Raymond Callahan's superintendent vulnerability thesis suggests that school superintendent behavior is subject to the political winds of local school boards, in turn dominated by the economic values of American businessmen. This thesis inspired a body of research termed "dissatisfaction theory," which describes the sequence of events resulting in school board incumbent defeat and superintendent turnover. The Robertsdale School District ethnographic study of three years in a district's political life portrays a community's increasing discontent with its public schools, board, and superintendent. It describes citizens' frustration at being unrepresented and unheard and focuses on the campaign of a challenger who unseats an incumbent board member, eventually becomes board president, and "eases out" the old superintendent. After illustrating the dissatisfaction theory model, this article evaluates numerous verification studies and offers conclusions and recommendations. The theory's most practical application is alerting beleaguered superintendents to potential causes of dissatisfaction. School officials and their boards need to be aware of socioeconomic changes and accompanying value shifts in their community that impact public education policy. The board must avoid elitism and heed special interest groups to prevent the recurrence of a disruptive, vicious cycle. Included are 1 figure and 33 references. (MLH)
AASA Outstanding Research Award Paper

The Dissatisfaction Theory of American Democracy:
A Guide for Politics in Local School Districts

by

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Statement of the Problem:

In 1962, Raymond Callahan first suggested the superintendent "vulnerability" thesis. Briefly, this thesis suggests that the professional behavior of the school superintendent is subject to the political winds of local school boards dominated by the economic values of American businessmen. It portrays the plight of the talented, well educated professional trying to do the job. Even the best may be fired for finally refusing to take action demanded by a school board for the sake of economic efficiency. To take such actions, says Callahan, is often counter to the best interest of children and the quality of education they receive. That scenario, with modifications, has been repeated all too often in the history of the local school superintendency.

A multitude of research studies initiated 25 years ago by the co-authors of this paper, their students and colleagues, have produced a line of research known as the dissatisfaction theory. This theory describes the sequence of events resulting in school board incumbent defeat and superintendent turnover.

Methods and Procedures:

An ethnographic study of a school district undergoing rapid change was begun in 1960 and reported by Iannaccone and Lutz (1970). It provided the bases for the original model from which the theory has developed. That ethnography was followed by a line of research which included statistical verification studies, additional descriptive studies, longitudinal studies, survey and case studies, and multivariant predictive modeling procedures. The study locations have geographically
spanned the nation from East to West, and have reached back into time; in some cases spanning a period of more than fifty years. A multitude of methods and procedures have been utilized in developing the theory often referred to as "The Lutz and Iannaccone Disatisfaction Theory of Democracy" (Mitchell, 1935).

Research Findings:

The original ethnography of the Robertsdale School District describes three years in the political life of a school district, its board, and its superintendent. It portrays the rising tide of the community's discontent with their public schools, their school board, and the superintendent whose "roots" were imbedded within into the older community. It describes the frustration of those community groups which felt themselves unrepresented by the board and unheard by the administration. It focuses on the campaign of a challenger, who unseats an incumbent school board member, and the three succeeding years during which the new member becomes president of the board and the old superintendent is "eased out" after an incumbency of 25 years.

Based on that description, a model was proposed which has served as the basis of this line of research for 25 years. This model is depicted in Figure 1.

Enter Figure 1 About Here
Figure 1
The Changing Political-Culture Relationships Between
The Community and Its Local School Board/Superintendent
Figure 1 depicts a community and its school board at a point in time (year one) when they are relatively coincident in their values and aspirations. The district is relatively open and interacting with its environment. As new jobs are created, as industry moves in or out, new political, social, and economic climates are generated and the community changes. At various times, (lines a, b, c) the community attempts to communicate its changing aspirations and values to the school board (SB) in the figure.

All governing bodies, certainly school boards, are subject to Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy (1966). The established leadership becomes more and more closed and rejects attempts to influence it. By year ten, the board is closed to new values and ideas (Carlson, 1962). The frustrated, dissatisfied community reaches out and jerks the school board back to reality. Its means for doing this is the ballot box. Its mechanism is incumbent defeat. The result within three years is superintendent turnover.

