Zirkel, Perry A.
Faculty Bargaining and Campus Governance: Rhetoric v. Research.
Department of Education, Washington, D.C.
400-82-0011
7p.
American Association of University Administrators, P.O. Box 6221, University, AL 35486 ($2.00).
Information Analyses - ERIC Information Analysis Products (071) -- Viewpoints (120)
Administrator's Update; v6 n2 1986
Centralization; *Collective Bargaining; College Administration; *College Faculty; *Governance; Higher Education; Organizational Climate; *Participative Decision Making; *Power Structure; Teacher Administrator Relationship; *Unions

The body of rhetorical writing and research studies about the interrelationship of faculty bargaining and campus governance are compared and synthesized. The research is emphasized so that the findings can inform and advance the ongoing debate and operational decision about this issue. Qualified, but not complete, support is found for the belief that lack of faculty influence in institutional decision-making causes faculty unionization. Other significant variables, such as the institutional context, enter into this equation. The view that faculty bargaining causes significant increase in the faculty's influence in institutional decision-making is not clearly supported, particularly for academic matters at mature universities. The notion that faculty bargaining will bring about the end of faculty senates is premature. The literature supports the assertion that other collegial governance structures, such as personnel and academic committees, will be either significantly eroded or enhanced. Finally, to the extent that faculty have collectively gained influence in decision-making, it seems that their gains have been generally paralleled by centralization of administrative authority, largely at the expense of deans and department chairs. A 59-item reference list is included. (SW)
The growth of faculty bargaining has largely been a phenomenon of the 1970s. In the early 1980s, the proportion of higher education faculty covered by collective bargaining contracts leveled off, at least temporarily, at approximately 20 to 25 percent—slightly higher than the proportion in the rest of the nation's work force (Garbarino 1980, National Center 1982).

Although the literature about the interrelationship of faculty bargaining and campus governance is extensive, much of the widely disseminated writing consists of strongly subjective and value-laden rhetoric. ("Campus governance" is treated here in terms of the decision-making structure within an institution, with focus on the faculty's influence on it.) Substantial research on this topic has been relatively neglected. Consequently, "the impact of faculty collective bargaining on the governance of higher education is a subject on which much has been written, [but] it remains shrouded in folklore and mythology." (Crossland 1976, p. 41)

This article provides an overview of the rhetoric and the research concerning the interrelationship of faculty bargaining and campus governance. It emphasizes the research, so that the findings can inform and advance the ongoing debate and operational decisions about this important issue.

Rhetoric

The rhetorical writing about faculty bargaining and its relationship with campus governance seems to be derived from and divisible into two opposing assumptions. One view is that faculty bargaining enforces and enhances shared authority (see, for example, Brophy 1972). This view, typical of but not limited to faculty union advocates, describes collective bargaining as democratic as well as professional (Change 1977) and decries collegiality as largely mythical or historical (Baldridge 1982). The opposing view is that faculty unionization is "destructive of the traditional role of the faculty in the decision-making process of the university[and]... will at least militate against any increased role for the faculty in governance" (Hanley 1971, p. 12). From this perspective, held by some but far from all institutional authorities, collective bargaining is "rife with negative possibilities" (Ianni 1974, p. 295), including losses in the faculty's professionalism, educational quality, and senate authority (Meskill and Meskill 1976). A tradeoff may be the result: "The employee-professor in the new world may turn out to be a better paid individual in a spiritually poorer environment" (Boyd 1971, p. 314).

Despite these polarized perspectives, both sides seem to concur on certain points. First, adherents of each viewpoint have characterized the causal relationship between faculty bargaining and campus governance as neither one way nor isolated. Thus, although disagreeing on the degree and direction of this relationship, both sides have portrayed faculty participation in campus governance as having an effect on as well as being an effect of faculty participation in collective bargaining (Boyd 1971; Shanker 1978). Similarly, concomitant and contextual factors are perceived as playing significant roles in the cause-effect relationship (Carey 1978; Duggan 1980).

The specific issue of the effect of faculty bargaining on faculty senates has been the subject of controversy rather than consensus. Based on limited experience, sometimes not extending beyond one institution, some participants have portrayed the coexistence of faculty unions and senates as satisfactory (Dougherty 1977), while others have portrayed it as favorable (Wardwell 1979). Predicting a likely diminution in the role of senates, Garbarino and Aussieker (1975) portrayed three possible effects: cooperation, competition, and cooptation. To foster accommodation and cooperation and to avoid absorption or cooptation of senates, several observers have posited the
effectiveness of adaptations of the industrial paradigm—or example, dual-track, two-tiered, or integrative models of collective bargaining (Birnbaum 1980, Lavine and Lemon 1975). These various formulations aim at structurally and functionally separating the spheres of authority of unions and senates. Beyond these formulations, opinion is significantly split as to whether senates and other faculty governance structures should be the subject of collective bargaining contracts (Walters 1973).

Research

Empirical research on the interrelationship of faculty bargaining and campus governance is not widely known. The few reviews of this body of research (for example, Meskill and Meskill 1977, Nicholson 1977) generally have been limited in terms of coverage, currency, sophistication, or circulation.

