The main purpose of this paper is to provide a basis for discussing issues associated with the process of "going to scale" with programs of early childhood development. "Going to Scale" programs are described as those that attempt to reach as many potential beneficiaries as possible at a regional, national, or even worldwide level. The first section of the paper summarizes results from three analyses of successful projects and programs in an attempt to identify barriers to scale and to specify conditions, characteristics, strategies and processes accompanying successful programs. The second section examines advantages and drawbacks of three broad approaches to achieving scale, while the third section draws implications for child development programs from the preceding two sections. The final section discusses costs, organizational issues, the role of communications, evaluation, and some options for international organizations as they consider ways to increase the coverage and impact of early childhood development programs. (HOD)
Going To Scale

A paper prepared for the Second Inter-Agency Meeting
on Community-based Child Development
New York, October 29-31, 1984

Robert G. Myers
Consultant to UNICEF 1

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Robert G. Myers
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

1This paper has been commissioned by UNICEF. It is intended to stimulate discussion and does not represent an official position of UNICEF.
INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this paper is to provide a basis for discussing issues associated with the process of "Going to Scale"\textsuperscript{1} with programmes of early childhood development. Section I will summarize results from three analyses of successful projects and programmes in an attempt to identify barriers to scale and to specify conditions, characteristics, strategies and processes accompanying successful programmes. A second section will examine advantages and drawbacks of three broad approaches to achieving scale. The third section will draw implications for child development programmes from the preceding two sections. The final section will discuss costs, organizational issues, the role of communications, evaluation, and some options for international organizations as they consider ways to increase the coverage and impact of early childhood development programmes.

\textsuperscript{1}In this paper "scale" will not be defined precisely. In general, the term describes programmes (rather than smaller projects) that attempt to reach as many potential beneficiaries as possible at a regional, national, or even worldwide level. One convention suggests that reaching 80 per cent of a population constitutes scale. By that standard very few programmes anywhere in the world can be said to have gone to scale. Another is a classification used by the American Public Health Association in its review of 52 USAID-assisted programmes: National programmes; Large-Scale Regional (2-18 million) programmes; Medium-Scale Regional (500,000 - 1 million) programmes; Small-scale regional (100,000 - 500,000) programmes; and Small-Scale (under 100,000) programmes. (APHA, p. 26) Even in cases where geographic coverage approaches 100 per cent, the actual number of participants is likely to remain a small fraction of the total. While keeping the ambitious goal of total coverage in view we will here be more concerned with the process of moving to scale than we will be with achieving a particular level of coverage and use.
National governments and international development organizations are, for humanitarian, political and economic reasons, interested in reaching as many people as possible with the services or self-help programmes they promote or fund.\(^1\) One measure of success for development organizations is whether or not programmes they have assisted can and do grow beyond restricted pilot projects to touch the needy, wherever they may be found.\(^1\)

There are at least two reasons why "Going to Scale" has recently become of increasing interest to international agencies. First, some organizations have placed their institutional prestige on the line by committing themselves to programmes promising nationwide or even worldwide coverage and impact. Primary Health Care for all by the year 2000 is an example. The "Child Survival and Development Revolution," promising dramatic reductions in mortality and morbidity, is another. These commitments, made in part to stir enthusiasm, mobilize demand and spur action, bring with them also a responsibility to mount the sustained operations necessary to accomplish these large goals - or at least to show major progress toward them. If that does not happen, these successful and inspiring communication efforts will be interpreted as hollow public relations ploys.\(^2\)

A second reason for the increasing interest in analysing and understanding what is necessary to mount large-scale programmes is a growing frustration

\(^1\)It is not surprising, therefore, that the topic, "Going to Scale", emerged in May 1983 as one of considerable interest during the inter-agency meeting held to exchange ideas about projects and programmes designed to increase survival and enhance the development of young children in the Third World. (See Bernard van Leer Foundation, Summary Report, 1983, p.6)

\(^2\)"Impressive and widespread as the public interest in a child survival and development revolution has been, it is only a beginning. All we have achieved so far is hardly more than a world-wide clamour of great expectations. If we fail to mount the next phase - the operational phase - immediately, two years from now we will have little or no substance to show for all the hopes we have raised." (Vittachi, p. 3)
within organizations whose small scale research, pilot or demonstration projects have failed to have an impact on policy and programming over the years, often despite their successful outcomes. That frustration is not confined to organizations with small budgets that depend on others to pick up and utilize ideas and methods on a large scale. Rather, governments and larger development organizations have also experienced problems repeatedly, as they have tried unsuccessfully to bring pilot projects "out of the hot-house".

"How many times during the last three decades of intensive development efforts has a demonstration or pilot project provided 'the answers' to a development problem? Everyone is flushed with enthusiasm and optimism. The model that proved so successful on a small scale is expanded with the hopes of benefitting a larger portion of the population. All too often, however, impact decreases or disappears completely." (Pyle, p. 1)

The problems associated with going to scale are common to many fields. This paper, while drawing broadly on experiences in such diverse areas as family planning, literacy and irrigation, will emphasize multi-dimensional, community-based, and participatory programmes directed toward improving the intellectual, social, and emotional development of poor children, ages 0 - 5 in the Third World.

Child development projects and programmes vary widely depending on social and economic conditions, the mix of programme components, the age group, the institutional structure of planning and implementation, and the degree of community involvement sought and the methods used to deliver the service. Approaching scale will obviously be different if a programme focuses on physical development and on immunization in a small country where the population has a relatively high literacy rate, than if it attempts to build a sustained, community-based service including health, nutrition, and psycho-social components in a large country with a relatively low literacy rate.
Compiling reasons why there may not be "Life After Project" (Pyle, 1984) does not require a major research project. With little effort, for instance, a useful list of possible reasons emerged from conversations with a handful of UNICEF, USAID, and World Bank field staff about why projects fail to "go to scale".

