Recent legal developments concerning college students and their institutions are reviewed, with a focus on constitutional issues related to the rights of students to organize, the collection and allocation of mandatory student activity fees, and the protection of freedom of speech regarding commercial enterprises. In addition to considering the status of educational malpractice, implications for policy and practice are addressed. Four student-institutional relationships are traced historically: in loco parentis, fiduciary, contractual, and constitutional. Issues concerning the evolution of constitutional rights in higher education include individual rights, due process, privacy rights, and First Amendment rights. Attention is also directed to several rights of association and their effect on the recognition of religious and gay organizations and on regulations governing use of facilities. Religious and political objections concerning the use of mandatory student activity fees are covered, along with methods of fee collection. Also discussed are: the boundaries of constitutional protection for noncommercial and commercial speech and extensions to the college campus; and malpractice theory and the courts' position in educational malpractice. Ten pages of general and legal references as well as an index are provided. (SW)
The College, the Constitution, and the Consumer Student: Implications for Policy and Practice

by Robert M. Hendrickson and Annette Gibbs

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The relationship between student and college is at the heart of collegiate education. At one time, the relationship was largely taken for granted or subsumed under a nonspecific notion of in loco parentis in which the college was the principal determiner of the educational environment. Since 1960, however, this relationship has changed, and today these multifaceted relationships, described as fiduciary, contractual, and constitutional, take the form of rights defined by the Constitution or by the student as consumer.

Litigation involving the constitutional relationship has moved from an emphasis on individual rights in the 1960s and 1970s to First Amendment rights of association and freedom of religion as they affect student organizations in the late 1970s and 1980s. Another First Amendment issue—commercial speech—has also been defined during the last several years.

Issues involving contractual and fiduciary relationships have been litigated as torts based on negligence, breach of contract, or educational malpractice. The novel consumer litigation lies in the area of educational malpractice, and adequate litigation exists to plot some future directions and trends. Consumer protection has become more important than in the past, and colleges find themselves struggling to design policies that are both consumer focused and preserve past policies appropriate for their primary mission.

What Rights Do Student Organizations Have on Campus?
Administrators of public colleges and universities are bound by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to ensure that rights and privileges are extended to all student groups equally and fairly. Administrators of private colleges, while not bound legally by constitutional considerations, may find less conflict acknowledging rights and freedoms required of public colleges by the Constitution, particularly at this time, when American society places a great deal of importance on those rights.

While speech-related activities of student organizations are constitutionally protected, they are subject, however, to some regulation as a result of the special characteristics of the school environment. In balancing the constitutional rights of students and the prerogatives of the institution, administrators must ensure that:
- Freedom of speech is guaranteed, but behavior is subject to regulation.
- Behavior that interferes with or disrupts the normal activities of the institution or the rights of others is subject to regulation.
- Regulation of time, place, and manner is lawful for maintaining the proper educational environment of the college or university.
- Once some groups or organizations have been recognized by the institution, all groups must be accorded such status, provided they meet the same lawful procedural and substantive requirements.
- Religious speech must be treated as secular speech as it relates to recognition of student organizations and policies regarding the use of institutional facilities.

What Issues Surround the Collection and Allocation of Mandatory Student Activity Fees?
Major legal challenges to mandatory student fees have alleged that certain uses of the fees violate students' constitutionally protected rights to freedom of religion or freedoms to associate, speak, and express themselves. In both areas, the courts have deferred to administrative discretion, balancing the interests of colleges and universities in the use of the fees against students' First Amendment rights.

College administrators should thus structure fee systems to ensure the presence of as many of the following characteristics as possible:

- The group receiving funds is an institutionally dependent, on-campus organization.
- The primary purpose or activity of the group receiving funds is educational—not political—and the group permits expression of a wide range of views.
- The funding mechanism is one to which all on-campus groups have equal access.
- The fee system allows a maximum amount of discussion, approval, or objection by students at the outset, before fees are ever exacted.
- The institutional student activity fee must support a broad forum of ideas and activities, while not promoting or hindering expression of any particular view.
It is unlikely that an absence of any one of these characteristics will make a mandatory fee system stand or fall. Absent clear direction from the courts on the issue and a controlling Supreme Court decision, however, implementation of a fee system with as many of these guidelines as possible is likely to be the best course for avoiding legitimate disruptive student dissent and costly, time-consuming litigation.

**What Rights Do Vendors Have on Campus?**
The First Amendment's freedom of speech is not absolute. To ensure the implementation of free expression, the Supreme Court has determined that restrictions regarding time, place, and manner of individual expression must satisfy four requirements: They must (1) be content neutral and (2) narrowly drawn, (3) serve a significant governmental interest, and (4) leave open alternative channels of communication. Commercial solicitation, as a form of commercial speech, is afforded less than the full array of constitutional safeguards for free speech.

The courts have ruled further that:

- Administrators may ban group commercial solicitation in students' residence hall rooms.
- College officials are well advised to prevent the use of residence hall rooms as merchandising marts by commercial vendors.
- A one-on-one demonstration and/or sale in a student's private room may be allowed if the student invites the solicitor.
- Institutions should provide some means for allowing commercial speech, information, and expression, including newspapers, mail, radio stations, and telephone, for example.
- Colleges and universities may prohibit any misleading or unlawful commercial activity.

**What Is the Status of Educational Malpractice?**
The current disposition of the courts is not to encroach into some areas of the fiduciary relationship—specifically academic decision making—which includes, for the moment, educational malpractice. The courts refuse to recognize educational malpractice as a tort, because to do so
would conflict with public policy. This position is consistent with the case law on academic dismissal.

Several policy considerations seem appropriate.

- The process for peer review and evaluation by department heads and supervisory administrators should be reviewed to ensure that incompetence and poor performance are not swept under the rug.
- Institutions should ensure that diagnostic procedures meet the practices and procedures accepted by professionals in the field when such standards are available.
- Review should be built into the process of awarding grades and certifying skills to protect against arbitrary and capricious decisions and, at the same time, to protect the academic integrity of the faculty evaluation process.
- Catalogs, bulletins, and other publications should be reviewed to ensure that they do not make guarantees beyond the institution's capabilities.

While this monograph provides information essential to the development of educational policy, it is not a substitute for the advice of legal counsel.
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*The College, the Constitution, and the Consumer Student*
FOREWORD

The most significant change in the relationship between students and higher education institutions occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the states lowered the age of majority from 21 to 18. As a result, most college students are considered adults in terms of legal status, rights, and responsibilities. Colleges no longer are parental stand-ins, subject to the protection that that special status implies; they are now more like commercial enterprises offering contractual services.

The revised status of college students is also reflected in the court’s recognition of their constitutional rights. While particularly applicable to public institutions, this new emphasis reflects changing societal values that most private institutions should also find advisable to consider. Perhaps the most significant change in the relationship between students and their colleges is that institutions no longer can assume, given their special status as educational entities, that they are immune from possible litigation. While it is still true that the courts will give colleges and universities deference in academic matters, they are holding institutions accountable for failing to provide agreed on services and administrative procedures.

The 1980s have seen an increased tendency for litigation. Administrative awareness of individual rights and institutional responsibilities can minimize the possibility of the assessment of damages. Certainly, the possibility of being sued should be kept in mind when developing policies and procedures governing student activities.

In this report, Robert Hendrickson, professor-in-charge of the Higher Education Program at the Pennsylvania State University, and Annette Gibbs, professor in the Center for the Study of Higher Education at the University of Virginia, have reviewed and analyzed recent legal developments concerning students and their institutions. The authors have concentrated on constitutional issues related to the rights of students to organize, the collection and allocation of mandatory student activity fees, and the protection of freedom of speech regarding commercial enterprises. Concluding with a discussion of academic malpractice, the authors offer suggestions for policy development.

Administrators, especially student personnel administrators, can benefit greatly from this report as they develop
policy and procedures guiding their relationship with students. Given the nature of legal issues and their propensity to change direction rapidly, administrators will find this book a valuable reference work.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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STUDENT-INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

The relationship between student and college is at the heart of collegiate education. At one time, the relationship was largely taken for granted or subsumed under a nonspecific notion of in loco parentis in which the college was the principal determiner of the educational environment. Since 1960, however, this relationship has changed, and today these multifaceted relationships take the form of rights defined by the Constitution or by the student as consumer.

