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INTRODUCTION

VINSON H. SUTLIVE, JR.
The College of William and Mary

... In stepping toward civilization man has stepped away from liberty, equality, and fraternity.

- Leslie White

... The theory that the armed forces are the military arm of the civilian government sounds suspiciously like doctrinaire English Whiggism. In most of the world and for most of the world's history, it would be nearer the truth to say that government was the civilian arm of the military.

- Geoffrey Barraclough

The title of this issue was chosen to emphasize experiments and problems with self-rule. Although there is the popular notion that "democracy" is a product of the American and French revolutions in the 18th century, it is in fact a political process which has been used by numerous societies in a variety of times and places. It
is not of a single form nor does it derive from a single source or set of events.

This issue itself is the climax of several events which happened close upon one another in 1983. First, we received a letter from Hafizullah Emadi, an Afghan emigrant, proposing publication of a manuscript on the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Then, on August 21, the late Senator Benigno Aquino was assassinated in Manila. Aquino had been a guest in our college and, in his address to the International Circle, had predicted his murder if he returned to the Philippines. Finally, the day following Aquino’s death, the Pathan leader, Sirdar Shaukat Hyat Khan described the political situation in South Asia at a luncheon arranged by Robert Clifford. His summary of the issues and their obvious commonalities with the other events impelled us to solicit and publish papers on efforts towards and against democratic processes in Third World nations.

Within the week following Khan’s visit, and with the help of Robert Clifford, without whose encouragement, network, and patience this issue would not have been published, we invited contributions from scholars, government officials, and development agents, among others. Some accepted, and their papers constitute this volume. Others declined because of various constraints, among them the problematic political situations in which they live. One of the latter composed a cleverly coded and poignant reply which expresses the personal peril faced by a majority of citizens of many Third World countries if they seek the freedoms and privileges enjoyed by the peoples of fewer than two dozen developing countries. This eloquent and sensitively worded response appears as a "Note" following the Introduction.

Some of the articles contain controversial statements. Our first inclination was to edit out what we perceived to be potentially objectionable materials. To have done so, however, would have belied the purpose of the issue, and the basic right of responsible self-expression. Therefore, the articles appear substantively as they were submitted. Just as each author may not agree with everything in this Introduction, there also are points or
To write about the "rise" of democracies is to describe the earliest human societies. Such societies were characterized by an egalitarian ethos. Their technologies precluded acquisition of material and political capital. Their survival was contingent upon interdependence and accommodation, rather than authoritarianism. The situation probably was like that in 12th century B.C. Israel in which "every man did what was right in his own eyes" (Judges 21:25), to quote a relevant Biblical phrase.

The first major revolution in human prehistory was the invention of food production. It made possible the second, the formation of the state. The former enabled human beings to manipulate natural processes, the latter, social processes. Thus, abler, more ambitious men (gender intended) seized control of decision-making processes by the all-too-familiar steps of differentiation and discrimination. Self-rule was subverted, and authority for the affairs of societies was assumed by a few persons. As Yehudi Cohen (1974:401-406) convincingly argues, the formation of the state as a distinctive type of social structure was a watershed in human history. And, as Cohen emphasizes, it was the result of purposive political processes rather than an inevitable by-product of technological change.

One of the significant and recurrent themes in myths of early states is a rather didactic demonstration that the welfare of the people's "goddess" (read, "state") was contingent upon the harmonious relations of her citizens. Multi-ethnic and culturally plural societies represented potential conflict situations, as illustrated in the Cain (agriculturalist ancestor of the first cities) and Abel (nomadic pastoralist) myth. Appeals to self-interest for the good of the state were understandable. In retrospect, however, the intention of such myths was to protect the newly created positions of the privileged rich and powerful, while pacifying the newly disestablished poor and powerless. Circumstances in early states were strikingly similar to those in contemporary Third World nations. Alexander Spoehr, founder of the East-West
Center, has observed, "The principal problem in developing nations is a lack of articulated values between the rich and the poor."

In time, myths were elaborated into cosmologies and religious systems, for example in Egypt, China, and Peru. In such systems peace was promised as the reward to the citizen who kept his place in the divinely ordered (state-defined) scheme of things.

History of early states is replete with rebellions and revolutions to gain basic rights. One of the clearest and most familiar sequences of assimilation, enslavement, and rebellion is the story of the Joseph tribes and the liberation movement led by former "general" Moses (cf. Josephus 1899:65-70). In this series of events, the quest for food took Semitic pastoralists into the northern territory of Egypt in the late 18th century B.C. Settling there, they were later conscripted as slave laborers for state projects. Rebell ing, they fled Egypt in the early 13th century, only to come full-circle and establish their own stratified state two centuries later.

No revolutions in history have been more far-reaching than the French and American. It was the former which articulated the rights of its citizens to "liberty, equality, and fraternity." It was the latter which proposed the revolutionary idea that the individual was capable of assuming responsibility for his life without oversight of the state. The framers of the Declaration of Independence adopted two basic guidelines. First, power must be allowed to concentrate neither in individuals nor in institutions. And second, sovereignty--the ultimate power--must reside in the people.

The delegates (to the Continental Congress) cherished no naive illusions as to the innate goodness of men or even to their rationality. A fair reading is that they feared democracy almost as much as they feared despotism. Benjamin Franklin, the urbane, witty realist, did not hesitate to remind the convention of two passions that powerfully influence men: ambition--the love of power--and avarice--the love of money. James Madison, delving into how a majority could be motivated to respect
the rights of a minority, hardly could be accused of sentimentality:

"A prudent regard to the maxim that honesty is the best policy is found by experience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals. Respect for character is always diminished in proportion to the number among whom the blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in individuals: in large numbers, little is to be expected of it."

Alexander Hamilton captured the essence: "Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many" (Mintz and Cohen 1977:3).

On expectations generated by these events, George Appell writes, "With the liberal revolution came the idea that governments were to be for the benefit of the governed and under the control of the governed. And they were not to be intrusive into the lives of citizens" (1985:17). The promise of the American revolution, and the precautions urged by framers of the Declaration of Independence, were not taken as model and guide in the colonial and post-colonial periods of the Third World. For, as Peter Lyons has observed,

Despite its pristine anti-colonialism and assertions of independence it was not . . . the young United States which was the augur of what post-colonial government for a newly independent ex-colonial state would actually be like. Rather it was the newly independent successor states to the Spanish Empire in the Americas—with the caudillos and pronunciamientos, their coups, followed by coups and further coups (sometimes grandiloquently called revolutions)—who held up a rough mirror for the future of large parts of the contemporary Third World. Even Brazil, which from its relatively peaceful transition to independence in 1825 had looked as if its Portuguese pedigree and different composition
would enjoy a more placid and prosperous course, overthrew its monarchy in the late 1880s to install rule by a military junta (1985:10-11).

It is especially ironic that the so-called "era of independence," the decades following World War II during which rule was transferred from colonial to native administrators in several score Third World countries, has become "the era of internal colonialism" (Casanova 1955:27). Although now sovereign, only a minority of the recently independent states permit political freedom and basic rights to their citizens. Whatever the system or situation, whether, as Geoffrey Barraclough observes "the government (is) the civilian arm of the military" or "the armed forces the military arm of the civilian government," there is no doubt that civilians and military alike are caught in restrictive and tortuous systems.

Consider these summary statements from Ruth Sivard's World Military and Social Expenditures 1985 (p. 5):

While national governments compete fiercely for superiority in destructive power, there is no evidence of a competition for first place in social development. In a world spending $800 billion a year for military programs, one adult in three cannot read or write, one person in four is hungry.

In the Third World military spending has increased five-fold since 1960 and the number of countries ruled by military government has grown from 22 to 57.

There is one soldier per 43 people in the world, one physician per 1,030 people.

It costs $590,000 a day to operate one aircraft carrier and every day in Africa alone 14,000 children die of hunger or hunger-related causes.

Disproportionate costs of "independence," that is, military governments or military-supported governments,
5) Legal equality.

- Stratification, unequal access under law, or perhaps more correctly, "stratocracy", insures legal inequalities as the order of society. (Stratocracy is a word coined in England during the Cromwellian Commonwealth to describe a form of government in which the army exercises the ruling power; cf. Lyons 1985:12).

Current restrictive administrations face problems similar to those of early states discussed above: cultural pluralism and multi-ethnic societies forced together in improbable, uneasy national unions. Short of permitting rival groups to fight it out, administrations have had to impose restrictions for the common good. But beyond the disproportionate costs of supporting a strong military have been the inestimable losses of many countries incurred in the excesses by police, military, or quasi-military forces, "for the common good."

These excesses have manifested themselves in the all-too-common practice of torture against "enemies of the state," often opposition leaders or simple citizens who are powerless to resist. Amnesty International estimates that torture is routinely used by at least one-third of the countries of the Third World. Torture, the consummate form and force against "self rule" knows no geographic region, no national boundary.

Item: A member of the opposition in the Philippines was tortured by having a ten-penny nail driven into his skull. Though he survived his imprisonment, he died shortly after his release.

Item: Guatemalan children have seen their mothers raped, their fathers decapitated, their fellow-villagers massacred.

Item: Jacobo Timerman (Prisoner without A Name, Cell without A Number) is the best known but only one of thousands of prisoners tortured during the 1970s in Argentina.

Item: Foude Cissa', former director of the national radio station, spent seven years in Boiro Camp,
Guinea. Tortured with electrodes attached to his tongue and genitals, he survived.

As worthy of condemnation as the apartheid system of South Africa is, it is but one of almost one hundred repressive governments in the Third World. As Harold Williams, a black journalist writes:

In many Black African countries there has been a systematic dismantling of such pre-independence institutions as a free press, an independent judiciary and private enterprise--and these have been replaced by one-party rule and state-controlled monopolies. If it is apartheid to create a subordinate class of people in South Africa just because they are not white, it is fratricide when black leaders kill thousands of citizens every year just because they differ in their political thinking (Newsweek, January 28, 1985).

What Williams has written about political conditions describes the "rise and fall of democracies in the Third World."

The papers in this volume vividly recount problems of self-rule in representative societies. John Stempel identifies "three significant efforts to bring some form of popular—if not strictly democratic—government to Iran" (p. 1). Most important was the late Shah's "White Revolution." A two-party system was ineffective and short-lived, but helped whet appetites for greater participation in government. By the late 1970s, "the portents for disaster were in place" and "Iran's attempt at constitutional monarchy" collapsed (p. 10). Stempel correctly clears away confusion about the current regime: "Politics is played out in an oligarchic format, not a democratic one" (p. 12).

Hafizullah Emadi traces the troubled history of Afghanistan from the 19th century to the recent invasion by Russia. A geographically and culturally diverse country, Afghanistan has been polarized by a struggle between Pashtun and Baluch peoples. "All foreign invaders fanned the flames of communalism for advancing their..."
colonial aims" (p. 23). Emadi discusses the principal factions and the most important developments in pre-Russian Afghanistan. Events since 1979 and "facts have shown that not only those who have trusted the internationalist aid’ of the Soviet Union, but also those who have believed that they can rely on Soviet aid’ and alliance and with it they can safeguard their own national interest have become victims of its expansion" (p. 38).

"Of all the countries with a predominantly Muslim population, Turkey is probably the only one to seriously experiment with western-style, political democracy," observes Paul Magnarella (p. 43). Following World War I, Ataturk had to persuade the peoples of Turkey to shift their identity "from a wide multi-national Islamic-Ottoman Empire to a uni-national, secular Republic" (p. 45). His "principle of populism . . . did not imply political or social democracy" (Ibid.). From its inception 64 years ago, Turkey has had a strong and often ruling military. In "only 26 years and four months" (p. 56) has it experienced multi-party civilan rule.

But, "with the November 1983 elections (restrictive as they were), Turkey may have begun a transition back to some form of democracy. Time will tell" (po. 56-7).

A former French colonial officer, Roland Cartigny writes as an administrator, concluding that there are historical and ethnic (read, "cultural") "obstacles to the installati’ of an Atlantic-type democracy in Black Africa" (p. 63). A wide variety of factors--tribalism, " . . . the lowest level income in the world" (p. 64), related health problems, collective rather than individual ownership of property, high rates of illiteracy, different epistemologies, and decision by consensus rather than by majority--have combined to frustrate or abort early post-colonial experiments in self-rule.

One of the prime movers of this issue, Sirdar Shaukat Hyat Khan traces problems of Pakistan's politics to the waves of conquerors of South Asia and religious stratification of the region's peoples. "It was against this back- ground of Hindu religious bigotry and Muslim economic backwardness that the subcontinent was partitioned on Independence from Britain" (p. 78). Independence and
partition created a "moth-eaten Pakistan" (p. 80). In its 40 years of independence Pakistan has been dominated by military strong men, who probably will continue to administer the country for the foreseeable future.

Following an overview of Indonesia, it geographic features, political history, and people, Ronald Provencher analyzes the "characterizations of five types of protagon-ists" in Indonesian literature (p. 95). He then presents "revolution" as described in 15 compelling Indonesian stories, and contrasts "western sociological explanations of rebellion and revolution" (p. 117) with Indonesian cosmology.

P. N. Abinales traces "the Philippine militarization experience, drawing certain summary points and trends which have evolved since intensified repression became a major problem for the Filipino people in 1972" (p. 130). Supported by a military notorious for numerous excesses, President Marcos has implemented "a conscious policy to instill military values into Philippine cultural life as part of an effort to create a fascist culture under the new order" (p. 147). These values include "discipline, hierarchy, (and) restraint with the personality cult" (p. 149). Abinales notes international support which has made possible Marcos' program, and is not optimistic that "demilitarization of society is possible" (p. 165).

Judith Ewell acknowledges the peril of identifying "the rise and fall of democracies" in Latin America. In the 1980s, however, there have been several civilian governments elected, and more ballots cast in recent years than in previous decades. Ewell analyzes reasons which have contributed to what another author has described as "Demilitarisation in Latin America" (Calvert 1985), and concludes that civilian governments exist and will continue to do so at the pleasure of the military.

Donna Becker interviewed office- s in all Central American embassies in research on the effects of United States' foreign policy on Central American countries. In an even-handed analysis she examines the histories of the states, their forms of government, and internal and external problems. Her conclusions bring to mind The Triumph by John Kenneth Galbraith, viz. that support of
friendly fascist regimes and efforts to subvert unfriendly governments denies other countries the experiments in political democracy undertaken by the United States.

The papers represent the processes of ordering life and regulating societies which are continuous. Today's problems present tomorrow's challenges. Writing about his visit to Boiro Camp, Guinea, Charles Powers states that the camp

... now stands as a "museum of oppression." "In the midst of the torture, the cruelty," Foude Cissay says, "the thing that struck me most was the strength of resistance in man . . ."

"... (Walking) down the silent row of cells, opening door after door, revealing concrete floors six paces long and three paces wide . . . the inscriptions begin to ring in the ears, like a conversation of philosophers.

"To live is to struggle,' wrote a man who once lived in cell 54. "Freedom is for every man,' said a prisoner of cell 63.

"'Courage is the motto of man" (Los Angeles Times, August 14, 1984)

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NOTE

The project you propose is very interesting. I feel, however, that I must point out some of the difficulties you may encounter. You are asking about the possibility of having a prominent citizen of a country who also happens to be quite knowledgeable of the political situation of his country as well as of the deplorable series of events that led to absolute loss of all liberties, to write a chapter on how this came about and what the situation is. The authorities would immediately find out about this. Life for that man would from then on be unbearable, that is, if he were allowed to live at all. You see, since repression is so great in that country,
than even eulogizing former democratic leaders would be considered critical of the people in power. That man wouldn't stand a chance. He would lose all possibility of finding work or of making a living. You know that in those countries, the police class citizens according to their dangerousness to the state. From a rank of 1 (little danger) which he has been able to achieve without necessarily becoming a stooge of the government he would immediately be dropped to 5 (most dangerous) since his views would be seen as dangerous to the State. The government wouldn't give that man, or his family, or his friends, a chance.

About the only way you could get that person to cooperate with you would be if you were willing to give him safe conduct out of the country before he wrote a word, help him get all his belongings as well as his extensive library out, personal notes, etc., and guarantee him a life income for self and family, since he would lose whatever he had in the way of property, etc. Perhaps, if he really wanted to cooperate with you, he might send you a few days after answering your letter telling you how impossible this would be for him, he might send you in an unmarked envelope, the name and address of someone who had had to leave so that you could contact him. That person could write freely since he is already out of the country. Of course, if he did such a thing, you could never acknowledge that that bit of evidence had come from him. Don't forget that in countries such as the one I am referring to, the very slightest hint of "having cooperated in attacking the regime" is considered a major crime. It is only that way that they can keep themselves going when the whole population is against them but is totally impeded from making any kind of show of disagreement with the slightest act.

You are faced therefore with several alternatives, each of which has shortcomings. Should you receive such a name and address, you can be sure that it will be highly critical of the regime that made him flee his country. It might contain a lot that is worthwhile, but would suffer from some bias. There is also the problem that, not having been in the country for some time, he would not be as up-to-date as a resident. Should you offer to take the person out of the country and guarantee a lifetime income
for him and his family, he might not even accept that. He may have many friends, connections, etc., as may his wife and children, and he may be harboring the hope that eventually that insane government would disappear and better times come. Another option would be that your correspondent might give you the name of someone else who could do the job. In that case, the correspondent might not wish to do so. He might be giving the name of someone he respects and therefore may not wish to put him on the spot. On the other hand, if that person did agree to write something, it would certainly have to be laudatory of the present situation and very critical of former rulers. You would not get the right picture. Remember that in such countries, even mail is censored and even an exchange of correspondence on the subject might cause unpleasantness.

(Editor's Note: The author concluded by assuring us that everything in the country from which he wrote was peaceful and secure, and that under his government "we enjoy every freedom and liberty."

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DEMOCRACY IN IRAN: THE UNTENABLE DREAM

DR. JOHN D. STEMPEL
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Historically, the region we know as Iran prospered under the influence of strong secular rulers, beginning with Cyrus the Great in 550 B.C. In the intervening centuries, when weak leadership existed Iran was subject to invasion and dissolution. However, when powerful leaders such as Xerxes, Darius and the Safavid and early Qajar shahs unified the country, they controlled substantial empires. Such majestical government, though effective, was so authoritarian it left little room in the Persian political tradition for popular participation or legitimization. The most recent incarnation of this tradition was Reza Shah, the father of the last imperial ruler, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Reza Shah rose from humble origins to establish himself in 1925 as absolute ruler of Iran until 1941, when he was forced into exile during World War II by the British and the Soviets.

In the past 80 years, however, there have been three significant efforts to bring some form of popular -- if not strictly democratic -- government to Iran. The
first of these occurred around the turn of the century, when the nascent middle class teamed with religious leaders in the constitutional revolution of 1906. This became Iran's original attempt at parliamentary government in the modern sense.

The second effort occurred from roughly 1950 to '53, when once again the middle class, this time stronger and in opposition to the traditional religious leaders, tried to wrest political power from Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the same shah who would be overthrown by the Ayatollah Khomeini 25 years later. This time the Shah's nemesis was Mohammed Mossadeq. Working in uneasy alliance with the Tudeh (communist) Party, Mossadeq's National Front gained working control of the political system and even chased the Shah from Iran for a brief time. However, within two months the Shah would return to Tehran in triumph, leading a coalition of traditional religious elders, merchants and aristocrats.

In each of these two incidents, the attempt to spread political power by creating representative or democratic government fell victim to the relative disorganization of the democratic forces. In both cases, a large majority of Iranians eventually returned to supporting imperial rule.

The third -- and most interesting attempt at popular government began in the early 1960s. It sputtered along intermittently, finally ending in such abject failure that it included the demise of the Shah and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini. This most recent effort was significantly different from its predecessors, because unlike the two earlier attempts it was induced by the Shah himself and was not the result of a popular groundswell opposing monarchical rule. The Shah initiated the changes because of his perception that Iran's future as a modern, industrialized state required more involvement of the rising middle class in the country's political system. Reza Pahlavi wanted to build a participatory political system from the top down. In that sense his efforts to create a representative political structure are squarely in the developmental tradition of other modernizing monarchs, dating back to 17th century Europe.
THE SETTING

Beginning in 1955, after his near-fatal run-in with Mossadeq, the Shah began consolidating his political position by manipulating traditional groups -- the clergy, the landlords and the bazaar merchants -- and developing Iran economically. Encouraging foreign assistance (notably the U.S. Point Four program) and a group of young Iranian graduates of foreign universities he began to lay the groundwork for the phenomenal economic growth that followed in the 1960s and '70s. In other changes, by early 1963, the Shah had purified the army of Tudeh (communist) influence, created SAVAK (a combination FBI-CIA) and become master of a political system which discouraged participation by the average citizen. Several small political parties, including the remnants of the National Front, were allowed to exist, but any serious politicking was carried out in the executive branch of the government under the control of the Shah and his close advisers.

On January 9, 1963, the Shah announced his "White Revolution" (later labeled the "Shah-People Revolution"). This program, among other things, called for major land reform, nationalization of forests and pasture lands and electoral reform. It was anathema to the clergy, who saw it (and rightly) as an effort to break the power of the mullahs by destroying their iron hold over peasant farmers. The clergy was so powerful because up to the time of land reform the mosques -- the glue holding together the country's social structure -- owned nearly as much property as the Shah.

During the first six months of 1963, while the Shah's programs were just gaining popular appeal, fundamentalist clerics rallied the masses, claiming the reforms attacked Islam and were meant to enslave the people, not to free them. In an eerie foreshadowing of what was to come in 1978-79, the radical religious leadership fomented mass demonstrations. Riots in Tehran and other major cities in June 1963 were eventually suppressed, in the Shah's name, by Prime Minister Assadollah Alam, who ordered the army to fire on the mobs. Ironically, more than anything else it was that very same act -- which the Shah would refuse to carry out under similar circumstances 15 years latter --
which brought 15 years of political peace to Iran. In 1963, with the army firmly behind the Shah, the demonstrations collapsed. Ayatollah Khomeini, one of the primary agitators, was sent into exile and for the next decade-and-a-half the Shah and his court advisers dominated the government. The 1963 riots, in so many respects a carbon copy of those that would erupt 15 years later, also marked the beginning of significant cooperation between the religious groups and the secular opposition (the heirs of the old National Front, and the newer Liberation Movement of Iran).

After the confrontation in 1963, the religious leadership either made its peace with the government, or in the case of Khomeini and other radicals, continued opposing the Shah either from exile, or, quietly, from within Iran. In any case the economic takeoff continued, heralding a major change for the country's traditional social and cultural groups, specifically the bazaar merchants. Now they were competing with the new industrialists, who were fast developing factories and an urban proletariat to run them. The evolution of a modern sector also encouraged the breakup of traditional tribal patterns. Nomadic groups like the Qashqai began settling near the provincial centers during the winter months, and the lure of schooling brought many aspiring youngsters into the modern economic system. Most tribal families at least established an urban base of operations and thousands of peasants moved to the cities completely, won over by the Shah's promise of a better life.

With both the new prosperity and land reform, many peasants became landowners for the first time, but this did not automatically bring them into the Shah's constellation. Agribusiness enterprises sponsored by the government squeezed many of the new, smaller landowners. Besides, the former peasants still prudently retained their close socio-religious ties with their local mosques.

The evermore intense shifts in values brought on by the jump in development increased social stress in all classes of society. This was especially true after the Shah pressed OPEC to increase its oil prices and oil revenues worldwide were quadrupled in 1974. The rapid
influx of so much new money into Iran precipitated a new set of economic problems. Inflation in the country soared between 1974 and 1976, averaging between 25 and 35 percent per year.

Constant reiteration by the Shah that he was building what he called "The Great Society" merely whetted appetites for a piece of the action. Economic conditions improved for the two to three million Iranians closely associated with the modern sector, but for the majority there was no dramatic change. The trickle-down effect from the economic development was too slow and not broadly enough based to satisfy those not directly affected, specifically the peasants turned slum dwellers. Perhaps 10 to 12 percent of the population benefitted from the superheated economy. The remaining 30 million Iranians looked on with growing envy, but also with dismay, because Western values acquired by the educated elite at universities in France, Britain and especially the United States were continuing to erode traditional values and culture.

The shortfall between expectation and reality came into sharp focus when economic conditions began to worsen in late 1976 and into 1977. Many Iranians who had originally supported the boom became alienated. Inflation kept increasing. Other difficulties included ships that couldn't unload cargoes in overcrowded ports, so both the merchants and the constituency they served were disgruntled. Another problem was that loan money was in very short supply; small businessmen could not generate any capital, and the new landowners were left to fend for themselves as agricultural credit mechanisms broke down. Groups other than the growing mass of urban unemployed were becoming desperate.

These were the conditions when the Shah began to experiment with increasing participation in government.

ATTEMPTED POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Though the Shah would brook absolutely no interference with the modernization process, now well underway, as far back as 1957 he began experimenting with political
organization, when a two-party system was established. The Melliuon Party (which evolved into the Iran Novin Party), was pro-government; the Mardom Party was the "loyal opposition." However, no one could run for office in either party without the Shah's approval. The situation remained unchanged until March 1975, when, with the Shah's blessing, the Resurgence Party of Iran was established. Other parties were "invited" to disband and join the new group. It meant the end of the two-party system.

The Shah's decision to abandon the two-party structure he had committed himself to in the early '60s was an important one. The concept of fostering a "loyal opposition" had never really taken hold, and as Iran began developing economically the need for a more complex society became obvious. Beginning in 1973, younger members of the elite, led by Houshang Nahavandi, Ahmad Qoreishi, and Jamshid Amouzegar, convinced the Shah he should create a one-party system. They argued that then it would be possible to organize and modernize political life within a framework that would not threaten the stability of the country. The Shah expected such a change to allow both the elite and the masses to become involved in a controlled relationship.

Thus to be in opposition would no longer automatically be synonymous with treason. The citizenry could practice "responsible" politics and provide the institutional framework to strengthen the constitutional aspect of Iran's constitutional monarchy. (That winter, for the first time, the Shah also began alluding to his son's succession in approximately a decade-and-a-half to a throne more constitutional and less absolute.)

Accordingly, in March 1975 the Resurgence Party was born, under the leadership of Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda. The idea was to have the party serve as a national guide, as exemplified by TANU, the single party of Tanzania. Theoretically at least, the Shah was placing himself above politics as the omnipotent leader, neither subject to its control nor responsible for its failures. Among other things the Resurgence Party would institutionalize a buffer between the monarch and popular discontent.
It was true that the two-party system had not been effective. At least disbanding it eliminated the hypocrisy that choices were available. The new objective was to create an organization which could give the masses a role in the Shah's system in the same way that the country's elite had acquired one. At the same time the Resurgence Party was expected to evolve into an effective vehicle for "educating" people to support the government.

The concept had a certain logic, but it had not been well thought out. Neither the Shah nor the elite had an agreed-upon long-range strategy to encourage the new arrangement. Allegedly created to stimulate participation, the Resurgence Party was designed to control, not encourage, participation and bargaining. It was a mechanism to manage participation based on the assumption that the people would be satisfied with minimal political activity and would not be interested in making wholesale changes.

The rhetoric about encouraging the newly established party could not hide the fact that major changes which might have given the Resurgence Party credibility were never sufficiently addressed. From its inception the Shah vacillated over how much real decision-making authority the party should have and how much the party should become involved in allocating resources. These two aspects of party participation were of real interest to the emerging middle class and other social groups such as factory workers and small farmers. Opposition leaders lost no time charging that the Resurgence Party was merely a new trick to sustain royal absolutism. This charge became ever more credible as time went on.

Despite this lack of focus and the absence of a commitment by the Shah to heed the complaints of party members, there was a surprising amount of interest in the party, particularly by those who had benefitted from Iran's modernization. The Resurgence Party was established from the top down, but was supposed to provide a focus for transmission of ideas upward to district, province, and finally the national level. Most of the organizational work was done by politically active Western-educated technocrats who joined with old-line politicians who strongly supported the Shah.
The Shah left no doubt where he stood when he said the Resurgence Party was for all Iranians who accepted the monarchy, the constitution, and the Shah-People Revolution of 1963. By design he excluded all those who did not support the regime, noting that these individuals could either stay in Iran or leave, but any dissidents choosing to remain would have no say in the government.

What the regime had done was make the party the basic means of access to political rewards. Though there was little outright coercion to force membership -- even based on government figures, it was never more than 60 per cent of the eligible population -- subtler pressure put the message across quite well. Indeed, membership eventually became mandatory for anyone who wished a career in government.

Though no one was prohibited from joining, at the same time neither was there any special effort to encourage the hard-core opposition to participate. This was also true of the clergy, because the establishment remembered that the Islamic fundamentalists had opposed the Shah-People Revolution and the economic reforms it represented. For the modernizers, the clergy signified reaction and oppression, not participation and democracy.

For various reasons many middle class Iranians were willing to give the Resurgence Party a chance; the most obvious was a desire to have a say in their political destinies. In fact some kanouns (party chapters roughly similar to U.S. precinct organizations) became centers for the discussion and debate of political issues between young professionals and university faculty. In Tehran, approximately 600 faculty members became involved, through the kanoun structure, in party affairs. Even lower-class Iranians were enthusiastic, as shown by an incident in 1977 when Prime Minister Hoveda was excoriated before a hall packed with Tehran's poorest citizenry for failing to deliver on government promises.

It was in the provinces, however, that participation in the party blossomed. In the eight or nine provinces where the governors really pressed party membership, most leaders (with the exception of the clergy), became involved in some way. Several provincial assemblies even
began suggesting policy initiatives to their respective governors.

However, at the national level there was never any doubt that the party was still fully under the control of the Shah, even though expectations to the contrary were growing. For example, in 1976 several officials formed "wings" -- party factions to advocate different policies. That summer, when it appeared real policy differences might develop, the Shah decreed there could be no direct competition in parliament between the wings. In another example, when Party Secretary-General Jamshid Amouzegar moved up to become prime minister in August 1977, his successor, Mohammed Baheri, began taking positions contrary to standard government policy on housing for the poor and the need to control inflation.

But the Shah continued to be unwilling to take the next and most important step: allow the party to have real influence on government decision-making -- the reason why most government leaders joined in the first place. Instead, Baheri was dismissed in December 1977 for deviating from the Shah's proscribed guidelines on housing and inflation, and Prime Minister Amouzegar was reappointed party secretary-general. The message was clear: the Resurgence Party would remain no more than a tool for the throne.

Mass disillusionment set in, especially among those individuals who had taken the Shah's government reorganization seriously. When Baheri was replaced the timing could not have been worse. The opposition was becoming increasingly more vocal.

This was because back in April of 1977, in the halcyon days of the Resurgence Party experiment, without fanfare the Shah removed some of the impediments to opposition activity. SAVAK was directed to stop harassing dissident meetings, and gradually the opposition groups began congregating openly, no longer hidden in the shadows of the mosques as they had been for the previous 15 years.

But the signals were mixed: in two highly visible incidents that fall opposition rallies were broken up and
leading dissident politicians beaten. Such harsh treatment, coupled with the automatic executions meted out against anyone convicted of anti-government terrorist activities, hardly made the Iran of late 1977 a place where dissent was encouraged. So just as the opposition, both secular and clerical, began to flex its atrophied muscles, there was a growing uneasiness that the party system was really nothing but a sham. The portents for disaster were in place. Iran's attempt at constitutional monarchy was faltering.

THE SYSTEM CRUMBLES

The riots in Qom on January 9, 1978, marked the first large-scale domestic violence in Iran in years. It began with two days of demonstrations protesting a newspaper article denigrating Khomeini. On the third day the police fired into a crowd of 5,000 killing six and injuring 200. (The opposition would claim 30 were killed and several hundred injured.) Thus began a cycle of violence that 13 months later almost to the day would topple the Shah and elevate Khomeini to supreme power.

What is interesting from the perspective of creating democratic institutions is that so few of the individuals and groups who benefitted the most from the Shah's economic turn-around rallied to the support of the imperial system. The middle class was willing to cast its lot with the secular opposition largely because of its frustration over failure to achieve even minimal political power. Therefore the overwhelming majority either sat on its hands or tacitly approved of the two major opposition groups, the National Front and the Liberation Movement of Iran. With the Shah neutralized, the road was open for the rise of the Islamic movement under Ayatollah Khomeini, a man who knew what he wanted and went after it with a vengeance.

Working through the mullahs, the clerical opposition appealed to the deepest religious feelings of factory workers and others like them who had become alienated as they watched the favored few benefit from a newer, more modern Iran. And to the middle class, the secular opposition and its religious allies offered modernization
without the Shah's authoritarianism. Even in exile the
dominant figure was Ayatollah Khomeini. By force of
personality and effective use of the organizational
capabilities of the "mosque network," he generated protest
marches a million strong on the major holy days of Ashura
and Tassua (December 10-11) in 1978. The already extreme-
ly tenuous legitimacy of the Shah's reign was shredded,
paving the way for the monarch's departure on a "vacation"
a month later, on January 16.

Two weeks later Khomeini returned to Iran in triumph.
The Iranian army was never defeated; it just melted away
during the first armed challenge from Khomeini supporters
on February 11-12. Thus were the last vestiges of the
Shah's governmental structure swept away forever.

In its place was created the Islamic Republic, ruled
by Khomeini and a council of advisers. At the outset
Khomeini had the support of at least 95 percent of the
Iranian people. Elites from the previous regime were
either jailed, shot or escaped into exile. The Majles
(parliament) was eventually reconstituted and new elec-
tions were held, returning mullahs for two thirds of the
seats.

The regime which emerged was scarcely more democratic
than the Shah's, but the people believed themselves a part
of it, and a sizeable minority remain passionately
attached to it even today. A rough kind of democracy has
been practiced by the factions close to Khomeini, but the
Ayatollah himself began excluding his erstwhile allies
from political grace almost from the beginning. The
politics of religious ideology -- "holy fascism" -- sup-
planted the Shah's autocracy.

PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY

The Shah's amateurish efforts to develop some form of
modern interest group politics, first using two parties,
then a one-party system, passed into history only to be
replaced by a radically different sort of regime which
holds out even less promise of evolving toward greater
citizen participation. Within the organizational struct-
ure of the Islamic Republican Party there are several
smaller party groups and many factions, but Iran's contemporary political system is based on the personal charisma and authority of Ayatollah Khomeini. When he dies that system will change significantly. It might even disappear.

Back in 1978, in the initial stage of Khomeini's rise to power, some American scholars confused the mass movement nature of Khomeini's following with a rudimentary form of democracy. Yet the lack of representative tradition is especially visible in the special variant of Islamic culture which Ayatollah Khomeini brought with him when he took over. Political power in the Islamic Republic rests on the charismatic and religious qualities of the leadership, not on its claim to be representative of the power will. The Council of the Faithful, not the Majles is the principal advisory body to the Imam. While parliament is still a place where groups seek to influence policy, any legislation it generates may be changed at will by the council. Politics is played out in an oligarchic format, not a democratic one. The Islamic Republic has not built a strong consensus regarding either its system of government or its policies. Instead the Ayatollah, a master politician, has used the Iraq-Iran way -- now more than five years old -- to build national support in much the same way as Stalin used World War II to inspire Russians not must attached to communism.

The current prospects for the development of some form of democracy in Iran are dim. In fact the only element of the system to offer any hope for the development of necessary political skills is the persistent haggling between factions. These arguments over trade, the use of Islamic law and land reform have led the groups into sharp parliamentary exchanges and bargaining sessions. Unfortunately, the ideological nature of the regime, specifically its dependence on religious authority for legitimacy, leaves even less room for the concept of a "loyal opposition" than the Shah's political structure. Moreover, the most likely successor regime will not be some form of European parliamentary socialism as espoused by the principal exile groups, but a return to some kind of authoritarianism in the name of effective -- not representative -- government. Khomeini's virtual destruction of the modernizing middle class, that group with the most
to gain from democratization, means that in any successor regime a natural constituency for democracy will have to be rebuilt.

At the present time Iranians who favor modernization are automatically opposed to Khomeini's fundamentalist values and are forced to support underground groups who may espouse "democracy," but whose operating style leaves little room for it. The fundamental shift in Iran's political, social and cultural values after the triumph of the Islamic Republicans has complicated the prospects for creating the consensus on public values needed to establish and nurture democratic government in a country subject to international pressure from both East and West. There is also the very real possibility that Iran may no' hold together as a centralized state. The Kurdin insurgency in northwest Iran, unrest among tribal groups in the central mountains, and the disdain for the Ayatolah's government in the eastern provinces of Baluchistan and Khorasan, coupled with the ever-present possibility of foreign meddling, offer the first serious challenge to the territorial integrity of the Iranian state since the Russian invasion of Azerbaijan in 1946-47.

What is the probable course of development in Iran? This writer sees no reason to change his projection of four years ago:

But what of the longer term? Given the inherent weakness of the Islamic government on both organizational and substantive issues, coupled with the potential for foreign intervention, what are Iran's prospects? The most likely possibility is a continuation of the present institutionalized chaos, because of the failure of any faction to firmly establish itself. Forces within Iran will continue to pull the country apart, increasing the power and importance of tribal and ethnic groups whose commitment to a centralized state is less strong than their concern for themselves.

Then in time-honored Persian fashion -- two, five or seven years ahead -- circum-
stances will favor a new "man on horseback," a new Reza Shah. Whether king or commissar, from the left or from the right, but most likely with some discreet foreign support, he will emerge from Iran's armed forces or from among the array of guerrilla or tribal leaders. Distinguished by his force of personality, the fledgling dictator will reunify as much of present-day Iran as has not already passed under foreign control and destroy the power if not the personages of the religious extremists. He will seek to unite the country against further encroachment, joining with the more moderate religious leaders who will emerge from the shadows to pronounce a final benediction on the wreckage of Iran's clerical authoritarian experiment in the supremacy of mosque over state. Still Iran will be faced with one of the oldest problems in political philosophy: how to reconcile seizing power with attaining legitimacy. It is hoped that the new format will offer more positive prospects than the last.


AFGHANISTAN'S STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION

HAFIZULLAH EMADI

A SHORT HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan became a battlefield between the Russia and the British empire (British government of India) and the reactionary forces of the 19th century. In 1838, for the first time, the British militarily interfered in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by launching an invasion of the country, but they faced the heroic armed struggle of the Afghan patriots, whose history has been written in the blood of struggles against colonial powers. The armed resistance of the Afghan people which started on January 1842 resulted in the death of over 2,000 British soldiers. The Afghan people fought British forces (equipped with sophisticated modern weaponry) with their traditional arms and expelled them from Afghanistan.

A decade later, it was the period of Russian expansionism toward Afghanistan. The Russians were able to consolidate their forces beyond the Oxus river in the northern part of Afghanistan, while British considering
Russian expansionism a threat to its domination of the region, tried every method to halt Russian expansionism. The British therefore, interfered in Afghanistan several more times. The second Afghan armed resistance against British forces was in 1880. But this time the revolutionary forces defeated as a result of which British forces were able to control governmental administration in Afghanistan.

In 1919, King Amanullah came to power. He was relatively democratic in comparison to the other kings. This on one hand, and the resentment of the oppressed masses of Afghanistan, who were the motive force of Afghan history, on the other hand, instigated the Third Anglo-Afghan war. In this and other armed struggles the Afghan people, regardless of their creeds, nationality, and background, widely participated and proved that they are the makers of their history. As such the armed struggle of the masses succeeded and struck a heavy blow against the British and forced them to sign the Rawalpindi Peace Treaty in August 1919. As a result of this, the British direct and indirect intervention was halted for a while in Afghanistan's affairs.

The national liberation struggle of the Afghan people was hailed high by the Soviet leaders (Lenin and Stalin). The relationship was highly improved between the two countries. Afghanistan not only broke the chain of colonialism in the country, but largely contributed toward the liberation movements of the neighboring countries (Indian subcontinent and Iran). Many Indian revolutionaries settled in Afghanistan and established Indian Revolutionary government in exile based in Afghanistan. Mr. Raj Manandra Pratap, an Indian revolutionary, was elected as the President and Mawlawi Barakatullah as his Prime Minister and it had twelve cabinet members. During this time, many Indian nationals migrated to Afghanistan to conduct political works there. It was due to this reason that King Amanullah issued a decree to the Afghan people not to sacrifice cow during the Muslim religious festivities (because cow was considered to be a sacred animal useful in primitive societies and its sacredness was declared by Hindu religious authorities). Stalin in assessing the movement in Afghanistan said: "The struggle of the Afghan king for Afghan independence
despite its tendency for restoration of the kingdom from an objective point of view is a revolutionary movement, because this struggle weakens imperialism, disintegrates its forces and finally it shakes imperialism to its roots."

Since the interest of the British was threatened in Afghanistan and King Amanullah with his strong anti-British policy was a great threat to the British spheres of interest in the subcontinent, therefore, London with the collaboration of feudalism hatched a plot to overthrow King Amanullah. Such a plot was realized with the support of a bandit gang headed by Habibullah publicly known as swash-buckling son.

It was crystal clear to the British that it could not protect its interest in Afghanistan by supporting the bandit gang; therefore, the British replaced him by another loyalist person, King Nadir. In this way, the British, with the collaboration of the internal reactionaries, installed King Nadir into power and by giving him wide support, again consolidated the dark authority of the Mohammadzai dynasties in Afghanistan who ruled the country until 1978.

The people of Afghanistan soon realized that the regimes of King Nadir and his son Zahir were not in the service of the people; therefore, they fought to establish their own government. The reactionary regimes of King Nadir (1929-33) his son King Zahir (1933-1973) and President Daoud (1973-78) realized the fact that they would not be able to resist peoples' struggle, so, they resorted to that old cunning method of divide and rule, to suppress the peoples movement by promoting regionalism and communalism in the country.

Due to internal struggle within the ruling class, the monarchy was overthrown and a Republican regime was proclaimed in 1973 (the reasons for this will be discussed later on). The Republican order was overthrown by a military coup in April 1978 which resulted in the establishment of the so called Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The anti-people regimes of Noor Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal also tried to fuel the flames of communalism in order to consolidate their
But the people of Afghanistan from the beginning realized the anti-people character of these governments and they are fighting in a united front against their common and class enemies.

Today, many different ethno-linguistic peoples in Afghanistan fight the Soviet occupation in the country.

ETHNO-LINGUISTIC GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is a country in which different ethno-linguistic groups (nations) live together. Each one of the groups has its own language, culture and traditions. The dominant language is Persian (Dari) and the majority of the population speaks that language. Pashto is the second most important language which is spoken by 40% of the population.

The ruling class of Afghanistan belonged to the Pashtun nationality who ruled the country since 1747 with the emergence of Ahmad Shah Abdali at the head of the first patriarchal tribal monarchy in the country. The Persian language was the official language of the country and it was a language used in the court as well.

Pashtunization of the cultural life of the country started much later in the 19th century particularly in 1952. The oppression of national minorities by the Pashtun ruling class was advanced by the reactionary and anti-people governments of King Zahir and his successors. The oppression of national minorities by the Pashtun ruling class was enforced by the endorsement of the Immigration law which the government used to shift Pashtun nomads of Paktiya and other provinces in the regions among the tribes of Uzbek, Tajik, Turkman etc...

Anis Daily on January 21, 1951 reported that the immigration of the Pashtuns in the northern part of the country will start in 1952 under the supervision of the immigration office of the Ministry of Interior. By this, the anti-people government on one hand tried to win the oppressed Pashtun people to its side by giving them lands and settling them in non-Pashtun areas and, on the other hand, used the poor Pashtun peasants as a squad...
to suppress the other nationalities. This arbitrary immigration and naturalization of Pashtun peasants was carried out at the expense of the indigenous population (with the displacement and with appropriation of the landed properties of the local inhabitants).

The anti-people state deliberately made Pashtun tribes a thorn in the flesh of non-Pashtun people and tried their best to sow the seeds of distrust and hostility among the peoples of Afghanistan in order to perpetuate their decadent life.

The hegemony of Pashtun tribes was apparent in the cultural spheres as well. In 1950, for the first time a law was promulgated that made Pashtu an official means of communication in the country. Under this law, the government employees were forced to speak and correspond in Pashtu, while the languages of the other people and tribes such as Uzbek, Turkman, Baluch, etc. were never taken into consideration.

The Ministry of Education under the leadership of Mohammad Naim, the brother of Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud (1953-1963) and President (1973-1978) was publishing books for the promotion of the Pashtu language and many other institutions were established to promote this cause. Names of places were changed from Persian into Pashtu in all Persian and non-Pashtu speaking areas. Radio Afghanistan was broadcasting Pashtun chauvinism. Article 35th of the constitution of 1964 read as follows: "It is the duty of the government to provide useful programs for the development of Pashtu language." This trend despite the hollow phrasemongerings of President Noor Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal on the equality of the people still continues to exist. The present regime in collaboration with its masters, also tries to capitalize on tribal differences in order to advance their own narrow interests and provide a stumbling block in the way of peoples' unity for national liberation struggles.