- Funds for the larger effort were not available (or were cut off).
- Political commitment was missing.
- The social organization and participation that helped make community-based pilot models work was too threatening when contemplated on a larger scale.
- The demonstration model that was successful in one region did not work in other locations.
- It was difficult to hold people accountable.
- The organizational base was inadequate to support large scale programmes, and expansion occurred too fast for the needed changes to take place.
- The "mystique" associated with an original project did not transfer as the programme grew.
- The charismatic, dedicated leadership that accounted for so much of the small-scale success could not be cloned.
- Squabbling among regional groups took its toll.
- Administrative methods were not in place.
- Bureaucratic territoriality and malapportioned good intentions.
- Information about the pilot projects was not available at the proper time and in the proper form to the people who counted.
- Response by the people to the programme was slow and no attempt was made to mobilize them, to gain real participation and involvement.

The reasons fall into four general categories: resource constraints, lack of political commitment at various levels, weak demand for services, and organizational, implementation, and management problems. Readers will
certainly be able to add to the list based on their own experience.

More difficult than listing potential causes for failure is the task of discovering what accounts for successful attempts to "move to scale". How, for instance, have successful programmes coped with the leadership question and overcome the potential problem arising from natural limits on charismatic leadership? Have successful programmes always started on a small scale and grown large slowly? How have successful large scale programmes coped with diversity? Is it possible to identify commonalities among programmes that have successfully "scaled up"? Under what conditions is "participation" really necessary for the successful spread of a project? How is demand created?

Relatively few projects have been evaluated systematically as they have grown into programmes. And, relatively little energy has been devoted to documenting the process of arriving at solutions to the organizational, administrative, and management problems facing most projects as they increase in size. Fortunately, however, experience is growing and lessons have been extracted from case studies by several authors. Here we will summarize results from reviews and analyses of successful projects and programmes by three authors: David Korten, Samuel Paul and David Pyle.

A. Korten: Lessons from Five Asian Success Stories

David Korten examines five extremely varied Asian programmes1 in his well-known paper on Community Organization and Rural Development (Korten, 1980). Each programme began on a relatively small scale as a community-based project and grew significantly in size.

1 The five cases are: the Indian National Dairy Development Bank, the Sarvodaya Sharamadana Movement, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, Thailand's Community-Based Family Planning Services and the Philippine National Irrigation Administration's Communal Irrigation Programme.
From his analysis, Korten concludes:

1. **There is no blueprint.** Each project was successful because it had worked out a programme model responsive to the beneficiary needs at a particular time and place and each had built a strong organization capable of making the programme work. (p. 495)

2. **"Successful transition from project to programme is associated with a learning process in which villagers and programme personnel shared their knowledge and resources to create a programme which achieved a fit between needs and capacities of the beneficiaries and those of the outsiders who were providing the assistance"** (p. 497) "The learning process approach calls for organizations that: (a) embrace error; (b) plan with the people; and (c) link knowledge building with action." (p. 498)

3. **The roles of researchers, planners, and administrators were combined in a single individual or a closely knit team so that "Even as the organizations grew, the mode of operation stressed integration. Researchers worked hand-in-hand with operating personnel, and top management spent substantial time in the field keeping in contact with operations."** (p. 499)

4. **The organizational capacity developed in the pilot projects was preserved and drawn on as expansion occurred.** "The individuals who had created and sustained the fit were assigned to guide the learning experiences of others until they too gained the knowledge, commitment, and skills to make the programme work. As the programme moved into new communities, new lessons were learned, including lessons on how to maintain the fit between programme and people as the organization expanded. New knowledge and the organizational capacity to put it to work were created simultaneously by one and the same process." (p. 499)

Later in the paper, three stages in the learning process identified by Korten will be sketched.

**B. Paul: The Lessons of Success**

Echoing Korten in several respects is an analysis by Samuel Paul of six successful national development programmes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.¹ Paul's study also emphasizes the importance of organization and

---

¹ The programmes are: The National Dairy Development Programme of India, the Philippine Rice Development Programme, Konys's Smallholder Tea Development Programme, the Indonesian Population Programme, the Public Health Programme of China, and Mexico's Rural Education Programme. (The first two examples overlaps with Korten's work)
management variables as a necessary complement to political commitment and to availability of resources. Despite their diversity of the sectors and countries, the successful programmes studied by Paul had in common:

1. **A marriage of planning with implementation.** Programme managers were included in the formulation of programme strategies. Successful programmes avoided the tendency to import programme strategies or formulate them through internal groups without any reference to those likely to manage them. Therefore, strategy and implementation were not disjointed and were mutually adaptive.

2. **Political commitment** was evident in a degree of flexibility and organizational autonomy given to programme leaders by the government.

3. **Selectivity.** Initial focus on a single goal or service was followed by sequential diversification.

4. **Organizational networking.** Even single services require complex integration of diverse inputs and required skillful coordination of efforts at national, district, and community levels. That was best accomplished by relying on inter-organizational cooperation through networks rather than on hierarchical control.

5. **Deliberate linkages between pilot projects and national programmes.** Pilot projects were used as learning experiences.

6. **Phased programme implementation.** Phasing development programmes in geographic or functional terms is an adaptation to the uncertainty, diversity, and scope of the environment and to the lack of techno-managerial resources. It also serves as a means by which programmes can successfully build on experience.