Some districts may not experience this process for decades and others seem to repeat it more frequently. The cyclical reality is clear as demonstrated in subsequent research (Criswell and Mitchell, 1980).

**Verification Studies:**

The model presented in Figure 1 is descriptive of the data generated in the ethnographic study. Although it generated hypotheses, it did not test them. The next logical step was to test some of those more compelling hypotheses. The first three such studies were done in California. That research used discriminant analysis to distinguish meaningful differences between districts which had
experienced incumbent school board member defeat and those which had none, and also between those experiencing involuntary superintendent turnover and those which had not.

Kirkendall (1966) studied the changes in social, economic, and political (input) variables preceding incumbent defeat. These were operationalized as a series of ratios of: average daily attendance/over assessed valuation (ADA/AV) and votes for challengers vs. incumbents in school board elections. Based on analyses of the data, the relationship between the indicators and incumbent defeat was significant at the .0005 level. The variables distinguish between incumbent defeat vs. non-defeat districts.

The defeat of an incumbent school board member is significant, but the target is often the superintendent. Walden (1966) demonstrated that involuntary superintendent turnover follows incumbent defeat at a significance level of .001. That involuntary turnover is followed by an outside superintendent (.001) was supported by a study by Freeborn (1966), further explaining the nature of political instability in districts undergoing incumbent defeat and superintendent turnover. Here the work of Carlson (1962 and 1972), although not directly a part of the dissatisfaction theory, is noteworthy.

But are there constraints on this incumbent defeat/involuntary turnover relationship? How does the general non-partisan nature of school elections affect it? Moen (1971) tested that relationship in Pennsylvania's party (partisan) elections. He confirmed the relationship again at the .001 level. Mitchell and Thorsted (1976) broadened the parameters by showing that when an incumbent is defeated
at the polls or when two or more incumbents refuse to run for re-election, the results are the same: political instability followed by superintendent turnover.

About this same time, Le Doux and Burlingame (1973) suggested that a decline in the input variables in a school district could differently affect the incumbent defeat process than does an increase in those variables. Using data from 66 cases in New Mexico, they failed to find the high levels of significance previously demonstrated by Kirkendall. Further analysis and the changing of some decision rules, however, produced a more significant relationship between the variables. Districts experiencing growth behave differently from districts experiencing decline. They found that growth districts must be treated differently from declining districts in any statistical analysis. Of some importance, Le Doux and Burlingame reported their research prior to the Mitchell and Thorsted study. Therefore, it was Le Doux and Burlingame who first suggested that incumbents who retire are better classified as defeated and Mitchell and Thorsted who demonstrated that the retirement of incumbents eligible for re-election signaled the same degree or more of political instability as does the defeat of an incumbent at the polls.

Following Le Doux and Burlingame's lead, Garberina (1975) sought to confirm the differences in the manner in which the socio-economic political indicators behave in growth (up) districts as contrasted with declining (down) districts. In addition, he attempted, for the first time, to describe the amount of variance in incumbent defeat that could be explained by the input variables. This is particularly significant
because such a procedure must precede any attempt of prediction. Also, the basic model had not been tested on the east coast. Using a sample of districts from Massachusetts, Garberina demonstrated the different behavior of the indicators in up versus down districts and the amount of variance each indicator contributed to incumbent defeat in each type district. An amazing 85% of the variance was accounted for in some cases.

Mitchell (1978) re-examined much of the data upon which the dissatisfaction theory was built and suggested tighter decision rules about certain political indicators and the length of time incumbent defeat is likely to precede superintendent turnover. Of particular note is his discussion of the Thorsted Index and his re-analysis of the Walden/Freeborn data. Mitchell established the probability and critical importance of a second election reaffirming the first incumbent defeat. Both findings stimulated additional research. His conclusion is noteworthy:

This analysis continues to affirm that democratic control of local school district policy formation operates through the influence of citizen dissatisfaction on electoral outcomes and superintendent careers. (Mitchell, 1978:95)

Garberina's addition to the growing body of research provided a basis to infer that statistical models could be developed which would predict incumbent defeat and thus superintendent turnover. More important, such predictions could alert superintendents to take appropriate action to prevent the cataclysmic changes connected with involuntary turnover. Based on that work, Hunt (1980) attempted to predict incumbent defeat in 95 randomly selected school districts in Ohio. Statistical modeling techniques were employed to generate
predictive models for up-districts and down-districts and the Thorsted Index and a more sophisticated measure of incumbent defeat based on the work of Le Doux (1971) and Mitchell and Thorsted (1976) were used. In spite of several modeling attempts, Hunt's predictions were not better than chance might provide. Several explanations of this failure were offered by Lutz and Hunt (1982).

