUSL, as you know, is good; they've got a good track record at getting their statutes adopted at the State level. So I'm optimistic that it will move.

I think that's an initiative that the Congress needs to follow, and then I think at the Federal level the Congress needs to take a look at the Privacy Act, take a look at the role that the Federal Government plays in health care, take a look at automation and adopt legislation ultimately that addresses health care and the handling of health records at the Federal level.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Belair follows:]

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Mr. Chairman, I am Robert R. Belair, a partner in the law firm of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, in Washington, D.C. I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the Subcommittee concerning the status of privacy law as it relates to health records and, in particular, computerized health records. Before beginning, I want to commend the Subcommittee and its Chairman for their interest in this vital, but often neglected, issue.

INTRODUCTION

Before proceeding with my statement, I would like to describe briefly my background. I have devoted a good deal of my professional career to problems related to health record privacy and other privacy issues. I have served as a staff member for the National Academy of Sciences' Project on Computer Data Banks, which produced a landmark report entitled Data Banks in a Free Society. I have also served as the Deputy General Counsel of the Domestic Council Committee on the Right of Privacy in President Ford's Administration.
Since leaving government, I have served as General Counsel of the now defunct National Commission on the Confidentiality of Health Records, a federation of 21 health professional organizations dedicated to enhancing the confidentiality of health records. More recently, I have served as a reporter for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' ("NCCUSL") Drafting Committee on Health Record Privacy. In 1985, the NCCUSL adopted the model Health Records Act and since that time the Act has been unanimously endorsed by the American Bar Association. I have also written and spoken extensively on the subject of health record privacy.

In my remarks this morning I would like to talk first about the importance of health record privacy. Following that I will summarize confidentiality and privacy law as it relates to collection, maintenance, dissemination of health records and patient access to these records. Finally, I want to focus on a few particular problems, including the automation of health records, that I think deserve Congressional scrutiny and action.

HEALTH RECORD PRIVACY IS THREATENED

Every public opinion poll that has addressed the issue of health record privacy finds that the American public is vitally interested in protecting the privacy of health records. Despite this interest, the extent to which Americans enjoy health record privacy has declined dramatically. Not long ago, Dr. Mark Siegler published an article in the prestigious New England Journal of Medicine (December 9, 1982) entitled, "Confidentiality in Medicine -- A Decrepit Concept".
Dr. Siegler kept track of the number and type of hospital employees who reviewed an "average" patient's record. The result was startling. Dr. Siegler found that the average patient's record was reviewed by 6 doctors, 12 hospital officers, 20 nurses on three shifts, 6 therapists, 3 nutritionists, 2 clinical pharmacists, 15 students, 4 unit secretaries, 4 hospital financial officers, and 4 hospital reviewers. Siegler concluded, "Let's not perpetrate the myth of medical confidentiality -- it no longer exists."

Unfortunately, we do not have empirically valid data regarding the extent to which hospital and other health care records are reviewed or disseminated. What we do have, however, is an impressive body of anecdotal reports. For example, a Sulphur, Oklahoma woman lost her marriage when it was improperly disclosed that she had been tested for VD; a Kansas City woman quit her job after her employer was told that the woman was being treated for severe depression. A Russellville, Alabama woman suffered severe emotional distress after pictures of her breast implant surgery were improperly circulated among hospital employees. An Evergreen Park, Illinois woman was denied entrance to the Catholic sisterhood after a Catholic hospital disclosed to the Mother Superior that the woman had a psychiatric record. A Cushing, Oklahoma woman suffered severe emotional distress after it was disclosed within the community that she was being treated for syphilis -- she was 90 years old. (Compiled from the records of the National Commission on the Confidentiality of Health Information).

ADVERSE EFFECTS OF PRIVACY INVASION

Stories such as these are endless. The reason, of course, is that the improper disclosure of health record information can, and often does, have significant adverse effects on patients. Such disclosure adversely affects opportunities for jobs, promotions,
the granting of credit, and insurance. Moreover, disclosures of health record information can disrupt relationships with family and friends. Some years ago, for example, I represented a newspaper editor whose marriage suffered after it was disclosed that, prior to their marriage, he had been arrested for sexual assault and had been treated for psychiatric and emotional problems at that time.

Furthermore, disclosure of health record information destroys the trust that health care providers are quick to acknowledge. This basis for a provider-patient relationship. Moreover, psychiatrists and other professionals have documented that the disclosure of health record information often results in feelings of shame, humiliation, betrayal, loss of status and face, and loss of control. In short, the unexpected, inappropriate disclosure of health record information is demeaning -- it's an assault.

SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HEIGHTEN THE THREAT TO PRIVACY

Over the last several decades a number of fundamental developments have increased the threat to the confidentiality and privacy of health care information. These developments include the emergence and growth of third-party payment plans; the use of health care information for non-health care purposes; the growing involvement of government agencies in virtually all aspects of health care; the declining role of physicians in providing health care (in the early part of this century, 85 percent of all health care providers were physicians; today physicians make up only 5 percent of the total). Dilemma -- A Report of the National Commission on the Confidentiality of
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Health Records, p. 2 (1977)); the emergence of corporate, multi-state health care providers; and the exponential increase in the use of computers and automated information systems for managing health care record information. Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society, at 283 (1977) (hereafter "Privacy Commission Report").

SUMMARY OF PRIVACY LAW

Notwithstanding the growing threat to health record privacy and the public's interest in preserving such privacy, the fact is that privacy laws have failed to keep pace. Only one-fifth of the states, for example, have adopted comprehensive privacy acts -- based more or less on the 1974 Federal Privacy Act -- which provide some assurance that health records held by state government agencies (but not the private sector) will be disclosed to third parties only after first obtaining the patient's consent. See, for example, Arkansas Statute Annotated § 16-802 et seq.; Connecticut General Statute Annotated § 4-190 et seq.; Indiana Code Annotated § 4-1-6-1; Mass. General Laws, Ch. 30, § 63, Ch. 66A; Minnesota Statute Annotated § 15.162 et seq.; Ohio Revised Code Annotated § 1347.01 et seq.; Utah Code Annotated § 63-50-1 et seq.; and Virginia Code § 2.1-377 et seq.

Only two types of health record legislation are common in virtually every state. First, statutes in every state require health care providers to report many types of patient information to state agencies. Typically, these statutes require providers to report health data concerning violent injuries (gunshot and knife wounds are most common); contagious or infectious diseases; tuberculosis; venereal disease; occupational illnesses and injuries; certain congenital defects; and injuries from child abuse.
Second, almost every state recognizes some type of provider-patient privilege. The privilege generally permits the patient to prohibit his provider from disclosing health record information in at least some types of judicial proceedings. (South Carolina, Texas and Vermont do not have doctor-patient privilege laws.) However, the privilege belongs to the patient and thus can be waived by the patient. Moreover, many statutes include express exceptions which allow providers to provide information to a court in connection with court-ordered examinations; where child abuse is at issue; where involuntary hospitalization is at issue; where the patient relies upon his medical condition as a defense; and in cases of criminal prosecution.

Only a few states (Rhode Island, California and Montana, most notably) have adopted comprehensive health record privacy statutes which regulate the collection, maintenance and disclosure of health records by private sector providers. In jurisdictions without comprehensive statutory schemes, private sector health care providers enjoy broad discretion to collect, manage and maintain patient records.

However, even in the absence of statutory standards, health care providers do not enjoy unfettered discretion when it comes to the disclosure of health records. In most jurisdictions the courts have held that providers must have the patient's consent in order to disclose records. Disclosures without such consent can result in tort liability -- on the theory that disclosure represents the publication of private facts -- or can result in liability in contract -- on the theory that there is an implied contract of confidentiality between providers and patients. See, Decisions: Judicial Decisions in Health Records Confidentiality (1979). However, under these common law theories the courts recognize numerous exceptions which permit providers to release health record information without patient consent to third-party payors, law enforcement agencies, public health agencies, researchers and other third parties who provide services to providers or to society at large.
CONTENT AND MAINTENANCE OF RECORDS

When the current law is reviewed in regard to specific record-keeping activities, the inadequacy of current law becomes even more apparent. For example, although most health care providers have an obligation to maintain health records, the content of the records is left to industry standards. Interestingly, many hospitals take very seriously their obligation to maintain health records. For example, it is reported that St. Bartholomew's Hospital, in London, still has patient records dating from the year 1137.

However, the absence of criteria for the content of health records means that the information in such records is not held to a relevancy standard. Virtually any type of data a health care provider wishes to collect can be placed in the health record. The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals does impose certain record content standards on hospitals. However, these standards are not directed at the protection of privacy.

Beyond a general requirement found in most state laws that at least institutional health care providers, such as hospitals, are required to maintain a patient's record for a set period of time, there is little in the way of regulation of the maintenance of these records. Occasionally, on a common law basis, courts have held that hospitals must expunge or correct health records. Wolfe v. Beal, 384 A.2d 1187 (Pa. 1978). Normally, however, the courts reject such efforts.

The courts have also rejected the argument that patients have an interest in whether or not a record is computerized. In Volkman v. Miller, 383 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1976), a New York State court held that there was no violation of a patient's privacy interest for the provider to computerize out-patient psychiatric records.
PATIENT ACCESS

Perhaps the area that where lawmakers have made the most progress relates to patient access and review of records. Today, about 30 states have adopted some type of patient access statute. In some states the statutory requirement affects only hospitals, and in still other states the access requirement affects only governmental health care providers. Moreover, the statutes which require providers to allow patients to review, and in some cases, correct their health records usually make exceptions for mental health information, or for those instances in which a provider believes that patient access would be injurious to the patient's health. Auerbach & Bogue, Medical Records: Getting Yours, Public Citizen Health Research Group (1980).

A few courts have held that even in the absence of a statute patients have a common law right of access (notwithstanding that the courts have also held that the health care record is the property of the hospital and belongs to the hospital or other provider). Cannel v. Medical and Surgical Clinic, 315 N.E.2d 278 (Ill. 1974); Wallace v. University Hospital of Cleveland, 170 N.E.2d 261 (Ohio 1960); Hutchins v. Texas Rehabilitation Commission, 544 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1976).

Even as regards patient access, the state of the law is by no means entirely rosy. Perhaps the key problem is compliance. While no definitive studies have been done, there is much anecdotal evidence to suggest that providers frustrate patient access laws by failing to provide the record on a timely basis, or by providing only an oral or written summary of the record. Many providers, of course, worry that patient access laws only encourage malpractice suits. For example, one study conducted in Massachusetts in 1983 found that hospitals in that state routinely failed to comply with the state's patient access law. One hospital official, in explaining compliance failures, stated, "Good medicine is good law." Many respondents to the Massachusetts survey cited a notorious Massachusetts incident in which a 33-year-old lawyer committed suicide after reviewing his psychiatric record.
DISCLOSURE TO THIRD PARTIES

Disclosure to third parties is, of course, the principal privacy threat. One of the most frustrating and ironic aspects of the health record privacy problem is that the most serious and invasive disclosures to third parties are done entirely with patient consent. Studies indicate, for example, that patients routinely sign virtually any type of consent form put in front of them, no matter how overbroad or vague. Rosen, Why Clients Relinquish Their Rights to Privacy Under Sign-Away Pressures, unpublished monograph, 1983; Informed Consent -- Why Are Its Goals imperfectly Realized?, N. Engl. J. Med. 1980 at 896. Both statute law and case law has generally blessed the use of even the most overbroad or vague consent forms.

The Privacy Protection Study Commission's recommendations, the Model NCUESL Bill, and model health care legislation proposed by virtually every major health professional group, including the American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association, the American Nurses Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the American Medical Record Association, have recognized that overbroad patient consent forms are perhaps the most insidious threat to patient privacy and all of these organizations have urged legislators to restrict the use of such consent forms. These model proposals would require that patient consent specifically identify the records to be disclosed; the purpose of the disclosure; the identity of the party disclosing the record; the identity of the recipient; and restrict the applicability of the consent to a limited time period, usually one to two years.

As noted earlier, existing law also recognizes the right of providers to disclose health record information even without consent to a number of types of recipients. These recipients customarily include other health care providers or parties assisting health care providers; third party payors (although
usually third party payors are careful to ensure that they have obtained a blanket patient consent; law enforcement agencies; public health and other authorities who obtain information under compulsory reporting laws; researchers; employers; family members; parties with a need to know in emergency situations; and parties in danger and as to whom providers have a duty to warn. In general, the courts have held that disclosures to these types of recipients do not violate a patient's common law right of privacy in health records because there is a qualified privilege to disclose health care information for purposes of providing health care, obtaining payment, protecting the public health, and assisting law enforcement agencies, among other purposes. Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345 (1962); Pyramid Life Insurance Company v. Masonic Hospital Association, 191 F. Supp. 51 (Okla. 1961).

AUTOMATION OF HEALTH RECORDS

The automation of health records and record systems is an issue of special importance. Computerization of health records does not change the rules, just the risk. Automation, in the words of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, makes it easier to say "yes" to requests for disclosure. Automation also makes it easier, and cheaper, to maintain a great deal of health record data that may not be needed. Automation also encourages the centralization or linking of information about a single patient so that a more comprehensive and detailed profile is available. Finally, automated systems, as is well known, are vulnerable to unauthorized penetration. For example, a couple of years ago a 21-year old used a $1,200 Apple II and the Telenet Communications System to gain access to Sloan Kettering's patient radiation records.
Of course, the effect of automating health record systems is by no means entirely negative. For one thing, automation promotes the standardization of data elements and language, thereby minimizing chances for mistakes or misunderstanding. Furthermore, automated systems are usually more auditable than manual systems because the record-keeping events are identifiable and recallable. Moreover, the quality of the data in automated record systems is often improved because the updating and correcting of data is easier. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, automating a system requires everyone involved in the system to be more thoughtful about the process and often results in real benefits from a privacy standpoint.

Nevertheless, the privacy threat posed by automation probably outweighs the privacy benefits from automation. In the last Congress, Representative Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), introduced legislation that would have restricted access to federal health records in automated systems. While this approach may not be perfect, the Congress should act to require federal health care providers to take steps to avoid the adverse privacy impact of automated health record systems. This would mean mandating the upgrading of computer security, limitations on the length of time that health care information can be maintained; limitations on the kind of health care data that can be maintained in an automated environment; and mandated data quality standards.

GOVERNMENT ACQUISITION OF HEALTH RECORD DATA

Another issue that should be addressed by the Congress relates to federal government's voracious appetite for health record data. The federal government's role as a near-ubiquitous third-party payer; its role as a law enforcement agency; its role in public health; and its role as a researcher makes
the government a seemingly insatiable consumer of health record data. Compulsory reporting statutes, in particular, threaten to deputize every health care provider in the country and make that provider part of the law enforcement system. The long-term effect of federal demands for health care data threatens to have an adverse impact upon the quality of health care and the quality of our citizens' lives.

The Congress should look for ways to sharply limit the government's acquisition of health record information. Whenever possible, the government should make special efforts to obtain health care information in non-identifiable formats or promptly transfer records into such formats. Whenever possible, the government should ensure that it uses health record information only for the purpose for which the record was first obtained. Whenever possible, the government should seal or destroy health record information. Finally, the Congress should insist that the federal government take the lead in using patient consent forms that are protective of personal privacy.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE A MODEL

In 1979, the Congress gave serious consideration to adopting federal legislation to protect the privacy of health records. S.503 and S.865, and see Hearings Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate, 96th Congress, 1st Session. Unfortunately, objections from the law enforcement community that the legislation went too far in protecting privacy, and objections from the mental health community that the legislation failed to go far enough, doomed the legislation. Since that time the Congress has not seriously revisited this issue.
However, despite the Congress' inattention, the problem has not gone away. Indeed, the problem has become acute. Thanks to the efforts of the NCCUSL and the American Bar Association, the states now have before them a model bill that effectively addresses many of these problems. Hopefully, the state legislatures will act with dispatch to adopt this legislation. This effort should be monitored in the Congress. In the meantime, the Congress should act to make the federal government, which in and of itself is a major health care provider, a model for health record privacy.

Thank you for this opportunity to present my views on this vital subject.
Mr. Volkmer. Thank you very much, Mr. Belair.

Let me ask a question, right at the beginning, of you, pertaining to those records. Do you see more problems in the future with the computerization of medical records and dissemination—unauthorized dissemination because of the computerization?

Mr. Belair. No question. It just makes it easier. It's so much cheaper to get that data, keep it a long time; you can disseminate it almost with the push of a button. It just introduces lots of incentives to move this data around, to centralize it, and if we're not vigilant, the technology will outflank the protections in current law.

Mr. Volkmer. What about collection and storage of patient data that's not immediately needed for treatment? What can we do with it? Purge it?

Mr. Belair. You see, it's such a hard question. You know, the physicians will tell you—and I don't think that they're wrong—that if you start putting limits on the amount of data that physicians can keep or the kind of data that they can collect or keep, what you will do is adversely impact on health care.

There aren't any easy answers here, Mr. Chairman, unfortunately. I think that what we need to do is try to find ways to put this information in a nonpersonally identifiable format or at least to limit the number of people and the kind of people who have access to this data in a personally identifiable form—in other words, make the records anonymous to the extent that we can.

That's one answer, and the other answer, I think, goes to dissemination. The collection has to be—I think you'd have to be awfully intrepid to go in and begin telling physicians what they can and can't collect.

Mr. Packard. Mr. Chairman, would you yield on that point?

Mr. Volkmer. Yes, I yield.

Mr. Packard. Why couldn't there be a key—a computer key to each patient's records that would only permit authorized personnel that have that key access to that information? It would appear to me that technology could answer that better than perhaps some other system.

Mr. Belair. I think they could, Mr. Packard. That's the kind of promise that the technology has. It's not all onesided by any means. What you hear is what we've heard this morning—and maybe Dr. McDonald wants to speak to it—and that is, "Gee, that makes it hard for physicians."

Physician convenience ought not to be a barrier to the imposition of adequate safeguards; it simply can't be, and if we end up inconveniencing physicians a little bit, they're just going to have to find ways to reorient their schedule and their activities to account for that. I simply don't think that that's a compelling concern.

Mr. Packard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Volkmer. I see.

Would you wish to comment on the description made earlier in the first panel by Dr. Gardner of the quote, HELP system and the security that they've placed on it for physicians so that they have to be coded even to enter into it?

