The dissatisfaction theory of school governance predicts that, when community dissatisfaction with schools is great enough, the following events occur: (1) public demand increases for new policies and procedures; (2) the number of split votes by the school board increases; (3) the rate of school board member turnover increases; and (4) involuntary superintendent turnover occurs. The main purpose of this study was to test the dissatisfaction theory of school governance to see if the events it predicts do occur. Three districts with recent labor disputes were selected for a 4-year longitudinal study of community dissatisfaction and its effects. Data were collected from minutes of school board meetings, newspapers, and interviews with school officials. Standards were developed for judging whether observed events matched predicted events, and the theory was modified based on analysis and interpretation of data. Elaborations of the theory were made in the areas of (1) level of community dissatisfaction needed to affect change in school governance, (2) split voting patterns by school boards, and (3) interaction between school board member turnover and split voting by school boards. In cases where predicted events did not occur, a search was made for intervening variables that might explain the theory's failure of prediction. Appended are (1) an index of magnitude-of-demand inputs and (2) the standards used for judging whether or not observed events match predicted events. (TE)
COMMUNITY DISSATISFACTION AND SCHOOL GOVERNANCE

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COMMUNITY DISSATISFACTION
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The study of school governance is concerned with the organization and control of public schools. Studies about school governance usually attend to the relationships between school administrators, school boards, and the public. These studies seek answers to questions such as: Who controls school policy and the operation of schools? How did those in control gain control? Is the governance of schools democratic? And, who benefits from decisions and policies related to schools?

Three views dominate the field of school governance -- the continuous competition theory, the decision output theory, and the dissatisfaction theory. All three theories set different standards for judging the democratic nature of school governance. The dissatisfaction theory of school governance, however, is the only one of the three theories that predicts changes in school governance.

The main purpose of this study was to test the dissatisfaction theory of school governance to see if the events it predicts do occur. The dissatisfaction theory predicts that when a community's dissatisfaction with its schools is great enough, the following events occur: (1) inputs from the public that demand different or new policies or procedures reach a high level; (2) the number of split votes by the school board reaches a high
level; (3) the rate of school board member turnover increases; and (4) involuntary superintendent turnover occurs. Previous research related to the dissatisfaction theory of school governance has some weaknesses including (1) a very abstract level of data on school board member turnover, (2) little empirical work related to decision-making style of school boards, and (3) no direct measure of community dissatisfaction with schools. This study addresses these areas of weakness.

**THEORY**

The dissatisfaction theory of school governance was developed by Lutz and Iannaccone in response to what they perceived as deficiencies of the continuous competition theory and the decision output theory. The test of democracy critical to dissatisfaction theorists is whether the public, when sufficiently dissatisfied with a government, can change the government -- both its people and its policies. The dissatisfaction theory of school governance, however, does not refute evidence presented by the other theories of school governance, such as low levels of public participation in school governance, dominance of school boards by superintendents, or lack of congruence between public preferences and actions of the administration and school board.

The dissatisfaction theory is based on the premise that there is an "inevitable drift toward an organized elite in all political systems and the tendency of that elite to perpetuate itself." If the ruling elite maintains policies reasonably congruent with the wishes of the public, a stable political environment exists.
Ruling elites, however, tend to isolate themselves from the general public. This isolation can lead to unresponsiveness, accompanied by an inability to adjust to changes that occur in the general public. If the public has a shift in values, ideologies, or policy preferences that is not accompanied by a corresponding shift by the ruling elite, a widening gap can develop between the public and the ruling elite. When this occurs in a democracy, citizens, using the power of their vote, make changes in the ruling elite that returns it to the mainstream of public sentiments.\(^8\)

The dissatisfaction theory's major contribution to the study of school governance is its power to predict. By examining data longitudinally, dissatisfaction theorists have pieced together a set of relationships that are useful in explaining and predicting events in school governance. They have found that a change in the socioeconomic makeup of a community can lead to a gap in values between the school board and the community, and that this gap in values often leads to the defeat of incumbent school board members.\(^9\) The defeat of incumbent school board members in turn leads to involuntary superintendent turnover,\(^10\) and to a successor superintendent being selected from outside the school district.\(^11\)

Based on the relationships stated above, Lutz and Iannaccone state that the dissatisfaction theory "...leads to a firm yes to the question as to whether there is democracy in school district governance."\(^12\)

**METHODOLOGY**

**SAMPLE**

Labor conflict was used as a likely source of community dissatisfaction with schools. Three districts each that had factfinding, intent to strike,
or strike during 1977 or 1978 were identified. The different levels of labor conflict were intended to connect with different levels of community dissatisfaction with schools. The actual level or community dissatisfaction assigned to each school district was determined by collecting information from newspapers and interviewing school officials.