The student-institutional relationship has received considerable attention in the literature since Dixon v. Alabama [294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); cert. denied, 286 U.S. 930 (1961)], which requires public institutions to give due process to students in disciplinary dismissal cases. Dixon is credited with changing the student-institutional relationship from one of in loco parentis to a new one based on the Constitution. One of the first constitutional law scholars to propose this new relationship suggested that in loco parentis was no longer a viable way to conceptualize the relationship between students and the institution and that constitutional parameters were now in control of some aspects of it (Van Alstyne 1962, 1965, 1968a, 1968b).

While some announced the death of in loco parentis (Young 1973), others saw it as having a minimal influence in describing the student-institutional relationship (Chambers 1976; Diener 1971). More recently, the literature reflects multiple, situation-specific relationships, and the courts are still discussing a special relationship between student and institution that is similar to the concept of in loco parentis (Conrath 1976). At the same time, the literature and court cases reflect a more sophisticated view of the student as consumer that in legal theory substitutes contractual and fiduciary relationships for in loco parentis. And the constitutional relationship has been evolving.

While post-Dixon decisions focused on students' rights—due process, privacy, freedom of speech and association—more recent pivotal decisions have involved rights of student groups, particularly as they relate to the First Amendment. This new case law and the liability and malpractice litigation affecting the fiduciary relationship in the last few years form the novel case law giving rise to this monograph.

In Loco Parentis
Interest in in loco parentis peaked in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when a number of studies found support for
the existence of the concept in higher education institutions (Johnson 1971; Serra 1968; Wagoner 1968). Much of the literature on legal issues published during that period reflects the debate about in loco parentis as a viable practical and legal concept, and as late as 1976, one study found the doctrine of in loco parentis continuing to describe the relationship between student and institution (Conrath 1976).

In loco parentis as a legal concept can be traced back to English common law (Harms 1970) and early case law. One of the most frequently cited cases in the literature, Gott v. Berea College [161 S.W. 204 (Ky. 1913)], states:

*College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral welfare and mental training of pupils, and we are unable to see why, to that end, they may not make any rules or regulations for the government or betterment of their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose* (p. 206).

Anthony V. Syracuse University [231 N.Y.S. 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928)] further emphasizes the complete authority the institution has over students. In that case, a female student was dismissed because she was not a “typical Syracuse girl,” and the institution was given unlimited authority to determine the nature of its relationship with students (Kaplin 1979, p. 6).

A more recent case, Evans v. State Board of Agriculture [325 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Colo. 1971)], indicates continuing support of in loco parentis under certain circumstances, assuming the existence of in loco parentis as the legal basis for the institutional authority to make and enforce rules that control the campus environment and make it conducive to the pursuit of learning (Conrath 1976, p. 139). But even though the concept of in loco parentis no longer adequately explains the student-institutional relationship, especially when considering students’ rights [see Butteney v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University, 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968)], dicta in these cases still indicate a reluctance to totally disregard the concept (Conrath 1976, pp. 173, 175).

The literature reflects the continuing existence of in loco parentis as a student-institutional relationship, but in terms
of the legal implications, it is more appropriate to view it in terms of the fiduciary relationship.

Fiduciary Relationship
A fiduciary relationship:

...exists where there is special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good conscience is bound to act in good faith with due regard to the interests of the one reposing the confidence (Black 1979, p. 753).

This relationship—the "trust theory" (Alexander and Solomon 1972, p. 413)—is one in which the institution possesses the knowledge to determine not only what is necessary to produce an educated individual but also the environment most conducive to learning (see Diener 1971; Lerblance 1979). The fact that the court gives deference to academicians in academic dismissal cases, as it did in Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz [435 U.S. 78 (1978)], lends further credence to the existence of the fiduciary relationship. (Academic deference, discussed in detail later, explains the court's reluctance to focus on the fiduciary relationship.)

The fiduciary relationship defines the relationship between a patient and a client. Educators have that same patient-to-client relationship inside and outside the classroom. Students place trust in the institution and its staff to deliver educational programs that will improve their capabilities as functioning adults. The existence of licensing procedures for higher education institutions is a state mechanism to protect the public against fraudulent institutions, and it is similar to the licensing practices in other professions where a fiduciary relationship is present. The fiduciary relationship is important in the developing legal concept of educational malpractice and is closely related to contract theory.

Contract Theory
Contract theory has been recognized as one student-institutional relationship. The most frequently cited case in which contract theory has its origins in case law is Carr v. St. Johns University [231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962); aff'd, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. 1962)], which recog-
nized contractual relationships that go beyond expressed contracts between students and the institution. An implied contract at a private university, for example, was used to support the dismissal of a student for failing "to comply with the university's prescribed terms" (Kaplin 1979, p. 178). A subsequent case, Healy v. Larsson [323 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971); aff'd, 348 N.Y.S.2d 971 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971); aff'd, 360 N.Y.S.2d 419 (N.Y. 1974)], extended the enforcement of similar contractual relationships to public universities: An institution was forced to award a degree to a student who had satisfactorily completed the degree requirements prescribed by an academic counselor during his attendance (Kaplin 1979, p. 179). The counselor's advice was viewed as an implied contract.

The interpretation of the courts' adherence to certain contract principles will be important in determining the direction contract theory takes (Kaplin 1979, p. 181). For example, the courts do not usually enforce "unconscionable contracts" (contracts that unfairly favor the stronger party to the detriment of the other and would be unacceptable to the reasonable person without coercion), and "contracts of adhesion . . . offered on a 'take it or leave it' basis, with no opportunity to negotiate the terms," may also tip the courts' favor toward the weaker party when controversy or ambiguities exist (p. 182). Both legal principles may be significant, not only in questions of liability but also in the area of educational malpractice, as they involve a relationship between institution and student that is similar to the fiduciary relationship.

Institutions should carefully review policies and practices affecting students to be sure that they are free of "language suggestive of commitment (or promise) to students" (p. 182). Not only should an institution be aware of what it is promising; it should also eliminate promises it is unable to deliver.

This question of fair practice in higher education is addressed in literature setting out a code of fair practice (El-Khawas 1979). Similarly, the new consumerism, while focusing on an issue that arises out of federal regulations, also has a basis in contract theory (Stark 1976). A "contract to educate," which finds its origins in college bulletins and other publications, is recommended as a conceptual framework for use by the courts to define the student-
institutional relationship (Nordin 1982). These publications tie the contractual relationship to consumer protection and educational malpractice in higher education (see Bean and Hines 1981). Questions surrounding liability and educational malpractice and the student as consumer have been addressed in numerous litigations.

Constitutional Relationships
The constitutional relationship applied to students enrolled in public institutions is the one receiving primary focus in the recent literature on students in higher education. Before Dixon, this relationship was nonexistent in the eyes of the court. In fact, in a case decided not long before Dixon, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the existence of in loco parentis and denied a student’s due process and right to freedom of speech and press [Steier v. New York State Education Commission, 271 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1959)], ruling that attendance at a public institution was a privilege granted by the state and that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over the granting of those privileges.

Dixon v. Alabama reversed past precedent and brought the Constitution onto the campus, involving the denial of due process rights of black students dismissed from an Alabama public college for participation in a sit-in at a lunch counter at the state Capitol. The court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses define the student-institutional relationship at public institutions. As a result, the state must give students due process of law when either a liberty interest or property right is found to exist before denying a student access to the institution for the purpose of continuing his education. The Fourteenth Amendment thus becomes the vehicle requiring the state to guarantee those rights expressed and implied in the Bill of Rights to students enrolled in public institutions. The case also reflects a retreat from the courts’ previous position of reluctance to adjudicate decisions about campus life (Kaplin 1979; Nordin 1982; Young 1976). And it reflects the position of higher education in society and the fact that higher education has become a primary source of upward mobility, fueling demands for accountability (Henry 1975).

