The Evolution of the Relationship between Reflective Inquiry and Social Studies Education: Implications for the Future.

Following a brief discussion of the lack of definition and cohesion in the social studies and the curriculum, the paper argues that the reflective inquiry rationale has had the most significant influence of all the alternative rationales for the field and its curriculum. The paper presents its case in four basic sections. The first section, "Historical Development of the Reflective Inquiry Model," traces the development and refinement of reflective inquiry from the concepts of John Dewey through restatements by a long line of educators. The second section, "Current Conceptions of Reflective Inquiry," examines two perspectives on reflective inquiry; these have been described as the logical-analytical and reflective skepticism models. The third section, "Criticisms of the Logical-Analytical Model of Reflective Inquiry," criticizes the assumptions, nature, and application of the model most dominating current inquiry presentations. The fourth section, "Implications for the Future: Fostering an Alternative Approach to Reflective Inquiry," explores the opportunities, roadblocks, and prospects for reflective inquiry in social studies classrooms. An extensive reference section is included. (TRS)
The Evolution of the Relationship Between Reflective Inquiry and Social Studies Education: Implications for the Future

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The field of social studies is so caught up in ambiguity, inconsistency and contradiction that it represents a complex educational enigma. It has also defied any final definition acceptable to all factions of the field....Scholarly definitions of the social studies have been characterized by conflict rather than consensus. If the social studies is what the scholars in the field say it is, it is a schizophrenic bastard child. (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, p. 1)

How has social studies managed to remain such an undefined and ambiguous part of the elementary and secondary school curriculum? In Defining the Social Studies, Barr, Barth and Shermis identify two basic reasons. First, the field is relatively young in that it has only been recognized as a professional field during the last 60 years. Second, the social studies curriculum has been the major focus of many special interest groups seeking to influence what is taught in the public schools.

Unlike the areas of English, mathematics, and science, where the academic disciplines are reflected in the school curriculum and where there is a rather direct relationship between university scholars and curriculum offerings at the elementary and secondary level, there has never been agreement over who was or should be responsible for the social studies curriculum in the public schools. (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977, p. 15)

This lack of cohesion in the social studies curriculum is evidence by the many and sometimes competing conceptions of what the emphasis in social studies education should be. Several recent analyses of curriculum theorizing in the social studies reveal a great variety of "organizers," themes, or rationales that have been used as the foundation of social studies curricula (Barr, Barth, & Shermis, 1977; Stanley, 1981; Osborne, 1984; Newmann, 1985; and Chilcoat, 1985).
In one of the most comprehensive of these analyses, Osborne (1984) identifies six major rationales developed since 1960. The major influence on curriculum theorizing in the social studies in the last twenty-five years, according to Osborne, has been Jerome Bruner's *The Process of Education*. Although Bruner's focus was primarily on science education, the book had an extraordinary influence on social studies education as well. Using examples from articles, textbooks, and curriculum projects of social studies educators, Osborne notes that four of the rationales developed for social studies since 1960 are interrelated with or the direct result of, Bruner's ideas in *The Process of Education*. These include: (1) the search for concepts as the basis for organizing both curriculum and instruction (Hanna & Se, 1962; Beyer, 1971; Fenton, 1968; Schwartz, 1968; Taba, 1971); (2) the attempt to define the social scientist's method of inquiry and make that the central principle of curriculum development (Massiala & Cox, 1966; Boyd, 1972); (3) the advocacy of discovery and inquiry as the most desirable forms of pedagogy (Fenton, 1969); and (4) the analysis of public issues as the central focus of the social studies (Oliver & Shaver, 1968).

There are two other major developments in social studies theorizing since 1960 that are not associated with Bruner's work, according to Osborne. The first of these is the values or moral education movement of the late 1960's and 1970's. Values education came in three different forms: "values analysis" (Ewmann, 1970), "values clarification" (Raths, Harmin, & Simon,
and "moral reasoning" (Fenton, 1977). The sixth rationale for social studies education identified by Osborne was a renewed interest in citizenship or civic education (Shaver, 1977; Osborne, 1982; Conrad & Hedin, 1977).

