A linguistic model of communication is preeminent in Western culture, and part of its power arises from the Western preoccupation with word, particularly the Christian meditation on the Word, the second person of the Trinity. Augustine's philosophy and theology of the word made him a proponent of a linguistic epistemology: all knowledge is knowledge of the word and words are signs of reality. Anselm shifted the grounds of the discussion of the word-Word metaphor from rhetoric to grammar. He worked from within language and built up his argument from a series of grammatical and logical equivalences, making the issue the definition of the Word. Peter Lombard's treatment of the word-Word metaphor dealt with predication about the Trinity and the application of the "Categories" of Aristotle to the Trinity. Thomas Aquinas changes the notion and scope of the inner word and its metaphorical relation to the divine Word by substituting Aristotelian epistemology for Augustinian. Aquinas also blends poetry and theology in his treatment of the Word, so that what he attempts to explain theologically he evokes poetically. The word-Word metaphor reveals a view of communication common to the Middle Ages: communication always reveals the inner, making it concrete. (SRT)
Thinking, Talking, and Trinitarian Theology: From Augustine to Aquinas on Communication

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ABSTRACT

Any theory of communication rests solidly on an historical foundation and takes an implicit structure from that foundation. The logocentric character of Western rhetoric and communication theory stems in part from medieval theology's discussion of the Trinitarian Word. This paper presents a brief history of the word as a metaphor for the Word, noting how later the Word becomes the model for any word.
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Traditional canons of rhetoric posit certain topoi or places in which to search for ideas necessary to construct an argument. The topoi a particular person, group or culture employs both limit knowing and offer information about that individual, group or culture to an outside observer. And—a careful observer will note—the topoi of an unfamiliar age or group illumine the observer's own beliefs and systems of ordering the world as well.

A linguistic model of communication holds a certain pre-eminence in Western culture. Scholars divide communication studies into verbal and non-verbal realms; action theorists comment on content and relational aspects of communication; McLuhan isolates and then merges medium and message. Such is the power of the linguistic model that people generally conceptualize communication as "containing" something: a meaning, for example. If only the packaging functions well, the message will be persuasively delivered.

Part of the power of the linguistic model arises from the Western pre-occupation with word. And part of the background of that fascination has its source in the Christian meditation on the Word, the second person of the Trinity. The prologue to the Gospel according to John opens, "In the beginning was the Word:
the Word was with God and the Word was God." Thus begins a centuries-long tradition of reflection on communication—reflection primarily focussed on the Word.

This essay explores one part of that reflection: the metaphor of the word and the Word. In one clearly rhetorical example, St. Augustine maintains that a close human analogue to the Trinity is the relation between the inner word (verbum mentis) and human thought. And in a second application of the metaphor he sees the Word's enfleshment as parallel to the vocal expression of the inner word. Augustine takes up the various strands of the word and fuses them into a metaphor that remained powerful for centuries of Christian theology and whose traces still affect Western thought, especially in its understanding of language, reference, and cognition.

Once the metaphor entered Christian theology, it focussed a continuing question about communication and anchored a theory of communication that largely escapes contemporary notice because it falls outside of our usual topoi.1 Medieval communication theory resides not so much in the study of rhetoric as it does in the study of Trinitarian theology. The question of communication appears in the theological speculation on the Trinity because the nature of the Trinity, as understood by the medievals, was to communicate its essence both to itself and through creation and redemption to human beings. God shares God-ness and makes God's love known to humanity. These two functions pre-eminently
defined communication to the medieval mind.  

To illustrate this point this essay looks at the metaphor of the word in the tradition of Augustine, following it through some of its epiphanies until the time of Thomas Aquinas. Not only does it illustrate a theory of communication but it also supplies a case study of a metaphor which changes throughout the centuries. By way of preview, note that "word" is itself polysemic and that this quality is freely exploited by both the rhetorical and the grammatical traditions that marked the development of Western thought.