Thus, a new and very specific relationship was born. Precedent-setting litigation in the 1960s and 1970s ex-
panded and clarified the individual rights of students. Novel litigation in the late 1970s and 1980s has focused on the group rights of student organizations, particularly as they affect the First Amendment.
EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Public institutions fall under the obligations of a state to guarantee those rights enumerated in the First through Fourteenth Amendments. While private institutions are not under the same constitutional mandate as public institutions, constitutional protections are enforced at many private institutions on the basis of ethical—as opposed to legal—precedents. Litigation subsequent to Dixon shows the evolving case law, from the definition of individual rights in the 1960s and 1970s to the definition of First Amendment issues involving groups in the 1980s.

The Evolution of Individual Rights

Dixon v. Alabama was clearly a landmark decision. The case involved a group of black students who had participated in civil rights protests in Montgomery and were notified by letter of their dismissal from Alabama State College. The students sued, demanding proper notification of the charges and a hearing before dismissal from a public institution and alleging rights guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The students alleged that the act of enrollment at a public institution did not result in the relinquishment of constitutional rights. The Fifth Circuit Court held that "...the state cannot condition the granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional rights to procedural due process" (p. 156) and noted that education was both "essential and vital" to productive citizenship in a modern society. The result was that the court not only had brought the Constitution to bear on public institutions in their various relationships but also had buried past reluctance to intervene in educational matters previously left to the college. This case opened the doors to the campus, facilitating the litigation of other challenges in education outside the constitutional realm (Millington 1979, p. 5).

The importance of Dixon is emphasized not only in the long line of case law that followed but also in the literature, which labels the case as "still very instructive" in describing due process requirements in disciplinary dismissal cases involving students (Kaplin 1985, p. 303). The Dixon court stated:

*The notice should contain a statement of the specific charges and grounds [that], if proven, would justify*
expulsion under regulations of the board of education. The nature of the hearing should vary depending upon the circumstances of the particular case. The case before us requires something more than an informal interview with an administrative authority of the college. By its nature, a charge of misconduct, as opposed to a failure to meet the scholastic standards of the college, depends upon a collection of the facts concerning the charged misconduct, easily colored by the point of view of the witnesses. In such circumstances, a hearing [that] gives the board or the administrative authorities of the college an opportunity to hear both sides in considerable detail is best suited to protect the rights of all involved. This is not to imply that a full-dress judicial hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is required. Such a hearing, with the attending publicity and disturbance of college activities, might be detrimental to the college’s educational atmosphere and impractical to carry out. Nevertheless, the rudiments of an adversary proceeding may be preserved without encroaching upon the interests of the college [emphasis added]. In the instant case, the student should be given the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written report on the facts to which each witness testifies. He should also be given the opportunity to present to the board, or at least to an administrative official of the college, his own defense against the charges and to produce either oral testimony or written affidavits of witnesses in his behalf. If the hearing is not before the board directly, the results and findings of the hearing should be presented in a report open to the student’s inspection. If these rudimentary elements of fair play are followed in a case of misconduct of this particular type, we feel that the requirements of due process of law will have been fulfilled (pp. 158–59).

While Dixon is still instructive about requirements for due process, other cases further clarify not only this right but other constitutional rights that states must guarantee to students at public institutions. By the beginning of the 1970s, many of these individual rights had been clearly defined.
Due Process

While Dixon defined the requirements of a notice and a hearing, other cases would further refine those requirements. The most frequently cited case providing a very detailed description of requirements for due process was *Esteban v. Central Missouri State College* [277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967)] (see Kaplin 1985, p. 304; Kemerer and Deutsch 1979, p. 351). In *Esteban*, the court listed a number of requirements to ensure due process: (1) written notification of the specific charges 10 days before the hearing; (2) a hearing before the agent(s) empowered to expel; (3) an opportunity to inspect documents or items the institution will present at the hearing; (4) the opportunity for the accused to present his own stories and witnesses on his behalf; (5) a determination of outcome based solely on the evidence presented at the hearing; (6) a written statement of the hearing agent's findings; and (7) the right of the accused, at his expense, to record the hearing (Kaplin 1985, p. 304).

The specificity of these requirements may have resulted from the facts of that case, limiting somewhat their application to all due process cases (Kemerer and Deutsch 1979, p. 351). More recent cases seem to indicate less rigidity than the due process proscriptions in *Esteban*. *Henson v. Honor Committee of the University of Virginia* [719 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1983)], for example, supports the notion of administrative flexibility in meeting requirements for due process (Kaplin 1985, p. 304).

Other cases have reviewed other specific requirements concerning due process. *Wright v. Texas Southern University* [392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968)], for example, indicates that an institution need make only a "best effort" to deliver a written notice to a student, and *Jenkins v. Louisiana State Board of Education* [506 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1975)] describes the contents of the notice as adequately defining the charges, while allowing for additional charges to be developed as a result of factual information evolving from the hearing. *Gross v. Lopez* [419 U.S. 565 (1975)], a case involving secondary education that is applicable to higher education, ruled that suspensions before a hearing could take place only when it was determined that continued attendance of the accused "poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting

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the academic process." A subsequent hearing must take place as soon as possible (p. 583).

The right to counsel was also clarified. While the right to counsel is not an absolute right, it is clear that, if the institution uses legal counsel, the student must also be allowed access to counsel (Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W.Va. 1968); French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969); Young 1976, p. 13).

These cases demonstrate the evolution of the courts' definition of what constitutes due process. More recent cases, such as Henson, indicate the courts' willingness to provide some flexibility in meeting the requirements of due process. While this flexibility is reflected in the case law, some of the literature does not reflect the same level of flexibility in the application of requirements for due process. Some authors promote rigidity and complexity in meeting requirements for due process that may go beyond the courts' intentions but serve desires for conservative risk management. One argument, for example, advocates the establishment of a standard of proof in disciplinary cases called "the clear and convincing arguments standard" (labeled as the middle ground and used in equity cases), which lies between "the reasonable doubt standard" (used in criminal prosecutions) and "the preponderance of evidence standard" (used in civil cases) (Long 1985). While lawyers might feel comfortable with these definitions, laymen find them very confusing, with the result that judicial proceedings take on the tenor of strict judicial proscriptions. Disciplinary hearings conducted under strict judicial proscriptions are outside the intent of Dixon and are not consistent with recent litigation and an institution's educational objectives. It is strict legal proscriptions that have resulted in student affairs administrators calling for disciplinary procedures that lend themselves to developmental objectives for students while protecting the rudiments of fundamental fairness and due process spelled out in Dixon and subsequent case law (Ostroth and Hill 1978). By following the court's directions in Esteban, one could walk the tightrope between concerns about students' development and sound risk management.

**Due Process in Academic Dismissal**

Courts have traditionally deferred to academicians in academic decisions (Hendrickson and Lee 1983; Kaplin 1985,
p. 307), and cases involving faculty employment and academic dismissal reinforce the concept of deference (Hendrickson and Lee 1983; Hobbs 1981). Academic deference forms the locus for the case law involving academic dismissal.

The controlling case in the area of academic dismissal is Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz [435 U.S. 78 (1978)], which considered a medical student dismissed for failing on several occasions to meet the clinical requirements for graduation from medical school. Dismissal was the final result of several years of oral and written notification of deficiencies and opportunities for reevaluation by different professionals. The court stated:

Academic evaluation of a student, in contrast to disciplinary determinations, bears little resemblance to the judicial and administrative fact-finding proceedings to which we have traditionally attached a full-hearing requirement. . . . The decision to dismiss respondent, by comparison, rested on the academic judgment of school officials that she did not have the necessary clinical ability to perform adequately as a medical doctor and was making insufficient progress toward that goal. Such a judgment is by its nature more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the average disciplinary decision. Like the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decision-making (pp. 90–91).

for these holdings is that charges of cheating or plagiarism implicate a liberty interest (harm to one's good name) necessitating due process. The assignment of grades and the determination of academic performance continue for the time being, absent a showing of arbitrary and capricious action, to be nonjusticiable issues.