A second view of social studies curriculum theorizing is presented by Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977), who have attempted to define the social studies by presenting a picture of a field in which it is agreed that the primary goal is citizenship education. As part of a historical overview of what has occurred in the name of social studies education they identify three traditions. These three traditions are: (1) social studies as citizenship transmission, (2) social studies taught as social science, and (3) social studies taught as reflective inquiry. Though these traditions vary in curriculum content and pedagogical methods, Barr, Barth, and Shermis situate each of these traditions within the following definition: "The social studies is an integration of experience and knowledge concerning man relations for the purpose of citizenship education" (p.69).

In the process of outlining a plan for the reconstruction of current social education approaches based on Harold Rugg's notion of social reconstruction, Stanley (1981a, 1981b), provides a third perspective on social studies curriculum theory and identifies five rationale categories that have been used to organize and facilitate the analysis of social studies education. Stanley's rationales include: (1) social education based on common values (Oliver & Shaver, 1966); (2) the social science
disciplines and history as a rationale for social education (Wesley & Wronski, 1958; Bruner, 1960; Lowe, 1969; Wiggens, 1972; Morrissett & Stevens, 1971; Krug, 1967; Bestor, 1969); (3) inquiry as a rationale for social education (Beyer, 1971; Goldmark, 1968; Engle, 1970; Brubaker, 1967); (4) social education as inquiry into selected social problems (Hunt & Metcalf, 1968; Massialas & Cox, 1966; Nelson, 1974; Phillips, 1974); and (5) citizen action as a rationale for social studies education (Newmann, 1975).

Newmann (1985) presents a synthesis and critique of what he terms the "radical perspective" and proposes a research agenda to be undertaken if this perspective is to be incorporated into social studies teaching. The radical perspective includes propositions "which promote a central social value or ideal, which describe the nature of social life, and which suggest strategies for improving education."

Newmann describes the "mainstream" perspective in social studies education and four general curriculum rationales that have critiqued the mainstream in the last twenty years. Drawing on several studies of the state of social studies and schooling in general, (Shaver, et al., 1978; Morrissett, 1982; Goodlad, 1983; Boyer, 1983; Sizer, 1984), Newmann characterizes the "mainstream" or modal pattern of social studies teaching and curriculum as including:

- the teaching of isolated facts focused on life in the United States and its history, a passive acceptance of dominant social institutions and roles and the acquisition of social knowledge as something to be received as authoritative
rather than to be understood or constructed as problematic. (1985, p. 1-2)

Newmann identifies four general curriculum rationales that critique the mainstream. Each rationale has articulated a theoretical framework, has developed curriculum programs for the schools, and has been tried-out in the classroom. These rationales include: social science inquiry (Morrissett & Stevens, 1971); critical thinking on public controversy (Oliver & Shaver, 1974); moral development (Kohlberg, 1981); and social action (Newmann, 1975).

Newmann continues by identifying exceptions to the mainstream pattern in social studies and calling attention to the lack of agreement that exists within the field. He also points to the inclusion of topic-related studies in the social studies—such as global education, law-related education, economics, ethnic studies, and peace studies.

One of the common features in each of the above analyses of curriculum rationales for social studies education is the inclusion of reflective thinking, inquiry, or critical thinking as a significant movement or rationale for teaching the social studies. Newmann (1985) points out that although the impact of alternative rationales on the mainstream curriculum has been negligible, the reflective inquiry rationale has had the most significant influence.
Historical Development of the Reflective Inquiry Model

John Dewey proposed a theory of reflective thinking in 1910 with the writing of *How We Think*. Reflective inquiry as a rationale for teaching the social studies was developed by the National Education Association Committee on the Social Studies in 1916 when it called for students to participate in critical thinking instead of recitation, drilling, and memorizing. The Committee called for students to follow a process of (1) identifying facts from their life experiences, (2) gathering other facts through investigation, (3) using their reasoning powers to form conclusions, and (4) submitting their conclusions to criticism (in Barr, Barth, and Shermis, 1977. pp. 63-64).