**Augustine**

Throughout his life Augustine remained true to his original calling--proclamation. Student and teacher of rhetoric, he left a career as a "vendor verborum" at the time of his conversion to Christianity to embark on a related career as a preacher, controversialist and practical theologian. In all his work and in all his thinking, the master metaphor is the word.

Augustine's treatment of the word and his use of the word metaphor cannot be separated from his epistemological theory of truth nor from his psychological theory of the trinitarian processions. And in each of these larger contexts it is possible to discern how the metaphor of the word functions.

It is his philosophy and theology of the word that make him the proponent of a linguistic epistemology. All knowledge is
knowledge of the word. Words are signs of reality, a point that Augustine goes to great lengths to demonstrate in the De Magistro and in the De Doctrina Christiana. But even here, words might not be trustworthy were it not for the efficacy of the divine Word. For Augustine it is the power of God—choosing to be incarnate in human history—that makes possible the union of the tangible world, with its words (and signs), and the world of ideas, a world he ultimately inherits from Plato.

This linguistic epistemology can also be viewed as a fusion of two other, related, traditions. The rhetorical tradition which nourished Augustine's life went far beyond ornamentation of discourse or mere word play. Rhetoric was, rather, the discipline entrusted with the task of inventio—finding persuasive arguments for public disputation. If knowledge could be communicated, rhetoric was the master discipline. But even here, Augustine encountered the difficulty of the sophistic rhetor, the manipulator of appearances. And at this point he once again turns to his Christian inheritance. Borrowing the Logos philosophy which had entered the Christian milieu from the Gospel of John's poetic prologue and embroidered by the thought-to-be-Christian philosophy of Philo of Alexandria, Augustine effected a powerful reclamation of the word. The human word could be effective and productive because it was created in the image of the divine. And that divine Word—the Logos—was not only God's creative word, but also the Word that redeemed human
history and sustained all creation, human and non-human.

This word, then, became for Augustine the source of access to the knowledge of God and of God's creation. Since all is created in the image of God, everything is what it is because it participates in God's ideas. . . . In other words, everything is like God because of the manner in which it imitates the ideas. . . . But if all things are what they are because they resemble something else, then there must be a Resemblance and by participating in it all like things are alike. This primary Resemblance is none other than the Word."4

It is this relation of God to God's self that is the source of all other possible relation, even the relation of creation. Human word can image reality because it participates in this resemblance and human word can escape the Platonic cave because the divine Word is incarnate in human reality.5

How this process works Augustine spells out in the De Magistro. A student learns not from the teacher's words but from the power of God operating within the learner: ". . . for he is not taught through my words but by means of the things themselves which God reveals within the soul."6 God reveals these things through Christ, the inner teacher. Christ, then, holds the place of the verbal and actual reconciliation of God and humanity. "The role which God assigns to speech in the economy of His redemption demands a real and dynamic relationship between language and objective truth."7 Words are meaningful for Augustine because they share in the resemblance of the Word. Because of this unity between word and thing, based in the
Incarnation, we can apprehend the world. "We can learn from things, through words because our apprehension reflects, Augustine thinks, the unity of sign and signified which occurs in veritate in God."8

Besides being an access to world, word for Augustine is also the human access to knowledge of God. Because of the relation of Christ to the soul as inner teacher, every knowledge of God is ultimately seen as speech. "God speaks, as Augustine later observes in the events leading up to his conversion, through the precept and example of individual Christians, through Holy Scripture, and through the magisterium of the bishops of the Church."9 The verbal signification of God can be either literal or figurative: literal when the medium of knowledge is already verbal; figurative when the medium is non-verbal but metaphorized into a verbal one. In any case, though, the power behind the word, that which makes it effective, is Christ within the hearer, acting as the inner teacher.

Before moving on from Augustine's linguistic epistemology to his Trinitarian thought, several things should be noted. First, Augustine moves back and forth between things "inner" and "outer": Christ, the inner teacher versus the magister; God at work in the soul versus the word of God's address in the Scriptures, the magisterium, and so forth. This distinction between inner and outer will return in Augustine's consideration of the human word and its relation to the divine Word not only in
the sense of participation but also in the sense of sharing the same structural grounding. Second, Augustine moves easily back and forth in his conception of word between human and divine. Human word presupposes the divine Word just as the divine Word has no human meaning apart from the human word.