DATA COLLECTION

Since events predicted by the theory might take several years to occur, a longitudinal study was required to test the theory. Data covering a period of four years before and four years after community dissatisfaction with schools developed were collected. Data for the study were collected from (1) minutes of school board meetings, (2) newspaper reports, letters to the editor, and editorials and (3) interviews with school officials.

CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

DECISION-MAKING STYLE

In discussing decision-making style of school boards, the focus is not on the interconnecting details that lead to decisions, but rather on the general manner in which decisions are made, i.e., how school boards go about their business. The general manner in which small groups including school boards make decisions is referred to by Bailey as their council behavior. A continuum between elite council and arena council behavior is used by Bailey to develop a conceptual definition of council behavior.

Based on Bailey's conceptual definition and later work by Lutz, this study uses three characteristics as indicators of council type: (1) rate of
demand inputs from the public, (2) magnitude of demand inputs from the public and (3) rate of nonunanimous voting of school boards.

These characteristics were chosen for indicators because they lend themselves to objective analysis: They can be counted, and quantitative analysis comparisons can be made between different observations. The operational definitions for the three indicators are presented below, followed by an operational definition for shift toward arena-like council behavior.

State of Nonunanimous Voting

The total number of nonunanimous votes per fiscal year represents the rate of nonunanimous voting. To determine the rate of nonunanimous voting, the school board minutes of each school district were analyzed. Each decision that was not reached by a unanimous vote was tallied. Absences were not considered when determining whether a nonunanimous vote occurred.

Rate of Demand Inputs from the Public

Any statement directed to the school board that expressed a person's beliefs or desires about a school related issue was considered a demand input. The person did not need to be calling for any direct action by the board. Demand inputs were determined by analyzing the minutes of each district's school board meetings over the eight year study period. Any statement that fit the definition stated above was tallied. The total number of tallies per fiscal year represents the rate of demand inputs.

It should be noted that the reliability of data on demand inputs might
be questionable. Comments from the general public are not a legally required part of school board minutes. The degree of inclusion of these comments might vary according to the desires of the school board or superintendent, and with changes in the person taking the minutes.

Magnitude of Demand Inputs from the Public

The rate of demand inputs per year does not in itself describe the likely impact demand inputs might have on a school board's decision-making style. A large group and an individual, for example, could present similar demands to a school board. Forty people filling a board room to present a single demand presumably has more impact than the same demand presented by an individual. A simple tally would conceal the differences in the impact the two presentations are likely to have on the school board.

An index for determining the magnitude of demand inputs was developed to account for the differences in the likely impact of different presentations of demands. The index allots points based on the following: (1) number of people making a demand, (2) whether the people present represented a larger group, and (3) whether a petition was presented. (See Appendix A.)

Shift Toward Arena-Like Council Behavior

The dissatisfaction theory of school governance predicts that when community dissatisfaction with schools develops, school boards shift their decision-making style toward more arena-like council behavior. As mentioned above, this study uses three measures as indicators of a shift toward
more arena-like behavior. They are (1) rate of nonunanimous voting by the school board, (2) rate of demand inputs from the public, and (3) magnitude of demand inputs from the public. The literature is silent on the variation in each measure that qualifies as a shift toward arena-like council behavior.

It was assumed, and the data confirmed, that from district to district school boards have differing ranges of rates of demand inputs, magnitudes of demand inputs, and rates of nonunanimous voting. The rates of these indicators for each school district tend to collect around a median rate, with very low or very high rates occurring for some years. A lower rate, of course, indicates more elite-like council behavior, and a higher rate indicates more arena-like council behavior.

The literature is also silent on what constitutes a high level for the three measures of council behavior. In order to test this portion of the theory a standard for determining high levels for these three measures had to be developed. Since, from community to community, school boards go about their business in different ways, a great number of nonunanimous votes or demand inputs might be accepted as the normal operating procedure in one community, and viewed as completely out of character in another. The standard, then had to be a relative one.