Mr. Belair. Are you talking to me, sir?
Mr. Volkmer. Yes.
Mr. Belair. I'm sorry.

Gee, you know, I don't know enough about that system to really—it wouldn't be fair for me to pronounce whether I think it's a good or bad system. It certainly sounds like they're aware of the security issues and they're trying to address them.

Mr. Volkmer. OK.

Professor Brannigan, you discuss in your oral testimony and your written testimony the applications of strict liability as against the use of negligence. Would you think that this is sufficient—and as I read it, it appears to be sufficient—to do the regulation—that would be sufficient as far as regulation is concerned?

Professor Brannigan. In an article, which I'll be happy to send to you, I argue that point in the Journal of Consumer Policy in 1983—was that strict liability for injuries acts as an adequate self-regulatory effort in this particular area because the institutions are really responsible and they know it, and therefore there's no way they can dodge it, and my research conclusion is that that is correct, that strict liability is adequate to guarantee a very high level, and trying to guarantee perfection would stifle the technology.

(The article follows:)
Current Developments in Consumer Law

Vincent M. Brannigan
Compensation or Regulation: The Problem of Medical Computer Software

ABSTRACT. Medical computer software represents an excellent example of the difficulty of applying the law to developing technology. A society must decide which of the goals of efficiency, equity, or subsidy are paramount in the development of the technology.

The two legal tools available to achieve the goals are compensation (the paying of damages) and regulation (the direct control of the technology). These tools are not well suited to the control of medical software, since the ephemeral decentralized technology is normally not able to be identified with sufficient exactness to permit regulation nor is it produced by any single individual or firm which would allow normal methods of compensation.

Thus the limitations of the legal tools make achievement of the social goals extremely difficult. This difficulty may force the society to choose a different combination of efficiency, equity, or subsidy which better reflects the ability of the tools to control the technology without stifling the technology.

Computer software is an excellent example of the problem of social control of technology through law. Compensation and regulation are the primary legal tools for coping with software defects. This paper offers some of the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of these two control mechanisms, along with some criteria used to assign a technological product to one area or the other, and investigates software problems which make these issues relatively difficult to decide (see Brannigan & Dayhoff, 1981).

This paper will address the particular problem of medical software. The use of computers in medicine has revolutionized certain aspects of medical care and has the potential to change it in fundamental ways. Virtually all new technological developments go through a sequence of invention, development, and stability. Often society becomes involved because of the need to cope with the inevitable problems of technological development.

Medical computer systems involve a wide range of new technologies. There are computer systems which directly control the machine that interacts with the patient; software on which the physician relies without independent checking; and computer systems used by the physician as a resource equivalent to a medical textbook. It is a challenge to the legal system to develop effective social structures for coping with these types of technologies.

The Code of Hammurabi was one of the earliest regulatory approaches to technology. Crudely put, under that code, if a building collapsed, killing the owner, the architect was put to death. This clearly defined the responsibility of the private sector and avoided entirely the need for government regulation.

Since we no longer put professionals to death for mistakes, we use the two controls of compensation or regulation. In the modern environment, compensation tends to be in the form of malpractice or product liability; the injured person being compensated with money.

GOALS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CONTROL

In the area of technological control, there are three traditional, possible goals of the legal system. The first, an efficient level of safety, is described by most experts in this field as a minimization of the total cost of injuries and injury-reduction activities. All things being equal, as one regulates past that point, the cost of injury-reduction activities increases, so that both overregulation and underregulation are socially inefficient.

The second goal of the legal system is to achieve an equitable distribution of the cost of those injuries and injury-reduction activities. Economists who hypothesize an "efficient" level of injuries or safety do not normally address the question of equitable distribution, i.e., who should bear the cost of these injuries. Nevertheless, if computer programs are going to be the source of a certain number of injuries, then the question of who assumes the burden of that cost should be raised as separate and independent from the issue of an efficient level of safety.

Thirdly, the promotion of the use of a particular technology is characterized by the reality that our society often engages in subsidizing some developing technologies in order to encourage their use. Two classic examples are (a) air transport, which is subsidized on the international level by the Warsaw Convention limiting liability of air carriers for injuries caused to their customers; and (b) the Price-Anderson Act for nuclear power plants, which limits the liability of power plant owners and manufacturers in order to further development of nuclear power capabilities. These are generally considered subsidies regardless of whether the government agrees to pay the cost of mishaps or accidents, or, as is more common, restricts redress and recovery by consumers.

These three goals, efficiency, equity, and subsidy, are socially determined — usually politically determined — but they are not
technical questions. The challenge is, having decided on the goals, how do we achieve them through the legal system? Liability and regulation are two alternative means of achieving this social control.

REGULATION

The theoretical advantage of regulation is that society directly attains the level of safety it desires. What it does not have is direct control of the cost of the safety-producing activity. It is one thing to stipulate the production of a safe product; it is quite another to guarantee a safe product at a socially efficient price. It is quite possible to regulate certain kinds of activities out of existence, because there is no way to achieve compliance at a price the society will pay. Thus, one of the disadvantages of regulation is that the cost of injury-reduction activities may bear no relationship at all to the benefits. Unfortunately, there is no automatic, self-limiting control over regulation to balance this equation. In a free-market economy devoted to promoting the widest variety of products, a common view is that the institutionalization of regulation has an anticompetitive effect, suffering as it does from problems of centralization, industry capture, and institutional bias. These problems are aggravated when the subject of the regulation is not easily regulated. This increases inefficiency and transaction costs.

Types of Regulatory Systems

Regulatory systems fall into two groups—permit and inspection systems. Permit systems, which require obtaining permission from the government to sell a product, have some inherent characteristics: (a) permits tend to centralize the examination process, enabling easy application of a standard; (b) a permit structure can offer considerable advantages to those manufacturers who are first to apply, and priority sometimes overwhelms technological superiority; (c) there is a tendency to use permits to centralize the producers; (d) it automatically creates a list of those who are affected by the particular statute; (e) failure to have the required permit is itself a crime or offense; (f) normally, the person who wishes to engage in an activity cannot engage in it until the permit is issued therefore, normally, delay runs in favor of the government or in favor of not allowing the activity; (g) summary enforcement is relatively easy since permits can often be lifted or revoked on essentially a merely probable cause showing, although this question is not entirely free from doubt; and (h) if the government does not assign enough
qualified persons to review and grant the permits, there are two possibilities. Either permits will be granted which are not determinative of compliance— that is, in order to avoid the backlog of paperwork, permits are simply stamped and issued without establishing compliance—or there is simply an extremely long delay in the granting of the permits, which can lead to political and economic problems.

Regulatory control can also be exercised according to an inspection model. Here, inspectors search out systems to determine whether or not they comply with the approved set of standards. The advantages of this strategy are more or less the opposite of those of permit regulation. The characteristics of the inspection model are: (a) it does not automatically require particularly well-trained people. The effect of inadequate searches is normally to simply not generate any compliance activity. The nature of governmental agencies is that what they don't know normally does not show up in their records; completely untrained persons can be assigned in the inspection model to go out and do various inspections, for example, and if they don't see a defect, there is no follow-up; (b) delay runs in favor of the private party; and (c) inadequate inspections are rarely discovered until a disaster occurs. Since the disasters are relatively rare events, the agency can go on for a long period of time thinking it has an adequate inspection program without any contrary evidence in the form of a disaster. Rather than benefiting a few producers, inspection serves to decentralize decision-making.

**Regulating Software**

The nature of software is such that it is particularly difficult to regulate. First of all, software is ephemeral. It is easily altered and there may be no way to detect that the alteration has taken place. Not only is it difficult to pinpoint what software is at any given time, there are few guarantees that software will manifest itself in exactly the same format day after day.

All regulatory systems depend on the existence of centralization of information concerning production (e.g., registration of all producers). Software, of all the medical devices, probably the most decentralized in production. Responsibility is extremely diffuse. In the case of large medical software packages, the attempt to hold a manufacturer liable is frustrated by the fact that there is no single manufacturer in the conventional sense; instead there are a multitude of software programmers at various levels. At the very least we need to acquire new or more suitable working definitions and concepts to shape our understanding and supervision of software production.
From the technical perspective, the most significant problem is that a standard of acceptability eludes definition. Most regulatory endeavors assume some standard or convention of acceptability; however, the task of meaningfully defining a medical software feature such as error-free code is awesome. Some technicians claim that the only way to define an error-free program is to write it. They claim that no specification is possible. Any attempt to regulate software would have to cope with these and other problems.

COMPENSATION

Compensation is often defined as a free marketplace approach. The concept accepts injury as a given, but insists the consumer not bear the financial burden. Its application to technological development is difficult.

The fault system, generally known as negligence, imposes on the consumer the development risk of a new product. Manufacturers are not liable unless they fail to meet some reasonable standard of care imposed by society and sometimes by the government.

A no-fault system shifts costs elsewhere. Someone other than the consumer bears the burden, usually either the providers of a product or the government. In Sweden, all medical injuries of any sort are covered by a government-sponsored/industry-paid-for fund. Although this fund pays all injuries, a company especially egregious in its action can be assessed by the government for greater contributions to the insurance fund.

The most Pareto optimal approach is strict liability on the part of providers, meaning that injuries to consumers are factored into the cost of production, and that the price of the product reflects these costs. In the long run, society receives an efficient level of safety and might be heard to make strong arguments on behalf of this approach since it also preserves some equity. Nevertheless, strict liability harbors a number of practical obstacles. The "deep-pocket" problem, where people with the most money end up paying, is particularly nettlesome. Secondly, and more germane to software liability, the requisite proof is extremely expensive. Transaction costs, often ignored by economists, may be overwhelming.

Sources of Compensation

One alternative is a government-controlled central fund to which manufacturers contribute. However, in the case of software, many "houses" are extremely small and difficult to find. Another is to
make the hospital the sole defendant. Hospitals are, after all, responsible for most of the equipment and injuries. Thus, the hospitals would not be allowed to segregate their liability and turn it over to the manufacturers; instead, liability becomes an expected cost of doing business which hospitals assume as relatively large and somewhat more efficient cost-spreaders.

One problem is that hospitals are notoriously inadequate at estimating the rate of injury due to system failure. To achieve the economies inherent in a compensation model, they must be able to predict the rate of loss and the more efficient predictors must "profit" from their predictions. This is difficult to institutionalize in most hospitals. They are not cost-conscious, and often lack the technical ability to predict losses.

**CONCLUSION**

In choosing between compensation and regulation, we must recognize that society has an interest in the development of this technology, since it represents a substantial possibility for better health care at lower cost in the future. If the risks of financial uncertainty are too great, the technology may not be developed.

Our current regulatory and compensation systems are unable to deal completely with the problems presented by modern-day medical software. We have not, as yet, encountered the widespread injuries attributable to computer software failure which trigger public awareness and the demand for redress. We may have a brief grace period, but not much. The devising and choice of an appropriate strategy for ensuring software safety and efficacy deserves much more attention than it has received to date, or we can stifle the technology through fear or overreaction to the inevitable problems.

**REFERENCE**


**ZUSAMMENFASSUNG**

Schadenersatz oder Regulierung – Das Problem der Benutzung medizinischer Informatiksysteme (Medical Computer Software). Gesellschaften, die die Auswirkungen von technologischen Entwicklungen zu kontrollieren versuchen, haben normalerweise zwei rechtliche
Legal Tools for Controlling Computer Software

Kontrollmöglichkeiten zur Hand, nämlich Ersatz und Regulierung, Schadenersatz internalisieren die Kosten einer schädigenden Handlung in das Unternehmen, das diese Handlung verursacht. Regulierung beinhaltet eine direkte Kontrolle der technologischen Entwicklung. Diese zwei Mittel werden benutzt, um drei gesellschaftliche Ziele zu erreichen:

1. Ein effizientes Produktionsniveau,
2. eine gerechte Aufteilung von Kosten und Nutzen einer technologischen Entwicklung,
3. indirekte Unterstützung bestimmter Technologien, um ihre Anwendung zu fördern (etwa durch eine Haftungsbeschränkung).


Es gibt zwei Arten von regulatorischen Systemen. Das eine besteht darin, daß Erlaubnisse oder Betrechnungen vom Staate erteilt werden, um eine bestimmte Tätigkeit auszuführen. Ein anderes System beruht auf Überprüfung und Inspektion, in welchen der Staat diejenigen Subjekte kontrolliert, die eine bestimmte Tätigkeit ausüben, um zu sehen, ob diese Tätigkeit den sozialen Verhaltensgeboten entspricht oder nicht. In beiden Fällen benützt das regulatorische System (a) ein bestimmtes zu regulierendes Ziel und (b) einen spezifisch anzuwendenden Maßstab.

Beides existiert jedoch nicht im Fall von medizinischer Software. Software stellt sich als unkörperlich dar, kann leicht verändert werden und kennt keinen allgemein akzeptierten Maßstab. Es kann daher außerordentlich schwierig in ein regulatorisches System gepreßt werden.


Eine Gesellschaft, die zum Zwecke der Nutzung von Technologien die Entscheidung zwischen diesen Maßnahmen trifft, muß abwägen zwischen Effizienz, Gerechtigkeit und indirekter Unterstützung, wobei gleichzeitig unterstellt wird, dass die rechtlichen Maßnahmen, nämlich Schadenersatz und Regulierung, dieser Technologie nur wenig gerecht werden. Wenn sich die Gesellschaft auf rechtlichen Restriktionen nicht bewußt wird, kann sie neue Technologien unterdrücken und abwägen.

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Mr. Volkmer. And therefore we do not really need FDA regulation.

Professor Brannigan. Not of the type that they're suggesting. As I said, registration of such systems, I think, might be in the public interest, but not regulation.

Mr. Volkmer. But not for them to evaluate it and determine whether or not it's a perfected instrument.

But just turn it around and go one step further. With the strict liability, what does it do as far as those who are providing these systems? Are they going to put them out there. Is there strict liability connected with them?

Professor Brannigan. This is where my argument—and this is probably extremely depressing to a lot of people in the health care system—is that that liability ought to be imposed and not be delegable on the hospitals using the system.

In other words, this would allow small providers to compete with large providers because the financial viability of the provider, as opposed to, let's say, their expertise, would not be critical in their ability to put the systems out and that the hospitals that use the systems have the best control over this line between the advice to the physician and being relied on by the physician without further checking, and since that is the critical issue, I believe I would impose the liability on a nontransferable basis on the using hospital or other institution, and that would generate competition in the supplying of these items.

If you will, to use an analogy, this is the way the U.S. Government operates in the acquisition of a lot of its products. By accepting the liability itself, it opens up the competition to supply those products to the widest range of potential producers.

Mr. Volkmer. As I read the statement, by the way, from FDA, it is almost like they are saying that on software—they have under the heading here “Stand-Alone Software”—that they are possibly proposing to regulate it because of this software.

Professor Brannigan. I read it the same way, and, as I said, I think proof by blatant assertion is the logic they're using.

Mr. Volkmer. And what bothers me, just using their definition—I'd just like to read it in. We will insert the statement into the record in full. But it says,

And they use the word “products”—

That are marketed separately from a computer (generally referred to as “stand-alone software”)

So now I'm talking about the floppy disk; it has the Caduceus information or any other one on it—

And used with a computer to form a system which operates as a medical device will be treated as a medical device.

Now you're saying it's blue because it's blue.

[FDA's statement appears in app. I]

Mr. Volkmer. Now what bothers me a little bit with that is, I have a physician out here, or hospital, that has a computer system, and just because it's a computer system, let's say right now all it's
doing is basically information gathering on patients and storing. That, in itself, is not a medical device, is not under FDA regulation.

The way I read it—and I ask you, Professor Brannigan, if it says the same thing to you—if I buy the same floppy disk and I put it in the computer, and all of a sudden that whole system has to be regulated.

Professor Brannigan. If I can extrapolate on this just a little bit at length, in my conversations with them, that is the way they talk—that is, speaking broadly of FDA people at various levels, realizing that no one speaks for FDA except the Commissioner, and all those kinds of limitations.

Mr. Voltmer. Right.

Professor Brannigan. I think they're people of immense good will and want to do the right thing by consumers. I don't think there's the slightest suggestion that they are not acting in what they conceive to be the public interest, as well as that can be established. I think they're just wrong.

I think that their idea is that this is some kind of new bedpan, that it's a thing, and their attitude is oriented toward it as a thing, as a product, if you will, and having made that at some preliminary stage, then they're wrestling with the fact that it's very hard to mesh this very strange thing in with the rest of their other things. So, rather than try to create a separate regulatory program, they just say, "Well, we're going to treat it the same as all the other things."

However, in oral conversations they have said that people who use artificial intelligence systems who provide advice to hospitals are in the service business and they're not going to regulate that. So it's even worse than what you're describing. If you buy the floppy disk and put it in your hospital, they'll regulate it, but if somebody in Canada buys the floppy disk and tells you over the phone what it's doing, it's not regulated.

So their position is simply not logical. It doesn't bear any resemblance to logic, and I think that the ultimate answer is simply that you go back to the statute, that they don't have jurisdiction, and I base that really on three points in my other paper. One is that the statute just says "contrivance," which isn't an idea—what is Caduceus and the rest of these other systems are; they're ideas. Second, the legislative history doesn't support that broad a reading; and, third, the constitutional issues.

I mean, these are fundamentally ideas, and in the very first interpretation of the Food and Drug Act in 1911 by Justice Holmes, the Congress didn't mean to regulate people's opinions as to what was right and wrong, they meant to regulate certain specific devices—[cites, p. 47] if people want it—and I believe that that has carried down to today.

I've got various books with me of lunatic medical theories—of all sorts of books you can buy in the supermarket, and whatever we do in this country, we don't regulate people's lunatic medical theories, whether they write them in books, or put them in Dr. McDonald's

system, or whatever. We don't regulate that because the Constitution says people have certain rights to their ideas, even if they're crazy, and I've cited a few of these cases in my material.

So, therefore, I think the FDA is trying to regulate something in which there is no track record of being able to effectively regulate it, which is why they produce last-minute statements, because even in the best of faith, with the best of will, the best of technology, the best of intentions, they can't do it, and I think they've admitted on numerous occasions they have no standards against which to measure these things, and I think what that just indicates is that it's not the kind of thing that the medical device regulations were designed to control.