7. **Mobilizing demand** was an important feature of programming.

8. **Simple information systems** with fast feedback were developed and used.

9. **Flexible selection and training processes** were used.

The role of national governments in successful programmes involved:

a. Specifying broad objectives and providing resources.

b. Bringing programme planning and implementation together by establishing the programme agency, making the key appointments before formulating the programme, and allowing discretion to the appointed leaders in both formulation and implementation.

c. Helping monitor progress and performance.

d. Providing stability, commitment, and continuity of programme leadership (continuity and commitment by leadership were more important than charisma).
According to Paul, programmes differed in: Their approaches to participation, the nature of the functional and vertical integration, the degree of decentralization, and the mix of incentives used to motivate beneficiaries. For instance, whereas economic incentives work well for programmes with economic goals, non-economic incentives (recognition, status, a sense of challenge) are more important in social programmes.

Variation in the critical interventions from one programme to another depended on the complexity of the environment (in terms of scope, uncertainty and homogeneity) and whether single or multiple goals were sought.¹

C. David Pyle: An Analysis of 7 Indian Experiences

In his draft manuscript, "Life After Project", David Pyle attacks directly the question of moving to scale. He examines seven successful pilot projects carried out in the Indian state of Maharashtra first in terms of what he calls a "rational actor model", and then from organizational and political perspectives. The "rational actor analysis" emphasizing inputs and cost effectiveness, is inadequate according to Pyle. Its assumption - that increasing inputs and solving technical problems will be sufficient to bring about the desired results - is faulty. More important, he suggests, are the organizational and political dimensions of projects.

Focussing on the process of implementation, Pyle draws an ideal type from the seven small-scale projects. Comparing the small scale project with the extension to large scale programmes, he finds the following organizational deviations from the ideal.

¹ In Appendix A three diagrams are presented summarizing critical interventions for four programme types identified by Paul.
### Project Characteristics

1. **Specific, time-bounded objectives.**

2. **"Targeting" the most vulnerable.**

3. **A results orientation.**
   - Evaluations are concerned with process and impact.

4. **Teamwork.**

5. **Training as an on-going process**
   - with emphasis on developing self-esteem and a social orientation.

6. **Selection based on motivation and values; not on test results.**

7. **Non-monetary/Incentives**
   - Individual initiative is rewarded.

8. **Supervision** of reasonable scope and based on clearly defined responsibilities. Supervisors function as trainers.

9. **Administrative control** is local, flexible, and autonomous.

10. **Information** is collected and used to make changes. Methods to determine "at risk" individuals are effective.

### Programme Characteristics

1. **Vague, ambitious objectives**
   - without time boundaries.

2. **Lack of targeting.**

3. **Concern with inputs, reducing the attention to education, maintenance and follow-up.**

4. **Hierarchical relations in which para-professional contributions are discounted.**

5. **Training is one-shot and overloaded, particularly with technical material.**

6. **Selection on test results or other "objective" criteria (e.g., education levels)**

7. **Monetary incentives - Initiative is discouraged.**

8. **Supervision is thin, plagued by logistical problems and responsibilities are not clearly defined. Supervisors function as inspectors.**

9. **Administration is centralized and rigid, residing in bureaucracies.**

10. **Information collection is haphazard and there is little feedback. "At risk" measures become ends not means.**

Pyle adds a political analysis to his organizational review by examining commitment, and accountability, how programmes relate to the structure of interest groups, and the degree of self-sufficiency sought. **Commitment** is evident in policy statements, budget allocations, motivations, and the willingness to make needed structural reforms. This last indicator of commitment is seldom present. Needed structural reforms run counter to too many vested interests. The commitment to needed decentralization reforms, for instance, requires an unusually strong and secure central government.
In most settings, the structure and influence of interest groups favor those who are urban, educated, and established professionals. Accountability is affected by how precisely goals are stated, how monitoring is set up and how training occurs.

The political analysis of programmes, in terms of the self-sufficiency sought for/by beneficiaries, quickly exposes the potential political threats that can accompany programmes promoting participation and involvement. Pyle suggests there is a need for more precise definition of what is meant by community participation "so that we can distinguish real community involvement from community-based service delivery". (p 219). He notes that an active role by the community in all phases of a project or programme, however desirable, may be idealistic and unrealistic.

"The important thing to remember is that while community participation and involvement have definite advantages and benefits for all concerned (e.g. increased control for the community and decreased economic and administration role for the bureaucracy), it is not always required to achieve impressive impact".

In the above discussion what emerges as the preferred approach to achieving scale successfully is a rather deliberate focussed, phased approach beginning with a single service, then adding on. It is an approach requiring not only political commitment and resources, but also flexibility, time for learning and adjustment, teamwork, and innovative and continuous leadership capable of fitting programmes to existing environmental, organizational, and resource conditions/constraints even while trying to change them. Pilot or demonstration projects linked specifically to plan for expansion are seen as potentially important, not only to work out technical details but also as a training ground for those who will follow a programme to scale and as a source of information that can help gain or sustain commitment.

Before falling into the trap of accepting a new "blueprint", albeit one that emphasizes flexibility and learning, we should consider alternatives to
the phased, flexible, learning-oriented approach to achieving scale described above. In the following section, three approaches are distinguished.

II. ACHIEVING SCALE

There are at least three ways to approach scale -- by expansion, explosion, or association. Scale through expansion begins typically with one model which is tested on a small scale, adjusted, and then extended (usually with further adjustment) to other locations until the desired coverage has been attained. Scaling up through explosion by-passes the pilot stage. Programme implementation starts on a large scale usually with one model serving all parts of a nation. A process of local adjustment and filling in may occur after an initial explosion in order to make the programme more responsive to diverse social needs and to intensify coverage in some areas "covered" in the original burst, but in a token way. An association mode achieves scale by adding up coverage obtained in several distinct (and not necessarily coordinated) projects or programmes, each responding to the needs of a distinct part of the total population served.