The method chosen to establish this standard is as follows: For each year and for each school district, a tally was made of nonunanimous decisions and of demand inputs. The standard deviation and the mean number of tallies for each indicator for each year of the eight year study period was calculated. If the total tallies per year (the rate) for any year met...
or exceeded +1 standard deviation from the mean, it was said to be a high level; if it met or exceeded -1 standard deviation from the mean, it was said to be a low level; and if it was within a +1 or -1 standard deviation, it was said to be a moderate level. This method established an objective standard that was relative to each school board's and community's unique situation.

If rates are cast into three levels -- low, medium, and high -- then several combinations of shifts (movement from one level to another) can occur. Shifts from a high level to a moderate or low level are shifts away from arena-like council behavior. Shifts from low to moderate, although moving toward more arena-like council behavior, are only a return to normal operating procedures for the school board. For this study, then, only shifts from a low or a moderate level to a high level are considered shifts toward more arena-like council behavior.

School Board Member Turnover

The defeat of an incumbent school board member has important implications for school districts. If an incumbent board member is defeated, the school district is likely to have involuntary superintendent turnover within three years. Also, school boards that have incumbent school board member defeat influence school district policy by selecting "career-bound" superintendents. In a case study, Iannaccone and Lutz illustrate the high degree of influence a new board member who defeated an incumbent can have on the decision-making style of a school board.
Based on Mitchell's reassessment of the data, Lutz indicates that incumbent retirement, or their defeat at the polls should be considered jointly when assessing the affect community dissatisfaction with schools has on school governance. In this study, then, incumbent defeat and incumbent retirement are considered the same phenomenon, and are referred to as incumbent school board member turnover.

Incumbent school board member turnover is said to occur if a board member does any of the following: (1) stands for reelection and receives fewer votes than a challenger, (2) is recalled from office, (3) resigns before the completion of a full term in office, or (4) does not stand for reelection.

Superintendent Turnover

Involuntary superintendent turnover is likely to occur within three years of the first incumbent school board member defeat. This is the final scene and climax in the dissatisfaction theory's portrayal of changes in school district governance. As the "new" board arrives, the "old" superintendent, carrying the baggage of the "old" board, departs.

In this study involuntary superintendent turnover is considered instances when the superintendent (1) was asked to leave, (2) was dismissed, (3) was not offered a contract renewal, or (4) left because of conflict with the school board. Cases that did not fit any of these categories are considered voluntary superintendent turnover.
DATA ANALYSIS

Standards for judging whether or not observed events matched predicted events were developed. (See Appendix B.) The data were analyzed. A judgment was then made regarding passage of each portion of the test set for the theory.

Modifications of the theory were made by adjusting observational time frames. These adjustments provided an opportunity to examine different interpretations of the data. Elaborations of the theory were made in the following areas (1) level of community dissatisfaction needed to affect change in school governance, (2) split voting patterns of school boards, and (3) interaction between school board member turnover and split voting by school boards. In cases in which predicted events did not occur, a search was made for intervening variables that might explain the theory's failure of prediction.

CONCLUSIONS: MODIFICATIONS AND ELABORATIONS

As a result of testing the dissatisfaction theory of school governance, several conclusions can be drawn. These conclusions are presented below as modifications and elaborations of the theory.

The test of the dissatisfaction theory used observational time frames that were used or suggested by other dissatisfaction theory studies. Although based on other studies, these time frames were arbitrary. Adjustments of these time frames provide different interpretations of the data, some of which
are useful modifications of the theory. Some portions of the theory have been elaborated. The modifications and elaborations of the dissatisfaction theory are presented below.

DEMAND INPUTS FROM THE PUBLIC

Magnitude of demand input is used as an indicator of shift in decision-making style and is a reflection of the number of people making demands on the school board. The number of people making demands on the school board is also considered when assigning levels of community dissatisfaction to each of the school districts. Since all school districts assigned to relatively high levels of community dissatisfaction with schools were done so in part because of the high level of rate of demands on the school boards, the use of magnitude of demand inputs as an indicator of shift in decision-making style might be misleading.

In reanalyzing the data, it seems that the measurements for demand inputs -- rate and magnitude -- are better viewed as a reflection of community dissatisfaction with schools rather than as indicators of decision-making style of school boards.

SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER TURNOVER

Based on previous dissatisfaction theory research, a time frame beginning the year of and ending four years after community dissatisfaction with schools developed was used to observe an increase in rate of school board member turnover. When using this observational time frame, the theory failed this portion of the test set for it.

