Problems that existed during the 1937-1945 era at George Peabody College for Teachers were investigated, using a historiographical approach. In addition to a search of various kinds of records, interviews were conducted with faculty, staff workers, and administrators. The Delphi technique was used to isolate problems of an administrative nature, specifically those dealing with finance, curriculum, and faculty. The college's history was written from a conservative, traditional viewpoint. Little or no attention was given at the college to social issues, labor-management relations, the effect of war on national policies, the study of peace, women's rights, or integration. Peabody was primarily a place where the status quo was observed. Major financial problems during the era were: decreasing funds, faculty salaries, inadequate business procedures, and insufficient buildings and equipment. Two problems concerning faculty were identified: the quality of the faculty, and the faculty members' inadequate promotion of the purpose and objectives of the college. Major problems relating to the educational program concerned enrollment, departmental reorganization, and the quality of students' work. Two innovations were a conference on professional negotiations and the establishment of the Joint University Libraries system. (SW)
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND THE PEABODY EXPERIENCE, 1937-1945

John R. Petry, Associate Professor
Department of Foundations of Education
Memphis State University

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An analysis of a report about George Peabody College for Teachers in the late 30's and early 40's helps to form a conclusion that historiography has changed greatly in recent years from approaching an institutional history from chronological and topical aspects to writing it from a social or economic context; that is, emphasizing the reaction of the university to cultural issues or its involvement in the issues by using a proactive stance.

The era in question, 1937-1945, was characterized by Frederick Rudolph as a time of change, social protest, and a repudiation of the past on the American campus.1 Change and uncertainty were stated to be the order of the day. The administrators in the seats of learning were confronted with the effects of an economic drought in the nation, war in both hemispheres, and enrollment and financial losses. The era started with the U.S. government taking action on numerous fronts to cure the economic ills of the nation, continued with the involvement of many nations in the Axis-Allied confrontation, furthered with the revitalization of the U.S. industrial complex and rearmament and enlargement of military forces, and concluded with the triumph of the Allies over their enemies. The United States became the most industrialized nation in the world, having destroyed the major centers of the production of armaments in Germany and Japan. Its high industrial capacity, ability to preserve its military forces through effective strategies and technical planning, and the failure of the enemy to wage war in the contiguous United States were reasons for its success in achieving victory on sea and land and in the air.

While all of these earthshaking events were taking place in the real world, Peabody, in the shelter of academe, was doing what many other institutions were undoubtedly doing, if institutional histories are to be believed; namely, being concerned about the improvement of the curriculum and
of the faculty, finding nationally known leaders for the institution, improving the status of buildings, increasing financial support, and shaping teacher education.

Though the world was literally coming apart, little or no attention was given at Peabody to social issues, labor-management relations, the effect of war on national policies, the establishment of the study of peace, women's rights, or integration. Peabody was primarily a place where the status quo was observed. It did not react energetically to the issues of the day, but endeavored to keep what it saw as its fitting place in the educational hierarchy - a private institution with a public image generated by training educators for teaching and administrative positions in hundreds of schools, colleges, and universities. Its position as the leading graduate institution in education in the South was not shaken by movements much greater than the discussions between the members of the Progressive Education Society and the Essentialists who were faculty members there.

Why was this so? - that a well-known institution located in a city of learning in a somewhat progressive Southern state not have the sensitivity to address problems with social implications: unemployment, underfunding of public education resulting in undereducated children taught by less well-qualified teachers, segregation, and civil rights.