Using the original Hunt data, Lutz and Wang (1985) point out that the socio-economic-political indicators were unstable in the election years prior to any predicted Ohio election. Thus, the indicators, while useful in explaining the incumbent defeat phenomenon, are not useful in predicting it. They suggest a search of stable factors and through the re-analysis of Hunt's data, discovered some procedures of particular significance. They developed a single "dissatisfaction factor" not used by Hunt. This is operationally defined as the number of seats available, divided by the number of incumbents plus the number of challengers running for that seat.

About the same time, Ruth Danis, in a study of 50 years of Santa Barbara municipal and school district elections, found the number of challengers running to be the single strongest antecedent indicator of incumbent defeats (1981). Neither Danis nor Hunt were aware of each other's research. Lutz and Wang (1985) demonstrated that with the addition of that factor, Hunt would have been able to predict at a reasonable level of significance. That discovery provides the basis for research presently underway in Texas which may enable us, for the first time, to statistically predict incumbent defeat. That ability may then head off the political upheaval in local school districts, at least
reduce the level of conflict, often disruptive of the educational process and surely disquieting to the professional careers of superintendents.

Additional Studies Offering Explanation:

Numerous other studies have been conducted in an effort to provide greater explanation and understanding of the dissatisfaction theory. Edgren (1976) investigated a representative sample consisting of 14 Pennsylvania communities (excluding major metropolitan areas). He was interested in seeing if citizen political values pervaded the types of local government (e.g., boards of education/superintendents versus city councils/city managers) and the extent to which citizen participation in government affects their satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) with that government. He found (1) political culture pervades the community and blurs the distinctions between local governments; (2) satisfaction with government is related to the citizen's participation at the citizen's desired level of participation (i.e., some wish more, some less -- satisfaction is the result of congruence between participation expectations and behavior); (3) most citizens are willing to give more power and discretion to the superintendent (vis-a-vis the board) than they are willing to give to the city manager (vis-a-vis the city council); (4) although citizens think school superintendents and school boards "listen to them," they do not perceive that their opinions make much difference in influencing school board policy.

The above statements have obvious impact on the process and nature of dissatisfaction. Perhaps somewhat influenced by the dissatisfaction theory, but not directed by it, Cistone (1970) found striking
relationships between a set of values held by citizens and their preference for city council form of government and the expectations for the school board/superintendent policy making in public education. His findings were also consistent with Edgren's aforementioned finding (#3). A most recent and comprehensive work by Zeigler, Kehoe and Reesman (1985) also finds like similarities between types of local government and their administrators. However, Zeigler, et. al., do not agree with the dissatisfaction theory's proclamation of local school politics as democratic. They also find meaningful differences between city managers and school superintendents as well as similarities.

The responsiveness of the board and superintendent to public demands surely affects the satisfaction of that public. Lutz and Iannaccone (1978:15–24; 101–112) set forth a model of culture-conflict that explains likely responses of the public to the board/superintendent policy making process. Based on Bailey's (1965) dichotomy of elite–arena councils, they posit a "fit" between the council style and the political values of the community. Based on these council types, Gresson (1976) studied an elite board (i.e., one that thought of themselves as separate from, and trustees for the people) and an arena board (i.e., one that acted as delegates of the people and behaved as "community in council"). The ethnographic descriptions of these school boards are consistent with Bailey's descriptions of councils in other political cultures. The elite council reached consensus in private and enacted unanimous decisions in public; the superintendent often "acted for" the board because he knew "what the board wanted." The arena council debated issues in public and decided by majority (often split)
votes. The superintendent administered board policy but refrained from active participation in its formulation.