Rights to Privacy
The Supreme Court has enumerated various rights to privacy as emanating from several amendments in the Bill of Rights. The benchmark case enumerating these rights is Griswold v. Connecticut [381 U.S. 479 (1965)]. Justice Douglas, delivering the majority opinion of the court and citing the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, noted that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations that help give them life and substance" (p. 481). These amendments create a zone of privacy guaranteed to all citizens. The interpretation of the existence of this zone of privacy came to higher education in the form of questions of search and seizure in institutionally operated residence halls. Students do not abdicate basic rights to privacy because they are living in the institution's residence halls (Young 1976, p. 18). Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University [284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968)] established the institution's right to enter and search a student's room when it has reason to believe that the student is using the room either for illegal activity or in a way that threatens the educational atmosphere fostered at the institution. Piazzola v. Watkins [442 F. Supp. 284 (5th Cir. 1971)] noted the institution's right to inspect the premises and to enter in times of emergency but ruled that such authority to maintain discipline and an educational atmosphere may not be transferred to civil authorities. Speakes v. Grantham [317 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. Miss. 1970)] found that evidence found in plain view during the legal entrance of a student's room is admissible in court.

The case law in this area indicates that the level of privacy established by the courts is less than that guaranteed to a citizen in the community. Students are protected from warrantless searches by law enforcement officers but must allow institutional authorities access to their rooms for purposes of inspection and when the "educational atmo-
sphere" of the residence hall is seriously threatened. It would behoove administrators to read the literature carefully and to discuss these matters with legal counsel before developing or implementing policies that may violate students' rights to privacy (see Edwards and Nordin 1979, 1983; Kaplin 1985; Kemerer and Deutsch 1979; Young 1976).

The Expansion of Individual Rights by Federal Regulation

If the 1960s is characterized as "the decade of the ascent of individual rights," then the 1970s should be characterized as "the decade of federal regulation" (Hobbs 1978). Federal regulation has given rise to "the new torts" under the rubric of legal liability (Hendrickson and Mangum 1977). Litigation in the 1970s surrounding Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, for example, significantly affected institutional admission practices and athletics (Hendrickson and Mangum 1977, pp. 32–33).

More recent litigation has narrowed the scope of Title IX by addressing the issue of whether Title IX covers employment (Hendrickson and Lee 1983). Grove City College v. Bell [104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984)] and North Haven v. Bell [456 U.S. 509 (1982)] defined a program covered under the act as one receiving direct federal financial assistance and held that federal student aid money can be traced only to the specific program receiving that aid (for example, the financial aid office). These cases essentially narrowed the scope of Title IX so as to render it almost impotent; however, the litigation of the 1980s has thus far not diminished the changes this legislation brought about in the areas of admission and recruitment in academic programs and in the enhancement and in some cases creation of women's athletic programs.

The Buckley Amendment [the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (41 CFR 9062)] defined requirements for students' and parents' access to their own records under threat of loss of federal funding for noncompliance. While little litigation has occurred in this area, it did have a significant effect on the way institutions keep records and give students access to those records.

The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 701) set guidelines prohibiting discrimination in the admission and hiring of "otherwise qualified handicapped individuals" in programs receiving federal financial assistance. In the area of
admissions, the Court in *Southeastern Community College v. Davis* [442 U.S. 397 (1979)] set the valid criteria that can be used in determining the admissibility of an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual," noting that criteria used in the performance of essential job functions need not be modified to accommodate the handicapped individual; such individuals should instead be evaluated as able to perform those criteria despite the handicap.

Federal regulations and subsequent litigation had sweeping effects on higher education in the area of employment during the 1970s through legislation and enforcement of Titles VI and VII. Affecting both students and employees in their relations with institutions, these regulations give credence to the characterization of the 1970s as the decade of federal regulation. The seventies not only saw the clarification of the courts' reluctance to become involved in academic matters but also was a time when the First Amendment would have a significant effect on the recognition of student groups. And the refinement of the issues involving the First Amendment would continue into the 1980s.

**First Amendment Rights**

A number of First Amendment rights involving freedom of speech—the freedoms of press, speech, assembly, and association—evolved in public institutions. *Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District* [393 U.S. 503 (1969)] established the existence of First Amendment rights in educational settings. The case involved the prohibition of the wearing of armbands in protest against the Vietnam War. The Court ruled that the wearing of armbands was pure speech, in no way disrupting the educational processes of the high school, and thus established that nondisruptive speech is a protected right at a public educational institution.

*Healy v. James* [408 U.S. 169 (1972)] applied protections of the First Amendment to college students equal to those applied to citizens of the local community; the Court stated that colleges are the "marketplace of ideas" where "academic freedom" should be protected (p. 180). In *Buttney v. Smiley* [281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968)], however, the court found that activity preventing others from speaking or participating in institutional business is not protected by the First Amendment. At the same time, speakers cannot
be denied access to the institutional forum where speech is permitted unless there is reason to know that the words uttered will result in disruptive activity by the speakers or onlookers or create imminent danger to the safety of the speaker or onlookers [see Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963 (N.D. Miss. 1969)]. Rules may be set governing “time, place, and manner” of the speech, but such rules should not be used to inhibit speech [see Bayless v. Maritime, 430 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1970)]. Regulations that go to the content of speech are suspect and as a general rule will not be upheld in court except in the event of disruption or imminent danger [Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1972)].

Healy and other cases are examples of the use of a prior restraint on speech or the content of school newspapers, and Hammond v. South Carolina State College [272 F. Supp. 947 (D. S.C. 1967)] is a classic example of a prior restraint (Kaplin 1985, p. 319). In that case, a student was expelled from campus for holding a demonstration without the president's prior approval. As is true historically of prior restraint, the court held it to be in violation of the student's First Amendment rights.

The most frequently cited case involving the editorial content of a school newspaper is Dickey v. Alabama [273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967)], where a student editor was suspended for an editorial that was critical of the governor. The court found that, while the school was not obligated to provide financial support to the student newspaper, the editor's freedom of speech would be violated if he were suspended for the editorial content of the paper.

In the absence of a showing of material disruption, interference with the rights of others, or that the publication is obscene, censorship and control of such publications by college officials is deemed an unwarranted interference with protected constitutional rights [Young 1976, p. 5, citing Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973)].

Antonelli v. Hammond [308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970)] noted that obscenity can be restrained, but the courts have set very narrow guidelines that place the burden of proving obscenity squarely on the shoulders of the institution (see Kaplin 1985, p. 335).
A key case involving rights of association was *Healy v. James*, which considered the denial of an institution's official recognition of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).

The mere disagreement of the President with the group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it recognition. As repugnant as these views may have been, especially to one with President James' responsibility, the mere expression of them would not justify the denial of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did in fact advocate a philosophy of "destruction" thus becomes immaterial. The College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent (p. 175).

The principles established in *Healy* were followed in a number of cases involving organizations advocating homosexual rights [see *Gay Students Organization of the University of New Hampshire v. Bonner*, 367 F. Supp. 1088 (D. N.H. 1974); aff'd, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974); *Gay Liberation v. University of Missouri*, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1977)]. These cases held that failure to recognize such organizations violated a student's rights of association and that recognition could not be withheld based on the group's lawful advocacies.

First Amendment issues continued to evolve in the eighties. The next three sections outline the primary litigation of the decade: rights of association as they affect recognition of groups and their use of facilities; rights of association as they affect the collection and allocation of mandatory student activity fees; and the right, under commercial speech controlling regulatory schemes, to limit solicitation on campus.
RECOGNITION OF STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS AND USE OF CAMPUS FACILITIES: First Amendment Boundaries

This chapter reviews several rights of association and their effect on the recognition of religious and gay organizations and on regulations governing use of facilities.

Distinctions between Public and Private Colleges
The actions of public colleges and universities are considered state actions, and, because they are considered agents of government, the institutions are bound to comply with the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Private colleges and universities, however, are neither agencies of the state nor an arm of state government. As suggested in the last section, numerous legal rulings have held that private institutions, unlike their public counterparts, are not legally bound by constitutional standards for the protection of private persons and institutions unless strong indications exist of state control.

The major distinction between private and public colleges is that public colleges have both contractual and constitutional relationships, while private colleges have only contractual relationships with their students (Hollander, Young, and Gehring 1985).