The answer is found in searching records of various kinds - minutes of the Board of Trustees, minutes of the faculty, bulletins, presidential papers - and through querying faculty members, staff workers, and administrators about problems of paramount importance. The Delphi technique was used in isolating problems of an administrative nature, specifically those dealing with finance, curriculum, and faculty; that is, individuals were asked to participate in this research by identifying problems that existed during this era and to comment
on them in tape-recorded conversations. Those problems commanding the most attention by participants were isolated for elaboration purposes, and the gathering of information and opinion was limited to them. The information gathered from conversations and interviews correlated highly with the materials in the minutes of the Board of Trustees and of the faculty and the president. Although faculty meetings were all but eliminated after the first three years of President S. C. Garrison's term, the opinions of the interviewers were positive in nature about administrative style and purposes. It should be recalled that there had been from a 22- to 30-year gap in the memories of the interviewees, long enough to color their opinions and enhance or reduce their biases.

None of the documents and conversations revealed much more than a concern for internal matters that left little time for efforts to deal with matters that would become national in scope and have strong social repercussions, especially on schooling, housing, and voting rights. This exclusion of concern for social welfare and civil rights confirms the notion that the school was struggling for existence, despite being well-known and prestigious among institutions of higher education in the South. Its summer school for educators had traditionally been larger in enrollment than had any quarter in the academic year because its courses were practical and its professors were well-known in their fields. Numerous highly visible practitioners were employed just for summer school. This practice united the theorists and prime movers with the professional in the classroom to provide a unique and meaningful educational experience. But the struggle for economic solvency was apparent despite the allusions to prestige and respect, and it was not common only to Peabody.

When Garrison became president of Peabody, the nation was in the throes of
a depression. Many businesses and banks had failed, and many individuals had been wiped out financially with all savings and investments lost. The federal government had stepped in with corrective measures that put people back to work and money into circulation. Premature withdrawal of funds through cancellation of promising programs sent the economy into a recession in 1937 and left eleven million people unemployed. College and university enrollments dropped considerably, and, not surprisingly, the nation's birth rate was at an all-time low. Two years later, after Hitler's legions had marched unopposed into the Rhineland, Austria, and the Sudetenland, the second World War started with an invasion of Poland by both Germany and Russia.

No one knew for sure what the future held. Garrison stated that businessmen, bankers and manufacturers, especially, were terribly afraid. He pictured educational finances as being tight and admitted that some of the major institutions were on shaky financial ground, especially the private ones. "Many," he stated, "were running deficits and had been for some years, even the most wealthy ones." He regretted that there was so much waste and extravagance in Washington, but he expressed his appreciation of those who tried to limit the expenditures of the war to the war effort alone. Garrison thought that institutions of higher learning were going to have a very trying period for a few years, and he hoped that they would pull through.

Problems Related to Finance

In a study made for the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, correlations between institutional excellence and financial factors were shown to be exceptionally high, "indicating that adequacy of financing is in general a superior index of institutional excellence." Factors of significance were the amount of stable income available to an institution; expenditures, especially for educational purposes; and
indebtedness.

The administration pledged itself to proceed as cautiously as it deemed best for the institution. It geared itself for any possible financial crises by deciding that "less important and more unnecessary things" around the college would be eliminated or curtailed. Despite these precautions, there were a number of pressing problems that faced the college.

Though there was surplus of income over expenditures each year, the college did not enjoy the certainty of such a situation. Student fees and endowment returns constantly concerned the administration. There was also the need for working capital. School officials sought to counteract these problems with positive action, such as managing endowment investments to receive a more significant return, seeking additional enrollment, and adding to the working capital.

What Garrison feared for so long was realized in December of 1941. With the entry of the United States into a major conflict, the financial situation began to change rapidly and for the worse. Income from tuition and fees gradually decreased by almost 40 percent. Garrison's belief that college financing was going to be difficult was thus confirmed.

The Army is taking practically all the men from the colleges, and many of the girls are going into war work. This, of course, is as it should be. Winning the war must be our first objective. Nevertheless, it will create a grave financial situation as far as higher education in America is concerned. Institutions such as Peabody, which emphasize graduate work, will be harder hit than other institutions, because their students are more mature and are, therefore, almost universally eligible for military service, or are already prepared to go to work in some industry or profession.4

To counteract these losses the president sought authority to contact the government for permission to train military recruits on the campus. The presence of the military unit provided a source of income that alleviated a declining budget and provided a surplus.
In financial matters, the president took a firm commitment for institutional solvency, instituted stringent accounting practices, and moved the control of the business of the institution to his office, thus effecting savings and increasing efficiency.

