Using Kenneth Burke’s conceptualization of the "representative anecdote," this paper explicates Burke’s own theoretical frame. By examining Burke’s system through the two anecdotes of "drama" and "nuclear war," the paper demonstrates that Burke weaves together two distinct theoretical threads, one a theory of Being, or ontology, and the other a theory of knowledge, or epistemology. First, the nature and function of the "representative anecdote" as a theoretical construct and as a critical procedure is described, and the paper distinguishes between Burkean constitutive and admonitory types of representative anecdote. Second, the paper reasserts Burke’s argument for "drama" as a constitutive representative anecdote for human nature, and hence human ontology. Finally, the paper argues for "nuclear war" as an admonitory representative anecdote of human epistemology, and demonstrates the conceptual interplay between "drama" and "nuclear war" so construed. Forty-four endnotes conclude the document.

(SRT)
"Drama" and "Nuclear War"
as
Representative Anecdotes of
Burke's Theories of Ontology and Epistemology

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As the title of this essay indicates, my concern is one of using Kenneth Burke's conceptualization of the "representative anecdote" to explicate Burke's own theoretical frame. To suggest that "drama" is a representative anecdote of dramatism is certainly not a very controversial—or original—statement; indeed, scholars ranging from Charlie Conrad in our discipline to the venerable K.B. himself have noted as much. To suggest that "nuclear war" is also a representative anecdote of Burke's theoretical frame may seem more brash, especially given that in A Grammar of Motives Burke considers "war" as an anecdote which might be representative of human relations, but eventually discards it as too depressing. In reviving and perfecting the anecdote of "war" my purpose is not to depress us but rather to make a point about what I see as an important, and often overlooked, distinction which has emerged in the corpus of Burke's theorizing, specifically the distinctive—and often theoretically distinct—slants of epistemology and ontology.

Too often, it seems to me, when we write and speak of Burke, we tend to operate as if there were one unified theoretical perspective offered us by Burke. While that may ultimately be the case, I don't think that we have examined adequately the complexities of the case. Typically, when we read of Burke—at least in our discipline—we read of the theory of "dramatism," embracing as it does such familiar concepts as the pentad, cluster analysis, and the
representative anecdote. Usually, we will note that dialectic and drama are very similar concepts; indeed, we note that Burke often treats of them synonymously. No doubt encouraged by that convenience, we often proceed to synonymize them ourselves, at least in our practical usages of the concepts. Similarly, we tend to muddle together "logology" and "dramatism," even while noting in passing that logology is somewhat more akin to employing a secularized Christian form in the analysis of language structures. We know that from that latter perspective, logology involves analogical reasoning. Similarly, we frequently presume that dramatism relies upon the metaphor of drama--an analogy between the stage and life. While that may cause us to wonder about Burke's oft repeated claim that "drama" is literal, not metaphorical, we are usually able to dismiss that concern fairly comfortably by reminding ourselves that Burke has his quirks and that after all, he is getting up there in years.

While these generalizations suffer the "blems of all generalizations in that they do not acknowledge important individual deviations from these norms (and are thus unfair to a great many scholars--and no doubt to all who are present here today), I nonetheless think that there is some element of accuracy to them. I think that in muddling together much of our thinking about Burke by blurring together notions such as dramatism, logology, and dialectic, we have failed to recognize fully much of the genius of Burke's overall theoretical frame.
By examining Burke's system through the two anecdotes of drama and nuclear war, I hope to demonstrate that Burke weaves together two distinct theoretical threads, one a theory of Being, or ontology, and the other a theory of knowledge or epistemology. As Burke queried in a recent article in *Communication Quarterly*, "Why two terms for one theory?" Because "'dramatism' and 'logology' are analogous respectively to the traditional distinction (in theology and metaphysics) between ontology and epistemology." Regrettably, the final tapestry has no name; indeed, perhaps it can have no name, for maybe there is no final containment of, transcendence of, the slants of Being and Knowledge. The development of my argument proceeds along three lines: first, I shall describe the nature and function of the "representative anecdote" as a theoretical construct and as a critical procedure; second, I will echo Burke's case for "drama" as a representative anecdote for human nature, as representative of human ontology; third, I will advance the case for "nuclear war" as a representative anecdote for human knowledge, as representative of human epistemology.