The external reflection of Pashtun chauvinism can be crystalized on the issue of Pashtun and Baluch in Pakistan. The Baluch people were divided between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran and the Pashtun people
between Pakistan and Afghanistan when the British were forced to yield Afghan independence in 1919. Since that time the anti-people regimes of King Zahir, Daoud and the present one kept quiet about this issue. When internal struggle of the oppressed people of Afghanistan (all nationalities including the Pashtun oppressed class) posed a great threat to the reactionary states in Afghanistan, this issue was raised in order to divert peoples' attention from internal struggles.

King Zahir, who suppressed the people of Afghanistan, tried his best to please the Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan so that in case of a people's revolution, he would be able to seek their support against other tribes in the country. This was exactly what his father, King Nadir, did upon his coming to power in 1929. It was during this rising tide of Pashtunism that King Zahir nicknamed one of his sons, Mohammad Daoud, Pashtunyar (Friend of Pashtun). King Zahir took this infant baby (Pashtunyar) to every Pashtun gathering and conference to show people his nationalistic feelings.

King Zahir's mask of solidarity with the Pashtuns of Pakistan was exposed when Pashtun tribes of Akakhil, Afridi of Pakistan fought against the dictatorship in their homeland. The government of Pakistan gunned down hundreds of people of these tribes but King Zahir dispatched a congratulatory telegram to the president of Pakistan, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, on the occasion of Pakistan national day on March 23, 1960.

As mentioned earlier, Afghanistan is a country which has diverse ethno-linguistic groups. Each one of these groups has its rich cultural tradition and a long brilliant history which is full of heroic struggles against colonialism. But unfortunately, little has been written about the history, culture, revolutionary tradition, language etc. of the oppressed nationalities of Hazara, Uzbek, Turkman, etc. in Afghanistan. The ruling class of the Afghan government (mostly Pashtuns) did not allow any such literature to flourish and abandoned research on this subject. Foreign scholars also have never done anything but research on Pashtun history, culture, etc. that directly praised the ruling authorities in Afghanistan.
If some works on this issue has been done, it is void of any scholarly and scientific truth.

Therefore, analysing the history of a nation (different nationalities constitute the national state) from the perspective of the ruling class denies the very existence of other nationalities and their vast cultural traditions.

The main ethno-linguistic groups of the country are the followings:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethno-Linguistic Groups</th>
<th>Language</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>Pashtu</td>
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<td>Tajik</td>
<td>Persian</td>
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<td>Qizilbash</td>
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<td>Uzbek</td>
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<td>Turkman</td>
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<td>Kirghiz</td>
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<td>Baluch</td>
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<td>Nuristani</td>
<td>Kafiri dialect</td>
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<td>Brahui</td>
<td>Brahui</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arabs</td>
<td>Persian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hindus</td>
<td>Hindi, Punjabi, Lahanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>Hebrew (all speak Persian)</td>
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All foreign invaders fanned the flames of communalism for advancing their colonial aims. One of the main policies of the British was the "divide and conquer" policy. Since the political consciousness of the masses was low, therefore, foreign invaders could easily stretch their hands in the country by fueling regionalism. But the people of Afghanistan (all nationalities) fought foreign invaders and helped each other in every social and political upheaval. For example, all nationalities strongly participated in all three wars of national liberation against the British and today, they fight against the Soviet occupation forces to liberate their country.
THE CLASS STRUCTURE OF AFGHANISTAN

Afghanistan is a semi-feudal country, occupied by a superpower, the Soviet Union, on December 1979. The relation of production is based on feudal relations of production and almost 85% of the population are landless peasants with a small number of industrial workers that emerged with the nascent relations of national bourgeoisie at the beginning of 19th century. The peasants and workers have played revolutionary roles in face of any foreign invasions. Here I discuss separately the role of each one of the classes.

THE WORKING CLASS: The preliminary foundation of small-scale industry (gun and artillery) which was laid down during the reign of King Shir Ali Khan (1869-1879) in Afghanistan, brought with it the working class. The number of the working class increased later on during the reign of his successors in parallel with the increase in number of industries engaged in para-military and non-military activities such as boot-making, leather, cotton textiles, hydro-electrical installation of Jabalsaraj, a large scale (lucrative) government monopoly for manufacturing wine, whiskey and brandy which was exported to India.

The working class has always heroically fought to change their condition of living and the socio-political structure of the country; and sometimes dealt heavy blows to their lords despite their disorganization and lack of a revolutionary party to lead them.

THE PEASANTS: The peasants have always been under savage and unbridled exploitation by the feudal landlords and bureaucrats. Such a condition forced them to rise up and struggle against this tyranny and brutality. The peasants in addition to working on the farms of feudal landlords had to pay different kinds of revenue and taxes to the central government and additional taxes to the revenue collectors. Such severe working conditions and exploitation encouraged the peasant uprising of 1912-1913 in different provinces of Afghanistan.

Peasants constituted 85% of the population in Afghanistan and have always participated in Jihad against any
foreign invaders and its internal minions. Their participation in Jihad (which forms the subjective characteristics of the wars in Islamic countries) prior to anything else was the realization of their objective rational demands. However, such demands had a religious mark, because in a feudal society religion had the possibility of existence as a cultural entity. Pan-Islamism which was spreading among the peasants was a utopian disguise for equality and justice in reconciling the antagonistic contradictions of different antagonistic classes.

During the time when ideological confusion prevailed all over the movement, the expression of these demands (Pan-Islamism) was vaguely formulated but it was in conformity with the aspiration of the national bourgeoisie and was also considered a strong ideological weapons in the hands of peasants in their fight against internal and external dictators.

The Afghan victory on the Second and Third Anglo-Afghan wars was accomplished by direct participation of the peasantry and their heroic struggles. Therefore, the peasants always remained a revolutionary class in Afghanistan even up to the present time. The peasant's movements have always been manipulated and the political agents of bourgeoisie always deceived the peasants by using their class slogans. Therefore, the peasant liberation movement sometime slipped into the hand of the religious clergy and benefited some feudal lords. Thus the "national war" and sometimes the peasant movement were attributed to this or that feudal lord.

THE LOCAL BOURGEOISE: This class emerged during the time of King Abdur Rahman 1880-1901, who built a strong unified centrally feudal government. The internal stability achieved at this time provided the opportunity for the inauguration of a few light industrial networks. The bourgeois class, as a class in itself, was relatively weak, but it saw feudalism as a great barrier toward establishing new industrial networks. Since it had socio-economic ties and interests with feudal lords, thus it accepted few limited social reforms and did not fight feudalism more effectively. It stood in opposition to the feudalism and foreign capital only to the extent of smashing the feudal and imperialist webs which were spun
around its structure which limited its economic activ-

ities.

THE FEUDALS: The feudal constitute 15% of the popula-
tion of the country. They were the main obstacles to
the socio-political advancement of the country and always
fueled the flames of war in the interest of foreign
invaders and colonizers. A section of this class which
was relatively weak (from the economic point of view), had
advocated political conservatism (Pan-Islamism) and with
misgivings, they were drawn into democratic and national
liberation movements.

THE CLERGY: They can be divided into two distinct
parts:

a. The Aristocratic Clergy
b. The Vagabond Clergy

a. The Aristocratic Clergy: This group in addition to
having lands and properties, always enjoyed their reli-
gious prerogatives. They not only exploited the peasantry
who worked on their lands, but were also collecting money
and taxes from the people, in different religious forms.
They always implanted the seeds of social-religious
atrocities. In villages and towns, they were regarded as
Pontiffs with supernatural powers and in the cities, they
always held the position of judge, accountant, comptrol-
ners etc. In addition to these positions, they had
extended their roots into the royal aristocratic circles,
intellectual groups and political forces. Therefore, they
created a special political and economic force in the
country. The prominent figure of this class was Hazrati
Shorbazar whose family traditionally respected as a pontif
and inherited the right to crown the kings. This person
had deep influence among different tribes especially among
Sulimankhail tribes and gradually promoted as the chief-
tain in the religious hierarchy of the reactionary
aristocrats and biased clergy in the country.

The British always hailed the idea of "Pan-Islamism"
(which was a true reflection of anti-colonial nature of
a feudal Islamic society), in order to obscure the
influence of the October Socialist Revolution of 1917
in the USSR and its effects on the national liberation
movements of Islamic nations in British colonies. The Aristocratic clergies were not only hated by patriotic and progressive forces, but they were also hated by those aristocrats who favored the democratic and national liberation movements. Today as in the past, they always defended the old relations of production and try to restore their lost prerogatives.

b. The Vagabond Clergy: This group constituted the lower strata of the Aristocratic clergies. Their means of subsistence came from begging money from the people. They are members of the oppressed class and had always had close contacts with the masses of the people. Due to its religious nature and its common socio-economic ties, they had to follow the religious hierarchy and enjoyed respect among the people and always propagated the necessity of armed struggle and actively participated in such a massive social uprising. Numerous unknown national heroes and ideologues of anti-colonial movements were developed from among this people.

SOCIO-POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF AFGHANISTAN IN 1933-1978

From 1933 to 1978, Yahyah's dynasty ruled the country while members of the family held the key positions in the government offices. During this time, a handful of feudal-bureaucrats and bourgeois-bureaucrats savagely exploited the working people of the country and brutally undermined any kind of democratic and progressive movements. Thousands upon thousands of the young working-men and revolutionary patriots were jailed and underwent inhuman treatment until they died in those dark dungeons, which specifically were created for punishing the patriotic forces. The country's economy went bankrupt and the living conditions of the workingman were terribly deplorable that forced them to emigrate to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and many other Middle-Eastern countries.

Mr. Daoud, who earlier served as General Commander of the Central Forces of Afghanistan, was appointed Prime Minister of Afghanistan in 1953-1963, after he proved his collaboration with the other aristocratic circles in suppressing the movement of the Safi people and
establishing a relative stability in the country, he tried to improve the country's economic condition. To do so, he sought economic and technical assistance from the superpowers.

The political conditions were very suffocating, especially when Mr. Rasul was appointed Chief of the Afghan Intelligence Agency. The ruling class organized several mass rallies and demonstrations under the banner of the Pashtunistan issue and solidarity with the Pashtunistan people. The main purpose of such rallies was to belittle the main political campaign of the freedom fighters and to find an excuse for jailing and torturing revolutionary elements by branding them foreign agents, supporters of Pakistan and Pakistanis, etc.

During Daoud's premiership, in 1956, the first Soviet experts were invited to Afghanistan to assist in the drafting of the First Five-Year Economic Plan. The plan borrowed a large amount of capital from the two superpowers, to improve and develop transportation and communications networks. The highways built under this program largely connected Afghanistan to the main international highways and to the Soviet Union. The highways helped the ruling feudal-bureaucrats to import foreign commodities to the country and export raw materials to the world market.

The implementation of the first Five-Year Plan served the interests of the superpowers, but the national needs (Agriculture) of the country was never given any priority and consideration. It was due to this reason that agricultural activities gradually slowed down and famine struck the country.

Daoud signed contracts with the Soviets to purchase arms and munitions and initiated the building of several military airbases. The leaders of the Soviet Union were invited to Afghanistan and the same invitation was extended to the Afghan government to pay a visit to Soviet Union. Daoud and his cabinet had no fear of the Soviets as they used to have. (Soviet Union, under the leadership of Lenin, supported the progressive King Amanullah against the reactionary elements backed by the British like Nadir Shah and his brothers. Daoud was Nadir's nephew). Not only did he himself develop personal interests in reading
the Soviet literature but he also encouraged his friends: Daoud seemed to play the role of Prince Sihanuk in Afghanistan.

The alleged Freedom of the Press of the 1950's disappeared when Daoud took office as a Prime Minister of the country during the King Zahir period. No one dared to speak about freedom of the press and of speech. Daoud adopted two kinds of approaches—punishment and rewards towards intellectuals. In doing so, he awarded some pieces of land to those few graduate students and professors in the Jamal Mina and Parwan Mina, Kabul, in order to keep them busy so that they would not find time to participate in political affairs. Against others, he appointed special lawyers to trace them in court, filing several unlawful dossiers (accusing them for an alleged theft, embezzlement of the state properties etc.) for them so they should be kept busy. Such bureaucracies constituted the backbones of the feudal aristocratic governments of the time.

Daoud not only adopted such repressive measures toward the intellectual strata and revolutionary elements, but also brutally suppressed even those reformist elements who favored the Monarchy. The prominent figure of the reformist group, Mr. Abdul Malik Abdur Rahimzai, and his associates were jailed without legal trial. Such measures were purposely performed by him in order to teach a lesson to the other revolutionaries and frighten them to death in case they rebelled.

Daoud did his best to call himself the champion of the Women's movement (Modernization and unveiling the women) and attributed the first recruitments of the women in Afghan government offices to his historic mission. As a matter of fact, Daoud was not such a champion, but it was the influx of foreign commodities that flooded the internal markets (luxury items) and the comprador bourgeoisie needed consumers to purchase those commodities. Beside that, the families of the ruling class and rightist-liberals, whose mind and bones were imbued with imperialist cultural values, could not tolerate their quarantine by the feudal cultural values (feudal culture attached importance to the fact that women be veiled). Therefore, freedom of women, in
addition to many other factors, was considered a historical necessity of the time and was not of Daoud's initiation. But, such a movement never meant true freedom for the Afghan women.

Pashtun nationality and national oppression largely suppressed national minorities in Afghanistan. (By Pashtun nationality, it is not meant the general people, but rather the ruling circle of the Pashtun nationality. As many oppressed Pashtuns also, along with other oppressed nationalities, suffered heavy blows in the course of Afghan history.) In other words the national oppression along with feudal oppression lay heavily on the backs of the working people of Afghanistan.

Hazara, Kizilbash, and Turkman along with other national minorities, were not given a chance to rise to high ranking posts in the army, and they were deprived of their rights to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At a later period, the admission of their children to military schools was prohibited.

In fulfilling the Third Five-Year Economic Plan, the two superpowers began to export capital into the country. The Soviets were ranked first in exporting capital to Afghanistan, during the reign of Daoud as Prime Minister in 1953-63. The main characteristic of capital exports is to increase the interest rates of return in the donor countries. The capital export, which is mainly composed of consumer items, does not promote the industrial growth of the recipient nations so as to enable them to stand on their own feet.

In the First and Third Five-Year Plans, attention was paid to improving those raw materials that the capital lenders needed. For example, during the Third-Five year plan wheat, which was considered the most urgent need of the country, was never given priority. Instead priority was given to the planting of cotton in the northern part of Afghanistan. In the First-Five Year Plan, cotton production was raised by 127% and sugar beets by 17%. During the Third-Five Year Plan, the quantity of cotton production was raised by 130% and sugar beets by 57%.
Daoud, during his premiership, increased his relations with the Soviets. This policy conflicted with the interest of those liberal bourgeois groups who were trying to establish close relations with Western capitalist countries. This contradiction became acute and finally resulted in Daoud's resignation in 1963.

Upon the resignation of Daoud, a new constitution was promulgated. Principally the constitution was nothing except an unholy alliance of the comprador bourgeoisie and feudals to realize the superpowers' interests in Afghanistan.

The true essence of the anti-people character of the alleged democracy was immediately exposed when the government gunned down hundreds of young people at a demonstration in Kabul on October 25, 1966 (Sehumi Aqrab in the Afghan calendar). That day is regarded as a historic day in the history of the national liberation movement in Afghanistan. It was during this time that dissemination of progressive ideologies was initiated among the oppressed working people of Afghanistan.

After the promulgation of the constitution (1964), economic stagnation and bankruptcy constituted the main problems of the country. According to the statistics available, the average increase in imports (consumer products) of 1964-68 was about 17%. In contrast to this figure, the average increase of import of semi-consumer items, that were necessary to building industries, was 9.5%, a decrease in the same years.

In 1964, the value of Soviet exports to Afghanistan was $18 million (excluding military hardware), while its imports were around $27 million (this included cotton and wools, but excluded natural gas from Afghanistan). In the same year, the country's export to Western capitalist countries was $46.5 million while its imports were $50 million.14

In the balance of foreign trade of Afghanistan in the year 1964, the imports index of Soviet bloc countries shows $31 million (excluding military hardware) while the index of Western countries was $11.9 million. All these figures show the economic dependency of the country on
foreign capital and further shows that during the reign of Daoud as Prime Minister before 1963 the value of capital imports from superpowers greatly increased while after his resignation, it slightly decreased. Therefore, the interests of the superpowers and their allied ruling class in Afghanistan were damaged and required that Daoud should again assume state power, which he did in 1973.

The comprador bourgeoisie including White and Reds in Afghanistan was dissatisfied with the ineffective leadership of King Zahir. Each was viewing internal and external conditions in search of bringing a change in the country that would guarantee the smooth growth of its class interest. A military coup by several political rivals of King Zahir (Daoud, Sardar Wali son-in-law of King Zahir, former Prime Minister Maiwandwal and Musa Shafiq) was about to occur. Zahir's government was embarked on a corrupt road that resulted in the culmination of national starvation, impoverishment, inflation and disease. A World Bank report of 1972 summed up the situation as follows:

The past fifteen years have been frustrating and disappointing for those concerned with the development in Afghanistan. A relatively large volume of aid sustained high levels of investment to little visible purpose in terms of higher standards of living for the majority of the population. To some extent it was inevitable that the major share of investment would be needed for basic economic and social infrastructure, with long gestation periods. However, it has proved difficult to move from this stage to the point where effective use can be made of the infrastructure created and a proper impetus can be provided to the kind of productive activities which result in wider spread increase in income.

The report continued:

The responsibility for this situation lies with the inadequacies of administrative structure. This is reflected in the failure
of the government to manage the large number of public enterprises efficiently, to allocate funds within projects so as to secure the maximum return, to gear up its administrative capacity to prepare new projects and to promote the institutional and legislative changes needed to create an appropriate environment for private agricultural and industrial development. 15

King Zahir attributed the acute problems of the country to each Prime Minister, not to his administration and the existing relations of production.

For a long time, the ruling class deceived the people, under the slogan of democracy and parliamentarism, but their pseudo-democracy shattered and lost its credence in the eyes of the people. Therefore, no other alternative existed for them but to continue their savage plunder and exploitation, except by planning a coup and changing the old forms of exploitation (monarchy) into a new one (Republic) that would give them another chance to continue their moribund and decadent rule.

It was due to this reason that the coup occurred in 1973 under the leadership of Daoud, who proclaimed Afghanistan as a Republic for the first time.

SUPERPOWERS' INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN

The United States emerged unscathed out of the international conflicts after World War II defeated its rivals. Soon it tried to consolidate its power and bases in the regions which once belonged to its defeated rivals. A shift in Soviet policy after 1953 set the Soviet Union in contention with the United States in the redivision of the world in their spheres of influence. Both superpowers tried to influence Afghanistan under different names and using different policies.

One of the methods which both superpowers used was to tie the country to its capital. The advanced industrial countries are necessarily in need of alliance with reactionary ruling cliques in the underdeveloped countries
because they do not want their interests to be endangered. Thus, with all their might, they support reactionary regimes and try to annihilate revolutionary forces. Today in most of the so-called "Third World Countries" such reactionary forces who are the guardians of superpowers' interests, are in power and savagely undermine any attempt or movement which runs counter to the interests of the superpowers. This is clearly evident in the Philippines, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Despite U.S.-Soviet rivalry for world domination, Afghanistan was attractive for capital investment by both superpowers and for exploitation of its natural resources and the labor of its people.

The U.S. proposed the first developmental project (in the Hilmand & Argandab Valley) to the Afghan government. The U.S., along with its desire for political and military influence, wished to tie Afghanistan to the economic chains of the Western countries and to economically exploit the country. As a first step, the U.S. loaned $21 million at 3.5% interest for the construction of that project after World War II. The loan was to be paid back in 18 years and the equipment for the project had to be purchased from the U.S.A. The Morson Company was responsible for the construction of the project.

The second U.S. loan for this project was given in 1954 at 4.5% interest for a period of 13 years. The American government and U.S. private enterprises invested $51.75 million at an interest rate of 4% from 1946 to 1957. Only eight percent of these loans were spent on the Hilmand project. Due to the quality of the soil in the region the project did not yield any favorable results.

U.S. loans to Afghanistan decreased after 1960's for the following reasons:

1. The escalation of political movements inside Afghanistan increased the risk of the U.S. losing its money.
2. The increasing influence of the Soviet Union in the country.
During the period of 1960 to 1967 Afghanistan's imports from the United States exceeded $4720.72 million Afghanis ($1=45 Afghanis). After this period the amount of Afghan imports drastically declined. The U.S. made a profit of $4.66 million from its loans during ten years of 1946-1956, and also sold many of its products in Afghanistan.

SOVIET POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN:

The Soviet Union in contention with the United States influenced Afghanistan by exporting to it capital and military aid at a cheaper rate than the U.S.

The issue of Pashtun and Baluch between Afghanistan and Pakistan leaders, and the U.S. support of Pakistan in this issue, made the Afghan bureaucrats look upon the Soviet Union, which was looking for just such an opportunity, as an alternate source of support. The Soviet Union welcomed the Afghan bureaucrats and extended its all round political, economic and military support. The Soviet export of capital to Afghanistan consolidated the authority of the bureaucratic and feudal state and its controlling role over the economic activities in the banking and industrial sectors. This policy halted the growth of private investment and such a plan (the state monopoly capitalism) which was promoted by the Soviet Union, stopped the growth of a class which was antagonistic to the feudal type economy, and finally blocked the road for a genuine mass revolution in the country.

Under the guise of these policies "State-ownership, non-capitalist road of development," and finally the "peaceful transition to socialism," the Soviets aided Afghanistan not for the sake of its development but in order to completely tie the country to its economic chains, to politically and militarily dominate it.

When Mohammad Daoud took the state power with the help of the anti-people parties of Parcham and Khalk in 1973, the Soviet Union welcomed Daoud and his policies and encouraged the PDP (Peoples Democratic Party) to support Daoud's domestic and foreign policy which was in conformity with the interest of the Soviet Union in the
region, particularly Daoud's fascist actions in undermining the revolutionary mass movement inside the country and his fascist approach to the Pashtunistan issue.

Daoud came to power right at the time when the country was deeply immersed in an economic crisis and internal dissatisfaction, and while mass and intellectual movements were at their height.

Until 1978, Daoud could not do anything to improve the lot of suffering people inside the country and improve the crippled economic structure of the country. He even failed to utilize the Pashtun and Baluch issue.

Daoud normalized his relations with the government of Pakistan and Iran and the issue of Pashtunistan and Baluch which was a burning issue at that time cooled off. This and many other policies did not serve the best interest of the Soviet Union. It was on this occasion that the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to oust him by a military coup in 1978.

The Soviets extended its full fledged support to the so called Marxist-government of Noor Mohammad Taraki and Amin which emerged out of a coup in 1978. Taraki's and Amin's policy were not really different from the fascist policies of Daoud which were based on national oppression and Pashtun chauvinism. However, their policies were disguised under the slogans of socialism and equality. But the fascist regimes of Taraki and Amin also could not win the people to their side. Thus they imposed "socialism" and this "socialism" imposed from the top did not work, as it has not worked elsewhere.

The fascist policy practiced by Taraki and Amin forced the people of Afghanistan to violently oppose it and fight against it with tooth and nail. Later on Amin succeeded in over-throwing Taraki and began normalising his relations with the West. Such a policy endangered the Soviet interests in Afghanistan. In order to protect its interest the Soviets violently ousted Amin in December 1979 and replaced him by another loyalist, Babrak Karmal. The Soviets said: "We came to deliver the Afghan people from outside interference." They did not realize that they cannot hide their hands which had been stained in the
blood of the innocent people, by now wearing a different mask.

SOVIET INVASION OF DECEMBER 1979

Afghanistan was semi-feudal and semi-colony, a country that superpowers were contending with each other in exploiting the country's cheap labor force and natural resources. Today the country has been occupied by a newly-developed superpower, the Soviet Union. Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has been viewed as a sign of "proletarian Internationalism," "Defending the Afghan Revolution" by certain people who are being charmed by the rosy picture that the Soviets are presenting to the world. Today the Soviet Union dons the sign of socialism and practice fascism and terror in Afghanistan.

Today the hegemonic and expansionist policy for the establishment of world domination, the adventurous course for the preparation and incitement of war also characterize Soviet foreign policy, the global strategy of which and especially the ways in which it is applied have likewise become more aggressive.

Beginning with the occupation of Czechoslovakia, the policy of the Soviet Union has gradually assumed a pronounced militarist character which is expressed in the use of military force to realize its expansionist aims. Its military interventions followed one another. After Czechoslovakia came Angola, Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, into which the Soviets intervened by third parties. Finally came Afghanistan. Afghanistan marked the commencement of the great march of the Soviets toward the South where the world's greatest resources of energy are found, together with the most important strategic junctions and the fields where the most acute superpowers rivalries collide with one another.

The Soviet Union is seeking military bases in foreign countries and creating political military alliances with other countries to have them as outposts for the extension of its domination over the peoples and in its contest with the United States. Likewise it is not lagging behind in the armaments race. The Soviets have now a huge military
arsenal which they are continuously building up and perfecting in the preparations which they are making for the outbreak of war. The militarized Soviet economy has been placed in the service of realizing its plans for conquests.

There are illusions among certain people and political forces in various countries about the Soviet Union and there is a mistaken concept about the order which exists there and a naive trust in its policy. This comes about not only from the fact that the Soviet Union gambles heavily on its socialist past and that it peddles its policy of rivalry with the United States as an anti-imperialist policy, but also for many other reasons. The main one among them is that the Soviet expansion is generally carried out through its penetration into the anti-imperialist, liberation movements, transforming them into its instruments and exploiting them to its own advantage. The facts have shown that not only those who have trusted the "internationalist aid" of the Soviet Union, but also those who have believed that they can rely on Soviet "aid" and alliance with it they can safeguard their own national interest have become victims of its expansion.

What is the content of the so called "internationalist aid" preached by the Soviets? The basic criterion of the internationalism for them is unconditional submission to the policy and dictates of the present day Soviet Union, support for its activity in the political and ideological fields. Whosoever does not agree with such unconditional submission is accused of nationalism and reactionism. The so called fraternal aid given by the Soviet Union to Afghanistan and many other countries around the world is not derived from its benign wishes but rather from its greed for maximum profits and exploitation by means of exporting capital.

The Soviet Union stands first among the capital exporting countries that extended economic loan to Afghanistan. In the First Five Year Plan, its share was $34 million (60% of the total foreign loans of Afghanistan). In the Second Five Year Plan, $252 million (61% of the total foreign loans of Afghanistan) and in the Third Five Year Plan, it was $300 million.
These loans were not given free of charge nor was it a token of their goodwill but it was accompanied with 3% interest charge per year. During these Five Year Plans, most of the loans given by the Soviet Union, was spent on the construction of roads, ports and military bases in Afghanistan. This project did not bring any improvement on the living conditions of the people but it was designed to facilitate the import of Soviet commodities into the country and accelerate the country's export of raw materials to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union was pursuing another objective while constructing roads and highways in Afghanistan. Its objective was to bring the Soviet Union near to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. The roads built up by the Soviets have been used by their invading forces today in suppressing the national liberation movement in Afghanistan.

In the agricultural sector, Soviet aid in Afghanistan was given to those branches of agriculture that served the interests of the Soviet Union. During the Third Five Year Plan, the Soviet Union agreed to give loans to Afghanistan on the condition that this plan must be formulated by the Soviet experts.

In the past Afghanistan was producing wheat, cotton, sugar, minerals, cements, natural gas. All these products were exported to the Soviet Union while Afghanistan's domestic needs were completely ignored and Afghanistan was paying enormous amounts of money to buy these products back from the Soviet Union.

In 1968 the Soviet-Afghan technical contract for the extraction of natural gas (with an approximate capacity of two miliard cubic meters) in the northern part of the country was signed. According to this contract, the gas had to be exported to the Soviet Union. In the preface of this contract, it was written "according to the wishes of the Afghan government this gas will be exported to the Soviet Union." There was no doubt that the Afghan government due to its anti-people character was keen on exporting this gas to the Soviet Union. In this connection, the Soviet Union loaned 35 million Rubles at an 2.5 interest. According to the
contract, all equipment, materials for extracting gas and oil had to be purchased from the Soviet Union and the salary of the Soviet experts had also to be paid from this loan.

The price that the Soviet Union was paying for each 1,000 cubic meter of gas was $6.519 while they were paying $11.00 to Iran for the same amount of gas and the international price of the gas was $14.00. These are clear signs of Soviet exploitation of Afghanistan and its imperialist policy of plundering the country.

The Soviet Union which is locked in a fierce rivalry with the United States for world domination, has always tried to disguise its aggressive and hegemonic policy with demagoguery about peace, detente, disarmament, anti-imperialism, etc. Such phrases of Soviets about "internationalism", "defending the interest of a socialist country", being the natural ally of the national liberation movements, etc. have not been able to hide its aggressive and expansionist aims. However, the Soviets continue to try to disguise their aggressive, hegemonic and warmongering policy with high-sounding phrases in almost all of their propaganda, the real character of the Soviet policy was admitted by Yuri Andropov, in an interview with the West German magazine Der Spiegel. Responding to a question about the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, Andropov compared the Soviet occupation to what he described as United States' efforts to protect its interest in Central America. Andropov stated, "would the United States not care what kind of government rules in Nicaragua? Nicaragua is an enormous distance from America. We have a common border with Afghanistan, and we are defending our national interests by helping Afghanistan." This makes it perfectly clear as to why the Soviets are in Afghanistan and why the Afghan people are fighting? But the Soviet leadership forgot the lessons of history that the tanks and bombs and secret deals of the superpowers will never be able to extinguish the aspirations and struggles of the people for democracy, national independence and social progress.

The Afghan people have courageously demonstrated their determination to persist on their legitimate struggle for the liberation of their homeland until they
win victory. Neither the Soviet demagoguery nor their terror and violence can stop the development and the final victory of this struggle through to the end and this is the only path through which they can achieve national liberation of their country, by relying upon their own self-sacrificing efforts, and establish a genuine democratic society in Afghanistan.

The Afghans are not alone in their fight against Soviet occupationist forces. All peace loving people of the world are with them and support their just causes, because the Afghan war of national liberation does not only have national character but it is an inseparable part and parcel of the international war of national liberation for democracy, freedom, social justice and peace.

NOTES

2 Ibid., pp. 441-444.
3 Gupta, Annand, Lenin and India, New Delhi, India 1980.
4 Chubar, G. N., Afghanistan In the Course of History, Kabul, 1967.
5 Stalin, J. V., Collected Works, Vo. 6, p. 125 W. Germany.
6 Anis Daily, January 21, 1951, Kabul, Afghanistan.

11 Ibid., p. 28.


13 Ibid.


Of all the countries with a predominantly Muslim population, Turkey is probably the only one to seriously experiment with western-style, political democracy. For this reason, an examination of the Turkish case is critical to any discussion of democracy in the Third World.

POLITICAL DEMOCRACY DEFINED

By western-style political democracy, I mean any one of several types of political systems that share the following set of conditions:

1) The right of political choice through regular, open, and contested elections. A free selection process in which opposing groups have relatively equal access to the voters.
2) The existence and participation of genuinely opposing political groups, with restriction on the opposition determined by judicial or other open and objective processes.

3) Freedom of expression and dissent through public means, such as assembly, press, radio, television. Freedom of thought, religion, etc.

4) Universal suffrage. A political process open to the vast majority of mature citizens.

5) Legal equality. Citizens stand equal before the law without discrimination based on race, religion, class, sex, etc. The state has the responsibility to protect the security and rights of all citizens equally.

Using this working definition, we can say that only about thirty of the world's approximately 160 states presently qualify as political democracies. These include the states of Western Europe and North America, Mexico, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, and only a few other more debatable cases. Of the Middle East countries, only Turkey has qualified, and that was during only parts of the 1950's, 1960's, 1970's (see below). Israel's systematic discrimination against its own Arab citizens disqualifies it (see Lustick 1980).

TURKEY'S POLITICAL HISTORY

Under the charismatic leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later Mustafa Kemal Ataturk), the Turkish Republic was constructed on the crumbled foundations of the multinational Ottoman Empire, which had suffered dissolution and partition after World War I. Mustafa Kemal -- the most impressive military officer in the defeated Ottoman army -- refused to surrender Turkey to the will of foreign powers. His inspiring personality and unswerving determination revitalized the defeated Turks into a military force that drove the Greek occupation forces from Anatolia and secured an independent Turkish homeland. Kemal then embarked on the ambitious project of remaking the country into a modern nation-state in the image of the leading European powers.
This challenge required the creation of a new identity and symbol of loyalty for the peoples of Turkey. Unlike many of the new African leaders who must educate their citizenry to transfer loyalties from particularistic social units, like tribes, to a very general one, like a state, in Turkey Ataturk had to achieve the opposite. Loyalty and identity had to be shifted from the general to the particular -- from a wide multi-national Islamic-Ottoman Empire to a uni-national, secular Republic. This entailed the attainment of a new socio-cultural and political integration on the basis of secular values and norms which alienated many people and undermined their sacred symbols of collective identity. According to the program of Ataturk's Republican People's Party (RPP), "religion, being a matter of conscience, [was to be] separated from the affairs of this world and the state as well as from politics" (as quoted in Rustow 1957:86). Given the pervasiveness of Islam in Turkey, this goal was revolutionary, if not unrealistic.

Ataturk accused Islamic - Ottoman institutions and culture of responsibility for the fall of the Empire and the miserable conditions of the Turks, and he decreed that the new Turkey would be based on the principles of nationalism, secularism, statism, populism, and reformism (see Karpat 1959). Among his numerous secular reforms were the abolition of the Caliphate and Sultanate, the disestablishment of Islam as the State religion, the closing of the religious schools and brotherhoods, the replacement of Islamic law with European codes, the abolition of the Faculty of Theology, the replacement of Arabic script with Latin letters, and the prohibition of the fez -- the customary Muslim headgear. In addition, it was required that the Muslim call to prayer be made in Turkish, rather than the traditional Arabic, and Istanbul's Aya Sofya mosque -- a symbol of Muslim victory over Christian Byzantium -- was converted into a museum, while at the same time numerous mosques throughout the country were turned over either to the RPP for political uses or to the military for temporary barracks and supply depots. New mosque construction was strongly discouraged and in some places prohibited.

Kemal's principle of populism (Turkish, halkcilik) did not imply political or social democracy. Rather it
meant national independence through citizen labor. It also had anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist overtones. In his 1921 speech to the Grand National Assembly, Kemal said,

"Populism is a social doctrine which aims to base its social order on work. [...] To protect this right and to keep our independence secure, all of us pursue a doctrine which justifies nationwide struggle against imperialism that wants to destroy us and against capitalism that wants to devour us. [As quoted in Ozbudun (1981:88)]."

In later years, according to the Turkish political scientist Ergun Ozbudun, "populism came to mean... popular sovereignty and equality before the law, as well as a rejection of the class conflict" (Ibid.).

From 1923 until his death in 1938, Kemal Ataturk ruled Turkey through a single party system as a benevolent but firm dictator, who allowed no opposition to stand in the way of his reforms. Two experiments with multi-party politics "failed" when he quickly lost patience with opposition that he felt only impeded the country's rate of progress.

Although Ataturk could have been another sultan or a European-type king, he chose the title of President of the Turkish Republic. Yet, his political operating mode was not democratic. One of his biographers described him as follows:

"Mustafa Kemal was victor, dictator, undisputed master in his own particular world.... He had no wish to be dictator. The dictatorship was to him a necessary evil, which would have to stay until the people were ready to govern themselves. At the same time, he was no friend of liberal democracy. A soldierly-disciplined, well-led national State was his creed. He saw in that the State form of the future. [Froembgen 1971:256]."
Ataturk's successor, retired General Ismet Inonu, continued his political policies up to the end of World War 'I. At that point, Inonu moved Turkey more toward democracy. Many of the reasons for this shift have been succinctly summarized by the Turkish political scientist Kemal Karpat (1959:140-141):

It appeared certain at the end of the war that Turkey's political and economic interests lay in the West, and that these could be best served by a closer rapprochement to it. Thus, the destruction of the one-party regimes in Italy and Germany, the adherence of Turkey to the United Nations Declaration, and her closer rapprochement to the West considerably weakened the foundations of one-party rule at home. Moreover, the political atmosphere abroad, especially in the United States, made it apparent that without a democratization of her political system, Turkey would not be able to gain in the West the proper moral recognition she desired and needed. Furthermore, the strains of discontent at home, stemming from various political, social, and economic measures taken during the war, had become so serious that it was necessary to "open a safety-valve" to prevent a general upheaval. All of these helped to prepare the ground for liberalization.

Inonu announced in 1945 that he would permit another experiment in the formation of opposition parties. Dissident members of the RPP, who opposed the government's rigid stance on religion and the economy, immediately organized the Democrat Party (DP). This new party found support among businessmen disgruntled by strict wartime economic controls, consumers suffering from the high cost of living, Christians and Jews who had to pay a discriminatory tax (varlik vergisi) in 1942, elitist groups whose ambitions were not being promoted by the RPP, and millions of malcontent peasants who resented the RPP's neglect of agriculture and suppression of religious expression (Rustow 1957).
As expected, however, the rigged election of 1946 deprived these people of an opportunity to register their complaints. After over twenty years of strict compliance with RPP directives, the government officials and bureaucrats responsible for the election's supervision could not remain neutral: many acted as though their patriotic duty was to ensure an RPP victory. To correct this situation, parliament passed a new election law which required secret ballots, public accounting of votes, equal broadcast time for each party, and the supervision of elections by the judiciary.

The electoral system had been evolving progressively up to this time. During the early years of the republic, the voting franchise had been limited to males over eighteen years of age, and the national electoral system was indirect. Men voted for secondary electors who selected the actual deputies to the unicameral assembly. In 1934, women received the right to vote and to run for national office. Consequently, the Fifth Assembly, elected in 1935, had eighteen female deputies. In 1946, the electoral system became a partially direct one. In 1950 and thereafter, however, elections were based on fully direct suffrage. All votes became equal; ballots were cast secretly; and results were counted openly. Since that time, citizens twenty-one years of age or older have been eligible to vote, the exceptions being military personnel below the rank of officer, persons who have been convicted of or stand accused of serious crimes, and persons banned from the process by military governments. (For a fuller description of the systems of government and politics in Turkey prior to the 1980 coup, see Magnarella 1982.)

In 1950, the first open and honest election of the Turkish Republic gave the DP a resounding victory. Surprisingly for many, the Republicans honored the will of the people by stepping down. "Turkey thus became perhaps the only country in modern history in which an autocratic regime peacefully gave up the reins of government" (Tachau 1972:382).

The Democrats created an atmosphere of religious tolerance by allowing the Arabic call to prayer and including Islamic instruction in the regular primary
school curriculum as a voluntary course. Religious expression, long forced to remain secret or dormant, asserted itself openly once again. Nevertheless, neither the DP nor the majority of Turks favored the reestablishment of a religious state; most people preferred a combination of secularism in government and religious freedom in society. The DP accepted Atatürk's secular principles and acted against religious extremism.

The political divisions manifested during Turkey's multi-party era grew out of the country's dichotomous socio-economic structure. Until 1950, the RPP existed as a fascist-like totalitarian party, which claimed to be the supreme instrument of society. It was an elitist organization whose leaders doubted that a party responsive to the people could solve the country's pressing economic and social-cultural problems. The RPP rested on a supportive alliance of urban elite, civil bureaucrats, military leaders, and large landowners, who through their affiliation with the party were able to reinforce their domination over the peasantry, who together with the urban poor comprised about 75% to 80% of the country's population.

The DP, having found support among the disinherited and the RPP's own disenchanted, took a number of social and economic measures during its period of rule (1950-60) which altered this dichotomy. It gave more attention and benefits to rural areas: roads, electric projects, farm credits, aid for building construction, new industry, and more educational and medical facilities. These contributed to the villagers' and townpeople's new capacity for political awareness and involvement. In the cities, DP support for private industry and commerce facilitated the development of an urban elite that rivaled or surpassed the high bureaucratic and military echelons in terms of wealth and status. Accompanying these changes and compounding them were an economic boom and inflation that favored many DP supporters, but penalized people living on fixed salaries, such as civil bureaucrats and military officers (Ergil 1975).

Turkish citizens who profited from the DP's socio-economic measures and/or who valued the greater freedom of religious expression returned the party to power in 1954.
and 1957. These events served to increase frustration and resentment among RPP supporters who were suffering from withdrawal of status. To compensate for their impotence at the election polls, the frustrated urban supporters of the RPP began expressing their anti-government sentiments in the press and through public demonstrations. However, the political tradition that the DP inherited from the RPP was intolerant of vigorous and vociferous opposition. Following the model of the previous regime, the DP became repressive: it silenced the opposition press and legislated against public anti-government demonstration. By legal definition, most adverse expression became criminal.

Significantly, unlike former Generals Ataturk and Inonu, the DP leaders -- Prime Minister Menderes and President Bayar -- had never been professional military men, and the period of DP rule is the only time in modern Turkish history when a general has not occupied at least one of the two highest governmental offices. This fact contributed further to the military's lack of confidence in the DP. In 1960, when the government increasingly relied on the army to quell the "illegal riots" of political protest by university students in Ankara and Istanbul, the military leadership decided that civilian politics had failed.

Headed by General Cemal Gursel, the military carried out a bloodless coup on May 27, 1960, arresting Democrats holding national office and replacing most Democrats in municipal offices with either military officers or RPP members. During the ensuing period of martial law, the military permanently outlawed the DP and purged its own officer ranks of DP sympathizers. Former DP Prime Minister Menderes was accused of violating the constitution, and after litigation he was condemned to death and hanged along with his Foreign and Finance Ministers (see Weiker 1963).

One of the first acts of the ruling junta, known as the National Unity Committee (NUC), was to appoint a commission of liberal law professors to write a new constitution which would both act as a legal obstacle to future political abuses and institutionalize the military's involvement in politics. The resulting document created a bicameral parliament and made members
of the NUC senators for life. It also created a National Security Council, comprised of armed forces chief, which would assist the cabinet in making decisions concerning "national security and coordination." In addition, the constitution provided for a new independent court empowered to decide on the constitutionality of parliamentary legislation. It legalized the organization of free trade unions with the right to strike and bargain collectively. It called for certain social and land reforms, and provided autonomous status for radio, television and the universities. It guaranteed the freedoms of conscience, political belief, assembly, and press as well as the right to form political parties and cultural organizations. This was to be Turkey's most liberal and democratic constitution ever. It became law in 1961 after winning acceptance in a national referendum.

On April 11, 1961, the NUC lifted the ban on political parties, and most of the former Democrats reorganized themselves into the Justice Party (JP) and the New Turkey Party (NTP). In the October 15 general elections no party won a clear majority, but the former Democrats did surprisingly well, winning 46.6% of the vote (JP - 34.6% and NTP - 12%). The RPP, still headed by Ismet Inonu and favored by the NUC, won only 38.4%. Upset by the former Democrats' strong showing, certain military factions wanted to annul the election results, abolish the new parties, and continue praetorian rule. But General Cemal Gursel, head of the NUC, and the "moderates" decided to turn the government back to civilians.

Prior to the elections, the NUC had made the parties agree to avoid criticism of the 1960 revolution and to elect General Gursel President of Turkey as soon as a new civilian parliament was formed. After the elections, the NUC also forced the JP to enter into a coalition government with the RPP leader, Inonu, as Prime Minister. Despite these safeguards, praetorian radicals remained dissatisfied, staging abortive coups in 1962 and 1963.

From 1962 to 1965, four different coalitions experienced little success in their attempts to work together and govern the country. In the 1965 election, the JP, under the leadership of Suleyman Demirel (a civilian, businessman, and engineer), won a clear majority of
parliamentary seats and assumed power. The JP realized that in order to be permitted to govern, it had to convince the praetorians that it would protect and enhance the military's corporate interests. In his program speech to Parliament on November 3, 1965, JP head and Prime Minister, Demirel, lauded the military and promised that his government would "take the necessary measures so that the personnel of the Armed Forces... will be able to enjoy a standard of living suitable to the honour and pride of their vocation" (as quoted in Ahmad 1977:176). Following that, Demirel's government increased the military's share of the national budget substantially, greatly enhancing officer salaries and perquisites (Ergil 1975).

Another development pertinent to the military's corporate interests and national politics was initiated in the 1960's with the establishment of the Army Mutual Assistance Association, known in Turkey as OYAK. Among other things, OYAK controls a huge investment fund accumulated through obligatory and voluntary contributions of military personnel and investment profits. Sizable investments have been made in the auto, truck, tractor and tire industries; petrochemical, cement, and food processing industries; retail and service industries. In this way, the Turkish military became partners with foreign and domestic firms, and shared with them the same economic concerns. Through OYAK investments, the economic security of thousands of active and retired armed forces personnel became dependent upon the profitability of large capitalist enterprises. A "military capitalist sector" was created (Ahmad 1977:280-181; Ergil 1975). Consequently, the military's corporate interests expanded into the areas of labor law, trade unionism, monetary policy, corporate taxation, tariffs, investment banking, and related matters.