That Peabody survived during this time as a private institution of higher learning with a narrow purpose is a tribute to the administrative skills of Garrison and his administrative officials. Basically, it was the skill of perceiving what the problems were, realizing what solutions were possible, implementing the decisions chosen to lessen and dissolve the issues, and anticipating the beginning of a new era that would commence after the worldwide conflagration ended.

This administration perserved the image of Peabody as a college for teachers whose primary mission was to improve educational opportunity throughout the Southeastern United States. Despite the faults that appeared or the missteps that were taken, the resources of the institution, though sapped to the point of collapse at one point, were carefully protected so as to avoid their complete dissolution or a change of identity. This action allowed the college to continue to revise and improve its educational mission in the face of threatened prostration.

The institution practiced austerity by holding its expenditures to the money it had and generally withheld expansion of its program until it was assured of an enlarged income and a growing enrollment. During its most pressing period it chose to pare its courses to those that were essential to the training of teachers in order that it might remain solvent and still fulfill its basic educational philosophy. It later adopted new degree programs in the hope that enrollment might be strengthened quantitatively. After its survival, it began to assume a stronger academic role in an era of a more
democratic educational system that found old standards of entrance into the institutions of higher learning falling by the wayside when the flood of veterans reached its doors.

In essence, Garrison's action as Peabody's chief administrator was of a holding nature. Peabody did not undergo the spirit of change, social protest, and repudiation of the past that Rudolph said was one of the most significant characteristics of the American campus in the 1930's. However, it did sustain some changes and, without stood great uncertainty that Rudolph said were the order of the day in the 1930's and 1940's. It stood the test of survival, enduring despite financial privation stemming from a dearth of students during the early and late years of the year under investigation. During the struggle for leadership survival, Peabody College provided graduate education and library programs for teachers who had no other Southern college available.

One major financial problem was related to income. Receipts from endowment failed to increase. Decreasing funds prohibited the college from giving the aid it normally would have extended to students. Money was needed to endow specific services that were already a part of the educational program as well as to provide for additional instructional services. Additionally, numerous parties defaulted in their payments on bonds purchased by the institution. Also, student fees failed to produce as much income because of a drop in enrollment in the forties; nor was there enough working capital to sustain the college in times of emergency.

These needs were met by making more productive endowment investments, setting a higher limit on stock purchases, settling bond defaults at reduced interest rates, obtaining a military unit for training on the campus, and increasing the working capital through grants from private foundations and alumni support.
Another problem related to salaries. Wages had been reduced drastically at the college during the depression. For the faculty in the college a salary scale was established and later increased. However, when salary raises were asked for some but not for all, some faculty members claimed that there was no scale in existence. Additional financial relief was given the institution when authorization was obtained to employ some faculty members for three quarters instead of four. This allowed the school the opportunity to hire summer school teachers at lower rates than regular faculty.

A third major problem centered upon inadequate business procedures that Garrison inherited upon his assumption of the office of president. These included allowing a large indebtedness in unpaid bills to accumulate, not collecting unpaid student loans, and spending large amounts on administrative costs. The method of purchasing supplies was deemed unsatisfactory and the office of business manager was considered to be nonessential.

When supervision of the offices of the bursar and the business manager was assumed by the president, this allowed the president to control fully the operations of the business office, including purchases. It also made possible the elimination of the office of business manager. Trustees asked for and got better management and control of the financial affairs, especially with reference to the bonding of employees, check countersigning, and accounting procedures.