When using an observational time frame of only two years, the rate of...
the rate of school board member turnover increased from 58 percent before community dissatisfaction developed to 75 percent after community dissatisfaction developed. When using the two year observational time frame, the theory was judged to have passed the test set for it. The two year period following the development of community dissatisfaction with schools is judged to be the time frame best for observing increases in rate of school board member turnover.

NONUNANIMOUS VOTING BY THE SCHOOL BOARD

Based on previous dissatisfaction theory research, a time frame beginning the year of and ending four years after community dissatisfaction with schools developed was used to observe high levels of nonunanimous voting of school boards. Although the theory passed the nonunanimous voting part of the decision-making portion of the test set for it when this time frame was used, a time frame of only three years after community dissatisfaction with schools developed captures nearly all high levels of rate of nonunanimous voting. The three year time frame is judged best for observing high levels of rate of nonunanimous voting.

TYPE OF NONUNANIMOUS VOTING

The role nonunanimous voting by school boards plays in the dissatisfaction theory was elaborated by determining the school board members that voted in the minority most often for years in which high levels of rate of nonunanimous voting occurred. When analyzing nonunanimous voting, three types of nonunanimous voting patterns became apparent. They are (1) isolated voting, (2) ideological voting, and (3) pluralistic voting.
Isolated voting is when a school board member votes in the minority at least 50 percent of the time that nonunanimous voting occurs, and this member is the sole dissenter at least 50 percent of the time. Ideological voting is when a school board member votes in the minority at least 50 percent of the time, but is joined in dissent by other school board members at least 50 percent of the time. Pluralistic voting is when all board members vote in the minority less than 50 percent of the time that nonunanimous voting occurs.

In this study, the five school districts that developed at least a moderate-high level of community dissatisfaction with schools had frequencies of each type of nonunanimous voting pattern as follows: isolated voting -- two occurrences, ideological voting -- three occurrences, pluralistic voting -- four occurrences.

NON-UNANIMOUS VOTING AND SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER TURNOVER

Although the sample in this study is small, it appears that when neophyte school board members win positions on the school board by defeating incumbents, they are able to resist socialization pressures from other school board members and the superintendent. These neophyte members tend to take an independent stance on issues facing the school board. This independence is revealed by their voting in the minority most often when a high level of rate of nonunanimous voting occurs.

Neophytes who gain a position on the board by appointment or by winning an election in which an incumbent has chosen to retire appear to play a more passive role on the school board than do neophytes who defeated incumbents. In these cases the split in the school board appears to be between veteran
school board members. In the six cases of high levels of rate of nonunanimous voting in which 60 percent of the veteran school board members remained on the school board, the school board member who voted in the minority most often was always a veteran member.

In the cases cited above, it seems that the school board's philosophy shifts, but some veteran members remain intransigent, resulting in a split in the school board. The role neophyte members play in these cases is unclear. They might, however, bring new ideas to the school board that spur a shift in the philosophies of receptive veteran school board members.

IN VOLUNTARY SUPERINTENDENT TURNOVER

The dissatisfaction theory of school governance did not pass the involuntary superintendent turnover portion of the test set for it. The theory's failure of prediction might be attributable to the separation of superintendents from the source of community dissatisfaction with schools.

In this study the source of community dissatisfaction with schools is labor conflict. The advice given to local school boards by their state and local associations is to separate superintendents from collective bargaining so the superintendents can retain good working relationships with the school staff. As a source of community dissatisfaction with schools, labor conflict might not have provided a fair test for the involuntary superintendent turnover portion of the test set for the theory.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The analysis of the data on school board member turnover and nonunanimous voting indicates that school board member turnover usually precedes a high
level of nonunanimous voting by the school board. A high level of nonunani-
mos voting likely occurs the same year in which an incumbent school board
member is defeated. The relationship between school board member turnover
and nonunanimous voting seems less closely coupled when the school board
member turnover is resignation or retirement.

SOURCE OF DISSATISFACTION AND PREDICTION OF EVENTS

In previous discussion, speculation was made about how the source of
community dissatisfaction with schools might affect the theory's ability to
predict involuntary superintendent turnover. In the following discussion,
speculation is broadened to include how the source of community dissatisfac-
tion with schools might affect school board member turnover.

The source of community dissatisfaction with schools might be important
in relationship to school board member and superintendent turnover because
it can determine on whom the community's dissatisfaction will focus. The two
likely focuses of community dissatisfaction with schools are school board
members and superintendents.