Recognition of Organizations
According to the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,” and students have not hesitated during the past decade to sue college and university administrators who limit or deny their First Amendment right of association or recognition.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Healy v. James [408 U.S. 169 (1972)] that the First Amendment right of freedom of association applied to students and, as a corollary, that official recognition from the college or university was necessary to implement that right.

In Healy, students at Central Connecticut State College attempted to organize a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society. Following procedures established by the college, the students filed the request for official recognition as a campus organization with the Student Affairs Committee. The committee, while satisfied that the statement of purpose was clear and unobjectionable on its face, was concerned over the relationship between the local group and the national SDS organization. In response to
inquiries, representatives of the proposed organization said they would not affiliate with any national group and that their group would remain "completely independent" (Healy 1972, p. 172). The committee ultimately approved the application and recommended to the president of the college that the organization be granted official recognition.

The president rejected the committee’s recommendation, asserting that the organization’s philosophy was at odds with the college’s commitment to academic freedom and that the organization would be a disruptive influence on campus. The Supreme Court rejected the president’s argument:

*While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the [First] Amendment, it has long been held to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition. There can be no doubt that denial of official recognition, without justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges that associational right* (p. 169).

*Healy* thus makes it clear that a state college or university may not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by a group abhorrent (p. 170).

**Denial of Benefits of Recognition**

To understand the severity of the burden placed on rights of association by denial of recognition, one must be aware of the meaning of such recognition. Courts have generally accepted official recognition of groups to mean that the college or university “acknowledges and sanctions the existence of” the group, not that it necessarily “approves” any religious, political, economic, or philosophical position of the organization. Official recognition usually conveys various benefits and privileges made available by college officials only to recognized student groups. These benefits may include but are not limited to:

1. *The privilege of scheduling campus facilities for meetings and activities, usually rent free;*
2. *The opportunity to lease a campus post office box;*
3. *The right to request funds from the student activities fund;*
4. *The privilege of using the school’s name as part of the organization’s name;*
5. The opportunity to use school media;
6. The right to post notices and appropriate signs announcing activities;
7. The privilege of being listed in the student handbook and yearbook; and
8. The opportunity to qualify for awards and honors given to college student organizations (Gibbs 1984, p. 38).

In the case of the college president's denial of official recognition in *Healy*, the Court found that the organization's ability to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate and to pursue its stated lawful purposes was limited by denial of access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students, concluding, "Such impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial" (*Healy* 1972, p. 181).

Mere Advocacy versus Unlawful Action
While the Court allowed recognition of the SDS, it also—and equally as important—addressed the issue of justifiable nonrecognition. It concluded that an association's activities need not be tolerated if "they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education" (*Healy* 1972, p. 189). This legal position was defined in more specific terms two years later in *Gay Students Organization of the University of New Hampshire v. Bonner* [367 F. Supp. 1088 (D. N.H. 1974); aff'd, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974)]:

*The university may deny or withdraw all recognition of rights and privileges flowing there, from a student organization where there is a failure or refusal to abide by reasonable housekeeping rules or there is a demonstrated danger of violence or disruption of the university's educational mission or there has been a violation of criminal law by organization or by its members at a function sponsored by organization* (p. 1088).

The courts do not require colleges and universities to recognize organizations, but once institutions elect to sanction some groups, legal precedent indicates that courts will

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The College, the Constitution, and the Consumer Student
mandate the recognition of all student groups, providing three criteria have been met. First, the group must have complied with all procedural requirements and must agree to abide by regulations governing time, place, and manner of speech. Second, the group must not demonstrate a danger of violence or disruption to the institution's educational purpose. Third, neither the organization nor its members may violate the criminal law during or through a group function (Gibbs 1979, p. 486).

The Public Forum Doctrine on Campus
The public forum doctrine has emerged from the Supreme Court's rulings involving the First Amendment rights of free speech and association and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Broadly defined, a public forum "is a medium enabling people, individually or collectively, to exercise their speech, association, or petition rights for the advancement of public beliefs" (Bauer 1983, p. 136). The basic concept of the public forum doctrine is that freedom of speech guarantees speakers the right to use public places for expression as well as association. In practice, the First Amendment guarantees a right for citizens to use public forums for effectively exercising their rights, particularly in places traditionally used for speeches and association, such as streets and parks. Such rights are subject to reasonable regulations governing time, place, and manner if ample alternate channels of communication are left open (Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators Association, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)].

Issues of primary interest and concern to college administrators are what constitutes a public forum and what are reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner. Courts have been consistent in viewing college campuses as places for thought, a forum for the free exchange of ideas. The student union building, for example, is a public forum, open to all student groups (Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980); aff'd, Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981)).

The Supreme Court clearly described the public forum doctrine in Police Department v. Mosley [408 U.S. 92 (1972)]:

*The First Amendment means that government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds*
acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. There is an “equality of status in the field of ideas,” and government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone (p. 96).

In Grayned v. City of Rockford [408 U.S. 104 (1972)], the Supreme Court addressed reasonable regulations governing time, place, and manner, asserting that “[t]he nature of a place [and] the pattern of its normal activities” dictate what constitutes “reasonable” (p.116).

While locations like streets, sidewalks, and parks traditionally have been held to be public forums because of their historical association with the broadest scope of First Amendment activities, other public facilities have achieved the special status of public forums as a result of their designation by authorities as a place for exchange of views among members of the public (Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators Association 1983). Finally, public facilities that have been created for purposes closely linked to expression although not for unrestricted public interchange of ideas have been recognized as “semipublic forums” (Howarth and Connell 1981, p. 115).

In summary, the consensus of the courts appears to be that public college campuses fall at least within the category of “semipublic” and thus are subject to the principle that only non-content-based, reasonable restrictions of time, place, and manner may be placed on expression therein (Chess v. Widmar 1980; aff’d, Widmar v. Vincent 1981).

Religious Organizations at Public Colleges
The primary issue involving religious organizations at public colleges is whether a state college or university, which makes its facilities available for the activities of recognized student organizations, may close its facilities to a group desiring to use the “public” facilities for religious discus-
The Supreme Court addressed this question in *Widmar v. Vincent* [454 U.S. 263 (1981)].

The *Widmar* litigation began when Cornerstone, a recognized student religious group at the University of Missouri at Kansas City, was denied continued access to university facilities. The university had actively encouraged student organizations, had officially recognized more than 100 such groups, and had regularly provided facilities for recognized groups. Cornerstone regularly applied for university space in which to conduct its meetings and received permission to use the facilities between 1973 and 1977. In 1977, however, the university decided to enforce a 1972 ruling by the Board of Trustees that prohibited the use of university buildings or grounds “for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching” (*Widmar* 1981, p. 272).

The students sued the university, alleging that because religious worship is constitutionally protected speech, UMKC’s regulations restricting access to campus facilities violated their First Amendment rights of free speech and religion. The university countered that the discriminatory language in the challenged regulation was necessary to prevent state support of religion in violation of the establishment clause. The federal district court upheld the university, concluding that its restrictive regulation was indeed appropriate to prevent a breach of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment (*Chess v. Widmar*, 480 F. Supp. 907 (W.D. Mo. 1979); rev’d, 635 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1980)). The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, finding that UMKC’s policy was an unconstitutional attempt to regulate the content of speech without showing a compelling justification.

The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals:

*Having created a forum generally open to student groups, a state university may not practice content-based exclusion of religious speech when that exclusion is not narrowly drawn to achieve a state interest in the separation of church and state* (*Widmar v. Vincent* 1981, p. 264).

Thus, the Court directed college and university administrators to treat religious speech as secular speech in their
recognition of student organizations and their policies regarding the use of institutional facilities.

The Establishment Clause

The Supreme Court since 1947 has interpreted the establishment clause to require that government must not only avoid giving preference to one religion over another but also must refrain from directly affecting any religious activities [*Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)]. It has not, however, described so definitively the scope of the boundaries of the establishment clause, vacillating between a strict interpretation of the clause requiring total separation of church and state and a more liberal definition allowing varying degrees of interplay between the two [*Zorach v. Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)].

In *Widmar*, the university argued that its need to comply with the establishment clause was a compelling reason and it was therefore justified in prohibiting Cornerstone from using the university's facilities. This position provided a different and somewhat unusual twist for the Supreme Court, in that the case had characteristics of the establishment, free exercise, and freedom of speech clauses.