The late 1960s witnessed a deterioration of the Turkish economy (high rates of inflation, unemployment, labor-management strife, and small business bankruptcies). In response, many workers and university students began to support the radical programs of extreme right- and left-wing political organizations, whose right to exist was guaranteed by the 1961 constitution. The RPP had moved to the left-of-center under the leadership of
social democrat (and civilian) Bulent Ecevit in opposition to the pro-capitalist JP. Leftist views also became prominent in the media as well as in the lower ranks of the government bureaucracy and the military. Violent strikes and anti-government demonstrations; clashes between right- and left-wing students; occupations and boycotts of universities together with the economic decline created an intolerable situation for conservative military leaders.

Believing that Demirel's JP government was unable to cope effectively with the crisis, the praetorians forced it to resign and replaced it with a series of "above party" civilian governments from 1971 to 1973. During this period, the military also purged itself of several hundred "left-leaning" officers and cadets. It declared martial law in most of the major cities and over a dozen provinces; prohibited strikes and lockouts; banned radical political publications; arrested thousands of leftist, religious activists, and intellectuals; and shut down radical political organizations, such as the religious National Salvation Party and the pro-Marxist Turkish Workers Party.

Arguing that the abuses of the rights granted by the liberal 1961 constitution had been the cause of the anarchy, the military exerted pressure on civilian parliamentarians to amend it. Consequently, the freedom of the press was somewhat restricted, and the autonomy of radio, television, and the universities was curtailed. Certain categories of government employees were prohibited from joining unions. Authorities received the right to imprison persons for up to seven days before showing cause, and martial law powers were expanded. (For these and other amendments, see Dodd 1979:101-105).

In 1973, the military decided to step into the background again and allow the public to determine its government through general elections. Over the next seven years, Turkey was "ruled" by ineffectual coalitions often comprised of political parties with opposing views. Both the RPP and the JP had been reduced in strength by factional splits. Small parties profited from a new national remainder electoral system which permitted parties receiving insufficient votes on the provincial
level to win parliamentary seats to pool their votes on the national level and gain seats from their national totals.

The weak coalition governments were faced with problems too immense to handle: high rates of inflation and unemployment; a growing balance of payments deficit; serious energy shortages; industry operating well below capacity; labor and student unrest; and excessive urbanization. These were aggravated by an economic decline in Western Europe that put a halt to the flow of Turkish workers abroad and reduced the remittances of those already there. In addition, the U.S. embargo on military aid to Turkey, because of the latter's 1974 military operation on Cyprus, caused serious reductions in the defense budget.

Once more, many workers, students and other dissident citizens joined political action groups of the right and the left which advocated violence as a remedy to politico-economic ills. Violent strikes, bloody clashes between rival groups, political terrorism, and crimes of all sorts spread throughout the country. 3

On September 12, 1980, the military stepped onto this chaotic scene to take control of the government. It declared martial law throughout the country, dissolved parliament, banned all political parties and political activities, and arrested thousands of suspected terrorists and criminals, along with political activists, intellectuals, and union leaders. The country had failed again to function as a democracy.

The new military junta, called the National Security Council (NSC), was to rule the country for the next 3 years and 3 months as the most repressive of Turkey's praetorian governments. It came down especially hard on members of leftist trade unions and suspected Kurdish separatists (Barchard 1984; van Bruinessen 1984). 4

The NSC ruled by decree, which automatically became law. Among other acts, it permanently terminated all existing political parties and arrested several of their leaders. It also outlawed all but one moderate labor union confederation, and decreed that henceforth, unions
could not engage in political activity. The junta forbade strikes during its period of rule, and legally limited strikes thereafter to 60 days duration. NSC laws denied public service employees the right to strike and empowered the government to halt any strike for reasons of public health or national security. They placed the universities, radio and television under direct government supervision and sharply curtailed the freedom of the press. Any criticism of the coup, the NSC, or its actions constituted a crime. This law, like the others enumerated above, has extended beyond the period of praetorian rule.

The NSC threw out the 1961 constitution, replacing it with a much less liberal document that created a unicameral parliament and a very strong office of president. According to the new constitution, the president's actions can go largely unchecked by other branches of government. For example, Article 105 states that "No appeal shall be made to any legal authority, including the Constitutional Court, against the decisions and orders signed by the President of the Republic on his own initiative." Article 125 states that "The acts of the President of the Republic in his own competence and the decisions of the Supreme Military Council are outside the scope of judicial review" (1982 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey). With the acceptance of this new constitution in the November 1982 referendum, General Kenan Evren -- head of the NSC -- automatically became President for the next seven years.

The NSC scheduled elections for November 1983, after it had a new political parties and election law written. The praetorians barred over 700 former politicians from politics for periods of five to ten years. It also prohibited the thousands of persons imprisoned during and after the coup from running for office. All new parties and candidates had to submit to NSC review before they could enter the election. The junta had empowered itself to veto, without giving reason, any applicant. Of the 17 parties applying, only three survived the veto process.

In November, multi-party elections were held without incident, and a new civilian government was voted into office. Interestingly, the party that President Evren
supported came in last, while the one he targeted for criticism finished first. Turkey's citizens once more asserted their right to choose.

CONCLUSION

Owing to the Ottoman past, Turkey's citizenry historically has had only limited experience with self-government. During the era of the Turkish Republic, certain elites found the ideas of Western democracy appealing, but primarily in the abstract. Many of the same elites were convinced that Turkey's common people -- poorly educated or illiterate, religiously conservative, etc. -- could not be relied on to make the kinds of political choices Turkey needed to modernize (i.e., westernize) and join the ranks of European states. In practice, then, these elites favored a form of "custodial democracy." The military, claiming it acts in the name of the people and in accordance with Ataturk's tradition, has closely monitored civilian politics and has taken charge of the government when it seemed necessary.

During the first 61 years of the Turkish Republic -- from its founding in October, 1923 up to October, 1983, Turkey has experienced only 26 years and four months of multi-party civilian rule (periods: May 1950 to May 1960; October 1961 to March 1971; October 1973 to September 1980). Of these multi-party periods, the decade of the 1961 liberal constitution best exemplified the five conditions of political democracy enumerated at the beginning of this essay. The two other terms of multi-party politics represent weaker approximations of them.

The remaining political periods -- from 1923 to 1950, when the RPP of former Generals Ataturk and Inonu dominated the government, usually as the country's only legal party; from May 1960 to October 1961 and from September 1980 to November 1983, when the military ruled directly; and from March 1971 to October 1973, when the praetorians governed indirectly -- do not qualify as occasions of democratic government. With the November 1983 elections (restrictive as they were),
Turkey may have begun a transition back to some form of democracy. Time will tell.

Why has Turkey experienced such difficulty achieving and maintaining political democracy? Some observers say it is because such a governmental form is incompatible with traditional Turkish political culture which promotes authoritarian-patrimonial rule (e.g., Tamkoc 1983). Others believe a combination of sociocultural and infrastructural factors have inhibited democratic development (e.g., Magnarella 1982). Still others charge that Turkey's tradition of military interference and the military's established practice of using government directly to protect and promote its own interests threaten civil rule of any kind (e.g., Ergil 1975; Kemal 1984). Some less analytic commentators attribute Turkey's political problems almost solely to foreign subversion, either from the United States or the Soviet Bloc, depending on their own political biases.

There have been foreign pressures on Turkey favoring democracy. Following the 1980 coup, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Economic Community, and the Council of Europe -- organizations in which Turkey holds membership -- urged Turkey's praetorians to return to the barracks and permit the reestablishment of civilian rule as soon as possible. Within Turkey itself, there are strong democratic forces among some of the political elite, intellectuals, students and labor organizations. It appears that the realization of democracy will depend on the ability of these democratic forces to reach an accommodation with the military which must involve an agreement concerning basic infrastructural change.
In preparing this list, I have been influenced by Buultjens (1978).

This has been called the "coup by communique."

For a discussion of this situation as well as the infrastructural, cultural, and psychological conditions that promoted it, see Magnarella (1982).

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REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY
IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE
BECOME INDEPENDENT SINCE 1960

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INTRODUCTION

I am a former Administrateur de la France d'Outre-Mer and I performed my duties during 35 years in the following countries of Black Africa: Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Senegal, Niger, Chad and even in the Comoros Archipelago in the Indian Ocean off Madagascar. During the first phase 1942-60 I was the official responsible for an administrative district which I administered in the name of the French Government. Then in a second period 1960-77 I was a technical advisor to local governments after they had received their independence.

For these reasons I have been asked to analyze the causes of the failure to establish democratic regimes in most of the new African states. So I seek to find these causes, if possible, in the psychological system and traditional spinal marrow of the African Man.
The African Man - Homo africanus - will then emerge. My long association with numerous African people urges me to think that there exist in fact some common and basic traits among the people of the black race who live South of the Sahara. Quite obviously each people, each ethnic group, each tribe has its peculiarities which distinguishes it from others and which differs it from others. Anthropology scholars have spent years comparing and explaining these similarities and differences. Thus, I am well aware of the infinite varieties of human beings whom one can find in the area extending from the sandy edge of Senegal to the swamps of Bahr-el-Gazal, across the savannah shrubs of Upper Volta and the primeval forests of the Congo. Nevertheless, there exists a certain unity amongst these people, black or mixed, which one must take into consideration in any study about their psychological and political behavior. It is the idea of negritude which has been well defined by the President of the Republic of Senegal, Leopold Sedar Senghor, poet, writer and man of political affairs.

PART ONE: WHAT IS DEMOCRACY?

Before tackling a problem, we must define what we are talking about.

An ancient Chinese philosopher (was it Confucius or Lao-Tzeu, I do not recall) had said in response to a question on what is the most important base on which to establish a government of men: "The first thing which I would do is to define the meaning of the words".

I think that he is generally right. Most of the quarrels and wars which men undertake against each other have their source in different interpretations of the words which they use. Misunderstanding brings reaction and hostility.

The word "democracy" is a good example of a word which can have differing interpretations. For Americans of the United States or Canada and for the Europeans of Western Europe, the word "democracy" summons forth the words of Thomas Jefferson: "Democracy: government of the people, by the people and for the people".
But how many other interpretations can be made of this word? One talks about Greece, cradle of democracy. What democracy? That of a town like Athens where for 20,000 free men there were so many more who were slaves? Demosthenes and Plato held the stage but one must also look behind the scenes!

In our times, Soviet Russia, the countries of Eastern Europe, China and Cuba, give themselves the name of "Democratic Republics" and the people who live in these states really think that they live in a democratic state as they lack any means to make a comparison in time or space: the little canary who has been born in a cage thinks himself free and master of all his movements.

Let us turn to the problem which interests us: democracy in Black Africa. From the above, it becomes a question of defining "democracy" in terms of the type found in North America/Western Europe (call it "Atlantic democracy" to advance our proposition) because the Black African countries are former English, French or Belgian colonies. It is this type of Atlantic democracy which we wished to install in them, with some local variations. French-type democracy was more worried than English democracy which for its part was more realistic that the French version. But despite these subtle nuances, we observe that, from Dakar to Lagos, from N'Djamena to Freetown the graft did not take. Why?

OBSTACLES TO THE INSTALLATION OF AN ATLANTIC-TYPE DEMOCRACY IN BLACK AFRICA

It is always difficult to implant institutions coming from outside in states whose history, cultures, and religions as well as level of economic life are very different from those who wish to make this implant. This fact can be verified by all the Black African countries and particularly by those on the edge of the Sahara such as Niger and Chad.

And unfortunately, one can say without making a mistake, if the new African states must adopt democracy as a political institutions, they are more apt to adopt a democracy of the Russian type rather than of the
Atlantic type. We will bring this out in the following paragraphs.

a. **Democracy and the Level of Economic Life.** In order that an Atlantic-type democracy nurtures and develops, it is necessary that the people who will live under such a political system have a satisfactory standard of living. When men die from hunger, when cattle die from thirst, it is very difficult to interest men in political matters and to ask them to participate in the running of the state.

"First to survive, then to philosophize" said a writer in the Middle Ages. Let us note that democracy in the countries of Europe could not really develop until the XVIII century when the specter of Famine had been rolled back.

Africa, and in particular the Sahelien countries, like the Niger, Chad and Sudan, have the lowest level of income in the world. The area of these countries is three quarters desert. The rainfall in South Chad is only 1070 mm. in an 80-day period, 640 mm. in 50 days at N'Djamena (formerly Fort Lamy), and 4-5 mm. in a year in the north (Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti). Under these conditions, it is difficult to engage in conversation on different forms of democracy with the Toubbous nomads who roam in these regions, searching for unutilized wells and for some dwarf acacia trees for their camels. I think that they have more important problems to resolve...

If we look now at the sanitary conditions, we cannot engender any more optimism. In Chad, at the present time, one child out of three dies before the age of two. With rare exceptions a man of 60 is the equivalent of a man of 100 in our society. Microbial and parasitic diseases render precarious the health of youths and adults. In Chad, there is a permanence of dysentery, leprosy, tuberculosis, and malaria. If you manage to escape them you run the risk of catching parasites which cause bilharzie, oncho-cersose (which causes blindness) or the Guinee worm which paralyzes you. Without good health, do not talk about democracy, because I have too many other things on my mind and I cannot reply to you!
If we really wish to introduce a democratic regime in Chad and the other Black African countries, let us first establish the conditions necessary and adequate for men not to die of hunger but to enjoy good health. A full cooking pot comes ahead of an election ballot! As a clerk once said to me in requesting an increase in salary: "Monsieur, an empty sack cannot hold itself up". And democracy must be able to hold itself up.

b. Democracy and Individualism. Democracies of the Atlantic type are based on "the rights of man"; the Declaration of Independence of 1776 in North America and those of 1789 in France are the bases of our democratic system and they engendered during the XIX century all the democracies conforming to our moral norms. That which matters is that the individual, whoever he may be, is owed respect, liberty, and security. Laws are made for him, not against him. He is the fundamental element in our entire political structure.

Now, what says one who has lived in Black Africa a while? He states that the African man does not exist as an individual; the African exists only to the extent that he belongs to his group: village, tribe, ethnic. The African, even if he has not known the Christian religion follows the advice in Ecclesiastes, (1: 10) "Woe unto him who is alone". African life is constantly collective: adobe houses are built for the future owner helped by his neighbors, cousins, and friends; sewing and harvesting are done jointly; one actually lives only in a collective effort, including collective joy and collective mourning. Actual life in Black Africa never really blooms unless it has a collective manifestation. In my 35 years in Africa, I have never seen a man work, hunt, play, or cry alone. No, the individual does not exist and he is being asked to be a perfect democrat by isolating himself by dropping a voting ballot in the election box. "That heresy! What nonsense!

The poor man does not understand anything and he considers that moving into this little closed booth cannot but bring his misfortune. This is why, despite the many explanations which we gave him during the Colonial period, the African has refused to use the
ballot box and thus shows to everyone that he does not want to be seen as different from his racial brothers.

Do not be surprised then that Africa is the continent of single party system! There Soviet-type democracy conforms better to their customs and tastes than our liberal and individualistic system. Long years of apprenticeship are still necessary if we wish to establish solidly in Africa democracy of the Atlantic type, but will Russia and her satellites allow us the time? I pose the question without prejudging the reply.

This problem is not new. I recall that at the Ecole Nationale in Paris, which was preparing us for our careers as Administrateur, a professor liked to repeat: "If you wish that Africa count in the world, you must count the Africans and you others, young administrators, you should multiply the census of the population". This was a view both rational and individualistic on the question and, 40 years later, I ask if my professor was not right?

c. Democracy, Education, and Reason. Despite the efforts of the Colonial powers during 70 years, the efforts of international and multinational organizations during 20 years, the literacy rate in Black Africa is not very high: 2.5 percent in Niger and Sudan, 4.5 percent in Chad, and 9 percent in Senegal (this percentage based on the total population in each of the four countries). In the large towns of Chad, D'jamena, and Sudan, one Chadien out of ten knows how to read and write. In the bush one Chadien out of sixty knows how to read and write. Under these conditions it is really difficult to ask the people to interest themselves and to participate in political affairs.

Why ask these illiterates to choose in full consciousness the candidate who will best defend their interests? If physically a choice is made possible only by making the ballots in different colors or presenting symbols such as animals or other objects, one can doubt the value of such an electoral process. The candidates are largely unknown by the voters; they are often of another race or speak another tongue than the voter and if they make campaign tours they will use abstract terms such as "nation",
"national representation", "public finance", and "economic relations" which make absolutely no sense to the illiterate voter who has never been outside his village. To talk about democracy under these conditions strikes me as a bit illusory!

The political process is just a game for some half-educated officials with already well-lined pockets and hearts of personal ambition.

The Chadiens, like other people of Black Africa, are simple types and they can understand a simple political program. In the years preceding independence, political parties like the R. D. A. in Chad and other countries of French rule, the C. P. P. in Ghana and the T. A. N. U. in Tanzania had a great influence on the people because their programs were easy to understand: independence, the departure of most of the Europeans, the end to administrative worries, a better distribution of the land. Once independence was obtained, the political programs became so complicated that the illiterate or semi-literate lost their footing; they could no longer follow the political chiefs and they lost interest in the democratic regime about which they had been told and which did not change one bit their style and level of life after independence. African political life became then a struggle between a bourgeoisie without tradition, officials who thought themselves intellectuals and military who carried a revolver at their belt: hardly an argument for democracy.

Finally, one must remark a very important contradiction between Atlantic-type democracy and African mentality. For us Democracy and Rationalism go together: one cult of reason, of logic and of scientific strictness are the essential machinery of the democratic system.

In Black Africa, even amongst those who have been to school, even amongst the directors and ministers the way of thinking is not often rational; belief in magic, in spirits, in the operations of supernatural forces remain well anchored in men's hearts. Such bents of mind do not encourage, let us agree, the operations of a democratic regime.
d. Democracy and the Will for a Communal Life on a National Scale. On 15 November 1884, an international conference was held at Berlin in which the then 14 most powerful nations in the world, except for Switzerland and the United States, participated. This conference set the conditions by which the division of Africa could be accomplished by the colonial powers. This was the start of a "steeple chase" as it is called in England. Actual presence gave a right of sovereignty. It was a beautiful race between the French, British, Belgians, and Germans to see who could arrive first.

Obviously, at this epoch, the rights of the local population, regard for ethnic or cultural units, and natural geographic limits were scarcely respected. Numerous peoples were cut in two as in the case of the Ewes between Gold Coast and German Togoland. The frontiers between the British and French colonies were demarcated in as artificial a manner as those which separated Gold Coast and French Niger. Lord Salisbury said on this occasion that he was leaving to "the French Rooster the Sahara's sandy wastes to scratch".

If there is any African state which illustrates this absurd partition of the Black Continent, it is Chad. In order to understand how this state was born, it is necessary to retrace briefly the Colonial origins of this territory.

From 1850 on Lake Chad attracted like an iron magnet the great explorers: Barth in 1851, Vogel in 1854, Rohfs in 1866, Nachtingel in 1870, Monteil in 1891. One imagines this lake to be like an interior sea, fertile and navigable around which stretch fertile green fields. In reality, it is just the contrary: the lake is quite shallow surrounded by marsh covered by papyrus trees and the desert moves in several kilometers farther away.

For France, the possession of Chad appeared not only like an Argonauts' dream but also as a political necessity. To the French installed in Algiers, in Dakar, and the borders of the Congo, Chad appeared to them as the key to the empire which they were building... and they must arrive there first. Paris gave necessary orders...
In 1898 three columns were directed toward the banks of Lake Chad. The first and largest, that of Colonel Lamy, left Algiers to cross the Sahara. Another, that of Joalland, departed from Dakar, going up the Senegal River, then down the Niger River. The third, Gentil's Mission, left Congo and cut a path through the dense forest. If we disregard the political reasons, we can hail the expeditions as a "sporting feat" which represented long marches by foot, by horse, and by camel totaling more than 3,000 km. The junction of the three columns took place on 22 April a little north of the present site of D'jamena (Formerly Fort Lady).

Seven days later they engaged in a battle with a petty king of the region, Rabah, an Arab half-breed from the Abeche area who gained his forces and fortune from the slave trade with Tripoli and Cairo. Rabah was killed and his "empire" transformed into a military territory: the country and protectorate of Chad. His adversary, Colonel Lamy, wounded by a spear thrust, died the same day.

The conquest completed, and accomplished rapidly, it was necessary to give a political framework to the country. A text of 1903, modified by a decree in 1906, attached Chad to French Congo. When the "French Equatorial Africa" group was formed in 1910, Chad took its place as the "Colony of Chad".

But the boundaries of this territory were never precisely defined. Chad, like other African countries, served more as a bargaining chip in European diplomatic discussions. France, in order to have its hands free in Morocco, on 9 November 1911 ceded to Germany a part of Congo but received in return what was called the "duck's beak" region of Moundou which was detached from German Cameroon and annexed to Chad.

In 1926 the French, stating that the Chad which they themselves created was not viable, attached the entire southern part to the colony of Oubangui-Chari (capital Bangui), then four years later reestablished Chad with its former boundaries.
In 1934, the French Prime Minister Pierre Laval signed an agreement with Mussolini to cede to Italian Libya a strip of land of 110,000 sq. km. running the length of the northern frontier of Chad. Actually this territory was never ceded to Libya because the agreement with Mussolini was never ratified by the French Government. However, it is this area, now known as the "Aozou Strip", after a miniscule oasis lost in the desert, which is being claimed by Colonel Khadafi today.

On 11 August 1960, the independence of Chad was proclaimed to the whole world and the frontiers of this new state were those which had been fixed by the colonial powers 50 years earlier. To touch them in any way is considered a sacrilege against the New Africa.

I must be excused for this long historical introduction in a piece on democracy and national unity, but it seems indispensable in order to clarify the question. Africa was not born in 1960!

Let us look at the Chad which is endeavoring to survive in 1983. It is an enormous area of 1,284,000 sq. km. whose population has reached 3,800,000. This gives an average population density of 2.9 inhabitants per square kilometer, but it must be noted that in the regions of Sahr, Moundou, the density reaches 80 people per square kilometer. On the other hand, between Faya-Largeau and the Libyan border, it is 0.1 people per square kilometer. There are two large cities: D'jamena with 200,000 inhabitants (before the war) and Sahr with 80,000 residents.

The North and the South of this country are quite different. In fact, they are in constant opposition to each other. The North before Colonization comprised the Sultanates of Baguimi, Kanem, and Ouadia. It is a zone of poor, scattered and thorny vegetation where the people are sedentary or semi-nomad. The far north is made up of the mountainous massif of Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti peopled by the Toubbous nomads who circulate in Libya as much as in Chad. All these peoples have been converted to an ignorant and fanatic Islam. Some are of the pure white race having originated in the oases of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. Others have more or less a
mixture of black blood, the black portion increasing as one heads south.

In the South are black people of the Sara race, animist peasants who devote themselves to the cultivation of millet, rice, and cotton. They are more open to European culture than the Moslems of the North and have attended French schools. Those who served in the French administration came from their ranks. They never had any sympathy for the nomadic herdsman of the North who in turn considered the Saras as people to be enslaved and treated like cattle.

Given these differences in race, in religion, in past history, and present interests, the installation of a democracy in Chad seems pretty difficult. Democracy is based on a consensus on a common life, one not imposed by force but one desired by each citizen. How does one maintain unity in such a country when there is no force? So we face this dilemma: Maintain the unity of the country by sacrificing the liberty of its citizens or introduce democracy at the risk of seeing the disintegration of the country. Incidentally, the federal type solution recently proposed by M. Mitterand is rejected by the majority in the whole world!

e. Majority and Unanimity. Democracy, at least the type which I call Atlantic, depends on the will of the majority: the people are consulted, a majority emerges and it is charged to govern the country. The minority does not hesitate to criticize but it submits.

For one accustomed to the mores and practices of Black Africa, this rule is alien to the country. In the gatherings of the family, village, and tribes decisions are not made by just the majority; the rule of unanimity must be followed. They may discuss one day, two days, three days but they must arrive at a formula acceptable to all participating in the meeting.

These African traits find themselves in the conduct of Deputies in the National Assembly, in the councils of the government, and the Organization of African Unity. Always the rule of unanimity is followed. "Contrivance!
Masquerade!" scream Europeans and Americans. No. Just go back to the African mind which is different from ours.

This system of "all or nothing" makes practically impossible the functioning of democracy in Black Africa because if unanimity cannot be obtained, there remains only one solution: war and dissidence. In the final analysis in Africa there is no minority and this aspect makes, once more, these new states lean toward the type of "peoples' democracy".

f. Democracy and Progress. To us the two notions are allied: no democracy without progress and no progress without democracy, an interacting phenomenon which alternately sends back the weight of the pendulum and thus advances the machine.

But in Black Africa did those who introduced democracy on the day after Independence well understand the views of Africans about progress? Oh! I am not speaking about purely material progress such as the use of automobiles or of radio transistors; these are foreign customs which do not involve one's deep personality.

From what I know about Africans, these people are not for any real progress, that is a change from what exists. The African looks to the past. Do you know that in many African languages: Bambara, Malinke, Foullah there is no future conjugation? There is no future, only a present and a preterite. So is not language the materialization of thought; certain philosophers affirm even that speech creates thought. Primum est verbum said the evangelist according to St. John - (1:1).

I remember the reaction of a peasant in Upper Volta when I questioned him about his conduct. "What I want" he said to me "is to place my feet exactly in the footsteps of my father. That is the only normal path to follow; to leave his path would be to commit an error which would bring misfortune to me and my family".

Atlantic democracy will have a different time, in my opinion, in such a submission to the past.
g. Democracy and Separation of Powers. In the XVIII century the philosopher Montesquieu brought out in his essay on L'Espirit des Lois that liberal democracy rested on the separation of powers. The legislative votes the laws, the executive promulgates them, and the judiciary insures their application. If there is confusion in the separation of these powers, then there is no more liberty and despotism takes over in that nation. The Founding Fathers of 1776 and the French Revolutionaries of 1789 were inspired by this doctrine in writing the new constitution and, in my eyes, they will always be the best guarantee of the rights of man.

How goes it in Black Africa? For most of the illiterate blacks the abstract notions of judiciary, executive, and legislative make absolutely no sense. In using this vocabulary we take off for another planet!

And furthermore, this separation of powers is contrary to all their customs. In Africa with the Sereres of Senegal, the Ashanti of Ghana, the Yorubas of Nigeria, the Djerma of Niger, the Saras of Chad, everywhere, he who holds the executive power also holds the judicial power: to command and punish, it is the same thing. How can a chief command if he does not have the power to judge? How can a judge pronounce a judgment if he does not hold political power? Hence this separation of powers for a Black African is an absurdity, a shocking bit of nonsense. As for the legislative, he ranks it in the category of councilors, priests, and jesters - important men, yes, but subordinate to the chief executive.

Here again we put our finger on the profound incompatibility between the African mind and democracy. Perhaps one day the African will be able to distinguish our subtleties but for the moment he is still a long way off.

h. Democracy. "Jus rations loci" and "Jus rations personnae". These two Latin terms were current after the Fall of the Roman Empire and throughout all the Middle Ages. Laws were not applied with reference to the territorial scene of the crime or misdemeanor, but in relation to the statute or origin of the person. The Franks, Visigoths, Lombards, Gallo Romans, each one
had his own statute and even though inhabiting the same town or same province, the laws were not the same for everyone. In Black Africa the traditional courts, presided over by an African in former British colonies, by a Frenchman in former French colonies, followed this principle for civil and commercial affairs, the respective penal law of the territorial unit in which located. The colonizers were wise in this instance because this practice fitted in perfectly with African ideas of justice; they would have been offended by being subjected to laws which would have trampled on differences in race and religion.

These feelings about belonging to such and such ethnic is always strong in Black Africa although for several years it has been growing weaker and weaker. The inhabitant of Chad thinks of himself first as a Sara, Toubou, Peulh before thinking of himself as a Chadien; he has brothers or race and fellow citizens.

Now one of the essential elements of democracy is equality of citizens. "All citizens are equal under the law"; all our constitutions repeat this. Democracy is leveling. How can this idea fit with African thinking? Badly, I think, and it will take years to rub out the ethnic and religious differences which determined statutes - legal or illegal - of the men and women of Black Africa. Such changes are not made in a day. To move too fast risks derailing the system. The French fable teller La Fontaine wrote: "Seek the natural, it will return at a gallop!"

Let us not stalk the African character at the risk of its reacting faster than it normally moves. I will cite as an example the decision made by President Tombalbaye a year before his disposal to require all senior officials of the Chad Government to undergo, in the deep bush, initiation rites into the secret and grotesque society of African wizards. Some of them came back crippled from this little joke!

In a democracy the law is the same for all. this is not always the case in Chad or elsewhere... this depends on the race of the President and the accused!
CONCLUSION

Finally, we arrive at the close of our analysis on the introduction of Atlantic-type democracy in the newly independent countries of Black Africa and particularly in Chad.

I recognize very well that there are many other things to say and that my exposition is incomplete.

I also know that this exposition can be charged with lacking in objectivity - I plead guilty - but, "your honor" who is objective? Is there a man who is "objective", neutral, without feelings or without a past? I claim only to be sincere and never to have altered the truth intentionally. I hope that my 35 years experience in Africa will not be lost, especially for the young, and that it can serve for a better understanding between the Blacks and the Whites, for without this understanding there cannot be a reciprocal esteem, and without esteem there cannot be a human brotherhood.
INTRODUCTION

The problems which Pakistan is encountering in establishing a viable democracy stem historically from the geography and the ethnic diversity of the vast Indian subcontinent, the centuries-old conflict between Hindus and Muslims, over a century of administration by British Civil Servants, and the 1947 birth of Pakistan in a bloodbath of communal massacres. In this frustrating environment it has been difficult for a democratic parliamentary system to flourish and the civil and military services have governed the country for 29 years out of its 37-year old history.

A DIVIDED SUBCONTINENT

It must be remembered that never was the subcontinent politically one united whole. It had been conquered piecemeal by Aryans, by the Muslims, and by the British administrative and political creators. In its thousands of years of history the subcontinent has witnessed the

1 For readers unfamiliar with South Asia Robert L. Clifford has written this introductory paragraph.
rise and fall of Buddhist and Hindu empires, the creation of the Moghul Empire by Muslim invaders, and the spread of British rule over the subcontinent from 1757 to 1849. In 1947, when the British granted Independence the subcontinent was partitioned between Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. Today, Pakistan occupies about 22% of the area and has nearly 10% of the people in the subcontinent.

Hindu people of India had maintained for thousands of years a caste system which stratified its society into Brahmin the priest, Rajput the warrior, Vesh and Kashatri as the businessmen and tillers of land, and Achut, the original inhabitants, as untouchable slaves. This system continued and destroyed the indigenous Buddhism which had to go East to find a home. Neither nine hundred years of Muslim rule nor the 150-odd years of British domain could change Hindu hatred of non-Hindus or Hindu desire to dominate. Muslims and Christians were termed Malech, a sub-human species, destined to live in Hell forever.

In the West, landlords were emaciated by the Hindu moneylender and the Muslim people were kept away from industry by the Hindus and the British so that they remained a fertile recruiting ground for the Army and for others employed in the lower range of Civil Servants.

In East Bengal, its people were the outcastes of the 1857 Bengal Army which had mutinied and ever since punished for their patriotism. The Hindu Tax Collector took over as landlord and the Bengali tenants became the hewers of wood and carriers of water. The Dacca Muslim weavers were destroyed. The tiler of the soil with a world monopoly of indigo became a victim of chemical substitutes.

It was against this background of Hindu religious bigotry and Muslim economic backwardness that the subcontinent was partitioned on Independence from Britain. Muslims feared the caste-ridden Hindu majority with its rapacious money-lending class. Pakistan was created to safeguard the Muslim majority areas as well as to balance Muslims against Hindus. Muslims had to seek their own protection by claiming independent homelands in the areas
where they were in the majority in the North West and North East of the subcontinent.

BRITISH RULE

Where the British Colonial Government was concerned, India as a whole was a gold mine under their sole control. It was literally a Jewel in the British Crown and a main source of income for their commerce. The British started with the establishment of the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras in the late 17th century, destroying all opposition through the sword but mostly by intrigue. Later Calcutta became their main headquarters and the source of their Bengal Army. Then the British bribed and purchased their way throughout the rest of India. Their last acquisitions were the Sikh Kingdom of Punjab, Sind of Mirs, and Baluchistan of Sirdars.

India was divided into British India and the Indian States. In British India, provinces were created on the basis of their economic usefulness and were governed directly by British administrators. The Indian States were ruled by vassals who had accepted British paramountcy.

Progress toward viable political self-rule was a long drawn-out process. It started with partial Indian participation in municipal government. Dyarchy was established in the Provinces with Indians handling non-income-bearing departments but with British keeping Finance and Revenue under their control. At the Federal Government level, the British Parliament's Government of India Act of 1935 laid down the fundamentals for self-rule but it was made subject to assents by the rulers of the Indian States. This was made impossible by the British-staffed Political Department which oversaw these rulers. Hence this Act never came into effect until the final Independence in 1947.

During World War II, the Muslims took full part in the Allied war effort in the hope of an eventual grant of safety in the form of a separate Dominion. On the other hand, the Indian National Congress started insur-
rection by launching an anti-British "Quit India" movement.

After the war, the British Civil Servant in India was opposed to the Labour Government in London granting independence. These Civil Servants created a cleavage between the two religious communities. The British Army in India was interested in keeping the entire entity of India for Imperial defence purposes.

But the Labour Government in London was more pragmatic. Britain was economically broken by the war. The Labour Government considered it better to attain economic superiority in the subcontinent than to continue political rule. Then there was the question of settling the large British debts owed India. So a deal was in order.

The Americans were pleading the cause of freedom, considering it a problem parallel to their own Independence struggle, but were apt to oversimplify the problem on account of their lack of apprehension of the caste system, religion and other ethnic problems involved.

INDEPENDENCE AND PARTITION ACHIEVED

In the negotiations for independence many a hurdle had to be crossed by the Muslims because of the personal likes and dislikes of the British Civil Servants. While the Hindu had to fight for freedom from the British, the Muslim had to fight both Hindus and the British for their own existence and economic emancipation. Muslim negotiators fought against the establishment of Hindu hegemony over the subcontinent and fought for the creation of two countries, with Pakistan to be split between a West and East wing. Eventually, agreement was reached. A moth-eaten Pakistan was created.

Viceroy Mountbatten moved hurriedly to enforce the decision. Nearly five million Hindus and Muslims were massacred in the ensuing exchange of populations. Many British and Hindus hoped that Pakistan would not be able to survive and would collapse.
The British, on their departure, turned over administration of the new Pakistan more to the British-trained civil and military services than to the Muslims who had fought for freedom. Depending on the loyalty of their former Civil Services, and later the army, the Generals started a game of undermining the politician and putting Civil and Military Services at the helm of Government. In fact, out of 37 years of Pakistan only during some 8 years at intervals were the politicians allowed to hold their own. The services in the effort for supremacy eventually broke up the country by conceding Independence in 1971 to the freedom-demanding Bangla Desh.

From the very inception Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, a former Civil Servant in the Indian Accounts Service and later to become the first governor-general of Pakistan, had induced his pupil-master Nawabzada Liaqat Ali, the Finance Minister in the Viceroy's interim Cabinet and later the second Prime Minister, to bring in Mr. Ghulam Mohammad, an ex-Accounts Service man, then serving Hindu Big Business to be taken in as Finance Minister in the new Pakistan Cabinet. This gentleman was a master of the Divide and Rule game. Similarly Sir Zafrullah Khan, a British blue eyed boy, was inducted as Foreign Minister. Later still another opponent of Muslim League, Mustaq Gurmani, a labour adviser in the Government of India, was appointed Minister for Kashmir Affairs and later promoted to the Interior department. Chaudhri Mohammad Ali himself became the first Governor General of the Government of Pakistan with a host of Secretaries and Joint Secretaries from the Accounts Service.

Therefore, at the very start, Government Servants entered into a commanding perch. It suited both the British as well as the inexperienced Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan, later to fall a victim to the bullets of an agent on the state payroll.

The inexperience of Ministers, death of Quaid-i-Azam within a year and Liaqat Ali Khan both in a short time, gave a free hand to these civil servants to rule the roost. They pitched one inexperienced politician against the other. The Accounts Service was supplanted later by
the Indian Political and Civil Services which included Sikandar Mirza and Aziz Ahmad, ICS, and his brother G. Ahmad, a trusted policeman of the British. They paved the way for General Ayub Khan whose gun had been the main support of these impostors. He decided to take over as a dictator in 1958 and on quitting office nominated General Yahya Khan to succeed him. All these gentlemen stunted the growth of democracy under a plan.

The politicians responsible for the creation of Pakistan through a democratic process of vote and party system were intentionally subverted. Party system was thrown on the wayside. The name of Muslim League, the party responsible for creating Pakistan, itself was stolen by General Ayub Khan who divided the real League into Council League and his own Convention League. An illegal name and act. When he was thrown out after ten years rule by the combined force of politicians led by Miss Jinnah, the founding father's sister, quite against his own so-called constitution, he handed over power to his own stooge - a General Yahya. Then Yahya reigned for three years, held an election but did not allow the winner to govern, and divided the country after the 1971 civil war. In all these actions first the British and then the Americans turned a blind eye. Even the judiciary was forced by Ghulam Mohammad to write a new Jurisprudence naming it 'law of necessity' to justify non-political rule.

Many a patriot died in the struggle for freedom against these unlawful acts but to no avail. The big brother always gave a nod to the acts of unelected elite of the services. It would be noticed that democracy was snuffed out at the very outset.

RULE BY STRONG MEN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

The Americans as a dominant power in the Cold War started a new theory of equating strong men at the helm of affairs with stability, thus giving little credence to the basic idea that it is the people who have to fend for themselves against foreign ideologies and that no short cuts can be an alternative. The lesson of Vietnam was forgotten in a struggle to get over the
American trauma that neither the strong men nor the greatest army in the world could defeat a determined and harrassed Vietnamese people.

In Pakistan, we who had been taught by the British that democracy was the ideal form of government, so much so that we vied with each other to reach the war front against totalitarianism, were to be disillusioned. In the end we saw that there was no such thing as loyalty to an ideology.

The national myopic self-interest can enact a Yalta Agreement throwing Poland and ex-allies to the wolves, install Syngman Rhee to head South Korea, support strong men in the Philippines, back Diem & Company in Vietnam, Ayub Khan in Pakistan, the Shah in Iran, Generals Cursell and Evren in Turkey, Generals Naguib and Sadat in Egypt, Bourguiba in Tunisia, the Kings of Saudi Arabia and Morocco, the Sheikhs of the Persian Gulf States, and the injustice of Israel. Little thought was given to getting to the people of these lands and giving them a just social system for which they could stand up and fight. Men willing to sacrifice and suffer in the name of democracy still live but they are being brushed aside.

I defer to say that the lasting answer lies in true democracy with a promise of hope for betterment for the people at large. A little sacrifice by the opulent north, a little selflessness, a little magnanimity, and sacrifice of selfish self-interest are required. I suppose that I would be dubbed a Utopian but I would much rather die in that hope than to live under the tutelage of a so-called strong man, whether imposed by the East or the West.

THE FUTURE OF PAKISTAN

I feel that any continuation of a strong man’s role in Pakistan is going to bring unknown dangers and disintegration with dire results. At the moment, Afghanistan has been taken over by the Soviets who, with impunity, are flooding Pakistan with three million refugees which it cannot possibly absorb. They are impinging on the existing precarious economy of the North
West Frontier Province and of Baluchistan. No amount of money for them would solve the problem of economic viability. Politically among these refugees are pro-Soviet agents. For over a century the Soviets have been looking greedily to the warm waters of Baluchistan. No amount of religious appeals are going to solve these problems.

Internally, there are already pulls within Pakistan against the Punjab State which has a population more than the other three federal units put together. Should there be a secessionist movement in Baluchistan - which is being openly preached - the Punjab with 80% of the Army and consuming 80% of the Budget makes the smaller provinces feel the injustice. The Army cannot walk into Baluchistan without a check by the Soviet Union. There would be a similar situation in the North West Frontier Province in addition to a civil war between the Punjab and Pathan soldiers. In Sind, India can assist a secessionist movement closing the only port of Karachi, thus turning the Punjab into a land-locked state.

The Sikh who is up in arms against the Indian Government can then be dangled the carrot of a United Punjab. But some five million Muslims of East Punjab were murdered in 1947 by the Sikhs who were used as watchmen by the Hindus. It is therefore difficult to guess whether the Muslims would prefer Sikhs or the godless Russians. In fact, a Punjab strong man like Zia and his kind can create greater problems today than they can solve. The civil servant and the army officers are only conveying reports which the master likes hearing. This was the custom/doing of the British in late forties.

The answer, therefore, lies in a truly democratic Government. None need fear that the strong men in power today would be thrown to the wolves as a vendetta. Ayub Khan and Yahya, his successor, were allowed to live unscathed even after they divided the country, or finally broke it up. The army is still a dominant force.
RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM

And last of all, the idea of religious fundamentalism being preached by the Saudi Government is counterproductive. Nor can Khomeniism prosper in better educated Pakistan.

The problems are mainly economic and not religious. I have seen children switch off television sets even in normally religious homes when preachers appear on the screen. There is a story current in Pakistan that a man rung up the Director of Television asking him to have his set repaired. The officer indignantly told him that his job was not to repair TVs, that he had better take his set to a mechanic. The poor harassed householder replied, "Of course! went to many mechanics but without any substantial improvement." The Director inquired the cause of his trouble and the man replied that a Mullah (priest) had gotten into the set and would not get out!

No amount of religious gendarmes now being created can force religion down the hungry throats nor would such unfair practices be able to fill hungry bellies. Generals are trying the practice of religion in place of economic emancipation of the masses. Soon the Pakistani bread earners in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates would pack home and Pakistan, without their income, would go bust, falling prey to foreign ideologies. Let the thinkers of the Free World ponder.
Before its independence in 1949, Indonesia was known as the Netherlands Indies. It is a large nation of approximately 3,000 islands stretched out along and just north of the equator from Sumatra on the west to Irian Barat (western New Guinea) on the east, the land and sea of which covers an area approximately the size of the United States. Ninety percent of the land surface is accounted for in the five largest islands: Sumatra, Sulawesi (Celebes), Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), Irian Barat, and Java. More than half the population of 160 million lives in Java, which comprises only about six percent of the total land surface of Indonesia. The incredible population density of Java, more than 2,000 persons per square mile in many rural areas (and averaging more than 1,200 persons per square mile in rural areas of Java) is related to the high fertility of its volcanic soil and to the high value placed on its central place in the cosmos by the Javanese.
Indonesia is not in fact an ancient state. Like many other Third World countries, it was founded through liberation of a colonial territory from a Western imperial power (in this instance, the Netherlands) in the decade following World War II. However, unlike many other nations that came into being through similar processes at that time, Indonesia had had experience with native states and empires for more than a thousand years before becoming a colony of the West. From the fifth century A.D. until after the arrival of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century A.D., successive native empires (Srivijaya, Majapahit, and Melaka) held sovereignty over much the same territory as that now incorporated into Indonesia. Sometimes the area within these empires was smaller; sometimes it was larger; sometimes it included communities in areas now incorporated into the territories of the modern nations of Malaysia and the Philippines.

There was, even in pre-European times, a Javanese term for the entire expanse of the Indonesian archipelago, Nusantara. However, that term, like many other native conceptions relevant to national polity, was replaced by the purely Western term, "Indonesia" (classical Greek: Indos / 'India', and nesos / 'island'), by Dutch-educated Indonesians who came to dominate the political processes that led to the founding of the modern state (cf. King 1982:37, 70). It may well be that this Western-derived term served the cause of independence better for not being so obviously connected to the Javanese, whose polities had contended with and dominated the polities of dozens of other ethnic groups of the area over the centuries.

Neither the Javanese nor any other of the more than three hundred ethnic groups of the archipelago ever totally dominated all the others (Peacock 1973:94). One reason for this is that the area is broken into many islands and the larger islands are broken into many small river drainage systems which in ancient times provided the only easy means of transport and communication in a wet-tropical climate. Small states, with slightly different cultures, developed in the major riverine systems and in fertile inland areas of the larger islands. Many rather populous ethnic groups, such as the Batak of Central Sumatra, did not develop their own states although they comprised important economic and symbolic
elements in states whose core populations were ethnically
different. Over the centuries, a number of ethnic groups
achieved state-level societies that were dominant over
fairly large territories for a century or more. Among
these (home territories in parentheses) are the Acehnese
(North Sumatra), Minangkabau (West Sumatra), Malays
(South and East Sumatra), Sundanese (West Java), Javanese
(Central and East Java), Balinese (Bali), and Bugis (Sulawesi).
Over the centuries two of these, the Javanese and
the Malays, were more successful than others in dominating
their neighbors.

Malays comprised the ethnic core of two of the
major ancient empires (Srivijaya and Melaka) compared
to one (Majapahit) controlled by the Javanese. Moreover,
the Malays were deeply involved in controlling the local
and long-distance trade along the coasts even when the
Javanese were in ascendance. The earlier Malay-based
empire, Srivijaya, and the Javanese-based empire that
succeeded it had state ideologies based on slightly
differing versions of Hindu-Buddhism. But Melaka, the
Malay-based empire that overcame the power of Majapahit
(and lost its position of dominance to the Europeans) was
Islamic, probably a change in response to the increased
numbers of Moslem traders in the long-distance trade
through India beginning in the twelfth century. Islam, a
religion strongly related to control of long-distance
trade, was the major ideological force involved in the
fall of Hindu-Buddhist states in the period immediately
preceding European control.