I

The representative anecdote is, quite simply, a synecdoche: it is a part which stands for the whole, just as the whole may stand for the part. In that sense it is never simply metonymic, or reductionistic, but rather involves the
complexities which obtain in the case of a microcosm which "stands for" the macrocosm. From this perspective, the representative anecdote becomes, in Balthrop's terms, "a single act which dramatizes a situation of human interest and, for Burke, contains substantial elements of other acts occurring within the same or similar situations." The representative anecdote is thus both a theoretical construct, a statement of what a motivational complex is, and a methodological procedure, or a way of discovering the motivational complex. In myriad manifestations, such doubleness is characteristic of the representative anecdote itself. Burke, for instance, declares that the "representative anecdote" is "so dramatic a conception that we might call it the dramatic approach to dramatism: an introduction to dramatism that is deduced from dramatism..." Indeed, such doubleness may be the essential condition for its representativeness.

The representative anecdote is an act—a narrative segment, an event, an embedded image. But in its synecdochal function, it is also a form, and in this sense it is both an act and a structure. Burke says that a representative anecdote is "procedure...to be used as a form in conformity with which" any terminology, or calculus, of motives is constructed. The paradox of substance is immediately evident in Burke's description: the treatment of representative anecdote as a procedure, a method, approaches it in terms of process, of action, yet the treatment of it as a form views the
representative anecdote as something structural or static.10 The representative anecdote is both a way of "seeing," or critically discerning, the motivational complex of a given terminology and, if it is truly representative, something, some form, which is already in the terminology,11 just as a "familial" definition is already "in" the tribal terms.12

The suggestion that a representative anecdote is both form and process raises further complications, given Burke's unique, and dynamic, approach to "form." In Counter-Statement, Burke defines "form" as "the creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite."13 To pursue the implications of that definition in this context, a representative anecdote, as a representative form, should create a desire in the reader/audience for the totality represented and should simultaneously satiate that desire by creating the illusion of plentitude, of the presence of the totality. Such an illusion can only be sustained if the anecdote is indeed representative; that is, if it displays both sufficient scope as to achieve the illusion of plentitude and sufficient reduction as to achieve the focus and condensation necessary for the excitation of the appetite.14 This view of the representative anecdote as a "form" which duplicitly summarizes a plentitude by condensing it but nevertheless creates and satisfies a desire for the plentitude reveals the "substantiality" which a representative anecdote attains through its transcendence of, its "containing" of, the paradox.
of substance: a representative anecdote appears as simultaneously both the microcosm and the ground for that microcosm, the macrocosm. Through the transcendence of dialectical oppositions (as in the actus/status dichotomy), the representative anecdote attains a degree of "substantiality." That is, by its attainment of scope sufficient to "contain" the paradox of substance, the representative anecdote attains a measure of "substantiality" "in itself." The representative anecdote functions as a way of reducing complex terminological clusters without plummeting pell-mell into the antinomies of definition, into the always already present paradoxes of substance. By "containing" the paradox of substance, and hence the "grounds" for alchemic transformations, the representative anecdote retains a measure of substantiality, or at least an aura of substantiality. This perspective on substance provides the key to understanding Burke's elaborations on the representative anecdote.