But the human word is more than meets the ear. At least three different uses of "word" or types of word appear in Augustine's thought. He sums them up in this passage from the De Trinitate: "For those are called words in one way which occupy spaces of time by their syllables, whether they are pronounced or only thought; and in another way all that is known is called a word imprinted on the mind, as long as it can be brought forth from the memory and defined, even though we dislike the thing itself; and in another way still, when we like that which is conceived in the mind." There is, first, the outer word, the acoustic word which sounds forth and is issued according to human language. Second, there is the unpronounced--or thought--acoustic word. And finally, there is the inner word, something which knowledge imprints on the mind. (Augustine makes a distinction here between a knowledge of something disliked and of something liked. In the discussion which follows both of these are collapsed into "inner word.") This inner word is not simply a mental image, nor the knowledge of a thing, but an appropriated knowledge which becomes and remains part of the knower. In Augustine's words,
A word, then, which is the point we wish now to discern and intimate, is knowledge together with love. Whenever, then, the mind knows and loves itself, its word is joined to it by love. And since it loves knowledge and knows love, both the word is in love and love is in the word, and both are in him who loves and speaks.\textsuperscript{11}

An authentic and truthfully spoken outer word (whether acoustically sounded or merely interiorly pronounced) is the sign of this inner word and makes the inner word manifest. Such forms the basis of Augustine's psychological theory of the Trinity: the model of human thought sketched above lies behind his understanding of the relation of the Father to the Son and to the Holy Spirit.

In perhaps the most confident use of his master metaphor of the word, Augustine calls to our attention the fact that the human word is the image of the divine Word and as such gives within the human mind an image of the Incarnation and an insight into the Trinity:

Thus, the word which sounds externally is the sign of a word which shines within us, and this inner word better deserves the title of "word." What is uttered with the mouth is merely the sound of a word; it is called a "word" by analogy with the inner word, which has made use of the sound so that it (i.e., the inner word) can be expressed externally. Thus, our inner word is somehow or other translated into a physical sound by employing that particular sound by which the inner word may be exhibited to the human senses. This is exactly how the Word of God was made flesh—by taking upon itself that flesh in which it might be made manifest to the senses of men. Just as our inner word becomes a sound but is not changed into a sound, so the Word of God became flesh, although it would be wrong to say He was changed into flesh. Our inner word becomes a sound, not by destroying itself in order to be changed into flesh, but rather by putting on a physical form,
in the same way as that other Word became flesh.12

Here Augustine has applied the inner and outer distinction to both the human word (moving out of the human inner word) and to the divine Word (moving out of the Trinity). Augustine considers the Trinity both as immanent (relating to itself) and as economic (relating to human history)--as inner and as outer. Note also here that the movement of the word from inner to outer is parallel in the two instances of word and Word. In a sense, then, the metaphor is a two-way street. This interpretation is strengthened when it is situated in the Augustinian tendency to give the word validity only through its resemblance to the Word. He ends up with a double, intertwined metaphor: word has meaning and power only insofar as it is an image of the Word and only in virtue of the Incarnation of that Word. And the Incarnation of the Word can be conceptualized only on the model of the acoustic word as expressive of the inner word. This relationship between word and Word is itself a metaphor of the relationship between the Father and the Son: the Son is the perfect image/ressemblance of the Father; so the acoustic word is the perfect image of the inner human word; and just so is the acoustic-inner word relation the image of the Logos-Father relation.