In 1933, Dewey restated his theory of reflective thinking in a new edition of *How We Think*. In this restatement of the relation of reflective thinking to the educative process, Dewey sought to present his theory with "increased definitiveness and clearness of statement," therefore making it more accessible and useable for the classroom teacher. In the now famous Chapter VII, Dewey presented his analysis of reflective thinking, identifying "the essential functions of reflective activity." Reflective activity, according to Dewey, involves the states of thinking that occur following a "perplexed, troubled, or confused situation at the beginning" (pre-reflective situation) and prior to "a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation at the close" (post-reflective situation). In Dewey's theory, reflective thought occurs within these limits and includes the following
five "phases" or "aspects":

(1) suggestions, in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution; (2) an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity that has been felt (directly experienced) into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought; (3) the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis, to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material; (4) the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition (reasoning, in the sense in which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and (5) testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey, 1933, p. 107)

In a review of research on teaching the social studies Metcalf (1963) acknowledged Dewey (1933) as the source for the general theory of reflective thinking, but points out that Griffin (1942), "stands alone in his attempt to elaborate in practical and theoretical terms what reflective theory means for teaching history and for the subject-matter preparation of high school history teachers" (Metcalf, 1963, p. 934). Griffin's dissertation is significant in that it addresses questions of pedagogical method, selection and organization of content, and the curriculum of teacher education in a complete and precise manner, and draws upon the theory of reflective thinking outlined by Dewey.

Studies by Bayles (1950), Quillen and Hanna (1948), and Knight and Mickelson (1949) attempted to empirically test the main propositions of Griffin's theory. For a variety of reasons, such as inappropriate research designs and "misapplication" of Griffin's theory, these studies provided little new information about the relationship of reflective thinking and social studies education (Metcalf, 1963).
Meanwhile, work was being done during the 1940's and 1950's to extend the theory of reflective thinking that Dewey had initially provided. Boyd Bode (1940) published *How We Learn*. Earl Johnson's (1956) *Theory and Practice in the Social Studies* synthesized the ideas of Dewey and Bode. Maurice Hunt and Lawrence Metcalf in *Teaching High School Social Studies* (1955) provided an important integration of the method of reflective thinking and the teaching of social studies by proposing their "closed areas" approach, which called for the treatment of topics that are most often affected by prejudice, stereotypes, ignorance, and controversy (i.e., ethnicity, values, patriotism).

In the 1960's, the value of reflective inquiry in the social studies was supported by two different schools of curriculum thought. Each used the theory of reflective thinking as its conceptual framework, but advocated different instruction ends.

One school of thought focused on the development of analytical skills. This brand of inquiry "involves the processes whereby the learner participates in social science, and acquires the organizing principles and analytic tools of a discipline as means to further and continuing inquiries within that field" (Crabtree, 1967, p. 79). The major impetus to this school of thought was Bruner's *The Process of Education*. This movement is popularly known as the "structure of the disciplines."

A second school of thought, saw "informed decision-making" as the ultimate aim of social studies education. The importance of inquiry and analytical skills was not denied, but the emphasis
here was on the synthesizing skills of the decision-maker, not
the analytical skills of the social scientist. The process of
valuing was viewed as a major factor in decision-making.

It is the professed character of this school of the social
studies to give practice in submitting those values to
analysis, and in judging the worth of decisions reached
against their tested—and criticized—outcomes in action.
(Crabtree, 1967, p. 80)

Shirley Engle's (1960) article, "Decision Making: The Heart of
Social Studies Instruction" and Hullfish and Smith's (1961)
Reflective Thinking: The Method of Education, were major
influences on this perspective of reflective inquiry, providing
rationales similar to the one produced by the N.E.A. 1916
Committee.

Throughout the 1960's, the results of the emphasis on new
curriculum development in the social studies produced what has
been called a "cafeteria" of curriculum selection. Emphasis on
the role of the social science disciplines and a values approach
to social studies were the two most dominant strains of "the new
social studies." A vast array of curriculum "organizers", that
included law-related education, global studies, ethnic and
women's studies, career preparation, free-enterprise schooling,
etc., created "curricular anarchy" (Gross & Dynneson, 1983).

The continued development and refinement of the reflective
inquiry model for social studies survived the flood of
alternative curriculum proposals, however, several significant
treatments of reflective inquiry were produced during the 1970's.
The influence of these works are reflected, in part, in the
current conceptions of reflective inquiry. Beyer's *Inquiry in the Social Studies Classroom* (1971) and Richard Phillip's *Teaching for Thinking in High School Social Studies* (1974) both identified the paramount concern of social studies to be the creation of intellectually independent individuals, based upon the application of the theory of reflective thinking. Jewett (1971) and Gilliom (1977) have provided examples of how the theory of reflective thinking can be applied in the secondary social studies classroom.