The centuries of Malay dominance in local and long-
distance trade accounts largely for the spread of Malay
language throughout the archipelago and for the fact that
Malay was the base from which independence-minded native
writers fashioned the national language, Indonesian, in
the first several decades of the twentieth century.2

Native empires had been concerned primarily with
controlling long-distance trade and a portion of some
of the economic surpluses of the region and secondarily
with nominal imposition of religious ideologies that
justified such control. The Portuguese of the sixteenth
and seventeenth century were concerned primarily with
controlling the long-distance trade. Successors of the
Portuguese, the Dutch, and the English (with whom the Dutch briefly competed in Sumatra and Java), began in the same manner as the Portuguese but were gradually drawn more deeply into controlling regional trade and regional production and consumption while continuing with their control of long-distance trade.

Slowly, the Dutch drew the Indonesian economy deeply into their own. First, through a system of "forced deliveries" instituted in 1723 and then, through the "cultivation system" introduced in 1830, the Indonesian agrarian economy was transformed into the major source of Dutch export earnings in world trade. Javanese peasantry, forced to meet continuing demands of the traditional aristocracy as well as the new demands of the Dutch, were reduced to extreme poverty. Moreover, the demand for export crops furthered the need for labor, the cost of which fell to the peasantry, whose high rate of fertility from the eighteenth century onward, as much as a declining rate of mortality in the twentieth century, produced the phenomenally high density of population of Java. This rapid rate of population increase and its consequent high density of population, among the most dense in the world for rural areas, severely depressed prospect of reducing rural poverty. As peasants were drawn more into production of export crops, they were more at the mercy of the fluctuating prices of commodities in the world market. Many were forced out of rural areas into the cities, where they came to comprise a huge poverty-stricken stratum because of their lack of capital and of appropriate education and skills.

Liberal Dutchmen intimidated the colonial government into reforming the most repressive economic aspects of the "cultivation system" in 1870. By that time, provoked in part by "liberal" disgust with the "authoritarian abuses" of native aristocrats and perhaps more by an interest in gaining the economic surpluses absorbed by them, the Dutch had transformed the Javanese aristocracy into a colonial bureaucracy. Stripped of their titles and traditional retinues by colonial administrators, they were partially Westernized but still respected as traditional aristocrats, priyayi, by the peasants.
The first Europeans in the area, the Portuguese, had an intense desire to obliterate Islam (see Collis 1958:18-19). If anything, this Portuguese attitude accelerated the spread of Islam into previously Hindu-Buddhist societies because it was a more potent ideological vehicle for opposing European efforts to control the economy. In subsequent centuries, however, the English and especially the Dutch eased their opposition to Islam while imposing no state religion of their own. Furthermore, the Dutch destroyed the native states, the better to control their economies, removed most of the Islamic rulers (sultans), and reduced the authority of the remaining few over their subjects in matters of religious practice. The effect was to reduce the penetration of Islamic orthodoxy into Hindu-Buddhist communities that had recently converted to Islam, and this set the stage for ideological conflict between orthodox santri and not-so-orthodox abangan Moslems. The latter were in large part the cultural heirs of the inland peasant populations of the last Javanese empire; the former were in large part the cultural heirs of the coastal populations of the last Malay empire. A third category of Indonesians mentioned above, some of whom were descendants of minor officials (priyayi) of traditional kingdoms, some of whom had found low-level places in the colonial bureaucracy, some of whom were partially Dutch-educated and somewhat secularized, and some of whom aspired to be members of the modernizing elite, were partially the cultural heirs of Western humanism, a new tradition that included new ideas about parliamentary democracy.

These three categories of the Indonesian population were deeply involved in the evolution of Indonesian political associations of the early twentieth century. Beginning in 1911, Sarekat Islam developed into the first great association of native peoples that was dedicated to the independence of the Indonesian nation. But in a very few years, in the early 1920's, it began to split into two broad ideological currents: nationalists who were Moslems and nationalists who were communists; the first were deeply involved in Islamic orthodoxy and reform, and the second were deeply involved in the notion of a popular revolution of cosmic proportions. The nationalists who were communists (PKI) attempted the beginning of such a revolution in 1926 and 1927, but were quickly
repressed by Dutch colonial forces. Shortly thereafter, in 1927, a third major element of the Indonesian nationalist movement, the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), at once nominally Islamic, culturally Javanese, and ideologically humanistic in the Western sense of that term, was formed under the charismatic leadership of Soekarno (May 1978:45-51).

These political associations, which developed more specialized constituencies and rapidly increased in number, were interest groups and voluntary service organizations rather than political parties that elected representatives to a legislature (King 1982). There was no legislature as such. It is true that the Dutch colonial regime authorized a Peoples Council (Volksraad) in 1916 to manage (or "coopt") Indonesian aspirations for self-governance. But throughout the period that it existed (1918-1942), it was an advisory rather than a legislative council. Moreover, its chairman (always a Dutchman) and half its membership were appointed by the Dutch colonial regime. Election of the remaining members was by an indirect method that assured Dutch control. Indonesians never held a majority of the seats and there was never a majority of Indonesian members who favored independence (Emmerson 1976:42).

In 1943, The Japanese replaced the Peoples Council with a Central Advisory Council (Chuo Sang In), which was similarly constituted by government appointment and indirect election, and which had similar advisory functions. It differed from the Peoples Council in that its membership was drawn only from Java rather than from the whole of Indonesia, more than ninety percent of its members were Indonesians, and its chairman (Sukarno) was Indonesian (Emmerson 1976:49-51). This colonial experience with appointed and indirectly-elected representatives to "legislatures" whose functions were only advisory set the pattern for the Indonesian parliament after independence was gained. Indeed, only one parliament (elected in 1955) had a very strong appearance of being a democratically elected legislature in the Western sense, and it seems reasonable to suggest that Indonesia has never experienced Western-style democracy sufficiently to consider its fall (Emmerson 1976:41). A Western style democracy might have come into being during the two years
after 1955 except that regionalism and disputes between political parties led to the imposition of a less directly representational form of government called "Guided Democracy," in which councils of leaders nominated to represent the major constituencies of Indonesian society advised a strong president, Sukarno.

A fourth category of people involved in the social upheavals of twentieth-century Indonesia, the overseas Chinese, were present in a few places and numbered no more than a few thousand before the European arrival. Now they number more than three million and have an important place in the Indonesian economy. The Dutch colonial regime encouraged their immigration and settled them into specialized roles as tax farmers, moneylenders, salt and opium traders, and small-scale wholesale and retail traders of common goods. They were treated neither as natives nor as Europeans, and thereby occupied an intermediate caste in colonial society as well as an economic position intermediate between wealthy Europeans and poor natives. They were as envied by the natives as they were distrusted by the Europeans.

In time, more than two hundred thousand Indo-Europeans, part European and part native, would come to occupy a position similar but somewhat higher than that of the overseas Chinese in the colonial caste structure, but most of them left Indonesia with the fifty or sixty thousand Dutch residents before or after independence, and they do not figure importantly in the Indonesian stories of revolution except in their role as "Brown Dutch" soldiers who fought against the revolutionaries.

The Chinese in Indonesia were not culturally unified. Recent immigrants and others who were slow to assimilate to Indonesian culture, so called totok / 'of pure blood,' were divided among themselves by their different languages, principally Hakka, Cantonese, and Hookkien. Moreover, the so-called peranakan, many of whom were born in Indonesia and whose ancestors had lived in Indonesia for generations, spoke Malay or Javanese or another local language rather than any Chinese language and had adopted some but not all of the customs of local natives. The peranakan population was the result primarily of more tolerant attitudes regarding intermarriage and cultural
differences that had prevailed under native regimes. The tolok population resulted in part from racist and chauvinistic attitudes and ordinances promulgated by the Dutch colonial regime.

A fifth sector that was to play a major part in the drama of national revolution, the Indonesian armed forces, came into being under the auspices of the Japanese after their occupation of the Dutch East Indies in 1942. Afraid of Allied landings and of pro-Western sentiment, the Japanese sponsored political organizations as vehicles of anti-Western propaganda and provided military training for several hundred thousands of Indonesians. Moreover, the Japanese recruited Indonesians into lower levels of government bureaucracy, encouraged the use of Indonesian language, and promised Indonesian independence in the near future (Feith 1962:6-7).

The best trained of the Indonesian military auxiliaries, the fifty thousand strong Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Fatherland, or Peta, who figure into an example of revolutionary violence (The Fugitive) considered later in this article, produced many of the regular officers of the present-day Indonesian army. But it is important to note that perhaps ten times again as many Indonesians, another five hundred thousand, received some basic military training in less well-armed (bamboo spears were the main weapons) para-military units for peasants and Indonesian youth (Seinendan, Keiboden, Jawa Hokokei). These organizations, trained by the Japanese during World War II, provided the base for a huge revolutionary army that fought British and Dutch regulars to a draw and eventually won. Moreover, it could be argued that this type of successful training by the Japanese provided a lesson that twenty years later, during Gestapu, was not lost on communist leaders (although their own efforts to train youths and peasants proved inadequate against a professionalized Indonesian army).

These are the main categories of people who have been part of the major social upheavals of Indonesia in the twentieth century. It is useful to further describe their characters and psychologies as protagonists in the revolutionary events recorded in the samples of modern
Indonesian literature that are described and analyzed in later sections of this paper.

**PATTERNS: CHARACTERIZATIONS OF FIVE TYPES OF PROTAGONISTS**

The santri pattern is one of Islamic orthodoxy, but of a special kind of orthodoxy that in some ways comprehends conceptions of the cosmos not unlike those of Hindu-Buddhism.\(^8\) Santri is the term for male students who live and study at a pesantren, a small scale religious school owned by a teacher, a haji who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca. The students work the land of the haji for their own livelihood and to compensate the haji for his lessons. There are thousands of such schools in Indonesia and their curricula are left to the individual teachers, most of whom are guided in their instruction by notebooks in which they as santri recorded the words of their own teachers. Islam, with its relatively simple message and ritual, especially the five pillars (confession of faith, five daily prayers, giving of alms, fasting in the month of Ramadan and not consuming pork or alcohol, and making the pilgrimage to Mecca if possible), is thoroughly represented in these notebooks, but there is more and the addition is Sufist mysticism, which is derived in part from Hindu-Buddhist and is similar in part to animistic elements of Javanese culture. Some of these elements are: the notion of the "Self" into which all else may be absorbed, even God; the idea of the "Lord-servant" or gustikawula bond between a God and a believer; and the acceptance of trance as a means of direct communication with sacred power. Nonetheless, the santri look down in disgust at the abangan and the principal abangan ritual-feast, the selamatan. Finally, many of the santri are involved in very small scale businesses. This probably reinforces their general dislike of communism and it also strengthens their negative attitudes towards the overseas Chinese, who compete with them as small-scale businessmen.

The abangan pattern is only nominally Islamic. Most individuals who follow this pattern have made a confession of faith, but they make little attempt to practice the remainder of the five pillars, or they
practice them in ways that are heretical from the perspective of those who embrace santri ways. Central portions of the most important rituals of the abangan pattern display many Hindu-Buddhist symbols while only the opening and closing segments are Islamic. Also Hindu-Buddhist and animistic perspectives inform their understanding of the meaning of the sacred gong and xylophone orchestra (gamelan), shadow play (wayang), and dagger (kris). Indeed, each of these expresses basic paradigms of abangan cultural cosmology. For example: the gamelan expresses the inevitable rhythm of cyclic change and thereby exemplifies the order of experience (J. Becker 1979); the wayang expresses and exemplifies the enduring plots and protagonists that are the substance of experience (Peacock 1968); and the kris expresses and exemplifies the intrusions of cosmic power into experience. These basic paradigms, together, make a difference between the santri and abangan patterns regarding the nature of history. As Peacock (1973:32) notes:

Islam imagined history as linear. History flowed from Adam to Abraham, from Moses to Jesus, climaxing in Muhuammed and resolving on Judgement Day. The Hindu-Javanese concept of history was cyclical rather than linear; history would pass through four phases, followed by the destruction of the world, after which the cycle would begin all over again.

The Javanese living within the traditional abangan pattern provided the bulk of popular support for the communist party (the PKI). Their traditional "pulsating-cyclical" view of history (Geertz 1960:30-31 and Peacock 1978:43-44) and their poverty stricken condition as peasants and slum-dwellers led them to hope that a dramatic change for the better was possible, even probable. It is reasonably clear that the mass peasant base of the PKI did not understand revolution in the linear Marxist sense and that their ideological motive in revolution was much closer to Wolf's (1969 and 1982) view that peasants revolt in order to reform untraditional landlords. But more precisely, their broad motive was to turn the wheel of history to another, no more unique but less painful, pulse in the cycle. Abangan who supported
PNI had the same understandings but were somewhat better situated economically on average and less willing to risk their fate to the revolution.

The abangan are not fatalists who merely wait for the wheel of history to turn or not; like the Sufist santri they understand that fate must be sought neither too avidly nor too reluctantly but correctly, with perfect insight. This is especially important with respect to the ultimate fate of the individual, who, if insightful in choosing and performing fateful behavior, either succeeds momentarily or at least passes from this life into Paradise (if santri) or into a better life in the next cycle (if abangan).

The third pattern, priyayi, is much broader. It includes descendants of the traditional aristocracy as well as many other Indonesians who have absorbed a fair amount of Western culture and are more-or-less secular in the sense of not being drawn so deeply into either the santri or the abangan pattern that they are intolerant of the other. Most are clerks, bureaucrats, and middle or high-level officials living in urban places. They know the abangan cultural cosmology or another (non-Javanese) ethnic cosmology, the five pillars of Islam, and even something of democracy, capitalism, and Marxism; but are devoted to no one of these. Their broad cosmological perspectives are often similar to those of the abangan peasants and urban poor, but their interests are often different because they are a class above the peasants and urban poor. Membership in PNI was drawn heavily from priyayi as well as abangan portions of the population. Moreover, priyayi were to be found among the leaders of virtually every segment of the political spectrum.

The fourth pattern, that of the overseas Chinese, is again a complex category of protagonists, but much of that complexity is not considered by the other protagonists to be salient, and it is, therefore, important here to note how other Indonesians have viewed the role of the Chinese in the drama of revolution. Disliked to some degree by virtually every other ethnic group of Southeast Asia, the Chinese of Indonesia are especially disliked by the reformist santri, some of whom compete with the Chinese in the petty commerce of rural areas. Oddly, the santri
viewed these Chinese merchants as extensions of the communist state of mainland China, while (equally odd) the communist PKI (even its abangan constituency who were as much victimized by these Chinese capitalists as by the santri capitalists) viewed them with equanimity. The santri view was a matter of ideological and economic competition; the abangan view was influenced by the PKI through its ties with the communist party of mainland China, which had an interest in the Chinese of Indonesia as dual citizens of China, and through the communist ideological constraints against racial bigotry (Mackie 1976b:129-131).

Finally, the Indonesian army is perhaps the most complex of the major protagonists in the drama of revolution. Members of the officer corps were trained in a number of different contexts: a very few were trained by the Dutch before World War II, more were trained as Peta officers by the Japanese, and many more received lower-level training by the Japanese or were simply drawn into positions of authority as members of irregular guerrilla or pemuda ("youth") units based on localities or political associations during the war of independence. After independence, a few of the higher-ranking Western-oriented officers received training in the United States. In effect, different segments of the army have reflected different segments of Indonesian society.

Some elements of the army have, from time to time, attempted to purify it of other elements, and these attempted purifications comprise a recurring theme in revolutionary episodes of Indonesian history, for example: (1) the "July Third Affair" of 1946, in which PKI pemuda units, who wanted to continue the struggle of revolution, opposed other elements of the army loyal to the PNI, PSI [moderate socialist], and Muslim political interests who wanted to begin negotiating with the Dutch; (2) the "Madiun Affair" of 1948, in which PKI pemuda units secured a communist territory in east Java, attacked santri living in the area, and attacked republican army units engaged in battle with Dutch forces; (3) the aftermath of the "Madiun Affair," in which many PKI pemuda units and PKI sympathizers were destroyed by republican army units; (4) the "Seventeenth of October Affair" of 1952, which involved a struggle between Western-trained
and Peta-trained officers; (5) the "Lubis Affair" of 1956, in which regional commanders of the Outer Islands were aligned against the Javanese military establishment, which resulted in martial law from 1957 to 1963; (6) the "September 30th Movement" or "Gestapu" of 1965, in which senior American-trained officers were assassinated by juniors officers and PKI military units; and (7) the aftermath of the unsuccessful "Gestapu" coup, in which PKI military units, functionaries, and sympathizers were massacred by Muslim and republican elements of the army and by civilians under their direction. These attempts to "purify" the military of undesirable elements are paralleled in the most popular classical literature, the Mahabharata, in which Arjuna, the apical Javanese hero, is forced by fate and duty to kill his siblings. Quite naturally, many Indonesian stories of revolution note this parallel.

Having barely sketched the broad historical and cultural context of revolutionary events in Indonesian society, I turn now to a description of Indonesian views of these events as they are alluded to in literature. Purposely, I have chosen stories that were written originally in Indonesian but which are easily available in translation so that these sources not only represent native perspectives but are also available in English.

REVOLUTION IN INDONESIAN LITERATURE: EXAMPLES

UPHEAVALS OF INDEPENDENCE.

"The Fugitive" by Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1975), "Indonesia's greatest modern prose-writer" (Teeuw 1963:179), is set in the context of the 1945 revolt of Peta troops against the Japanese in Blitar, east Java. This revolt and its aftermath resulted eventually in the overthrow of the Japanese regime and the establishment of an independent Indonesia before the return of Dutch colonial forces after World War II. Aveling (1975c:xiii), citing Anderson (1966b; 1972b), notes that the final year of the Japanese occupation was a time of intense revitalization of Indonesian culture in which there was a "... widespread feeling of impending catastrophe: the golden age had
given way to an age of madness (djaman edan), such as one
expected prior to the return of the Righteous King (Ratu
Adil), foretold by the very popular prophecies of the
medieval monarch Dja'abadja."

This story makes pointed reference to the ways that
contemporary life imitates ancient art; or, more specific-
ally, to the ways that modern revolutionary events
parallel those of classical Javanese theater (wayang) and
literature (specifically the story of fraternal warfare in
the Bharata Yuddha). Three Peta commanders who agreed to
commit their units to the Blitar revolt are likened to the
classical warrior brothers, Arjuna and Bima, and their
half-brother warrior, Karna, who was raised by enemies of
the family. In the ancient tale, the half-brother is a
traitor, and his counterpart in the modern tale is a
traitor also. The native paramilitary unit he leads
fails to attack the Japanese. The two other units,
without sufficient strength, are defeated and the survi-
vors are forced to become fugitives.

A major part of the story is devoted to a description
of the asceticism of one of the fugitive commanders and to
parallels between his experience and that of the legendary
hero, Arjuna. In the end, he is betrayed by his own
father-in-law and together with the other fugitive
commander, he is brought before the traitorous half-
brother and the Japanese commandant. The traitor has
sided with the Japanese, but he is not without honor. He
has protected the wife of the fugitive and he has also
honored his soldier's pledge of loyalty to the Japanese
monarch (a pledge required of all of the Indonesian Peta
officers). Just as it appears that the fugitive Peta
commanders will be executed by the Japanese, news arrives
that the Japanese have surrendered to the Allies. The
Indonesian soldiers turn on their Japanese officers, the
Japanese commandant is killed, and so (accidentally) is
the hero's beloved wife.

In the classical story, Arjuna kills his traitorous
half-brother; in Pramoedya's story, Arjuna's counterpart
helps save the traitor from death at the hands of the
triumphant Indonesian soldiers. That ancient art and
modern life in Indonesia thereby differ from the ending of
Pramoedya's story may be surmised from the many occasions

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when rebellion and counterrebellion have been unsparing of human life. However, Pramoedya's point may be not that a traitor's life was spared but that the traitor himself was able to magically prevent his own death. After the hero, Hardo, has restrained the other fugitive Peta officer from killing the traitor, the traitor is set upon by the crowd of ordinary Indonesian soldiers and the traitor confronts them.

Then he slowly took off his jacket, shirt and singlet and threw them on the ground. No one moved. They were awestruck. Karmin was naked from the waist up, he was beautiful. Then he took his officer's belt off and threw that down too. "Karmin!" Hardo shouted again. "Quickly! Run!" But Karmin advanced another half-step. He threw his officer's cap into the crowd and screamed: "Kill me, comrades. I am a traitor!" They were amazed. They put their weapons on the ground very slowly, one after the other. (p. 141)

This point is reminiscent of two other stories by Pramoedya, not dealt with here, in which a unit of the newly-formed Indonesian army fights against an English army unit (reoccupying Indonesia for the Dutch after World War II) and is slaughtered because their cook, a haji (and presumably santri), betrays them. Survivors of the unit catch the haji, but seem unable for some time to revenge themselves and their dead comrades because the haji is able to repel their blows without injury to himself. One story records his death finally as a magical event brought about by a samurai sword of the sort that a Peta officer might wield, and the other story describes the perspective of a witness who, not being present at the beginning of the revenge-taking, sees only a ruined and dead carcass where others see a sweetly smiling and undamaged haji. This affirms the presence of cosmic power in a time of revolution and of the equivalence of forces in this time and place of change with forces in other times and places of change and it attempts to refute the appearance that killing and mutilation are only revenge.

"An Affair of the Heart" (S. Rukiah Kertapati) is about the incompatibility of idealistic love. The
narrator and main protagonist of the story is a middle-
class Javanese girl whose mother is domineering and
extremely materialistic. Early in the story, her sister
is married off to a salesman with a new house (capital-
istic materialism) and she is made to abandon her own true
love, supposedly because as a Sumatran he is "foreign,"
but really because material goods are of no interest to
him at all. Her mother finds another, wealthy, suitor for
her. Disgusted, she leaves home and joins a medical unit
that serves the republican army. There she learns that
her true love has married a Javanese girl that looks a lot
like her, and she transfers to another unit that serves
the Red (PKI) army. Already more plainly dressed than she
had ever been, she adopts even plainer clothes and male
mannerisms. Then she meets and falls in love with a
communist idealist who is deeply concerned with the
material welfare of common people (communistic materi-
alism).

Her comrades become dissatisfied with her as her
appearance and behavior soften under the influence of
her love for the idealist. She herself is disturbed
with how boring her beloved is when he speaks of commu-
nism.

Why had I been born an Indonesian obliged to
read and comprehend foreign books and, unable
to do so, condemned to the stupidity of those
parrots who recited but didn't even understand.... (p. 74)

She is also disturbed with his distaste for the kind of
reading she loves.

Don't spend too much of your time reading
books like that. Poetry takes you into the
mysterious and the miraculous and will present
you with a set of bourgeois morals, like those
found in ancient books. (p. 74)

The Medium Affair and its aftermath eventually destroy
her world. Just as it begins and just before he must
leave (unknown to her) they make love and she is impreg-
nated. She believes that they are about to marry. But he
goes off to fight the good fight. She waits for him
beyond the time that he is supposed to return and finally, she is forced to leave. Believing her lover to be dead, she returns to her mother's house. Within a few months she marries the wealthy suitor (who has waited for her) and moves into his big house to have her child but lets him believe that he is the child's father. Her husband is a republican nationalist (PNI). One day, months after her son (named after the idealist) was born, while her husband is at a PNI meeting, her beloved idealist comes to the house. She assails his greater love for communism than for her. He says: "But I love you and my convictions" (p. 102). She refuses to be second to his beliefs, sends him away, and hugs and kisses her son, who is his replacement.

"Acceptance" (Pranoedya Ananta Toer 1983) describes, from the perspective of a small town, the full series of disastrous upheavals that beset Java from the beginning of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia in 1942 until the establishment of independence in 1949. As the various kinds of army units -- Japanese, nationalist defense, communist, republican nationalist, and Dutch -- occupied the small town of Blora in turn, they each spawned a slightly different set of local leaders and followers who preyed upon their neighbors. The narrative focuses upon the experiences of a family headed by a widower whose wife died about the time of the Japanese arrival and as seen primarily through the consciousness of the second oldest daughter, Sri.

Sri becomes the de facto head of household when she is about twelve years old, because her older sister and her father are thoroughly occupied outside the home. The widower's two oldest children, sons, have been recruited into the Japanese Imperial Army and sent off to Burma. Their father is strongly pro-Japanese and very proud of his sons until he learns that they died in Burma. Then he ceases to actively support the Japanese government of occupation, and joins the local nationalist committee when the Japanese surrender to the Allies. His third child, the eldest daughter, is drawn into a socialist youth group, pesindo, and eventually joins the Red army. He is crushed by his daughter's disloyalty to the nationist (PNI) cause, and worse, he is arrested by the Red army, which has displaced the nation-
alist defense forces. The eldest daughter, who had left home to serve in the Red army, returns and forcibly recruits Sri. Defeated outside the town by the Siliwangi Division of the republican army, the Red army kills all their prisoners (including the childrens' father) and burns the town jail, bodies and all.

At this point, the focus of the narrative shifts to Sri's younger sister, Diah. Gone from the scene are the mother, father, two brothers, and two older sisters; leaving Diah and her three younger brothers. Diah searches the burned-out jail for her father and finds only one of his legs, the toes of which she caresses and kisses until the soldiers of the Siliwangi Division dispose of it. She takes the place of Sri as the head of the household.

Then the Dutch forces move into town. Sri, starved and with a broken arm, reappears in the field behind the house, where the children are hiding from Dutch soldiers. She tells them of the defeat of the Red army by the Siliwangi Division, of her horse being shot from under her and breaking her arm in the fall, of being captured and mistreated by Moslem militia, and of her eventual escape. That very evening, one of the older brothers returns, too. He had been captured, not killed, by British forces in Burma and subsequently released to join the Dutch army. As he tells of his own experience and inquires about other members of the family, the neighbors set fire to his truck. He leaves. The neighbors then set fire to the house to punish the family for harboring a Dutch soldier. The disaster is complete. At each change of occupying force, the family and their town had suffered loss of their property, abuse of their persons, and starvation. Some of the members of the family and of the town were drawn into the purview of each regime and thereby raised their prospects for the moment but suffered when the next regime arrived. In acceptance of their fate, of hopelessness, Sri says:

Let it be ... I've learned something from this whole bitter experience: we can overcome it if we just forget that we really exist; when we disappear, our suffering vanishes as well.

(p. 47)
"Bawuk," (Umar Kayam 1983) the youngest daughter and the youngest child of the head of a subdistrict onder district hoofd in the native administrative service under the Dutch colonial rule, was the least disciplined and most temperamental, and yet "...the most engaging, clever, and generous..." of her siblings (p.106). As the story opens, her mother has received an untypically brief note from her to the effect that she is arriving soon to place her two children in her mother's care. Her mother sends for Bawuk's siblings -- the wife of a brigadier general in the army, a civil engineer, the wife of a director general of a government department, and a lecturer at Gadjah Mada University -- and their spouses so that they, too, can meet with Bawuk.

Bawuk, the wife of a brilliant and dedicated young communist leader, has for some time been fleeing the bloody persecution of the communists by the Moslems and the army in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt of the September 30th Movement. She arrives at her childhood home in the late afternoon, not in disguise, but simply riding with her two children in a rented becha (a three-wheeled pedicab). She recounts her experiences during the time of fleeing from the army and of a brief time when she and her husband tried to organize peasants against the army's attack, of fleeing with her children from a rural township that was conquered by the army, and thereby losing contact with her husband. Finally, she had decided to bring the children to her mother so that she could more easily search for her husband.

Bawuk's siblings and their spouses, all firm members of the establishment, ask her many questions about her political beliefs, and are puzzled when she says that she is not a member of the communist party (PKI). In the early morning she says goodbye to them. Only her mother understands that Bawuk has suffered not for the sake of the communist party but for the sake of her husband, whose interests she must serve as a loving and faithful wife.

Another day Bawuk's mother sits, newspaper in her lap, listening to the Koran lesson given by a Moslem
religious teacher to Bawuk's children, and thinks about the recent news that Bawuk's husband (and perhaps Sawuk herself) has been caught and executed by the army.

"Sri Sumarah" (Umar Kayam 1983) is an attractive, but middle-age masseuse, with an upper-class priyayi background. Her name means, "the honored one who yields," and her story is about the major occasions in her life when she has been forced to surrender to circumstances and her fate, and how she has done so with cleverness and grace.

Raised by a mother who was rather like Kunthi, the nobly suffering mother of the Pandawas in classical Javanese literature, she acquiesces to her grandmother's wish that she marry a school teacher whom she had never met. But on meeting him, she accepts him as her true love. Her grandmother drills her on the skills necessary to please a husband, including (among many other things) massage. She pleases her husband so well that even she cannot persuade him to take a second wife who would have brought a large piece of land as dowry to them. Although their sex life is very active, only one child, a daughter, is born to them.

Her daughter was only twelve years old when Sri's husband died. Their savings were not sufficient to support Sri and her daughter, but Sri took in sewing and rented out her patch of rice land to a hardworking santri neighbor. She managed so well that she was able to send her daughter to the city for schooling.

One day the daughter returns home unexpectedly and confesses that she is two months pregnant. Sri Sumarah, rising to the occasion, arranges the marriage of her daughter to the young man, and pawning half her land to the santri neighbor, gives them a magnificent wedding feast and money to rent a small house in the city for two years. Afterward, she herself lives very frugally and starts a business selling fried bananas in addition to taking in sewing.

Inflation wipes out her sewing and her fried banana businesses, her rice crop fails, and her daughter gives birth to a girl. Short of money and needing more, she
loses the field she pawned to the santri, but she does not blame him. Her son-in-law, a prominent member of a communist student association, is furious. He arranges to put his mother-in-law's house and remaining land under the management of a communist farmer's union (which threatens the santri). Sri moves into town to live with her daughter and son-in-law and to care for her grandchild while they engage in seemingly endless political meetings. Sri worries about the well-being of her former neighbor, the santri.

Then the coup of the September 30th Movement fails and the counter-coup begins. Her daughter and son-in-law flee, leaving her with her grand-daughter. The son-in-law is caught, tortured and killed. Later, her daughter comes home and Sri negotiates the surrender of the daughter to ensure that she will not be mistreated or killed. Further insurance, in the form of bribes for the guards and food for her daughter, is needed to secure the life and well-being of her daughter in prison; and this requires money that she does not have. Moreover, the government has taken over her property because it has been held by the communist farmers union and because Sri's son-in-law was a communist.

In a dream, her husband asks her to give him a massage. Waking, she interprets the dream as advice from her dead husband to become a masseuse in order to earn enough money for her daughter's survival. At first, she was just a skillful masseuse who was available by appointment, and who used her earnings to support herself, her small grand-daughter, and to support the needs of her daughter in prison. As the grandchild grows and as the cost of maintaining her daughter increases she acquiesces bit-by-bit becoming first a companion and then a lover by appointment with higher and higher-ranking and higher and higher-paying customers.

In "Cain's Lamb" (Kipandjikusmin 1975a), a parallel is drawn to the story of Cain killing and butchering and burning a lamb, which was for nothing because God hated Cain's evil. Karno, the main protagonist, a soldier who patriotically follows orders to help organize insurgency of Chinese communists in Sarawak against Malaysia, becomes disenchanted, is severely wounded and disfigured in
action, and deserts to recover in an isolated Bugis village near Singapore. Eventually he is forced by the ending of confrontasi and loneliness for his family to return to his home and to the barracks of his former military unit. He finds that his whole family, because of his father's position in the communist party, has been identified with the communist side and slaughtered in the aftermath of the abortive Gestapu coup. Even the house has been burnt to the ground. Unrecognized because of his disfigurement and his presumed demise in battle, he kills soldiers of his former unit on their way to mosque and finds his way into the military command office where he confronts an officer and a local official whom he has known and admired all his life. After shooting at the officer (and wounding the official, who throws himself in front of the officer), and remorseful for killing so many people, he shoots and kills himself.

In "War and Humanity" (Usamah 1975), the narrator of the story describes his role as an organizer of the Anti-Communist Front and an interrogator for the Action Command to Crush Gestapu during the massacres in Solo, where perhaps a majority of people were not originally antagonistic to Communism and many were actively involved with it. Usamah mentions his rapid rise to the position of intelligence assistant and notes that one of the unpleasant duties of this position was to interrogate suspected Communists who were also acquaintances (if not friends). He describes in some detail his thoughts and emotions during his interrogation of a high school teacher with whom he was well acquainted (female and a few years older than he), and a classmate (female and about his age); and he describes his thoughts and emotions during his involvement in their torture and death. Usamah seems never to doubt their guilt. He relishes his new personhood and his authority over them. But although he orders or suggests that they be tortured, he "disliked watching the infliction of pain" (p.17), to the extent that it made him ill. He sees that the torture, disfigurement, and the execution of these three are necessary and they would have been compelled to do the same to him if he had been on the losing side. His greatest concern, after the two women are led to slaughter with twelve other prisoners, is that they may have been bitter or mistrusting or full of hatred toward him just before they died (pp. 20, 22).
There is no description of the killings. At the point where the killing begins he loses his hearing and becomes dizzy and sightless, as if asleep. Also, he swears to himself that he could not have watched it. Unable to write a report showing that the massacre was necessary, he flees.

In "Death" (Mohammad Sjoekoer 1975), a massacre of twenty communist prisoners is described by one of the eighteen soldiers assigned to kill them. One of his classmates is among the prisoners but he does not see him. Instead, he helps to escort an older man to the mass grave. The narrator and all except one of the other soldiers are inexperienced in killing and very afraid. One of the fearful soldiers justifies the action they are about to take, noting that the prisoners failed in their attempt to take over the country and that the soldiers would have been killed if they had succeeded. The night is damp and cool and there is a breeze, but as the commandant begins the order to kill, the soldiers clench their fists, hold their breath, and feel "very hot" (pp. 25-26). It is as if the soldiers are mere witnesses to what the commandant orders, "...like part of a play or a movie, and not an actual execution at all" (p. 26). The narrator is concerned that the prisoners had "...died so easily... and were buried like animals" (p. 26).

"Star of Death" (Kipandjikusmin 1975b) describes the final adventure in the life of a brilliant young leader, Ktut Geria, who is communist, but who perhaps was also a foulidling prince.

It was rumored that he was the son of the banished king of Tabanan and he had never denied this. His fine skin and handsome features made it possible. He had been destined to be the sort of person he was. His parents, who lived in a village on the slopes of Mount Agung, had been killed in a landslide. He became bitter. Life was hard. Until he was twelve he hung around the Bali Hotel in Den Pasar. He could do anything: shine shoes, steal, find prostitutes for
foreign tourists or even suitable young men for homosexuals. (p. 28)

Older boys in the wandering gangs of the 1950's taught him to read and he was recruited by a local PKI leader while reading in a temple. Despite his tender age, he quickly became a communist leader. This fact apparently helped him through university and in obtaining a junior lectureship. But the story opens with the failure of the coup against the generals, his escape to central Java, and his assignment by higher leaders to form communist bases in Bali for a counterattack, which "...was a death sentence" (p. 27). As he travels incognito in Bali an old man who is his traveling companion sings new words to a traditional tune and thereby tells of the Balinese anger with the communists, noting the mass kidnapping, murder and mutilation of people who were considered to be communists. He asks the old man why these terrible things have happened, to which the old man replies:

Perhaps it's the old story, my son. The holy war of Puputan, sixty years ago, was preceded by the sighting of a comet. So was the great war at Klungkung. The priests said that Yama, god of death, was angry: men had sinned. Many people saw the star before the PKI revolted. Those who saw it tasted death. They felt threatened: they had to kill before others killed them, and they became fierce, cruel, ruthless, unthinking and suspicious [i.e. they did not take their fateful defeat graciously as they should and thereby sinned]. Blood flowed. Finally they were killed. What do you think? (pp. 30-31).

In his mind the young communist mocks the old man, but he does recall that Ikeyan Saki, the comet, passed by Earth on the day that the communist party was destroyed. He dreams of a "death star," a snake-like comet made up of his dead and mutilated comrades, wakes to remember that kesaktian (a magically powerful state of "calm attention") has saved him before, hears the old man's opinion that the death "...star never shows itself to good folks," and that "History does repeat itself" (p. 32). In the end he stays in the house of the old man, whose visiting nephew turns
out to be a person Ktut had kicked out of school during the time of communist power. Cornered by the nephew, Ktut pretends to see a comet flashing through the sky, and the nephew is distracted and knifed in the heart. His screams bring the villagers. Ktut, "like a mad dog," is driven by them to the "ravine where animals were sacrificed on feast days" (p. 34). At first Ktut considers surrender but, realizing that the villagers will kill him anyway, madness overcomes him and like the "... blinded animals [that] had been driven there before," he steps to the edge of the ravine, the crumbling earth roars, and he is accepted as an offering by "... Shiva, the supreme destroyer" (p. 35).

"The Climax" (Satyagraha Horip 1975) examines the dilemma of a modestly charismatic Moslem teacher whose sister's husband, an equally modest "leading-figure" on the communist side, is the intended victim of the teacher's teen-age students. Indeed, they want him to be the major participant in the death of his brother-in-law. Caught between the requirements of his own teaching that "...the light of God was more than pity and meekness, that it had to be manifested through action" (p.43), on the one hand, and the basic moral fact that "Murder, especially the murder of a kinsman, was unnatural" (p.43), on the other, he experiences "Short, fierce fragments of an imaginary film" (p. 44) running through his mind, and he sees "... real men mixed with characters from literature: Arjuna [the major hero of traditional Javanese literature who like the teacher was forced by circumstance to kill members of his own family], Aidit [the most powerful of the communist leaders in Indonesia], Brutus [like Aidit a famous but unfortunate hero or an infamous traitor], Untung [the junior colonel who began the communist coup against the generals in 1965], Winbadi [the leader of the teacher's students who is like Untung in precipitating action against an elder person]..." (p. 44). If he failed to murder his brother-in-law, his students might see him as a coward, a person unwilling to act out the dictates of his ideology; if he murdered his brother-in-law, he would make a widow of his sister and orphans of his nephews and nieces [the more dreadful for the fact that they were his sister's children]. He asks an older friend, a patron of his literary performances, what to do and receives the reply:
If you are destined to kill your sister's husband, you can't get out of it. You know, I'm not sure that things are that absolute, and that you can't refuse. There is an absolute decree not to violate human life, you can't refuse that either.

In spite of his self-doubt, he manages to delay action, without seeming to, until events take their own course. Prior to the time they had set for him to meet with his students at the house of his sister, the students went there and forced the surrender of his brother-in-law. The precise fate of the brother-in-law is not crystal clear: the student leader says "The boys "gave him a bath" (p. 49); but the teacher sees his own future filled with caring for his sister and her children. Perhaps ambiguous to most Westerners because the fate of the victim is not entirely clear, the ending is nonetheless a powerful climax from the Indonesian perspective, because the main protagonist (the teacher) forces himself through a subtle combination of patience and action that is isometric with fate and the cosmos and is without blame.

"The Threat" (H. G. Ugati 1975) and "A Woman and Her Children" (Gerson Poyk 1375) focus on the plight of those who felt morally obligated, in the face of strong community opposition, to protect the innocent lives of the widows and children of their enemies (members of the communist PKI).

The time frame of "The Threat" is a single night during which a man tries to shelter the widow and children of his enemy from vengeance by his neighbors. His wife is opposed to the presence of the refugees in their home. Her most conscious fears are typical of those expressed in other stories: (1) that those who shelter the innocent relatives of enemies are suspected of being in league with the enemy; (2) that those who shelter relatives of enemies will be treated as enemies, i.e. killed; and (3) that the house of those who shelter relatives of enemies will be treated as an enemy's house, i.e. burned to the ground. However, as his wife first threatens and then actually prepares to abandon him, she expresses her deeper which are that he wants to take the widow (a former
girlfriend of his) as a second wife and that he also wants the widow's children as his own. She focuses on the children, noting that she has not had any children and is thereby an object of her neighbors' scorn, and that "...the easiest way...[to get the mother as a wife] is to keep the children" (p.54). The man convinces his wife that she is wrong about his motives by indicating that his former girlfriend never really accepted him because of his poverty. As night draws near, the neighbors attack, yelling "P K hiiii!", and throwing stones through the windows. The young widow, who has been attacked by the neighbors as she returned from an unsuccessful search for work, gathers her children and tells the man she will seek shelter under one of the many bridges in the area rather than expose her hosts to further danger. The wife responds: "Go to your room. We couldn't let you leave and sleep under a bridge. That would be a sin" (p. 57). And the man praises God for His greatness.

Compared to "The Threat," "A Woman and Her Children" is less deeply concerned with noting the violent and immoral attitude of ordinary people against the relatives of the communists and those who would protect them. It is more concerned with a struggle of conscience within a (syncretistic) man (or society) who believes that God (or human history) is concerned with the masses rather than with individuals while accepting the moral necessity of personal vengeance and of protecting innocent children of a communist leader whose death he "witnessed." In the account of his mental struggle it becomes clear that the deceased was his personal enemy, a man who had sent him to prison and impoverished his wife and child, thereby causing his wife to lose her health and his child to die. Moreover, it becomes clear that his enemy's widow is a woman he once loved but who left him to marry his enemy because his enemy offered her higher social and economic status. The enemy's widow, five children, and old deaf babysitter are on the verge of starvation when he finds them. The widow begs him to take all of her children. He says that he and his wife can take only one. He is fascinated and repelled by the prospect of taking the oldest boy, whose face is an exact replica of his enemy. He travels throughout the area, visiting old friends, asking each to take at least one child. They all refuse. In the end, his enemy's wife dies, and he takes all the
children and the servant with him, presumably to live with him and his childless wife. And the seeming contradictions of his conscience are not resolved, they are accommodated.

"The Valley of the Shadow of Death" (Zulidahlan 1975) deals with the reintegration of a member of a communist family into village society in the aftermath of Gestapu. During Gestapu, his father, uncle, sister, and brother were arrested. None was seen alive again. His mother has just died in the family house. He is not certain what to do and fears that his neighbors will somehow use the occasion of his mother's death to harm him in some way. Fearing that the villagers will not allow her to be buried in the village cemetery because she is communist, he nonetheless reports her death to the village authorities, stating that he is without funds to pay for the burial. To his surprise, the neighborhood association pays the expenses and his fellow villagers prepare the corpse for a proper burial. His faith in God returns.

"Dark Night" (Martin Aleida) illustrates a very different kind of outcome. This story is about a young man who journeys from Jakarta to central Java to marry his beloved, whom he met some months previously in Jakarta. She had returned to her home from schooling in Jakarta because she feared that her family would be persecuted. Her father, a well-known communist leader, had been executed during the Gestapu aftermath. As he travels towards her home, following the directions she has given him in a recent letter, he meets and walks along with an official from her village. The official asks him many questions and discovers that he is a traditionally-minded youth from a good Moslem family. As they come to the entrance of his fiancee's village, the official informs him that a communist refugee was found hiding in her family's house and as a result the whole family has been executed and their house burned to the ground. The official is very apologetic and tries to explain:

*The people don't discriminate at a time like that. They have borne their anger and bitterness a long time. When it finally*
explodes, one cannot expect them to be rational. ...They were all killed. ...The fact that Mrs. Mulyo [the fiancee's mother] couldn't read and that her children knew nothing of politics made no difference. Politics is blind. They all went into the river. (p.92)

Somewhat later, after he has been offered full hospitality by the neighborhood association that carried out the deadly deed, he goes to the middle of the bridge over the river, prays to God, and commits suicide.

"A Minor Conflict" (Sosiawan Nugroho 1975) is a philosophical dialogue between three friends who work in a batik factory. The question involves the fact that one of the friends is a devout Moslem who prays the prescribed five times each day and is also a communist sympathizer. One Friday he returns to work from the sermon at the mosque and notes with disgust that the imam (head of the mosque) gave a political speech on the treachery of the September 30th Movement instead of a proper sermon. The other two friends begin an argument about whether a good Muslim can be a good communist or vice versa; that is, is their friend a Marxist Moslem or a pious PKI? On the one hand, Marxism is opposed to religion, because it is an obstacle to social change; on the other hand:

Marxism is still developing. Modern Marxism is not the same as the Marxism of Marx and Engel's era, when they had to fight so hard against religion. Modern Marxism, especially in Asia, treats belief as a private matter. It doesn't matter whether a person is religious or not; just as long as religion does not actively oppose Marxist or hinder the proletarian struggle, it is not an issue. Where there are similarities, such as in the attitudes to capitalism and imperialism, religion ought to be embraced as a comrade-in-arms. (pp. 104-105)
LITERARY REFERENCES TO SOCIOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL COSMOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF REVOLUTION AND MASS VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA

Western sociological explanations of revolution and mass violence -- poverty, economic exploitation and envy, religious and ethnic differences, and aspirations for independence -- are noted in these stories from modern Indonesian literature. Pride for the independence of Indonesia is the most strongly expressed of these. Quite naturally, it is mentioned often in the three stories ("The Fugitive," "An Affair of the Heart," and "Acceptance") about the Peta rebellion against the Japanese and about the war against the Dutch; but it is also mentioned in regard to the strongly felt differences between the nationalists (PNI) and the communists (PKI), implying that communism is antithetical to nationalism.