The Court acknowledged that UMKC's interest in complying with the establishment clause could be termed "compelling" but that a policy of equal access would not violate the establishment clause. The Court concluded no justification existed for the university's content-based discrimination because a nondiscriminatory alternative was available (*Widmar v. Vincent* 1981). It apparently reasoned that when the two clauses collide head on, as they did in this case, the establishment clause must bow to the interests protected by the free exercise clause. Thus, the Court's ruling was based on First Amendment guarantees: Colleges and universities may not discriminate against student religious organizations and their access to university space on the basis of content, absent showing a compelling state interest. To do so would be to violate students' rights of free speech and association under the First Amendment.

Gay Student Organizations

Gay student organizations are often the most visible and active groups on college campuses today; perhaps in no other area in recent years have the asserted First Amend-
ment rights of students clashed so with the will of college administrators (Stanley 1983–84, p. 398). One of the most recent rulings involving the recognition of gay student organizations on the public college campus is Gay Student Services v. Texas A&M University [737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984)], in which the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision upholding the state university’s refusal to officially recognize the homosexual student group. The Court of Appeals’s ruling held that the asserted justifications for the university’s refusal to recognize the group were insufficient to justify the infringement of the group’s First Amendment rights (p. 1318).

Administrators at Texas A&M registered an appeal with the Supreme Court, but in April 1985 the Court denied rehearing and dismissed the appeal, stating:

The state-supported university’s refusal to recognize gay student organization violated the First Amendment; the district court’s finding of fact that gay student organization was fraternal or social organization of type generally not recognized by university and that state had interest in preventing certain results that would flow from recognition were clearly erroneous [105 S.Ct. 1860 (1985)].

In Student Coalition for Gay Rights v. Austin Peay State University [477 F. Supp. 1267 (M.D. Tenn. 1979)], administrators at the university presented several reasons to the court for not recognizing a gay student organization: (1) recognition would give credibility to homosexual behavior and tend to expand violations of state law prohibiting homosexual behavior; (2) recognition might lead to increased personal and psychological stress for people troubled about their sexual identity; (3) recognition would not be consistent with the university’s educational goals; and (4) administrators were concerned about how the community outside the university would react if the coalition were recognized (p. 1269).

The district court rejected all four arguments, noting that by its failure to recognize the student group, “the University created a significant abridgment of their First Amendment rights” (p. 1272).
Two years later, the Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma refused to recognize the Gay Activists Alliance (GAA), using as its justifications that: (1) it had a duty to ensure that the purposes of recognized groups reflected prevailing standards in the community; (2) behavior endorsed by GAA violated state law; (3) the university had a duty to protect the health, welfare, morals, and education of students; (4) recognition of the group would constitute endorsement; and (5) members of GAA suffered no infringement of constitutional rights by the university’s not recognizing it [*Gay Activists Alliance v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma*, 638 P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1981)].

The Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that the regents had not met their burden of proof relative to their justifications and that GAA was entitled to recognition as a university organization. When the denial of recognition is based on mere suspicion, unpopularity, and fear of what might occur and is achieved by state action that burdens rights of association, resulting in the lessening of an organization’s ability to effectuate legal purposes, guaranteed freedoms have been violated (p. 1122).

The courts emphasized, however, that recognition by the university did not preclude regulation by the university. Drawing once again from the *Healy* standard, the courts ruled that reasonable regulations as to time, place, and manner of activity that are not unduly burdensome may be imposed equally upon all university student organizations. *Wood v. Davison* [351 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972)] involved the University of Georgia’s denial of school facilities for a conference and dance by a student group called the Committee on Gay Education. The district court found that university officials had violated the students’ First Amendment rights of assembly and association by denying them use of facilities open to all recognized campus organizations. After discussing the merits of the case, the court established three possible grounds upon which denial of use of campus facilities might be based: (1) the group’s refusal to abide by reasonable college regulations; (2) demonstrated danger of violence or disruption at the meeting; and (3) a potential violation of state or federal law by the meeting itself. (For example, a meeting that contemplated criminal activity would be a basis for denial.)
Each of these grounds requires evidence to support an institution's denial of the organization's use. The court made explicit the university's responsibility following such a denial, however, requiring the university: (1) to give notice to the requesting organization within a reasonable time before the date planned for the activity, stating the grounds for denial; (2) to provide the organization an opportunity to eliminate the bases of denial if the irregularity can be cured; and (3) to give the organization an opportunity to respond to the grounds for denial, that is, some reasonable opportunity for the organization to meet the university's contentions. No requirement exists that this procedure consists of a "full-blown" adversary proceeding. The court noted that, should a basis of denial arise after approval, the university need not sit idly by and wait but may take steps to curtail violence, disruption, criminal activity, or conduct proscribed by applicable university rules and regulations (Wood v. Davison 1972, pp. 555-57).

In summary, the Wood court succinctly stated the dilemma of administrators, at least in the public sector, vis-à-vis their treatment of homosexual groups:

University presidents have the unenviable position of trying to maintain a precarious balance between the rights of members of the academic community and the wishes of the taxpayers and alumni who support that community. Nevertheless, it is not the prerogative of college officials to impose their own preconceived notions and ideals on the campus by choosing among proposed organizations, providing access to some and denying a forum to those with which they do not agree (p. 549).

Gay Student Organizations at Private Colleges
In the continuation of a six-year-old gay rights case, a three-judge panel of the District of Columbia's Court of Appeals reversed a trial court's ruling and ordered Georgetown University to grant official recognition to two organizations for homosexual students [Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University, 496 A.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1985)].

Citing the Supreme Court's 1983 mandate in Bob Jones University v. United States [461 U.S. 574 (1983)], the D.C. court ruled that the District's 1977 Human Rights Act
established an "overriding governmental interest" in ending discrimination against homosexuals that is a sufficiently strong public policy to justify some infringement on the Jesuit university's religious freedom. (In the Bob Jones ruling, the university lost its federal tax exemption because a ban on interracial dating was found to violate federal laws aimed at preventing racial discrimination, which was viewed as a significant national public policy.)

The full District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the Georgetown University decision and docketed the case for review [Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University [496 A.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1985)]. Lawyers representing both Georgetown University and the two student groups presented competing arguments to the D.C. Court of Appeals in October 1985 (Chronicle of Higher Education 23 October 1985), but as of publication of this monograph, the Court of Appeals had not handed down its decision. Whatever and whenever the ruling is determined, both sides indicate that the case will eventually be appealed to the Supreme Court.

Summary
Healy established that rights of association identified as part of the First Amendment apply to institutions and policies regulating student organizations. Institutions cannot deny or restrict speech or association simply because they find an organization's views abhorrent. The rationale for this position is partly the result of the courts' view that official recognition is nothing more than acknowledgment of the existence of the group and does not connote approval of the ideas or positions espoused by the group. Benefits accrued by recognition allow the group to participate in the intellectual give and take of an institution whose espoused purpose is to promote academic freedom. Once an institution recognizes an organization, it must award recognition free from bias based on the political, religious, or philosophical views of the organization.

Recognition can be withheld, however, from groups that are disruptive or violent or have committed a criminal offense. The burden of proof is on the institution to show than any of these rationales exist.

Denial of recognition to organizations that advocate the repeal of criminal statutes but do not commit criminal acts
is not a constitutionally acceptable rationale. Cases involving gay organizations are examples; the courts have consistently upheld their right to recognition at public institutions. In private institutions, local statutes prohibiting discrimination based on sexual preference have been used to argue that a public policy would require private institutions to recognize gay organizations. This litigation, following the arguments in the Bob Jones case, is working its way through the court system.

Finally, two cases raised questions concerning institutional policies denying religious organizations access to facilities based on provisions for separation of church and state in state constitutions and the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The courts found that the equal access policy of allowing groups recognition and use of facilities regardless of positions advocated struck a delicate balance among the freedom of association, free exercise, and establishment clauses of the First Amendment.
COLLECTION AND ALLOCATION OF MANDATORY STUDENT ACTIVITY FEES

Assessing mandatory student activity fees to students has become common practice at colleges and universities. Though no legal challenge to the practice has yet reached the Supreme Court, lower court rulings have held that charging such mandatory fees is constitutional. The rulings from litigation involving such fees and those from analogous cases in noneducational areas have answered few important constitutional questions, however. Does the Constitution limit how the funds may be used? Does the use of these funds affect how a college or university may collect the fees? And conversely, can certain methods of collection run contrary to constitutional limits on the use of the funds?

