This conference report provides the main findings of a meeting whose goal was to produce a state-of-the-art analysis of Asia-Pacific immigration. Five additional, more specific goals of the conference were: (1) To examine the Asia-Pacific situation in relation to global and historical immigration patterns; (2) To analyze immigration in the context of other international linkages to obtain insight into its causes and implications; (3) To call attention to the impact of emigration upon the sending countries; (4) To address the question of what Asia-Pacific immigration portends for the region; and (5) To facilitate policy analysis through building a better data base and stimulating analyses of the role of international migration in the Pacific Basin. The first section is a description of highlights and conclusions regarding demographic information about the various Asia-Pacific immigrant groups in the United States, societal factors influencing immigration, and the impact of immigration on the countries of the immigrants' origin. This section is followed by abstracts of the numerous conference papers and panel discussions, each approximately 700 words long. Next is a summary of research and policy issues addressed by three working groups that met during the conference, on gains and losses to the sending country, gains and losses to immigrants and the receiving country, and the implementation and effectiveness of U.S. immigration policy. There is a selective bibliography on Asia-Pacific immigration to the United States, a summary of emigration policies in selected Asian countries, the conference agenda, and a list of conference participants. (CG)
Asia-Pacific Immigration to the United States
Asia-Pacific Immigration to the United States

A Conference Report

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February 1985
“Probably the most important change in post-World War II immigration policy has been renewed access to immigration for Asians. Barred from immigrating by a series of laws that dated from the 1880s, Asians had been persistent victims of a discriminatory U.S. policy. Nearly 20 years [after the 1965 change in policy], we find that we know relatively little about the new Asian immigrants.”

Teresa A. Sullivan
University of Texas
(Conference Participant)
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CONFERENCE OVERVIEW

The explosive growth of Asian immigration to the United States over the past 20 years is an important aspect of social and economic development in the Pacific Basin. Yet, this phenomenon has received relatively little attention in the region, perhaps because of the paucity of accurate and timely information on international migration and related transfers of resources between countries. This conference brought together 48 scholars, government officials, and representatives of immigrant service agencies, with the aim of producing a "state-of-the-art" analysis of Asia-Pacific immigration. The meeting also had five more specific goals:

1. To examine the Asia-Pacific situation in relation to global and historical immigration patterns, so that recent regional experience can be understood within a broader perspective.
2. To analyze immigration in the context of other international linkages—trade, political relationships, communications—to obtain insight into the causes and implications of immigration trends.
3. To call attention to the consequences of emigration not only for U.S. society, but for Asia-Pacific sending countries as well, thus redressing the imbalance caused by past emphasis on the impact on receiving countries.
4. To raise the central question: what does continued growth of Asia-Pacific immigration portend for the future of the region and its people?
5. To facilitate policy analysis through building a better data base and stimulating thoughtful analyses of the role of international migration in the Pacific Basin.

In contrast to previous conferences on Asia-Pacific immigration, this meeting gave relatively little attention to the problems faced by individual immigrants in adapting to their new environment or to the societal issues of immigrant assimilation. These topics were not ignored, but they were treated as part of the larger context involving conditions in the sending countries and the inter-country linkages that are represented by migration flows and counterflows. Likewise, U.S. immigration policies were examined not in isolation but in relation to Asia-Pacific emigration policies, the policies of alternative destination
countries, and the less tangible social and cultural influences that impel and constrain movements of people between countries.

This conference report has been prepared to provide rapid dissemination of the main findings from the meeting. In the next section, important highlights and conclusions are presented in summary form. Subsequent sections of the report provide:

- abstracts of conference papers and panel discussions,
- a summary of research and policy issues addressed by three working groups that met during the conference,
- a selective bibliography on Asia-Pacific immigration to the United States;
- a summary of emigration policies in selected Asian countries,
- the conference agenda, and
- a list of conference participants.

Many of the issues highlighted in this conference report will be examined in greater depth in a book, now in preparation, based on selected conference papers and additional specially written materials.*

* The Publications Office of the East-West Center will be able to provide information in late 1985 about the contents and publication date for the book derived from the conference. Persons wanting copies of conference papers in the meantime should request them from individual authors, whose addresses are shown on the list of participants.
HIGHLIGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The scale of recent Asian immigration is not widely appreciated. For example, there is little public awareness that Filipinos are now the second largest group (after Mexicans) among all recent U.S. immigrants, or that the flow of Asian immigrants now far outnumbers the flow from North and Central America and the Caribbean. The dramatic rise in Asian admissions after the 1965 immigration law reform is shown in Figure 1. The trends for major Asian sending countries (excluding Vietnam) are shown in Figure 2.