**Current Conceptions of Reflective Inquiry**

As we have seen, over the years Dewey's theory of reflective thought and the pedagogy it inspired was restated again and again by a long line of educators and has in fact taken a revered place among theories of learning and teaching. It is generally agreed that reflective inquiry is an extremely useful and popular teaching strategy. Yet, in spite of widespread endorsement of reflective inquiry, especially by social studies educators, classroom teachers use this teaching strategy rarely, if ever, relying instead upon pedagogical approaches that many times stifle inquiry and critical thinking (Shaver, Davis & Helburn, 1979; Ross, 1984).

As currently conceived, reflective inquiry is not unlike what is now called "critical thinking." Cornbleth (1985) identifies two perspectives on critical thinking evident in the current literature.
First, the logical-analytical perspective presents critical thinking as a list of steps or skills to be mastered individually. The focus here is on precisely identifying the "parts" of the thinking process and providing the student with a series of steps to follow. The ultimate goal of this approach is improvement of student thinking through the development of a complete taxonomy of thinking skills. An example of the logical-analytical approach to reflective inquiry in social studies can be found in the work by Beyer (1979, 1984a; 1984b). Beyer's version of reflective inquiry is presented to students in a very detailed, step-by-step manner and students are encouraged to approach problem-solving tasks using a linear procedure. Beyer identifies the major stumbling-block in the effective use of reflective inquiry pedagogy to be insufficient proceduralization. He also advises that thinking skills of students can be improved through precise definition of the skills to be taught, providing explicit or "step-by-step instructions" on how to use specific thinking skills. The most crucial part of teaching thinking skills, according to Beyer, is the discussion of its operational procedures.

Cornbelth (1985) describes an alternative to the logical-analytical model of critical thinking—an approach to critical thinking that is more closely associated with the theory of reflective thinking as presented by Dewey and Griffin. This alternative has its "ecological niche" in the social theory and philosophy of Dewey (1933), Mills (1959), Bernstein (1976), and
Cherryholmes (1982). Cornbleth's alternative model of critical thinking is closely linked with Dewey's notion of reflective thought as, "an active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it leads" (Dewey, 1933, p.9).

This alternative perspective goes beyond the "skills approach" of the logical-analytical model. As presented by Cornbleth (1985), it involves informed skepticism, the questioning of ideas encountered, and the cultivation of a "critical spirit" or "reflective skepticism." It is also reflexive—"encompassing reflection on our beliefs and actions, either in self-review or in anticipation of future consequences of alternative actions" (Cornbleth, 1985, p. 8-9).

### Criticisms of the Logical-Analytical Model of Reflective Inquiry

The logical-analytical model dominates current presentations of reflective inquiry. This model of reflective inquiry rarefies the "steps" of reflective thinking identified by Dewey. The fragmentation of the thinking process into steps or procedures, implies that reflective thinking is a linear process, which it rarely if ever seems to be (Cornbleth, 1985). On the contrary, Dewey presents reflective thinking as a recursive process:

- The five phases, terminals, or functions of thought, that we have noted do not follow one another in a set order. On the contrary, each step in genuine thinking does something to perfect the formation of a suggestion and promote the location and definition of the problem. Each improvement in the idea leads to new observations that yield new facts or
data and help the mind judge more accurately the relevancy of facts already at hand. (Dewey, 1933, 115-116)

Not only does the proceduralization of reflective thinking contradict the conception of Dewey, a logical-analytical approach to thinking is narrowly reductionistic and fails to call attention to the logic of dialectical issues (Paul, 1984; Cornbleth, 1985; Sadler & Whimbey, 1985; Sternberg, 1985; Ross & Hannay, in press).

The logical-analytical approach to thinking, as represented by the work of Beyer and others, is helpful as a diagnostic tool (Sadler & Whimbey, 1985), but it is an inappropriate method of fostering truly reflective or critical thinking by students. Sadler and Whimbey (1985) warn that a focus on the development of a taxonomy of thinking skills, as advocated by Beyer (1984a; 1984b) would mislead our understanding of the learning process and interfere with teachers efforts to increase the analytical ability of their students.