In A Grammar of Motives, Burke discusses what are often taken as two "types" of anecdotes either in addition to the "representative anecdote" or as varieties of it. These anecdotes are the constitutive and the admonitory—hortatory. My argument is that the constitutive anecdote and the admonitory—hortatory anecdote are, individually, representative anecdotes, and collectively they constitute the range of representative anecdotes. That is, if a so-called representative anecdote is neither constitutive nor
admonitory-hortatory, what is it? There are no alternatives remaining. I believe that while the constitutive and the admonitory-hortatory are representative anecdotes, they differ in that they represent different kinds of phenomena. A constitutive anecdote represents what a motivational complex is, and in this slant it is ontological: it summarizes the substantial nature of the motives and, by necessary implication, the Being constituted in those motives. This is the slant of Dramatism, and it is why in A Grammar Burke shows decided preference for constitutive anecdotes (this is for instance a major reason why he rejects "war" as an anecdote). The admonitory-hortatory anecdote, however, approaches the question of substance by showing not what we are but rather what we are in danger of becoming. The admonitory warns us against the potentiality; the hortatory urges us toward it. Burke notes that this is at best an indirect way of discussing what we are. In A Rhetoric, however, he modifies the argument somewhat in noting that depiction of the end may be but a dramatistic way of stating what we are. In other words, the end reveals what we are becoming, or, specifically, what we are making ourselves. How do we go about making ourselves? For Burke, the answer seems to be that we "constitute" ourselves through our various identifications, through our various inhabitations of linguistic, and therefore dialectical, structures. The admonitory-hortatory anecdote, then, concerns a summation of what we would be were we to identify ourselves along certain lines, according to certain
distinctions and oppositions. Or, more directly, in focusing on questions of teleology in the realm of understanding, of linguistic creations and recreations of the world, the admonitory-hortatory anecdote concerns itself with the slant of human knowledge, with questions of epistemology. When the admonitory-hortatory anecdote is actualized—that is, when we identify ourselves along the ultimate, perfected lines of our linguistic distinctions—then it too becomes substantial: Or, for instance, when the admonitory becomes no longer a warning about the implications of our particular ways of knowing but rather an enactment of our knowledge, then the admonitory becomes constitutive. We re-identify ourselves, and at this point "total war" may indeed become the essence of human relations.

II

The selection of "drama" as a representative anecdote of human Being, of human ontology, represents Burke's claim that we are literally "bodies that learn language." We are the symbol-using animal, suggesting that we inhabit, enact, dramatize the problematics of language, the duplicities of dialectic. Dramatism's ontological "loop" grounds itself in the encompassing, self-authenticating structure of this definition. The anecdote of drama represents our inhabitation
of, our identification with, the dialectical structure of language, and to that extent it is a constitutive anecdote of human ontology.

A consideration of the paradox of substance, by which all other certitudes may be seen to dissolve into their own traces, demonstrates Burke's privileging of ontology. In *A Grammar*, Burke selects "drama" as the constitutive, representative anecdote of who we are because it "treats language and thought primarily as modes of action." From this perspective, Burke suggests that dramatism can encompass and contain the paradox of substance, and the encompassing "substance," which transcends the antinomies attendant to the pun in substance, is "dialectical substance." "'Dialectical substance,'" Burke tells us, is "the over-all category of dramatism," and yet it is a category which exists only in its own absence, in its own non-presence: "Whereas there is implicit irony in other notions of substance, with dialectical substance the irony is explicit. For it derives its character from the systematic contemplation of the antinomies attending upon the fact that we necessarily define a thing in terms of something else." To possess dialectical substance is to be at home, literally, in irony: it is to be irony.

In suggesting that humanity is of dialectical substance, Burke seems to be maintaining that when humans "move into," inhabit, or identify with the dialectics of language (and we
must always use some "terministic screen" and thereby dwell within some dialectic), we come to enact the agonistic fissures implicit in dialectic itself, and in enacting the agonistic we transform dialectic into dramatistic. Drama, it seems, is lived dialectic in which human agents consciously act, constrained only by the empirical fact that "action" itself is possible only within the realm of dialectic. Consequently, as long as humans are animals that learn language, "drama" literally is the substance of human existence. Burke continually reminds us that he means by "drama" in this quite literal sense, not in the overtly metaphorical sense of viewing life as drama. For Burke, life is drama. In his 1968 article "Dramatism," Burke writes:

In this sense man is defined literally as an animal characterized by his special aptitude for "symbolic action," which is itself a literal term. And from there on, drama is employed not as a metaphor but as a fixed form that helps us discover what the implications of the terms "act" and "person" really are.