Augustine knows that he deals with a mystery here and his term for this mystery he borrows from Pauline usage. "In seeing this image as an image, or in seeing our words as images of the Word, we see 'through this glass and in this enigma.'"13 This is
a favorite term for the metaphorizing from human word to divine and from divine to human, appearing throughout book XV of the De Trinitate. However, it also reveals that Augustine moved to this metaphor from his rhetorical training, since enigma was a rhetorical figure with which he would have been familiar from Cicero. "... Cicero made a valuable contribution to the discussion of linguistic symbolism in his analysis of figurative language. In the standard list of metaphors and rhetorical tropes which Cicero includes in the De oratore, we find the term "aenigma." He defines it as a species of metaphor: "Something resembling the real thing is taken, and the words that properly belong to it are then ... applied metaphorically to the other thing. ..." While this is not conclusive proof that Augustine drew his Trinitarian analyses from his rhetorical training, it does indicate his predilection to think in rhetorical terms. It is Augustine the rhetorician who has succeeded in finding the proper figure and argument to point out the mystery of the Trinity. Even though he is careful to acknowledge that God is greater than our words, it is still the human word which is the point of the analogy. The importance of this figure for Augustine can be indicated by one further reference. Of all the images and traces of the Trinity which he sketches throughout the De Trinitate, it is this one to which he returns in the De Doctrina Christiana.15

While the emphasis on the word in Christian philosophy and
theology did not begin with Augustine, he did give it a distinctive cast and a priority for Western Christendom. This Augustinian emphasis fit right in with the educational focus on the word manifest in the trivium which dominated the schools until the renaissance. It also supported the Christian focus on preaching while it found its own strength in the Johannine prologue. The metaphor of the word entered the Western theological tradition and resurfaces throughout the middle ages. The metaphor of the word also gets adapted and changed over the centuries. An attempt to track it reveals how it changes as it emerges in the writings of various theologians and also reveals how it characterizes the enterprise of communication. Communication in these instances, though, refers to God's communication first.

Anselm

Anselm, one of the medieval inheritors of the Augustinian tradition, not only makes explicit use of the word-Word metaphor but also takes on the whole linguistic outlook that defined the possibility of talking about God. "The received tradition of the trivium, moreover, although doubtless a pale imitation of the linguistic arts at Augustine's disposal, served nonetheless to make Anselm's conception of knowledge as ineluctably verbal as Augustine's was."16 However, Anselm shifted the grounds of the
discussion from rhetoric to grammar. No longer was the issue one of finding appropriate ways to speak of the knowledge of God, of locating and creating apt figures for this expression, but it became an issue of the definition of the Word. Anselm works from within language and builds up his argument from a series of grammatical and logical equivalences.

Within this framework, Anselm adapts the relation between human word and divine Word. In chapters IX-X of the Monologium he uses the metaphor to explain the process of creation. Human beings begin their verbal self-expression with mental words and only later speak those words in perceptible signs. In the same way, the creator has locutiones about the universe before creating it externally. All that is exists only through the self-expression of the Supreme Being. As he develops this notion, pointing out its limitations in the ways that the creator differs from the human artisan, Anselm picks up almost exactly the Augustinian triple distinction among kinds of words. By expression of the mind he means the general conception of the objects themselves.

For, from frequent usage, it is recognized that we can express the same object in three ways. For we express objects either by the sensible use of sensible signs, that is, signs which are perceptible to the bodily senses; or by thinking within ourselves insensibly of these signs which, when outwardly used, are sensible; or not by employing these signs, either sensibly or insensibly, but by expressing the things themselves inwardly in our mind, whether by the power of imagining material bodies or of understanding thought, according to the diversity of these objects themselves.
Anselm recognizes that the first two kinds of expression are tied to specific languages. It is, rather, the third kind of expression in which he is interested:

This last, then, should be called the especially proper and primary word, corresponding to the thing. Hence, if no expression of any object whatever so nearly approaches the object as that expression which consists of this sort of word nor can there be in the thought of any other word so like the object, whether destined to be, or already existing, not without reason it may be thought that such an expression of objects existed with [apud] the supreme Substance before their creation, that they might be created.17

Once again, in order to understand the action of the creator requires a prior understanding of the action of human creativity and the action of human expressiveness in language. Anselm presumes an acceptance of the Augustinian analogy of word.