The last major financial problem centered around buildings and grounds. Through the years, not enough money had been allocated for their upkeep, and before 1937 all kinds of repair were needed on campus buildings. Many high schools and most colleges surpassed Peabody in the equipment it made available for learning purposes. At least five new buildings were needed in order to maintain a superior program.
To bring buildings and grounds up to minimal maintenance standards, funds were increased over previous expenditures, monies were designated for equipment, and the library received an increase in funds to be expended for some collections of important volumes.

Problems Related to the Faculty

A study of fifty-seven institutions in the North Central Association revealed that institutional excellence is dependent largely upon a competent, well-organized faculty that is provided with a satisfactory working environment.

Individual members must be adequately trained, sufficiently experienced in their specialities, and must evidence their scholarship through publication and by participation in learned societies. Effective faculty organization means a well-balanced ratio between student numbers and instructional staff, an adequate representation in the various fields of instructional, and ample opportunity for staff participation in policy making. Good working conditions means that satisfactory provisions must be made for the following: "salary status; tenure; instructional load; recruiting, selection, and appointment; aids to faculty growth; and provisions for leaves of absence, retirement, insurance, housing, and recreation and community life."5

In a speech to the members of the board, Garrison expressed a desire to have a strong faculty at the college. He stated that the faculty problem was the biggest problem facing the institution at that time. He maintained that the developing of teaching personnel was a problem of internal growth and development, and that, if the institution were to produce a high quality of leadership, it must be manned by superior personnel. He felt that there was a need for building a faculty of distinction because other institutions were looking to Peabody for graduates who would teach or fill administrative positions.

Although Garrison recognized that scholarship was an imperative in any institution doing a major portion of its work on the graduate level, he was convinced that the faculty at Peabody should possess more than scholarship.
A teachers' college, more than any other type of institution, must have faculty members who possess desirable personal qualities, who have a sane and wholesome point of view toward the traditions and ideals of their country, who have unusual human understanding and sympathy, and who are devoted to the development of a better life in the general population through educative and orderly means.6

He did not want Peabody teachers to become a part of what he held to be a generalized view of faculty members in the better schools of America. He perceived not only that the era was a revolutionary one in education, but also that many teachers lived in an idealistic world and were wholly unprepared to meet the new situation.

In the better colleges in America, a faculty member gets into an atmosphere where he feels secure; and he feels that he can do those things that he wants to do. Many times what he wants to do has no relationship to what the community or society needs. From the pragmatic point of view his courses become almost worthless.7

Members of the board advised using caution in the employment of persons who would be teachers at the college:

The fact that Peabody has an obligation to set the standards for the region makes it necessary that the educational, moral, and spiritual atmosphere of the college represent the best that there is in our region. For that reason we must be very careful in the selection of faculty members.8

In other meetings Garrison admonished them not to be too technical or wooden in their approach to students, not to pass students in order to keep up enrollments, and not to pressure them into taking certain classes. Additional counsel was offered:

Remember to do good teaching; know your students; require good scholarship; have a sympathetic understanding and attitude toward the students' problems.9

Because the greater portion of the faculty were beyond military age, Peabody did not lose a large number of teachers to the armed forces. This situation was in contrast to that of many institutions whose teachers were younger and whose teaching ranks were depleted by military service commitments.
As the enrollment diminished, particularly in the graduate school, the institution retained almost as many professors as when the enrollment was higher. This figure included a large number of women. Garrison and others throughout the United States thought that graduate enrollment might disappear. By 1943 it had already dropped off by 50 percent. This left Peabody with a lower teacher-student ratio but created serious problems financially. It was decided that their retention would be based on consideration of the future: those fields in which Peabody was strong would be preserved.

Garrison also stated a policy which he had set in operation concerning the selection of teaching personnel.