There are only subtle hints of ethnic prejudice in these stories, such as a Javanese mother's objection to her daughter marrying a Sumatran ("An Affair of the Heart") or a condescending mention of the "plain speaking" characteristic of Sumatrans ("Dark Night"). In any case, the fighting is not depicted as between ethnic groups, although it might be argued that it is subtly present in the overdrawn, "too Arabic" or "too Malay" depictions of Javanese santri, or the "ultra-Javanese" depictions of abangan and priyayi, who do torture and massacre each other. Interestingly, the Chinese are hardly mentioned in this regard. They appear negatively as agents of communist China in one story, ("Cain's Lamb"). And the Ambonese are barely alluded to as "Brown Dutchmen" ("Acceptance").

Religious differences, between the orthodox santri Moslems and the non-orthodox Moslem abangan and priyayi, are clearly stated as the cause of violence in seven of these fifteen stories, including two of the three stories ("Acceptance" and "An Affair of the Heart") on the struggle for independence and five of the twelve stories ("Sri Sumarah," "Cain's Lamb," "Death," The Climax," and "The Valley of the Shadow of Death") on the aftermath of the September 30th Movement. However, most of the communists in these stories are clearly either abangan or priyayi and most of the anti-communists are santri, so that all but two of the fifteen stories ("The Fugitive"
and "Dark Night") at least imply that Islamic orthodoxy versus ethnic traditionalism is an issue worthy of violence. Moreover, santri are regularly equated with the anti-communists, so that Islam versus communism comprises another basis of religious difference and violence (see "A Minor Conflict"). There are, of course, Indonesian Christians, but they are not apparent in these stories.

Finally, there is class struggle as an explanation of revolution and mass violence. Poverty is vividly described in several stories ("The Fugitive," "Acceptance," "Bawuk," and "A Woman and her Children") and every major communist character in the stories mentions poverty or class warfare. But the poverty-stricken are given little to say. Even in the stories that have parts with strongly pro-communist narration ("Acceptance," "An Affair of the Heart," "Bawuk," "Sri Sumarah," and "A Minor Conflict"), poverty-stricken people do not themselves complain about the wealthy; communist leaders say it for them, referring not to particular starving individuals but to "The People." This is not to say that action is not taken against the wealthy. It is. But in at least some instances, as in the actions against Chinese merchants in West Java in 1963, property and goods rather than persons were destroyed. Moreover, in the stories considered here, relatively well-off communist leaders arrest and torture relatively well-off leaders of other parties, and vice versa. Mostly, they know each other, compete for the same women, and compete for positions of local leadership. Nonetheless, poverty was a force that drove peasants to violence under a Red banner several times in recent Indonesian history.

Western sociological explanations of rebellion and revolution are relevant to Indonesia. Yet, there is more to be explained. Most Westerners familiar with Indonesian cultures are aware of the marked non-aggressiveness of Indonesians in ordinary times. This characteristic seems contradictory to the deep involvement and complicity of many ordinary people, who seem not to be fanatical ideologues, in horribly thorough massacres that involved the disfigurement of the bodies of victims before their deaths. Moreover, the victims in most cases appear to have been quietly acquiescent to their own disfigurement and death. And the slaughterers expressed deep
sympathy and contrition toward their victims before, during, and afterwards. Some of this surfaces in most of the stories considered here ("The Fugitive," "Acceptance," "Cain's Lamb," "War and Humanity," "Death," "Star of Death," "A Woman and Her Children," and "Dark Night").

The relevance of Indonesian cultural cosmologies to an understanding of these unfamiliar behaviors and attitudes is clear in most of the stories, which openly compare major protagonists to the heroic characters in classical Javanese literature. However, the stories do not themselves provide all that is necessary for understanding, because they were written for an Indonesian audience well versed in their own cultural cosmology.

In that cosmology, everyday life is supposed to be a microcosmic replica of the universal macrocosmos. There is the implication of cosmic revolution in social upheaval. Moreover, "revolution" (revolusi) has the same connotation as in the original Western meaning of "turning to another point in a cycle" rather than the present Western meaning of taking a progressive step forward or upward in a unilinear series of stages. That is, Indonesian cosmic time is cyclical. There are no stages, only recurring time/places or settings, such as those that are also labelled as zaman/era, masa/period, and jam/hour. These terms are used to speak of segments of time, but they are also used to speak of different scales of particular environments, each of which has its own particular system of rules (see McKinley 1979). Most Indonesian stories of revolution allude to this cosmology through reference to parallels between their plots and characters and the plots and characters of stories in classical literature, which themselves depict different places in the cosmos. Even a parallel in one detail may be sufficient to suggest, at the very least, that the wheel of the cosmos is about to turn or that it has turned, which implies a reordering of the rules. But, even a difference of one detail may suggest that no such change is to occur. These Indonesian views of the nature of cosmic revolution account, at least in part, for such phenomena as the repeated communist attempts at violent social revolution in the face of rather thorough reprisals each time by other elements of the society. That is, it is difficult to tell whether or not this time is the time
that the wheel of the cosmos turns to the communist spoke. And the attempt to turn it or restrain it must be thorough.

Individuals, as well as societies, must fit into the cosmos. "Fitting," is the meaning of sesuai, which also implies "suitability." It is regularly used to indicate whether or not a particular person fits into a particular community or a particular social setting. There is an emphasis on smooth interpersonal relations in virtually all Indonesian cultures. And there is an emphasis on correct social forms, manners and courtesy (budi bahasa). Indeed, the complex systems of manners and courtesy and language level, each appropriate to particular kinds of participants and audiences and social settings, were quite literally the "glue" of traditional Indonesian society. Individual identity or person was defined in terms of these systems. Imperfection in social performance amounted to imperfection as a person as judged according to a particular system of social manners and social settings. This is still largely true. The problem for the knowledgeable individual is to ascertain the system he or she is in.

Imperfection is a mark of discontinuity with the cosmos. Beauty, dignity, and calmness are marks of continuity with the cosmos. Discontinuity with the cosmos results in loss of cosmic force, because the individual draws such force (semangat) from the cosmos, and if he is not in tune with it, his own power will be lost. An example of an emotional state in which such loss is said to occur is fright (ka'get). Behavior that is not appropriate (tidak sesuai) has the same effect. There is a need to search out one's own especially suitable domain within the cosmos and one's predestined place within it. Such continuity with the cosmos results in power and its formal manifestations: beauty, dignity, and calmness. There are more formal methods, which many even ordinary Indonesians learn, for achieving a conscious state of "calm attention" (kesaktain) that attracts cosmic forces into one's body. This is explicitly referred to in one of the stories ("Star of Death") considered here, when the main protagonist is trapped in an impossible situation and needs a miracle to escape. Moreover, the attempt to achieve a state of "calm
attention" is clearly implicit in many of the other stories ("The Fugitive," "Acceptance," "Bawuk," "Sri Sumarah," "Cain's Lamb," "War and Humanity," "Death," "The Climax," and "Dark Night"). In these cases, not fitting-in is a matter of fate to which one accedes after a thorough trial to be sure but with final calm and grace, the better because of greater spiritual potency to find one's place in another, more fitting, cosmic domain (Paradise or the next cycle of rebirth).

It is this conception of the place of individuals in the cosmos that explains the apparent calm acquiescence of victims about to be slaughtered, the necessity for their slaughterers to make them formally imperfect through disfigurement, and the necessity for the slaughterers to be polite by showing sympathy and contrition for the acts of disfiguring and killing their victims.
NOTES

1 See Wolters (1970) for a thorough detailing of the history of the Malay-based empires and their relationships to Javanese-based empires during this period.

2 See Anderson (1966) for an exploration of psychological, political, and cultural bases for the development of Indonesian language.

3 The process of the Dutch gaining political authority over the entire area of what is now Indonesia continued through the first decade of the twentieth century, and, except in the case of Java, economic penetration was even slower.

4 "Liberalism," in that time and place referred to both economic and personal liberty; that is, it favored unrestrained capitalism as well as civil liberties.

5 Among the earliest and most thorough treatments of the abangan and santri patterns is Geertz (1959).

6 Mackie and Coppel (1976:1-18) provide a very concise survey of the Chinese of Indonesia upon which this summary is based.

7 Peranakan is based on the root anak / 'child', indicating mixed blood and birth in Indonesia. Peacock (1973:47) notes that the full term is peranakan tionghoa / 'Chinese children (of the Indies)'.

8 The brief summaries of santri and abangan patterns are based on those of Peacock (1973:24-31). Also see Peacock 1978 for detailed treatment of the several varieties of santri.

9 The two stories, Dendam ("Revenge") and Di Tepi Kali Bekasi ("On the Banks of Bekasi River"), may or may not refer to a single historical event, but that is of no importance here.

10 Requiring minor officials, novice soldiers, and anti-communist civilians to "witness" the executions during the Gestapu counter-coup against the communists.
may be seen as a way of increasing the number of persons involved in the taking of human life, thereby diluting individual moral responsibility. "Witnessing" was only one of several roles -- mentioned along with "informing," "questioning," "designating," "giving the order," and "executing" -- involved in the "orderly" massacre of suspected communists and communist sympathizers. Confronted by other persons or by their conscience, in these stories, participants in the massacres, no matter which role they played, claimed not to have played the essential role.

11 This was mentioned in Ben Anderson's paper on "Reading Modern Indonesian Literature: The Case of Pramudya's Revenge," prepared for the "Conference on Southeast Asian Aesthetics," held at Cornell University in August, 1978.
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MILITARIZATION IN THE PHILIPPINES

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INTRODUCTION

On January 17, 1981, President Ferdinand E. Marcos formally declared the end of eight years of emergency rule in the Philippines and the ushering in of a transition process which would culminate in the full restoration of Philippine democracy by 1984. Despite such pompous announcement leading opposition groups caricatured it as a mere "face-lifting," doubting Marcos' sincerity by pointing out to that fact that the president still holds vast powers even after January 1981.

By the middle of the year, Marcos, appearing impatient, called for the Batasang Pambansa (National Parliament) to conduct a nation-wide plebiscite which would approve fundamental amendments to the 1973 Constitution. Among others, the more important were the vesting of broad powers to the hitherto regarded figure head of parliament, the president; a six-year elective term for the president, and the immunity of public officials from prosecution.
during their period of emergency rule. The plebiscite was held on April 7, 1981 and the amendments, despite a vigorous boycott or "NC" campaigns waged by the different opposition groups, were "approved" by the people.

Marcos "staked" his political leadership by calling for a presidential election in June to ascertain whether "the people would want me to continue in office." At this point, a strong left-led boycott movement had coalesced with the legal opposition to form a loose, tactical alliance which organizationally expressed itself through the PEOPLE'S MIND (People's Movement for Independence, Nationalism and Democracy). With the absence of major legal opposition groups, Marcos had to face a coterie of mediocre candidates. As expected, he won but PEOPLE'S MIND reported that no threats of prosecution and even religious excommunication (!) could persuade 40% of the national populace to either boycott the polls or spoil their ballots.

On June 30, Marcos was proclaimed the first president of the new political order symbolizing a new and normalized Philippine democratic system -- the "New Republic."

These political moves towards a "normalization" of the political system did not, however, lead to the end of political and military repression in the Philippines. On the contrary, repression and militarization of Philippine society which had come to characterize politics under martial law only further escalated.

This paper is an initial attempt to present historically an account of the Philippine militarization experience, drawing certain summary points and trends which have evolved since intensified repression became a major problem for the Filipino people in 1972. While it cannot be denied that instances of militarization did occur in the pre-martial law years, it was only when the Philippines came under authoritarian rule that the problem became pronounced.
THE MILITARY, MARTIAL LAW AND LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR MILITARIZATION

The historical roots of the present-day political dominance of the military as the coercive arm and reliable partner of the Marcos regime date back to the early post-war period when the Americans decided to reorient the Philippine military after World War II. With the total defeat of Japan, the ascendant American power saw another potential and open threat to its dominance in Asia in the communist-led national liberation movements which played major roles during the war years in tying down Japanese forces before the American counter-offensive. In the Philippines, General Douglas MacArthur openly expressed his fears of the local HUKBALAHAP movement when he declared,

"(It is) a distinct potential threat to the Commonwealth government and the future peace of the Philippines... (hence) it is... necessary to take the wind out of the sails of this organization."\(^4\)

It was because of this American "fear" of the Huks that the Philippine military assumed a new role as both an external as well, but principally, an internal force after the "granting" of independence in 1946.

The spread of the Huk rebellion in the early 50's further tilted the military towards internal defense. It was under the leadership of the late Ramon Magsaysay that the defense establishment underwent an extensive streamlining programme which included, among others, the introduction of non-military socio-economic activities to be undertaken by the armed forces. Under these particular activities, which eventually became known by the euphemism "civic action," the military involved itself in such hitherto non-military projects as land resettle-ment and active policing during the electoral processes of the period to counter the Huks.\(^5\) American hand was fairly visible through the presence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives in leading positions of the Philippine military. Magsaysay himself, was generally known as under the control of Major Edward Landsdale of the CIA.
After Magsaysay, the armed forces continued to perform its "socio-economic" activities which eventually became a comprehensive program with the establishment of the "Socio-Economic Military Program" in 1958. This Program was never fully implemented in the early 60's and found itself being vigorously operationalized only in the first year of the first term of President Ferdinand Marcos.

The first decisive step Marcos took was to integrate the military's socio-economic program to the broader national development objectives. In his first State of the Nation address, Marcos explicitly declared:

"The Armed Forces of the Philippines with its manpower, material and equipment resources plus its organizational cohesiveness and discipline possesses a tremendous potential to participate in economic development which should be exploited in the maximum. Such participation becomes imperative considering that the problem besetting the country is socio-economic rather than military and that the resources available to solve this problem are scarce and limited."

The military henceforth participated in the implementation of the 1966 Four-Year Economic Program which ranged from infrastructural support to involvement in local development projects previously undertaken by local civilian governments.

A deteriorating peace and order situation and the qualitative transformation of the radical movement provided ample justification for the Marcos administration to expand the AFP in the form of the creation of new services and increase in manpower. During the height of student activist upsurge, the government, together with the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Public Safety, created and trained a 6,000-man urban para-military force to counter demonstrating students. The METROCOM was to play crucial roles when Marcos enforced martial law in 1972. The increase in smuggling also led to the creation of the Coast Guard in 1967.
Senior officials' training was given additional impetus with the activation of military schools like the National Defense College and the Command and General Staff College. The emphasis of education, however, went beyond military training. In both colleges, in particular, officers selected to undergo advanced education were trained to "enhance (their) managerial and professional skills... (so as) ...to increase (their) understanding of the national environment focusing on both the military and civilian roles as a military officer."9

Within the context of a rapidly disintegrating elite democratic system the expanded role of the military was to become an asset to whatever plans the ruling elite had in maintaining itself in power. It also allowed the elite faction in power to strengthen its vantage position against the national democratic movement.

When martial law was declared, the military was in a position to assume undisputed control over important sectors of Philippine society. Through a series of general orders, decrees and letters of instruction, the regime gave the AFP the right to administer and control important institutions and establishments such as the media, public utilities and military-related industries like the steel industry. Military operations, previously hampered by legislative inquisitiveness, were now unhindered; initially against the budding New People's Army in Central Luzon, and later on in the Mindanao island where the Muslim resistance achieved qualitative sophistication with the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Development programmes, especially those in the local level, were also given to military men with full support from the Office of the President. The military was even allowed a hand in judicial functions through the creation of military tribunals which were given the sole right to try cases involving both military personnel and civilian cases dealing from national security violations to the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.10

Thrust into a position of political significance, the military became one of the major beneficiaries of the new authoritarian order. Its share in the total government expenditures soared unprecedently during the
martial law years. (See Table 1) At present, the military retains a major share of the national budget.

With 1972 as base year, military expenditures during the martial law years increased by as much as 534%. The highest increase registered on an annual basis occurred in 1973 - 1974 as the military moved to consolidate martial law and escalate its campaigns against the MNLF and the NPA. There was also a major increase in the years 1977 - 1978 when the NPA expanded to the Visayas and Mindanao thereby forcing the military to wage a "war on many fronts" against the former and the MNLF. In the same year the placidity of the urban areas was broken by resurgent worker and student movements.

As military expenditures grew, the armed forces correspondingly grew in number. From a force of 51,700 regulars in 1971, the AFP's manpower grew to 112,800 within a span of ten years, ably backed up by a 110,500 man para-military force fully integrated into the AFP. This has effectively raised the total military strength to over 223,300 men or a ratio of 1 soldier to every 224 Filipinos. Manpower expansion has also been accompanied by a ten-year revitalization program designed to "modernize" the AFP's defense capability. Marcos has repeatedly emphasized that the modernization of the armed forces is a matter of first national priority.

The "aggrandizement of the military," as Jim Swick pointed out in his study on "Militarism and Repression in the Philippines," went beyond the dramatic increases in state support. As the main partner for implementing martial law policies, the military was also allowed access to the sphere of business and politics. The take-over of military, the steel industry in particular, has given the military not only a chance to put into practice its newly learned administrative and managerial skills, but more importantly, an economic leverage in the business sector. The steel corporation it took over in 1972 remains up to the present in military hands.

By 1978, the administrative and finance sections in certain government institutions were already staffed or headed by military men. For example, 50% of the head offices of the Presidential Regional Offices for
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>$ per HEAD</th>
<th>% of GOVERNMENT SPENDING</th>
<th>% 2 of GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>793</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979*</td>
<td>753</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980**</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981***</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* IISS statistics differed from the FEER one which reported a total defence expenditure of U.S.$ 764 million.

** Based on FEER 1981 and 1982 Yearbooks.

*** Both sources indicated n.a. on this particular statistic. The figure arrived at is based on the computation of total defense expenditure of GNP.
Development (PROD) Program, created by the regime to undertake and coordinate development programmes in the regional and local levels, are military men. Top ranking military officers (generals) headed important development offices, such as the Southern Philippines Development Authority which administers all development programmes for Mindanao, and Laguna Lake Development Authority which is implementing similar development programmes in the Laguna de Bay area. Military presence is evident in important government institutions like the Civil Aviation Authority, the National Housing Authority, the Department of General Services and serve in important offices like the Economic Planning Research Staff of the National Economic and Development Authority. More than this, the military was allowed to actively participate in private businesses as a "vanguard of national development." Initially public utilities were under control. Later on, through presidential directives, military-run business establishments were established such as the PEFTOK Investment and Development Corporation which provide investment opportunities to Korean War veterans and their dependents. Later, a similar corporation, the Philippine Veterans Development Corporation (PHIVIDE), was also created in July 1973 to "provide investment opportunities" for retired military personnel. It was provided an initial capital outlay of U.S.$500,000 (government provided 20% of this) with tax benefits which increased in 1974, to P10 Million. It was opened to active-duty military personnel during the same year.

In sum, for the Marcos regime, the military was not only to contain political threats but to also principally assist in national development goals by either actively participating in it or providing the necessary conducive atmosphere to allow unhindered national growth. The foundations for the evolution and dominance of militarization and repression in Philippine society were then to be laid down.
PART II. MILITARIZATION AND PHILIPPINE SOCIETY

MILITARIZATION AND RESISTANCE: THE EARLY YEARS

The militarization of Philippine society proceeded in earnest right after the declaration of martial law. Aside from the steps made by the military as mentioned above, the AFP was charged with the task of acting swiftly against the different political forces which may become rallying points for any immediate resistance to the martial law. Under the convenient pretext of preventing a communist-led uprising strengthened by the alleged collaboration of "rightists" the regime ordered a full-scale military campaign against its "enemies." A few weeks after the proclamation, representatives of the regime admitted that about 30,000 persons were already in detention camps all over the country.

The immediate focus of the AFP's military operations were the different leaders of the traditional elite opposition to the leadership, members of the national democratic movement in the urban areas, and guerrillas of the New People's Army. Eventually the list included members of the rising Moro National Liberation Front.

It was relatively easy for the martial law regime to break up the legal opposition. By disarming the "private armies" of politicians, the military deterred any possible plans by the rival elite factions to resort to arms in resisting martial law. The arrest of leading luminaries of the elite opposition decapitated the opposition. Moreover, the character of Philippine politics where the changing of party affiliations as a general occurrence made it easier for the regime to draw in vacillating elements of the opposition into its fold.

Simultaneous military operations were launched in the countrysides to destroy NPA strongholds in Luzon Island and the growing Muslim resistance in Mindanao. A sustained military campaign was conducted in Isabela Province of Central Luzon, the reported original first guerilla front of the NPA. After more than a year of operations, the AFP managed to drive away the NPA from its base but as a result the latter "spilled" over into
adjoining and nearby provinces, opening new "guerilla fronts" and expanding in the process.  

Considerable difficulty, however, was faced in destroying the Muslim rebellion. Fired up by the expose of a massacre of Muslim trainees by the military and driven to arms by intensifying terror perpetrated by fanatic Christian as para-military units of the army, it was the MNLF which ironically launched the opening salvo against the regime in early 1973 up to 1974. Seventeen towns were captured by MNLF forces in Cotabato in March 1973, and by February 1974, between 1,500 to 2,000 insurgents "liberated" the major city of Jolo and held it for three days.

The AFP's military superiority and the relative inexperience of the MNLF on confrontational warfare negated the initial gains of the Muslim resistance. Nonetheless, popular support and aid from sympathetic Arab states to the MNLF allowed it to absorb the impact of six successive major military operations. By the end of 1975, the Muslim war in Mindanao led to a military stalemate with the military unable to completely eradicate the MNLF and the latter forced to shift to more unconventional forms of warfare. By this time, the military had to commit 85% of its forces to Mindanao at a cost of P137,000 a day. All in all, 20,000 government troops lost their lives in 7 years of fighting.

One of the end results of these early military campaigns in both the rural and the urban areas was the pervasive use of certain militarist methods which became part and parcel of the standard military response to any form of resistance. These methods manifested the evolution of a process by which the whole society came under the influence and domination of militarization. While these actions came to light only in the mid-70's when church groups took pains to document and publicize them, the military had already been using these techniques and methods as early as 1973. And as martial law advanced through the 70's, the number of reported repressive acts increased with the military achieving a certain degree of applicative sophistication.

The rural areas bore the brunt of the military campaign, and the concomitant abuses. There was a war
which closely resembled the type waged by the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies in Vietnam where the human and social cost was simply staggering.

The Mindanao rebellion alone led to 1.1 million Muslim refugees, 30,000 of whom were reported by the Malaysian government to have gone to Sabah after successive military operations in the Jolo region. Muslim support groups based in Europe reported that by 1977, 50,000 Muslims had been killed — most of them civilians; two million had become refugees, 200,000 houses were burned, 530 mosques and 200 school buildings demolished, and 35 cities and towns wholly destroyed.

The most blatant example of how indiscriminate firepower can lead to devastating effects was the burning of Jolo, the center of Islam in the Philippines. To divert military pressure from the mountains, the MNLF adopted a tactical move taking-over Jolo city. The military response was to practically pour all available manpower and material upon the city. The result was an overkill.

"The massive shelling... damaged both the Moslem mosque and the Catholic Cathedral and was mainly responsible for the fire that gutted the whole city. Evolving the parallel with Hue in 1968, one correspondent concluded that 'the government helped destroy a town in order to save it.'"

Similar Vietnam-type tactics were used to flush NPA guerrillas out of their stronghold. In 1973-1974, more than 20,000 people from 100 to 200 villages were forcibly evacuated in Isabela province "to deprive the fish of its water." This type of operation was to be repeated in areas where the NPA had also established new guerilla zones.

While the military was performing its assigned role of stamping out the opposition and ensuring control over vital sectors of society, the ruling elite was likewise doing its part to create a facade of political legitimacy for the new order. With its political opponents including anti-Marcos delegates to the Constitutional
Convention in jail, the regime hastily reconvened the Convention. In only 70 days, a new constitution was drafted to include interim provisions to allow Marcos to continue exercising martial law powers. The new constitution provided for the installation of a parliamentary system. Marcos was recognized as both the prime minister and the president with the powers to replace all officials and to continue issuing proclamations and decrees which would become part of the laws of the land.27

"Citizen's Assemblies" sprang out of nowhere in early January 1973 to "ratify" the proposed constitution. With a mere show of hands in the public meeting staged by these Citizens Assemblies, the New Constitution was approved "overwhelmingly" on the same month. Attempts by some opposition leaders to question the validity and legality of martial law and the ratification of the 1973 Constitution came to naught as a docile Supreme Court could neither invalidate the "ratification" nor declare martial law unconstitutional.28

These "citizens assemblies" and such other political circuses (like the referenda-plebiscites) would, in the future, become the convenient means by which the regime would attempt to gain a badly-needed image of legitimacy.29

The government proceeded to transform political structures to resemble military structures. As Jim Swick explained,

"Constitutional change in the Philippines has led to the militarization of traditionally autonomous civilian government structures through the centralization and hierarchization of control. There is no allowance for civilian opposition to Marcos' or the military's actions and policies since these could lead either to charges of subversion or prompt removal from office through the naming of a new successor. It effectively institutionalizes the form of militarization outlined by the Study Group on Militarization of the International Peace Research Association that leads directly to varying degrees of
respect for law and order and to the repressive actions which follows from them. By allowing the continuation of Marcos' decrees and orders beyond the ending of Martial Law, the New Constitution ensures that any move to re-order the government along more democratic and less repressive lines will involve a long and arduous legal process in the National Assembly. The 'institutionalization of the revolution' that Marcos wrote of represents in fact the institutionalization of militarization in the country."30

MILITARIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION

The militarization process which evolved during the early martial law years was itself the logical result of the active efforts to stamp out the political opposition through a speedy military solution. Since the principal threat emanated from the insurgent and secessionist movements based in the countrysides, it was the rural areas which bore the brunt of the impact of these military campaigns. Moreover, the urban areas were also subjected to militarization through massive arrests which the military conducted against leaders and activists of the different political parties and organizations.

As indicated earlier, the military campaigns managed to temporarily break the armed resistance, both in the cities and the countrysides. But the setbacks were temporary. By 1975, the national democratic movement had weathered the impact of the declaration and had started to rebuild its crippled structure. In the urban areas, an elaborate underground system was beginning to take shape among the workers, urban poor, and students while new guerilla fronts were being opened by the NPA in northern Luzon, the Visayas, and Southern Mindanao.31

Meanwhile, in Mindanao the conventional warfare strategy of the MNLF led to a series of setbacks which the AFP failed to take advantage of because of the extensive logistical support the rebel group received from sympathetic Arab countries. The stalemate forced
the regime to seek a negotiated solution to the Muslim problem. With the prodding of the international Arab body, the Islamic Conference, both sides opened negotiations in 1976. A ceasefire agreement was inked at Tripoli in December 1976. Both parties also agreed that mutual moves would be taken to establish political autonomy in the Muslim regions. However, shortly after the agreement broke down when the MNLF accused Marcos of duplicity. By mid-1977 war once again resumed.32

This political scenario continues today, with the MNLF occasionally exhibiting flashes of its logistical capability and the NPA conducting a more frequent series of ambushes.33

It is against this backdrop that militarization in the middle and latter parts of the 70's mounted. It brought forth certain practices and techniques which the military did not generally resort to during the early years of authoritarian rule.

Despite international pressure from human rights groups, military campaigns of repression, and the ensuing violations of human rights continued to escalate in an alarming rate from 1975 to 1979. Highly illustrative is Table 2 which a church organization prepared to document the increase militarization in only three major municipalities in Isabela province (See Table 2).

By 1979, even the military expressed concern over the increasing occurrence of military abuse. The Deputy Minister of Defense admitted that complaints about military abuse reached a rate of 150 a day. From this statement, the Asian business paper, Far Eastern Economic Review, estimated that given 100,000 soldiers, abuses are committed by one out of every two soldiers.34 The Deputy Minister conceded that "martial law has led to a lot of unnecessary cruelty (which) ...will not unite the country."35

Military atrocities ranged from simple abuse of position or military misconduct to officially condoned use of militarist techniques against members of the armed opposition and the mass of their supporters and sympathizers. Victims of these military abuses ranged
Table 2

Partial Number of Victims by Type of Military Abuse,

in three Municipalities in Isabela Province

(Excluding Military Operations Like Strategic Relocation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>THREATS</th>
<th>FORCED LABOR</th>
<th>MANHANDLING</th>
<th>ARBITRARY ARREST and DETENTION</th>
<th>TORTURE</th>
<th>LOOTING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ARREST</td>
<td>DETENTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>1979</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

from simple peasants (some of whom never had been involved in politics), workers fighting for economic demands, students demanding academic freedom, priests, to top leaders of both the national democratic movement and the MNLF.36

Of the many techniques employed by the military, specific forms became notoriously widespread. In the mid-70's the use of torture was extensively documented by a church group which pieced together the accounts of detained political prisoners and reports of refugees escaping war torn areas in the Visayas and the Muslim provinces.37 Recently, however, the most blatant manifestations of militarization have been the increasing use of extrajudicial executions of prisoners locally known as "salvaging." the experiments with strategic hamlets program in Southern Mindanao, and the outright massacres of demonstrators and marchers.

A church group concerned with political detainees, the Task Force Detainees(TFD) noted with alarm the growing number of deaths due to summary executions by the military. Based on compiled statistics, TFD reported that from 1975 to 1978, there were 507 cases of "salvaging" and involuntary disappearances among political prisoners in the country, averaging 100 cases a year. In 1980 alone, the church group documented 202 cases (149 cases of salvaging and 53 involuntary disappearances) doubling the rate of the first five years. And in the first months of 1981, it documented 173 such cases, an increase of 150% over 1980.38

The Vietnam-inspired operation of strategic hamletting has also been reported recently in Mindanao where 29,000 peasants of a Davao del Norte town were forced to dismantle their houses at their own expense and to transfer them to areas designated by the military. In these centers, the people were subjected to restriction like curfew and a stern warning that those found outside the perimeter at curfew time shall be summarily shot. Public pressure led by distinguished civil libertarians forced the defense ministry to order the abandonment of the project but whether the order was implemented is another question.39
Anti-riot squads mercilessly quashed student-led mass actions while the military actively suppressed workers' strikes and the resistance of the urban poor community against their forced relocations.

MILITARIZATION AND "NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT"

While militarization in the Philippines is primarily a response to political threats to the authoritarian regime, the problem of military dominance and abuse must also be understood within the context of what Robin Luckham calls the interaction between the state and the military projects and the response and resistance to such an interaction from affected sectors. The Philippine authoritarian economic project, like those in other dependent capitalist statuses in the Third World relies on a development programme premised on the participation of capital and technology-rich institutions from the metropolis and a production strategy designed to heighten the integration of the Philippines into the world capitalist economy.

The intensification of competition among the world capitalist powers for search and control of markets, areas of investments and sources of raw materials in the Third World led to a new stage characterized by the scramble to find areas where costs can be lessened while high profits generated. The Philippines even during the pre-martial law days was certainly such an area except for the political instability caused by a rising nationalist movement and an intense intra-elite struggle which did not provide the ideal atmosphere to pursue such plans. Martial law was the new political order that would provide "the proper atmosphere for the implementation of the new growth strategies." Thus,

"Subsequently, investment laws were liberalized and areas previously reserved for Filipino nationals, such as agricultural production and fishing, were opened to foreign capital. A list of pioneer areas was drawn up where wholly-owned foreign firms may set up business. Economic sectors that have been laggards in contributing to the national
income are being targeted for "rationalization" and "modernization." These include the grains and the coconut industries.\textsuperscript{41}

Measures were also taken to ensure unhampered operations of foreign capital and lessen production costs by controlling labor and other politicized sectors like the studentry.

Yet, well into the late 70's, the Philippine economy was in a state of crisis. By 1981 balance of trade stood at P20 billion.\textsuperscript{42}

The balance of payments was in similar trouble. By December 1981, it totalled U.S.$ 15.8 billion and in 1980 U.S.$ 856 million was paid as loan interest payment alone.\textsuperscript{43}

The economic crisis likewise led to a deterioration of living standards. Income distribution worsened as the top 20 percent of the population increased its share of the national income from 53.9 percent in 1971 to 55.5 percent in 1975. And while the middle 40 percent's share went down from 11.9 percent in 1971 to 11.2 percent in 1975. This trend is even projected by government planners to continue and to worsen by 1999.\textsuperscript{44}

The crisis of the regime's development strategy led to increased resentment from marginalized classes, particularly the workers. In 1976, despite a strike ban imposed by government, workers of a liquor factory mustered enough courage and organizational disposition to go on strike. This strike provided the historical juncture from whence the working class movement really took off after almost half a decade of stupor.\textsuperscript{45} Since then, the economy has been disturbed by an ever-increasing number of strikes despite the strike ban.\textsuperscript{46} In 1978, these strikes caused a production loss of P55,793,392, a 352 percent increase over the previous year.\textsuperscript{47} The strikes warranted the constant intervention of military forces to disperse striking workers, protect industrial operations or implement government labor decisions which tended, in general, to favor management. Very recently, a Cabinet Bill was filed and approved in the Batasang Pambansa, restoring the right to strike in certain industr-
tries. But the more militant unions have opposed it, regarding it as a mere palliative and not truly reflective of the basic economic and political demands of the working class.48

Thus, while counter-insurgency is one side of the militarization coin, the efforts of the regime to effect a development program designed to strengthen dependency relations constitute the other. A dialectical relationship exists between the militarization and between these two factors, just as a similar relationship exists as a consequence of development and insurgency.

MILITARIZATION OF PHILIPPINE VALUES

Militarization in the Philippines was to go beyond the dominating presence of the soldier in uniform in civilian life. There was also that conscious policy to instill military values into Philippine cultural life as part of the effort to create a fascist culture under the new order. The military had become the regime's model of what a "New Society" man ought to be. As the regime itself admits,

"The military's capacity to 'govern and exact obedience' was seen as the 'first new principle or manifestation in the New Society;' that of a 'breed of men capable not only of ruling others but of governing themselves.' Thus discipline, restraint, centralization of power, and other aspects of traditional military ideology were to be the cornerstone of Marcos' New Society."49

The military seriously tried to live up to such a role. In its already expanded educational and civic action program, attention was given to the training of officers for civilian functions and inculcating civilians of the proper "citizenship education." Special care was also given the youth and students due to their ability to be articulate and receptive to ideas. During martial law, the military's civilian education programme "Educated" 15,000 secondary students in Metropolitan Manila.
The project eventually was extended to the rest of the country.

The citizen's army training program also incorporated a Youth Action Development Organization (YADO), the collegiate counterpart to the existing education program for secondary students. A youth arm of the regime was also organized along militarist lines which included close adherence to discipline, a spartan way of life and hierarchical obedience. The Kabataan Barangay (Community Youth) envisioned the militant youth (a la the Red Guards of China) acting as the "Prime propagators of the Democratic Revolution" of the regime. Mass organizations purposely created to maintain control in the local levels were also established and trained along openly militarist lines.

At this point it is worthwhile to cite the Barangay Kawal (Community Soldier) training given to local officials and community leaders as a concrete example of the attempt to militarize Philippine values. This training has, among others, the general aims of making the participant understand the visions of the "Democratic Revolution" so as to "draw their personal commitment to the vision of the New Society," and to develop among them the "proper attitudes, traits and virtues necessary in fulfilling and projecting their personal vision of the New Society." This indoctrination program includes lectures on discipline and unity, perceived problems of the "Old Society" (the pre-martial law social order), and the visions of the New Society replete with marches and taped messages from the President and First Lady.

Such indoctrination sessions have become standard procedures of training for every regime-created organization. But what is alarming is the growing pattern in which blind loyalty is being asked/demanded from trainees. As a concerned priest puts it,

"the 'Barangay Kawal' programme, has given many citizens cause for grave apprehension that there is probably a nationwide pattern to preparation for totalitarian rule based on a personality cult of certain high officials (i.e. Marcos) of the martial law regime."
The manner in which the highlights of both authoritarian and militarist modes of thinking are being infused upon participants of these indoctrination seminars is dramatized in the following account.

"On the last night... the seminar takes on a new twist, an atmosphere of mystery and suspense... the participants are blindfolded and led by circuitous and confusing routes for... to another place of assembly. When their blindfolds are removed, they usually find themselves in a hall in which only the light comes from torches which flank full-length picture of... Marcos. This picture is invariably of heroic, more than life proportions and is sometimes accompanied by a picture of Mrs. Imelda Marcos... In the foreground there is a red-covered book of one of Mr. Marcos' writings... A human skull often completes the setting...

After a brief exhortation touching on the greatness of... the New Society and its exalted leader... the participants... are... inducted into the Barangay Kawal. They are then told... that they will be sworn to defend with their lives and their total *hambi 'Supreme' (leader) and 'Primer Ministro' (Prime Minister) of the New Society, Ferdinand E. Marcos. The participants are enjoined to strict secrecy regarding the dramatic events of that night."

The combination of discipline, hierarchy, restraint with the personality cult only shows that militarization in the Philippines does not only seek to instill fear and silence on the people but to also transform their consciousness to fit into the schema of authoritarianism. Moreover, the effort to develop a personality cult stems from the inadequacy of what Eqbal Ahmad calls the "neo-fascist state" to maintain the charisma of the leader worthy of the Western fascist's tradition. The absence of "support" from the mass, in the face of a growing revolutionary movement can cause problems for the authoritarian
regime which may mean its eventual demise when left unsolved, even temporarily. Marcos may have charmed his way to gain the middle class and even the masses' support in the initial stage of martial law. But as the crisis of dependency increasingly affects the people, it is very likely that "support" will considerably diminish. It is significant to note that indoctrination trainings like the Barangay Kawal became more actively implemented at a period when the regime witnessed an increased resistance from the people as shown in the massive outpouring of anti-Marcos sentiments during the eve of the April 1978 elections to the Interim National Assembly.

THE HUMAN AND SOCIAL COSTS OF MILITARIZATION

It is virtually impossible to determine the exact number of people affected in various ways by the militarization of Philippine society. There had been no systematic documentation on such human and social costs of militarization except very recently when church groups concerned with human rights have managed to develop a nationwide monitoring system to report on military abuses. Even then, these groups admit that many incidents remain unreported due to a number of reasons; primary of which is fear of reprisal from the military. There is one thing these partial reports however reveal: there has been no let down in the number of military abuses and in fact militarization has increased.

Thousands have become victims of militarist methods like torture, detention, relocations and massacres. Church accounts of torture on political prisoners, for example, are replete with stories about the most insidious methods being employed during "tactical interrogation." Prisoners bear the effects of torture even after release and some are mentally disabled by it:

Leonila Lumbang was arrested on 12 May 1974 and released after a few months in dire need of psychiatric treatment after her period of detention. She had been taken to... (a) ...safehouse sometime in July 1974. At one point her head was banged against the corner of a refrigerator door. At another point...
scalding water was poured on her legs. Her head, body and limbs were black and blue when she was returned to (the regular detention center) she was where sometime in November she fell from a swing, lost consciousness and was taken to an (army hospital)... from where she was released. Upon her release Leonila was unable to walk or talk... Those who took care of her report that her body would convulse uncontrollably at the sound of a car's 'backfire' or similar noises.55

Detention centers, in general, are maintained along sub-human lines with prisoners cramped in small cells. In relocation centers, the people suffer under similar conditions and their displacement has deprived them of the chance to actively work for their economic livelihood.56 The costs of militarization also extend beyond the victims and affect their families.

The military share of government expenditures remains one of the largest to the disadvantage of other services which are more important to a poverty-stricken society. (See Table 3). Since resources allocated to the military cannot be expended on anything else no productive returns can be expected. Diokno argues this out effectively in his paper on the "Social Cost' of Militarization":

"Some 15,000 people died violently in my country in 1974, perhaps half of them because of clashes between the military and rebel or dissident forces. But in the same year, some 46,000 people died of pneumonia; 31,000 of tuberculosis; 15,000 of avitaminosis and other forms of nutritional deficiency; and 12,500 of malignant neoplasms. All 76,500 died of causes that could have been prevented or cured. Yet that year the Philippine government spent only U.S.$ 3 per capita for health, compared to U.S.$ 8 per capita for the military. As David K. Whynes says: 'The moral is clear! guns kill in more ways than one.'"57
### Table 3

Defense vs. Education, Health, Social Security/Welfare, Housing and Community Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>% of TOTAL</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>% of TOTAL</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>% of TOTAL</th>
<th>1975</th>
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<th>1976</th>
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<td>10342</td>
<td></td>
<td>11712</td>
<td></td>
<td>18198</td>
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<td>Defense</td>
<td>818</td>
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<td>1211</td>
<td>(11.70)</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>(16.50)</td>
<td>3542</td>
<td>(19.47)</td>
<td>4118</td>
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<td>(10.0)</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>1223</td>
<td>(15.0)</td>
<td>1336</td>
<td>(13.00)</td>
<td>1711</td>
<td>(14.60)</td>
<td>2104</td>
<td>(11.50)</td>
<td>2459</td>
<td>(11.9)</td>
<td>2721</td>
<td>(12.0)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>(3.00)</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>(4.00)</td>
<td>712</td>
<td>(4.00)</td>
<td>927</td>
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<td>1044</td>
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<tr>
<td>S. Welfare</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>(2.80)</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>(2.40)</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>(2.4)</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>(1.8)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>(.6)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>(.48)</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>210</td>
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<td>(1.0)</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>(1.1)</td>
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FEER 1981 – 1982 Yearbook
RATIONALIZING MILITARIZATION

Human rights as an international issue brought about immense pressure on the Philippine authoritarian regime to counter the growing accusation that it was a major violator of human rights in Asia. The various church accounts and the reports of international human rights organizations like Amnesty International drew international uproar against the abuses perpetrated by the military on the various sectors of Philippine society. Forced into a very embarrassing position, the regime responded in different ways: outright denial and anger,58 promises of investigation, announcements of releases of political detainees and the persecution of military officials involved in these abuses. However, all these were made to create a facade of humanitarianism and a respect for the rights of individuals under the law.

The regime was particularly sensitive to accusations of torture on political prisoners. In 1974, President Marcos angrily denied that torture was employed to extract information from detainees.59 The continued documentation of church groups on torture, however, led the regime to admit that such form of military abuse has become a problem and investigations have been made against military personnel whom church groups accuse of being continuously involved in the torture of political prisoners.60 In his book, Five Years of the New Society, Marcos appended a compilation of such investigations as proof of the serious efforts of the regime to minimize, if not eliminate, torture totally. Ironically, the very data itself showed the lack of sincerity and seriousness to solve the problem.

Of the 79 cases of torture against military officials and men, only 2 were meted light sentence while the rest of the cases were either dropped due to "lack of evidence," or the officers were merely administratively admonished. In five cases, the military outrightly lied about their use of torture despite the counterevidences supplied by the Task Force Detainees.61 With the exception of the case brought against soldiers responsible for the killing of a tribal leader leading the opposition to the Chico River Dam project, there has been no major trial against military officers accused of abuse and
atrocities. Most incidents reported to the military have been received with mere promises of investigation.62

Other instances of the regime's lack of sincerity towards protecting human rights have also been pointed out as in the case of major announcements on releases of political detainees. As observed by Task Force Detainee,

"In the period from 27 June to 7 September 1977, President Marcos is said to have announced the release of some 3,609 detainees in six batches. Out of the six batches of releases supposedly ordered... only one complete and two incomplete lists totalling 1,007 names ever appeared in the local dailies. 2,061 names are not accounted for. Of the 1,007 names listed only 95 have been verified to be political detainees. Of these 92, only 41 had actually been released since June 27th. The remaining 54 had been released (two had already been dead for a year) prior to 27 June 1977, some as long as three or four years earlier."63

In the case of the 1981 massacres, for example, the military has taken no move to prosecute officials and soldiers responsible for the killings despite media pressure. Instead the commanding officer of the Constabulary detachment responsible for the Daet massacre in Bicol province was promoted to a higher rank.64

Annual published reports on national security and defense also make special mention of the number of military personnel being meted various types of punishments due to different kinds of abuses. But even if the figures appear to be true, the number of abuses cannot be offset by the so-called corrective measures taken against erring military personnel. According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, by 1979, a total of 54,000 complaints against Military abuses had been logged at the Defense Ministry. Meanwhile, from 1973 to 1976, only over 1,900 military personnel had been meted various penalties by the military. Marcos in 1977 reported that 2,083 personnel had either been dismissed or penalized due to abuses.65
Authoritarianism and militarization as the proper responses to ensure "stability" in the Philippines met the approval of the United States despite the fact that it had always pledged itself with having transformed its erstwhile colony into "the showcase of democracy in Asia." After all, what mattered was that the "military bases and a familiar government are more important than the preservation of democratic institutions, which were imperfect at best." This approval was to be further expressed in terms of increased military and economic assistance to the regime after 1972.