Although such a grounding is explicitly in language, it suggests a movement through language to a positioning on language. The motto which Burke invokes for dramatism captures that: "By and through language, beyond language." The move beyond language, however, is an ontological move only, not an
epistemological one. It privileges the human subject, not truth or knowledge. And the anecdote of "drama" represents such an ontological privileging.\textsuperscript{25}

III

The selection of "nuclear war" as a representative anecdote of human knowledge derives from Burke's view of language as a dialectical structure infused with perfectionism (a kind of entelechial dialecticism). Language is fundamentally dialectical in that we must speak of things in terms of which they are not. Through such doubleness, we are able to draw distinctions between categories; however, the margins of distinctions are transformable via the "dialectical pressure" in language into the agons of conflict. That is, difference is perfected in opposition. And human inhabitation of, or identification with, linguistic distinctions, of course, readily transforms such "dialectical pressure" into human drama, replete as it is with linguistic battles which all too often perfect themselves in physical combat.\textsuperscript{26} As early as \textit{A Grammar}, Burke argues that it is through such inhabitation of the dialectic that humans come to know: "Stated broadly the dialectical (agonistic) approach to knowledge is through the act of assertion, whereby one 'suffers' that kind of knowledge that is the reciprocal of his act."\textsuperscript{27} From this orientation, our processes of knowing culminate in our impulse for combat. Modern warfare perfects itself in nuclear war, and it is quite simply my contention that "nuclear war" therefore functions in
Burke's writings as the "aria," the summational definition, which contains in microscopic form the complexities of human epistemology. In other words, it is a representative anecdote, with a strongly admonitory slant, of human knowledge.

Burke's elaborations on epistemology are framed in terms of his theory of "logology," or in the study of "words about words," so it is in the realm of logology that "nuclear war" should function as a representative anecdote. Burke maintains that logology is epistemological in that it "is rooted in the range and quantity of knowledge that we acquire when our bodies (physiological organisms in the realm of non-symbolic motion) come to profit by their peculiar aptitude for learning the arbitrary, conventional mediums of communication called 'natural' languages..."

Language "duplicates"--or perhaps more accurately "supplements" in the Derridean sense of that term--the realm of nature. Burke writes, "I call logology epistemological because it relates to the initial duplication that came into the world when we could go from sensations to words for sensations." "In that sense," he adds, "sensation and words for sensation, plus their analogical properties, give us the groundings of interpretation we call 'epistemology.'"

As epistemology, logology "puts its primary stress upon duplication, polarity, negation (and countless variations of such)."
In this duplication reside both the paradox of substance, which dissolves linguistic aspirations toward certitude, and the "alchemic center" which both creates new distinctions and allows for transformations between distinctions. Each new distinction is "creative": it adds a new dimension to the world, and it is here that Burke finds the parallel between theological and logological form. Just as God's "creativity" arises from "his verbal fiats in the first chapter of Genesis," so too is language "creative" by virtue of the fact that "any new verbal distinction" adds to the "universe of discourse" something that was "not there until language put it there."

Perhaps not coincidentally, the example which Burke uses to illustrate this creativity in language revolves about the new nomenclature that led to the creation of the Atomic Bomb.33

Importantly, such distinctions are a-temporal, although they may allow for our conception of temporality itself. That is, when human agents use linguistic distinctions, they sequence them; they order them temporally and create the stories that we live by. Burke argues that when we could duplicate the natural realm of sensations with words for sensations, "that's when STORY was born, since words tell about sensations. Whereas Nature can do no wrong (whatever it does is Nature) when STORY comes into the world there enters the true, false, honest, mistaken," etc. etc.34 Linguistic distinctions thus lead to human knowledge in the guise of
stories which moralize the world for us and moralize our role in the world. Our knowledge, then, is a moral knowledge, which in turn implies the ethical dimension of choice even within the realm of knowledge. Or, moral knowledge focuses upon potentiality: it concerns what we are making our world and ourselves into, and it thus may take the guise of either hortatorical urgings for the actualization of the potentiality or admonitory warnings against such actualization.