This same dependence on the metaphor of word underlies Anselm's consideration of the procession of the Word in the Trinity. Later in the Monologium, he ponders whether the word of creation is the expression of the creator and whether it is the word by which the creator expresses himself. It is a question of the role of word in thought, from a purely definitional point of view. The model again is the expression of the human rational mind and its image of itself. "The rational mind, then, when it conceives of itself in thought, has with itself its image born of itself, that is, its thought in its likeness, as if formed from its impression, although it cannot, except in thought alone, separate itself from its image, which image is its word.18
While not as intricately worked out as the word-Word metaphor of Augustine, Anselm's use of the word as model for understanding the divine operations, both intra and extra, shows an interesting shift in the metaphor. What Augustine grounded rhetorically in his search for figures, Anselm takes as common sense. Gone are Augustine's attempts to embed the word-Word relation in a whole series of Trinitarian images throughout creation; gone are the turnings and backtrackings that mark the De Trinitate. There still exists a consciousness of metaphor, since Anselm does indicate the differences between the human artisan and the creator, but the metaphor remains much closer to the grounding of Anselm's thought. In a sense, Anselm leads one to wonder, how could things be otherwise than Anselm describes them? There is a sureness in Anselm that Augustine does not show. Augustine at least knew he was a rhetorician. Anselm takes over these rhetorical qualities and figures and, in the headiness of the newly discovered grammatical method which guides his inquiry, seemingly forgets (or never notices) the rhetorical sources he draws on. His aim is clarity and definition, not proclamation nor expression.\(^{19}\)

Anselm's model of communication presumes the identity of the content of thought and its utterance/expression. The speaking of the word poses no problem, but automatically follows. Not surprisingly this coexists with a rhetorical tradition which focussed on ornamentation rather than invention.\(^{20}\)
Peter Lombard

The Sentences of Peter Lombard never explicitly deal with the Word-word relation, even though Lombard's chief references throughout his sections on the Trinity are to the De Trinitate. Lombard's interests have less to do with conceptualizing the operations of the Trinity (either ad intra or ad extra) than they do with predication about the Trinity and the application of the Categories of Aristotle to the Trinity. Insofar as this dominates his thought, he tends to follow Boethius more than Augustine in constructing his compendium. In the one place in which he does quote Augustine on the Word of God as related to the human word, it is to show the differences between the two. The only presumed analogous functioning of the divine Word and the human word is that both arise from knowledge: the Word from the Father's self-knowledge and the inner word from human knowledge. And the two differ precisely insofar as human knowledge is of a different order and principle from divine knowledge.21

Perhaps the only conclusion appropriate here is that Augustine still defined the field of inquiry for the early scholastics. Even when they did not seek the same goal in their investigation they could not set the Augustinian project aside. The metaphor had marked out the trail too clearly not to be followed at least part way.
Thomas Aquinas

The notion and scope of the inner word and its metaphorical relation to the divine Word undergoes a radical change by the time Thomas finishes with it. It remains a privileged analogy for the Trinity, but its role as centerpiece of the linguistic epistemology of Augustine fades as Aquinas substitutes his Aristotelian epistemology. Several things in particular happen to the metaphor. First, Thomas refines the Augustinian concept of the inner word and explores its epistemological usefulness. Second, he clarifies the role of love in the process of communication, citing the Holy Spirit as his exemplar. And third, Thomas displaces the metaphorical role of the word-Word relation even while acknowledging its place in theology.

While Augustine presumed a linguistic epistemology, Thomas more carefully works out a fuller theory of knowledge in reference to both human and divine knowing. The Thomistic epistemology continually makes reference—usually by contrast—to the divine operations and also makes more explicit the communicative aspect of the word. For Thomas, the inner word is related to the outer word as efficient and final cause and "the inner word is what is meant immediately by the outer." However, there is no point to point correspondence between inner and outer words. Aquinas indicates that inner words do correspond to realities but that outer words are products of
convention and vary with different languages. In addition, inner words can be divided into two classes: definitions and judgments. As such, they are of a higher order than the particular outer words since they refer to knowledge.23