Some caveats about this literature are in order. The reliance on perceptions and the prevalence of case studies limit the objectivity and generalizability of the research. Perhaps the most important caveat, however, is to bear in mind the concomitant and intervening effects of contextual factors on the relationship between faculty bargaining and campus governance: (1) societal trends, such as the movement from elitism to egalitarianism; (2) the state environment, such as applicable legislation; (3) institutional characteristics, such as size and level; and (4) institutional events, such as a declaration of fiscal exigency. Some researchers have properly exercised caution in interpreting the impact of faculty bargaining on governance, pointing out the concomitant effect of other variables, including the general trend toward centralization of authority (Duryea and Neddy 1977) or a single incident, such as hiring a new university president (Sabol 1976). Others have found the interactive effects of such variables as institutional level significant (Hooper 1977). A further example of such contextual factors is the recent Supreme Court decision in Minnesota State Board of Community Colleges v. Knight (1984) which upheld the constitutionality of a state statute restricting, when the faculty has opted for collective bargaining, formal faculty participation in administrative policy making to the duly designated union. The result of this special statutory provision, as the Supreme Court recognized, "has been a restructuring of governance practices in [Minnesota's] community college system." Finally, some studies have found that the affiliation of the faculty bargaining organization—with the American Association of University Professors, the American Federation of Teachers, or the National Education Association—or its status as an independent organization has a measurable, albeit not predictable, effect on the militancy of the local organization, on the specific contours of campus governance (Ladd and Lipset 1976, Napclitano 1978).

Effect of Campus Governance on Faculty Bargaining

The faculty's perceived level of involvement or influence in campus governance has generally although not consistently acted as a powerful predictor of the faculty's attitudes toward collective bargaining in higher education (Drsdall 1978, Hess 1976, Kubak 1981, Thomas 1980). Relatively low perceptions of faculty influence tend to be associated with relatively favorable attitudes toward faculty bargaining. The inverse effect of this variable seems to carry through, although not as powerfully, in the faculty's actual voting behavior in elections (Bornheimer and Lonsdale 1979, Fitzgerald 1980). Differences between perception and actuality and between causation and correlation serve as more general qualifiers. Thus, in light of contextual and concomitant variables, the conclusion that the lack of faculty influence in institutional decision making causes their unionization receives caution and qualified, rather than complete or consistent, support in the research to date.

Views from a legal perspective, the relationship between governance and faculty bargaining takes on an ironic twist in relation to private institutions of higher education. Most such institutions (those with gross revenues of over $1 million) have been subject to the coverage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) since approximately 1970. In a landmark decision in 1980, the Supreme Court held that, based on the effective role the institutional governance, faculty members at Yeshiva University were managerial employees and thus excluded from coverage under the NLRA (Zirkel 1981). The National Labor Relations Board and its administrative law judges have been busy ever since adjudicating which private institutions are like Yeshiva and thus whose faculty are not covered by the act. The results have been mixed (Lee 1983-84, National Center 1983), but as the recent decisions in the Boston University and Polytechnic Institute of New York cases illustrate (Watkins 1984), the practical effect has been to dampen the incidence of faculty bargaining in the private sector. Thus, while the faculty's perception of their role in governance has fostered unionization, the court's perception of the faculty's governance has impeded their unionization, at least in private colleges and universities.

Effect of Faculty Bargaining on Campus Governance

National studies by Committee T of the AAUP (Pardee, Stull, and Adler 1971, Pardee, Stull, and Wolf 1969) and by the first phase of the Stanford Project on Academic Governance (Kemerer and Baldrige 1975) provide a prebargaining baseline of policies affecting governance. These studies show a general pattern in higher education of high faculty influence in academic affairs, low influence in economic matters, and mixed influence in personnel areas. Differences between two and four-year institutions account for a major variation in this pattern, however (Mortimer, Funne, and Leslie 1976).

Using the AAUP data as a baseline and identifying three samples of four-year institutions of higher education—unionized, "no agent" (as a result of a representation election), and "control" (that is, no such election initiated)—Adler (1977) found a slight but general increase in the level of faculty participation in institutional decision making for all three sub-samples from 1970 to 1977. On a scale of 1 (no influence) to 5 (determinative influence), the overall level of the no-agent group increased 0.3, whereas the unionized and control groups' overall levels increased 0.2. These results might be attributable to a general societal shift toward participatory decision making or to a domino effect of faculty unionization, on nonunionized institutions. While Adler's findings are limited by the design of his study and the sampling of only four-year institutions, studies in a variety of col...
College and university settings have found, with one exception (Hill 1982), that faculty at nonunionized institutions are equally or more satisfied with their participation in governance than those at unionized institutions (Cooper 1981; Danese 1977). And although institutional and union leaders differ with regard to the effect of faculty bargaining on the faculty's influence in campus governance, neither side views the effect as significant and both groups became less positive from 1974 to 1979 about its strength (Baldridge, Kemerer, and Associates 1981).