Only four countries in today's world—Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States—have relatively open immigration policies, admitting significant numbers of permanent migrants, offering them most of the rights of citizens at the time of entry, and promising eventual citizenship. Together, these four countries admitted about 3 million immigrants in a recent five-year period, with 65 percent of that total coming to the United States. Canada ranked a distant second (20 percent of the total), then Australia (13 percent) and New Zealand (2 percent). Thus, two of three immigrants to the main receiving countries came to the United States in 1980 (compared to about one of two in the 1950s).

Twenty years ago, most of the immigrants to these receiving countries came from Europe and other economically advanced areas. Now, two-thirds come from Third World nations. The change is most striking in the United States, increasing from about 30 percent Third World admissions in the late 1950s to more than 80 percent in the late 1970s. Asians comprise a disproportionate share of these increasing Third World immigrants. In fact, Asians have been the dominant group among legal immigrants to the United States since 1978, but this development has largely escaped public attention because of the congressional focus on Hispanic immigration. The changes in national origins of U.S. immigrants are shown in Figure 3.

The watershed change in U.S. immigration patterns is shown starkly by this comparison. In a recent year, more immigrants came to the United States from the Philippines and Korea (with their combined population of less than 100 million) than from all the 30-plus countries of Europe (with a combined population of 500 million). Although Mexico remains the largest, single sending country, the next four are all in Asia—Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, and China.
Figure 1. Asian immigration to the United States, 1854–1983.
Figure 2. U.S. immigration from selected Asian countries, 1960–81.
Figure 3. Region of origin of U.S. immigrants, 1960–81.
Many of the new Asian immigrants are Indochinese refugees, a living legacy of the U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. The statistics on refugee immigration are dramatic. In less than ten years, beginning in 1975, more than 700,000 Indochinese refugees have been settled in the United States (see Figure 4). Every fifth Asian-American is now Indochinese. The largest group by far is Vietnamese, followed by Laotians and Cambodians.

The fast pace of Asian immigration also shows up in census data. Among the Asians counted in the 1980 census, six of ten had entered the United States since the previous census in 1970. Overall, the Asian-American population grew by 133 percent during the 1970–80 period, from 1.5 million to 3.5 million. Demographic projections by the Population Reference Bureau show continuing growth, passing the 8 million mark by the year 2000. This increase is impressive, but Asian-Americans will still be very much a minority, comprising only 3 percent of the population at the turn of the century and slightly over 6 percent in 2050. (These projections assume no radical shift in immigration policy.)

Currently the three largest Asian-American groups, in order, are the Chinese, Filipinos, and Japanese, each with more than 700,000 persons. There is a gap between these major groups and a second tier of substantially smaller groups: Indians, Koreans, and Vietnamese—ranging in numbers from 260,000 to 360,000. According to present trends, however, Filipinos will surpass Chinese to become the largest Asian-American group by the turn of the century, and Koreans will surpass Japanese to become third largest. Japan is the only Asian country where immigration to the United States has declined in recent years, but the number of Japanese entering on temporary business visas has grown markedly.

The Asian and Pacific Islander population is highly concentrated in just a few states. Well over half live in the West, compared to only 19 percent of the U.S. population as a whole. California, which had over 1.3 million Asian residents in 1980, has proven to be a particularly strong magnet. Asians are considerably underrepresented in the southern United States and in states that are not highly urbanized. They constitute only a tiny minority of the population outside of the West (no more than 1 percent in any state). Numerically their influence is substantial only in Hawaii, where Asians and Pacific Islanders
Figure 4. Refugee flow from Southeast Asia to the United States, 1975–84, by nationality.

are in the majority, and California, where they constitute more than 5 percent of the population.

Migration across the Pacific to the United States is generally seen as an upbeat story, with the remarkable achievements of Asian-Americans providing a happy ending. But there is also an underclass in this migration flow, the Pacific Islanders, who are moving outward to more developed Pacific rim countries to escape stagnating economies and increasing population densities on resource-poor islands that have dim prospects for development.

The 1980 census has given us for the first time a detailed statistical picture of the Pacific Islander population in the United States. Of the quarter-million total, about two-thirds are Hawaiian-Americans. The next largest group is Samoans, with about 40,000 in the United States, followed by Guamanians at 30,000. (Guamanians are mostly U.S. citizens; American Samoans are U.S. nationals with unrestricted rights of entry to the United States.) Following the three leading groups with a sharp drop in numbers are the Tongans at 6,000. The Pacific Islanders differ from Asian-Americans in many ways, most notably in their low socioeconomic status. Their unemployment rates are high, and Pacific Islander families fall disproportionately below the poverty level. Differences among Islander groups are important, though, such as the high percentage of Micronesians who are in the United States as students--many of them assisted by special Federal grant programs.