As the frequency and variety of students' attacks on the nature of mandatory fees increase, the difficult task remains for college and university administrators to assimilate what guidance the courts have given and formulate legal and equitable policies concerning the collection and allocation of mandatory student activity fees.

The courts cite several parallel cases involving mandatory dues for trade unions when ruling on mandatory student activity fees. Teachers who were not members of a teachers union, for example, were required to pay a service charge equal to union dues [Abbood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977)], but the Supreme Court approved only that portion of the assessment "used to finance expenditures by the union for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment" (p. 209). The union could not exact fees for political purposes from anyone who objected to its goals. The constitutional basis for this ruling is that a corollary of the First Amendment right to associate is the right not to associate. The fact that the appellants were compelled to make, rather than prohibited from making, contributions for political purposes works no less an infringement of their constitutional rights (p. 210).

The Seventh Circuit Court expanded the Abbood ruling by scrutinizing not only the legal use of mandatory fees but the methods of their collection as well [Perry v. Local Lodge 2569 of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 708 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1983)]. Even though a refund system allowed reimbursement to individual members who objected to certain uses of mandatory fees, the court held that such a union refund system...
was inadequate to protect members' First Amendment rights not to be coerced into financing the union's political objectives.

While the Abood and Perry rulings make clear that First Amendment rights cannot be violated by the imposition of mandatory fees despite the method of their collection, these cases provide little information as to what analysis the courts employ when determining precisely when such a right has been violated. In Lindenbaum v. City of Philadelphia [584 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1984)], where city employees claimed they were denied increases in pensions because they chose not to join a union, the district court explained the analysis used:

Government distinctions between persons similarly situated are constitutionally permissible if they are shown to be reasonably grounded in some legitimate government policy; those distinctions based on a "suspect classification" or substantially impinging upon "fundamental rights" cannot pass constitutional muster unless they satisfy substantially stricter scrutiny than mere rationality (p. 1197).

The differential in the award of fringe benefits based on payment of union dues is a "suspect classification" that must be substantiated by a compelling governmental interest. The equal protection clause is the umbrella that places the differential treatment violating the First Amendment freedom of association clause under scrutiny; this test will be applied in other cases involving mandatory fees.

Allocation and Use of Mandatory Fees
Mandatory student activity fees are distributed to student groups and organizations in several ways. In 60 percent of schools surveyed in one recent study, student government associations have primary authority for appropriation, while in another 30 percent, an institutional official or body has the primary authority (Meaborn, Suddick, and Gibbs 1985). In those institutions where students have primary responsibility, internal established guidelines are often used for assistance, thus ensuring that institutional administrators assume at least an indirect role in the process. Courts have supported administrators' involvement by
recognizing the university’s power to intervene to the point of being able to prohibit or direct the use of certain funds allocated by the student government association [see Maryland Public Interest Research Group v. Elkins, 565 F.2d 864 (4th Cir. 1978); cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1008 (1978)].

The funds generated by mandatory student fees may be distributed on a prorated basis according to various student groups’ requests, line items in the budget, assessment of need, or a formula for distribution. College administrators have broad power to intervene in the allocation of funds to the extent of being able to insist that a student organization include a specific item in its budget. In Associated Students, San Jose State University v. Trustees of California State Universities and Colleges [128 Cal. Rptr. 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)], for example, where the student government association omitted athletic grants-in-aid from its budget, the court ruled that “a state university or college president may reject a student body organization’s budget or financial program when he reasonably concludes that it is not in conformity with the policy of the campus” (p. 601).

Despite the numerous methods used to allocate fees, these methods of appropriation have not themselves played a significant role in court challenges to the assessment of student fees. Litigation has focused almost exclusively on use of the fees, with the methods of their allocation having little or no bearing on the courts’ ultimate rulings.

Religious objections
One category of challenges to student fees has alleged that certain uses of the mandatory fees violate students’ First Amendment rights to freedom of religion. In Erzinger v. Regents of the University of California [187 Cal. Rptr. 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)], for example, the objecting students charged that the university had infringed upon their First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion by exacting from them a fee used to pay for abortion counseling, abortion referral, and abortions. The California appellate court ruled that, to be exempt from paying that portion of the fee so used, the students had to “allege and prove the university coerced their religious beliefs or unreasonably interfered with their practice of religion” (p. 164). The students failed to provide such proof, as their payment of the fee neither prevented them from expressing their own views.
against abortion nor forced them to endorse abortions. In recognizing the regents' wide discretion over internal matters, the court held that it was not important that the primary focus of the program was the students' health and not their education, as "the Regents have the legal authority to assess mandatory student fees and utilize those fees for the benefit of its student population, even when those fees are not used directly to support the cost of specific education programs or services" (p. 164).

While not yet the subject of actual litigation, other expenditures of fees that elicit complaints based on religion include the purchase of alcohol for student social functions and payments to rock groups for campus performances. It is likely that the courts will use the reasoning of Erzinger and exercise minimal scrutiny over such use of fees, prohibiting them only when they coerce certain beliefs or interfere with personal religious choices and practices. Purchasing alcohol, for example, does not prevent students from abstaining from its consumption or expressing their views against its use.

**Political objections**

The other major category of challenges to use of mandatory student fees is politically oriented, with the offended students claiming violations of constitutionally protected freedoms to associate, speak, and express themselves. In this area too the courts have deferred to administrative discretion, but scrutiny of possible violations of constitutional rights is heightened compared to that applied to religious objections. Just as in the cases involving challenges to fees exacted in nonschool settings, the courts tend to engage in a constitutional balancing act, weighing the college's or university's interests in the use of the fees with students' First Amendment rights.

One of the earliest legal rulings to institute the balancing test was Veed v. Schwarkkopf [353 F. Supp. 149 (D. Neb. 1973); aff'd mem., 478 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973); cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1135 (1974)], where mandatory student activity fees were used to fund the student newspaper, student government, and a guest speakers program. The complaining student argued that requiring him to pay a fee to subsidize programs that advanced views he found repugnant effectively forced him to become associated with
those views, in violation of his First Amendment rights.

The simple, clearcut rationale for the court's rejection of this argument was that the university had no direct control over the use of funds and thus was not advancing any particular view. The court also held that the university's educational program extended beyond the classroom, functioning to provide students with "a broad range of ideas in a variety of contexts" (p. 153).

The Veed court's ruling provided the foundation for the balancing test important in later decisions. While the court generally approved the university's right to impose mandatory fees, it made clear that such power is not unlimited. The institution's exacting and use of the monies cannot be arbitrary, cannot impose acceptance or practice of repugnant religious, political, or personal views, or cannot chill students' exercise of a constitutional right (p. 149).

The balancing test was the primary analytical tool used in Good v. Associated Students, University of Washington [542 P.2d 762 (Wash. 1975)], where the Supreme Court of Washington addressed the comparable funding of a student government association:

*If we allow mandatory financial support to be unchecked, the plaintiff's rights may be meaningless. On the other hand, if we allow dissenters to withhold the minimal financial contributions required, we would permit a possible minority view to destroy or cripple a valuable learning adjunct of university life* (p. 768).

The court, depicting the university as an arena where conflicting ideas meet, ultimately approved the use of the mandatory fees when such use is lawful and "not the vehicle for the promotion of one particular viewpoint" (p. 763). A university can exact the fees even from students who oppose certain uses of the funds, regardless of their reasons. Those students cannot be compelled, however, to join an organization that "purports to represent all the students at the university" (p. 768).

While these rulings have generally provided the balancing test used in scrutinizing uses of mandatory fees for violations of constitutional rights, they do not show exactly how use of the fee is analyzed. These cases have merely set forth the test to be used and stated the result. They do
not explain how the test is used nor why a constitutional right is violated in one situation and not in another, thus giving little guidance to college administrators facing immediate or prospective problems.