The conceptual distinctions made above blur in practice. Expansion to large scale may, for instance, be programmed over such a short time after the initial model has been tried out successfully that it is, in effect, an explosion. Or expansion might occur as several very different models are tried out and applied successively within different parts of a country. In that case the result approximates scale achieved by associating different models. Nevertheless, distinguishing the three approaches is useful because each requires different pre-conditions for success and is related to differences in timing, organizational needs, learning potential, initial costs, and other features.
A. Scale by Expansion

Virtually all the cases of successful programmes reviewed by the three authors summarized in the previous section would be characterized as part of a process of expansion. Ideas were developed first on a relatively small scale and expansion occurred in stages with adjustments based on learning from experience along the way.

In the expansion that characterizes a "learning process approach", Korten suggests that programme development proceeds, ideally, through three stages, each emphasizing a different learning task. (See Figure 1) In the first stage, the major concern is with learning to be effective. In this stage, efficiency and coverage are low, and errors may be high. "The programme beings to make a transition to Stage 2 when it is found to be effective in responding to an identified need and it achieves an acceptable level of fit between beneficiaries, the working programme model, and the capabilities of the action research team." (p. 500) In the Stage 2, major concern shifts to learning to be efficient - to "reducing the input requirements per unit of output." Modest programme expansion during Stage 2 will increase the cadre of persons experienced in making the programme work and who are available to help build the expanded organizational capacity of Stage 3 in which emphasis is on learning to expand and on organizational capacity (rather than programme). Constant attention to ensuring an acceptable level of fit (among organization, programme, and beneficiaries) will mean some inevitable sacrifice in effectiveness and efficiency. The rate of expansion will be governed largely by how fast the necessary organizational capabilities can be developed to support it. Once Stage 3 has been completed, the organization may turn to the solution of new problems.
Notes: It should be expected that some effectiveness will be sacrificed in the interest of efficiency and expansion. With expansion, efficiency will likely suffer due to trade-offs with the requirements of expansion.

From: Koten, Public Administration Review (September/October 1980), p. 500
The Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) of India is probably the main example of a national programme that is large-scale and explicitly a child development programme. The ICDS has followed an expansion approach, beginning in 1975 on an experimental basis in 33 of India's 5,000 or more administrative blocks (UNICEF, ICDS, 1984). By 1985, the programme was scheduled to be in effect in 1,000 administrative blocks through the nation. The ICDS system\(^1\) takes a holistic approach to child development and is a valiant attempt to orchestrate services for the benefit of poor children and their families. Poor blocks have been chosen for participation in the programme. Within each block, all children under age 6 are eligible; no particular attempt is made to select children "at risk". This more democratic view contrasts with, for instance, a model used in the nutrition supplementation programme being carried to scale in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, in which only children "at risk" are provided supplementary feeding.

The ICDS programme, although launched on a relatively (for India) small scale has expanded quickly. The opportunity to learn along the way has been present, but there seems to be relatively little room for adjustment in the basic ICDS model: A true "learning process approach" does not seem to have taken hold and means are needed to make adjustments in the on-going programme. A case study of the ICDS experience would be instructive.

\(^1\)The focal point of the converging services is the anganwadi or pre-school child centre, located within the village itself. The anganwadi worker and a helper are supported by a Child Development Project Worker. These individuals are selected according to uniform criteria set by the Central Government, based on education and experience. A uniform curriculum has been developed for pre-service training, provided by existing academic institutions and non-governmental organizations. The programme includes growth monitoring, immunization, health check-ups, supplementary feeding, non-formal pre-school education, and nutrition and health education for mothers.
B. Scale by Explosion

The "big bang" approach to scale is usually the product of a national political decision, often motivated by a desire to gain broad political support or to build goodwill. Maximum coverage is sought in the shortest period possible. In such cases, programmes are centrally conceived, and organized, even though community participation and popular education may be considered central elements of the programme philosophy. A "blueprint" approach is taken in which the same model is applied to all parts of a country or region.

Once a national political decision has been taken, development organizations and implementing agencies move to take advantage of the political moment, even while recognizing potential problems associated with attempting to do too much too fast. The quality of the service delivered may be sacrificed in order to attain greater coverage as quickly as possible. Demand mobilization is a crucial element in scale by explosion. By quickly establishing a large programme, organizations hope to secure resources not previously available and to gain a mortgage on the future thereby turning an immediate action with short run results into a longer-run programme with continuing benefits.

If judged from the organizational viewpoint presented in the previous pages; an explosion approach might appear undesirable. It does not embody a learning process nor allow organizational and management capabilities to adjust with the expanding programme. It seems guaranteed to overload the system and to open up accountability problems. However, there are circumstances in which such an approach to scale appears not only to be justified but successful. Programmes can successfully explode on the scene if they concentrate on one developmental component or idea, and are directed at a goal that is easily articulated, understood, and achieved. Indeed, the enthusiasm and energy created as part of the explosion will be a major contributing factor to success.
A successful explosion to scale is probably best illustrated by immunization and literacy campaigns. Colombia, for instance, has recently completed an immunization campaign raising coverage dramatically. The literacy campaigns in Cuba (1961) and Nicaragua (1980) were clearly-focused national campaigns producing excellent results in a short period. Although campaigns can achieve short-term success, the problem, of course, is to capitalize on that success to build the lasting programmes required to maintain the gains. No matter how successful immunization campaigns may be, for instance, they must avoid building an "innoculation mentality" about organization.