The inner word becomes communicable because it emerges at the end of the process of thought. There is no understanding until there is an inner word, "a product and effect of the act of understanding, . . . an expression of the cognitional content of the act of understanding."24 It is in the inner word and through it that the intellect comes to knowledge of things:

the intellectual conception is not only that which is understood but also that by which the thing is understood. Consequently, that which is understood can be said to be both the thing itself as well as an intellectual conception. Similarly, that which is spoken interiorly can be said to be both the thing expressed by the word and the word itself, as is also true of the exterior word because both the word and the thing the word signifies are expressed when the word is spoken. I assert, therefore, that the Father is spoken, not as a word but as a thing spoken by the Word. The same is true of the Holy Spirit, because the Son manifests the entire Trinity. Consequently, by uttering his own one Word, the Father utters all three Persons.25

In this analysis, the word makes communication possible by providing both the condition for communicating and the content of that communication. But, again, Thomas does all this in the context of explicating the Trinitarian relations.

Thomas realizes that his analysis relies on metaphorical predication to some degree, yet his ontology does allow him to isolate some things in the analysis of the inner word that can be
properly predicated of God. Vocal words, dependent as they are on corporeal reality, can of course be predicated only metaphorically, as signs of divine intellection just as an effect is a sign of its cause. So too the image of the vocal word—as in Anselm's discussion of the mental locutions prior to the creation—is predicated only metaphorically. "But the word of the heart—that which is actually considered by the intellect—is predicated properly of God, because it is entirely free of matter, corporeity, and all defects; and such things are properly predicated of God, for example, knowledge and the known, understanding and the understood."26 The inner word, which is knowledge, and is proper to both the divine and the human intellect, underlies what is communicable. The condition of communication—distinction without destruction—finds its model in intellection and in the generation of the word (and of the Word).

When an intelligible word is conceived and brought forth, there is no movement or succession; hence, it exists as soon as it is conceived, and it has a separate existence as soon as it is brought forth... And if this is the case with our intelligible word, much more does it apply to the Word of God, not only because his conception and birth are in the intelligible order but also because both are in eternity."27

The genesis of the inner word corresponds to the generation of the Word of God and both suggest for Thomas the ideal of communication—the immediate bringing forth of a perfect image of the intellect without the diminishing of the intellect.
Aquinas adds one final touch by repeating Augustine's figure for the Trinity. The word is not simply knowledge.

In the thinking by which our mind knows itself there is a representation of the uncreated Trinity by an analogy in this way: the mind thinking of itself brings forth its own word and love proceeds from these two. Just so, the Father speaking himself generates the Word from all eternity, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both.28

The word is not a word unless it is loved. Therefore, in the Trinitarian model what is communicated ultimately is the self of the communicator, a communication constituted by both knowledge and love of self. Thomas does not restrict communication to the communication of a concept or idea; an essential part of the communication remains the love and finally the person of the communicator. Human communication, following the divine model of self-revelation and self-bestowal in creation and redemption, gives—if it reaches this perfection—a self and a love in its creative word.

This examination of Thomas' recasting of the analysis of the inner word reveals a privileging of philosophical inquiry over rhetorical vision. Many of the starting points are the same: the Augustinian inner word, the types of word,29 the generation of the Word. However, Thomas' analysis is finer, the terms more precise, the shotgun pattern of Augustine narrowed to the accuracy of a small-bore rifle. Another shift whose significance looms larger in Aquinas' later writings is his treatment of the word-Word relation in the light of his analysis of metaphor. He
knows that the argument is predicated analogously and so he continually returns to the question of the validity of analogous predication. There is a philosophical self-consciousness of method in Thomas which is absent in Augustine (although Augustine did achieve a certain rhetorical self-consciousness). Thomas is much more aware of the limitations of the word-Word metaphor and uses it much more selectively. At the same time, though, he prefers the psychological theories of the Trinity to any other.

What is interesting to note in Aquinas is the dropping of various aspects of the Augustinian usage. No longer is there a multi-metaphorical approach; no longer is there an intertwined metaphor (philosophy would rule out any question-begging here; rhetoric would rather enjoy it); no longer is there a kind of punning with the polysemousness of "word." What remains is the centrality of the word and the unity of creation in the Word.