Mr. Volker. To go one step further, what costs would you envision would be imposed on a total health care system if they proceeded with this type of regulatory policy?

Professor Brannigan. I think it's in the form of opportunity costs, as the economists would call them, which is, you'd stifle the industry.

Mr. Volker. In other words, it does away basically with what we're trying to do.

Professor Brannigan. In my limited experience in talking to the people, these systems have been built in the equivalent of bailments by people on—despite what looks in numbers like generous Government funding, compared to various other areas—these things have been built on a shoestring, and they're implemented on very small computers, and they perform wondrous things on nothing. We really are dealing with an infant industry.

I will say an analogy that I use, however—in terms of long-term power, and particularly interaction with the doctors, which I use in the materials—is this is John Henry and the steam drill.

In other words, we've got the first steam drill, and right now there's no question that Dr. McDonald can personally smack his own computer system down, but they don't forget, and they do get better, and as you get the collective efforts of lots of people, these systems will, over the next few years, have the potential of rivaling—not necessarily exceeding—in ordinary diagnosis the capabilities of the vast run of doctors; I'm convinced of that, and that's why stifling that potential, and not only its potential for the United States but for other countries which don't have our medical surplus, I think, would be a real loss, and I think that the FDA proposal has that potential, to simply wipe the whole industry out.

Mr. Volker. Dr. McDonald, do you share Professor Brannigan's optimism for the potential for these type of—we won't call them medical devices; we'll call them computerized informational systems, diagnostic informational systems.

Dr. McDonald. Well, I share his enthusiasm about what he says about the regulation side of it, and I don't want to pretend—I'm a computer nut. I practice, see patients, but I do like computers, and I work with them a good part of my waking hours, but I think that we must not—and maybe I'm overreacting a little bit—we must not dramatize too much their power.

I don't disagree—they're smarter, they can save more information, they can do things more accurately—but what they can't do is
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see the patient (yet), and there's an immense amount of redundant information in that process, you know.

EKG \footnote{Dr. McDonald changed "EKG" to "Consider heart monitors..."}—we've had analyzers that sound the bell when the patient's arrested since 1955, or 1965, anyway, and at the beginning, they always sounded—mostly when the patient was still alive and well, and I have never yet even heard of an instance where one of those computer alarms went off and, if the patient was eating or talking, someone rushed in and shocked them. You know, we \footnote{Dr. McDonald asked that "kind of" be deleted.} [physicians] just kind of see that, and in an instant we just discard all the other rules, and as long as the computer looks at it [the patient] through a little peephole at what data happens to have come in through sensors, I think it's prone to being very dumb, and you're going to still want someone sitting there.

You're going to want a pilot flying that plane even though it's got an automatic pilot that's very, very, very smart. You still have two pilots up in that 747—or maybe three, I guess it is now—and I think you're going to want that for a long time.

Now there may come a time when computers—and this is many orders of magnitude beyond where we are now—can sort of do a Dr. [Mr.] Spock sort of thing \footnote{Dr. McDonald alludes to the futuristic medical technology portrayed in the syndicated television series "Star Trek". The chief medical officer aboard the fictional U.S.S. Enterprise was Dr. Leonard McCoy, however, Mr. Spock was first officer and science officer aboard the Enterprise. Examples of the technology can be found in the Star Trek StarFleet Technical Manual (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975) and the StarFleet Medical Reference Manual (New York: Star Fleet Productions, Inc., 1977).}—they point something at you and really see the whole patient in its glory through NMR [nuclear magnetic resonance] or some such thing—and be equivalent in the total spectrum of knowledge of the physician. But the physicians may not know as many facts, but they know more about the patient than the computer will in a long, long, long time to come, just by a glance.

Mr. VOLKMER. All right.

Professor Brannigan, I'd like to get back again just a minute to the—before I do, Dr. McDonald, what you're telling me is that it may occur in the future but right now you don't want to raise the optimism to where everybody thinks this is going to happen tomorrow or next year and we really don't need the expert physician any more, we're going to have him in one computer. We're still going to have to have the physician.

Dr. MCDONALD. We're not at a watershed.

Mr. VOLKMER. Right. OK.

Professor BRANNIGAN. If I may, for the record, I don't disagree that that's the current status.

Mr. VOLKMER. Current—right, 20 years from now or 25 years from now, we may see something a little different.

But on the strict liability question, how would you apply that, basically, to an operation such as, without designating as, but such as that which has been described at Disciples Hospital—Latter-Day Saints—excuse me—Latter-Day Saints in Salt Lake City?

Professor BRANNIGAN. OK. If they send up a record from the laboratory and it's wrong, either because it's wrong because someone
entered it wrong, the computer stored it wrong, or it comes, and let's assume causation and all those other good legal things—you know, that the wrong data—all of a sudden it comes up with this wrong data, and someone shoots the wrong medication into the patient or something like this, I would essentially impose liability without the plaintiff having to prove why the wrong data was provided.

In other words, strict liability, to me, is you have to prove causation, but you don't have to prove a violation of a standard of care, and it's that simple. In other words, you have to prove, in effect, not that the patient was harmed, which is the first step, but you have to prove that it was caused by a defect in the system.

The difference, as I interpret it, is the difference between having to prove a failure to meet a standard of care, in which case we'll talk about what a reasonable computer system would do. Strict liability would say, "It's got to be right when that information comes up."

Now let's assume that the information, for the moment, is probabilistic. The concept of rightness of information when it comes with a probabilistic conclusion, this is an area that I'm still researching, and I don't have as clearcut an impression.

That's why I think there is this critical difference between data which you rely on without further analysis. I mean, if we put a thermometer in you and it comes up 105 and your real temperature is 98, that's strict liability—that data output—and that's where, I think, the strict liability would come down.

I'll give two minor analogies. A lot of hospitals—I promised confidentiality, incidentally, when we talk about privacy—to everyone who gave me information about the failures of their own systems when I was conducting this research, but at one major hospital where they had a stupendous backup system—I mean, running seven computers simultaneously—they had the shop for repairing terminals directly connected to the computer room without any fire safety. In other words, they had thought about patient privacy, a lot of other issues, and ordinary fire safety, and the loss of an ongoing ICU, and everything; they had seven simultaneous processors, and they could burn the whole thing up with a match. You get these kind of technical blinders that people get into.

Another issue, to use an example from the privacy, is that 1 hospital with 64—a very prestigious hospital—with 64 different computer systems in operation, full blast, going all the time, only 1 was encrypted and password protected, and that was the physicians' salary system, which indicates that when it really gets down to something critical for privacy, physicians don't mind the interference with their doing business.

Mr. Volmer. But basically, on the Caduceus system, which is basically an information system now, even though it would be, let's say, a diagnostic system along with it, helpful in recommending diagnosis to a physician, the physician using that would still be under a negligence standard.

Professor Brannigan. I believe it would be under negligence standards if for no other—I think there are multiple reasons that that device doesn't really reach the patient, as required by section 402(a) of the Restatement of Torts. It doesn't reach, and that reach-
The requirement in this area is really very important and it is filtered, and I believe the negligence there would be at two levels. One is, was the physician negligent in relying on the system? Second, was the system negligent in sending that information to the physician? And I think we have drawn that distinction in our environment.

Mr. VOLKMER. It would be the same thing as with the type of computerized system that Dr. Gardner described. If the computer failed to find a drug interaction and a nurse, along with the doctor's prescription for it, gave the drug and there was a severe interaction, that would be strict liability, wouldn't it?

Professor BRANNIGAN. I would say that would be strict liability.

Mr. VOLKMER. All right. Where are we then with the hospitals on insurance in other words, trying to get insurance with this strict liability?

Professor BRANNIGAN. OK. When I talked with the major medical centers—now the centers that I dealt with were overwhelmingly academic medical school medical centers—a vast number of them are, in effect, in the self-insurance business because their risks are uncalculable, and many of them buy coverage with $1 million deductibles.

In other words, they're really insuring against unbelievable catastrophes, and the rest of the time they rely on very careful monitoring of risk—I think this is very important because this is where we place some of our students—but very careful monitoring of risk within their own institution and watching it, and I think that this creates a better level of care.

In other words, internalizing regulation is much more effective than external regulation, but hospitals tend to buy insurance in a very, very competitive—they're big buyers in the market. Therefore, the crises that come tend to be crises of overall coverage, not the kinds of crises that come with relatively small purchasers like day-care centers.

So, yes, there is both a malpractice insurance problem—I don't know if I want to call it a crisis—but I think hospitals—I have not heard from these hospitals that insurance coverage, as such, for their broad operations—they don't tend to buy coverage for narrow, little points of their operation, they tend to buy all-risks coverage, and they tend to have very large deductibles, in my limited experience. Someone else could correct that, I'm sure.

Mr. VOLKMER. All right. How would you propose to impose the standards for strict liability in one instance and negligence, which is present law, on the other? Statutorily, or just let the courts—

Professor BRANNIGAN. I think a common law analysis would be adequate for this purpose, because we rarely would get into some of the more complex areas of assumption of risk and contributory negligence.

I don't believe it requires any statutory development, and it has the minor advantage that the hospital knows what legal system it's operating in under its State law, whereas you don't get that additional problem of products which move in interstate commerce and what are the different rules.
So you actually negate some of the national commerce problems by imposing liability on a thing where you can say the law applies here because this is where the patient comes from.

Mr. Volkmer. OK. Have any of you—again, as to the previous witnesses, I want to ask this—ever been asked to serve on any of the FDA advisory panels on this subject or the subject on which you testified?

Mr. Belair. No, sir.

Mr. Volcker. No. Dr. McDonald—Professor Brannigan.

Professor Brannigan. I say this—I'm not sure they ask lawyers routinely ever, so—but I will say that I have been asked to serve on an advisory panel to NIH in some related areas, or at least reviewing grants or something.

Mr. Volkmer. Dr. McDonald, have you ever been contacted at all by the FDA on expert systems?

Dr. McDonald. Well, I was invited to the AAMI meeting last weekend in this regard, and—yes, I guess.

Mr. Volkmer. But that's been the only interaction.

Dr. McDonald. Yes.

Mr. Volcker. And it's been very recent.

We've heard Professor Brannigan's feelings and, I think, to some extent, yours, Dr. McDonald, but I would like you to, if you would, specifically address bases for FDA policy or proposed policy in regulating medical software, and some of that is—again, in their statement they said it's inherent public health risk of products—inherent public health risk. How would you assess such risk since you propose—and I believe still we will have the doctor in between—how do we—

Dr. McDonald. I think it reflects maybe a negative understanding of the physician's operational behavior. I look at physicians as being the most cynical about others' opinions, the most untrusting, and compulsive of human beings in many—for many different categories.

You know, as a faculty member, I tell the residents, "This is what you ought to be doing." They go, "That's crazy; I don't believe that." They're willing to reject anything—I mean, not that mine may be the very best, but they certainly are not at all reluctant to discard advice from others or others' observations. The tendency is always do it yourself, check it yourself, and believe your own observations, and there's an immense redundancy in the process.

I don't think just because—we have some little inklings of how the decision process works, but I don't think we have a deep understanding of many human decision processes, but there's an awful lot of redundancy in it, and we do give computer reminders, and the residents and faculty accept them. They don't love them, although they behave remarkably different with them—and one that they took great glee—and they're error prone.

I rather would say there's a sensitivity and a specificity, just like a test, and when you do a mammogram, you get a positive test result. You're only right one out of five times. That is, most of those positive cancer-looking mammograms will actually be non-cancerous when they're biopsied, but we don't consider that an error. So you have to make these tradeoffs, and you operate where the balance falls out right.
Well, we had a reminder to do a cervical Pap smear, which is one of the preventive tests, and it was on a patient who had the code of M—I mean of F, for female—stored in their sex field, [the patient] but it was a male, and—but there was not even one single attempt to do a Pap smear on that man. They didn’t even call the nurse to get the equipment. I mean it was just—but that’s the kind of thing. It’s just blatantly obvious, and so instead, what they did, they Xeroxed™ that record, and they papered the room with it. They took great glee in finding the mistake by the computer, which did what it should do—respond to that field and say something.

Even in due respect to this fever issue, if I gave you a thermometer and it said you had a 105° temperature, I’d go feel your head, just like your mother did, and I’d go: “No, that doesn’t make sense, because you don’t look sick.” I mean, there’s all this other information you get.

So I think that there is not a grave risk. I think there’s got to be thought given to it. I think there’s got to be more products out there and more experience to understand whether there are problems and what they will be.

Mr. Volkmer. OK. I’ll now yield to the gentleman from California for his questions.

Mr. Packard. Thank you.

May I continue just a little bit with Dr. McDonald on the point you were just talking about, confidence that physicians have in other physicians or other opinions.

Do you think then that physicians, as this kind of expert system would be implemented, would have more confidence in a computerized informational system than they would in the consultation process with each other?

Dr. McDonald. It has not been my experience, and my prediction is, in fact, until these systems are very, very good, they’ll be used relatively infrequently.

Mr. Packard. You are rather pessimistic as to the quickness that this kind of a system will be implemented.

Dr. McDonald. Well, it’s based on history. The system developed by Howard Bleich for acid-base balance was not developed with LISP or the classic artificial intelligence approaches, but it produced a consultation. It was very accurate about acid-base problems. They put it in 30 VA hospitals, and they ran it for 1 year, and basically no one came to the wedding feast. Of course, they had to go upstairs to go to the terminal, had to learn how to use the terminal; there were all the problems about interface, and socialization, or other kinds of issues, but it is not something that I think is going—is a vast market immediately available.

I think where the power is going to come is in systems like the HELP system where the computer volunteers [information] without an investment by physicians, and they get information, and not only does, they give them—that gives them two things; it tells them when they don’t think to know there’s a problem.

You see, if you have to say: “I think there’s a problem; I’ll go ask about it,” you don’t get as much advice as if you say you haven’t

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81 Dr. McDonald changed “advice” to “help.”
thought about it, and the computer says: "Hey, there may be a problem." Samuel Johnson said man more often needs to be reminded than informed, and I think—that was a long time ago; I think it's still true.

Mr. PACKARD. It would appear to me that if Dr. Myers is correct as likening this unto a computerized textbook, it becomes then a refresher tool of information that the physicians may have gotten over their studies and their experience but have not—their recollection of the processes simply aren't able to recall all of the information that they've had available to them. This becomes a recalling or a reminding tool. It would appear that that would tend to be more of a confidence builder than perhaps consulting with someone else that may have forgotten even more than what you've forgotten.

Dr. McDonald. Well, I think it will be very useful in that respect, that is, to restructure your thinking and re-remember the things you do, and maybe even to guide you to ask some other questions.

But you have to remember the advantages the human consultant provides. This is not to diminish the system, which is a very exceptional development but, rather, to maybe enlarge the human capabilities.

If you have a human consultant, No. 1, you just have to call them, and then you're done. No. 2, you've got protection in terms of malpractice and he may have a bigger bankroll than you have, if he's one of the right kind of consultants. No. 3, he goes and gets other observations, and as we're taught in medical school, that's often the biggest value of the consultant. It's the thing they felt when they feel the thyroid that you didn't feel, or it's the history they dug out that you didn't dig out; it may just even be in a redundant gather.

So we need to emphasize this information gathering; if you talk to the consultant computer, you're the one that gathered the information, and you filter it for the computer, and so you don't get as much, I don't think, as you do out of an expert consultant at today's history; 10 years from now, it might be quite different.

Mr. PACKARD. Before I get, Mr. Chairman, I intended to ask unanimous consent to have the response that Professor Brannigan has mentioned in regard to this recent document entered into the record also.

Mr. VOLKMER. Yes.

Mr. PACKARD. I do not have a copy of your response, and so before we leave today, I'd like to get it.

Professor BRANNIGAN. I gave it to Mr. Paul [James Paul, professional staff member, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight], I believe. Here's another copy.

Mr. PACKARD. Fine.

[The document follows:]

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\[12\] Dr. McDonald changed this to read “...an expert consultant...today.”
Abstract

Recent developments in medical computer software have raised the possibility that federal regulators may claim to control such software as a device under the Food and Drug Act. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the statute to determine whether computer software is included in the statutory scheme, examine some constitutional arguments relating to computer software and finally to discuss some regulatory principles which should be taken into account when deciding what type of regulation might be appropriate. This paper is limited to computer programs whose output is used by humans in deciding what medical therapy, if any, a patient should receive.

Statutory Issues

The 1976 amendments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) extend federal regulations to medical devices. Devices are defined as:

"an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is ..."

(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals..." FDCA 201(h)

The act sets up a series of classifications. Devices are divided into Class I, II, and III. Class I devices are subject only to the most general manufacturing controls. Devices under Class I include bedpans, skull punches, crutches and stethoscopes. Class II devices are subject to more stringent performance testing. Class II devices include the bulk of medical devices including fetal monitors, heating pads, salometers and therapeutic genital vibrators. Class III products are subject to the most stringent controls, including premarket approval based on appropriate tests. Class III devices include: intra-uterine contraceptive devices, intra-aortic balloons, pacemakers and replacement heart valves. Currently computer systems are not classified under the act. However, they could be placed in either Class II or III, depending on the FDA's interpretation of certain provisions of the statute. Certainly, if medical software is placed in Class III, the cost of regulatory compliance will be enormous.

The first question is whether clinical medical software is or can be a device under the FDCA. There are basically three approaches to statutory analysis. First, the actual words of the statute should be analyzed, to determine exactly what Congress said. Second, the legislative history of the statute can be examined, to expand on and explain the words of the statute. Third, the administrative agencies interpretation of the status and its regulatory program can be analyzed to determine whether a given interpretation is reasonable.

Statutory Language

The most obvious problem in trying to apply the statute is that computer programs do not fall clearly into the category of "an instrument, apparatus, implant, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article." Clearly most of these terms cannot apply to programs, since they refer to a specific tangible item. Software is intangible, somewhere between an idea and the expression of an idea. The only word which could apply to software is "contrivance." Contrivance is an ambiguous
Computer programs are significantly different from the other types of medical devices regulated by the FDA. While a computer-driven device would clearly be tangible, computer programs themselves are abstractions. They are a species of intangible property, whose value is extrinsic. They can exist in infinite numbers and each one is identical to the original.