We must not put people on our faculty because they want positions or because they are good men. People must be put on the faculty only because there is an educational job to be done, and the individual selected must be considered the best man available. Faculty members must be employed solely on the basis that they are needed and contribute to our educational program. We must not make places for people at Peabody, but we must find people for the places.10

Garrison felt that the problem concerning the quality of the faculty was the largest facing the institution. He wanted to develop the teaching personnel into an outstanding group of educators. Though he considered the Peabody group generally to be effective in its educational pursuits, he thought that many teachers in the colleges and universities of America were unprepared to meet the challenges of the era.

In order to keep quality faculty at a high level, the administration adopted measures governing retirement, annuities, tenure, and faculty replacement. The retirement plan adopted effected the termination of personnel reaching the age of sixty-five and the annuity plan coupled with it gave all participants a degree of security. The purpose of the tenure plan was to guard against employing those deemed not capable of fitting into Peabody's plan for excellence in education. When enrollments began to dip during the war, in
order not to be saddled with extra personnel, Garrison decided that personnel would be retained in only those departments vital to the attaining of the objectives of the college. He did not replace departed faculty members but chose to wait until the war's end and then seek the personnel he deemed fit for Peabody.

The administration labeled the relationship of the faculty to the educational program a second faculty problem. The issue arose partly because of the individualism that characterized the teaching personnel. Garrison claimed that they were not always able to see the purpose of the college and that this affected the development of the educational program. He urged the teachers to assist in fulfilling the mission of the college and to enlarge on the services they were rendering to the college and to the region. Special faculty programs were held to seek to better their understanding of the purpose and objectives of the college.

Problems Related to the Educational Program

The first major problem relating to the educational program was enrollment. After experiencing a graduate rise from 1937-40, figures for the four major classifications began to decrease with the exception of the Demonstration School. The major cause was the involvement of former and prospective students in both the military and economic aspects of World War II.

Measures were taken to counteract this downward trend. A committee on student enrollment formed, met, and reported means for keeping and securing students. Prior to this, those departments, including Physics, that had low enrollments and excessive costs were eliminated, together with many courses in other departments. Some modern language offerings were eliminated during the war. Further cuts came in all areas when faculty members left for the armed
services and were not replaced. Another attempt to remedy the enrollment predicament was to secure an Army unit for training on the campus.

The second major problem involved instructional reorganization. Several departments had become ineffective and were not providing trained leadership for the region commensurate with the role of the institution. Special attention was given to improving the offerings of Home Economics, Music, Fine Arts, Health Education, Nursing Education, and Physical Education. All were given authority to develop their own programs and were advanced to divisional status during this era.

Changes produced unusual growth in the Music Department and in Nursing Education, which was the largest department of its kind in the south and the second largest in the nation. Growth took place in the Home Economics Department but did not reach its expected potential. Enrollees in the Health Education Department dwindled to almost nothing. Some of the above-mentioned departments lost courses as did other departments in the college. Funds allocated were transferred to departments training teachers or to departments whose courses contributed to teacher education.

One group of problems related to academic performance in the institution. Attempts were made to upgrade the quality of student work, particularly theses and dissertations. The president urged the faculty to take more responsibility in promoting scholarship. The experimental Junior College, which had become a device for giving a few departments work for graduate students, was abandoned. A failure to achieve its purposes, the inability to secure independent facilities, and a lack of interest on the part of the president were instrumental in its demise.

Extension courses for graduate credit were terminated for the following reasons: (1) teacher production and teaching standards were lowered, (2)
resident enrollment did not increase for this service, (3) costs were excessive, and (4) other institutions offering credit for graduate extension courses had taken similar action. In contrast, new degrees were added to serve the nation and the region more effectively.

Institutional cooperation with Vanderbilt University and Scarritt College was an effort to extend to the students in the academic community an opportunity to enlarge their educational experiences and for the institutions to avoid duplication of courses, thereby saving monies that were applied to other projects and offerings. Peabody, however, did not drop courses it deemed necessary to its program or that it could handle more cheaply than by purchasing them from other institutions. Beyond the interchange of classes, the major cooperation came in the formation of a unified library administration that resulted in the creation of the Joint University Libraries. The main library building in this complex was completed during this era. Its establishment was the formation of a major institution among a few with regional and national reputations.