Within this epistemology of logology, how does nuclear war function as a representative, admonitory anecdote? My argument is that from a logological perspective, a representative anecdote is the entelechial image of the "end-of-the-line," the grand convergence into the transcendent Word. This again reflects the master analogy between logology and Christian theology, between words and The Word. Similarly, Burke discusses a form of convergence into a "god-head" in A Rhetoric of Motives, but the focus there on identification reveals the central concern with Being--with self and identity--not Knowledge. The Word is ordained knowledge, not ordained being, and hence its logological slant becomes clear; similarly eschatological envisionings of the end-of-a-linguistic line provide an implicitly admonitory perfection of the "knowledge" created by the linguistic distinction, not (or at least not directly) a realization of being or identity. It is my contention that the eschatological imagery of nuclear war represents the grand convergence of our ways of knowing.
If distinctions and polarities are a-temporal logologically (in the sense that we view them in terms of "logical priority" rather than temporal priority), when they become inhabited by human agents then they become sequenced as story. Burke notes, "Myth, story, narrative makes it possible to transform this timeless relation between polar terms into a temporal sequence." It is at this point that difference is transformed into opposition and opposition into combat. Burke writes, "As judged from the logological point of view, there is no 'combat' among terms." For instance, in the "Cycle of Terms Implicit in the Idea of Order," there "is a set of mutually interrelated terms which simply imply one another. Though terms can confront each other antithetically as 'reward' and 'punishment,' nothing 'happens' until they are given functions in an irreversible, personalized narrative." 37 Once inhabited as story, however, language contains what Burke has called "the ever-ready dialectical resource whereby national 'differences' may become national 'conflicts.'" 38

War, then, becomes representative of human inhabitation of the dialectic of language. But whereas traditional, pre-nuclear stories of war always contain within the vision of war the hope of conquest, of winning, and always imply a living-on after the war, 39 nuclear war promises an end without legacy, an obliteration of all. Nuclear war is the "perfected" conflict which literally obliterates: it wipes out not only
human agents but also language—all distinctions, all stories, all knowledge. The nuclear legacy is Silence. Thus, the eschatology of nuclear obliteration contains within it both the culmination of knowledge (the perfection of our dialectical modes of knowing) and its ground of no-knowledge. As a synecdoche of human epistemology, the anecdote of nuclear war attains an aura of substantiality, albeit a substantiality grounded in potentiality. And, of course, it is a highly admonitory anecdote, warning us against the actualization of the potentiality.

This eschatological horizon provides the focus in the general anecdote of war which was lacking at the time Burke considered the representative qualities of war in *A Grammar*. In his subsequent 1947 essay "Idiology and Myth," Burke concludes that we need a new vision of peace, one which does not subscribe to the traditional myth of a "peace of pacification, a peace after victory." Burke queries, "Does not the nature of our modern weapons inexorably demand that, if we are going to have peace at all, it must be a peace without pacification, that is, a peace without war, a peace before war?" For Burke, logological analysis may, in a sense, "de-narrativize" dialectic, may convert opposition into difference. "In this realm" he writes, "the pious 'fear of God' would be replaced by a partially impious 'fear of symbol-using' (that is, an ironic fear of the very resourcefulness that is man's greatest boast)." Specifically,
he urges us "to perfect techniques for doubting much that is now accepted as lying beyond the shadow of a doubt." Logology is an epistemology which attempts to embrace such techniques, which grounds itself in the empirical realm of words while dissolving the turn to certitude, to The Word. For the certitudes of Knowledge contain the motivational complex of opposition, conflict, war, and destruction, and the anecdote of nuclear war in turn contains in admonitory form the processes of human knowing and its penultimate culmination in illusions of certitude.

IV

Burke's perspective on human knowledge is one which locates the processes of knowing in language itself; for Burke, as for Derridean brands of deconstruction, the "knowledge" contained within a linguistic category tends to unravel upon close inspection. That is, logological readings of claims to knowledge, informed by the genius of the paradox of substance, reveal that human knowledge is indeed a precarious phenomenon: the "content" of linguistic assertion remains essentially ineffable, and it is only when that essential ineffability fades before entelechially-inspired illusions of substance that we proclaim that we know. But, of course, to affirm X as
Knowledge is to deny Y, and the dialectic of opposition is immediately upon us. Given that, Burke would have us re-impose the paradox of substance through logological analysis. This problematizes all claims to knowledge, but what does it do to the human subject? Do we also unravel our own being? I want to suggest briefly that from Burke's perspective we do not, and we do not because, first, he warns us not to pursue the method into questions of individual identity and, second, the ontological position articulated in dramatism manages to "contain" the very processes of linguistic unraveling and deduce from them a new affirmation of our phylogenetic being as animals that use language.