Tangibility of the software is not just a minor feature; it relates to the fundamental nature of computer systems. What distinguishes computer programs from medical devices is the lack of any need for a specific physical entity. Even a physician sitting down at a computer terminal, the machine can be on the desk, in the basement, or in Canada. It makes no difference to the user. No other product in the area of regulated medical devices has this characteristic. This is significant because the FDA has already described the provision of computer-manalyzed data to a hospital as an unregulated service. What difference does it make where the computer is located? What about analysis conducted in another country?

It is worth noting that the treatment of computer programs under other laws has depended heavily on the issue of tangibility. Computer programs cannot be patented, because they constitute algorithms. Computer programs can be copied, but only as the expression of an underlying idea. Computer programs as "goods" under the Uniform Commercial Code, but the code has no requirement of tangibility. Computer programs may be products for liability purposes, but that is in spite of their intangibility.

At the very least, therefore, the statute is ambiguous and contains no clear authorization for the FDA.

Legislative history includes the various debates and committee reports which led up to the passage of a statute. It should be noted that it is not sufficient that a device should be regulated. The critical question is whether Congress meant for the FDA to have jurisdiction under the act. Since clinical medical computer software was virtually non-existent in 1976 when the medical device amendments were adopted, there is no specific legislative history to use to see if the Congress meant to include it under the statute, and if it was under the statute, which classification is justified. The lack of a specific legislative history is not fatal to the regulatory process. Congress often sets up agencies for the specific purpose of dealing with new hazards as they arise. In the case of medical devices, the most important inquiry into the legislative history is whether Congress intended the medical device amendments to close a gap completely, or whether they were designed to bring a specific set of products under FDA jurisdiction.

The history is at best inconclusive.

Agency Interpretation

The FDA is an extraordinarily expert agency in an unusually complex field. This means that decisions of the agency concerning its own jurisdiction are likely to receive great deference in the courts, if supported by a possible reading of the statute and reasonably consistent regulations. However, if it appears the agency is having difficulty articulating a coherent regulatory program, the courts may interpret this hesitation as indicating a lack of expertise in this particular area.

The FDA has not yet articulated an official position on the regulation of software. Part of the problem is fitting computer software into the other requirements of the statute. The statute is product oriented. It refers to manufacturers and good manufacturing practices. It assumes that the output of the manufacturing process is a specific item, which can be counted, labeled and shipped. The entire concept of the statute is foreign to the world of computer systems. Intangible items are not manufactured. Computer systems are not standardized items, and even similar systems have crucial differences. Software is sememeral; it is often changed in the field by users, and can be altered without trace. A program is often the product of many hands, who leave no trace of their
Individual efforts.

Programs do have characteristics which would tend to make them regulatable despite their intangibility. Computer programs can be owned. They exist through time, they have errors, which can be corrected. They can be passed from person to person. Like the camshaft on a car, once the instructions are set, the machine will do what it is told. However, the existence may be a narrower concept than product.

The fact that any analysis of the legal status of computer programs under current law is inconclusive, and may require litigation. Preparation for such litigation must precede any PDA action, since deadlines for appeal to the Courts are typically very short.

Constitutional Issues

The existence of a constitutional issue in the area of medical software may appear forced to most people, since medical care, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices have been regulated for decades. However, the very intangible nature of computer software may bring it within the power of the first amendment's protection of the press. The suggestion is that a computer program constitutes the author's ideas, and that ideas are absolutely protected under the first amendment.

This defense was successful in the related cases of SCIENTIFIC MANUFACTURING 126 F.2d 440 (1962) and PENNA-HAID 121 F.2d 282 (1941). In SCIENTIFIC MANUFACTURING an author was selling a book which contained his own opinion that aluminum pots caused cancer. In PENNA-HAID a company selling cast iron pots made the same claim. The Federal Trade Commission brought action against both parties. The FTC prevailed against the manufacturer on a claim of false advertising but lost against the author on first amendment grounds. While these cases are over 40 years old there is no reason to believe that they are not still good law.

The existence of a constitutional issue may make a court more hesitant in giving an agency jurisdiction over the area, since Congress is not assumed to readily commit to an agency the power to regulate activities subject to the first amendment.

Policy Issues

Whatever decision the courts make, make on the first amendment issue, it is important to define the policy issues involved in the regulation of software. It can be assumed that the goal of any such system is to promote the advancement of medical technology while maintaining the maximum of patient protection, both physical and financial.

The primary question in both areas is what regulatory approach should be used to control clinical software? The problem with the FDA's approach is that the product oriented standards of that act would be both ineffective and too late to the development of the technology. The legal system should not attempt to define in advance what direction this technology will take.

Computer systems are a completely novel technology in many cases. Trying to fit them into regulatory structures designed for other technologies will inevitably both fail and constrain their evolution. In the absence of a clear danger from the system this is unwarranted. A product oriented regulatory system may be detrimental to the entire medical software field. Computer programs are not built to blueprints. They are built to a generic design which is normally changed continuously as the system is being "run." Many are one-of-a-kind installations: were the design, production and quality assurance phases are merged together. Systems are often created in joint efforts between medical users and software houses. Systems are often put into service for field testing despite the presence of errors. Sometimes testing the system does not reveal defects only prolonged use of the system will. Once error correction is labor intensive. It is typical to leave a certain number of bugs in any system, to be corrected over time, the system is used. The term "maintenance" is often in most fields is simply keeping the machine up to specifications, is used in the computer field to describe this continuous error removal process. Because of this process, there may not be the clear cut separation between manufacturer and user. This reality must be taken into account.

There are certain basic principles which should control all legal efforts in this area.
First is protection of patients from the unreasonable risk of injury. There should be a search for relating injury in medical care, not absolute parts. On third, any system should avoid entrancing existing institutions, whether governmental, industrial or professional.

Fourth, in any implementation of a computer system there must be a financially responsible party. Fifth, in terms of patient therapy there must be a party clearly responsible for the proper operation of the system.

Compliance with these principles is difficult; under the current legal system, under the current regulation of medical devices and drugs, the federal government controls the manufacture and labeling of devices and drugs, and the states control the use. For all of these reasons, the technological development of this field has made this distinction between the product and use of the product obsolete. For example, a hospital worker sits down at a terminal. It makes no functional difference whether the computer is located in the same hospital, across the country, or in another country. Likewise, it makes no difference whether the system is produced in his hospital, or purchased on the outside. It is of no importance if the system is one of a kind or one of a group. Yet both the regulatory and liability systems foster these irrelevant distinctions to impose widely different levels of regulation and liability.

The primary policy choice is between the product oriented concept of the current medical device legislation act, and a user oriented regulatory approach suited to the nature of this technology.

A major problem with the product oriented approach is that it tends to stifle all of the attributes which make computer software such an exciting technology. Product oriented regulation tends to inhibit development in a field to those companies which are both adept at the technology and sophisticated in dealing with the regulatory authorities.

Second, product regulation tends to centralize production in a small group of firms. The first handful of firms approved can circumscribe the market because regulatory approval is a substantial entry barrier. There are only a few number of viable hardware producers in the computer field, compared to the vast number of software houses. This is due to the different economies of scale in starting up operations. The regulatory burden could be crippling to small, innovative companies. It is precisely these innovative companies which are the strength of the computer field. Many of the most innovative producers are universities and hospitals. There is a tradition of sharing breakthroughs and software, which cannot disappear due to regulation.

Most, regulation of the software tends to limit the flexibility of the use in adapting the device to local conditions, while the FDA provides for customization of a device to a patient, it does not provide for customization to the institution, which is often critical in clinical software. Moreover, modifications of systems by producers. In light of system failures or increased knowledge would be slowed by the need for regulatory approval.

Fourth, under the current concept, liability for defective software is diffuse. Small companies may not be financially viable. Insurance in this area is becoming unobtainable. The liability exposure is determined by traditional strict liability combined with contractual disclaimer and indemnity.

Fifth, some software will be exempt from regulation, because it is created by the using hospital. Software can also disappear from the regulatory system because of the demise of the producing company, with the software still in use.

Sixth, at the current level of software development and use, a form of registration combined with the possibility of rejection is probably adequate to protect consumer interests. There are strong forces in the hospitals to guarantee accurate and reliable data, forces which have been adequate to the present to prevent known injury.

These deficiencies can last be addressed recognizing that software is a fundamentally different item from a scalpel or an x-ray machine. The possibility would be to adopt a regulatory system oriented towards the use of the software, usually, the hospital, rather than the producer. Such a proposal would involve registration of each
This proposal would have the following effects: 1) It would focus regulation on the parties actually controlling the use of the software. It would clarify responsibility for control of the software and the potential uses to which software would be put. 2) Liability would be imposed on the using hospital, as the place best able to evaluate what level of oversight is needed. By concentrating liability at the user level there would be an increase in competition, rather than a reduction, since the financial viability of the producer would no longer be an issue. 3) The users are already subject to regulatory control. They are familiar with the requirements of the reg'ly authorities. 4) Hospitals are large enough to self-insure this risk, or they can purchase broad insurance coverage at market rates.

Conclusion

It is arguable whether software is a medical device under the current Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. However, in the long run medical software should not be exempt from regulation. In the case of this unique product, the public interest would be best served by imposition of a modest level of regulation on the user. This would provide the optimum mix of protection of consumers with minimum restrictions on the development of this revolutionary technology.
Mr. Packard. The question was brought up with the first panel as to whether it is anticipated that such systems, expert systems, will reduce ultimate medical care costs to the consumer. I'd like your impressions, particularly Dr. Clements and perhaps Mr. Belair.

Dr. McDonald. Well, I think they're the on!...hope. You know, we have to do—there are two issues. One is whether you can save dollar costs, and the other one is whether that will be passed on, and I think as the earlier panelist described, the regulatory realities are in place now that if costs are reduced they will tend to be passed on.

It's a competitive environment now, and there are opportunities as there—say the engineering workbench; the physician works at a terminal and can get every answer he wants about facts, about history, about the patient, plus decision support as he goes along. He can care for that patient faster, or maybe a nurse clinician can do a lot of the work in conjunction with the physician, or maybe a pharmacist can do more of the work. I'm not prejudiced about who does the work, but it seems clear that these systems will save time, immense amounts. My guess is we can save a third of the physician's time flat out within the next couple of years by these kind of support tools, plus do a better job at the same time; we can finally manage the system.

Now that may be against the physician's interests, but instead of having it being sort of a cacophony of everybody doing what they please, someone can look at the whole system and say, "Hey, this is crazy; this guy's doing all these crazy things down here, and people are dying too fast," or we can put it into some kind of a rational perspective, look at the data, analyze the data, and make judgments based on data rather than on just beliefs and biases.

Mr. Packard. Mr. Belair.

Mr. Belair. My answer, sir, would be strictly from a layman's standpoint. It does sound as though there's the potential for cost savings. I will say that it continues a process that's been going on for about 50 years now, which is to limit, to deemphasize, the role that the physician plays in providing health care.

Today, I guess you could quibble with the statistics, but the latest statistic that's bandied about is that only 5 percent of health care in this country is spent by physicians, and since they're obviously the most expensive component of the system, to the extent that you deliver health care through other means, you've got the potential for cost savings.

Unfortunately, from a privacy standpoint, there's a downside. Physicians are awfully good at maintaining patient privacy. They're steeped in that ethic. Most of the privacy problems that I've encountered and I think most of them that are documented come not from physicians but from other health care providers and professionals who simply don't have that same ethic and that same concern, maybe not as much to lose. You know, you could speculate about lots of different reasons for it, but it seems to be a phenomenon.

Mr. Packard. Professor Brannigan, you've talked at length about the liabilities that are related to misinformation or that may come through such a system, malfunction of the system, but we haven't
talked about the time when the lack of use of this kind of a facility would become an issue of liability.

When does a system reach the point where it is moved from a time when you'd be sued for using a system and a system not producing or providing adequate information or not doing what you want it to do, or you're misusing the system? When does it move from that to where you're sued for not using a system?

Professor Brannigan. The traditional term for this type of analysis is Hooper analysis, after a case called the *T.J. Hooper*,\(^\text{53}\) which was a tugboat which didn't have a radio in 1928—I'd have to check my dates—and therefore lost some barges because it didn't have the technology, and the court in that case—and there is a little bit of material in my longer written statement—I think Mr. Paul has it—on some of the cases in medical care that have analyzed this issue, that courts can and do say that an entire industry is negligent or portions of it are negligent for failure to acquire and use the appropriate technology at a certain level of certainty.

In my experience, I think we are there in drug-drug interaction. I think that's an essentially clerical technical task where there's no excuse to not have that module working properly even at the level of ordinary pharmacists. I mean, the stuff is very cheap to run this kind of system.

In broader terms, when will the failure to use a consultation—when will the failure to acquire such a system—I don't think in terms of complex expert systems we're there in the next, rough estimate, 10 years, but for narrower portions of it I believe that it's right there right now. I can furnish you with an article by Bruce Watson, formerly up in Massachusetts, that covered this issue that was in our symposium proceedings. I can probably get you a copy of that.

[The article follows:]

"A national agenda for medical computing and information systems must become a reality, not at some distant time, but now."

—James H. Sammons, M.D.
Executive Vice President
American Medical Association

November 1–4, 1981
Washington, D.C.

Edited by
Henry G. Heffernan, S.J.
Program Chairman
LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO ACQUIRE OR USE COMPUTERS IN MEDICINE

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Abstract

The traditional legal rule used to measure the
Negligence the standard of care for a provider's failure to use computers in the
context of medical care requires a provider to
The standard of conduct required of a provider in order to fulfill an imposed duty is usually the
major focus of a malpractice action because the
attorney defines the parameters of duty. That is,
the standard of conduct is the measure of care by
which breach of duty is established if the
defendant provider failed to provide care.
The traditional standard of conduct which a
provider owes to its patients is that of the physician
or hospital to exercise the degree of care, skill,
and diligence used by other providers similarly situated, yet what is commonly called customary
practice.

The identity of the competitive group has traditionally been drawn from those doctors or
hospitals in a provider's home community. This
locality rule was developed in the context of
malpractice litigation involving individual
physicians, and was later extended to hospitals.

However, a substantial number of jurisdictions have modified or completely replaced the geographic
concept of the locality rule. Many courts have
abandoned the standard of care that is customary
within communities or localities similar to that of
the defendant provider. Other courts have expanded
the spatial reach of the rule to include nearby
communities readily accessible to the patient, in
effect recognizing the change in geographical
accessibility wrought by modern transportation.
Some jurisdictions have adopted a national standard, which often recognizes
differences among hospitals with respect to size,
services, and equipment, as well as differences
according to specialization for practitioners.
Finally, a few courts have revived a theory imposing
liability for the absence of technical precautions
deemed reasonably prudent, regardless of the
prevailing custom among similar professionals or
institutions.

Application of the various forms of the
locality rule in medical situations where computers
were not used and would have made a difference will
result in the judicial imposition of different sets

183
The concept of reasonable prudence was first espoused by Judge Learned Hand in 1932 in the case of *Hooper v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.* The Hooper doctrine was applied to a situation where the owner of tugboats was held negligent in the docking of barges under low because of his failure to take the tug with radio receivers. The court reasoned that the captain would have heard broadcast weather reports concerning an approaching storm and, had he possessed radio, he would have put into a safe port. The storm and destruction of the barges occurred in 1929, at a time when few tugboats carried radio transmitters or receivers for their boats. Although the court found that there was no precise standard as to when the use of radios should be mandatory, it held that the owner of the tugboats would have relieved the highest degree of liability because a prudent owner might ignore or too slowly adopt only available safety devices. Thus, the court applied the reasonableness doctrine and found the tugboat owner liable for failing to take precautions even where such precautionary measures may not be customarily ignored.

The leading case for imposition of this standard on hospitals is *Hooper v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.* where the hospital was held liable for failure to provide air conditioning for allegedly negligent treatment which resulted in the amputation of the patient's leg. The Illinois Supreme Court held the hospital liable for failure to provide adequate care, and the court specifically said that the duty to provide air conditioning was a part of its medical care. The hospital's own bylaws now require air conditioning and the court found an omission of the duty in question.

The court applied the standard of care formula used for ordinary negligence law in doing so, the court referred to the *Hooper* principle that even universal disregard of ordinary safety measures won't allow an industry to avoid liability for their omission.

The development of this ordinary negligence approach clearly indicates the shift away from the doctrine that doctors and hospitals might be held liable for their failure to use or purchase computers. A court applying the failing standard could find that failure to use computers for a particular purpose exposed the patient to an unreasonable risk of harm, even where such use was unknown.

In *Rosen v. Caras,* ophthalmologists were held to be negligent as a matter of law in failing to administer a glucose test to a patient for whom the test was not customary. During the trial the testimony of medical experts for both the plaintiff and the defendants established that the standards of the profession for that specialty in the same or similar circumstances did not require routine blood or urine tests for diabetes and the court conceded that such tests were necessary in the circumstances. The court found that the evidence in question established that the defendants were negligent in failing to administer the test.

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that they provide the basis for a discussion of the relevance of quality and its presence to computerized medical technologies.

Availibility

Courts have approached the issue of availability as one of utility, efficiency, and economy. In a recent case concerning the use of radars in aircraft, a court refused to find the aircraft operator negligent because of evidence that radar systems available at the time of the accident were operationally unsatisfactory. The issue in this case concerns the propriety of the court's decision to conclude that equipment available when such devices are still in the experimental stage of development. Allowing computers may be used experimentally for particular purposes by some physicians and hospital doctors, but it is unlikely to impose on other purposes a system that has proven itself capable of Eq. 31 to the particular task for which it was designed.

The separate issue of accessibility focuses on the availability of the equipment to a particular user. Thus, for example, where a doctor may not own a computer, but nevertheless has access to one in a hospital or medical center, that physician will under proper conditions have an affirmative duty to use the available equipment. Under the traditional theory of negligence, a physician may be held negligence for any failure to use equipment available to him in his own locality if other physicians in good standing would have done so. Further, where particular jurisdictions have extended the definition of "same locality" to include institutions containing superior medical, technical, or administrative services, physicians could be required to seek computer services for their patients, even though this may require transfer of the patient.