The U.S. had always closely monitored and supervised the development of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, a fact that was openly admitted by an American military officer when he faced the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

"(U.S. Military) advise and assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of training, material and services as necessary to assure protection of U.S. interests in the Philippines and to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives in the area, as defined by the Department of State." 67

U.S. military assistance substantially increased after the declaration of martial law, as assurances were given by the regime that U.S. interests shall not only remain untouched and protected by the removal of the political threats principally coming from the left.

Unofficial and unauthorized assistance also comes in the form of the use of U.S. base facilities as training ground for Filipino pilots, joint exercises between the two armed forces and the most important and controversial of all, the active involvement of American advisers in AFP operations against the NPA and the MNLF in Isabela province and Mindanao, respectively. 68

The presence of the two biggest American bases outside of the United States allows the strong possibility
of American intervention in case the Philippine military feels such need. This right to intervene has been given legal cover lately, when a seemingly inconspicuous provision of the 1978 Base Agreement virtually allowed the Americans the right to extend "security operations" outside of the base area.69

With U.S. support the militarist posture of the Marcos regime has been considerably enhanced. U.S. support has allowed the regime to cut down its huge military allocation from the national budget thereby blunting criticism that national general appropriations heavily favored the military establishment. At the same time, assistance acted as a plug to the shortfalls encountered by the regime caused by the diversion of resources earmarked for projects and programs other than military needs.70

U.S. policy pronouncements since 1974 continue to approve of the martial law regime and its concomitant militarization. Despite "irritants" during the Carter period over the regime's human rights record, there was no let up in both pronouncements and support to the Philippines jumped from U.S.$ 69,530 M to a high U.S.$ 99, 114 M. Secretary Cyrus Vance provided the official explanation by declaring that, "whatever the human rights violations (in the Philippines), assistance could not be reduced because of 'overriding security considerations'."71 Presently, under Reagan and his staunchly anti-Soviet confrontational foreign policy, the Philippines appears to be assured of heightened U.S. support, both in policy statements and in material assistance.

The raison d'etre for U.S. increased assistance to the Marcos regime is simple support to a "familiar government" which has assured the preservation of U.S. economic and political interests in the Philippines and in Southeast Asia. In 1969, 60 percent of U.S. investments in Southeast Asia were already located in the Philippines. Upon the declaration of martial law, the Marcos regime instituted a series of "economic reforms" giving liberal incentives to locally based operations of American and other foreign transnational corporations. Foreign investments spectacularly pumped

The industrialization program of the government has also highly favored the participation and leading role of transnational corporations which since the pre-martial law years have already controlled major sectors in the Philippine economy. The countrysides, too, were actively exposed by government to TNC penetration through rapid infrastructural development and incentives to agribusiness corporations.

Within the Southeast Asian region, it is the strategic location of the Philippines which makes the U.S. more than willing to support the regime. The Philippines falls along important trade routes utilized by the U.S. and Japan to transport their raw materials needs, particularly oil from the Middle East. Politically, the Philippines assumes a very important military value in the eventual need for American intervention in the Asian region and the Persian Gulf. Any political instability within the Philippines would seriously affect the "capability to respond", especially if forces based on the two large American bases, Clark and Subic, are called for.\textsuperscript{73}

Amidst the growing tension in Southeast Asia due to a perceived increasing Soviet influence in the Indochina peninsula, American aid to the non-socialist stages, especially "allies" like the Philippines, will very likely go up.\textsuperscript{74} The proposed total assistance for 1980, for example, is U.S.$ 9450 M higher than 1979. The Philippines is also scheduled to receive an additional U.S.$ 250 M as five-year rental payment for the U.S. bases in the country. This assistance in turn would add fuel to the already pervasive problem of militarization in the Philippines. The regime is accorded continued support from a major arms supplier by merely using the communist bogey to preserve its dominance in Philippine politics. Militarization in the Philippines therefore is a national problem with an international dimension. It is no different from other Third World authoritarian regimes following the capitalist path of development.
If U.S. military aid represents the direct external support to Philippine militarization, other international institutions, not militarist in nature, also play indirect but crucial roles in preserving the authoritarian order. By financially propping up the martial law regime, these institutions in effect aid in the protection of the state and its policies against immediate and potential threats, particularly arising from rapidly politicized lower classes. Correspondingly, it assures both the maintenance of an open economy dominated by TNCs and industrialization efforts geared toward enhancing the imports needs of metropolitan centers rather than in fulfilling immediate needs.

One such institution is the World Bank. The World Bank has pumped over U.S.$ 2.4 billion since 1973, signifying its tacit support to the martial law regime and its policies. Previously hesitant to support the pre-martial law administrations particularly those embarking on an import-substitution program as shown by the meager U.S.$ 320 million aid it extended between 1970 to 1973, this U.S.-dominated institution and designed the Philippines a "country of concentration" where aid would be "higher than average for countries of similar size and income." The Bank has even gone to the extent of actually declaring that martial law in the Philippines is not repressive by declaring that the regime "resorts as little as possible to outright coercion and to broaden popular support through."76

With "sympathetic" Philippines development planners whose policies and projects the World Bank has fully endorsed, a Philippine development thrust has been outlined based on three principal components: development of rural productivity, the reorientation and strengthening of an export-oriented industrialization, and the over-all liberalization of the Philippine economy to attract more foreign investments.

Of central interest to the paper is the rural development thrust of the World Bank. This assistance has already accounted for 40 percent of the total World Bank funds. It centers primarily on raising rural productivity to maintain constant food supply and hopefully upgrade the income status of the rural peasantry.
Cognizant of the volatile rural conditions which led to intermittent peasant rebellions, the World Bank and the martial law regime have reached similar conclusions that such rebelliousness could only be eliminated, if not contained, by raising rural productivity and trying to placate the peasant's demand for land.

Rural productivity did increase after a decade of World Bank assistance. However, the costs of achieving such productivity entailed the increased dependence of farmers on high-priced fertilizers and pesticide inputs important for high-yielding rice varieties. The effects have only been recently felt when a number of farmers associations have called for the reduction of the prices of inputs and the raising of the rice support prices. A potential storm, other than the New People's Army, now brews in the Philippine countrysides as these associations contend that World-Bank inspired rural productivity has only eroded the income of the peasantry.

The World Bank itself admitted that despite "a successful" rural productivity programme, the absolute poverty of rural families increased from 23.1 percent by 1975. Furthermore, it has grudgingly admitted that supportive programs like rural credit and irrigation have only benefitted the upper strata of the rural sector... i.e., "middle and big landowners" and not "genuine small landowners." The land reform program has likewise been conceded by the World Bank as a failure. In effect, instead of blunting a mounting peasant rebellion, the rural productivity efforts of the World Bank, in close collaboration with the martial law regime, has increased the possibility of a strengthened countryside-based political opposition to the regime.

A World Bank project exhibiting a definite linkage to militarization is the Chico River Dam Project. Despite the strong opposition expressed by Kalinga tribesmen to the building of the dam, the World Bank only dismissed this opposition. It instead emphasized the need to support Philippine Development efforts. This consequently led to silence on the side of the World Bank when military force was used to stifle this
opposition. The threats of the Kalingas to transform the controversy into a full-blown war, however, forced the Bank to withdraw its participation in the Chico Project.

Other than the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) which despite its avowed "neutrality," is clearly a supporter of the regime as seen through its increased support after 1972. Between 1969 and 1972, official aid was only U.S.$ 56.2 million, but after declaration of martial law, it increased to U.S.$ 327 million. Together with the assistance extended by multilateral agencies like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the total foreign assistance made the Philippines the top aid recipient among TW beneficiaries in 1976.80

"preempt the New People's Army of a rural base in the area by offering as a substitute for agrarian revolution a development package, combining the objective of upgrading the productive efficiency of the existing agricultural property system dominated by landlords with palliative measures for small farmers and tenants."81

AID's support to the local development programmes of the regime can also be seen as part of a counter-guerilla effort to strengthen the regime's political and administrative units in the local level. This type of assistance becomes a convenient front for AID-sponsored counter-insurgency operations closely patterned after the Vietnamese CORD (Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development) operations. As early as 1973, CORD experts were to be assigned in war-torn areas in Mindanao and in Central Luzon. It has also been integrated as part of the government's Bicol River Basic Development Program. With the termination of the Public Safety Program, hitherto the effective conduit for para-military training, the Local Development Program of AID assumes extreme importance.82
PROSPECTS OF A DEMILITARIZED PHILIPPINE SOCIETY

The new decade shows no clear indication that militarization shall cease to be a major problem affecting the Philippines and her people despite the formal lifting of martial law. Repression has instead increased as economic and political conditions continue to erode whatever support is left to the Marcos regime. There have been gestures by the regime to liberalize and allow political concessions. The budgetary allocation for the military has been reportedly trimmed down and the defense budget now ranks third in the national appropriations ranking. During the military truce between the regime and the MNLF as a result of the Tripoli accord, the former went through the rounds of announcing the withdrawal of combat units from the Mindanao war zone as a design of sincerity and goodwill. In the urban areas, there were instances of military leniency towards protesting students and striking workers.

These actuations however do not indicate a serious effort to liberalize. As argued earlier, the decrease in the military budget was more than compensated by the consistent military support coming from the United States. The withdrawal of units from Mindanao merely meant a transfer of troops from the war-torn island to other parts of the country where NPA guerrillas have expanded their operations. Very recently, Marcos ordered the activation of 12-20 more army battalions to beef up present forces engaging the NPA in such "critical areas" like the Samar province. The permissive attitude to urban mass assemblies and protests has also been selective. There is toleration only in time when there is a conscious effort by the regime to legitimize itself (as in during elections). After such trappings of legitimization are installed, the "liberal atmosphere" is quickly transformed back to its repressive nature. The recent dialogues between the military and militant student and labor groups have been interpreted by some political observers as more of the effort of a faction within the Marcos camp to build up its own image rather than as serious moves towards de-militarization or de-repression. Moreover, while certain militarist techniques have been played down due to "exposure" by human rights groups, other forms of militarism have become more visible and
pervasive in the recent years. The infrequency of open mass arrests, the liberalization towards urban mass actions and the increase in the releases of political prisoners therefore do not signify that militarization has abated.

The possibility may exist however that any alternation in the political leadership may affect the dynamics of the authoritarian order in the near future. This in turn may cause corresponding changes in the militarization process -- either less repression may ensure albeit without a total disappearance of the problem, or a more massive repression highly similar to that of the Latin/American banana republics may occur.

Political observers, are in agreement that amidst the growing speculation of a debilitating sickness affecting the President, factions within the ruling elite are believed to be involved in an intense jockeying of position in anticipation of any eventuality. With the prospects of a social revolution unlikely to occur in the next few years, and with a severely incapacitated government opposition unable to unite and assert itself for a variety of reasons, a post-Marcos political scenario appears to be dominated by a faction of the elite with military support.

That the military will become a decisive force in the future is an undeniable fact known to all political groups, including the left. The vastness of its resources and manpower shall come in handy to whichever faction it shall support. The lessons and experiences the military have acquired throughout the martial law years have equipped it with the necessary skills to take over the helm of the government in the event the various civilian bureaucracies would refuse to swear allegiance to the new leadership through the parallel bureaucratic structure it has set up through the years.

The involvement of several army generals in the struggle between the two major factions may pose certain problems to the military establishment itself.

To ensure the military's loyalty to the regime, Marcos instituted two major policies which are bound to lead to a potential source of conflict when he dies or
steps down from power. First, is Marcos' marked bias towards officers coming from his province and region when promoting military personnel. Second, is the increasing number of reserve officers who have been recruited into active service and given prestigious and important positions in the establishment. The highest position accorded an integree was the Chief of Staff position now occupied by Marcos' fraternity brother and cousin, General Fabian Ver. These preferences may lead to cleavages within the military rank and file as officers from other regions and the so-called "professionals" and the non-Ilocano officers.

A possible rift may also be caused by a mutiny of troops engaged in the war against dissident forces and Muslim rebels. Mindanao may possibly be the arena of this officers' revolt as it is in this island where almost 85% of the military force is located. Moreover, idealistic young officers who recently graduated from the military schools are usually given their "baptism of fire" by being assigned to Mindanao. As one political scientist explained, "Frustrations at continuing losses in the battlefield, coupled with a sense of discrimination, could easily arouse danger as thoughts of defying the Bonapartist ruler and his 'swivel chair generals' in Manila." In the event of such a mutiny, the regime will be in no position to force a confrontation for fear that the transfer of troops to Mindanao will give NPA forces in Luzon and Visayas the much needed breathing space in order to expand.

Marcos appears to be conscious of these possible sources of tension and rift. In a major address to the armed forces, in 1979, the President warned the military not to become victims of "mischievous people" who are all out to split the defense establishment. The factions seem to heed the President's warnings and confine their struggles within the corridors of power. But it will surely be different once the Philippines enters a post-Marcos stage.

Perhaps even more significant is the critical role the United States will play in the event of a vacuum in the leadership of the Philippine political order. Since it is the major source of economic and military
assistance, the faction the U. S. decides to support will most likely assume leadership. Moreover, it can easily swing the military over to its favored faction. If matters turn to worse, the U.S. forces based in the two huge American bases can readily intervene.

American influence will possibly lead to some form of liberalization to legitimate the new political leadership. Steps might even be taken to install a civilian government or a joint military-civilian rule composed of reputable generals and reputable political leaders. Members of the elite opposition may even be invited to this coalition to strengthen the credibility of the new leadership.

The hawkish posture of the Reagan administration may dim prospects of liberalization and "civilian rule" and bring to the fore the possibility if a Brazilian type of rule with continuing U.S. support both in policy pronouncements and material assistance. In such a case, this rule of the generals may only serve to intensify the polarization of political forces and push the elite opposition into the radical camp. The 1981 boycott alliance indicated that the elite opposition and the radical movement can work together, albeit on a tactical basis. In the absence of an atmosphere where the elite opposition can effectively function, these common actions may bring about the formation of a political framework which could eventually lead to the formation of a united opposition similar to that of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

Very likely the U.S. will opt for a semblance of democratic rule to give the elite opposition more room for maneuver so as to prevent this possibility. However, with the present U.S. support to Marcos' "adherence to the democratic process," the Americans may face considerable difficulty in making this alternative a reality.

The legal opposition -- members of the disenfranchised factions of the elite when Marcos declared martial law -- is in no position to initiate liberalize or demilitarize. Neither can it demand a return to the old constitutional system nor present a political order which departs from the old liberal democratic order. Not
only has the martial law regime effectively crippled and deprived it of its political machinery, there continues to be disunity in its ranks. Hostility towards the regime and a desire to restore elite democracy seem to be the only points of convergence among the different groups comprising the elite opposition. Even the rise of new leaders who have replaced the old guards has not led to a united opposition. The two recent parties under relatively younger leaders are at loggerheads with each other as to the proper strategy to legally confront the regime.

The revolutionary movement is also incapable at paving the demilitarization of society in the immediate future. The principal reason for this is the strategy by which the National Democratic Front (NDF) seeks to seize political power. The NDF envisions a "protracted war" whereby revolutionary forces shall primarily advance "in waves" from the country-sides to the cities. Thus its armed force is principally based in the rural areas doubling as a guerilla army and an organizing force. The polarization of Philippine politics however has placed the NDF in the political limelight as Marcos continuously refuses to share power with the elite opposition and as repression continues to be a major means of exercising political power. At present, it is the NDF's revolutionary alternative that appears to be the only alternative to course action. Political moderates have even opened lines of communications with it in recognition of its organizational strength. The only limiting factor is its inferior military posture. As one NDF paper admits it,

"The NDF, of course, does not yet have the capability to bring down the Marcos dictatorship. Despite recent advances, . . . the process of political polarization has not yet reached a point where the NDF's political influence can make up for its military weakness." 

Although it is most certain that a form of liberalization will occur in the event of a post-Marcos scenario to prevent the further polarization of forces that would benefit a growing radical movement, return to elite liberal democracy may only serve to reactivate the old tensions which martial law subdued but never resolved.
Given this another precarious political situation, Martial law may be re-imposed and militarization escalated in society. This in turn may further polarize the political forces until a point is reached whereby a social revolution becomes the only possible solution.


5Constantino, Ibid., p. 240-241. Out of 1,000 families resettled under the EDCOR project only 246 were ex-Huk members.


7Hernandez, Ibid., p. 208.


10Hernandez, op. cit., pp. 219-224. Of course, the infrastructural support program of the military continued.

11Jose W. Diokno. "The Militarization of Asian Politics."...


15 Hernandez, op. cit., p. 223.

16 Ibid., p. 225. PHVIDEC "owns" a vast area of land in Northern Mindanao, part of which it has leased to Kawasaki Steel Corporation for the establishment of the controversial Kawasaki Sintering Plant in this part of the Philippines. It is slated to become an industrial site for other similar industries.


22 Razon, op. cit.


24 Ahmad, op. cit., p. 34.


26 Ibid., p. 40.

27 Jim Swick. Militarism and Repression in the Philippines. Arms Control and Disarmament. Earlham College. August 1980. p. 17. It was important to ratify the New Constitution since the legislature bodies were due to resume proceedings in January, 1973, the validity of continued martial rule might be called into question.


29 Similar referenda/plebiscites were held in July, February 1975, April 1977. The latest was last April.

30 Swick, op. cit., p. 18.

31 Rocamora, Ibid., pp. 6-7.


37. Bullentin Today, December 12, 1974. The President was reported to have emphatically denied the use of torture against political prisoners. This was disproven by a booklet published by The Task Force Detainees. See, Political Detainees in the Philippines. Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines, 31 March 1976 - 129 pp.


41. Ibid., p. 11.

42. From 1964 to 1973, total inflow was US$836.97M while outflow was US$3,675.15 or a dollar outflow-inflow ratio of 4.1:1. See Rigoberto Tiglao et. al. The Impact of Transnational Corporation in the Philippines. U. P. Law Center, Quezon City. 1978. p. 4.


44. Ibid., p. 3.


52 Ibid., p. 1.

53 Ibid., p. 2.


The Defense Minister continues to argue that most allegations are false, that abuses had been made by a "few misguided military custodians and that "isolated cases" of abuse had been sensationalized and made to appear as reflective of government policy. The increasing number of abuses however seem to show the fact that abuses are possibly concluded if not approved in the lower levels of the military structure. See Fookien Times Yearbook 1979. p. 85.


See for example, Roberto Z. Coloma. "The Las Navas Incident: A Village Government..." as reprinted in Muzzled Voices, Struggling Spirits, op. cit., p. 29.


U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Staff Report, 18 February 1973, as quoted in Robin Broad. International Actors and Philippine Authoritarianism, op. cit., p. 23.


Broad, op. cit., p. 53. See also Bello, Ibid., pp. 23-27.

70 Bello, op. cit., p. 53.


72 Central Bank Approved Foreign Equity Investments by Years of Approval. February 21, 1970 to September 30, 1981.

73 Swick, op. cit., p. 29.


77 As quoted in Ibid., p. 4.


80 Ibid., pp. 8-9. See also Broad, "International Actors..." op. cit., pp. 42-43.


82 The New People's Army integrates into its program the need to implement a "revolutionary land reform program" designed to expropriate landlords' lands and distribute them to depressed farmers and tenants. See

83Broad, "International Actors...", op. cit., p. 50.


86Ibid., p. 6.


89Niksch & Niehaus, op. cit., p. 103.

90U.S. Vice President George Bush's congratulatory message to President Marcos upon his election as first president of the "New Republic."


92"Polarization and the Class Struggle: The NDF Takes Center Stage," op. cit., p. 4.

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LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN THE 1980s: FACADE OR REALITY

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To assert at any given moment that democracy is "rising" or "falling" in Latin America places one in the unhappy position of being declared a fool two moments later. Even so, it appears that in 1985 there are signs of democratic aberturas in various countries which have suffered repressive dictatorships during the last two decades. "Since November 1980, ..., our southern neighbors have cast some 150 million votes in 33 elections in 24 countries. That is more votes in more elections in more countries than in any previous 4 years in the history of Latin America and the Caribbean."

The results have been perhaps most startling in the South American continent. Argentina held the first open elections since 1973 in December 1983, and Radical Party member Raul Alfonsin was elected. In 1985, the Bolivian and Peruvian armed forces allowed civilians to assume the presidency for the second time since the 1960s. Hernan Siles Z. surrendered power to Victor Paz E. in Bolivia and in Peru APRA's Alan Garcia succeeded
LATIN AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1985 President (Dec.)</th>
<th>Scheduled</th>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Jose Sarney</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Augusto Pinochet</td>
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<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Belisario Betancur</td>
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<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Leon Febres-Cordero</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Oscar Mejia Victores</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Miguel de la Madrid</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Daniel Ortega</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
<td>1968</td>
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<td>Eric A. Devalle</td>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Alfredo Stroessner</td>
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<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Julio Sanguinetti</td>
<td>1990</td>
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</tbody>
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*Presidential elections in which there was opposition and in which the winner was allowed to hold office, although not necessarily to finish his term.

**Minimal, or meaningless, opposition in election.

***Arnulfo Arias won but only held office for eleven days.
Fernando Belaunde. Ecuador too had open elections in 1984 in which Guayaquil businessman Leon Febres Cordero defeated Rodrigo Borja; the 1984 elections marked the first time in recent history that a popularly elected Ecuadorean president surrendered power to another elected president. Traditional democracies such as Venezuela and Colombia held presidential elections in, respectively, 1983 and 1982 and elected reformist candidates. Brazil's President Jose Figueiredo withstood strong popular pressure for direct presidential elections in 1984, but then presided over an election in which the opposition candidate Tancredo Neves defeated the divided government party. President-elect Neves died before he could be inaugurated, but the armed forces allowed Vice President Jose Sarney to assume the Presidency. Uruguay's junta begrudgingly opened the way to carefully orchestrated elections in November, 1984, which the Colorado Party's candidate, Julio Sanguinetti, won. In South America, the hold-outs have been stubborn Augusto Pinochet in Chile, who seems willing to continue to meet civilian demands for a return to legality with as much force as necessary, and Paraguay where long-term caudillo Alfredo Stroessner shows no sign of loosening his grip.

The Caribbean and Central America also have experienced some authentic displays of democracy, some more dubious demonstration elections, and generally a wider variety of political forms. Elections in the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica in 1982 and in Panama in 1984 all were viewed as meaningful, although the Panamanian President was forced to resign in September, 1985. There is little agreement on whether the 1981 election of Roberto Suazo Cordoba, a civilian, in Honduras signalled the erosion of military dominance in that nation and even less agreement on the meaning of the Salvadorean elections in 1983 which resulted in Napoleon Duarte's victory. The Guatemalan armed forces permitted constituent assembly elections in 1984 and presidential elections in 1985. They respected the Christian Democratic victories in both elections. Nicaragua's November 1984 elections were conducted fairly, but several opposition candidates protested and withdrew from the race or refused to participate. The English-speaking Caribbean continues unchecked in its democratic parliamentary tradition, although the 1984 Grenada elections may have only tempor-
arily silenced former strongman Eric Gairy. Jean Claude Duvalier allowed some municipal and legislative elections in 1983 and 1984, but opposition candidates could not participate freely. Since the mid-1970s, Cuba has had local elections in an effort to secure more popular participation in its political structure and to effect an institutionalization of the Revolution.

Is democracy on the rise in Latin America in the 1980s? The developments discussed focus on elections as an indicator of democratization. Yet elections in themselves frequently have only a tenuous relationship to real democracy in Latin America. Since national independence in the early nineteenth century in most of Spanish America, dictators and caudillos have staged elections to legitimize their power. More recently, "demonstration elections" have tried to convince public opinion at home and abroad that the government is an authentic democracy. As Edward Herman and Frank Brodhead write, "Although elections can be useful means of allowing public participation in the political arena, they often provide form without substance. Especially when countries are under military control, voting numbers and choices may reflect fear, coercion, and manipulated information and symbols. Elections in such cases are put on and managed to ratify power."

To use elections as an index of democracy in Latin America, one must examine closely the candidates, the platforms, and the conditions under which the elections are held. Moreover, although the liberal definitions of democracy concentrate primarily on the integrity of civil liberties and the mechanisms of the political process, it is preferable in Latin America to incorporate some social qualities of an ideal democratic state. That is, does a political leader, no matter how freely elected, accord some priority to the quality of life and the needs of the majority of his compatriots? Or does he favor the programs and demands of the small middle class or economic elite? The recent Latin American elections suggest that there is a more inclusionary trend to politics south of the Rio Grande -- that is, more people are included in the political system than have been in the past decade -- but there is little evidence yet to warrant a conclusion that a more equitable social structure will follow.
Most of the presidents elected in Latin America between 1980 and 1984 have been more reformist or populist than the regimes they replaced. All have fallen between the center left and the center right on the ideological continuum. It would have been unlikely, of course, that the military officers of Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, El Salvador, Honduras, or Panama would have allowed the election or accession of a radical leftist alternative. Nonetheless it is encouraging that the most conservative, or authoritarian, candidates apparently enjoyed little popularity with the electorate or with the generals. Bolivia's Victor Paz E. claims affiliation with the Socialist International, and Raul Alfonsin in Argentina, while not an affiliate, remains on friendly terms with the SI.

Extremist candidates fared no better in the nations where competitive elections have been more frequent -- Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Ecuador. The ideological range of the major parties is so narrow in these countries that it is difficult to assert that one party consistently is more reformist than its principal rival. For example, Belisario Betancur of Colombia, although a Conservative Party member, campaigned in 1982 with a promise to negotiate an amnesty with the guerrillas. Nonetheless, three of the six nations elected presidents who are affiliated with the Socialist International (Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Dominican Republic), and five of the six new presidents represented the opposition rather than the incumbent political party. Jorge Blanco's Partido Revolucionario Democratico in the Dominican Republic had been in power prior to his 1982 election, although his wing of the party had moved further to the left. In short, these elections, like those in the former military dictatorships, have also expressed frustration with the incumbent party's political management.

If we examine the process that led to these elections and the percentage of the adult population which voted, we can conclude that Latin Americans have become more assertive in demanding and exercising political power. In nearly every case where the government allowed or promised competitive elections after a spell of dictatorship, popular protests and demonstrations forced the issue. The
public outcry against the Argentinean generals who had bullied the nation into the disastrous Malvinas/Falklands war strengthened the legalista wing of the armed forces which scheduled the 1983 elections. The complacent armed forces in Uruguay had prepared a plebiscite in 1980 for the voters to endorse the facade of constitutionalism erected by the generals: surprisingly, the people overwhelmingly rejected the alleged choice and the officers counted the ballots fairly. Riots and demonstrations in Brazil in 1983 and 1984 focused not only on food shortages, but also on a demand for direct presidential elections in 1984. The size of the protests and their vehemence led President Figueiredo to consider direct elections in 1984; he held the line against direct elections, but he himself declined to stand for office again, and he tolerated the nomination of an official candidate of whom he did not approve. The cost of suppressing popular dissatisfaction apparently had become too high in South America.

The governments of Central American nations such as Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador have been shaken more seriously by guerrilla movements. Yet elections in the region have been held more in response to United States pressure for a veneer of legitimacy than because the generals have been ready to share or give up power. Presidents such as Jose Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador and Roberto Suazo Cordova of Honduras enjoy less autonomy than most of their South American counterparts and thus may find the task of constructing a stable populist following to be more difficult. Still, for the moment the elections and the victories of moderate civilian politicians allow Central America too to be counted among the new democracies in the Hemisphere.

Two questions come to mind: simply, why the new democratic mood? and, more complex, do the developments of the 1980s confirm or challenge social science literature on democracy and authoritarianism in Latin America? Taking the second question first, the recent abertura might well prompt scholars again to rethink generalizations about political development in Latin America. Theorists such as Seymour Martin Lipset have argued since the 1950s that democracy will come to Latin America when the countries have reached a sufficient stage of economic
growth, an economic growth which will create and support a large middle class and the luxury of liberal democracy.³ In fact, of course, theories which link economic growth and democratic institutions already had been discredited by the developments in Latin America in the 1960s and early 1970s. Contrary to optimistic predictions, the unprecedented economic growth of those decades brought not democracy, but authoritarianism, most notably in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile. Others have argued that perhaps the theory and the Western European/U.S. model are not at fault so much as is the optimism that such developments would occur quickly or in the same sequence that they did in Western Europe or the United States. Whatever association there may be between democracy and economic development over the long run, it is clear that the recent wave of elections in Latin America does not represent the sudden emergence of prosperous, middle class societies.

Guillermo O'Donnell, among others, has related economic variables to the demise of democracy and the rise of authoritarianism in another way.⁴ He argues that democracy or populism in Latin America accompanied the early stage of import substitution industrialization. Once the easy stage had passed, it became more difficult to satisfy all of the demanding groups in the country without requiring sacrifices of some. Authoritarian rulers such as the military officers in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, or Uruguay could only enforce their belt-tightening measures to help the business sector when they accompanied their rule with a repression which controlled the demands of the politicized working classes. In 1984, none of the Latin American countries have solved the perplexing problems of dependent economic development. Indeed, the economic crisis of the 1980s surpasses any that the hemisphere has seen since the 1930s. O'Donnell's association of bureaucratic-authoritarianism with a transitional stage in a dependent economy does not satisfactorily explain the political history of Latin America in the early 1980s -- unless the recent flirtation with democratic forms proves to be only a brief intermission.

Finally, we have noted some degree of populism among the newly elected presidents of Latin America. Their populism admittedly differs from that of the
classical figures of Getulio Vargas (President of Brazil, 1930-45, 1950-54), Juan Peron (President of Argentina, 1945-1955), or Lazaro Cardenas (President of Mexico, 1934-40). Yet, scholars who have examined populism most closely and in a comparative context have speculated that populism most closely associates with the first surge of urbanization and industrialization in Latin America, roughly the period from 1930 to 1965. They, like O'Donnell, place populism at a particular economic and social moment in history and conclude that it is unlikely to reemerge.5

Why do recent Latin American political events appear to be flying in the face of theory? Some of the most obvious partial responses have been suggested already. The secular, modernization theories which link democracy and economic development rest upon the historical examples of the United States and Western Europe. Like much social science theory which has a western bias, it may not be directly applicable to the late developing nations. Similarly, much of the bureaucratic-authoritarian literature relies on analyses of Argentina and Brazil at a particular time -- and a fairly short one -- in their histories; thus, the data on which the theories depend may be too narrow and specific to support useful generalizations. Scholarly studies of populism must also base their definitions on an interpretation of historical populist movements, and those definitions logically may be inappropriate to apply to new political forms, no matter how "populist" they may appear in a general sense. Nor can social science generalizations comfortably accommodate factors such as personal political acumen. It is doubtful whether theory alone can account for Romulo Betancourt's success in constructing and defending a democratic system in Venezuela and Juan Bosch's failure to do so in the Dominican Republic. A political leader's talent, toughness, and ability to take advantage of his political context can defy, if only rarely, political generalizations. As Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue in their discussion of the breakdown of democratic regimes, "...we felt it important to analyze the behavior of those committed to democracy, especially the behavior of the incumbent democratic leaders, and to ask in what ways the actions or nonactions of the incumbents contributed to the breakdown under analysis."6 The actions and nonactions of
politicians logically must also contribute to the consolidation of democratic regimes.

Finally, no analysis based on past structures and events can suitably factor changing circumstances into any predictions. Although the difficulties of late developing nations have been well observed and documented, the 1980s have brought a new variation in the contours of dependency with the privatization of the Latin American national debts. The increasing pressure exerted by the foreign banks and by the International Monetary Fund produces a new chapter in the history of economic dependency, which is different from earlier conflicts with multinational enterprises and from the 1960s indebtedness to public institutions. It logically may encourage a different political response.

In turning from a consideration of the theories about democracy in Latin America to the reality, we should bear in mind that it is possible that only the form of government has changed in many countries. Under duress the military officers have widened the governing coalition to include middle class politicians. All South American countries, even Venezuela, have National Security Doctrines which provide a constitutional basis for the armed forces to supervise or direct many aspects of national life under certain conditions. The armed forces of Peru, Brazil, or Argentina may construe that authorization more broadly than those of Venezuela or Ecuador, but it is clear that the shadow of the authoritarian state continues to fall upon the new civilian politicians. Nonetheless, it is significant that the generals have recently allowed a return to electoral politics. What have been the reasons?

In the "new" democracies in South America, there has been an historical tradition of populism and electoral politics. Even when these traditions have been eclipsed by the overwhelming power of the armed forces, they form a part of the political culture. The memories of Juan Peron in Argentina, of Getulio Vargas in Brazil, of Victor Paz Estensoro and the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) in Bolivia, of Victor Haya de la Torre and the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) in Peru, of Jose Antonio Batlle in Uruguay have endured. Under the
thrall of dictatorial governments, the magic of these men's names and what they stood for remained a standard for what "normal" politics should be. Most of the military officers who recently dominated these nations preferred the role of "antipolitician" to that of military populist. Yet many of them encouraged the popular feeling that the military governments were only a temporary aberration from "real" politics by promising that elections would be held and political parties legalized when the time was right. In short, the populist tradition coupled with the generals' own, sometimes hypocritical, assertions that their rule was temporary meant that many people continued to expect a return to contested civilian elections.

The South American countries also had had strong political parties although many of them had been outlawed for years: Peru's APRA, Argentina's Peronistas and Radical Civic Union, Uruguay's Blancos and Colorados, Bolivia's MNR. A testimony to the durability of the political culture is that these parties could reemerge in the elections of the 1980s with enough organization, credibility, and leadership to field candidates and to return to the political stage.

Of course another sign of the continuity of the political culture is the number of "old" politicians who returned to office in the 1980s. Former presidents Fernando Belaunde Terry (Peru, 1980), Hernan Siles Zuazo (Bolivia, 1982) and Jose Napoleon Duarte (El Salvador, 1983) assumed the presidency of their countries for a second time; former Panamanian President Arnulfo Arias only missed narrowly in 1984.

One might argue that the victories of these new, "old" presidents reflect only the tradition of Latin American personalismo, rather than an institutionalized political culture. No doubt that is true in a number of cases, but at least Siles of the MNR and Duarte of the Christian Democrats represented reformist parties which have not been simply personal vehicles. These parties, and others, have been greatly strengthened by their ties with similar parties in the hemisphere and in Europe. Venezuela's Accion Democratica has encouraged social democratic parties in the hemisphere while Vene-

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The Central American and Caribbean nations (excluding the English speaking nations) have had difficulty in developing strong political organizations with a commitment to reform. A generation of more liberal and responsible politicians did emerge in the immediate postwar era: Eliecer Gaitan in Colombia, Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela, Jose Figueres in Costa Rica, Luis Munoz Marin in Puerto Rico, Eduardo Chibas in Cuba, Juan Jose Arevalo and Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala, Paul Magloire in Haiti, Juan Manuel Galvez and Ramon Villeda in Honduras, and, a bit later, Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic. Of these, all but Betancourt, Figueres, and Munoz Marin died violently or were overthrown before they could construct durable political parties. In most cases the elected, liberal governments of the 1980s in the Caribbean basin are only beginning to mold their political reform traditions; they are further handicapped by trying to do so in a climate of ideological tension which inflates the significance of every gesture to a matter of global concern.
There have been internal and external catalysts for this new wave of democracy in Latin America; popular pressure and economic crisis have shaken most governments in the region as have a series of recent U.S. policies. To examine popular pressure first, the importance of public demonstrations in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Bolivia has already been alluded to. Yet more significant were those earlier, broad-based movements which brought Maurice Bishop (Grenada) and the Sandinistas (Nicaragua) to power in 1979 and threatened to overturn the Salvadoran military dictatorship soon afterward. Conservative governments, especially in the Caribbean Basin, feared the spread of popular unrest in their countries. The debt crisis and the International Monetary Fund's demands for austerity measures squeezed many of the former allies of the dictators. Growing dissatisfaction among a wider segment of the public could only be quelled by greater doses of repression. Yet recent examples of the collapse of the Shah of Iran and of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua could be read to warn that unbridled use of military or police force alienated much of the domestic population as well as foreign allies. The alternative appeared to be to allow a carefully controlled "return" to popular, civilian government. Elected governments could presumably command the force necessary to put down protests while arousing less domestic and foreign criticism; they also would have greater credibility and support in confronting the international banks than would a dictatorial government.

The United States government reinforced the conclusions that the generals must have reached. President Jimmy Carter's emphasis on real improvement in human rights angered and frustrated the authoritarian governments in the Americas. Yet some of them tried to minimize abuses or to appear less repressive. Ironically, Ronald Reagan has encouraged that same emphasis on appearances, although in a different form. In order to secure U.S. Congressional support for military aid to Central America, President Reagan had to argue that the aid was in support of democracy and against Communist expansion. It may fairly be said that the elections which have occurred in Central America in the last four years have responded more to U.S. pressure than to the force of popular movements. The two cornerstones of Reagan's Caribbean policy -- the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the National
Bipartisan Commission's Report on Central America (Kissinger Report) -- both make economic as well as military aid contingent upon a display of "democracy." The intention was to exclude Cuba, Grenada (until October, 1983), and Nicaragua from the programs and to try to derail other leftist movements in the region. Yet the yardstick must be applied to allies as well, so the Central American ruling cliques have arranged elections. Despite the tenuousness of these new governments, the increased popular participation may give rise eventually to authentic political reform movements.

Any discussion of the current surge of democratic governments in Latin America should conclude with an evaluation of their long term stability. For, as we noted at the outset, elections in themselves are less significant than the ability of elected leaders to solve problems and to retain their appeal. Using the Venezuelan transition from dictatorship to a stable democratic system in the decade of the 1960s as an example of a successful case, one might argue that several conditions are necessary for this transition to be successful. All of the major civilian political and economic groups must agree to the rules of the game and accept the role of loyal opposition when they are not in power. An obviously pragmatic corollary is that any ruling group must not exclude any of the other players in the distribution of patronage and benefits. The Venezuelan "Pact of Punto Fijo" in 1958 formalized such an agreement between the major political parties, business leaders, and labor leaders. A government which successfully makes the transition to competitive politics must also convince the armed forces to play a complementary role in the system, rather than the primary political role; obviously all of the civilian leaders must eschew calling on the military officers in times of domestic tension. One term of civilian leadership probably is not sufficient to establish civilian rule. Both the agreement among the civilian sectors and the appeasement of the military sectors takes both exceptional political skill and exceptional luck. Any dissatisfied group could unite with any legitimate leadership which spoke more forcefully for them -- the business classes with the armed forces or peasants with marxist guerrillas.
None of the contemporary situations replicate the favorable situation which Romulo Betancourt had in 1959 in Venezuela: agreement among all the significant civilian sectors; armed forces which supported the civilian politicians; adequate income from the petroleum wealth to be able minimally to meet demands of all sectors; and no tradition of any other civilian political party which had experience in governing and a claim on the themes of populism. Today, all Latin American nations suffer from a critical economic situation, and it will be difficult to woo all groups with economic benefits. Thus, the resolution of the other problems becomes even more crucial. We might divide most of the current "democracies" into three groups.

First, there are governments which have replaced a dictatorship in countries with some democratic, reformist tradition and political parties. If they are able to secure a definitive treaty with other civilian groups, reassure the armed forces, and skillfully avoid the major pitfalls inherent in the foreign debt, they may guarantee the return of competitive politics in their nations. Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and perhaps Peru are good examples. In Argentina, Alfonsin must confront a strong, if divided, peronist party, a strong labor sector, a strong armed forces, and militant agribusiness and industrial associations. Bolivia's President Victor Paz E. represents the majority MNR which has fewer strong civilian competitors than does Alfonsin's Radical Party, but the Bolivian Armed Forces seems more wary of civilian rule than their Argentinean compatriots. Ecuador is a bit further along since President Leon Febres-Cordero replaced a democratically elected president of another political party without incident. Peru's situation may be the most problematical of the four countries listed here. President Alan Garcia's Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) must confront conservative and military wariness and a serious guerrilla threat from the Sendero Luminoso. All in all, Garcia and Paz E. will need the greatest amount of skill and luck in order to succeed. Most importantly, they must be willing to surrender power to an honestly elected successor.

Second, we may consider the governments which have replaced dictatorships, but which are dominated by a
strong armed forces, face a formidable guerrilla challenge, and have not had a tradition of civilian democracy. The Central American countries of Honduras, El Salvador, Panama, and Nicaragua fulfill these conditions. These "democratic" governments will experience great difficulty in maintaining the small gains already made. The continuing presence of armed conflict, an ascending curve of professionalism and corporate military pride, and disastrous economic pictures will limit the possibilities for creating solid civilian political parties and coalitions. The overt dominance of the armed forces will make much more difficult the task of convincing the people that the form of democratic government really corresponds to any reality of popular power. The Nicaraguan leadership has made much progress in building a multifaceted political base through literacy campaigns, community political organizations, and wider distribution of a variety of government services. The promising beginnings, however, have been critically eroded by the externally financed guerrilla movement.

Third, we might consider the governments which have held limited elections or which have promised limited presidential elections in the near future: Uruguay, Brazil, Guatemala. The success of a transition to democracy in Uruguay and Brazil will probably depend on the ability of the civilian sectors to cooperate with each other. The possibilities look better in Brazil than in Uruguay, but Uruguay's impressive history as a social democracy cannot easily be dismissed. Guatemala's strong guerrilla movement will make it difficult for a civilian president to achieve much distance from the armed forces.

In conclusion, we return to the obvious assessment that formal democracy has unexpectedly made a return to Latin America in the 1980s. Popular and international pressure as well as a greater maturity of civilian political parties have encouraged the generals to step back from the direct exercise of political power. Yet economic vulnerability and social fragmentation will mean that the demonstration elections and demonstration governments will need extraordinary skill and luck to be able to consolidate authentic political and social democracies. At present the generals appear to be experimenting with new political models to coopt popular
revolution and to divide their civilian opponents. There is little doubt, however, that the traditional form of bureaucratic - authoritarianism will return if the experiment fails to maintain order and a semblance of credibility. Given human frailty, in the long run Guillermo O'Donnell may have more cases to add to his files on the association between authoritarianism and dependent economies.

NOTES


UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA

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The events transpiring between the United States and the various Central American countries compose one of the most important world situations today. Clearly the U.S. has legitimate interests in what goes on in Central America, just as other American countries have an interest in what goes on in the U.S. The fact that the U.S. has an influence as far as occurrences in that area are concerned is not the subject in question: it is as unrealistic and unreasonable to expect the U.S. to "get completely out of" Central America as it is to insist that the U.S. should be in absolute control of all aspects of that region. Rather, the important question is: what policies should the U.S. be pursuing to best promote its fundamental interests, namely economic and national security? The following chapter may clarify the past and current routes of U.S. foreign policy in Central America.
For the last several years, relations between Panama and the United States have been quite friendly, and the healthy alliance is a direct result of the successful negotiation of the Panama Canal situation, which was resolved during the Carter Administration when the Panama Canal Treaties (the Panama Canal Treaty and the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal) were ratified. The peaceful resolution of what could have become a disastrous conflict has been an extremely important development in the foreign policy of the United States.

The Panama Canal was begun at the turn of the century, and was completed in 1914. Much of the labor on the canal was done by the French Canal Company, an employee of which, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, was very influential in persuading the U.S. government to build the canal in Panama, as opposed to Nicaragua (thus benefiting his financial situation). He also was largely responsible for creating the situation which was for many years irritating and offensive to the Panamanians and highly lucrative for the U.S.A. It was he who convinced the Panamanian nationalist, Manuel Amador, that the U.S. would be behind a Panamanian uprising for independence from Colombia. (Whether the U.S. actively supported the Panamanian revolt has not been determined). Panamanian independence was declared in 1903, and Bunau-Varilla once again turned the situation to his own advantage. He went to Washington representing himself as the negotiator for Panama, and as the story has it, just two hours before the real Panamanian delegation arrived on the scene, Bunau-Varilla had managed to save his financial skin by signing the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which benefited him and the U.S., but left many things wanting from the Panamanian point of view. According to the State Department Basic Documents (1977-1980), the Panamanians in general have always felt that they were forced to go along with that treaty just to gain the good-will of the U.S. while a presumed war with Colombia was still a very real threat.

Basically what the new treaty called for was that the U.S. could behave "as if it were sovereign" over the area: building the Canal, controlling a 10-mile strip of
land (5 miles on either side of the Canal), while all the
time paying a relatively small amount ($10 million down
and a $250,000 annuity, "beginning 9 years after the
treaty came into force" (S.D. Doc. #6C, 12/77) to the
Panamanian government. This was an extremely lucrative
deal for the U.S. considering both the strategic and
economic importance of the Canal. It is still as impor-
tant as ever strategically, although its economic impor-
tance has declined a bit, as many commercial products
can be shipped more efficiently by other methods. The
S.D.B.D. reports that while the U.S. provides at least 50
percent of the Canal's business, the Canal only handles 12
percent of U.S. shipping needs.