**Benefits Accruing to the Field of Higher Education**

In only two known instances during this period did Peabody participate in the creation of something of significance for the field of higher education. One was its initiation of conferences on teacher negotiations; the other was the creation of the unified library services for the institutions in the area adjacent to the college. Otherwise, Peabody adopted numerous policies, procedures, and programs that were in existence elsewhere.

Nothing new was started in the field of college administration. There was no new decision-making model, no new structure for administering the affairs of the institution, and no new innovative departmental framework. There were no problem-solving procedures developed by institutional personnel that were
seminal for the profession, nor was there any evidence of their having developed studies formally in this field.

Decision-making opportunity was often delegated to those in positions of responsibility in the college. There is no evidence, though, that this was done in accord with any formal decision-making structure. There is some evidence that Peabody did not practice its classroom teachings in the actual administration of the college. Campbell stated that the college taught the best and acted the worst in this area.\(^\text{11}\)

In Garrison's day, decision-making had not become a formal study area. There is no evidence that the president spelled out the process by which decisions were to be made at the institution, or how problem-solving procedures were going to be determined. Presumably, no conferences were held dealing with this subject.

In the areas of finance, faculty, and the educational program, there were a few innovations, one being the conference on professional negotiations. Faculty were said to be innovative on some things, but there is no concrete evidence that what they created was making an impact on the educational movement of the day. Many traveled extensively with the message of educational improvement, but this was not necessarily synonymous with creativity, innovation, and change.

There was some updating of the institution's method of keeping financial records just prior to this era. Accounting methods used by major institutions were adopted. Later, the submission of a balanced budget was made by the Garrison administration. This was an indication of the desire of the administration for financial integrity, not an indication of creativity.

Changes in curriculum offerings were sought and obtained. New degrees were added, but they were not different in kind from those already offered by
other institutions of higher learning. Even the Master of Education degree, though relatively new to the area, was not new to American higher education circles. However, the glimmerings of a new program for educational trainees (the Specialist in Education degree) appeared during the discussion of its adoption.

The creation of some divisions was new for Peabody, but their birth only paralleled that kind of educational diversification and proliferation being pursued at other institutions. No radically different kinds of divisions were formed or anticipated. Efforts were made primarily to equate the curriculum with that of other colleges; therefore, limited chances were given to experiment in curriculum development. There was no radical departure in content for that already taught, just a re-organization of academic offerings for greater effectiveness and efficiency.

A unique contribution to education was the establishment of the Joint University Libraries system in which Garrison played a significant part both when he was Dean of the Graduate School and Senior College and when he served as president of the college. The overt symbol of this agreement was the construction during this era of the $2,000,000.00 central library building on property deeded to the Joint University Libraries by Vanderbilt University.

The uniting of the three institutions—Peabody, Scarritt, and Vanderbilt—in this endeavor was an additional agreement to that kind of cooperation involving reciprocal credit acceptance for classes taken by students enrolled in the three institutions. A major factor for influencing the formation of the University Center was to increase the availability for scholarship and research for those who were part of the academic community. It was also hoped that money would be attracted to the area from foundations and individuals who wanted maximum returns on their gifts to higher education.
Generally, problems were most frequently identified by the president who cited than in his annual reports to the trustees, in addresses to the faculty, and in letters to friends of the institution. Many of the statements made to trustees were published in the bulletins and periodicals of the college.

Only a few records are available concerning the meetings of the academic councils, and these do not mention specific problems confronting the college. The faculty identified some problems in their meetings. These were related mostly to degree offering and curriculum changes. They did not identify problems relating to themselves or to finances. The trustees of the institution did not so much identify problems as they did support the president in his solution of them.