Certificates of need legislation is of critical importance in determining a physician's access to computer technology. The program is designed to review the necessity of new medical equipment. State regulations indicate that facilities will be used to determine need. A hospital must receive a certificate of need before it can acquire the desired equipment. However, that legislation does not anticipate a particular standard of conduct in terms of patient care, although the ability of a provider to obtain equipment or to provide services clearly has impact on the type of care which will be provided by the institution. Thus, where a hospital seeks to obtain a computerized diagnostic device, and its absence for a certificate of need is decided, subsequent patient litigation over injuries allegedly attributable to adverse impact of the equipment will fall. It is quite likely that courts will assume a state's decision concerning the necessity of need in a context similar to any other specific certification of a regulation actually of conduct. This approach would provide a certain level of comfort for the physician, even if the possibility of a treatment for patient injuries by the state's remaining behind the CON denial includes the existence of an adequate supply of this equipment within the hospital's service area, a justification that is frequently applied.

Reduction of Risk to Patient

Courts may recognize liability as a matter of law for failure to use a computer where application of that equipment to all likelihood would have reduced the risk of ill health for the patient, even though the certainty of an improvement in present. The present example of the kind of applications which might improve patient care include the use of computers in diagnosis, utilization of therapy, and delivery of therapy.

Diagnosis is perhaps the most important application which could be of rule of reasonable prudence. Early, accurate diagnosis improves patient outcomes. Currently, computer systems already serve physicians in making diagnoses through provision of information and memory enhancement. If a physician does not seek out a computer's expertise, the physician's own clear would have increased the likelihood of a correct diagnosis. Under such circumstances, a physician's negligence is liable for any failure to apply the computer's expertise. One major limitation on application of the major doctrine in diagnostic situations concerns the extent to which physicians can or should be expected to use computers even though the providers should have developed the problem in question on the basis of the ordinary care and skill. This situation has led one author to conclude that where some illnesses are concerned, incorrect diagnoses would be the result of the physician's personal error, rather than of any failure to use a computer.

Computers can of course perform tasks which physicians cannot perform alone. Interpretation of electrocardiograms, generation of computerized tomographic scans, and measurement of a variety of laboratory tests are all directly possible because of the advances in computers. This automatic diagnostic process is perhaps the most important component on the part of physicians, a finding that is not likely to improve in the future, particularly since many diagnoses are concerned. Incorrect diagnoses would be the result of the physician's personal error, rather than of any failure to use a computer.

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failure to use a computer which would have reminded the physician of the existence of the therapy. On the other hand, if the physician did not know of the particular form of treatment, he would have been unaware of its existence through use of the computer. If the physician did not know of the particular form of treatment, he would have been reminded of its existence through use of the computer. The better course for the physician is to document his state of mind in the appropriate medical record.

Computers also serve directly to regulate the delivery of a growing number of medical treatments. For example, programs which monitor patients during or following surgery are used by hospitals to prevent patients at risk. It seems likely that physicians who have access to such systems will be expected to use them where their application will improve the likelihood of patient survival significantly. Where the cost of these devices is prohibitive, courts may require providers to purchase such equipment in order to meet the required duty of care. 18

Cost of equipment is the last major factor considered by the courts. While the present cost of computer is still relatively high, the declining cost of computer hardware and the availability of an increasing variety of scornware packages promises to lower the cost of more and more computer applications in the future. The courts will in all likelihood continue to engage in a balancing of interest. Although only a few courts have advanced a willingness to impose a high standard of care on hospitals over than on physicians, there may be judicial justification for imposing strict liability for a hospital's use of equipment, while imposing a lesser burden on physicians. This distinction seems appropriate given the increasing acceptance of the presumption that a hospital's primary function is to provide services and equipment, while physicians are expected to provide professional skills. In particular, courts could expand the standard of care concerning a hospital's failure to provide certain kinds of facilities once the institution is otherwise capable of providing such equipment.

Courts will also examine the broader impact of innovations in requirements for equipment. Courts may, for example, require that while requiring computers for diagnostic purposes in hospitals, the benefit probably would be offset by the increased hospital costs which would accompany them. In the alternative, courts could pursue a regional perspective in finding hospital liability where the institution, itself, without commensurate diagnostic technology, failed to transfer the patient to a hospital possessing the necessary equipment.

Conclusion

The discussion of the traditional rule governing the standard of care required of providers, has increased the likelihood that courts will impose liability where providers fail to make use of computers in medicine, given that such use would have reduced the risk to a patient's health.

Although the continued viability of the locality rule in some jurisdictions will preclude recognition of such a duty in those states, the modern trend to redefine the spatial meaning of the locality rule promises the imposition of a use requirement for some kind of providers.

The application of the rule of reasonable prudence in medicine is of special interest. As courts have recognized that rule explicitly requires custom of some kind as one of several factors used to determine medical negligence.

The key question in the application of the purer to medical computers is whether a judicially mandated change in medical custom is desirable or determined by a balancing of the expenditures and the health benefits of the acquisition and use of the computer. Medical computers are of course in a stage of developmental flow, and while their use can reduce the risk of injury, the precise amount of risk reduction varies with the character of the equipment, its instructions, and its users. Hospitals and physicians inherit a state of transition from purely experimental computer use to regular diagnostic and therapeutic application. As the transition occurs, some courts and counsel will probably attempt to apply the lessons of Stryker and its progeny. These applications may become a legal trend where societal and institutional costs are low and patient risks can be reduced significantly.
2. See一般 Example, Rule of Custom in Medical Malpractice Cases, 31 Ind. L. J. 312 (1976).
7. See notes 10-11, and accompanying text infra.
8. 60 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1932); cert. denied 285 U.S. 333 (1932).
11. Meiller, supra n. 10 at 983.
14. Moreover, the courts in Kansas indicated that failure to transfer unmedically indicated requires a showing that the equipment in question is below the minimum-cost review provisions of a state's Certificate of Need Act. See also Meiller, supra n. 10.
15. 225 F.2d 140 (6th Cir. 1963); cert. denied 350 U.S. 946 (1956).
17. See, e.g., Springfield General Hospital v Dept. of Health of the State of Ill., 116 Ill. App. 3d 461, 443 N.E.2d 58 (1985). (Pres. role include alternative availability of facilities, need for special equipment, impact on services, adequacy of financial resources, and sufficiency of manpower.)
18. It is particularly true where the cost of the equipment in question is below the
Mr. Packard. Has a medical school or a training hospital ever been included, to your knowledge, in a lawsuit against a provider, a physician, or some other health provider, on the basis that they did not provide them or teach them adequately or provide them enough information to adequately make their decisions?

Professor Brannigan. In terms of computerized information or other information? Just other information?

Mr. Packard. Information that a physician, in developing his treatment plan, did not—was not taught adequately, given enough information. Have the teaching institutions ever been included in such?

Professor Brannigan. Not at what we'll call the pure hands-on ground level. You can't sue a medical school for producing a lousy physician, using that very broadly. This is one of the distinctions that I was trying to focus on.

If you talk about the failure to get a chart up to a patient's room—that's why information has these multiple meanings—then the answer would be "Yes," and there's a whole series of cases that are cutting this very fine line that involved airline charts, and I cite one of the earliest cases in my article, but there have been cases since then where airline chart manufacturers have been included as defendants in strict liability actions against negligent pilots for giving them the information in an inappropriate way. That's the cutting edge of this field.

Mr. Packard. Do you accept the concept that this kind of a system would simply be an adjunct to providing information to a physician, a textbook, a computerized textbook?

Professor Brannigan. No. I accept that when it fills that function, liability is determined one way, but certainly there are other systems that operate directly on the patients or operate in such a way that it's not just a textbook, it's closer to the thermometer readout, and accepting that. It's a thing that if he's standing there he'll check the patient, but if he gets it over the telephone he might not, and so therefore I think that's the critical point.

Mr. Packard. If it's considered to be used as a textbook, as just an information gathering device, then would it be treated, as far as liability is concerned, on the same basis as an institution that's not liable for producing lousy physicians?

Professor Brannigan. I believe it would fall under—in other words, the institutional liability has been diffused for other reasons unrelated to the concept of the product. There isn't any thing there. I think that in this case it would meet the product-oriented standards that's there some item that we can fix on, but I think the liability would still be negligence. In other words, there would be liability but it would be on a negligence rather than a strict standard. This is not a very certain area, though.

Mr. Volkmer. Would the gentleman yield on that?

Mr. Packard. I'd be pleased to yield.

Mr. Volkmer. Okay, as we have no standards, and we have no standards for this expert type of computer operations, and there being these kinds, and it's just informational systems, and it goes to the heart that we're still looking at negligence, are we not?
Professor Brannigan. I believe that that's correct. As long as its filtered through the doctor, we're looking at negligence.

Mr. Volkmmer. So you're still looking at negligence. So it really doesn't make any difference as far as the liability is concerned whether that expert system is any good or not. It may be you have no database and not be worth a darn. If the doctor is still intervening and the liability is on the doctor maybe for negligence, and he discards that and goes ahead and does what he thinks is right, you still have the—

Professor Brannigan. Well, no. I wouldn't say that there's no consequence. In other words, doctors who are routinely liable for negligence are certainly making a lot of noise about malpractice. You have to get into strict liability to impose a lot of liability on them.

So there's no question that the plaintiff's attorney would be coming after on a negligence basis the negligent provision of this particular service to the doctor, and I believe it would be on a negligence basis, but they would certainly go after it, so that we provide a separate pool of liability.

The expanding liability of hospitals for provision of tools to doctors and whether that should be in strict liability or negligence, this is one of the most rapidly expanding areas of medical liability rather than using the term “malpractice” in the United States today.

When I researched it first in 1980, there were only two cases; now I can find hundreds. So the provision—the negligent provision of tools by the hospital for the physician to work with—I mean this is the nature of that type of case.

Mr. Volkmmer. Yes.

I yield back.

Mr. Packard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Again, Professor, does the development of new and sophisticated devices used in the medical field tend to increase liability, or does it tend to decrease liability, increasing by virtue of higher expectations, greater exposure, and more technology and training in use of these new and sophisticated devices, fewer perhaps on the basis that it helps them to make fewer mistakes and less malpractice?

Professor Brannigan. My gut prediction is that the vast bulk of malpractice, in my limited experience—and I'm an academic; I don't do much practice; I read it; I don't do it very much—is that an incredible number of cases are simply routine errors, fairly routine errors: Instead of drug A, they gave the patient drug B. It's this kind of mistake that hospitals are routinely sued for; they dropped the patient off the table. It's not at the highest level of medical decisionmaking.

Insofar as these systems routinize and check on these basic fundamental mistakes that occur in complex organizations, I think they will tend to reduce liability. Insofar as we're dealing with the cutting edge of decisionmaking, I think they'll probably have little effect on it until they become used routinely. That would be my gut feeling, that they would reduce it. And they'll reduce not just liability.

This is where, as a consumer-oriented person—reduce injuries; that's the critical thing. It's not so much the question of whether
you get sued after the fact; it's, did the patient get hurt? I think it will actually contribute to better medical care for the patients. We can reduce liability with a law that says the patient can't sue, but the trick is to reduce injuries.

Mr. Packard. In your testimony, I gather that you felt that this was not, at least at the current time, a place for FDA to regulate.

Professor Brannigan. I draw sort of a slightly middle ground, which is, they shouldn't regulate it under the device amendments. I believe very strongly that we should have some sort of registration system of all such systems in use so that at least we can pass information back and forth.

If I can use that to expand one point, one of the things that is very disturbing—and I've only begun research in this area—is FDA is perfectly happy to work with secrecy, and they have all kinds of trade secret requirements, and a lot of computer software in the business end is done under trade secrecy.

I think that violates some fundamental idea of peer reviewing and analysis of these types of systems, and one of the things that I would want to make sure is that in any regulation of these systems that secrecy was not only not encouraged or supported by the regulatory authorities, that it was absolutely prohibited by the regulatory authorities.

If anything bothers me at all, it's an expert system where someone can keep as a trade secret how they make the decision in the system, and this is something that FDA is completely geared up to do, and it just also illustrates, it's not like the kinds of things that they worked with in the past, and we may need other forms of protection as have come up in other areas for the intellectual effort involved in these systems, but certainly the kind of secrecy that FDA is willing to do in some of these areas is incompatible with the type of peer review that these systems need. So I would register the systems; I would not further regulate them.

Mr. Packard. In answer to a question by the first panel, do you feel that the AMA or other professional societies adequately can monitor and police the system if, in fact, under your recommendation, the FDA would simply be the certifying agent?

Professor Brannigan. Well, again, certifying has a direct implication. I would simply have it the repository of places where these things are.

I think that what Dr. McDonald was describing as the inherent conservatism of the whole system would be adequate, combined with liability, to safeguard patients for a substantial period of time into the future.

I'm not saying that this would last forever, but I certainly think we're at the level of—we're taking two people up in the biplane, we're not building 747's yet, and you can see what's wrong with it, and it's not worth stifling the development to try to make the system perfect.

Mr. Packard. One last question, I think, Mr. Chairman, is all I have.

What effect, if any, Professor, will tort reform, as we are seeing it in its preliminary forms, have on the liability question as it relates to the issues that we're discussing this morning?
Unquestionably, tort reform has reached a very high profile as an issue. We're seeing States like my own in California which have initiatives on the ballot where the people are deciding what level of tort they're willing to accept, and we're seeing other States do the same.

Obviously, we're dealing with it here in Washington when we deal with Superfund issues and many, many other issues relating to liability insurance, product liability in the medical area; all these are very, very difficult and problematic areas now that something will be done, in terms of tort reform, in my judgment, in this country.

As we see it in its preliminary form, what effect will this have on this whole question of liability?

Professor BRANNIGAN. Without going into all of the overall policy issues, I think the effect will be fairly small. In other words, it's in the nature of this kind of device that it probably injures people one at a time, if at all, and a lot of tort reform is directed toward other kinds of entities, and probably if it injures people, it injures them fairly quickly.

A lot of the tort reform is oriented toward the mass tort issues, and the long-tailed problems, and a lot of the other issues that have arisen. However, on the good side, one of the real negatives of tort reform is, it requires much more substantial regulation, and this is something the industry now recognizes, that if you don't use the tort system to control defective products, you have to do it directly.

So I have, in other contracts having nothing to do with this, advised people to essentially embrace strict liability in order to avoid inappropriate regulation.

So in that narrow sense, tort reform may force us to come back here and say that the FDA has to much more aggressively regulate these products because all of a sudden you lose the incentives, under certain circumstances. However, that's a broad criticism of some of the proposals.

In terms of these systems, I don't see the effect, and one of the other things is, on the difference between negligence and strict liability, on something like a drug-drug interaction program, as I think I mentioned at quite some length in my article, the difference is very small, because we're talking about really the design stage, and everyone who does liability knows that negligent design and strict liability design defects, these are very small differences. These are made things, not natural artifacts. So I think the liability effect would be very small.

Mr. PACKARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the panel.

Mr. VOLKMER. I have one last question, Mr. Belair.

Do you anticipate, if we see an ongoing use of computerization and informational systems, et cetera, in the medical field, further deterioration of the privacy rights of patients? I believe that's so we could possibly anticipate—to go back to the previous question about tort liability—the effect of tort reform on that possibility of more proliferation of Privacy Act suits against persons for, "I lost my job," or whatever have you.
Mr. BEAIRE. One of the problems we have right now in enforcing privacy laws, Mr. Chairman, is that most of them don't lend themselves to private rights of action. Either there is no private right of action, or, if there is, it requires the showing of actual damages, which is sometimes hard, especially when the invasion of privacy results in stigma, and emotional distress, and so forth, and of course it's a rare individual who can finance a lawsuit these days, thanks to the fees that lawyers charge; it's an expensive undertaking.

I must see 5 people a month who come to me, and maybe 1 of them has what I would consider a legitimate claim, but only 1 in a 100 can finance litigation.

Mr. VOLKMER. When you say a legitimate claim, you're not saying that they really wouldn't have a cause of action; I mean, they hadn't had wrong done to them, but they failed to have a cause of action on which recovery can be obtained—monetary recovery.

Mr. BELAIR. That's right. They have a cause of action, but there's no provision for attorneys' fees, and they can't finance an action, and so therefore they're left to the American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], or they're left to—

Mr. VOLKMER. Or if it's merely depression that's resulted from it, because they're now ostracized in their neighborhood or their hometown, or something, that's not—

Mr. BELAIR. Those are in the four out of the five that don't have a cause of action.

Mr. VOLKMER. Right.

Mr. BELAIR. I guess I don't see computerization affecting the ability, one way or the other, of patients to act as private attorneys general.

I really think if we're serious about regulating and protecting privacy, we have got to have some kind of regulatory presence, and I know all the downsides to that. There are lots of downsides to that, and all of us have reason to worry about that, but if we're serious about protecting privacy, there's no other answer.

Mr. VOLKMER. Professor Brannigan.

Professor BRANNIGAN. I would just mention that the United States is way behind most other countries in legislation in the area of privacy protection. We're almost unique among developed countries in having almost no private rights against private data holders, and if the committee is interested, there's a lot of other material. I do have a colleague coming over for several weeks in June, Dr. Bernd Beier, who is my coauthor in my work on privacy, and he could certainly supply you with some up-to-date information on at least what's being done in Germany. He's the data protection officer for a very large automobile parts manufacturer, and they work all over the world. They have problems, too, in that system, particularly dealing with network systems and microprocessors.

Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Packard.

Mr. PACKARD. Before you close the hearing, Mr. Chairman, I had a note as a followup of a question to you, Professor Brannigan. I think you indicated that these systems would probably not be too much liable as a provider of information to the physicians, that
malpractice would probably still be the primary source of suits. Would, however, a physician tend to look toward suits against the system by not providing them adequate information or something going wrong with the information that they've gotten by which they've made their decision, and then they would countersue?

Professor BRANNIGAN. For contribution or indemnity. I think that certainly the effect by defendants of shifting to the system a portion of their own liability—I won't use the word "responsibility;" I'll use the word "liability"—that will be an aggressive attempt. That has occurred, and that is mostly handled by contractual relationships among the various players in the game, and a lot of hospitals, again, in my small survey, have taken on that liability as a way of attracting the best and most competent physicians, so that the physician gets that as a matter of contract rather than as a matter of tort law. They simply cover them for any of those kinds of errors.

Mr. PACKARD. I see.

Mr. VOLKMER. They're basically indemnified, then.

Professor BRANNIGAN. That's right, because they can acquire insurance at a more efficient rate.

Mr. PACKARD. OK. Thank you.