As the treaty of 1903 was unsatisfactory to the
Panamanians in many ways, some minor revisions were made
over the years. For example, the Arias-Roosevelt Treaty
of 1936 and the Remon-Eisenhower Treaty of 1955 increased
the amount of the annuities and called for some other
little adjustments. These changes had some impact, but as
they were only minor adjustments Panamanian resentment
continued to grow with regards to what was perceived to be
a usurpation (or at least an abuse) of Panamanian auton-
omy. It is not the case that no good came of the U.S.
presence there; in fact, there were several advantages to
having the U.S. actively operating within Panama (e.g.,
Improved health services, greater hygiene, introduction of
medicines and modern medical techniques; installation of
waterways, and responsibility for maintaining the Canal).
But as far as the Panamanians were concerned the benefits
of the U.S. presence were eclipsed by the offensive Canal
situation. As one Panamanian official put it, "The
pre-Treaty Canal Zone situation was very humiliatinc to
Panama." Actually, the Panama Canal issue posed the one
major sore spot in relations between the two countries.
According to one person who lived and worked in Panama for
several years as a Peace Corps volunteer, the general
feelings of Panamanians towards the U.S. could best be
described as friendly and admiring.

Although the treaty of 1903 was highly distasteful to
them, the Panamanians acted in accord with it. However,
resentment continued to fester and on January 9, 1964,
riots in Panama over the Canal situation left 20 Panaman-
ians and four U.S. citizens dead. At that point, Panama
broke diplomatic relations with the U.S., the only Central American country ever to do so. This incident provided the impetus for the U.S. government to agree to work with the Panamanian government in hammering out a mutually agreeable treaty. It took 14 years before the project undertaken was completed. To reach common ground, both sides had to make many compromises, but as the goals of each were compatible, a satisfactory solution was reached at last.

The primary goal of both parties was to keep the Canal running efficiently. It appears that virtually all high-level foreign relations officials in the U.S. government were very much in favor of the treaties. The list includes the Presidents starting with Johnson (who consulted with Truman and Eisenhower on the issue) up to and including Carter; the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Department and the State Department (as well as several past secretaries of State) and others. All agreed that the ownership of the Canal had not even a fraction of the significance of the promotion of good will with the Panamanians (and in a larger sense with the rest of Latin America and the Third World). The U.S. officials saw the situation as a choice between working out a mutually beneficial and satisfying agreement with a potential strong ally, or continuing in a manner that would do nothing but promote bad feelings among not only Panamanians but also other Latins, and would leave the U.S. standing guard tensely over an easily-sabotaged canal surrounded by hostile, resentful people.

To assure that no provision of the Treaties would undermine U.S. national defense, the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were included in the decisions at every step.

On the Panamanian side, many people wanted an immediate transference of all functions and aspects of the Canal from the U.S. to Panama. This was not done principally because such an abrupt step probably would have severely interrupted the smooth functioning of the Canal, and the U.S. would then probably have rejected the proposals out-of-hand. Also, the Panamanians wanted large payments with the cession of the Canal. Both sides ultimately agreed that the payments would be an automatic
annuity of $10 million; "an annual amount of up to US$10 million per year, to be paid out of Canal operating revenues to the extent that such revenues exceed expenditures of the Panama Canal Commission including amounts paid pursuant to this Treaty;" and US$0.30 per Panama Canal net ton of shipping. It is important to note that all of these payments are coming from the Canal operating revenues. This basis of payment promoted by the U.S. government so that the money would not have to come out of U.S. taxpayers' pockets.

Some of the other major points of the Treaties are that Panamanian, rather than U.S. laws (as was previously the case), will be enforced in the Canal Zone (Art.9); and that the U.S. shall defend the Canal Zone until December 31, noon, Panama time, 1999, when the Treaty expires, and that at the end of that time the U.S. will hand over a debt-free Canal to Panama (Arts. 2, 4 and 8). The Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal basically establishes the neutrality of the Canal and stipulates that all ships of all countries shall have fair and equal access to the Canal. One reason for declaring the Canal Zone as neutral is so that "the Canal, and therefore the Isthmus of Panama, shall not be the target of reprisals in any armed conflict between other nations of the world." The U.S., even after 2000, can always take whatever measures it sees fit to keep the Canal Zone secure. U.S. military vessels are entitled to "expeditious transit," that is, they can go through the Canal regardless of their purpose or cargo, and in time of emergency and/or conflict they can go to the head of the line of ships waiting to pass through the Canal.

Although the Panamanians were concerned that they might not get a fair settlement from the U.S., once the Treaties were completed they met with approval from the majority of Panamanians: the Treaties were ratified in a plebescite (by referendum) by more than two-thirds of the people.

On the U.S. side, some people objected to the Treaties because they felt that the U.S. was either "giving away" the Zone, or, more ugly, that the U.S. was being "cheated" by a "Banana Republic." Others felt that the Canal Zone would be more vulnerable if the U.S. itself were not
defending it, and that U.S. commercial interests would be harmed by the agreement. Still others questioned the legitimacy of a treaty negotiated with the military leader of Panama, General Omar Torrijos, who died in a helicopter accident on July 31, 1981. These and other concerns were answered over and over by not only President Carter, but also by such dignitaries as Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Ambassadors Sol M. Linowitz and Ellsworth Bunker, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. George S. Brown (S.D. Bas.Doc.'77-'80; S.D. Sel.Doc.#6C, 12/77). They all concur on the major points of the aforementioned controversial issues: that the U.S. did not "give away" anything because it did not ever in fact have sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Rather, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty allowed the U.S. to act "as if it were sovereign" over the Canal Zone, "in perpetuity." In other words, as the U.S. never had sovereignty, what it did via the Treaties was to step aside and allow the Panamanians to exercise jurisdiction over land that was always theirs. One very important point from the Panamanians' point of view is that the current treaty has an expiration date. Without this term few Panamanians would have approved of the Treaties.

As far as the defense of the Canal is concerned, it already has been demonstrated here that U.S. officials are convinced that it is easier to defend the Canal with the voluntary and friendly cooperation of the Panamanians than without it. It also has been demonstrated that as far as business is concerned, the U.S. is more important to the Canal than the Canal is to U.S. business. The right of U.S. ships to pass through the Canal is guaranteed in the Neutrality Treaty. So for all purposes, the U.S. will not suffer commercially from the arrangement. With regards to the question of the U.S. signing a treaty with the former regime of Panama, this was not a legitimate concern, as the governments of both the U.S. and Panama had been working on the treaties long before 1968, when Torrijos came into power. The treaties were not only approved by Torrijos, they also were supported and ratified by the Panamanian people at large.

The conflict over the Panama Canal was resolved relatively peacefully and painlessly, but only because
both sides persevered in their efforts to find a resolution through diplomatic means. As Ambassador Linowitz said about diplomacy: "It is to try to find common ground; to make concessions on matters of lesser importance to you, but of vital importance to the other side, in order to protect that which is of the greatest importance to your own side" (S.D. Sel.Doc.#6C, 12/77). The warm relations the U.S. enjoys with Panama would attest that cooperation, rather than domination, serves as a sound basis for foreign policy.

NICARAGUA

One of the central, and most controversial, aspects of the United States foreign policy today is the bellicose relationship it maintains with Nicaragua. The U.S. has had interests in that country since the turn of the century. Some of these interests were economic (i.e. the fruit companies), while others had a more strategic importance, such as the initially proposed trans-isthmus canal. The existing situation between the U.S. and Nicaragua has much of its basis in the history of U.S. actions in Central America. Nicaragua became independent from Spain in 1821.

One significant figure in Nicaraguan history, who many Nicaraguans justifiably believe to be the quintessential "Ugly American" representative of an exploitative philosophy voiced by certain current U.S. officials, was William Walker, a U.S. citizen, who in the 1850s kept making attempts to run certain areas of Latin America. He tried first to take over part of Mexico, but was unsuccessful. Next he managed to establish himself in Nicaragua, where he set up Patricio Aivas as President, while he himself acted as the commander of the army. About a year later he set himself up as the "President of Nicaragua," and did such obnoxious things as usurping various landholdings, trying to make English the official Nicaraguan language, and attempting to reimpose slavery. After he tried to invade the surrounding countries, he was defeated and sent back to the U.S. by Guatemalan, Honduran, Salvadoran and British forces. He tried to force himself into power two more times, once in Nicaragua and once in Honduras, but the Hondurans executed him in
1860 (from Crawley, pp. 32-33). Walker was succeeded in Nicaragua by Tomas Martinez, a Conservative who governed for 10 years and was succeeded by a series of men. Augusto Sandino was born in 1895, and Anastasio "Tacho" Somoza Garcia, the father of the man overthrown by the Sandinistas in 1979, was born in 1898.

In 1911, Adolfo Diaz became President, and when Conservative General Luis Mena attempted a coup, the U.S. involved itself and supported Diaz. The insurgency was defeated but the U.S. retained some influence in Nicaragua through a "Legation Guard." The U.S. removed its "Legation Guard" in the 1920s but insisted on setting up "National Guards" in the various Central American countries under the direction of U.S. instructors. The "National Guard" in Nicaragua was then called the "Constabulary."

In 1926 Emiliano Chamorro came to power through a coup, and at one point Somoza tried to oust him but was unsuccessful. Chamorro, however, was eventually forced to resign and was succeeded by U.S.-backed (previous President) Adolfo Diaz, who had the "Legation Guard" return. Two men who rebelled against Diaz were Jose Maria Moncada and Augusto Sandino. After Moncada capitulated, Sandino went "underground." Sandino's purpose became the removal of U.S. influence from Nicaragua. He eventually united with Moncada, who began rebelling again.

That year, the U.S. Marines had arrived on the scene, and in 1928 Moncada succeeded Diaz to the Presidency. By 1931 the U.S. pulled its forces from Nicaragua, but Sandino continued to fight Moncada's government. In 1932, Juan Bautista Sacasa was elected to the Presidency, and in 1933 Somoza Garcia was appointed as the "Jefe Director" of the National Guard.

Sandino was still fighting the government, and as he ostensibly represented a threat to the power structure, Somoza had him and two of his colleagues assassinated in February of 1934.

Somoza became President in 1936. He was a very astute but not particularly moral leader, and he managed to juggle people, laws and events so that he maintained
control not only of the National Guard but also of the rest of the country. He had an extensive network of "eyes and ears" which proved necessary to his maintaining control of everything. During his reign, Somoza Garcia participated in many ventures, among them the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954 (though the U.S. and the United Fruit Company bore most of the responsibility for that particular event).

In September of 1956, Somoza was shot by Rigoberto Lopez Perez, who was immediately killed by Somoza's bodyguards; Somoza died several days after the shooting.

Somoza was succeeded by his sons Luis and Anastasio Jr. ("Tachito"). These two ran Nicaragua together until the late '60s, when Luis (apparently far the more moderate of the two) died. Anastasio "Tachito" Somoza Debayle became President of Nicaragua in 1967, and continued a program of repression and economic dominance until 1979, when he was overthrown by the Sandinistas (the F.S.L.N., Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional - the National Sandinista Liberation Front, a leftist group in El Salvador rebelling against the Salvadoran government). The Sandinistas were formed in 1961 by Carlos Fonseca Amador (who was killed in 1976), and Tomas Borge, among others.

"Tachito" Somoza was also in charge of the National Guard, as his father had been, and he used that as well as the "eyes and ears" network to maintain a harsh system of repression. Many of Somoza's actions rendered him unpopular, but one, detailed by Crawley, (pp. 148-154), apparently was the basis for widespread and lasting disgust and disillusionment by the population for somoza (even, reportedly, among his most ardent supporters).

In December of 1972, after Managua was decimated by an earthquake, Somoza lined his pockets off the suffering of the people by employing his own businesses in the reconstruction of the city, turning profits for himself and in the process phasing out small businesses that could not compete with his companies, especially after the damage they suffered from the earthquake. One U.S. priest spoke of other abuses, how during this period in 1972, Somoza allegedly sold relief supplies to the needy. So,
in the end he was overthrown by the Sandinistas. On September 17, 1980, an Argentine hit squad hunted Somoza down in Paraguay and killed him with anti-tank rockets while he was riding in his "armour-plated Mercedes" (Crawley, p. 177).

This brings us to the developments in the relations between the U.S. and Nicaragua in the last few years. The Sandinistas officially took power in Nicaragua on July 20, 1979.

At first it seemed as if everything after the revolution could continue on a fairly even keel. Even though President Carter was not particularly enthralled with the new Sandinista government, he was not as vehemently anti-Sandinista as are certain high-level members of the current administration. As a matter of fact, Warren Christopher, Carter's Deputy Secretary of State, had many things to say about the new government when addressing the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee, when he spoke to them on September 11, 1979. The following statements were obtained from the Department of State Bulletin of November, 1979. Mr. Christopher said:

The government's orientation, as revealed in its initial policies, has been generally moderate and pluralistic and not Marxist or Cuban. The government has restrained reprisals -- indeed I believe it has been more successful in doing so than any other recent government which has come to power in the wake of a violent revolution... The leadership of the government is very diverse. While there are influential figures who espouse positions with which we strongly disagree -- as at the recent nonaligned conference in Havana -- the government as a whole has expressed a desire for close and friendly relations with us.

He continued, explaining the U.S. actions taken with regards to providing economic relief to Nicaragua:

The situation in Nicaragua today is in a process of evolution. With the support of the
democratic countries in the hemisphere, Nicaragua will have an opportunity to revitalize its shattered economy and to continue on a moderate and pluralistic path. Without adequate support for reconstruction, the Nicaraguan government might resort to authoritarian measures to expedite economic recovery. Our relationship would doubtless become more strained as a result.

Mr. Christopher was, ostensibly, correct in his analysis of the situation. A few days after his speech, La Gaceta, a Sandinista publication, published the "Statute Concerning Rights and Guarantees of the Nicaraguans," similar to the U.S. Bill of Rights. Some of the major points in this document are the guarantees of the right to work, the right to form organizations and to strike. Freedom of expression, travel and association are assured. It is in this document that the death penalty is outlawed, and the maximum legal penalty of 30 years of incarceration is established.

Another document important to the situation in Nicaragua is the Law of Political Parties which was passed on August 17, 1983. Basically, this law provides for the establishment of various political parties, the framework in which they can operate, and significant time periods with regards to deadlines, etc. (Dixon and Jonas, pp. 174-182).

Several countries, including Sweden and West Germany, have sent economic aid to Nicaragua. Time (8/6/84, p. 46) reported that the Norwegians and the Swedes sent a "peace ship" carrying "$2.5 million worth of medicine, fertilizer and newsprint to Nicaragua." Apparently on that voyage went Linus Pauling and Adolfo Perez Esquivel, both Nobel prize winners. "The purpose of the voyage, in the words of an American cleric, was to 'demythologize' the situation in Nicaragua and to dispel claims that the country is a 'hotbed of Communism'" (Ibid.)."

With the inauguration of the Reagan administration, there was a major alteration in the U.S. approach to the Sandinista regime. To begin with, direct economic aid from the U.S. to Nicaragua was suspended, and some trade
restrictions were imposed. Nicaragua's principal cash crops are coffee, cotton, sugar and bananas. The U.S. drastically reduced its Nicaraguan sugar imports, and it is asserted (Dixon and Jonas, p. 32) that the United Fruit Company has been trying to destabilize the Nicaraguan banana market.

Members of the Reagan Administration apparently are convinced that the Nicaraguan government is up to no good in Central America -- that it is hard-line Marxist and bent on destabilizing the area, "exporting revolution" and threatening the United States. For this reason, the U.S. has been over time supporting various "contra" (counterrevolutionary) factions which are comprised of former (and now "disillusioned") Sandinistas to Miskito Indians to former National Guardsmen loyal to Somoza. Some of the more well-known of these groups are A.R.D.E. (Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica - the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance), formerly (until late 1984) led by Eden Pastora Gomez, popularly known as "Commander Zero" or, more recently, as "Macombo." Pastora is a leftist Sandinista who believes that the Sandinistas in power "betrayed the revolution." Alfonso Robelo is the current political leader of A.R.D.E. Time (8/6/84) reported that Pastora had been replaced as leader by Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro Rapoccioli.

Another group, the Frente Democratico de Nicaragua (FDN -- Democratic Front of Nicaragua) is the most sizable of the counterrevolutionary factions. Some say it is made up chiefly of ex-National Guardsmen. This faction was led for a time by Edgar Chamorro, a very outspoken fellow. Because of his outspokenness (he was called a "loose cannon" by some), Mr. Chamorro was removed from the FDN base in Honduras in mid-November, 1984, to Miami, but was ultimately kicked out of the FDN. Two of the spokesmen for the FDN are Frank Arana and Bosco Matamoros. Its president is Adolfo Calero, who owned the Coca-Cola bottling plant in Managua during the Somoza regime, and its military chief is Col. Enrique Bermudez, a National Guardsman and previously Somoza's military attache in Washington, D.C.

The most significant rebel group is made up largely of Miskito, Sumo and Rama Indians, is called Misura and is
led by Steadman Fagoth Muller. Another Indian group, Misurasata, is led by Brooklyn Rivera, who in recent months has been attempting to negotiate a separate peace with the Sandinistas for his followers. A well-known and outspoken critic of the Sandinista regime is Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo.

The situation in Nicaragua has become more and more volatile with the tense, wartime situation. (The Sandinistas say they are at war with the U.S. which is using the contras to overthrow them; officially the U.S. is conducting a "covert war" against Nicaragua, with the CIA defining "covert action" as "any clandestine operation or activity designed to influence foreign governments, organizations, persons or events." ) (Time, 5/16/83, p. 11). The rationale behind the U.S. "covert war" is the principle known as "collective self defense." The thrust of this principle is that the U.S. should join with its allies (i.e., Honduras and El Salvador) in defending themselves (thus it is "collective"). An aspect of the "covert" operations in this case is what is known as "multiservice tasking," which are "highly secret operations involving several branches of the military" (WP 9/15/84, p. A1).

Although the stated reason for the U.S. actions toward Nicaragua is to stop the flow of arms from Nicaragua to the rebels in El Salvador, many, in the U.S. and Nicaragua, are convinced that the Reagan Administration's only goal is to overthrow the Sandinistas at any cost. For this reason, the Boland Amendment, which "forbids the use of military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities... for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras," was passed in 1982 (Time, 5/9/83, p. 23, and Dixon and Jonas, p. 22).

Reagan has stated the Administration's position:

The national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America. If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble, and the
safety of our homeland would be put at jeopardy... It is the ultimate in hypocrisy for the unelected Nicaraguan government to charge that we seek their overthrow, when they are doing everything that they can to bring down the elected government of El Salvador (Time, 5/9/83, pp. 20-22).

Another bill meant to keep the U.S. from trying to overthrow the Sandinista government while at the same time providing for protection of the region was introduced in May of 1983 and passed in July of the same year. This was the Boland/Zablocki bill, which was to "prohibit U.S. support for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua and to authorize assistance, to be openly provided to governments of countries in Central America, to interdict the supply of military equipment from Nicaragua and Cuba" (Time, 5/16/83, p. 10).

The U.S. officially started backing the "contras" in 1982, but had begun cutting ties with Nicaragua early in 1981. Relations have steadily worsened between the two countries, in spite of periodic attempts at "talking out" differences.

It has become evident that the CIA has been behind many of the efforts to destabilize the socio-political and economic situations in Nicaragua over last few years. Between 1981 and early 1984, $80 million was spent funding the "contras." Not all of the factions, however, receive funding from the CIA -- Eden Pastora's forces were receiving some CIA aid, but in an effort to consolidate the contra forces, the CIA pressed Pastora to unite with the FDN. While Pastora has claimed that the ruling party in Managua has "betrayed the revolution," he is even more vehemently anti-Somoza, and has on numerous occasions flatly refused to unite with the FDN because he says that it is made up of nothing but Somocistas and former National Guardsmen. Ultimately the CIA stopped funding Pastora, who now scrounges funds where he can get them. Apparently at one point he received part of $660,000 that was stolen from the Nicaraguan Embassy in 1982 by then-Ambassador Francisco "Paco" Fiallos, who allegedly then joined up with A.R.D.E.
Ever since Congress cut off funding for the contras, they have had to depend on other sources for their supplies. The FDN has raised roughly $3-$4 million from private groups and individuals in the U.S., and has recently gone about arranging to sell bonds to raise more money.

The Nicaraguan government, elected on November 4, 1984, is made up of a nine-member Directorate, which works with other important members, and an Assembly. Some of the more prominent people in the Nicaraguan government are the President, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, his brother Humberto, who is the Minister of Defense; the Vice-President, Sergio Ramirez; the Culture Minister, Ernesto Cardenal and his brother Fernando, who is the Education Minister (both the Cardenal brothers are priests); the Interior Minister, Tomas Borge; the Deputy Interior Minister, Luis Carrion; the Ambassador to the OAS, Edgar Parrales (a priest); the Minister of Agriculture, Jaime Wheelock Roman; the Planning Minister, Henri Ruiz; President of the Nicaraguan Council of State, Carlos Nunez Tellez; Bayardo Arce, a member of the Directorate, and also a Director of the Sandinista Political Commission (Arce oversaw the Nicaraguan electoral process); the Foreign Minister, Miguel d'Escoto (a Maryknoll priest); the Vice Foreign Minister, Nora Astorga, and the Deputy Foreign Minister, Victor Hugo Tinoco.

As noted, four of these people are or were priests: d'Escoto, (who claims that he has been greatly influenced by Martin Luther King, Jr.), Ernesto and Fernando Cardenal, and Edgar Parrales. The problem between them and the Vatican stems from what the Vatican views as a conflict of interest: apparently it used to be policy, and is now Catholic law, that priests and nuns cannot hold governmental office while serving with the Church. Parrales ultimately quit the priesthood, and the Church suspended the other three.

*Newsweek* (6/20/83, p. 19) reported that the Nicaraguans charged that certain U.S. Embassy officials tried to poison Miguel d'Escoto, and that those officials must have been with the CIA. They then sent those three officials back to the U.S. The U.S. administration denied the charges, and in response to the return of the three
officials, closed down the Nicaraguan consulates in New York, San Francisco, Miami, New Orleans, Los Angeles and Houston, but left the one in Washington, D.C. open.

In mid-1983, it was reported (Newsweek, 6/1/83, pp. 12-13) that the U.S. carrier "Ranger" was sent along with "a cruiser, three destroyers, a frigate, a fast combat support ship and an oiler" for exercises in "international waters off Nicaragua." The Newsweek article said, "His (Reagan's) saber rattling was the strongest warning yet that if the Sandinistas didn't shape up more to his liking soon, he meant to bring them down." President Reagan is quoted as saying, "The Sandinistas promised their people freedom. All they've done is replace the former dictatorship with one of their own -- a dictatorship of counterfeit revolutionaries who wear fatigues and drive around in Mercedes sedans and Soviet tanks and whose current promise is to spread their brand of 'revolution' throughout Central America."

Early in 1984, the Sandinistas wanted to send Nora Astorga to the U.S. as Nicaragua's Ambassador. The U.S. refused to permit her the position as it thought that her appointment would not be "appropriate." The reason for this is that in 1978, one of Somoza's top men, General Reynaldo Perez Vega, was murdered in her bedroom. She claims, and it is generally accepted, that she set the General up to be kidnapped but did not do the actual killing -- she maintains that the General was killed in a struggle with the would-be Sandinista kidnappers. Whatever occurred, certain members of the U.S. government still hold a vendetta against Ms. Astorga -- it seems that General Perez was an important CIA contact. Ms. Astorga is now Nicaragua's Vice-Foreign Minister. The Ambassador to the U.S. is Mr. Carlos Tunnermann.

In early April of 1984, it was revealed that the U.S. (via the CIA) had aided the contras in mining three Nicaraguan ports: Puerto Corinto and Puerto Sandino on the west coast, and El Bluff on the east coast. The mines were "handmade acoustic mines, which explode easily but are unlikely to sink a ship" (WP 4/7/84, p. A1). Allegedly the CIA oversaw the mining, stationing themselves just outside Nicaragua's territorial waters, while the contras planted the actual charges.
This event caused an uproar all over the world. Claude Cheysson of France immediately offered France's aid to Nicaragua in clearing the mines if "one or several friendly European powers" would cooperate (WP 4/6/84). Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) wrote a letter to CIA chief William Casey (the text of this letter can be found in the April 10, 1984 edition of "The Washington Post") and among other things, he wrote, "The President has asked us to back his foreign policy. Bill, how can we back his foreign policy when we don't know what the hell he is doing? Lebanon, yes, we all knew that he sent troops over there. But mine the harbors in Nicaragua? This is an act violating international law. It is an act of war. For the life of me, I don't see how we are going to explain it." Nicaragua, as well as many other countries, asserted that the port mining was an act of terrorism. Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D-New York) temporarily resigned from the vice-chairmanship of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in protest of not being informed of the mining prior to its occurrence.

Most of the vessels that were damaged were either fishing boats or ships belonging to allies of the U.S. One Soviet tanker was damaged.

Nicaragua filed suit against the U.S. in the International Court of Justice, also known as the World Court, on April 9, 1984, and "The Washington Post" (4/10/84, p. A1) reported that Nicaragua was charging that "'The United States is recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying and otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding and directing military and paramilitary action in and against Nicaragua' in violation of international law, the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of American States." Three days before the Nicaraguans filed their case, on April 6, 1984, the U.S. decided to try to head them off: "It was the United Nations which the United States informed Friday that, for the next two years, it will refuse to accept the jurisdiction of the World Court on any cases arising from U.S. actions in Central America" (WP 4/10/84 p. A1). The U.S. made a double mistake with this declaration: In 1946 the U.S. agreed that if it were ever to exempt itself from World Court jurisdiction, it would give at least six months' notice. Also, the action by the U.S. "angered
several judges and deepened antipathy toward the U.S. legal position in the dispute with Nicaragua" (WP 11/27/84 p. A1). It has also been noted that the U.S. faulted the Iranian government when it refused to recognize the World Court's jurisdiction with regards to the 1979-1980 "Hostage Crisis." On May 10, 1984 the World Court told the U.S. in effect to leave the Nicaraguan ports alone, and on November 26, 1984, the Court accepted and claimed jurisdiction over the case.

The mining was part of a so-called "harassment plan" the U.S. launched against Nicaragua (WP 4/11/84, p. A1). President Reagan defended the action by saying, "We have a choice: either we help America's friends defend themselves, and give democracy a chance; or, we abandon our responsibilities and let the Soviet Union and Cuba shape the destiny of our hemisphere" (WP 4/10/84). Later he claimed that Nicaragua was "exporting revolution to El Salvador" and said that "as long as they do that, we're going to try and inconvenience that government of Nicaragua until they quit that kind of action" (WP 4/11/84 p. A1). However, Senator Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vermont) was quoted as saying about the mining, "absolutely stupid. It will prove at best a harassment to the Nicaraguans and can only diminish the position of the United States in the rest of the world" (WP 4/11/84 p. A1).

In late April, 1984, it was reported that the U.S. was conducting spy flights over Nicaragua. These flights originated from Palmerola Air Base in Honduras and Howard Air Base in Panama. An article in Newsweek (6/20/83, p. 19) stated: "Panamanians are increasingly upset about the Nicaraguan-bound spy-plane flights... and have rejected a U.S. proposal for a new AC-130 base near the Costa Rican border."

Congress cut off CIA funding to the contras following the controversy caused by the mining incident. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware), a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, said about the bill requesting $21 million in aid to the contras, which was defeated, "You are right in opposing this money going for the purposes allegedly stated here because they ain't the real reasons." He also said that if other senators knew what he knew, they would not vote for the bill. Allegedly the
CIA then asked both the Saudis and the Israelis to support the contras, but apparently neither would do so (CT 5/19/84, p. 4). However, in September it was reported that the contras were raising money through "private corporations and individuals in the United States and from foreign governments, including Israel, Argentina, Venezuela, Guatemala and Taiwan" (NYT 9/9/84, p. 1). Israel, though, has consistently denied that it is aiding the contras and President Alfonsin of Argentina said that aid from Argentina would halt as of January, 1985 (WP 9/10/84, p. A22). One group that supports the contras is known as the World Anti-Communist League and is headed by John K. Singlaub, who has said that since U.S. aid to the contras was cut, his group has managed to raise $500,000 per month for them (WP 12/10/84, p. A1). Recently there have been questions as to whether certain countries to which the U.S. gives aid have been acting as middlemen and have been passing on portions of their aid to the contras. Also, some have questioned whether the U.S. Air Force has been providing used planes to the contras through the CIA. "The Washington Post" (9/15/84, p. A1) described "Operation Elephant Herd," in which the U.S.A.F. supplied used Cessna 02A observation planes to the CIA, who in turn turned them over to the contras. This caused a bit of a dispute because it was not clear to some lawmakers whether the Economy Act of 1920 was being violated.

On May 30, 1984, there was an assassination attempt made against Eden Pastora when someone planted a bomb in his headquarters. He did not die; however, several other people, including some journalists, were killed. Pastora initially blamed the CIA for the attack, but later retracted his accusation. Many people thought it likely that someone from one of the other contra factions was responsible for the attack.

In late June, talks were begun by Nicaragua and the U.S. in an effort to find some common ground. The talks were held in Manzanillo, Mexico (neutral ground, as it were -- Mexico is one of the four "Contactora" countries), and 8 or 9 talks were held over a period of several months between Victor Hugo Tinoco and the U.S. representative, Harry W. Schlaudeman. Unfortunately, as little progress
was made during these talks, they were ultimately abandoned.

The Contadora group is made up of four Latin American countries (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) who in January, 1983, met on the Panamanian island of Contadora in an effort to seek a way to a regional peace that would include Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala. In September, 1984, the Contadora group completed a draft of what is officially known as the "Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America." In effect what happened is that the U.S. nominally supported the efforts of the Contadora Group, certain that Nicaragua would never agree to the proposals; therefore the U.S. did not initially concern itself with the particulars of the Contadora peace plan. When, in late September 1984, the Nicaraguans decided to accept the first draft of the Contadora plan, the U.S. was taken by surprise. It withdrew its support for the plan, saying on the one hand that the Sandinistas were being "cynical" and "hypocritical" for accepting it, and on the other, that the treaty was too susceptible to a loose interpretation by the Sandinistas. So the U.S. insisted on having the treaty reworded. It is still under negotiation.

Certain U.S. officials have accused the Sandinistas of trafficking in drugs: these charges were made by both General Gorman in El Salvador (NYT 7/1/84, p. 7Y) and Secretary of State George P. Shultz (WP 9/15/84, p. A4). This subject is also addressed in Jack Anderson's column of April 18, 1985 (WP p. Va. 19).

In early September 1984, two U.S. citizens were reported dead in Nicaragua, having been shot down while flying an OH58 helicopter over Nicaragua during a contra raid. The two men were identified as Dana Parker (of the U.S. National Guard) and James Powell, each 36 years old. They both reportedly belonged to a U.S.-based group called "Civilian Military Assistance" (CMA), which is aiding the contras in their efforts to overthrow the Sandinistas. The deaths of these men inspired an outcry, though different people had different reasons for being upset. Some claimed that the CMA had violated international laws, and "The Washington Post" (9/11/84, p. A1) discussed the conflict of having U.S. National Guards (i.e., Dana
Parker) participating in "free-lance military missions." The uproar caused Miguel d'Escoto to remark, "Thousands of Nicaraguans have died, and now two Americans die and you see an interest and a concern that wasn't there before" (WP 9/5/84, p. A8). (In April, 1985 the Sandinistas claimed to have recovered American dog tags from a dead contra (WP 4/14/85, p. A26). Interestingly enough, that dead contra was fighting in the company of an anti-Sandinista group known as the "Jeane Kirkpatrick Task Force."

The Nicaraguans held elections on November 4, 1984. These elections, however, caused yet another point of controversy between the U.S. and Nicaragua, part of which concerned the candidacy of Dr. Arturo Cruz, who was, in the early days after the Sandinista takeover, the Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United States. Like Pastora, he became opposed to the direction which he saw the Sandinistas were taking. "The New York Times" (7/29/84) reported that Cruz first announced his candidacy, then later pulled out claiming that he did not have a fair chance. (There was no persecution involved; his major complaint was that there just simply was not enough time for him to develop an adequate campaign.) However, "The New York Times" did have this to report:

At a news conference broadcast live by a Managua radio station, even Mr. Cruz appeared less categorical in his denunciation of the regime than some of his backers would have liked. He praised advances made by the Sandinistas in education and health care, and said their nationalization of the banking system was essential for national development. Some of the business and political leaders sitting at the back of the room looked a bit uncomfortable, particularly when Mr. Cruz said he would invite Sandinistas to participate in his government if he was elected. He went on to condemn rebel attacks on civilian targets, described himself a Sandinista at heart and declared, 'the revolution is irreversible.'
Although the legal candidate registration period ended in August, the Sandinistas opened it again for Cruz from September 24-30, but he did not register. The effort to get him to register was given up in early October. If Cruz had registered, he would have been the candidate for what is known as the Coordinadora (CDN - Democratic Coordinating Committee), the president of which is Dr. Luis Rivas Leiva. Both the Coordinadora and the Reagan administration wanted the Sandinistas to delay the elections, supposedly to give the opposition more time for campaigning. "The Washington Post" (10/2/84, p. A12) reported the opinions of Nicaragua's President, Daniel Ortega: "Ortega said, 'the bankrupt businessmen' in the Coordinator 'don't want an election in three days or three months' but seek U.S. intervention to restore them to power.

"The Reagan administration, he said, seeks an election delay because it would be easier to justify a military intervention against a government that is not formally elected."

It is said that the CDN is "numerically small and would be electorally weak.... The political strength of the CDN comes from its external linkage to the contras and the Reagan administration." (Nicaraguan Perspectives, no. 9, Fall 1984, p. 27).

Miguel d'Escoto had a great deal to say with regards to the Nicaraguan elections in a column he wrote for "The Washington Post" (10/1/84, p. A13). About the postponement of the elections, he wrote:

After years of criticizing the government for not holding elections earlier, Cruz now complains that the elections are too soon. He wants the entire electoral process to be postponed to allow him sufficient time to make up the ground he allegedly lost when he chose not to enter the campaign when it began seven weeks ago. He also demands that the elections be not only monitored by foreign governments (to which the government has agreed) but controlled by them -- something which no sovereign state would accept.
Mr. d'Escoto concluded by saying:

As a final matter, we Nicaraguans have reason to mistrust some of the sanctimonious concern for the fairness of our elections that we hear in the United States. The United States fully supported the Somoza family during its 45-year dictatorship and never once protested against the phony elections that were staged from time to time. Even now, there is a long list of countries with which the United States has the most cordial relations in spite of their not having had elections for many years. Democracy clearly is not the issue with which the Reagan administration is concerned.

Mr. d'Escoto said that the Sandinistas wanted nothing more than for Dr. Cruz to run in the election, principally because it would add legitimacy to the election process, but he said that Cruz's refusal to participate was an attempt to "embarrass" the Sandinistas. This is partially supported in an article by "The New York Times" (10/21/84) which stated:

The Reagan Administration, while publicly criticizing the Nov. 4 elections in Nicaragua as 'a sham,' has privately argued against the participation of the leading opposition candidate for fear his involvement would legitimize the electoral process, according to some senior Administration officials.

Although the article claims that yet other Administration officials have denied this charge (the disagreement being due to divisions in the Administration as to how to deal with Nicaragua), it goes on to say:

Several Administration officials who are familiar with the Administration's activities in Nicaragua said the Central Intelligence Agency had worked with some of Mr. Cruz's supporters to insure that they would object to any potential agreement for his participation in the election.
It was reported (WP 11/1/84, p. A32) that on October 31, the Sandinistas had opened a "national dialogue" with 33 political parties to "resolve their differences over political and economic policy."

So the elections were held on November 4, 1984. The FDN agreed to a 12-hour cease-fire (from 5:00 am to 5:00 pm) on election day, though they also encouraged people over the radio to spoil their ballots (marking them twice or otherwise rendering them invalid). Seven parties participated in the elections. There were 90 Assembly seats to be filled, the percentage of seats to be divided according to the percentage of the vote that the given party won. Each party (including the F.S.L.N.) was given equal campaigning time in the various media. Of course, it is said that the F.S.L.N. was already ahead of the other parties because it was so much better known to Nicaraguans in general. The results (WP 11/7/84, p. A23) were thus: the turnout was 79.7% of the registered voters. Of those, 7% spoiled their ballots. The Sandinistas won 70% of the vote (so they retained 70% of the Assembly seats); the Democratic Conservative Party (PCD) won 13.5% of the vote and the Liberal Independent Party (PLI) won 9.8%.

One reason the elections were so important to the Sandinistas was that ever since the U.S. invasion of the Caribbean island of Grenada on October 25, 1983, the Sandinistas have feared that they are next on what some people call the Reagan Administration's "hit list." These fears are heightened by historical fact -- that is, the failed U.S. "Bay of Pigs" ("Giron") invasion and overthrow attempt of April 17, 1961, against Cuba's dictator, Fidel Castro, who is an ally of the ruling Sandinistas. The Sandinista administration thinks that the fact that it is duly elected will make justification of an invasion of Nicaragua more difficult.

"The New York Times" (7/29/84) quoted President Reagan as calling Nicaragua "a totalitarian dungeon," but it seems that Nicaraguans do not necessarily share Mr. Reagan's view: the article went on to say that "Ramiro Gurdian, an outspoken anti-Sandinista business leader, said in an interview that he thought Mr. Reagan had exaggerated the level of repression here. "I would
describe the situation as not very agreeable,' he said. 'But Nicaragua is not Cuba and it never will be.'"

A series of developments in late 1984 led to a rather unnerving crisis situation in early November, on the eve of the U.S. presidential elections, which came to be known as the "MiG Scare." In September, it was reported that the Nicaraguans were building new airports, and that at least one of them was capable of handling Soviet MiG warplanes. The U.S. warned the Soviets not to deliver such planes, and immediately began making plans to destroy the various airports if necessary. Then because of mistaken conclusions arrived at on the basis of satellite information, U.S. officials charged on November 6, 1984 that the Soviet ship "Bakuriani" was delivering MiG warplanes to the Sandinistas at Puerto Corinto. At least two Mi24 helicopter gunships were delivered, but MiGs were not. After the suspicions became known, the damage was done. The Sandinistas claimed that the accusation was just a convenient excuse the U.S. was providing for itself to attack Nicaragua:

In his news conference yesterday, d'Escoto said the reports of possible MiG arrivals are 'all a smokescreen that is being sent in order to distract attention from what is happening in Nicaragua,' d'Escoto said. He ridiculed the notion that Nicaragua was trying to provoke the United States. 'It's a provocation that we had elections. It's a provocation that we accepted the Contadora peace proposals. I think our fundamental crime is that we continue to breathe air!'" (WP 11/8/84, p. A1).

Newsweek (11/26/84, p. 60) reported the effects of the belligerence over the MiG incident:

If Washington's aim was to halt that buildup, it seemed to be tackling the job in the wrong way... Meantime, by so publicly drawing the line at jet fighters, Washington has all but invited the Sandinistas to load up with lesser weapons. And instead of strengthening domestic critics of the Sandinistas, American
histrionics have created a circle-the-wagons environment that has undermined the political opposition.

Subsequent to the MiG incident, U.S. SR71 spy planes flew low over Nicaraguan cities for four days, creating sonic booms and alarming the Nicaraguan people. (WP 11/10/84, and 11/12/84, p. A24)

In late October, 1984, yet another furor erupted with the discovery of the so-called "assassination manual" which was published by the CIA and distributed among the contras. At least 100 of the manuals were sent into Nicaragua by balloon (WP 12/7/84, p. A44). The manual was 90 pages long and was titled Operaciones Sicologicas en Guerra de Guerrillas (Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare). It became very controversial because certain parts of it contained instructions dealing with "neutralizing" (the word assassination per se was not used) enemy (Sandinista) officials, as well as creating "martyrs" for the rebel cause. Apparently the manual was written by a CIA contract employee who went by the pseudonym "John Kirkpatrick" and was known to the contras as "Juanito." William Casey and some senators claimed that the press was giving the public a false impression of what the manual actually said, and was quoting it out of context. Other senators claimed that the manual was scandalous, and, in the words of Senator Edward P. Boland (D-Massachusetts), "a disaster for American foreign policy." There were those that claimed that the very publication of the manual was in opposition to the Presidential Decree put forth by President Ford and reiterated by both Presidents Carter and Reagan, and which states in part, "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in or conspire to engage in assassination.... No agency of the intelligence community shall participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this order" (NYT 10/21/84, p. E5). Part of the controversy had to do with who was responsible for the fiasco. Eventually punishment was meted out to several CIA employees by their superiors.

Several months prior to the revelation of this notorious manual, another manual, called the "Freedom
Fighters' Manual," which is ostensibly a stock CIA manual giving advice on little ways to dissemble society (cutting phone lines, stopping toilets, disabling motor vehicles, etc.) was discovered in northern Nicaragua (Nicaraguan Perspectives, no.9, Fall 1984, pp. 2-3).

There are many other issues that add to the Nicaraguan conflict. Among them are: the role that freedom of religion has in Sandinista society, the situation of the Indians in Nicaragua, and the status of the human rights/human liberties situation.

To begin with I consider the role that freedom of religion has in Sandinista society. As has been noted before, four of the highest ranking members of the Nicaraguan government are (now suspended) priests. Dixon and Jonas have translated, edited and printed a number of documents having to do with the situation in Nicaragua. Among them is a statement on the F.S.L.N.'s position on religion, taken from an issue of Barricada, an official Sandinista publication, dated 10/7/80. The position of the Nicaraguan government on religion is summarized in the following excerpts:

The FSLN sees freedom to profess a religious faith as an inalienable right which is fully guaranteed by the revolutionary government. This principle was included in our Revolutionary Program long ago, and we will maintain it in practice in the future. Furthermore, in the new Nicaragua no one can be discriminated against for publicly professing or spreading their religious beliefs. Those who profess no religious faith have the very same right.

Like every modern state, the revolutionary state is secular and cannot adopt any religion because it is the representative of all the people, believers as well as nonbelievers.

The question concerning the status of the Indians in Nicaraguan society is one that is a source of difficulty for some observers. In 1979, the Sandinistas forced an evacuation of the Miskito Indians from the Coco River Area near the Atlantic coast, in an effort to make the borders
secure from counter-insurgence, i.e. by controlling places that could be taken over and provide food and shelter for the contras. In addition to forcibly resettling the Indians, the Sandinistas also burned their villages for allegedly the same security reasons. (Very recently, the Sandinistas also have been faulted for some abuses committed against some Miskitos in 1982). It is not difficult to see why some Indians might have come to resent this, as many of them did. In "The Miskito Question: An Interview" (provided by the Nicaraguan Embassy) two priests, Father Francisco Solano and Father Agustin Sambola were interviewed by the Central American Historical Institute, and commented on the evacuation situation. Father Sambola said, "The Miskitos reacted. They did not understand the changes. Miskitos leaders such as Steadman Fagoth did understand the changes, but they took advantage of their positions of leadership to encourage suspicion. This is where the Miskitos' problem began.... The choice was between evacuating them and letting them die there, sandwiched between the Somocistas and the Nicaraguan army." Father Solano said, "Some Miskitos have come to understand that it was necessary to move the villages along the Rio Coco, and they can understand that the decision to evacuate the area saved many Miskito lives. But they still ask why the evacuation came so suddenly and with such force. For the Miskitos, movement itself is neither new nor bad. Throughout their history they have been a wandering people. But with the sudden evacuation, houses were burned and cattle were killed."

The most recent developments in the Sandinista/Miskito relationship were reported early in November of 1984. Brooklyn Rivera was reported to have tried to negotiate a settlement for his followers with the Sandinistas. His principal concerns were land rights and increased autonomy for his people. However, Rivera later said that his efforts of attaining peace with the Sandinistas were resisted by the Reagan Administration. In mid-December of 1984, Rivera (who operated out of Costa Rica and was allied, to an extent, with Pastoral) reached a settlement with the Sandinistas. "The Washington Post" (12/16/84, p. A27) reported:
The government named a nine-member commission on Dec. 5 to design laws and policies to guarantee autonomous rights in the coastal zone inhabited by Miskito, Sumu and Rama Indians.

"The central government is going to be modified, to be reorganized in that region, beginning with the recognition of a different reality -- historical, cultural, linguistic and social," the commission's coordinator, Deputy Interior Minister Luis Carrion, said in an interview yesterday.

Carrion said the government would consult with Misurasata -- but also with other Indian organizations, including the pro-Sandinista group Misatan -- in preparing its autonomy plan.

On December 9, 1984, Jack Anderson reported that the Misura group, led by Fagoth, probably would not be receiving the same benefits:

But Fagoth needs the refugees. Their wretched camps are a source of recruits for his little army. Their presence also justifies his continued resistance. For these reasons, the relief workers allege, many of the 17,000 refugees in Honduras have been prevented forcibly by Fagoth's men from going home.

In early January (NYT 1/6/85, p. 8) it was reported that Fagoth had been arrested in Honduras because of the trouble he was managing to stir up between Nicaragua and Honduras. They let him go, as he is still active.