The Mexican "Programme of Development for Children Ages 0-5 Through Parents and Community Members" (Mexico Sept, 1983) provides a somewhat different example of scale by explosion. That programme was not a campaign but was initiated simultaneously in rural areas in all Mexican States in 1983. It did not pass through a pilot stage.¹ The programme illustrates the "blueprint" approach criticized by Korten and Paul. One model was used for all parts of the country and one set of materials and a manual served equally for all.² To serve multiple goals - nutrition, health, and early education -- the Secretariat of Education did not formulate new programmes in

¹It did, however, include preparation in terms of
1. a review of pertinent social, economic and cultural studies.
2. a review of literature on child development.
3. a survey of communities designed "to corroborate the documentary research".
4. elaboration of documents, including a carefully conceived manual of operations.

²The "non-formal" programme is built around a guide for parents presenting a series of graduated activities that they can carry out to help their children develop. Parents and other family members are trained in the use of the manual by "promoters" who are community members with a minimum of a primary school education. Parental training is carried out over 15 days, for two hours each day, after which the promoter makes periodic home visits and calls meetings of small groups to reinforce parental actions. The promoters work with and through Community Committees. They are paid. A supervisor is charged with orienting and organizing the work of 16 promoters.
each area but, rather, sought collaboration (networking in Samuel Paul's terms) with the Ministries of Health, Agriculture, and Culture, and with the Post-Literacy Programme of the National Institute for Adult Education. As is so often the case, the "national" programme covered a relative small fraction of those in need (150,000 of the estimated 14,000,000 children under age six were included). The programme is being touted as a success. However, it will need to adjust as it continues and as it grows. If that happens, it will provide evidence that a programme can, without having passed through a pilot stage, adapt successfully. The case deserves to be followed closely.

Not all cases of scale by explosion are national programmes born of political expediency. The regional primary health care programme launched in Sine-Saloun, Senegal with funding from USAID is a variation on the theme. That "all-or-nothing" project was directed at 880,000 rural inhabitants and launched without a test run. (Gaspari, p. 19)

C. Scale by Association. In this mode, scale is achieved by adding together results of projects each of which is relatively small-scale, each initiated and/or carried out independently, and each approaching the problem in its own way. Although a central government might set general guidelines and provide some incentives, it does not dictate how coverage is to be achieved.

It is not unusual, for instance, for several nutritional supplementation programmes to be operating in a country at one time, each linked to a separate source of food, and to separate financing. The programmes may be directed to the same or to different target populations. For practical reasons, a government may assign geographic areas to each programme. Taken

1In the Sine-Saloun case, health services are provided through "Health huts", each of which was to be self-supporting. Before the project began, however, there was no attempt made to establish that the effective demand of the population for health care was sufficiently great to enable the huts to become self-sufficient.
together the different programmes may amount to large-scale national coverage even though no one programme is national in scope, and even though the type of coverage, delivery system, and even type of food varies from place to place.

In nations that are themselves loose confederations of distinct cultural groups, achieving scale by association may be a practical and desirable approach. It would allow each programme to work with a relatively homogenous population, respond to particular needs, and make the adjustments necessary to mount an effective programme with that group. As suggested in Pyle's political analysis, centralized bureaucracies are, however, often reluctant to allow too much independence of action in precisely such situations - particularly if sub-scale programmes are community-based and participatory.

The idea that relatively independent groups should develop and carry out their own programming (within general guidelines) has about it an air of "free enterprise". That need not be the guiding philosophy, however, as illustrated by the Indian National Adult Education Campaign (NAEC). The NAEC was government initiated and guided. It was constructed on a philosophy closer to Paolo Freire's consciousness raising than on a production-oriented basis. A programme of the Janata Party, NAEC was a politically-motivated attempt to go to scale quickly with a programme that would give the party credibility and support following its defeat of Mrs. Ghandi in 1977. The distinguishing feature of the unusually flexible, decentralized and varied approach to literacy, was its support for the many PVOs which were already providing adult education, each in its own way, in different parts of the country and to different groups. A pre-conceived notion of how literacy and adult education should be delivered was not imposed. Modest amounts of money were to be used to assist the various groups in small ways that made a difference. Scale was conceived as the sum of the efforts of these groups.
Scale by association may occur more by chance than by planning. However, national governments and international organizations can contribute to that by providing funds for distinct approaches to a problem. In the best of worlds, simultaneous funding of different approaches leads to "creative competition" among programmes, with broad benefits and extended coverage. In the worst cases, scarce funds are squandered and scarce human resources are destructively pulled in several directions by conflicting demands and models reducing potential coverage and impact.

III. GOING TO SCALE WITH CHILD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

Several statements about the process of early childhood development will help draw out implications from the previous two sections for that area of programming.

1. Development occurs as a child's combined physical, psychological, and social needs are met. Psycho-social needs should not be dealt with separately from physical needs. The truly integrated nature of early development places a strain on programming large scale activities which, as we have seen, tend to work best when concentrating on one problem. The current attention to child survival responds to only part of the development problem, focussing on physical needs of young children, but often neglecting the psycho-social dimension. How to promote psycho-social development in the context of attempts to go to scale with programmes of health and nutrition is an important question.