The two school district communities studied by Gresson were very similar in socio-economic political structure, except for the council behavior of their school boards. Unfortunately, that research did not examine the council behavior of the city governments. Given the descriptions of these two boards, Gresson, relying on Becker's (1960) description of _Normative Reactions to Normlessness_, described the behavior of the arena board holding traditional values of an elite board as "board anomie."

Wittmer (1976) studied 30 selected school boards in Pennsylvania in an effort to determine if the similarity between council type and community cultural type, suggested above, was useful in understanding community dissatisfaction with school politics. In his study, five "anomic boards" were identified. These boards exhibited values that were highly elite, but their council behavior was clearly the arena type. The board members themselves were dissatisfied. Their meetings were conflictual. Many board members either had refused to run for re-election or were planning to retire. The Wittmer study found statistical support for the relationship between (1) community culture/board council behavior and (2) community dissatisfaction.

Emmingham and Rawson (1985) studied an area in Washington state encompassing several school districts and cities. Danis (1985) studied a single community's school district and city government over a 50 year segment of its history. Both studies confirmed the notion of a political culture which blurs the distinction between types of
government and episodically precipitates dissatisfaction and a demand for public policy change.

Boyd and Johnson (1985) studied four selected communities in Pennsylvania and reported general confirmation of the dissatisfaction theory. They particularly highlight the fact that the dissatisfied public has little in common, except their dissatisfaction. They present data that questions the episodic nature of policy changes. Those data seem to call into question the definition of episodic rather than the fact that there are specific points in time which can be identified as change points. On the other hand, the stronger case appears to be that presented by Criswell and Mitchell involving twenty years of elections in each of eighty-nine districts (1980). Together with the 1974 Thorsted findings reported in Mitchell and Thorsted (1976), it suggests both mass society waves and unique local conditions produce critical election eras in local districts. Finally, a new state law such as collective bargaining imposed upon some local districts with local political cultures hostile to the new legislation also trigger the incumbent defeat, superintendent involuntary turnover process (Kerchner and Mitchell, 1981 and Chichura, 1977). All of these, mass society waves, intensified local political conflicts, community values hostile to state legislation, are not difficult to see for practicing school superintendents. This finding is of particular importance.

Conclusions and Recommendations:

The research cited above is perhaps the longest and most active line of research in the politics of education today. It provides an excellent example of the merger of practice and research. Almost
nothing could be more practical for the beleaguered superintendent than to discover the causes of the disease which most often results in involuntary turnover and sometimes professional death at an early age. Even more practical, the dissatisfaction theory identifies the symptoms, tells how to recognize them, and describes a treatment likely to cure the illness.

The disease is called public dissatisfaction. It may be foretold by significant changes in the socio-economic-political indicators of the community which begin as far back as ten years prior to the demise of the superintendent. The more salient symptoms, however, occur late in the illness. As the condition progresses, there are more attempts to influence the superintendent and the school board to alter policy. School people generally label this behavior as an increase in the number of "special interest groups" attempting to get "their own way." This is said to be adverse to the best interest of the public, presumably represented by the traditional policies of the existing board/superintendent operating in elite fashion. Unfortunately, school people tend to pass this symptom off as we might the "24-hour flu;" something rather unpleasant which we can do little about, and therefore is best ignored — "Take an aspirin and go to bed." Instead, the symptoms should be regarded as sharp, "hot" appendix pains hours before it explodes. Improper treatment results in poisons racing through the body endangering the life of the patient.

The next symptoms often are sharp increases in voter turnout in school board elections and, most important, increases in the number of persons competing for the available seats. This symptom is exhibited
very late in the illness and only the most radical surgery is likely to be helpful in saving the patient at that point.

The last symptom is the defeat of an incumbent school board member at the polls or the retirement of all incumbents running. This may be followed by a second defeat at the polls. At this point, "heroic surgery" is the only hope and the odds are clearly against the patient.