As far as the subject of human rights and human liberties under the Sandinistas is concerned, it seems that the Sandinistas are protecting the fundamental rights of most of their people. The current situation is such that some liberties have been suspended because the Sandinistas consider that they are currently in a wartime situation with the United States.
In late November 1984, it was reported (NYT 11/25/84, p. 12Y) that some opposition leaders were having trouble getting visas so they could leave Nicaragua, and about a month later, (WP 12/17/84, p. A19) the problems had ostensibly been solved and they were being permitted to leave the country. Meantime, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the then-editor of the opposition newspaper La Prensa, left the country claiming that he wanted to be with his family in Costa Rica and that he found the censoring of this publication unacceptable (WP 12/14/84, p. A3). Chamorro's father was assassinated during the Somoza regime. Currently, Chamorro's uncle Jaime is the editor of La Prensa. Recently it was reported (WP 3/25/85, p. A12) that the Sandinista government was willing to partially lift the censorship, maintaining control only over articles having to do with military matters. This issue is yet to be resolved.

There has also been some question as to how forcibly the Sandinistas are drafting young men, ages 17-23. There is, not surprisingly, resistance to the draft in some parts of Nicaragua.

Other abusive acts have been attributed to the Sandinistas, although these do not seem to substantiate claims of systematic repression. One charge is that the Sandinista government is again forcibly resettling people from the border areas. The Sandinistas have also been accused of some abuses with regards to their judicial system (WP 4/5/85, p. A22). But there is no firm evidence that the Sandinista abuses are as harsh or pervasive as in, for example, pre-Alfonsin Argentina, or, for that matter, Somoza's Nicaragua.

However, the abuses committed by the Sandinistas pale in comparison with the abuses of the U.S.-backed contras, who are responsible for such heinous activities as the massacre at Pantasma in October 1983, as well as countless other attacks against the civilian population of Nicaragua. A recent report by the group Americas Watch says that the abuses committed by the Sandinistas are diminishing but that "rebel abuses continue and involve 'selective killing of civilians, mistreatment of prisoners... hostage-taking and outrages against personal dignity such as rape'" (WP 3/6/85, p. A16, also see Dixon
Another recently released report by Reed Brody stresses that contra attacks are mostly directed against Nicaraguan civilians. Other crimes of the FDN include the murders of 22 coffee pickers (WP 12/6/84, p. A1), as well as the kidnapping of a Maryknoll nun (who later released) in early 1985. Jack Anderson has described atrocities committed by the various contra factions (except Pastora's) (WP 9/30/84, p. D7). These events would tend to negate President Reagan's claim, made in early 1985, that the contras are the "moral equivalent of the Founding Fathers."

At the moment, the Administration is seeking to resume aid to the contras, but so far Congress has not supported that plan of action. Recently the U.S. government has imposed a trade embargo against Nicaragua. These sanctions have been criticized both at home and abroad. They do seem to represent a historical injustice -- it was largely the U.S. that encouraged the changeover from subsistence crops to cash crops in Central America with itself as the major market for the products. To remove that now shoves the abyssmal Nicaraguan economic situation closer to the level of true disaster.

Unfortunately, there is the distinct possibility that the war against the Sandinistas could become an overt one. The Sandinistas have repeatedly made conciliatory overtures to the U.S. While some say that these overtures are a farce, others seem sure that the Sandinistas are very serious about peaceful coexistence with the United States. The Sandinistas refuse to subjugate themselves or become a "U.S. client state." They have insisted over and over that they must protect their independence and self-determination.

Recently it was reported that U.S. citizens are 4 to 1 against trying to topple the Sandinista regime (WP 2/28/85, p. A1). U.S. policymakers would do well to heed this mandate, and put their strongest efforts into diplomacy.
EL SALVADOR

The U.S. is heavily involved in El Salvador because it perceives that country as being very strategic in the running Central American conflicts, and for the last several years has been contributing large sums of money to help promote its interests. For the most part various divisions in the U.S. government and in the private sector seem to favor U.S. involvement there, especially with regards to supporting the recently elected government of Jose Napoleon Duarte.

The current Ambassador to El Salvador is Thomas Pickering, who succeeded Ambassador Deane Hinton in June of 1983, and who due to threats on his life by various Salvadoran factions is expected to be replaced himself early this year, possibly by Edwin G. Corr. (WP 12/12/84, p. A30).

Duarte's government is presently at war with leftist rebel insurgents, all of whom are generally known under the umbrella heading of F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. The F.M.L.N.-- (the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front)-- is the guerrilla arm of the organization. Formed in October of 1980, it is made up of five separate guerrilla factions and is named after the communist leader Agustin Farabundo Marti, who was a contemporary of Nicaraguan Augusto Cesar Sandino and was murdered in 1932 after a peasant uprising. The uprising was crushed by General Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez, and resulted in the killing of 30,000 peasants. This bloody event is known in El Salvador as "La Matanza," or "The Massacre." Hernandez was convinced that Marti was responsible for the peasant revolt.

The F.D.R. (Democratic Revolutionary Front) is the political wing of the organization and is a "coalition of several small parties and opposition groups, dissident labor unions and university association" (WP 10/15/84, p. A14). The F.D.R.'s two top leaders are Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora. There is another branch of the organization called the "Unified Revolutionary Directorate" which is made up of 15 top rebel 'comandantes' (Time, 4/9/84, p. 33). The rebels have their own clandestine radio station called Radio Venceremos ("venceremos" is Spanish for "we will conquer" or "we will vanquish").
According to Report on Human Rights in El Salvador (from here on in to be referred to as Report) the F.M.L.N.-F.D.R. was recognized in August of 1981 as a "representative political force" by both France and Mexico (p. xxvi).

The Reagan Administration has justified part of its involvement in the area by saying that the F.M.L.N. has its armaments supplied by the Sandinistas of Nicaragua. While some supply pipelines have been discovered as coming from Nicaragua through Honduras to El Salvador, many people, including rebel spokesmen, have claimed that the bulk of their weaponry is made up of American weapons taken from Salvadoran Army soldiers.

Recently accusations have been made charging the rebels with forcibly conscripting recruits from rural villages. There are witnesses who support these charges, but the rebels deny it, saying that it would not be to their advantage to acquire unwilling members.

The current government of El Salvador, headed by Jose Napoleon Duarte, came into power in mid-1984 after a runoff election. Mr. Duarte is a member of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), which he, among others, including Ungo's father, founded in the early 1960s. A little later (1965) the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), with which Guillermo Ungo was initially associated, was formed.

The chief conservative party in opposition to the PDC is known as ARENA (the Nationalist Republican Alliance). Its leading member is Roberto D'Aubuisson, a very important figure in the Salvadoran situation today. Until early 1985, the Conservatives made up a majority in the Salvadoran Assembly -- of the 60 seats they held 34. That changed in the March 31, 1985 elections, when, contrary to the expectations of many observers, Duarte's supporters won 34 seats in the Assembly (WP 4/2/85, p. A1). The Salvadoran Army openly supported the election results, thus cementing the existing power structure (WP 4/4/85, p. A1). Duarte's Administration is made up in part of the First Vice President, Abraham Rodriguez; the Defense Minister, General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova; the Chief of Staff, Col. Adolfo O. Blandor; Deputy Defense Minister Col. Carlos Lopez Nuila; the Economic Minister,
Ricardo Gonzalez Camacho; Planning (Coordination?) Minister Fidel Chavez Mena; and Minister to the Presidency Julio Adolfo Rey Prendes.

To better understand the significance of the current happenings in the Salvadoran saga, it is necessary to go back several years. In El Salvador, as in many other Latin American countries, there exists a great disparity between the rich (who generally control the cash crop plantations which produce mostly coffee, sugar and cotton) and the poor. For about 50 years, the military and the upper classes had controlled the Salvadoran government. In 1972, Duarte and Ungo were elected to the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency respectively (from their separate parties PDC and MNR) but, "As their lead piled up in unofficial returns, the army suspended radio broadcasts, and later simply announced that its candidate, Col. Arturo Armando Molina, had won" (Report, p. xxii). After this occurrence Duarte betook himself to Venezuela for seven years.

In 1977, Gen. Carlos Humberto Romero took control, but was ousted and replaced by a junta in 1979. By the early 1980s, Duarte had returned and resumed nominal control over the junta, but he was soon to be removed from his post by the military, and was later jailed and tortured. Apparently there were more fraudulent elections held in 1982. "The New York Times" (4/1/84, p. 1), said:

After the 1982 vote, for example, United States officials were stunned when all of El Salvador's rightist parties coalesced to form a power bloc that threatened to reverse the American-backed social and economic adjustments that had taken place and leave the Christian Democrats, favored by the United States, without a voice in policy.

It was only strong, behind-the-scenes warnings from the Reagan Administration and the Salvadoran military that kept the democratically elected Constituent Assembly from getting out of hand and naming a rightist -- perhaps even Roberto d'Aubuisson, who had been tied to the country's notorious death squads
-- to head the provisional executive branch as well.

Instead, Mr. Alvaro Magana acted as the provisional President until Mr. Duarte, who was elected in May of 1984, was inaugurated on June 1, 1984.

Ruben Zamora was a professor at the University of El Salvador, and was also a leading member of Duarte's PDC. About the time Zamora's brother, Mario, was killed in 1980, Zamora left for self-imposed exile. The University of El Salvador was reportedly at one time a hotbed of (some say leftist) political activity. It was closed on June 26, 1980, after 40 students had been killed by government troops. It reopened very recently on September 17, 1984. Reportedly Joaquin Villalobos, an F.M.L.N.-commander, was once a student there (WP 9/18/84, p. A12).

Over the past four or five years there has been a series of assassinations of both U.S. citizens and Salvadorans in El Salvador that has caused conflicts and difficulties for foreign policy makers who are trying to define the U.S. role in the area. Among the better known of these occurrences are the March 24, 1980 killing of the popular and progressive Archbishop Oscar Romero, while he was saying mass in San Salvador; the November 1980 massacre of the leading opposition figures, who were members of the F.D.R.; the December 1980 rapes and murders committed by Salvadoran National Guardsmen against four U.S. churchwomen, Sister Dorothy Kazel, layworker Jean Donovan and two Maryknoll nuns; the January 3, 1981 killing of two U.S. labor advisers, Michael P. Hammer and Mark D. Pearlman, and Salvadoran Jose Rodolfo Viera by Salvadoran National Guardsmen; and the May 25, 1983 assassination of U.S. military adviser Lt. Commander Albert Schaufelberger III in San Salvador by the F.M.L.N.

These occurrences have posed a problem for Duarte because the U.S. is pressuring him to find and prosecute the killers. If he does he may have to go after certain influential military commanders, which would antagonize relations between his government and the military, and such a development would erode the newly emerging power structure. Obviously Duarte has a tightrope situation on his hands, and he seems to be balancing it well: officers
that were suspected of participating in the death squads have been dismissed or transferred, and five National Guardsmen were convicted for murdering the nuns, but the 5-year coverup was not investigated. (Gen. Vides was in charge of the National Guard at that time.)

In March 1984, El Salvador had elections that were largely touted as "the first free elections in 50 years." The rebels asserted early on that they could not participate, as "safe participation" was a contradiction in terms (Time, 5/9/83, p. 23). For this reason they boycotted the elections, setting up roadblocks, laying mines, and in general trying to prevent the electorate from voting. The voting process itself was a rather complex one, mainly because the electoral commission insisted on importing a complex, $3.4 million computer system to help the process in a society with a heavily illiterate populace. The voting turnout was very large because voting is mandatory in El Salvador -- at the very least, one can be fined if one's voting card is not stamped. It is said among various U.S. sources that an unstamped voting card also is "prima facie" evidence of subversive activity as far as some right-wing army members are concerned (Time, 4/9/84, p. 31). Mike Royko, a Chicago columnist, quoted Heather Foote of the Washington Office on Latin America as saying, "The desperation to vote is not explainable by patriotic duty but an underlying fear that you need that stamp on your card. If you don't vote, you're more likely to be thought a subversive.... The card is their passport to life" (CT 5/11/84). A Salvadoran official denied this, however, and said that generally the U.S. media provides a "very shallow analysis" of the Salvadoran situation, and also that the U.S. press exploits the dramatic and the sensational at the cost of accuracy. At any rate, those elections were not decisive as no candidate won a defin- itive majority. Duarte carried a reported 43.4% of the vote, and D'Aubuisson, 29.8%. So a runoff election was held between them about a month later, on May 6, 1984. Duarte won, with 54% of the vote as opposed to D'Aubuisson's 46%, and he took office on June 1st, 1984. The CIA was said to have contributed significant financial support to Duarte's campaign (WP 4/16/84, p. A18; 5/4/84, p. A1; NYT 10/21/84). Many members of the Salvadoran military were not enthusiastic about the prospect of D'Aubuisson's election because of the distinct possibility
of a resulting reduction in U.S. aid. So, it surprised few, but relieved many, when Duarte was elected.

A whole separate battle was fought over the rules governing the March 31, 1985 Assembly elections. The Conservatives, who controlled the Assembly, introduced an "elections bill," which among other things said that parties should be identified on the ballots by their symbols. What this does, in effect, especially in the case of coalitions, is to provide a series of symbols on a ballot that for the most part represent the same people -- that is, symbols a, b, c and d could all represent candidate x. With a largely illiterate populace, this sort of arrangement could clearly favor a party with several symbols. Another provision of the elections bill was to prevent relatives of the President from operating in various government posts. One reason Duarte was against this was that his son, Alejandro, was the incumbent mayoral candidate in San Salvador, and would have been prevented from running. Duarte clearly had a problem on his hands. He tried to write his own version of the elections bill, but the Salvadoran Supreme Court decided to stay with the original version written by the Conservatives and to throw out Duarte's version (WSJ 1/18/85, p. 15; WP 2/8/85, p. A2).

A major concern of a variety of groups and individuals both in and outside of El Salvador is human rights. Since the beginning of the civil war 1979-80 between 40,000 and 50,000 people have died in the fighting. That is a huge number, especially considering that El Salvador is a relatively small country. The infamous "escuadrones de la muerte" or death squads, have received a lot of notice in the U.S. press.

Apparently certain Salvadoran officials originally thought that the Reagan Administration would "look the other way" with regards to the abusive activities, especially since Reagan "refused to sign a bill that would have required him to I. ep certifying to Congress that El Salvador was making progress on human rights" (Newsweek, 12/12/83, p. 54). (In fact, the Report claims that President Reagan's declaration to Congress on Jan. 28, 1982, regarding the bettering of human rights in El Salvador was "a fraud".) But Newsweek went on to quote
Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam as saying, "The death squads and their backers in El Salvador and Guatemala are enemies of democracy every bit as much as the guerrillas and their Cuban and Soviet sponsors." The Reagan Administration did pressure the Salvadoran government to curb the death squad activities, and in a visit to El Salvador, Vice-President Bush stressed the Administration's unhappiness with the death squads. Since Duarte has taken power, he has tried to curb the death squad crimes: he tried to set up an investigative commission, but the pre-1985 Conservative Assembly would not allow it.

Freedom House put out a report that called for the "civilization" of El Salvador's government, because this would help diminish the human rights abuses.

U.S. policy in El Salvador tends to be more well-defined than its policies toward Nicaragua, and Time (6/13/83, p. 33) delineated this policy:

That policy, Shultz reiterated last week, contains four elements: 1) increased aid in developing the economy and democratic institutions; 2) military assistance aimed at strengthening the Salvadoran army so that it can keep the guerrillas at bay long enough for the first goal to produce results; 3) support for negotiations to broaden participation in the democratic process, notably in the elections now scheduled for late 1983; and 4) encouragement of multilateral talks in which other countries in the region would try to help solve security problems.

Newsweek (12/12/83, p. 57) reports another facet of the U.S. foreign policy:

President Reagan has promised to "draw the line" against communist aggression in El Salvador. He has linked his credibility with allies and adversaries around the world to a steadfast commitment to victory. His closest advisers say flatly that Reagan will never allow a regional ally to fall to the communists "on his watch."
Newsweek later reported (5/21/84, p. 40) that many Americans believe that Reagan's policies are too militaristic and concentrate too much on fighting the effects (i.e. insurgents) rather than the causes (''social and economic ills'') of the problems.

The civil war in El Salvador continues, with occasional truces. Both sides, at least politically, seem to be concerned about the welfare of the Salvadoran people at large. For example, in late 1984 both sides agreed during their meetings to have a Christmas truce, for which the rebels backed off from the war from midnight, December 23 to midnight, December 26, and from December 31 to January 2, 1985. During this time the Salvadoran army agreed to limit itself to defensive actions only. Another truce was called on January 29, 1985 so that 400,000 children could be vaccinated (WP 1/30/85, p. A12).

Duarte has set down some tactical changes for air action against the guerrillas. It seems that the U.S. was aiding the Salvadoran Army in that it would make reconnaissance flights over El Salvador and would report the rebel positions to the Salvadoran Air Force, who would then bomb the positions. The only trouble with that, though, was that the bombs being dropped were killing civilians as well as rebels. Duarte's guidelines included a requirement "that each bombing raid be approved in writing by the chief of staff or his stand-in at the Defense Ministry. In addition, special restrictions will apply to raids in areas known to have civilian populations and in areas where there are no government troops on the ground" (WP 9/13/84, p. A1; NYT 9/16/84, p. 4E).

The New York Times (9/30/84) reported that Ambassador Pickering had determined that the Salvadorans had napalm weapons in their arsenal, but supposedly were not using them. However, the non-profit group Medical Aid for El Salvador claimed that they had evidence that some Salvadoran peasants had been exposed to napalm.

The U.S. has been contributing significant monetary amounts to El Salvador and has been extensively supplying the Salvadoran military with sophisticated weaponry. One branch of the State Department is called the Mil Group, which is "a 66-member team at the U.S. Embassy that
advices, trains, and funnels U.S. equipment to the Salvadoran Army" (WP 9/28/84, p. A1).

On October 8, 1984, President Duarte altered the course of developments in the Salvadoran civil war, during a speech to the General Assembly at the U.N., by proposing a series of peace talks with the rebels. Duarte principally wanted to talk to the rebel military commanders, "contending that leftist civilian leaders lack the power to do serious bargaining" (WP 10/9/84, p. A1 and 10/10/84, p. A1). On October 15, 1984, the first round of talks was held in the little town of La Palma about 40 miles north of San Salvador, and lasted 5 1/2 hours. The participants in these talks were Duarte and Gen. Vides, rebels Ungo and Zamora, Ferman Cienfuegos and Facundo Guardado. The talks were mediated by Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas, aided by Bishop Gregorio Rosa Chavez. Reportedly the Reagan Administration was initially against the talks, but later supported them (WP 10/11/84, p. A32; and Newsweek, 10/29/84, p. 49). Duarte was accused by some of staging theatrics since he "publicly invited the entire country to attend" the talks (WP 10/14/84, p. A1).

Duarte insists that the guerrillas gain power by acting in accordance with the constitution and participating in elections. The rebels, conversely, want to be permitted to share power without participating in elections, and they also want their soldiers to be incorporated into the Salvadoran Army. Guillermo Ungo was quoted as saying:

Our thesis is still that there can be no real settlement unless there is a sharing of power to guarantee its implementation.... The reason we did not raise it at this time was that we decided ahead of time to avoid bringing up issues that we knew would prove to be stumbling blocks for further dialogue.

Power sharing remains one of our fundamental goals, but we are realists and realized that at this stage of the talks to have put such a demand on the table would have risked future dialogue.
For us this meeting was just a beginning, a first step (WP 10/17/84, p. A1).

D'Aubuisson did not participate in these talks. He supposedly insists that the talks should include him or members of his party, and he was quoted as saying, "I don't consider what went on a real dialogue.... It was a monologue between old friends because Duarte and Ungo have long shared the same political space and both share the same socialist ideas" (WP 10/22/84).

A second round of talks was held November 30, 1984, in Ayagualo, at a Salesian Fathers Seminary, about nine miles south of San Salvador. The talks lasted for 12 hours, and were held between government representatives Col. Reynaldo Lopez Nuila and Julio Adolfo Rey Prendes, and rebel representatives Ruben Zamora, Hector Oqueli, Dagoberto Gutierrez and Facundo Guardado. The top leaders of each side (Duarte and Ungo) weren't present as the talks dealt with "procedural rather than substantive issues" (sources: WP 11/29/84, p. A3; 12/1/84, p. A1; 12/2/84, p. A1). The second round of talks left the two parties at somewhat of an impasse, because the rebels were much more insistent in their demands and the government continued to hold its position. But Archbishop Rivera y Damas said, "To talk for 12 hours is not something useless, precisely because part of a dialogue is the confrontation of theses and points of view" (WP 12/3/84).

Early in 1985, the rebels had been petitioning for a 3rd round of talks but were put off, largely because Duarte had to deal with the internal politics over the Assembly and the election rules.

Duarte has a long road ahead of him to establish a balance between the various forces operating in El Salvador. With his initiation of the peace talks in October, the President proved, "If nothing else... that the civil war is primarily a Salvadoran conflict -- not some surrogate struggle between East and West -- and that Salvadorans can hope to end it by themselves" (Newsweek, 10/29/84, p. 48). It seems possible that U.S. support of Duarte could facilitate the Salvadoran peace process.
HONDURAS

There have been a number of interesting developments in Honduras in recent years which have obvious implications for the future course of events in that area. At the moment, the U.S. has important economic and strategic interests in Honduras. The economic interests concern a variety of investments there by various U.S. firms. Strategically, Honduras is important to the United States because it serves as a base for the anti-Sandinista contras, as well as a launching point for reconnaissance flights over both El Salvador and Nicaragua. Also reportedly there is a "regional radar surveillance station" at Cerro la Mole near Tegucigalpa, where 1,000 U.S. soldiers are stationed (WP 11/8/84, p. A1).

Currently, Honduras is under the direction of a civilian government, the President of which is Roberto Suazo Cordova, who was elected in late 1981 and inaugurated in early 1982. President Suazo is a cagey and astute leader, who succeeded a long line of military rulers.

A glance at the history of Honduras will give some perspective on the country as it is today. On October 26, 1838, Honduras declared its independence. It had a long and turbulent series of leaders for roughly three-fourths of a century.

At the turn of the century, the various fruit companies, among them Samuel Zmuri's Cuyamel Fruit Company, were getting involved in the affairs of the area. In the early 1900s, one Manuel Bonilla was elected to the presidency of Honduras, but was later ousted. He was replaced by Miguel Davila. As many sources agree, Davila threatened the success of the Cuyamel Fruit Company, so Zmuri (Zemurray) reportedly pulled some strings and helped Bonilla depose Davila and become president once again. Bonilla died in 1913.

In 1923, Tiburcio Carias Andino succeeded to power. He was a member of the National Party (PNH, the more conservative of the two major Honduran political parties). Carias held onto power until 1948.
By that time Honduras had gone through several constitutions.

In 1963, Air Force Colonel Oswaldo Lopez Arellano (a National Party member) took power, and held power on and off for about 12 years, until 1974, when a scandal broke concerning his acceptance of a $1.25 million bribe. Apparently the bribe was paid to him and at least one other top Honduran official by the United Fruit Company, who wanted the banana tax lowered. (This subject is addressed in many publications, among them the United Brands annual report of 1974.) The scandal caused such an outrage that Lopez was removed and replaced by Col. Melgar Castro, who stayed in power until 1978. At that time Col. Melgar was overthrown and replaced by a military triumvirate made up of Honduran Army men Policarpo Paz, Amilcar Zelaya and Air Force Col. Domingo Alvarez. Those three kept power until 1980, when elections were held and Paz became "interim president." He drafted yet another constitution.

Then, in November of 1981, new elections were held, and Mr. Suazo was elected. President Suazo belongs to the Liberal Party (PLH).

Most people agree that even though Honduras is a poor country (the average income is $600/year and an estimated 45% of the people are illiterate) socially it is not terribly repressive: a reporter for the National Geographic wrote in November, 1983:

...The typical Central American alliance of rich landowners and army never became so oppressive here.

In recent years land reform has proceeded, albeit in fits and starts. The press freely reports. Labor enjoys guaranteed rights. In 1981 more than 80% of the eligible voters cast ballots for a president, ending 18 years of almost continuous military rule.

It has suffered economically in recent years, however: the updated "Background Notes" (provided by the State Dept.) claims on p. 5 that Honduras has been exper-
iencing some economic instability because of the generally volatile situation in Central America -- "foreign investors and bankers have become increasingly unwilling to bring new resources to the area."

There are, for most purposes, four political parties in Honduras: two major ones and two minor ones. The two major ones are PNH and PLH, mentioned before. The two minor ones are the Innovation and Unity Party (PINU) and the Christian Democratic Party (PDCH). One unofficial, unregistered leftist party is the Honduran Patriotic Front (FPH) but ostensibly it is not a prime moving force in Honduran politics. One source interviewed said that the PNH and the PLH were set up independently by the Standard and United Fruit Companies.

Some of the more influential members of the Honduran administration are: President Suazo; Minister of the Presidency Ubodoro Arriaga Iraheta; Commander of the Armed Forces Walter Lopez Reyes; President of the National Congress Efrain Bu Giron; Minister of National Defense Col. Amilcar Castillo Suazo; Minister of Foreign Relations Edgardo Paz Barnica; Minister of Planning Daniel Mesa Palma; and Special Economic Advisor for Finance and Investment Moises Starkman Pinel.

In addition to the administration, there is an Assembly made up of 82 people. State Department documents report that in the 1981 elections, the various parties won the following number of seats: PLH -- 44; PNH -- 34; PINU -- 3 and PDCH -- 1.

There is also a Supreme Court branch made up of 10 members.

Commander Lopez has only been in charge of the armed forces for about a year. His predecessor was General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, who was ousted on March 31, 1984. Alvarez was exiled to Costa Rica but later went on to Miami where he currently resides. In November of 1984 the Washington Post (11/9/84, p. A40) reported that the Honduran government wanted to extradite Alvarez from the U.S. on charges of "illegal enrichment." Allegedly the U.S. was taken completely by surprise by the ousting of Gen. Alvarez (WP 12/16/84, p. A27), and the event caused a
chill in relations between the then-Ambassador John D. Negroponte (as well as the U.S. Embassy) and the Hondurans.

The ouster of Alvarez was indicative of a number of growing apprehensions on the part of many Hondurans. The bottom line was that many of the officers believed that the course that their country was following, led by Alvarez and the U.S., would not be at all beneficial in the long run -- that Honduras was going to have to pay a heavy price if it did not play its cards more carefully. For one thing, for a while the U.S. trained Salvadoran soldiers along with Honduran soldiers at the Regional Military Center at Puerto Castilla, in an effort to minimize costs (it is cheaper to train Salvadoran soldiers in Honduras than in the U.S.) while keeping Congress happy. (Congress objects if there are more than 55 U.S. military advisers in El Salvador at one time.) The Hondurans do not rule out the possibility of a future war with El Salvador, and for this reason look askance at the betterment of the Salvadoran Army, especially taking place on Honduran soil. So, the Hondurans put an end to it -- they cut off the Salvadoran part of the training sessions (WP 9/28/84, p. A1). This upset the U.S., so in March 1985, the Reagan Administration asked Congress to shut down the facility at Puerto Castilla completely, and reallocated most of the funds to a training center in El Salvador (WP 3/16/85, p. A24).

With regards to the situation between the U.S. and Nicaragua, the Hondurans had two complaints: first, that the U.S. military buildup in Honduras was making the Nicaraguans edgy, and Honduras did not want to have to face the wrath of the Nicaraguans at a later date, especially if the U.S. was not seriously committed to the cause. It was this very perceived possible lack of commitment that has the Hondurans concerned about the future contra situation: several thousand (at least) contras are operating out of Honduras against the Sandinistas. The Hondurans are afraid that the contras will not make any headway either militarily or diplomatically with the Sandinistas, and then Honduras will be stuck with an unlanded, armed force of several thousand individuals, looking to establish themselves somewhere.
Over the years the U.S. has contributed a significant amount of economic and military aid to Honduras. The U.S. claims that it is necessary for the Hondurans to build up their armed forces because of the rapid Soviet supplied military buildup in Nicaragua. In a circular argument, Nicaragua claims it must continue its buildup in answer to the arms buildup in Honduras.

The U.S. also conducts military maneuvers in Honduras: among these, Ahuas Tara I, II and III; Granadero I, Focus 1984 and Universal Trek 1985.

One State Department official said the U.S. has neither bases nor base rights in Honduras, but does have access to airfields under prescribed conditions. This source also said that the core of U.S. military personnel in Honduras numbers 740, and also that there hasn't been a significant growth in the Honduran military forces, which number about 16,500, in the last few years. He said the Hondurans have an experienced air force but not very sophisticated weaponry.

U.S. involvement has had other costs. In December it was reported (WP 12/14/84, p. A20) that two Navy men had died in a demolition accident. A few weeks later, the disappearance of a U.S. C130 plane with 21 service people aboard was reported (WP 1/23/85, p. A1).

In early November 1984 two important news stories broke with regards to Honduras. The first was a report concerning an assassination plot being woven against President Suazo. The FBI broke the case, and arrested eight people in Miami. The conspirators had smuggled $10 million worth of cocaine into Miami, with the intention of selling it to raise money to finance the assassination. (WP 11/12/84, p. A1). President Suazo claimed that the National Party was behind the whole thing, but the PNH denied the charge, saying that the plotters were gangsters operating on their own (WP 11/3/84, p. A10 - both).

The other event had to do with the fact that the U.S. government had hired the company Harbert International Inc. to maintain U.S. troops at Palmerola Air Base and other, more remote areas. Some Senators, among them Jim Sasser (D-Tennessee) claimed that the fact
that the U.S. had hired a company to help the soldiers dig in, as it were, rather than making the soldiers look after their own needs, as they supposedly do in other temporary situations, meant that the Reagan Administration had more permanent plans in mind for U.S. troops in Honduras than it was indicating (WP 11/3/84, p. A10).

Several days later, it became public that the ruling Hondurans wanted to set up firmer ties and obligations between themselves and the U.S. by means of some sort of written agreement. They had set up a commission which met with Secretary of State George Shultz in late November of 1984. Reportedly the commission consisted of Walter Lopez, Edgardo Paz Barnica (who was hospitalized at the time of the meeting and therefore could not attend), Ubodora Arriaga, Col. Efrain Gonzalez Munoz, and Manuel Fontecha (WP 11/8/84, p. A1; 11/29/84, p. A1). The Hondurans wanted twice the economic aid they are now receiving, as well as a "security Pact" which would help insure that the U.S. would not at a later date leave them up on hooks between Nicaragua and El Salvador, with the contra force festering within their borders. As far as the Hondurans are concerned, they have to keep an eye on El Salvador as much as they do on Nicaragua. Without guarantees from the U.S., the Hondurans feel "exposed politically and militarily" (WP 11/8/84, p. A1). The article went on to say:

The request for sharp increases in U.S. economic aid flows from a feeling in the armed forces that the best way to avoid internal subversion in the long run is to guarantee a decent living for the 3.2 million Hondurans.... For the next few years, this cannot be done without more U.S. aid....

Basically, the U.S. reaction to these requests was an unhappy one. Reportedly the administration views the Hondurans' demands as unrealistic and inflexible, and thinks that it can continue on its present course because allegedly it does not see the Hondurans as having much choice in the matter (WP 1/23/85, p. A13). Also, the U.S. believes that its obligations are sufficiently covered in the standing 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the "Rio Pact," which "commits the
United States to come to the defense of other signatories under specified conditions" (WP 11/8/84, p. A1). Part of this argument is that none of the other Central American countries has special "security pacts" with the U.S., but rather only has the "Rio Pact"; therefore it would be unfair for the U.S. to make a special agreement with Honduras (WP 2/8/85, p. A21). However, Honduras claims that the "Rio Pact" over the years has not been as binding as they would have liked: one instance they cite is their war with El Salvador in 1969, another is the Malvinas (Falklands) war, in which the U.S. sided with Britain rather than with Argentina.

Officially, U.S. policy in Honduras has several levels; as Ambassador John D. Negroponte said in his December 6, 1984 speech, "Let's Stop Stereotyping Central America" (provided by the State Dept.), "We have pursued a three-part policy of supporting democracy, aiding economic and social development and improving the security of Central America's threatened nations." Or, as James H. Michel said in his March 28, 1984 speech to the Subcommittee on Installations and Facilities House Armed Services Committee,

Our policy toward Honduras is to support a democratic regime under pressure from external forces. Honduran authorities, including the military, agree that U.S. assistance has been concentrated in this sector. While Hondurans express gratitude, they are frustrated that the levels of aid have not been sufficient to bridge the current export-import gap....

A frequent criticism of U.S. policy toward Honduras is the assertion that all this activity in fact weakens democracy by militarizing the country. A careful look at what has happened politically -- and militarily -- in Honduras over the past few years suggests the contrary conclusion: that the whole direction of events has been from military control toward a civilian, democratic policy.... The Honduran budget gives higher priority to
health, education and public works than to military expenditures.

Indeed, it has been reported that Honduran military expenditures make up less than 10% of the budget.

Some Hondurans' opinions on the subject of U.S. policy in their country can be seen in a recent article in the Washington Post (WP 2/24/85, p. A1). One person said that some problems arise because the current U.S. administration tends to implement policies without first winning popular support for them in the U.S. The article also said:

For the most part, the Reagan administration appears to be listening to new Honduran demands with half an ear, concerned more with how Honduras fits into U.S. goals in the region than with Honduras' own objectives....

An influential Honduran, saying he reflected Lopez's (the Armed Forces Commander) views, said Negroponte was typical of most U.S. diplomats in not trying to understand Honduras' desires except in the context of what Washington wants Honduras to do.

"That has to change," the Honduran said. "You think we don't have any options, but we do. We can talk to Nicaragua, too."

Late in March 1985, the world was astounded by the news that President Suazo might have been overthrown. The initial reports were false, however; as it turned out, what had happened was that some of Suazo's critics had decided that the executive was dabbling too much in the other governmental branches, and so there was an attempt to replace certain members of the Supreme Court with non-Suazo men. Suazo claimed this was unconstitutional, the army was called out, and the new justices were placed under arrest.

One source who was interviewed, who had worked in Honduras for several months, said that U.S. involvement in Honduras was taking place primarily for economic reasons,
and said, "The Communist fear is just an excuse to dominate those countries economically."

While the State Department says that the Hondurans welcome the U.S. presence, this source said that the main concerns of the Honduran populace are socio-economic problems, and while the Hondurans are generally anti-communist, as a whole they don't want U.S. (or anybody's) troops in the country. The relationship the U.S. shares with Honduras is valuable, but also delicate. Both sides must work to assure the furtherance of their mutual interests in a strong alliance.

GUATEMALA

Guatemala is yet another piece in the Central American puzzle. That country won its independence from Spain on September 15, 1821. The following chronology of events is summarized from the Introduction and Annex II sections of 'Viscount Colville of Culross' report to the U.N., titled Question of the Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, With Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories -- Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala,

which will be referred to as Colville's Report. The U.N. Human Rights resolution of which this report is a product was taken on March 8, 1983 and Colville's Report was given in early 1984.

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Jacobo Arbenz was overthrown in 1954 and Col. Carlos Castillo Armas came to power. He was assassinated in 1957, and was succeeded by General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who took office on March 2, 1958. Ydigoras lasted until early 1963, when he was ousted by Col. Enrique Peralta Azurdia. President Peralta was responsible for, among other things, the formation and institution of a new constitution.

Elections were held in Guatemala on March 6, 1966, and Dr. Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro became President.
During Mendez's presidency, according to Colville's Report, violence increased, and the Guatemalan Army was authorized to "eliminate subversion," while remaining independent of the government.

There were more elections on March 1, 1970, and Col. Arana (of the National Liberation Movement) won, and was inaugurated on March 21, 1970.

More elections were held on March 3, 1974, which led to an interesting development. General Efrain Rios Montt (of the DCG) and Alberto Fuentes Mohr (who was assassinated on January 29, 1979) won the election, but General Kjell Eugenio Laugerud Garcia actually became president. It was at the end of Laugerud's presidency, in 1977, that the Carter Administration cut off aid to Guatemala because of its human rights record. For many years, then, Guatemala had to find other ways to keep itself afloat, and became a relatively independent country. President Laugerud was not permitted to run for a second term, and in the elections of March 5, 1978, he was succeeded by his Defense Minister, General Fernando Lucas Garcia. The internal strife continued.

On March 7, 1982, elections were again held, and another former Defense Minister, General Anibal Guevava, was elected. His regime did not last long, however, because less than a month later, on March 23, 1982, he was ousted by a "group of junior army officers," and General Rios Montt took control. His regime was a brief, but (for some people) controversial one. Rios Montt is a fundamentalist Christian, who, in his own words (Newsweek, 12/13/82, p. 57), governed with Biblical principles. Some people said that because of those Biblical principles, the human rights situation had improved under Rios Montt, but others contradicted that claim saying that Rios was following a "scorched earth" plan for defeating the leftist insurgents.

One policy that Rios favored was trying to give the indigenous Indians more power in the government. According to Newsweek (ibid.), "He has appointed 10 Indians to the 30-member Council of State," claiming "that Guatemala's Indian majority 'should be its rulers, not its
slaves.... Neither the Army nor the guerrillas can win without the support of the Indios'."

Rios Montt was supplanted on August 8, 1983 by General Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores, who was appointed by the Council of the Armed Forces to both the positions of President and Defense Minister. President Mejia currently maintains power. However, elections for the 88-seat Constituent Assembly took place on July 1, 1984. The Guatemalans were particularly proud of these elections because they were modern and fair (unlike the elections there through most of this century, according to one source). They were very happy with the electoral turnout. The results of the election were: the "moderate left" gained 30 seats, the "liberal right" won 27 seats, a coalition between two liberal parties won 1 seat, the "conservative right" won 29 seats, and the remaining seat was taken by a small group whose letters are OCAS. The Assembly was sworn in on August 1, 1984, and began right away to draft some new guidelines by which to govern itself.

There are a number of reasons why the Reagan Administration, which has resumed economic aid to Guatemala, is attributing a certain amount of importance to that country, the principal one being its strategic location.

Some U.S. officials and citizens object to the resumption in aid because of the continuing question concerning human rights violations. The war between the Guatemalan Army and leftist insurgents has produced many casualties, both in terms of refugees and deaths. At this time it seems as if the Army has all but won the war against the insurgents.

Many people fled to Mexico or to the U.S. The Washington Post (2/22/85, p. A21) provides an estimate that 46,000 refugees are currently in southern Mexico. Numbers of refugees have come to the U.S., many of them illegally. (At the moment, in the U.S., several citizens have been indicted for helping Latin refugees to enter the country, and then harboring them. As rules in the U.S. stand, non-nationals who come to the U.S. illegally can be deported back to their home countries, unless they are officially granted asylum.)
Historically, it has been the Army that is usually assigned the guilt for barbaric human rights violations: it used to be that the insurgents would disperse themselves among civilian population, and the Army would hunt them down, killing a lot of civilians in the process. Because of the Army's record, it was not hard for the insurgents to convince the rural populations, especially the Indians, that it was in their interest to aid the resistance. But apparently the Army has turned the tide: it set up a (not necessarily voluntary) system of "Civil Defense Patrols" in the towns and villages all over the country to aid the Army and inform on the rebels. Reportedly nearly one-seventh of the rural population actively participates in these patrols. Because of the new pressure put on them, the rebels have ceased to have the image of the "salvation of the People." In an effort to maintain control, the rebels themselves began to crack down on the rural people and basically commit the same abuses that the Army had been known for.

In January of 1985, the New York Times (1/13/85, p. E3) reported that one reason that the Guatemalan Army has been so successful is because it can fight in any way it wants, and be as inhumane as it perceives is necessary, since it does not have to answer to the U.S. Congress for its funding. Another reason is that the Guatemalan guerrillas are not exactly a cohesive, well-supplied force. The article suggests that since the Guatemalan Army has been so successful, it probably won't modify its tactics, with or without U.S. aid.

There is some indication, however, that the human rights situation is improving, even if only slightly. Material provided by the Guatemalan Embassy in the D.C. reports that several hundred refugees have returned to Guatemala due to an improved situation. The Guatemalan government is also rebuilding some destroyed villages to be "model villages." One U.S. citizen who has travelled in Guatemala, however, says that these villages are really just centers set up for relocation of the rural people, making it easier for the Army to keep watch over the people. Colville's Report indicates that indeed the Army does monitor the movements of the residents of these
villages, but that the situation is hardly inhumane or oppressive.

President Betancur of Colombia visited Guatemala in December of 1984, and reportedly praised that country for its advances in human rights (WP 12/14/84, p. A33).

As far as U.S. policy toward Guatemala is concerned, one Guatemalan official has said that the Guatemalans in general believe that they are rarely, if ever, considered independently -- in his words, in general Guatemalans feel as if they are "thrown into the bandwagon," and that, although the U.S. and Guatemala enjoy "good bilateral relations," the U.S. should pay more attention to Guatemala: that it wants to be viewed as an individual, unique country and not considered in comparison with other Central American countries. This official went on to say that certainly human rights are violated to some extent in Guatemala, but that the U.S. press misrepresents the suffering of the Guatemalan people -- that it does not dig below the sensational stories to look for the causes of the situation.

One U.S. source, who has worked and traveled extensively in Guatemala, says that the human rights situation has not improved at all, and that the Reagan Administration should be more concerned about this problem. He went on to say that the Reagan Administration's interest in battling the "Red Menace" in Guatemala is a poorly based policy, as the Soviet presence there is negligible at best.

CONCLUSION

As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the U.S. does have legitimate interests in Central America. But defining a good, long term policy is no easy task, especially since the various interests and concerns of the culturally distinct Central American countries must be taken into account. The U.S. definitely has an interest in discouraging the establishment of Communist regimes, but as far as Nicaragua is concerned, U.S. officials should recognize two possibilities: One, that the current policy seems to be accomplishing the opposite of
its intended purpose, and is undermining moderation; and two, that forcing other Central American countries to make a choice between the U.S. (with whom they would naturally like to maintain a peaceful, productive relationship) and Nicaragua (with whom they share history, language and certain other cultural traits) could make the situation far more disastrous than it already is. It is likely that the various Central American governments are painfully aware that the Reagan Administration will be out of office in three years, but Nicaragua will be around for an indeterminate length of time.

The U.S. must also recognize and act upon its historical responsibilities. By operating with those countries on a policy based on cooperation and mutual interest, rather than exploitation and dominance, socio-economic progress for everyone concerned could be the result.

Also, more progress will be made if the "Left vs. Right" or "East vs. West" scenario, in which so many world situations have been painted in the last few years, is not considered the framework for every situation. It isn't. When the Panamanians wanted to settle the Canal situation, it was a matter of national pride, and was not based on "communist" or "subversive" motives.

The next few months will probably be critical for the development of the Central American situation. The U.S. must attempt to design a policy that has better long-term potential. That is the least it can do for itself and its American neighbors.
SOURCES

Books


Interviews

Representatives from the following Embassies in Washington, D.C.: El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Panama. (Some of these Embassies provided extensive literature concerning their countries. The Embassy of Nicaragua provided literature, though none their representatives were interviewed).

Other interviews were conducted with:

1) An anthropologist who worked with Indians in Honduras.
2) A Peace Corps worker who lived in Panama for 4 years.
3) A professor who has worked and traveled extensively in Guatemala.
4) A State Department spokesman who specializes on Honduras.

Lectures

The following lectures were all held at the Humanities Building on the University of Wisconsin Campus, Madison.


2) July 23, 1984. Stuart Eizenstat, attorney and previously President Carter's Executive Director of the Domestic Policy Staff, "Factors that Influence Presidential Decision Making."

Magazines

1) The Atlantic.
2) Audubon.
3) Department of State Bulletin.
4) Harper's.
5) National Geographic.
6) Newsweek.
7) Nicaraguan Perspectives.
8) Rolling Stone.
9) Time.
11) World Press Review.

Newspapers

2) La Estrella de Panama.
3) La Gaceta. (Nicaragua).

Papers

4) Goldwyn, Robert. "Human Rights: The Moral Foundation for American Foreign Policy?"

Reference Materials


5) "Guatemala: Present and Future."

6) "Introduction to Panama." (pamphlet).

7) "Lists of Visits of Presidents of the United States to Foreign Countries, 1789-1983." (Dept. of State).


12) Weil, Andrew W. "Free Trade Zones."
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SIRDAR SHAUKAT HYAT KHAN was born in 1915, educated in the Muslim University Aligarh and at the famous government college at Lahore. He entered the Indian Military Academy, and was commissioned into the newly created Indian Commission in 1936. He served with the 1st Madras Lancers and Bengal Lancers, and was taken prisoner of war in Eritrea. Following World War II Winston Churchill inducted him as a Minister in the Punjab Cabinet. After Partition, he was appointed Minister in Punjab, Pakistan, and served as a Member of Parliament except during General Ayyub Khan's regime when he was jailed for opposing the surrender at Tash Kent. He was official spokesman for the opposition, a member of the Constitution Committee, and co-author of the first democratic constitution unanimously accepted by all provinces. He advised against the rigged elections of 1977, and refused to be the Speaker of the Assembly or Cabinet Minister in the non-democratic government.

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JOHN D. STEMPEL is a foreign service officer who served in Tehran prior to the Khomeini government, and currently is posted to the United States Embassy in India. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California. His thesis topic is, Policy/Decision-Making in the Department of State: The Vietnam Problem 1961-65. He is the author of Inside the Iranian Revolution (Indiana University Press, 1981).