2. Child development needs vary according to the socio-economic circumstances and cultural patterns surrounding the child. Needs vary also by age. There is, therefore, no formula for programming that is equally applicable in all locations. This suggests that an explosion model will be difficult to apply to promoting healthy child development on a large scale.
3. Improvements in the psycho-social development of children do not, particularly in the period from 0 to 2 years of age, require investments in institutionalized services. The problem is more one of education or motivation of family and community members than it is one of infrastructure. A new water system or a cold chain or an insecticide is not needed.

4. In one respect the technology of early childhood development is extremely simple; healthy and supportive forms of interaction between caregivers and children do not require fancy activities or expensive toys. In another respect, the technology is underdeveloped. An effective equivalent of the growth chart does not yet exist to help caregivers diagnose what is best for a given child, or to tell when a child needs special attention. Such devices as the Denver scale exist and have been tried out in some locations of the Third World. The "Portage Project" has developed a set of diagnostic cards related to stimulation activities and has experimented with versions in four languages in several parts of the developing world. Baby books have been created that help parents track their child's developmental progress. Simple toys abound. Still, the technology needs experimentation and adjustment.

5. National commitment to early childhood development is extremely varied, but in most countries early development programmes are not now a high priority. Appreciation of the need for attention to the psycho-social part of child development is growing, often as part of the attention to child survival or in line with growing needs for child care (related to increasing urbanization and increased participation of women in the labor force). The lower priority given to child development suggests a need for mobilization of political will and/or an approach that builds directly on existing institutions and/or customs.

6. For children ages 3 to 5, an unusual range of institutional experiments are being tried out in many different socio-economic contexts
providing an excellent opportunity to learn from the experience. The variety of ideas and models suggests an association approach to scale.

IV. ISSUES

Any effort to go to scale raises a number of basic issues. In this paper, and as a backdrop for discussion in the meeting, we will highlight five issues: cost, organization, the role of communications, evaluation, and the role of international assistance agencies.

1. Costs: What are the Costs of Going to Scale and Who Bears Them?

To "Go-to-Scale", low-cost programmes are required. That is the prevailing practical doctrine. Integrated services, appropriate technologies, volunteerism, para-professionals, and community participation are all part of the quest for affordable, effective programmes that can be extended widely. However, whether or not low cost programmes can be achieved that function on a large scale and that are effective is still an open question. Evidence is thin. With respect to primary health care, for instance, a study of 52 programmes by the American Public Health Association concluded that, "Although the stated intention of all the programmes is to provide low-cost, affordable health care, this study yielded little evidence that would indicate whether such can or cannot be delivered". (APHA, p. 77) The recent UNICEF paper to the Executive Board, which included a review of 42 projects, concluded that "the projects do not shed much light on the important questions of costs". (UNICEF, p. 26)

Large scale programmes tend to spread resources so thinly, for political reasons and/or in an attempt to keep per capita costs low, that programmes run the risk of producing massive waste because they are of such low quality.
It is often assumed that the process of going to scale will bring with it "economies of scale". However, "While many planners 'intuitively feel' that economies of scale exist with respect to their particular projects, there is no conclusive evidence on this topic." (Gaspari, p.12). Increased coverage may reduce purchase costs. Programme success on an expanding scale can reduce other costs as, for instance, when a targeted nutrition programme reduces malnutrition and leads to less need for food supplementation. A case in point is the Tamil Nadu nutrition programme. However, as a programme expands, it is likely to cover those who are more and more difficult to reach, (geographically and culturally) creating higher costs of training, supervision, education, transportation, and administration. The issue then becomes one of equity rather than of costs. Commitment to equity is severely tested in a circumstance when costs are relatively high as they may be for programmers aspiring to full scale coverage.

One reason for analyzing costs is simply to project what resources will be necessary to move to scale. Often, however, such projections are results of crystal ball gazing. Accurate data are not available on which to base projections. Variations in costs from country to country or district to district make working with averages difficult. And, the assumptions required to make the projections are heroic. (See, for example, the global projections by David Parker, undertaken for UNICEF). In general, "Initial assumptions about projects are often overly optimistic and costs are underestimated". (APHA, p. 78). Although some good work has been done to estimate costs for multi-goal programmes at a point in time (Cornia, 1984) the need for systematic analysis is still great.

In this discussion, the question of costs is of interest not only from the standpoint of overcoming resource constraints but also from the point of view of strategy and organization. The choice is not only between low-cost and
high cost alternatives, but involves also decisions about who will bear the costs. Will community members, or government, or an international agency shoulder most of the cost burden? If the community bears the cost, how is participation in the service affected? When does shifting the burden to the community move beyond an expected and desirable contribution that can be labelled "self-help", become a form of exploitation? How does who bears the costs relate to control over strategic decisions? These questions are rarely asked.

The resources contributed by communities are usually underestimated and so, therefore, are the real costs of a programme.

"The thought that community participation does not cost anything must be abandoned. In fact programmes based on community participation are not inexpensive. To begin with, because untrained and unskilled village workers are the basic service deliverers, their training needs are considerable. Training becomes a continuous affair which is combined with strong supervision. Thus, the intermediate supervision level must be intensive and capable". (Pyle)

Before accepting volunteer and para-professional solutions as truly low-cost alternatives, therefore, closer analysis is needed of costs in relation to effects.

2. Organization: Participation and Integration

The analyses in Section I pointed to a host of organizational issues. In an important way they provide a challenge to two of the most basic assumptions in today's development doctrine -- the assumed need for "integrated basic services", and for community participation. Successful larger scale programmes seem to begin with single service strategies. Multi-service strategies can easily overload the delivery system leading to failure. Indeed, the concept of "converging services" seems to be more appropriate to most environments than that of "integrated services", particularly as
programmes go to scale. The integration of components necessary to make a particular service function seems best achieved by establishing communication channels among existing organizations rather than by "integrating" participants in a new organization. These observations have particular import for programming to promote child development, which is, by nature, multi-dimensional.