This interesting point becomes a fascinating one when Thomas' poetic shift enters the picture. Not only was Aquinas a theologian and philosopher; he was also a Latin poet and hymnodist. What looseness Thomas removes from his practiced theology he allows in his poetry. In his hymn Adoro Te Devote, Aquinas is preoccupied with the idea of the word and bases the hymn on his theology of the Word.

Credo quicquid dixit dei filius:
Nichil ueritatis uerbo uerius.

Here he draws on the analogy between the intellectual generation of the Son or Word by the Father and the generation of the Son's own human knowledge in his
human intellect, together with its manifestation by His human voice. More than this, the implications of the connection between verum (the true) and Verbum (the Word or Truth of God) are exploited to the full as the similarity of sound between the two words is brought out in the peremptory verse pattern. For the truth of things derives properly and primarily from their being known to God when He knows Himself by His divine Intellect: and in this act of knowing, the Father or First Person generates the Second Person, the Son or Logos, Who is the term of the divine knowledge.30

The very polysemousness banished from philosophical theology has found a home in Thomas's poetry.

The reasoning that lies behind the overlapping of poetry and theology is, for Thomas, distinctively Christian and touches Augustine's concept of the Word which legitimates all words. The distinctively Christian element of Christianity (the Word was made flesh) "creates a tension in linguistic expression and that precisely this tension establishes a point of similarity with poetry."31 Metaphor, at home in poetry, also finds a dwelling place in theology—at least since Augustine. But this creates a problem for Thomas since his theology was not rhetoric nor was it mere speculation—it was, rather, the "queen of the sciences"—as scientific in its method as logic or mathematics. The looseness of metaphor finds a place in this science, though, because its subject-matter demands it. If poetry deals with things below human knowledge, theology deals with things beyond human knowledge—and metaphor grounds both ways of talking.32 What Aquinas attempts to explain theologically he evokes poetically. The word-Word relation still holds—as a model in theology and as
a conceit in hymnody. But Thomas has crossed a crucial boundary nonetheless. In his separation of the two methods of scientific theology and poetry, Thomas presumes a very different conception of language from Augustine's. Language has become an object for reflection. The Word no longer legitimizes the word; correct usage and careful definition do. The Word stands as an image of the Trinity and as a tool with which to approach the Trinity. The poetic use of the metaphor indicates an awareness of method on Thomas' part and further indicates a growing opacity of language.

Conclusion

The shifting metaphorical relation between the Word and word extending from Augustine to Aquinas serves on the surface as a point of privileged access to understanding the Trinity. The intimate relationship between God and world stands behind the image and ultimately guarantees its operative power. Within this constant though, there emerges a gradual falling away from the rhetorical source of the metaphor and an increasing precision of language such that the "well-it's-kind-of-like-this" quality of metaphorical predication was pushed to the background.

Beyond the Trinitarian use, however, the metaphor and its various appearances reveal a view of communication common the middle ages: communication always reveals the inner, making it concrete. Communication is the giving of a loved self to
another; that is, communication cannot separate intellect and affect but fuses both. Communication creates by bringing forth. Such a medieval world view lies behind communication even when the system begins to break down as philosophy looks at language rather than looking through language.

But the story does not end here. The word-Word relation continually re-enters Christian theology in various ways and often transforms that theology. Its next major appearance comes in the preaching and writing of the Augustinian monk, Martin Luther who emphasized the Word of God, the Word of the Scriptures, and the word proclaimed in the assembly and who triggered a rhetorical revival and a rhetorical departure from philosophical theology.

2. See, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei, Q. 2, a. 1.


6. Clark, p. 52.


11. De Trinitate, IX, x, 15, p. 236.


16. Colish, p. 84.


19. Colish, pp. 84-85.


29. See, for example, *Summa Theologica*, I, Q 34, a. 1.


32. Thomas Aquinas, *In Sententias Petri Lombardi Commentaria*, prolog., Q. 1, a. 5 ad 3.