In his discussion of "Agency and Purpose" in A Grammar, Burke makes clear his admonition about the limits of methodological skepticism. He writes,

Any level of conscious explications becomes in a sense but a new level of implications. And there thus comes a point where, lacking the protections of method, one must go no further. Nor is there any good reason why one should, since the methods of linguistic skepticism have been developed far enough to ground the principles of wonder, resignation, tolerance, and sympathy which are necessary for sound human relations—and what we now most need is to perfect and simplify ways of admonition, so that men
may cease to persecute one another under the
promptings of demonic ambition that arise in turn
from distortions and misconceptions of purpose. With
a few more terms in his vocabulary of motives, for
instance, the rabid advocate of racial intolerance
could become a mild one; and the mild one would not
feel the need to be thus intolerant at all. And so
human thought may be directed towards 'the
purification of war,' not perhaps in the hope that
war can be eliminated for any organism that, like
man, has the motives of combat in his very essence,
but in the sense that war can be refined to the point
where it would be much more peaceful than the
conditions we would now call peace.42

Rather than pursue skepticism itself, and especially inward, we
should use what we now understand about linguistic ineffability
as a springboard from which to admonish our own ambitions, our
own pursuit of categorical perfections. Burke's admonitory
anecdote for human epistemology—"nuclear war"—should be
interpreted from this perspective. In following the admonition
our identities remain secure—both from methodological
unraveling, from the madness of a nihilistic abyss, and from
the very real bombings of certitude run amuck, from the
Knowledge in the Name of which we would obliterate our selves,
our world, and our words.
Even if we pursue the implications of the paradox of substance inward, toward our own sources of being, to the point where, in Burke's terms, we stare into the abyss.\textsuperscript{43} the perspective of dramatism nonetheless offers a sort of collective affirmation, a validation of our ontological Being even in the problematization of our individual identities. In his discussion of mysticism, Burke provocatively suggests in relation to "that abstract, anonymous person who is the wanderer of Shelley's poems,"

Indeed, we might well take the vague journeyings as but the verbal equivalent of a universalized first person pronoun. The kind of super-person thus envisaged beyond language but through language may be generically human rather than individually human insofar as language is a collective product and the capacity of complex symbolic action is distinctive of the human race. Hence, the Self we encounter at the outer limits of language would be a transcendent Self, an individual "collectively redeemed" by being apprehended through a medium itself essentially collective. (the matter is further complicated, however, by the fact that the individual himself is largely a function of this collective medium.)\textsuperscript{44}

Thus, even if we pursue the paradox of substance too far, we find that while our individual identities are at peril, Burke
would find in that an affirmation of our collective ontological status as animals that learn language. From the perspective of dramatism, who we are remains assured even with the most pernicious invocation of the powers of the paradox of substance.

When viewing Burke's system as a whole, then, the slants of epistemology and ontology, while decidedly inter-mingled, nonetheless point in different directions: epistemology, in the guise of logology, confronts the antinomies of definition and dwells within the paradox of substance; ontology, in the guise of dramatism, seeks transcendence of the paradox of substance. Using the Burkean "method" of the representative anecdote in an effort to discern these different motivational strains, we find two representative anecdotes, one admonitory and the other constitutive, one moving toward questions of knowing (nuclear war) and one moving toward questions of Being (drama). The anecdotes imply each other, but there does not appear to be an implied hierarchy between them. Thus, in a sense drama may be a 'sanitized war'--a purified war--but war is by the same token (e)sc(h)atological drama.
ENDNOTES