The reductionistic assumption of this model of reflective thinking presents a serious problem. If the discrete skills as identified by this model add up to reflective thinking then the corollary is that reflective thinking may be divided and reassembled without damage (Cornbleth, 1985). This reductionistic assumption, "destroys the substance and spirit of critical thought" (Cornbleth, 1984, p. 6). In effect, then, reflective thinking becomes nothing more than a series of isolated cognitive actions that lack purpose, this approach proceduralsizes reflective thought (Ross & Hannay, in press).
The logical-analytical model's lack of recognition of the difference between problems of a technical nature and problems of a dialectical nature creates a tendency to reduce all problems to the procedural or technical level. This is a crucial point, especially for social studies educators because as Paul notes, "To the extent that a problem about humans is rendered technical it is reduced to a relatively narrow system of exclusionary ideas; technical precision and manageability are achieved by excluding a variety of other technical and nontechnical features" (1984, p. 10). Secondly, in the social studies and the humanities there are a variety of alternative systems or competing viewpoints. Within this context, the issues under investigation are, according to Paul, properly understood as dialectical—that is calling for dialogical reasoning not technical reasoning. Dialogical reasoning is described by Paul as,

...thinking critically and reciprocally within opposing points of view. This ability to move up and back between contradictory lines of reasoning, using each to critically cross-examine the other, is not characteristic of the technical mind. Technical knowledge is typically developed by restriction to one frame of reference, to one standpoint. Knowledge arrived at dialectically, in contrast, is like the verdict, with supporting reasoning, of a jury. There is no fail-safe path to it. There are at least two points of view to entertain. It is not, as problem-solving theorists tend to characterize all problems, a movement from an initial state through a series of transformations (or operations) to a final (answering) state. (1984, p. 10)

Dialectic thinking cannot, by its very nature, be reduced to an operational procedure. "When we think dialectically we are guided by principles, not procedures, and the application of the
principle is often subject to discussion or debate (Paul, 1984, p. 11). The most important and significant real life problems are not easily categorized. These problems span many disciplines, contain a multitude of variables, and the moral, intellectual, and affective factors at play are not easily isolated—the solutions to these problems are not to be found in the structure of a discipline or a procedure. As Paul notes, the "neat and abstract procedures of technical reasoning" have no place in the solution of these problems. When confronted with social problems, the most effective reasoning is dialogical.

What is called for is dialogic, point-counter point, argument for and argument against, scrutiny of individual event against the background of this or that global "totalizing" of it into one's life. What is called for is liberating emancipatory reason, the ability to reason across, between, and beyond the neatly marshalled data of any given technical domain. Because it cannot presuppose or restrict itself to any one system or technical language or procedure, it must be dialectical. That is, it must move back and forth between opposing point of view. (Paul, 1984, p. 11)

The technical nature of the logical-analytical approach to reflective inquiry in combination with the epistemological belief that social knowledge is non-problematic, produces passivity and a lack of skepticism on the part of students and teachers. As a result, critical interpretation is absent from social studies classrooms. Social processes and institutions become immune from critical examination and therefore are accepted as "value free" or as "unchangeable". This uncritical stance tends to reinforce and reproduce the status quo.

An example may help to clarify the discussion. In the
course of a ninth grade civics class, the students confront an important community issue—the homeless. The students identify this issue as a problem and begin to inquire into how the problem might be solved. Using the logical-analytical approach to inquiry, chances are high that any course of action decided upon by the students will involve using existing governmental or community organizations to solve the problem. This in and of itself is not inappropriate. The point here is that students have confronted an important crucial social problem, without examining the crux of the problem—how these people came to be homeless. The students are looking for answers to a problem by relying on the system and institutions that created the problem in the first place. In this situation, problem-solving occurs without the risk of upsetting the status quo. Social problems are investigated without critique of the social context.

The application of the logical-analytical model of reflective inquiry in the classroom presents students with an artificial conception of the reflective thinking process and does not prepare students to face real world problems. This viewpoint is shared by Sternberg (1985):

[There is a] lack of correspondence between what is required for critical thinking in adulthood and what is being taught in school programs intended to develop critical thinking. The problems of thinking in the real world do not correspond well with the problems that are in many respects unlike those that they will face as adults. (p. 184)
Sternberg (1985) continues by outlining the differences between current programs of critical thinking and real world thinking:

1. In the everyday world, the first and sometimes most difficult step in problem solving is the recognition that a problem exists.