Mr. VOLKMER. OK. Once again I would like to thank our witnesses, both panels, for appearing here today and sharing with us their opinions on these subjects. This has been a very valuable hearing for the subcommittee.

It definitely appears that the subcommittee needs a better understanding of the Food and Drug Administration activities in this area, and therefore I hope to hold hearings later this year for the purpose of receiving a formal statement from the Director of the Center for Devices and Radiological Health.

I would like to explore further other areas identified in the testimony presented here that deserve greater examination. We also need the views of other affected parties on the topics raised here today. So I welcome the interest displayed here and invite interested parties to contact the subcommittee to discuss this field. I also wish to thank Congressman Packard for his participation here today and look forward to his continued assistance.

With that, the subcommittee will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX I

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

4 March 1986

Hon. Frank D. Young, Commissioner
Food and Drug Administration
5600 Fishers Lane
Rockville, Maryland 20857

Dear Commissioner:

The Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology will hold a hearing on March 18, 1986, on the use of information technology and artificial intelligence techniques in the health care system. The hearing will examine some of the present medical applications of artificial intelligence research and the policy issues involved in the growing use of medical computer systems.

We would appreciate a statement for the record from the Center for Devices and Radiological Health that describes FDA's present position on the need for regulation in this field. This statement should specifically include the following information:

- Under what authority does FDA regulate computer software designed for applications in the health care system?
- Has the agency decided to regulate medical software under this authority?
- What policy exists regarding the regulation of medical software at the present time?
- What policy alternatives are being considered in the development of the agency's policy statement and what steps under the Medical Device Amendments are applicable to the future use of these information systems?

The Subcommittee would also be interested in FDA's oversight efforts involving over-the-counter sales of these systems, including any actions FDA has taken to assure that the public welfare is not compromised.
In preparation for the hearing, the Subcommittee would appreciate receiving copies of reports prepared by your staff in this area. We have a specific interest in the following documents:

- Report of the Task Force on Software and Computerized Devices (1981 or 1982);
- Report of the Program Management Committee on Software and Computerized Devices (December 31, 1984);
- the most recent version of the draft policy statement on software and computerized devices under review at the Center for Devices and Radiological Health, and;
- Guidelines for Review of Software-Driven Devices.

The written statement may be as detailed as you wish, and will be made a part of the record in its entirety. Please send the statement, before March 14, 1986, to:

James H. Paul
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
822 House Annex 1
300 New Jersey Ave., SE
Washington, DC 20515

Your cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Harold L. Voinar
Chairman
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
April 16, 1986

The Honorable Harold L. Volkmer
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight
Committee on Science and Technology
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am providing you with the following documents on computerized medical devices and software that you requested in your letter to Commissioner Young of March 4, 1986:

- Report of the Task Force on Software and Computerized Devices (January 1982);
- Report of the Program Management Committee on Software and Computerized Devices (December 31, 1984);
- The most recent version of a draft policy statement on software and computerized devices now under review in FDA's Center for Devices and Radiological Health, and;
- Guidelines for Review of Software-Driven Devices (draft dated March 1, 1986).

All of these are confidential, internal documents on policy matters that have not been resolved by the Food and Drug Administration and presently reflect solely the views of an Agency task force or individual author. They would be withheld by the Agency if requested under the Freedom of Information Act. We therefore request that the Subcommittee not release or otherwise publicly disclose their contents. I anticipate that the statement for the record that you also requested in your letter of March 4 for your upcoming hearing on April 21 will be transmitted to you in the very near future.

If we can be of any further assistance, please let us know.

Sincerely yours,

Hugh C. Cannon
Associate Commissioner
for Legislative Affairs

Enclosures
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

HEARING BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 21, 1986
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is pleased to assist the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight in addressing our current policy on the application of computer technology to medical devices.

The mission of the FDA is to provide consumer protection through judicious enforcement of the various laws entrusted to it. Our primary responsibility with regard to medical devices is to ensure these products are safe and effective for their intended uses. The regulatory policy of FDA regarding computers and software used in medical devices has been evolving over the last 5 years in response to the development and implementation of computer technology by the medical devices industry. The specifics of FDA's policy are still under development. Meanwhile, we are addressing industry developments on a case-by-case basis while awaiting the emergence of clear patterns in the application of computer technology to medical devices. Because the industry is changing rapidly, it is possible that the policy positions we present in this statement could change significantly as patterns in the industry change. It is with this warning in mind that the FDA responds to the Subcommittee's request for information pertaining to FDA policy on computers in medical devices.

FDA regards some computer hardware and medical software as medical devices, as defined by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic (FDC) Act. Section 201(h) of the Act defines a medical device as an "... instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any
component, part, or accessory which is ... intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or ... intended to affect the structure or any function of the body ... and which does not achieve any of its principal intended purposes through chemical action ... which is not ... metabolized for the achievement of any of its principal intended purposes."

FDA's regulation of computers and software in medicine is not new. FDA has completed premarket approval (PMA) reviews of computer-related products such as cardiac pacemaker programmers, patient monitoring equipment, and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machines. Some of these reviews date back to the 1970's. However, in the past few years there has been a rapid increase in the number and variety of such products. Of particular importance to FDA is the increasingly central role computer technology is taking in medical systems. With a judicious selection of computer products, today's health care professional can arrive at or verify a result or diagnosis, determine or even apply a therapeutic regime, and check his cash flow or billing status. It is not inconceivable that in the near future there will be a product which combines all of these capabilities, with decisionmaking provided by the system instead of the health care professional.

This burgeoning growth of computers in medicine and its more pivotal role poses new challenges to FDA, since we must assure adequacy and consistency in the Agency's reviews of new computer software devices before they are marketed. We also need guidance for field personnel who inspect manufacturers of these products. In addition, many
Manufacturers of new, computer-related medical technologies are not aware of their responsibilities under the law because they are not part of the traditional medical device industry.

In an effort to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding, FDA, through its Center for Devices and Radiological Health, is developing a detailed policy statement on computer-related devices to reaffirm and clarify existing requirements. Once this policy is finalized, it will be communicated to the current and emerging segments of the medical device industry.

Policy Outline

What follows is a general description of how medical devices are regulated with examples of how computerized devices fit into this framework.

The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 prescribe a tiered system of regulatory controls commensurate with the risks associated with the devices, and the testing needed to ensure the device is effective.

The FDCA Act requires FDA to classify devices intended for human use into one of three regulatory classes: Class I (General Controls), Class II (Performance Standards), and Class III (Premarket Approval). The law directs FDA to establish panels of experts, composed of members from the research and medical communities, industry, and consumers, to provide advice and recommendations on device classification. The advisory panels consider:
persons for whose use the device is intended;
-- conditions of use for the device;
-- probable benefit to health from use of the device weighed
  against any probable injury or illness from such use; and
-- the reliability of the device.

After receiving panel recommendations, FDA publishes for public
comment, a proposed regulation assigning the device to a class. A
final decision is published in the Federal Register after evaluating
comments to the proposal.

An explanation of the device classes and examples of how computerized
devices fit into these classes follows:

-- Class I devices are those for which general controls such as
  registration, labeling, and good manufacturing practices are
  sufficient to assure safety and effectiveness.

An example of a computer-related device proposed for Class I is the
calculator/data processing module for clinical use. This is an
electronic device used to store, retrieve, and process laboratory
data.

To minimize unnecessary regulatory control and resource commitment by
manufacturers and FDA, some devices are exempted from certain general
controls of Class I. For example, FDA exempts manufacturers of general
purpose articles from the registration and listing requirements. General purpose articles are defined as "... chemical reagents or laboratory equipment whose uses are generally known by persons trained in their uses and which are not labeled or promoted for medical uses." FDA will consider the broadest possible interpretation of "general purpose articles" as a first approach to the regulation of computerized devices.

Class II devices are those for which general controls are insufficient to assure safety and effectiveness, and existing information is sufficient to establish a performance standard that provides such assurance. This class of devices must comply with general controls and also with mandatory performance standards developed according to provisions in the FDC Act. Development of performance standards may be a lengthy and complicated process, and until standards are established by regulation, only general controls apply to these devices.

An example of a computer-related device proposed for Class II is the programmable diagnostic computer, a device that computes various physiologic or blood flow parameters based on the output from one or more electrodes, transducers, or measuring devices. The definition of this device type includes any associated commercially supplied software.
Class III devices are those for which insufficient information exists to assure that general controls and performance standards provide reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. Generally, these devices are represented to be life-sustaining or life-supporting, or are implanted in the body, or present potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.

An example of a computer-related device proposed for Class III is the obstetric data analyzer. This device, used during labor, analyzes data from fetal and maternal monitors to provide clinical diagnosis of fetal well-being. This generic type of device may include signal analysis and display equipment, electronic interfaces for other equipment, and power supplies and component parts.

**Specific Issues**

Some specific issues of concern to FDA or issues that have been raised by the Subcommittee include quality assurance data needed for device approval, stand-alone software, over-the-counter (OTC) sales of medical device software, and the limitations imposed by Agency resources.

**Quality Assurance of Computerized Devices**

The reliability of software systems and higher order integrated circuits are extremely difficult to assess because of their complexity. In general it is impractical to test them for every possible input value, timing condition, environmental condition, logic error, coding error and other opportunity for failure. The best that can be achieved is a finding that the state-of-the-art in testing such devices has been applied and acceptable results obtained. Manufacturing and quality
assurance programs for medical devices employing software and integrated circuits should maintain adequate documentation of test efforts.

Some of the quality assurance elements which FDA will need to consider in approving a computer-related medical device are:

-- appropriateness of model or algorithm;
-- completeness of model or algorithm;
-- protection against inadvertent changes in programs (model or algorithm);
-- software safety (protection against unsafe errors of execution);
-- adequacy of labelling for performance specifications, operating environment, interfaces; and
-- software maintenance (proper development, integration and testing of revisions to the model or algorithm).

Stand-alone Software

No separate policy for computer software presently exists nor is one envisioned for the future. Medical software products that are marketed separately from a computer (generally referred to as stand-alone software) and used with a computer to form a system which operates as a medical device will be treated as a medical device.

Computer software that meets the definition of a medical device will be regulated commensurate with the product's intended use and its inherent public health risks.
As mentioned above, FDA is already conducting premarketing reviews of new medical devices that feature computers as an integral part of their operation. Any issues which the software presents are addressed in the review of the system in which it is used. The regulatory requirements applied to these devices result from their medical function, not the existence of the computer. Based on existing authority, FDA has also initiated post-marketing actions against these products when they have been found to be defective.

Over-the-Counter-Sales

Over-the-counter sales of computer-related medical devices are regulated through the labeling provisions of the law. The prescription or OTC status of medical devices is determined by judging whether adequate directions for use by consumers can be written to ensure the safe use of computer-related devices. If such instructions cannot be developed, these products will be treated as prescription devices.

Resources

Agency resources are another important consideration. FDA is already facing an increasing workload in the medical device area. Today's high technology revolution has spawned ever more complex and sophisticated products for our review, some with computers and some without. We must set priorities based upon potential risks to patients and not just the presence of a computer. We believe that in a time of increasing demands and limited resources, our policy guidance in this area must enable the Agency to concentrate on critical issues based on potential risks and permit devices, including software which pose comparatively lower risk, to be marketed with limited regulations.
In summation, FDA is in the process of developing an overall policy for computer technology used in medical devices. It can be expected that the policy will apply equally to computer hardware and software; it may provide for "exemptions" from certain regulations when no specific and only general medical claims are made, and it will call for the minimum level of regulatory control necessary to ensure safety and effectiveness. Finally, available resources suggest a policy that concentrates on critical devices and limits regulation of lower risk devices.
Mr. Larry DeNardis  
Assistant Secretary for Legislation  
National Institutes of Health  
9000 Rockville Pike  
Bethesda, Maryland 20205  

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the Committee on Science and Technology will hold a hearing on March 18, 1986, on the use of information technology and artificial intelligence techniques in the health care system. The hearing will examine some of the present medical applications of artificial intelligence research and the policy issues involved in the growing use of medical computer systems.

Because the National Institutes of Health (NIH) have a significant role in supporting this area of research, I would like to have a statement for the record about your agency's present work in the areas of computerized medical records and in the development of expert systems.

The Subcommittee is especially interested in the present level of federal support for applying artificial intelligence techniques in the health care system, and a description of the projects now funded by your Institute. We would also appreciate discussion of the goals NIH is pursuing by funding these research projects, any recommendations you might wish to make regarding further support needed in this area, and the future direction NIH intends to take in this field. We would appreciate a similar discussion of support extended by NIH for the development of computerized storage systems for medical records.
This written statement may be as detailed as you wish, and will be made a part of the record in its entirety. Please send this statement, before March 14, 1986, to:

James N. Paul
Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight
222 House Annex 1
300 New Jersey Ave., SE
Washington, DC 20515

Your cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Harold L. Volkmer
Chairman
Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight
The Honorable Harold L. Volkmer
Chairman
Science and Technology Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversight
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your request, enclosed is a statement for
the record regarding National Institutes of Health efforts in
the area of artificial intelligence research for the
Subcommittee's April 21 hearing on the use of information
technology and artificial intelligence techniques in the health
care system.

If we can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely yours,

Lawrence J. DeNardis
Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislation

Enclosure
At the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the responsibility for training and research support for artificial intelligence and expert systems lies primarily with the National Library of Medicine (NLM) and the Division of Research Resources (DRR).

Artificial intelligence is a branch of computer science which deals with decision processes, particularly in the context of drawing conclusions or solving problems on the basis of logical inference and a knowledge base. Since the early 1970's, the principles of artificial intelligence have found increasing application in the development of "expert systems," in which the computer is provided detailed information in well defined areas and used to assist health professionals in analyzing actual problems. Today, these two fields--artificial intelligence and expert systems--are the most rapidly growing areas in what has now come to be called "Medical Informatics."

PROGRAMS OF THE DIVISION OF RESEARCH RESOURCES

Background of DRR Research Support

The Biomedical Research Technology Program of the Division of Research Resources has been supporting research on applications of artificial intelligence in medicine and biomedical science for more than 20 years. The focus of this support has been a computer linked community for artificial intelligence research and applications projects with special emphasis in biological and medical areas. Centers on the east and west coasts provide both computer support and methodological support to scientists throughout the nation.
The center at Stanford University was responsible for some of the first specific applications of artificial intelligence technology to biomedical areas through development of systems such as DENDRAL (chemical structure elucidation), MYCIN (infectious disease diagnosis and therapy) and INTERNIST (differential disease diagnosis). The rule-based logic system built into the MYCIN program was subsequently developed as a general decision framework program which could be applied to many applications problems, and became the initial basis for "expert systems." Thus, the effects of the direct and collaborative support of research projects in artificial intelligence in medicine at these centers have extended far beyond the host institutions. In fiscal year 1985, the DRR program spent $3.2 million in this area supporting both research centers and individual applications projects.

**Current Status of DRR Programs**

Among the projects funded by the Division of Research Resources:

1. A collaborative effort between Rutgers, the University of California and the IBM Corporation to develop a hand-held computer to assist primary health care workers in developing countries in the management of common, potentially blinding eye disorders. In developing countries, blindness is a major health problem whose control depends on the application of simple measures by frontline workers. Advances in portable computer technology have made feasible a self-contained package incorporating a set of guidelines for diagnosis and treatment to be used in the field. The Agency for International Development is also supporting parts of this activity.

2. A cost effective, workstation-based consultation system, ONCOCIN, for the management of cancer chemotherapy treatment protocols in outpatient cancer clinics is being developed at Stanford University. The initial computer program was designed to aid physicians in the treatment of lymphomas, and has been evaluated in cancer clinics. Current efforts are to modify the protocol management system so that it can be used on small self-contained workstation computers suitable for smaller clinics or even a physician's office. This project has also been supported by the NLM.

3. A broader diagnostic program, INTERNIST-CADUCEUS, supported by both the DRR and NLM at the University of Pittsburgh, addresses diseases of internal medicine. A detailed knowledge base on diseases of internal medicine and the diagnostic criteria for such diseases has been developed. With the aid of a question and answer program, a physician can explore the possible diagnoses for particular patients, and receive suggestions for further tests or examination criteria for particular diseases.
PROGRAMS OF THE NATIONAL LIBRARY OF MEDICINE

Background of NLM Research and Training Support

In 1971, a committee of nonfederal experts chaired by Dr. Eugene Stead of Duke University urged that the National Library of Medicine begin a program of training grants for the medical computer sciences. The grants would be funded under the Medical Library Assistance Act of 1965.

The NLM Board of Regents concurred in this recommendation and, in 1972, the first training program grants were awarded. At its zenith, 10 programs were simultaneously active. They were quite diverse, ranging from computer orientation to advanced research career training. The goal was to convey advanced computer skills to medical school faculty who, by using these skills in their research and teaching activities would serve as role models for students. This goal was attained, although it must be admitted that many investigators and clinicians were independently becoming "computer literate."

In 1978, a nonfederal task force studied the Library's research grants program and recommended a concentration on computer science research in the management of knowledge. Again, the Library's Board of Regents concurred, and a new program called "Computers in Medicine" was announced in 1979. Under it, there were five major 5-year awards to prominent universities as well as small projects for new investigators and research career awards. Although the new program was well received—even obtaining Congressional recognition in the FY 1980 appropriation—it was not possible to fund more of the major awards. Support for smaller investigator-initiated projects and for younger investigators continued, however.

Even with relatively limited fiscal resources, the program attracted promising young investigators and became identified as the program of choice for research into medical knowledge issues, not restricted to certain categorical diseases. In 1982, a study of program accomplishments showed that awardees were publishing their results at an impressive rate, in both medical and general scientific journals. In 1983, the designation Computers in Medicine was changed to Medical Informatics. The importance of this field was recognized once again in the NLM appropriation for FY 1985. A budget increase that year made it possible to attract and fund a significant number of new applications.

In addition to grant-supported activities, intramural research and development into improved information systems is conducted by the Lister Hill National Center for Biomedical Communications, the research and development component of the National Library of Medicine. In its projects, the Center has used a wide variety of technologies—computer, microwave, satellite, cable television, videodisc, and so forth—and has placed much emphasis on investigating artificial-intelligence-based expert systems and (more generally) knowledge-based systems to support clinical decision making.
Background of NLM's Program Interest

NLM's fundamental job is to organize, store, and provide access to the biomedical literature. Over its 150-year history, NLM has changed its methods to employ the latest in information management technology. Currently, computers are used to store and access medical knowledge as (largely) textual representations of scientific literature. There are already significant exceptions, however. The various toxicology databases are factual and numeric as contrasted with those that are preponderantly bibliographical and textual.