2Burke says that the selection of war as a "constitutive" anecdote of human relations, as one which summarizes our communal substance, may be "too drastic to be taken unless absolutely necessary" (p. 329). He prefers "constitution" as an anecdote of human relations (pp. 323-324); my argument is that nuclear war is summational of human knowledge. It should be further noted that in A Grammar Burke rejects war as an anecdote because modern war "in general" is "more of a confusion than a form" (p. 329). There is reason to believe, however, that Burke expressed that concern prior to the advent of the culmination of modern warfare in nuclear war; for instance, A Grammar is not published until 1945, and the section on "Representativeness of Total War" was originally written before U.S. entry into World War II, as Burke's usage of the phrase "concentration camp" makes clear (p. 330). I will argue that nuclear war contains the conceptual conciseness—"the form"—which was lacking in modern warfare prior to development of the bomb.

4Kenneth Burke, "Dramatism and Logology," Communication Quarterly, 33, no. 2 (Spring 1985), 89.


7Burke, A Grammar, p. 60.

8Balthrop cites the OED definition of "anecdote": a narrative of a detached incident, or of a single event, told as being in itself interesting or striking." Balthrop, p. 4; OED, Vol. 1, p. 319. Burke himself seems to rely upon the term "anecdote," without providing much clarification as to what is or is not anecdotal in nature; however, he does on occasion make implicit equations between "anecdote" and "form." See A Grammar, pp. 59, 324, 329. Brummet interprets a representative anecdote to be a "story form," or the "abstract dramatic forms and patterns" which "underly" the particulars of a text. See


11Not all critics writing about the representative anecdote support the interpretation that the anecdote must be in the terminology examined. Some have maintained that the critic can employ an anecdote of his/her own making which, from his/her interpretive frame, "summarizes" the motivational complex of the terminology in representative fashion. See Brummett, "Burke's Representative Anecdote as a Method in Media Criticism," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication*, 1 (1984), 162. Such an approach, however, seems to indulge in the antinomies of substance even in the endeavor to determine, as fully as possible, what substantially is in a given motivational complex; that is, in critically discerning what the motivational structure of a work is, the critic "summarizes" it explicitly in terms of something other, in terms of an anecdote which the terminology manifestly is not. This methodological alterity immediately invokes the paradox of
substance, which seems systematically to undermine the search for the substantial or constitutive "core" of a terminology's motivational complex.


14Burke discusses scope and reduction as the twin--and necessarily paradoxical--requirements of representation at a number of points. See A Grammar, pp. 59-123; pp. 507-511.

15Burke suggests, for instance, that "status" can be viewed as "potentiality" and "actus" as "actualization." "That is, in a state there are implicit possibilities, and in action these possibilities are made explicit." My argument is that a view of "representative anecdote" as a "form" which renders as if present, as if "actualized," the potentiality of the entire plentitude transcends the standard opposition between actus and status by simultaneously containing both. See A Grammar, p. 43.

16Conrad, for instance, maintains that Burke "provides a four-part hierarchy of anecdotes, ranging from the representative anecdote to the constitutive to the admonitory-hortitory to the wholly reductionistic metonymic-physicalist." See Conrad, "Phases, Pentads, and Dramatistic Critical Process," p. 98.
17A Grammar, p. 331.


20A Grammar, p. xvi.

21A Grammar, p. 33.


23"dramatism," p. 448.


25Much of this discussion of the "ontological loop" in dramatism is derived from my essay, "Under the Sign of


27 A Grammar, p. 38.

28 Burke, Language as Symbolic Action, p. 3.


30 Burke, "Dramatism and Logology," pp. 91, 92-3.

31 Kenneth Burke, "Theology and Logology," The Kenyon Review, 1 (1979), 175.

32 A Grammar, p. xix.

33 Burke, "Dramatism and Logology," p. 90.

34 Burke, "Dramatism and Logology," p. 90.

36 See Burke's discussions of mysticism in A Rhetoric, especially pp. 324-33. Also see A Grammar, p. 287-311.


42 A Grammar, 305.

43 Burke writes, "And the more puzzle over the reflexive, the more convinced I become that all of us, in pious terror, should be on guard regarding the role of the reflexive in our ideas of identity." Language As Symbolic Action, p. 60.

44 A Grammar, p. 300.