2. In everyday problem solving, it is often harder to figure out just what the problem is than to figure out how to solve it.

3. Everyday problems tend to be illstructured.

4. In everyday problem solving, it is not usually clear just what information will be needed to solve a given problem, nor is it always clear where the requisite information can be found.

5. The solutions to everyday problems depend on an interact with the contexts in which the problems are presented.

6. Everyday problems generally have no one right solution, and even the criteria for what constitutes a best solution are often not clear.

7. The solutions of everyday problems depend at least as much on informal knowledge as on formal knowledge.

8. Solutions to important problems have consequences that matter.

9. Everyday problem solving often occurs in groups.

10. Everyday problems can be complicated, messy, and stubbornly persistent.

An improved correspondence between the true nature of reflective thinking and the approach to reflective inquiry in the classroom should be our concern as we look to the future of social studies education. In the next section, implications of the alternative model of reflective inquiry will be explored.
Implications for the Future: Fostering an Alternative Approach to Reflective Inquiry

The major assumption of the alternative model of reflective inquiry is that proceduralization is incompatible with reflective thinking. Therefore, it cannot taught as a system of steps to be followed. Teachers can, however, provide opportunities and support for reflective inquiry.

Cornblet (1985) has suggested an opportunity-support-instruction framework for teaching reflective thinking. In this framework students are given opportunities for active involvement in tasks. Multiple resources providing varied viewpoints and interpersonal support are given to students, and the teacher gives direction to students' tasks and provides evaluative, rather than informative, feedback.

Many social studies educators have recently begun to explore the role of critical theory or the "radical perspective" on education (Newmann, 1985; Kickbush, 1985; Gordon, 1985; Ross & Hannay, 1985a & 1985b). Apple (1979, 1982), Giroux (1983, 1985), Cherryholmes (1980, 1985) and others, have provided a conceptual framework for the application of this perspective to education in North America. This perspective has its roots in Marxian thought and has been influenced by such authors as Habermas, Gramsci, Friere, Bernstein, Young, and Bordieu (Newmann, 1985). The radical perspective, as described by Newmann (1985), includes three propositions: (1) promotion of a central social value or ideal (emancipation of all people subject to domination), (2) description
of the nature of social life (existence of dominant interests and the ability of people to resist these interests), and (3) creation of strategies for improving education (social knowledge, practical skills and critical discourse).

A truly reflective inquiry model needs to be more firmly grounded in the critical theory of the radical perspective. Reflective inquiry must become critical by incorporating room for the application of principles, not procedures, in the investigation of social issues. Moreover, this critical reflection must be portrayed as a state of mind, rather than a set of steps to follow, and practiced within classrooms at all levels. Knowledge must be removed from the rarefied position it holds within textbooks and classroom notes. Knowledge should be represented as value-laden and negotiable. The aim of such critical pedagogy is to counter the pervasive passivity and unreflective thinking that now exist in social studies classrooms.

It is important to remember that education involves more than skill development. There is an important distinction to be made between "critical thinking skills" on one hand and "critical thinking" on the other. Thinking skills are isolated intellectual functions such as distinguishing between verifiable facts and value claims, recognizing logical inconsistencies in a line of reasoning, distinguishing between warranted or unwarranted claims, determining the reliability of a claim or source, etc. While these skills are certainly important, mastery of these discrete skills does not necessarily produce a critical thinker. Technical proficiency is to
be highly valued, but not as an end in itself. To train someone to think critically means to train them to expose their thinking to others, to open themselves to criticism from their peers as well as from authority. In scholarly circles this openness is insisted upon, because individual thinking, no matter how "skilled", is subject to distortions of all kinds, "from mere ignorance to 'bad faith'" (Sabini and Silver, 1985).