Even better representations of medical knowledge are needed and seem to be possible. The artificial intelligence techniques offer our brightest hope for optimal information service by NLM in support of medical decision-making by American health professionals in the future. Consequently, NLM has consistently and enthusiastically supported the development of this field and the testing of the increasingly practical products of its research.

The goals NLM has for the field include:

1. improved representation of medical knowledge and judgment,
2. automatic indexing and cataloging systems for processing the scientific literature,
3. intelligent assistance to users in framing searches of our data bases and intelligent assistance to them in evaluating the results of their retrievals,
4. contributions to the development of a Unified Medical Language System to facilitate sharing of knowledge between clinical medicine, research and education,
5. improved patient care through computer enhancement of clinical decision making, and
6. improved health sciences education through expert systems in personal information management and lifetime learning.

Current Status of NLM Intramural Programs

Within the National Library of Medicine itself, significant Medical Informatics work involving expert systems includes:

1. An expert system known as AI/RHEUM, based in artificial intelligence principles, has been devised for rheumatology. It consists of two major components: a diagnostic consultant system and a patient management consultant system for cases of rheumatoid
arthritis. In its current state, the AI/RHEUM diagnostic consultant "knows" of 26 rheumatologic diseases; reasons from a patient data checklist of 879 elements, and has been tested with more than 500 documented clinical cases. The management model is being tested with a small set of cases and will be further refined this year.

2. An expert system, known as AI/COAG, has been developed to assist practitioners with the diagnosis and management of problems in hemostasis. This is a medical specialty where acknowledged experts are very limited in number and often poorly distributed geographically. AI/COAG uses branching logic and a menu-selection approach to allow quick progression through the parts of the patient's history which are unremarkable and drops to deeper levels of questioning to elicit increasingly detailed answers when specific items denoting a positive bleeding history are identified. The initial system has been tested and is now being expanded and refined.

3. NLM, working with other government agencies, is building an expert system to facilitate retrieving information to respond to chemical emergencies. The expert system will provide artificial intelligence based assistance to the person who is coordinating the response at the scene of the emergency. The system will "ask questions" to discover the true nature of the emergency, search its memory for precedent situations, then to remote data bases to retrieve pertinent information to be used by the on-scene response team.

4. Finally, NLM staff have developed an online indexing system that is speeding up the indexing process at the Library. This has been of immense help, since NLM indexes some 300,000 journal articles each year for its data bases. Similar techniques are being applied to the process of cataloging books.

Current Status of NLM Extramural Programs

By the end of 1985, NLM was supporting 23 active research grants, six new investigators, and six research career development awards. The total amount was $4,297,000. The five major training programs were able to appoint 28 postdoctoral trainees, at a total of $1,091,000. During the period 1980-1985, NLM supported 165 trainees, 51 investigator-initiated research projects, 20 new investigator awards, and four program projects.

Among the projects funded by the National Library of Medicine:

1. A collaborative effort between Tufts and MIT to investigate expert systems with computed medical decision analysis, and at Dartmouth, the funding of research involving decision analysis protocols programmed on microcomputers and studied in the context of a medical curriculum. The medical domains include nephrology and laboratory medicine, especially connective tissue disease.
2. At the Brigham and Women's Hospital (Boston), a project in the complex field of radiology called "Investigations in Clinical Decision Making." The diagnostic areas include mammography and coronary arteriography.

3. At the University of Missouri, Columbia, a successful prototypical consultant system for genetic diseases such as deaf-blind syndrome. This is an application of artificial intelligence methodologies to genetic diagnosis.

4. "Feedback Technology to Improve Physician Judgment," at the University of Wisconsin and "Computer-Based Clinical Decision Analysis" at the Deseret Foundation (Salt Lake City) are both intended to assist physician decision making in patient care, including radiologic diagnoses of pulmonary disease.

5. "INTERNIST-CADUCEUS: A Computer-Based Diagnostic Consultant," at the University of Pittsburgh, is an artificial intelligence consultant system covering all of internal medicine (nearly 600 diseases). This is the largest biomedical knowledge base extant, covering an entire medical specialty.

Summary

Medical informatics, with its emphasis on the use of new computer and communications technology to apply medical knowledge to health care, is a vital link between the laboratory, on the one hand, and the classroom and bedside on the other. Both the National Library and Medicine and the Division of Research Resources are committed to furthering this field with continued extramural support and in-house research. Such support is necessary if we are to realize the maximum return on our substantial investment in biomedical research.
Dr. Jack Myers
Professor Emeritus
University of Pittsburgh
1291 Schey Hall
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15261

Dear Dr. Myers:

Enclosed is a copy of the transcript from the April 21, 1986, hearing at which you testified before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight on Information Technologies in the health care system. Attached to the transcript are instructions for submitting requests for changes or clarifications. Please read these instructions and the attached transcript of your remarks carefully. Your copy of the transcript, together with any written requests for changes, should be returned by June 30, 1986, to:

James H. Paul
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
822 House Annex
Washington, D.C. 20515

Also, the Subcommittee has developed other questions as a result of the hearing and would appreciate your response to them. Your answers may be submitted at the time your transcript is returned.

1. Why did you elect to use clinical trials as your means of verifying your design?
   a. What alternative methods were available?
   b. Why were these methods rejected?
   c. Is the FDA statement correct when it states that the complexity of software argues against an ability to test all of the pathways possible?
   d. If so, will verification on clinical trials be a sufficient trial of the knowledge base and inference engine?

2. CLEARLY, as it is presently designed, requires a physician's interpretation. Can instructions be written so that it would be accessible to laymen?
   a. If so, could these systems be safety sold over-the-counter or in computer software stores for use by the public?
3. In Medical Education in the Information Age, your committee expressed the view that computers should assume the role of providing necessary medical information to students, relieving them of the need to memorize an overwhelming amount of material. How would this affect the development of medical judgement?

4. How much does a physician need to know about a disease in order to decide on an appropriate treatment?

5. How do you determine that a disease has been sufficiently characterized, and thus is a candidate for inclusion in the CADUCEUS knowledge base?

6. Given that medicine is such a dynamic endeavor, how can the CADUCEUS knowledge base be kept current?

Enclosed is a copy of a statement submitted for the record by the National Institutes of Health.

Are you satisfied with the current focus of NIH research in the application of artificial intelligence techniques to medicine?

Are there changes or new areas of emphasis you would recommend?

6. FDA defines a Class I medical device as "...laboratory equipment whose uses are generally known by persons trained in the area and which are not labeled or promoted for general use." Can CADUCEUS meet that standard?

a. For a Class I device, FDA requires the establishment of a performance standard. How would you set such a standard for CADUCEUS?

Your testimony at the hearing was extremely valuable to the Members, and I want to extend our thanks for your participation and service to the Subcommittee.

Sincerely,

Harold L. Vouner
Chairman
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
My answers to the various questions which the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight put to me in the letter of 20 May 1986 follow. Incidentally I did not receive the letter until 28 May and have been out of town for a good part of the time since.

1. I know of no method to test a computerized diagnostic system like ours except to analyze the performance of the system on large numbers of cases, usually difficult from the diagnostic standpoint. Up to this time, those analyses for all have been exercises to detect omissions, errors, and refinements to be made in the program. As I believe I explained, the program currently is incomplete in that some 150 diseases in internal medicine remain to be programmed, and therefore it has not been placed in actual clinical use.

The FDA statement is correct that "the complexity of software argues against an ability to test all of the pathways possible". However, this point must be evaluated from the standpoints that medicine is not and never will be a perfect science, no medical textbook is perfect, and no physician diagnostician is perfect. The real question is how much such systems as ours aid the physician overall by providing diagnostic consultant advice. If the government and the public require perfect expert diagnostic systems then we shall have to abandon such expert systems development except as toys. Controlled clinical trials should demonstrate whether or not such computerized diagnostic consultant systems contribute to a significant and high level of improvement in medical diagnosis.

2. It has been our strong decision from the beginning that expert systems like INTERNIST-I must be used only by professionals and that the results require a physician's interpretation. We never expect to modify our system for use by laymen.

3. Medical judgement is acquired by the intelligent manipulation of medical information and by observing experts do such. Obviously the more information one has stored in his memory probably the better his judgment will be, but we have all known good memorizers who did not demonstrate commensurately good judgement. A very important point is that it is impossible by many fold for a medical student to
memorize the factual medical information available. What our report was stressing was the point that excessive emphasis in the medical curriculum on memorization be reduced, not abandoned.

The more a physician knows about a disease generally the better is his treatment of it. On the other hand, a good proportion of medical information is not pertinent to treatment.

4. To determine that a disease has been sufficiently characterized to be programmed is a matter of mature judgment, just as is the case for that disease to be included in a medical textbook. It is a large and difficult problem to keep a large knowledge base such as that of INTERNIST-I up-to-date. However, the knowledge base can be kept as current as medical textbooks and probably more so because of the lag time in book publication.

For example, we waited about 18 months for information to accumulate on AIDS as a disease before we decided to program it about a year and a half ago. Additional information has been periodically added since that time.

5. The Division of Research Resources of the NIH and that National Library of Medicine in my opinion have been quite far-sighted and innovative in the support of artificial intelligence in medicine and they remain so. New areas of emphasis will need to be proposed by the academic community, and currently we are in a stage of moderate stagnation.

6. The hardware used by INTERNIST-I can be defined as laboratory equipment and has a high degree of reliability. I would not classify the software as a medical device in the FDA sense; it is really an intellectual device like a textbook or monograph. However, it is anticipated that a controlled field trial of the knowledge base and inference engine should demonstrate and need to demonstrate that the computerized medical consultant program performs as well if not better than the expert human consultant and that the system led to improvement in medical diagnosis. The controlled clinical trials will be held in academic medical centers, first in ours at the University of Pittsburgh and then at others, where medical and diagnostic standards are high.

The only important inaccuracy in the transcript of my testimony is on line 164 where other should read various. My conversational English was not always of high clarity but nothing is really inaccurate.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

D. Myers, M.D.

CHM/rt
July 11, 1986

Harold L. Volkmer  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight  
House of Representatives Committee on  
Science and Technology  
822 House Annex One  
Washington, D.C. 20515-6307

Dear Mr. Volkmer:

I am sorry to be slow in getting my response back to you. Unfortunately the material was sent to my former address in Houston, Texas and it took a month for the post office to forward it to me here in Salt Lake City. The materials were here on my return from a family vacation at the end of June. Thank you for the opportunity of letting me participate in this subcommittee hearing. I have reviewed the transcript and am returning it with a few corrections. In response to your further questions:

1. In a 1982 report, the Committee on Science and Technology noted that one of the greatest barriers to wide-scale use of medical information systems was the reluctance of physicians to take advantage of their capabilities. How did you address this problem at LDS Hospital and with what success?

The HELP System used at LDS Hospital has been under development and in clinical use for well over a decade. Medical data entered into the system comes primarily from the clinical laboratory, nurses, therapists and technicians. Physicians are primarily recipients of data output from the HELP system with its extensive communications and decision-making capability. Over the years we have developed a "sociological" structure within the hospital which is conducive to physicians to use computer records. Recently we have added a capability of phone-in access from physicians offices which has been a successful venture. In my experience, it is clear that establishing the correct "sociology" where physicians gain a trust in the medical computer system is important. Most hospital computer systems used in the past have been "administrative" or billing systems. The HELP system emphasizes physician oriented "clinical" data collection. The ability of physicians to get results promptly and accurately is very helpful to them and not threatening. Physicians appreciate being notified when their patient might receive a contraindicated drug. In this way our system functions as an on-line "safety net."
2. Please describe the negotiations that led to the agreement permitting Control Data Corporation to market the HELP System.

a. Professor Brannigan's testimony indicates that LDS Hospital could conceivably be held strictly liable for errors in the HELP system because the hospital developed the underlying software. Was liability a concern to the hospital during these negotiations?

LDS Hospital’s primary interest at the time of the contract negotiations was to get financial support for continued computer system development. Control Data saw the advantages of the system and wanted to provide it in the commercial marketplace. The only reluctance Control Data had was that they did not want to get into the marketing of "medical decision-making strategies" which they were concerned might be thought of as practicing medicine. Therefore Control Data left the establishment of the medical knowledge base up to the hospitals where they sold systems, with the suggestion that the hospital contact LDS Hospital for initial concepts. At the start of our negotiations, liability was not a major concern. In more recent times the liability issue has become more of a concern (especially since my attendance at the Congressional Hearings!).

3. During the hearing, you stated that FDA had not communicated with you regarding the development of the HELP system. When Control Data Corporation began marketing the system, was any review required?

As far as I know, no contact was required for LDS Hospital to sell the computer system to Control Data Corporation. As far as I know, no action by FDA was required of Control Data Corporation in the 1981 contract time frame.

4. Please discuss the legal problems you alluded to in establishing remote access capability for your system.

Remote access to the system was an easy technological task, but required a lengthy legal and patient privacy review before being approved. A multi-step plan was implemented which allows staff physicians to purchase remote access services from the LDS hospital. A copy of the application form required of physician is attached for your interest. Multiple steps are taken to assure the security of the system. These include:
a. A floppy disk, which contains an encrypted log-on security code, is issued to authorized physicians who agree to keep it in a secure place and be responsible for it. The disk is also "copy protected" to prevent easy duplication.

b. Physicians agree to maintain the patient's privacy the same way as having access to the computer and other records when they are on-site at LDS hospital.

c. The physicians agree to notify LDS Hospital if their floppy disk is lost or stolen so that the lost code "authorization" can be removed from the HELP system.

d. A record is made of each call by access code in kept. Record are also kept of which patient's data are reviewed.

e. Physicians agree to hold LDS Hospital harmless if there are any claims arising from the use of their access code.

f. We review the access to the system every month and look for appropriateness of data access and have close communications with the physician users.

5. How is the HELP System used to meet information demands from third-party insurers?

HELP system records are used extensively for providing documentation of care given for third-party insurers. We are able to provide a level of documentation of both clinical and administrative data which minimizes "challenges" to the accuracy of the care given which saves both the hospital and third-party insurers time and effort. For example we have recently started charging patients for nursing care based on the patient's illness acuity. Also contained within the system is a medical records module which includes DRG coding, ICD-9 coding and a discharge summary coding scheme.

6. How has the HELP System been used to meet the demands imposed by Medicare's new prospective payment system?

The System has been a valuable tool in helping the hospital manage its resources and in meeting Medicare prospective payment requirements. We are able to quickly follow-up on patients who
have longer hospital stays than the "nominal." Each physician DRG utilization is reviewed (by the medical staff leadership and administration) to see if patients are being treated in a cost effective manner. Having the data in a readily available computer form allows the medical staff leadership to review the performance of their colleagues and allow for exceptions based on extenuating circumstances or take corrective action where necessary.

7. Please explain in more detail how "electronic signatures" are handled by the HELP System.

Nurses currently use an "electronic signature" to sign off nursing notes in our intensive care units. Each nurse is given a unique code which allows them to verify information on their patients. The codes and time are stored in the patient record. On "shifts" where multiple nurses care for a patient the final nurse also initials the computer generated patient record with his/her name. If changes in the record are required at a later time only the supervising nurse is authorized to make the changes.

8. Has the HELP system ever failed to alert the hospital staff to problems in a patient's condition, even though the information was available in its knowledge base?

I am sure the system has failed to alert the staff to "alert" conditions. However, I can't remember such a failure when the system was "running" and when the programs used were fully validated. Most of this type failure occur during the development and validation phases of projects. We work very hard at minimizing system "bugs" and other problems which could lead to this type failure. It should be remembered that the computer system is primarily a back-up for physicians and thus physicians still hold primary responsibility for the care of the patient (the physicians are the "captains of the ship"). The HELP system is an information generator and does not "close the loop" (such as injecting a drug) in any of the decision feedback. Not all of medical knowledge and not every contraindication known to man are coded into the HELP computer system.

9. How has the HELP system used in the performance of medical research?

The HELP system with its extensive data base provides a rich resource for answering medical and administrative questions. The structure and organization required by a computer data entry have
dramatically improved our capability to collect reliable data. We can make queries of the data base to test scientific hypothesis. We also test new decision-making strategies by applying them to the "retrospective" data base thus helping us to check and validate new concepts more quickly. "Before and after" studies are usually very easily performed since the "before" data is already available in the patient records.

I have included prints of the slides used during the hearing. I too appreciate the opportunity of being able to present what I think is unique and effective computer system developed by a team of dedicated and talented computer and medical scientists. I am but only a small part of that team and want to extend to my professional colleagues the just due that they deserve.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Reed M. Gardner, Ph.D.

Enclosures
Application Form

I am interested in having telephone access to the LDS Hospital Information System (HELP). I understand there is a $250.00 installation fee with service charge of $30.00 per month which will be billed quarterly. I presently have the following computer and communications equipment.

Personal Computer: IBM PC _____ IBM PC XT _____
(MS-DOS Compatible) IBM PC Jr _____ IBM PC AT _____
Leading Edge _____
Zenith 150 _____
TRS 2000 _____
Other _____ Specify _____

Modem: Hayes _____ Model _____
Avatex _____ Model _____
Signalman _____ Model _____
US Robotics _____ Model _____
Other _____ Model _____

Printer: Epson _____ Model _____
Other _____ Model _____

PATIENT PRIVACY

I agree to maintain the floppy disc I am provided in a secure place and will be responsible for any computer system access with the "logon security code" recorded on the disc. In addition I agree to maintain the patient's privacy in the same way I would by having access to computer and other patient records just as if I were on site at LDS Hospital. I will notify the Biophysics Department at LDS Hospital if my floppy disc is lost or stolen so that my security code can be removed from the system.

HOLD HARMLESS AGREEMENT

I further agree to hold LDS Hospital harmless from any claim in tort, contract or other legal theory arising out of my use or use through my access code of the LDS Hospital Information System (HELP) or of any information derived through such use.