Some source of community dissatisfaction with schools might focus com-
munity dissatisfaction on the superintendent. Superintendents who have per-
sonal problems that are made public, e.g. extramarital affairs, might become
the focus of community dissatisfaction. Superintendents' leadership styles
might also create community dissatisfaction with schools. Superintendents
who are belligerent, egotistical, or iron-handed might come into conflict
with citizens and members of the school staff. Dissatisfaction created by a
superintendent's leadership style would presumably be focused on the superin-
tendent.
There are other sources of community dissatisfaction with schools that might tend to focus community dissatisfaction on the school board. Conflict over any issue in which the school board assumes leadership, keeping the superintendent isolated from the conflict, are likely to limit the focus of dissatisfaction to the school board. Labor conflict is an example of one such source.

Some sources of community dissatisfaction with schools might focus dissatisfaction on both the superintendent and the school board. A series of tax levy defeats culminating in school closure might be such a source of dissatisfaction. Since superintendents often provide the leadership for the school board in such matters, they can become the focus of community dissatisfaction. School board members can share the focus of dissatisfaction because of their perceived disregard for demands from the public.

The discussion above has shown how the source of community dissatisfaction with schools can focus the community's dissatisfaction on (1) the superintendent, (2) the school board, or (3) both the superintendent and the school board. The dissatisfaction theory of school governance predicts that when a community's dissatisfaction reaches a high level, certain events occur. These events, however, might be contingent on the focus of the community's dissatisfaction. If dissatisfaction is focused only on school board members, the likelihood of increased rate of school board member turnover might be high, while the likelihood of superintendent turnover remains low. The other focuses of dissatisfaction would, of course, produce varying likelihoods of superintendent and school board member turnover.
LEVEL OF COMMUNITY DISSATISFACTION WITH SCHOOLS

The dissatisfaction theory is silent on the level of community dissatisfaction needed to affect change in local school district governance. In this study, the level of community dissatisfaction with schools necessary to affect change in local school district governance is evidenced by the following: (1) a sharp increase in the number of people, and their intensity in making demands on the school board and (2) letters to the editor critical of the school board or school district.

FAILURE OF PREDICTION AND INTERVENING VARIABLES

Events predicted by the dissatisfaction theory of school governance did not always occur. A listing of intervening variables that might have prevented predicted events from occurring are presented below.

An increase in school board member turnover might be prevented by the presence of a large resource of conflict-management skills or structural mechanisms for channelling community dissatisfaction with schools, Involuntary superintendent turnover might be prevented by separation of superintendents from the situation creating community dissatisfaction with schools, by superintendents' support of policies and programs that meet demands of dissatisfied school board members, by superintendents' use of an accommodating style of leadership, or by intense socialization of neophyte school board members.

RESTATING THE THEORY: AN HYPOTHESIS

This study has tested, modified, and elaborated the dissatisfaction
theory of school governance. The elaborations and modifications are synthesized with the theory, and are presented below as an hypothesis.

Hypothesis: If community dissatisfaction with schools is high as evidenced by a sharp increase in demands from the public to the school board, and an increase in the number of letters to the editor of the local newspaper critical of the school district, then the following events will occur:

(1) The rate of school board member turnover will increase within two years.

(2) There will be, within three years, a shift to more arena-like council behavior as evidenced by a high level of nonunanimous voting. (2a) A veteran school board member will lead the minority faction of the school board except when a neophyte board member defeats an incumbent, then the neophyte will lead the minority faction. (2b) Isolate or pluralistic voting patterns will characterize nonunanimous voting when neophytes lead the minority faction.

(3) The shift to more arena-like council behavior is preceded by school board member turnover.

(4) There will be involuntary superintendent turnover. If the focus of community dissatisfaction is on the school board and the superintendent, the turnover will occur within three years of a high level of nonunanimous voting by the school board. If the focus of community dissatisfaction is on the superintendent, the turnover will occur within two years of the development of dissatisfaction.
(5) Dependent on the focus of community dissatisfaction with schools, the results will be (1) an increased rate of school board member turnover, (2) involuntary superintendent turnover, or (3) an increased rate of school board member turnover followed by involuntary superintendent turnover. The results of the different focuses of community dissatisfaction are presented graphically below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Dissatisfaction With Schools Is Focused On</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Of:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Rate of School Board Member Turnover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shift to Arena-Like Council Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Involuntary Superintendent Turnover</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES


4. Lutz and Iannaccone, Public Participation in Local School Districts.

5. Lutz and Iannaccone, Public Participation in Local School Districts.


7. Lutz and Iannaccone, Public Participation in Local School Districts.

8. Lutz and Iannaccone, Public Participation in Local School Districts.


12. Lutz and Iannaccone, Public Participation in Local School Districts.


15. J. Walden, "School Board Changes and Involuntary Superintendent Turnover."

16. R. M. Freeborn, "School Board Changes and the Succession Patterns of Superintendents."


19. J. Walden, "School Board Changes and Involuntary Superintendent Turnover."

## APPENDIX A

### MAGNITUDE OF DEMAND INPUTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Points Allotted</th>
<th>Nature of Presentation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Individual representing others or with a petition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 to 5 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 to 5 people representing others or with a petition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6 to 20 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>6 to 20 people representing others or with a petition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Over 20 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Over 20 people representing others or with a petition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This index does not, of course, represent every combination of factors that can make up a presentation of demand inputs to the school board. It is, however, more descriptive than a one dimensional tally system.
APPENDIX B

STANDARDS FOR JUDGING WHETHER OR NOT OBSERVED EVENTS MATCH PREDICTED EVENTS

DECISION-MAKING STYLE OF SCHOOL BOARDS

The test of this portion of the theory examines the relationship between community dissatisfaction with schools and the following three variables: (1) rate of demand inputs, (2) magnitude of demand inputs, and (3) rate of nonunanimous voting. The test of this portion of the theory, then, is conducted in three parts.

In order for the theory to pass this portion of the test, the following two conditions must be made: (1) the average number of high levels on either of the two measures of demand inputs (rate and magnitude) the year of, or within four years after the year, community dissatisfaction developed must be at least 33 percent greater than the average number of high levels occurring the three years before the year community dissatisfaction developed, and (2) the average number of high levels of rate of nonunanimous voting the year of, or within four years after the year of, the development of community dissatisfaction must be at least 33 percent greater than the average number of high levels occurring the three years before the year community dissatisfaction developed.

The use of 33 percent as a standard is arbitrary. Statistical tests of significance were not used because of the small sample size and the exploratory nature of the study.

A large sample size would have dictated a higher level of abstraction
of data. The study would have then been unable to address some of the weaknesses of the Lutz-Iannaccone studies, such as identifying levels of community dissatisfaction with schools for the school districts in the study sample.

The findings from this study can lead to more detailed examinations. Future studies can focus on a single variable, collecting data on it from a much larger sample of school districts. Tests of statistical significance might be appropriate for these studies.

The use of a 33 percent increase, although arbitrary, provides a substantial standard, but one that will probably not conceal changes that might occur.

Average number of high levels per year is used instead of percentage of high levels because the before period includes three years and the after period, because it also includes the year community dissatisfaction developed, includes five years. By using the average rate of high levels per year, the biased affect that might occur from data being collected for a disproportionate number of years is eliminated.

INCUMBENT SCHOOL BOARD MEMBER TURNOVER

The criterion for judging whether or not the dissatisfaction theory of school governance passed the incumbent turnover portion of the test set for it is as follows: the percentage of incumbent turnover for the four year period after community dissatisfaction developed must be at least 33 percent greater than the percentage for the four year period before community dissatisfaction developed.

A four year period of observation was chosen because it is the length of a term of office for school board members in this study. Therefore, it
would take four years for the members of the community to have an opportunity to defeat the school board members that they associate with their dissatisfaction with schools.

The split between the before and after periods was set at the end of the labor conflict, i.e., the date at which an agreement between the school board and the teachers was reached. This split between the two periods was chosen because community dissatisfaction with schools is likely to be high immediately following the specific incident that created it—in this case labor conflict. Sensing the high level of community dissatisfaction with schools, school board members might resign from office.

This split between time periods, then, should assign school board member turnover to the appropriate period in relation to the development of community dissatisfaction with schools. Although each time period is not exactly four years, each includes four regular school board elections.

This division between before and after periods of observation for school board member turnover is different than the division in periods of observation for other variables in the study. The division between before and after observational periods for demand inputs and nonunanimous voting is the beginning of the fiscal year in which community dissatisfaction with schools developed. Because of the calculations need to analyze the data on demand inputs and nonunanimous voting, it was necessary to keep the data on these variables bundled in fiscal year units. The difference in observational divisions for school board member turnover and for demand inputs and nonunanimous voting is noticeable in the numbering of years used in the various tables. The difference in numbering of years in the tables is intentional and reflects the difference in observational periods.