A serious application of Dewey's concept of reflective inquiry provides another avenue to achieve this goal. Reflective teaching includes teaching carried out by someone not only skilled in the process of inquiry but someone that possesses the attitudes of "openmindedness, responsibility, and wholeheartedness" as defined by Dewey (1933). Good thinking, according to Dewey, results from the union of skilled methods and the appropriate attitudes. Because of their importance in Dewey's theory, a brief review of the attitudes follows. First, openmindedness refers to "an active desire to listen to more sides than one; to give heed to facts from whatever source they come; to give full attention to alternative possibilities; to recognize the possibility of error even in the beliefs that are dearest to us" (Dewey, 1933, p. 30). As Zeichner and Teitelbaum point out, this attitude requires an appraisal of rationales that underlie what is ordinarily taken for granted. Secondly, the attitude of responsibility refers to being intellectually responsible, by considering the consequences of one's actions and being willing to "adopt these consequences when they follow reasonably from any positions already taken" (Dewey, 1933, p.
The final attitude described by Dewey is wholeheartedness. This attitude refers to a genuine enthusiasm, where the attitudes of responsibility and openmindedness are at the center of the person's life.

Dewey defined reflective action as "active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in light of the grounds that support it and the further consequences to which it leads" (p. 9). For Dewey, as noted previously, reflection was more than merely the five phases of thought. The value of reflective thought is that it:

... emancipates us from merely impulsive and merely routine activity. Put in positive terms, thinking enables us to direct our activities with foresight and to plan according to end-in-view, or purposes of which we are aware. It enables us to act in deliberate and intentional fashion to attain future objects or to come into command of what is now distant and lacking (Dewey, 1933, p. 17).

If Dewey's perception of reflective inquiry is removed from the boundaries imposed by the logical-analytical model of reflective inquiry, then the facets described above are not incongruent with the concepts advocated by the radical perspective. What is proposed is the integration of reflective inquiry with the propositions of the radical perspective on education. What would social studies instruction and classroom interaction that is consistent with the notions of Dewey's reflective thinking and critical theory look like? Social studies courses should provide a milieu supportive of reflective inquiry with the goal of making the taken-for-granted problematic. Students would be encouraged and supported to apply Dewey's concepts of openmindedness, responsibility, and
wholeheartedness to their study of education. The focus would be on the creation and perpetuation of a dialogue that is both interactive and dialectical, as both students and teachers present and challenge claims and arguments.

There are many roadblocks and risks involved in the institution of this alternative approach to reflective inquiry in the social studies. Teachers that practice this approach may be criticized by the community for engaging in seemingly subversive activity. "Any teacher who creates student doubt about dominant community beliefs, no matter how obvious his commitment to democratic ideals and reflective process, runs some risk of community displeasure or misunderstanding" (Metcalf, 1963, p. 963). In recent years there has been a ground swell of opposition to permitting students in public schools to reflect upon basic beliefs. For reflective inquiry to be successful the intellectual freedom in our classrooms must be preserved.

A second roadblock to reflective inquiry in the classroom is the fact that even our best prepared teachers have experienced reflective inquiry as students, moreover, their acquisition of content from university courses has seldom been reflective in nature (Metcalf, 1963). Inquiry-oriented teacher education may be the most important vehicle in the movement toward reflective and discourse-based instruction in social studies (Zeichner, 1981; Zeichner & Teitelbaum, 1982; Korthagen, 1985). Ross and Hannay (1985; in press) have discussed the importance of social studies pre-service teacher education in providing opportunities for prospective
teachers to experience the method of reflective thinking and critical discourse in the classroom.

Creating classrooms where reflective inquiry and critical discourse are the rule and not just the exception is not an easily attained goal. However, there is no more worthy educational goal than an informed citizenry that has not only mastered analytical thinking skills but also approaches life with a reflective spirit and disposition.
Notes

1. Osborne notes that these first two developments focused on the concepts and methods of inquiry in the social sciences and were direct attempts to apply Bruner's "structure of the disciplines" notion to the social studies curriculum.

2. Newmann identifies Barr, Barth, and Shermis (1977), Mehlinger and Davis (1981), and Morrisett and Haas (1982) as sources for more thorough descriptions of alternative approaches to social studies teaching and curriculum in the United States.

3. "Reflective inquiry" will be used in this paper to denote what has been variously labeled as: social science inquiry, inquiry, discovery learning, reflective thinking, decision-making, problem-solving and critical thinking. The author is aware that each of these labels connotes slight differences in method and aim, however, each is an outgrowth of the same theoretical conceptualization—Dewey (1933).
References