Political overtones were lacking because the college was not embroiled in state, county, or city politics. The institution was not state-owned or governed, even though it did endeavor to provide educational leadership for public school systems. Nor did any racial, religious, or social situations form the background for problems faced by the college.

When problems were described as being solved, generally the administration was credited with the success attained, but credit was not given to anyone in particular. Committees were not utilized to their fullest capabilities. The decision-making process of the institution started with the trustees who heard the problems identified and who then asked the president for action. There was no AAUP or other kind of powerful group that identified problems relating to the faculty; therefore, there was no turning to a group of this nature for advice in how to deal with faculty-administrative relationships.

The president negotiated with the armed forces for military units to be stationed on the campus. The latter action, in particular, resolved many financial worries of the administration. These groups, however, were not
approached with the idea of their aiding in the solution even though they were a party to effective disintegration of prime issues; namely, enrollment and income. Numerous campuses had military trainees.

An ever-present outside force that influenced the decisions made at Peabody was the Southern Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. That the accrediting agency demanded certain standards not only posed potential problems for accreditation purposes but also was the solution for some. By meeting standards some potential problems were averted.

There were two overriding reasons why solutions were attempted: the financial reason and the enrollment reason. Every decision was related to the financial ability of the college to sustain itself. Though many reasons might have been given for the demise of certain projects and programs, it was really the potential financial loss that determined solutions. Vitally related to this was the enrollment. Without student tuition and fees, money available amounted to a small part of annual needs.

If greater numbers of the faculty had been involved in the decision-making process of the college, there would have been more creative ways of dealing with the problems of the institution. Faculty should be involved in the governance of colleges in order to preserve democratic principles, as well as to get the broadest amount of expert opinion concerning the possible solution of perplexing questions. Faculty meetings are necessary to preserve the unity of the group and to demonstrate their powers as a deliberative body. Morale of academic bodies is maintained in direct proportion to their being used in the governance of the affairs that affect them.

Conclusions

The Delphi technique, used to identify problems by asking Peabody personnel in the 1937-1945 era to state what they deemed of importance and then
isolating the major problems by eliminating those deemed to be minor on subsequent rounds of inquiry, was an effective tool in this research. It gave confidence to the researcher that the problems investigated were major, occupying the time, energy, and attention of upper-level administrators so that the institutions could remain solvent in a day when depression and war were the critical issues in the economic and political domains.

Oral history, the recording of the opinions of Peabody personnel concerning issues identified, corroborated the information gathered from the letters and papers of the president and those of the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Trustees and the faculty. Those who responded through interviews were kindly disposed and treated the issues with an even-temperedness, not promoting any personal cause or trumpeting any bias or prejudice. Their responses were intelligent, realistic, and honest, without acrimony. Their method of response aided in establishing validity to the question of correct issue identity.

So, what is the contribution of the Peabody story to historiography? The historical method employed in writing in 1968 was highly traditional, chronological, and topical, though limited to a set of problems identified as being important to the administrators. Should Garrison be criticized for having ignored some of the issues, or even for failing to identify pertinent issues of the larger society? There were glimmerings of concern for the educational improvement of black educators, but no time and effort were devoted to assuage their problems. Neither was there concern for trying to grant more rights to women, even though there were more women enrolled than men in Peabody's courses. Nor was there any action to assure students' rights, to change segregation to integration, to vie for more governmental aid to school systems, or to alleviate the poverty that lay within a few miles of the campus.
Peabody's history was not written from the viewpoint of class struggle, but from a conservative, traditional viewpoint because the institution did not have the vision, strength, energy, or commitment to pursue anything other than its survival.

Footnotes


2S. C. Garrison, Letter to J. B. Sanders, December 17, 1943, Garrison Papers.


6Annual Report, May 9, 1940, p. 1, Garrison Papers.


8Minutes of the Board of Trustees, George Peabody College for Teachers, May 5, 1938, p. 438.

9Minutes of the Faculty, George Peabody College for Teachers, VI, December 4, 1937, p. 225.