While pointing to the need for and importance of community participation, the authors point out that successful programmes have not necessarily required continuing involvement in the management and local control of programmes. On a larger scale, deep and continual involvement become more and more difficult to achieve.

That position is supported by the APHA review of projects:

"Although participation is important for reasons of equity, its value in improving health is not clear from the projects reviewed. However, available evidence suggests most ministries of health do not have the ability (financed or organizational) to undertake the direct task of delivery health services and mobilizing communities for more than routine programme-supported activities". (p. 17).

There is a need to untangle the participation question, accept participation as a goal, and seek it. But without major changes in the attitudes and structures of most governments, and without a radical shift in recruitment policies in order to identify a new type of technician sensitive to community needs and problems, community participation will remain an empty slogan.

3. The Role of Communication

Mobilizing demand emerges clearly from the review of successful projects as an important element in going to scale. Social marketing to create demand can be applied at the highest levels of government and can also be used to
empower local people with knowledge. In the case of child development, the educational messages used to mobilize demand may themselves have an effect on child development, whether or not a "service" emerges.

The potential force of the communications industry requires careful monitoring. With respect to child development, the social marketer should be sensitive to existing patterns of child rearing, reinforcing effective patterns rather than trying to introduce new practices that may be unfamiliar and no more effective.

4. Evaluation

From the analysis of successful programmes comes a bias against forms of evaluation that are linked to a "blueprint" and that do not allow for changing goals and processes as programmes develop. Over the last ten years, that position has grown increasingly strong. With it is often associated a reaction against surveys, closed-ended questionnaires with pre-set questions, and statistical analyses based on linear assumptions. Slowly, ethnographic methods and "illuminative evaluation" have claimed their place in the evaluation repertoire as part of a general shift toward participatory research and evaluation.

The technology and methods of evaluation should not be the main issue, however. A wide range of well-developed and validated techniques and methods are being applied successfully to evaluate development projects and programmes --from cost-effectiveness to anthropological studies. Whether a "traditional" or "non-traditional" method is chosen from among this range is not the question. Survey methods, for instance, can play a useful role in evaluations by project members designed to provide a project with immediate feedback for policy purposes or in more participatory evaluation involving villagers and designed to help change their behavior. Ethnographic methods can be useful to
help interpret data gathered in a large-scale project directed to very specific goals. What is important is that the technique be matched to evaluation goals and user needs, and that biases be recognized and stated. If more than one method can be applied in the same project evaluation, so much the better.

More important than the choice of evaluation methods are choices related to the organization and use of evaluation, beginning with the question of who is to be involved in the evaluation process. Two basic observations may help thinking about organizational and user issues in evaluation. First, the most immediate users of evaluation results are likely to be those who have participated in obtaining the results. Second, use of evaluation results should not be considered as something that happens only after an evaluation has been completed, rather it can occur during the process, leading to changes in the evaluation. If these observations are accepted, they lead to organization of evaluation in a way that will directly involve the users of evaluation results from the beginning. It responds to Korten’s and Paul’s observations that, in successful programmes, planning, evaluation, and implementation were not divorced -- that the same individuals were involved in all, or that closely knit teams were organized.

The role of an evaluator in a learning process approach is "that of an enabler, suggesting hypotheses, sharpening the project's focus, indicating appropriate methods, building up local capacity through training" (van Leer, Summary, p. 5).

Evaluation directed at project improvement and training is a labor intensive task. Paralleling the programme suggestion that a new type of technician is needed to work with communities in implementing programmes that are community-based, there is need for a new type of evaluator who can work
with villagers and local programme staff. That may be feasible as well as desirable within pilot projects, but labor-intensive, participatory evaluation becomes an expensive and potentially difficult strategy as projects go to scale. As programmes grow larger, the need to tie evaluation ever more closely to monitoring systems providing quick feedback on carefully selected variables grows apace.

Two other suggestions about the evaluation process arise from the earlier review.

1. Attention should be given to the political dimensions of policy and implementation. This cannot be done in an overly empirical way. However, it is possible to establish scales for rating policy formation, development, and implementation. Pyle and Wallerstein (in Sahn, 1984), for instance, suggest criteria for examining infrastructure, the degree of self-reliance, support from political elites, a results orientation, and the results of "targeting".

2. Process documentation, although sometimes tedious, is needed.

5. The Role of International Assistance Agencies

In the preceding analyses of programme implementation, the authors pose a major challenge to the international development community. Korten concludes, for instance, that: "In general, the need is for a flexible, sustained, experimental, action-based capacity-building in a style of assistance which most major donors are ill-equipped to provide." (p. 484) To move toward the learning process approach, he goes on to suggest that:

1. Donors might view pilot projects as a kind of venture capital investment in which only 10-20 percent of the projects funded would be expected to succeed and be funded for the next level of support in the process of going to scale.
2. Major donors should be prepared to live with staff-intensive programming in pilot project stages and should not expect to move large sums of money at that point.

3. Major donors should change their established programming procedures to allow more flexibility (in budgets, in implementation schedules, and even in project plans) so as not to pre-empt learning or its application which often requires changes (p. 502).

4. A portion of funding might be programmed around individuals with leadership qualities and commitment rather than around sectors. (p. 502)

5. Different funding organizations might play different roles at each stage with small, on-the-ground organizations (Foundations and PVOs) playing an important role in learning to be effective (Stage 1), larger funders such as UNICEF or USAID entering in the stage of learning to be efficient (Stage 2), and the World Bank entering at the third stage (learning to expand).