Our medical analogy of the death of a superintendent is not ill-conceived (no pun intended). The firing of a superintendent is no joke to the superintendent and usually very painful to the educational process in the school district. The death seems sudden, but those who recognize the symptoms know the illness is usually long and that early detection and proper treatment can often produce a complete recovery. The course of the illness and the treatment of the disease is clearly outlined:

1. Communities change; they grow or decline. Occupational opportunities change; blue collar factories close, high tech builds a new plant. Neighborhoods change; ethnically, racially, socio-economically.

2. These changes usually bring about changes in value orientation, aspirations and expectations that impact the public education programs and policy of the district.

3. School boards tend, over time, to be elite. They are political in nature and politics is the business of allocating someone's values with the authority of the state. As the board is elite and representative of the traditional community that first elected them (often
years earlier), they tend to ignore and underestimate the "special interest groups" and their values.

4. After a period of trying to influence the entrenched policy making body (the board/superintendent), many of these groups and individuals grow more dissatisfied with the schools and their policy makers.

5. There appear to be troughs of political satisfaction and tranquility and waves of political dissatisfaction and conflict that transcend governmental types and regional boundaries, making superintendents and boards more vulnerable. (Presently we seem to be in such a period of dissatisfaction.)

6. Dissatisfied individuals and groups usually have different interests, values, and demands. The single thing that unites them is their dissatisfaction. Soon they discover each other, unite their dissatisfaction, and set out to change public policy at the ballot box.

7. More challengers run for office, supported by the dissatisfied. More votes are cast. Most of these new votes are against incumbents. Voting in school board elections increases.

8. Some incumbents, seeing the handwriting on the wall, refuse to run and others are actually defeated at the polls.

9. Incumbent school board member defeat is followed by a new alignment on the board and the firing (in one way
or another) of the superintendent who had (often created by socialization) the support of the former board align-
ment.

10. The new board and the new superintendent adjust policy and programs.

11. After a confirming election, a new stability is achieved and the process is ready to begin anew.

Of course the treatment should begin with the first signs of the illness. As early as stage 1, a board and the superintendent might begin to carefully ask themselves what socio-economic-political changes in the community might signal needed educational policy changes based on the needs and wants of the community.

At stage 3, the board/superintendent certainly could see the symptoms. Like too many who are ill, they may choose to ignore the symptoms and invent rationalizations for doing nothing about them. Here, of course, is where action certainly should be taken. The board should begin to change its behavior from elite to arena. The special interests and values should be publicly debated and dissatisfied publics should be able to see that they are having some influence on school policy and programs, or at least feel sure that they are being listened to honestly (Iannaccone, 1981). No one needs to win every time, but everyone needs to win sometime!

The period of time between stage 3 and stage 7, when the disease should be in the process of treatment, is a time when, untreated, develops to a critical stage. Like most illnesses, factors otherwise unimportant make the condition worse. Typical of this is a stage 5 "wave" breaking over a community.
In stage 8, the infection has already caused the amputation of at least one limb; at least one board member has been defeated. Now the superintendent can only hope that the loss of one incumbent board member will precipitate the radical, even "heroic" policy surgery required to prevent the illness from becoming terminal.

At the outset of this paper, we pointed out the difference between statistical prediction and research that has led to deeper and stronger explanation and description of these phenomena. The next immediate tasks on the agenda for the basic researchers and the practicing school administrators are complimentary but different. The researchers need precise statistical prediction using the fewest and most powerful indicators. In the long run, these are also needed by the practitioner. However, what the practicing school administrator needs immediately are adequate early warning signs even if these are redundant and too messy for precise statistical prediction. The state of the art in research on incumbent defeat and superintendent involuntary turnover is rather similar to that of cancer research today. There is enough now known to produce a comprehensive set of indicators to provide early warning, mid-term, and late terminal detection. A program of the systematic collection and monitoring of these will not satisfy the researcher's goal of statistical prediction at the 5% or 1% level. But even increased odds of 25% in favor of remission is a lot better than a terminal diagnosis for the practitioner whose career may be at stake. From that person's point of view, an ounce of prevention is well worth a pound of cure. The present body of research is quite adequate to provide that.
REFERENCES