Date ____________________ Signature ____________________

Return Application to:
Reed M. Gardner, PhD
LDS Hospital
325 8th Avenue
Salt Lake City, Utah 84143
Enclosed is a copy of the transcript from the April 27, 1985, hearing at which you testified before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of Hearings on Information Technology in the Health Care System. Attach to the transcript your instructions for submitting requests for changes or clarifications. Please make these instructions and the enclosed transcript of your testimony from the April 27, 1985, hearing, your copy of the transcript, complete with all written requests for changes, should be returned by June 30, 1985, to:

James H. Pau
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
822 House Annex
Washington, D.C. 20515-630

The Subcommittee has developed further questions as a result of the hearing, and would appreciate receiving your responses to them. You may include them with your transcript.

1. In your search for venture capital, how did you describe your company and the market you were pursuing?
2. Please supply the Subcommittee with a copy of your prospectus for investors.
3. What steps have you taken to assist system developers with the problems you have identified?
4. What progress has been made in preventing expert systems that exceed their knowledge domain?
5. How will knowledge bases be updated as these systems become widespread?
6. Has your company obtained funds for research in order to obtain answers to these problems?
7. You stated during the hearing that venture capital would be more likely to fund the expense of evaluating these systems. Has any system designer accepted or offered financial assistance from your company in full or in part?
4. How will you choose the scheme that will govern verification of the expert systems you will market?

5. In your opinion, does the enclosed statement, prepared by FDA for the record, represent progress toward satisfying the concerns of computerized medical device manufacturers?
   a. FDA says in its statement that the field of consumer applications in medicine is in such a state of ferment that genuine experts have not yet identified a pattern to use in developing guidelines. Do you agree with that assessment?
   b. Do you believe that FDA's attempt to regulate this field will interfere with your efforts to market these information systems?
   c. How will you be able to market medical expert systems, as you recommend, FDA awaits the development of its own in-house expertise before it proceeds to establish a regulatory structure?

6. FDA estimates a Class 1 medical device as laboratory equipment whose uses are generally known to persons trained in this area and which are not labeled or promoted for general uses. Can CRUCEUS meet that standard?
   a. For a Class 2 device, FDA requires the establishment of a performance standard. How would you set such a standard for CRUCEUS?

7. Have you ever considered offering any of these expert systems to non-specialists, or over-the-counter?

8. Enclosed is a copy of a statement submitted to the record by the National Institutes of Health.
   a. Are you satisfied with the current status of the research in the application of artificial intelligence techniques to medicine?
   b. What changes or new areas of emphasis would you recommend?
Your testimony at the hearing was extremely valuable to the committee, and I want to extend our thanks for your participation and service to the Subcommittee.

Sincerely,

Harold L. Volker
Chairman
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
June 24, 1986

Knowledge Research Associates
5601 Garden Lakes Majestic
Bradenton, FL 34023
(813) 755-6262

Dear Mr. Paul:

Thank you for the opportunity to follow up on the April 21, 1986 hearing. The move to Florida has stolen more time than I had planned. My business has maintained contacts but has made no substantive progress since April.

In addressing the questions you have asked I have had some concern about disclosure of proprietary information contained in our draft business plans. I would appreciate your limiting circulation to those individuals who need to know in conducting the business of the House.

Question 1.
Answer 1. The vignette in Business Week July 9, 1984 provided most of the description needed by the venture capital organizations. Market definition is at present limited to physician customer/users. The family and General practitioners constitute the largest market segment.

Answer 1.a A draft business plan is attached. The plan is dated and does not reflect the current state but I believe it gives adequate insight to our plans.

Question 2.
Answer 2. Our relationship with system developers has been almost solely limited to advice on management and techniques to protect their intellectual rights.

Answer 2.a The system developers have yet to build self recognition of problems outside the knowledge domain of their systems. They believe, along with us, that until the technology for doing this is developed and tested, written instructions on the limits of domain expertise must precede initial use and use after each knowledge base upgrade.
Answer 2.b Knowledge-base updates will be handled by:
- Independent review of new knowledge,
- Independent recommendation of update action,
- Independent determination of the ripple effect of new knowledge on the system,
- Corporate action updating customer systems subscribing to this service, and
- Notification to non-subscribers that the update exists and the gist of its clinical substance.

Since we believe that the systems will sold on a turnkey basis, the above updating will be handled remotely without user intervention.

Answer 2.c My organization has no funding for the basic problem of recognizing knowledge domain boundaries. This is a fundamental computer science problem with a concomitant high risk beyond the scope of our company.

Our company has no intention of marketing a product without financing a committed base for the product representing a national consensus and a mechanism for knowledge base updating over the life of the product.

Answer 3 No system developer has accepted our offer to begin validation supported by our funds.

Answer 4 The schema for validation (verification) will be a process where domain specialists selected by users in that domain and supported by corporate set aside will examine contemporary literature for new knowledge, validate that which is significant to the domain, and recommend to the company appropriate updates with notification of the effects of the new knowledge on system operation.
Answer 5. It had not occurred to me before responding to this question that the FDA might have a role in the future of artificial intelligence expert systems. It may satisfy industry concerns if the FDA used the administrative home of the clinical domain specialist units organized to develop national concurrence and produce update recommendations when and where appropriate. This would go a long way in eliminating public concerns with corporate support of such activities.

Answer 5.a I agree with the notion that the computer field in medicine is changing very rapidly making the job for developers, watchers, and regulators extremely difficult. The FDA should develop a formal program to work with emerging clinical applications which may or may not go to commercial diffusion.

Answer 5.b I believe that with the present attitudes in place at the FDA, any attempts to regulate would close my opportunities for marketing clinical expert systems.

Answer 5.c I believe if FDA follows closely the development of national consensus in each of the clinical applications its notion of regulating usage will be the same as it holds in licensing of physicians by the states, ie no role.

Answer 6. I cannot answer this question for I do not know what is meant by "general uses". If it means "over the counter," I agree. If it means in general use by physicians or trained physician augmenters, I do not agree.

Answer 6.a In setting a performance standard for CADUCEUS, I believe a process similar to the NIH's consensus development should be used regardless of the class of the clinical expert system.

Answer 7. Some time before I left the NIH I felt that this method of representing knowledge could be extended down to the triage system. I still believe this to be true. Personnel trained to augment the functions of a physician could also become qualified users of these systems.

I believe it will be decades before these systems can be successfully used in the over-the-counter mode.
The dual programmatic thrust at the NIH is interesting in that the National Library of Medicine (NLM) is making substantive contributions to the field and is actively promoting the field while the Division of Research Resources (DRR) leadership seems to have difficulty supporting artificial intelligence in medicine and insists on maintaining a caretaker role. (I have several anecdotes substantiating this style of program management.) I am not satisfied that there is adequate competency or knowledge among the top management and program staff of the DRR to determine future directions, long range goals, or programs to attain those goals in clinical systems. The research resources and projects initiated and supported by the DRR during the 1970's and early 1980's are not currently attracting new investigators and new ideas to these DRR activities. It does not inspire my confidence that our funds in this area are best handled by the DRR.

On the other hand as DRR's capabilities have fallen, the NLM has performed admirably in recent years. The NLM hosted the most recent annual workshop conducted by the community of artificial intelligence in medicine, has vigorous and broad programs that are bringing new results into the field, and, as a further plus, has its own built-in research activity in the Lister Hill Center.

I recommend the funds and programmatic mission (research resources) of the DRR in artificial intelligence in medicine be transferred to the NLM. The NLM now serves as the nation's focus within the executive branch for these activities and by its very nature is epistemological. Therefore the NLM can provide an administrative and philosophical home for the field of knowledge-based expert systems within the NIH. It now has the leadership and constituency to deal effectively with the future of expert clinical systems.

I hope this is responsive to your needs. If more or changes are needed please don't hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely yours,

William Roy Baker, Jr.
Dear Professor Brannigan:

Enclosed is a copy of the transcript from the April 21, 1986, hearing at which you testified before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight on information technologies in the health care system. Attached to the transcript are instructions for submitting requests for changes or clarifications. Please review these instructions and the enclosed transcript of your remarks carefully. Your copy of the transcript, together with any written requests for changes, should be returned by June 30, 1986, to:

James H. Paul
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
224 Rayburn Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-6307

The Subcommittee has developed more questions as a result of the hearing and would appreciate your response. You may submit these at the same time you return your transcript.

1. Assuming your regulatory scheme is adopted, what would be the effect on a medical information system like the HELP system?

2. Because software is often customized for the hardware that supports it, can hardware manufacturers expect to be included in liability actions as a result of the use of these systems?
   a. Would you read the FDA policy on stand-alone software to imply that computer hardware manufacturers would be required to submit their products for FDA review on the chance that they might one day be used with medical software?

3. In the testimony you have submitted for the record, you indicate that the greatest threat computerization poses to patient privacy is remote access capability.
   a. How would you evaluate the position Dr. Gardner and Dr. McDonnell expressed on data security and the necessity of access?

Professor Vincent Brannigan
Department of Textiles and Consumer Law
University of Maryland
2100 Main Mall
College Park, Maryland 20742

21 May 1986
4. What criteria have the courts applied to determine when medical technology has become the "standard of care" for the purpose of evaluating treatment? 

a. How has this affected malpractice law?

In order to assure a complete record for this hearing, please submit the 1983 article from the Journal of Consumer Policy and the article by Bruce you discussed at the hearing. Also, please annotate your remarks on Justice Holmes' opinion (p. 116) with the appropriate citation.

Your testimony at the hearing was extremely valuable to the Members, and I want to extend our thanks for your participation and service to the Subcommittee.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Harold L. Volkmer
Chairman
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
Mr. James Paul  
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight  
822 House Annex 1  
Washington, DC  20515-6307

September 18, 1986

Dear Mr. Paul:

In answer to your inquiry:

1. I believe that all users of Medical information systems should be registered in a central location, with a reasonable amount of information on how the system is used.

2. Hardware liability problems are remote, with the possible exception of direct hardware problems, such as system crashes due to hardware defects. False promotion of reliability or compatibility may be an additional problem.

2a. No, I do not think the hardware manufacturers would be covered.

3. Without reference to Drs. McDonald or Gardner on a personal basis, I am convinced that many medical informatics professionals seriously underestimate the need for security of patient data, and the ease with which such data is removed from systems.

4. This question is difficult to answer without examining the entire field of medical malpractice and computer law. I have enclosed a copy of "Liability for Failure to Acquire or Use Computers" by Bruce Watson, which covers this area.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

Sincerely,

Vincent M. Brannigan  
Associate Professor

College of Human Ecology  
2100 Marie Mount Hall  
College Park, Maryland 20742  (301) 454-2141
Dr. Clement McDonie
Director, Medical Information Sciences
Regenstrief Institute, 5th Floor
1021 N. 10th
Indianapolis, Indiana 46202

Dear Dr. McDonie:

Enclosed is a copy of the transcript from the April 21, 1986, hearing at which you testified before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of information technologies in the health care system. Attached to the transcript are instructions for submitting requests for changes or clarifications. Please review these instructions and the enclosed transcript of your remarks carefully. Your copy of the transcript, together with any written requests for changes, should be returned by June 30, 1986, to:

James A. Fau
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
82 House Annex
Washington, DC 20515

The Subcommittee has developed further questions as a result of the hearing and would appreciate your response. These may be submitted at the same time you return your transcript.

1. How will expert systems make their greatest contribution to medical care?

2. You noted in your testimony that our understanding of physician decisionmaking is weak. Will a better understanding of that process come from research into expert systems, or should separate research on decisionmaking be done in this area?

3. Should expert systems be used to critique physician decisionmaking?

4. How does the regulatory climate for expert systems, as established by the FDA statement, "Inform...on overburden...rules and regulations?"

5. Is there a role for expert systems to inform the public on the availability of alternatives? Do you agree with the statement, "It is important to keep...for others...opportunities for failure. The fact that care is available...or finding that this statement is not true?"

We will be happy to share our responses with other health care organizations.

20 May 1986

James S. Pau
Chairman
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
3. Does this mean that until the problem of verification is solved, no progress can be expected in establishing regulatory guidelines in this field?

4. Would Professor Brannigan's idea to place the regulatory burden on the software user be an acceptable substitute?

5. What problems would you foresee with Professor Brannigan's approach?

6. Enclosed is a copy of the statement submitted for the record by the National Institutes of Health.

7. Are you satisfied with the current focus of NIH research in the application of artificial intelligence techniques to medicine?

8. That changes or new areas of emphasis would you recommend?

Your testimony at the hearing was extremely valuable to the members, and I want to extend our thanks for your participation and service to the Subcommittee.

Sincerely,

Harold L. Volmar
Chairman
Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight
July 3, 1986

Mr. James H. Paul
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight
822 House Annex I
Washington, DC 20515-6307

Dear Mr. Paul:

In the following, I attempt to answer the additional questions developed by the subcommittee.

1. Where will expert systems make their greatest contribution to medical care?

I think the emphasis in this question is misplaced. Expert systems are only one part of a larger whole including medical record systems, database storage techniques, human interfaces, display techniques, and all statistical analysis techniques—all of which are components of clinical information systems. Asking where expert systems make their greatest contribution to medical care is somewhat similar to asking how headlights will make a contribution to personal transportation. The automobile makes the contribution to transportation, the headlights are only a part of that automobile.

If you let me answer the question, "Where will intelligent clinical systems make their greatest contribution?", I would say to the accuracy of diagnosis and management, and to the cost of clinical care. Ultimately, clinical systems will make care faster—requiring less personnel and physician time. They will greatly rationalize the entire field of care as well. Closed-loop systems will have marvelous effects ranging from automated defibrillation in patients with ventricular instability to automatic insulin delivery in diabetics with embedded insulin reservoirs.
2. You note in your testimony that our understanding of physician decision making is weak. Will a better understanding of this process come from research into expert systems, or should separate research be done in this area?

Research in expert systems does contribute to the understanding of the decision process, but direct study of the process itself is a more efficient way to learn about it. Psychologic studies and work such as that performed by Elstein from the University of Illinois needs greater support. Support is particularly important now that computer techniques have evolved to the point where they can imitate what we "think" the physician does. Given this power to imitate, it is all the more important that we understand what the physician is really doing.

B. Should expert systems be used to critique physician decision making?

Important work has been done in the area of expert-system critique by Dr. Perry from Yale University. It is one of the many interesting pathways being explored. The field is too young to be talking about what should be done, however.

3.a. How do you believe this [the regulatory philosophy embodied in the FDA statement] will deter research in this field?

I did not receive a copy of the FDA statement presented at the subcommittee meeting of April 21, 1986, so I can't comment on the substance of that particular statement, but the general problem with regulation is that it is easy to come up with rules, but difficult to come up with regulations, especially regulations that are appropriate. When the regulators aren't practitioners in either the field of medicine or computer science, and they are to regulate the applications of computer science techniques to the practice of medicine, the odds that the regulations will match the realities are low. And when the field being regulated is so embryonic that there are very few examples of what the field is, the likelihood of mismatch increases. Regulations, by definition, impose strictures on how systems are developed, tested, and/or distributed. This generally imposes burdens of paperwork and hearings or other such time consuming efforts on investigators. The cost of "jumping" the regulatory barriers will tend to exclude the smaller and more inventive companies from involvement in the field because they have neither the personnel, the time, nor the capital to endure regulation delays. It will usually deter researchers from entering the field because their research energies will be tethered.
3. Do you agree with the statement: "In general it is impractical to test [software] for every opportunity for failure."

I agree with the statement because it is absolute fact. The problem is compounded by the need to change software. Changes are required to accommodate new hardware, new medical realities, new algorithmic approaches, and so on. In contrast to a drug, which remains the same during its patented lifetime, software must change to keep up with other realities. The need to pass software through the regulatory hurdles after every modification could impose hopeless costs and delays in the software development cycle.

3.c. Does this mean that until the problem of verification is solved, no progress can be expected in establishing regulatory guidelines in this field?

Yes, but I keep coming back to the question of what problem are we trying to solve with regulation? What excess has occurred? What excess is expected? What are the bad experiences the medical field has had with intelligent computer systems over the last twenty years that need to be corrected? Regulation for its own sake is bureaucratic excess in its purest form.

4. Would Professor Brannigan's idea to place the regulatory burden on the software user be an acceptable substitute?

I didn't fully understand the legal discussion between Mr. Brannigan and the subcommittee, but the idea of letting medical institutions decide what software is best for them is appealing. They already have substantial incentives, in the form of malpractice and liability issues, to choose only safe and useful software. I fully agree with Mr. Brannigan's arguments that medical software is not a device and therefore doesn't fall under the FDA's jurisdiction. I am not sophisticated enough in matters of law to give insightful criticism as to the possible legal problems with Mr. Brannigan's approach.

5. Are you satisfied with the current focus of NIH research in the application of artificial intelligence techniques to medicine?

This question requires an answer similar to that given for Question 1. Artificial intelligence techniques are only one of many techniques needed to produce useful clinical systems, and I don't think it is appropriate to single out one particular technique for individual support. Asking the broader question,
"Has NIH provided sufficient support for the research and development of clinical computing systems?", I would have to say no. Support has been provided by the National Library of Medicine, DRR, and the National Center for Health Services Research (not within NIH). The latter has provided the most support for research and development in clinical computing over the last 15 years, but their funding has been sharply reduced to one-fourth of the 1970's level. The problem with current support by NIH is that it's fragmented, and in many cases the "research" side of the research and development question has been underemphasized, particularly when work has been funded by one of the disease-based institutes. The National Library of Medicine is a reasonable agency on which to focus more of the support for clinical computing. However, a pure focus on artificial intelligence or expert system techniques is wrong. Research across a broad series of fronts, including means for storing patient data, efficient access techniques to large databases, integration of medical knowledge (textbook information) and patient facts (medical record), research and user interface, better understanding of the physician decision process, and rapid statistical techniques for dealing with irregular data sets, are all necessary for substantial advances to be made in this field. A pure focus on artificial intelligence would be analogous to focusing on only jet engines when trying to developing a jet airplane. Simultaneous work on airframe development, aerodynamics, environmental control, communication, and so on, are all necessary to build a successful airplane. The same will be true of clinical information systems. An amalgam of different technologies is going to be necessary, and more quantitative approaches should be taken.

With best regards,

Clem McDonald, M.D.
Professor of Medicine and
Director of Medical Information Sciences
Regenstrief Institute

CWM/JIM