Pyle suggests that donors fund experimental intermediate-sized programmes, still experimental, rather than moving to expand small projects to large scale in one giant step as is so often done. An intermediate-sized project, carried out in "real world", not "hothouse" conditions would shift focus from technical issues (presumably tried out in the pilot project) to delivery and organization. The suggestion is similar to Korten's Stage 2.

These innovative suggestions cannot be carried out unless there are major changes in most international agency policies. Continuity, flexibility, and restraint are required for learning by trial and error over extended periods.

Collaboration among funding agencies at different stages in the process of going to scale could allow each organization to contribute in a cumulative way to the process. It might help overcome the frustration associated with pilot projects that go nowhere. The suggestion, however, raises questions related precisely to the organizational discontinuities that would occur in such an
arrangement. These discontinuities would have to be controlled by national continuities. In addition, it may be difficult to fit agency norms together. As an example, a World Bank staff member indicated to me that most pilot projects funded by other organizations did not provide the information or meet the standards needed within the Bank to allow it to consider subsequent funding of the project idea on a large scale. There is, also, a constant need to guard against a kind of international collusion affecting the relationship of donors to national governments.

CONCLUSION

There are several reasons to conclude that now is not the time, in most places, to move ahead quickly with large-scale programmes that emphasize the mental, social, and emotional development of young children, as important as these programmes might be. First, the field of child development is a complex one requiring multiple responses to multiple and varied needs. Second, a technology similar to that developed for health and nutrition (oral rehydration, growth charts) does not seem to have been adequately tested and adjusted. Third, the current emphasis on survival seems appropriate still for most parts of the Third World where infant mortality rates are still very high. Therefore, focus on health and nutrition should continue to command major attention. Putting that together with warnings about the dangers of overloading systems gives one pause before adding another service component to a system, even in cases where to do so would be relatively inexpensive. Fourth, the demand for early childhood development programmes, per se, is only now beginning to grow. That demand is related to changing social conditions. It will continue to grow, particularly in urban areas in conjunction with the need for systems of child care for working mothers.
Different nations will, of course, be able to move faster or slower to increase the coverage of child development programmes depending on the strength of existing institutions, their social commitment, and the availability of resources. Although this is not the time, in most places, to go to scale with institutionalized programmes emphasizing intellectual, social and emotional development of young children, it is a time to educate, to mobilize demand, to learn from on-going experiences, and to experiment further. Interest and demand are growing. Simple technologies are being tried out. Implementation experiments abound, representing a wide range of alternative delivery models. Possibilities for “piggy-backing” on existing programmes are widespread. There is, then, a rich opportunity to prepare for expansion in the future through continued experimentation and by learning in a systematic and collaborative way from present experiments. Doing so would help to raise the consciousness of both national governments and international organizations and would help to train needed personnel along the way.
REFERENCES


12. La Republica de Mexico, Secretaria de Educacion Publica,Direccion General de Educacion Inicial, "Programa de Desarrollo del Niño de 0 a 5 Años a Través de Padres de Familia y Miembros de la Comunidad", Documento presentado al Taller Inter-Agencial sobre Evaluación y Costos de Programas del Preescolar en America Latina y el Caribe, Santiago de Chile, 17-22 de October, 1983 (mimeo).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complexity of Environment</th>
<th>Complexity of Program Objectives</th>
<th>Single Economic Goal</th>
<th>Multiple Social Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>Functional form</td>
<td>Matrix form = simultaneous focus on service and function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited Decentralization</td>
<td>Limited use of network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited organisational autonomy</td>
<td>Increased decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Use of authority as lateral influence for integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate organisational autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Matrix form = simultaneous focus on region and function</td>
<td>High degree of decentralisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate use of network</td>
<td>Integration largely through lateral influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increased decentralisation</td>
<td>High degree of organisational autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Integration more through lateral influence than authority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate organisational autonomy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Program Interventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complexity of Environment</th>
<th>Complexity of Program Objectives</th>
<th>Single Economic Goal</th>
<th>Multiple Social Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited beneficiary participation</td>
<td>Increasing beneficiary participation and internal autonomy for staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate attention to selection and training</td>
<td>Mix of formal and informal information for monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Informal, subjective monitoring</td>
<td>Increasing emphasis on selection and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Motivation through use of authority and economic incentives</td>
<td>Motivation chiefly through non-economic incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Increasing beneficiary participation and internal autonomy for staff</td>
<td>Considerable internal autonomy for staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mix of formal and informal information for monitoring</td>
<td>Formal information as main basis of monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing emphasis on selection and training</td>
<td>Considerable emphasis on selection and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Motivation through a mix of economic and non-economic incentives</td>
<td>Motivation chiefly through non-economic incentives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strategic Interventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complexity of Environment</th>
<th>Complexity of Program Objectives</th>
<th>Single Economic Goal</th>
<th>Multiple Social Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>Standardised single service</td>
<td>Multiple social services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Focus on homogeneous beneficiary group</td>
<td>Focus on homogeneous beneficiary group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Limited attention to demand mobilisation</td>
<td>Moderate attention to demand mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>Single service-differentiated</td>
<td>Multiple differentiated social services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderately varying combinations of inputs (integration to meet needs of heterogeneous beneficiary groups)</td>
<td>Diverse combinations of inputs to meet needs of heterogeneous beneficiary groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate attention to demand mobilisation</td>
<td>Strong focus on demand mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Re-balancing emphasis on logistics of supply</td>
<td>Rotating emphasis on supply logistics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>