Methods of Collection

Student activity fees are collected through several different mechanisms. The most basic method is the standard, mandatory fee assessment, where each student must pay the activity fee along with tuition. No exceptions are made: The fees are simply a fact of student life. This form of collection is least protective of an individual's constitutional rights, but it is proper to the extent that it supports a broad forum of ideas, thus not promoting or hindering expression of any particular view. Because college and university officials have more control over the standard assessment, courts might tend to accord greater deference to the university's judgment that the funds support such a forum.

At the other extreme of methods of collection is the optional, check-off system, where the student must act affirmatively to initiate contributions to student groups, usually by checking a box on a form to indicate that he wishes the fee to be assessed. This system offers the greatest degree of protection to the student's constitutional rights, as he or she may choose which student groups to support.

Somewhere between these two extremes are the reverse check-off and refund systems, where the student must act affirmatively not to pay activity fees. Under the refund system, the fee is mandatory and automatically assessed, but the money is returned if—and only if—the student requests a refund. A refundable mandatory fee gives the dissenting student some protection, but it allows the group that the student opposes to use the money for a period of time and requires the individual to ask for the refund. The reverse check-off system is like the refund system in that it requires action not to pay, but it affords greater constitutional protection because the student has the chance to refuse the assessment at the outset, before the fees are ever charged to the student's account. Thus, by checking off the appropriate form, a student who finds a particular group or its policies distasteful may choose not to give that group even temporary use of the collected money. The
reverse check-off system has met with approval in several courts, including the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals [Kentucky Educators Public Affairs Council v. Kentucky Registry of Election Finance, 677 F.2d 1125 (6th Cir. 1982)].

One major question surrounding the various collection systems is whether, once a student raises a complaint about uses of certain fees, the method of collection will make a difference in the amount of scrutiny the courts use. Stanley v. McGrath [719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983)] is useful in trying to predict what the courts will ultimately decide on this question and on the more general issue of the constitutionality of the various collection schemes per se. In Stanley, public complaints over the contents of an issue of the school newspaper motivated university officials to change the method of the paper's funding from a mandatory fee exacted from all students to a refund system. The paper's editors brought suit, claiming the action adversely affected publication and violated their First Amendment rights. The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, holding that the change in the method of funding had a chilling effect upon the newspaper and was thus unconstitutional. The court pointed to the fact that newspapers in other branches of the university did not suffer similar changes in funding, thus making the institution's actions purely punitive.

The Stanley ruling may be equally as important for what it does not say. The circuit court neither affirmed nor denied the district court's statement of the legal principle that it is constitutionally permissible for an institution to establish a fee refund system out of concern for the rights of opposing students not to fund views with which they disagree. Rather, it merely assumes “for present purposes that this is a constitutionally permissible motivation” (p. 283).

The Stanley court did not address the important question of how collection systems interact with use and allocation of fees.

In fact, students may have a First Amendment right not to be forced to buy a newspaper with which they disagree. Certainly a state could not pass a law requiring its residents to buy a particular newspaper, or any newspaper, for that matter (citing Abood). On the other
hand, the University may be within its rights in treating the Daily as a kind of bulletin board containing notices it wants students to see. It cannot make the students read a bulletin board, but it can buy one with compulsory student fees. We express no view on these questions [emphasis added] (p. 283).

In refusing to express a view, the court does just that. It is clear, for instance, that the constitutional balancing test is still being used—and still being used without explanation as to how.

Thus, Stanley establishes that a refund system may not be used as a subterfuge to aid an institution in avoiding its constitutional responsibilities (Morton 1985). This holding, in conjunction with the previous quotation, implies that it is questionable at best that a refund system attached to an otherwise impermissible fee will make it suddenly permissible. Though the court does not express an opinion on this issue, it can be inferred that the collection scheme used really does not matter. If the fee and/or its use is itself judged unconstitutional through the balancing test, changing the method of collection will not make a difference.

The Garda Saga: The Latest View
The most recent and widely publicized legal ruling on the subject of mandatory student fees is the second Third Circuit appeal of Garda v. Rutgers [589 F. Supp. 479 (D. N.J. 1984); rev'd and remanded, 722 F.2d 1060 (3rd Cir. 1985)]. [See also Garda v. Bloustein, 686 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir. 1982).] Several Rutgers students claimed that a mandatory fee the university had imposed on them for the specific purpose of supporting the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), a group whose aims and views the students opposed, was an infringement of their First Amendment rights.

PIRG is an outside lobbying group, independent of the university, that though nonpartisan actively advocates social change by lobbying for such politically hot items as ERA and a freeze on nuclear weapons. At Rutgers, PIRG was funded through a neutral funding mechanism rather than through the traditional mandatory fee because it was not an on-campus organization. Under this funding mechanism, if the university administration approved the organization's "concept plan," the plan would be put to a vote of
the student population at each Rutgers campus. If 25 percent plus one of the student body were to vote to fund the group, a fee would be mandatorily exacted from all students. Students objecting to the collection and use of the fee could then request a refund. PIRG's concept plan received the requisite university and student support in each of three successive years.

In the initial litigation, the district court upheld distribution of the fees to PIRG on the basis of the refund system, which it found to adequately protect students' constitutional rights. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court, ruling that the refund system did not provide adequate protection of students' rights, and remanded the case to the lower court for determination of whether the allocation of fees to PIRG did indeed violate the objecting students' First Amendment rights. Upon remand, the district court, through extensive findings of fact, determined that distribution of mandatory student fees to PIRG was constitutionally permissible, because PIRG's activities at Rutgers had a "very substantial educational component" that enhanced "the educational opportunities available at that university" (Galda 1984; p. 496).

In its second appeal, the most recent installment of the Galda saga, the Third Circuit reversed the district court, finding its decision clearly erroneous and the use of the fees to support PIRG unconstitutional. This ruling appears limited in that it applies only to "outside," off-campus organizations and "neutral funding" mechanisms. Indeed:

... we do not enter the controversy on whether a given campus organization may participate in the general activities fee despite the objections of some who are required to contribute to that fund. ... The question here is limited to ... an independent outside organization ... [emphasis added] (Galda 1985, p. 1066).

Even though the legal holding is limited, the court's analysis is similar to that in earlier cases involving mandatory fees and gives the most telling hints as to how other courts will analyze cases concerning mandatory fees and on-campus groups.

The Third Circuit used a two-tier approach to determine that use of mandatory though refundable fees to fund PIRG...
is unconstitutional. First, the court ruled that the district court incorrectly found PIRG to serve a substantial educational function. The group's activities were only incidentally related to such educational purposes, and the court concluded PIRG's primary function was political, not educational. Further, other groups on campus directly served the same educational functions PIRG was claiming to fulfill indirectly. Thus, the court held that "... the educational component [of PIRG] cannot obscure the underlying substance of the plaintiffs' complaint that they were compelled to finance a political entity whose [primary] function is to attain certain fixed ideological objectives" (Gaida 1985, p. 1069).

Second, the court found that the university did not meet the "heavy burden" of demonstrating a compelling state interest in supporting PIRG, which would override the complaining students' First Amendment rights. Rather, the court maintained, the educational experience cited as justification for funding PIRG could be gained by other means. The recent Garcia decision thus cautions that the primary purpose of a group funded by mandatory fees must be educational and that overriding, compelling state interests must be shown when students' rights are infringed upon to some extent. The ruling likewise indicates that funding to independent, off-campus groups will be treated with much greater scrutiny than funding to on-campus organizations.

The Gaida opinion also sheds some light on the problems surrounding choice of collection systems. It treats as highly suspect Rutgers's "neutral funding" mechanism, because such a system is directed at one group alone:

> Generally, when an activity fund comes into existence, all student groups on campus are free to compete for a fair share. That is not the situation here where the mandated contribution is earmarked for only one organization. ... The objection to funding an outside entity through the "neutral funding" procedure is that the result achieved is not neutral and does not achieve equal access (Gaida 1985, p. 1071).

In addition, the Third Circuit rejected the refund system as providing minimal protection of constitutional rights. The court seemed to support, although through its non-
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