Similarly, one may cautiously conclude that when the overall level of faculty decision making is analyzed in terms of the previously mentioned tri-chotomy, faculty bargaining may have had a more widespread and marked effect on faculty influence in economic matters, particularly with regard to salaries and grievances than in academic matters (Gilmore 1981, Kemerer, Mansel, and Baldridge 1981). In the former area it seems relatively clear that faculty have more of a vice at unionized institutions than at nonunionized institutions with regard to the increasingly important issue of retrenchment. These contractual rights are not particularly potent, however, particularly in the determination (as compared to the implemen-
tation) of fiscal exigency (Johnstone 1981, Lawler 1982). The level, size, and region of the institution are an important source of variation (Chandler and Julius 1980).

Studies concerning the impact of faculty bargaining on college and university senates have yielded mixed results. Some studies based solely on interviews (Hardt 1977) or contract analysis (Chandler and Julius 1980) have found no marked effects. Other, more comprehensive studies, however, reveal moderate cooptation especially when faculty senates were weak before the onset of bargaining (Gershfenfeld and Mortimer 1979, Lee 1979), and a tendency toward accommodated coexistence, particularly along the lines of a dual-track model (Kemerer and Baldridge 1981, Lee 1982). In such a model, the locus of faculty-administrator interaction in economic and personnel matters tends to gravitate toward the bargaining table, whereas academic affairs remain largely in the senate's purview. The duration of the accommoda-
tion is uncertain at this point, but the current situation is characterized by informal interaction between unions and senates and by faculty leaders' membership in both organizations (Tumminia 1979).

Faculty bargaining contracts would seem at best to have reinforced rather than expanded faculty governance structures. Senates were at least partially protected in the provisions of under 15 percent of recent faculty bargaining contracts (Lee 1982). Other nonunion faculty governance structures that were by contract protected albeit by fairly small percentages, were promotion and tenure committees, curriculum committees, and academic policy committees. Two vehicles of faculty governance seldom mentioned in contracts were long-range planning and budget committees. Gains from 1970 to 1980 in contractual coverage of faculty governance were more than matched by that for management rights (Andes 1982).

As for role groups in the governance process, it appears that deans, department chair, and students have tended to lose influence and that nonteaching professionals, central administrators, trustees, and outside authorities have tended to gain power. These changes, however, are neither dramatic nor uniform, and they depend on the characteristics of the institution and the areas of decision making (Lenneman and Bullis 1980, McKeever 1978). The limited research available has found that despite the democratizing allure of unionization to junior faculty, collective bargaining seems to have left their role largely unchanged (Baldridge, Kemerer, and Associates 1981).

**Conclusion**

The connection between the saturated body of rhetorical writing and the neglected body of research studies about the interrelationship of faculty bargaining and campus governance has been heretofore largely lacking. Comparing and synthesizing these bodies of literature results in some tentative conclusions:

- The belief that lack of faculty influence in institutional decision making causes faculty unionization is entitled to qualified—but not complete—support. Other significant variables, such as the institutional context, enter into this equation.
- The view that faculty bargaining causes a significant increase in the faculty's influence in institutional decision making is not clearly supported, particularly for academic matters at mature universities.
- The notion that faculty bargaining will sound the death bell for faculty senates is premature at best. Thus far, the pattern seems to be one of moderate cooptation, with a tendency toward accommodated coexistence.
- The assertion that other collegial governance structures such as personnel and academic committees will be either significantly eroded or enhanced is supported in the literature.
- To the extent that faculty have collectively gained influence in decision making, it seems that their gains have been generally paralleled by centralization of administrative authority, largely at the expense of deans and department chairs. The role of junior faculty does not seem to have changed significantly.


Thomas, Deborah. 1980 "Faculty Attitudes Toward Collective Bargaining in Two Selected Nonbargaining Regents Institutions in Kansas." Ph.D. dissertation, Kansas State University


The ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education abstracts and indexes the current literature on higher education for the National Institute of Education's monthly bibliographic journal Resources in Education. Most of these publications are available through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). For publications cited in this bibliography that are available from EDRS, ordering number and price are included. To order a publication, write to the ERIC Document Reproduction Service, 3900 Wheeler Dr., Alexandria, VA 22304. When ordering, specify the document number. Documents are available as noted in microfiche (MF) and paper copy (PC). Since prices are subject to change it is advisable to check the latest issue of Resources in Education for current cost based on the number of pages in the publication.

Administrator's Update is prepared by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education, The George Washington University, D.C. Series Editor is Glenn M. Nelson, Associate Professor of Higher Education at the University of Pittsburgh. Copies of Administrator's Update may be ordered for $2.00 each from the American Association of University Administrators, PO Box 6221, University, AL 35486. Payment must accompany all orders under $15.

This publication was prepared with funding from the National Institute of Education, U.S. Department of Education, under contract no. "00-82-0011.

The opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the positions of policies of NIE or the Department.

ADMINISTRATOR'S UPDATE
American Association of University Administrators
Box 6221
University, Alabama 35486