No single explanatory scheme seems to account adequately for the diversity found in Asia and Pacific immigration. Although changes in immigration policies have obviously made possible the growth in Asian immigration, the policies alone do not explain why Asians have edged out potential immigrants from other areas, nor do they explain the differences among Asian immigration streams. The major immigration streams differ enormously. Doctors and engineers from India, "war brides" and businessmen from Korea, nurses and farmers from the Philippines, students from Taiwan and Micronesia, and unskilled laborers from Samoa. From a macroanalytic perspective, there has been neglect of such important factors as the political and military links between Asian countries and the United States, the differentials in population growth and economic development, the role of international trade, and the immigration-facilitating effects of Asian students being admitted to the United States for higher education.

Another neglected approach to understanding Asian immigration
emphasizes family linkages, taking into account the role of earlier immigrants in starting a migration chain and viewing the migration decision process as part of a family strategy to enhance the welfare of current and future generations. This perspective gives equal weight to conditions in the area of origin and at the destination, looking at the entire migration system.

Most Asians now enter under family reunification provisions of U.S. immigration law, so they have the advantage of auspices or sponsorship. Assistance through family connections partly accounts for their rapid economic advancement, although having multiple earners in the family is probably a bigger factor.

A reliance on family also means that Asian immigrants make use of public assistance programs at lower-than-expected rates. Refugees from Indochina are the exception; they have had relatives here and needed assistance, but they too are now making economic progress and becoming independent of assistance programs.

More than half the world’s people live in Asia, so the pool of potential immigrants is enormous. And, while population growth rates have declined in recent years, they are still sufficiently high to produce 50 million additional Asians every year. With most Asian countries densely populated and the larger ones also poor, economic and social forces within the countries tend to push people out. Repressive political regimes, as in Korea and the Philippines, add to the flow, as do wars and their aftermath.

For some countries—Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines—there are clear connections between U.S. foreign policy (including military assistance programs) and immigration patterns. This does not seem to be the case for India, however, which is supplying highly skilled scientists, physicians, and engineers to the United States.

On the business front, enterprising activities by Asian entrepreneurs forge links around the world and give impetus to flows and counter-flows of people. Current estimates place the number of Korean-owned businesses in the Los Angeles area alone at more than 5,000. The role of Chinese-Americans in developing trade links with the People’s Republic of China, as well as with Taiwan, clearly has been important. Asian-Americans evidently have been responsible in significant measure for the explosive growth in Pacific Basin trade as seen in estimates of the enormous flow of funds through Asian accounts in West Coast banks:
Student admissions to the United States also have contributed to the growth of immigrant flows. American colleges and universities enroll a large number of Asian students—about 200,000 in 1984—and many schools are now vigorously recruiting foreign students from all over the world to offset declining U.S. enrollments. They are also unintentionally recruiting immigrants because about one in three Asian students eventually finds a way to stay in the United States.

The role of the U.S. labor market in attracting immigrants and constraining their opportunities has been given much attention in Hispanic immigration but has not been adequately applied to the Asian case. Theories of immigrant economic incorporation and cultural assimilation will be enhanced by new efforts to account for Asian immigration because of the need to explain diverse patterns in the sending societies, in the characteristics of immigrants, and in their economic and social roles in the United States.

The “brain drain” was a topic of dispute between developed and developing countries a few years ago, but it has nearly disappeared as an issue in Asia. The case of India is instructive. Among Indian immigrants to the United States, the majority are professional or technical workers, including large numbers of physicians, scientists, and engineers. When this pattern was noted in the 1960s, studies were initiated to show how much was “lost” through India’s educational investment in these emigrants. Today, by contrast, India has the world’s third-largest pool of scientific and technical manpower—about 2.5 million people—and the substantial emigration of Indians to Western countries is not very significant in this light. Indians abroad also send home significant amounts of money, which helps the balance of payments and raises the standard of living of many families and whole villages. Thus, the “brain-drain” issue has been largely defused in recent years, although the overall impact of emigration on the development of the sending countries is still a matter of considerable uncertainty.

Currently, there is a dearth of information about such important sending country impacts as remittances, return migration, and business linkages between emigrants and the home country. Better information is available about impacts in the United States, primarily from census data. The 1980 census will produce more detailed analysis on Asia-Pacific immigrants than has previously been available. However, in-depth specialized studies of Asian immigrants have been lacking (in comparison with studies of Hispanics, for example), hence, data are
inadequate on certain important topics and almost nonexistent for some groups, such as Indians and Pacific Islanders.

The abstracts of conference papers and panel discussions presented in the next section provide additional information on these and other topics. The abstracts are given in the order shown in the conference agenda.
ABSTRACTS

The Global Picture of Contemporary Immigration Patterns
by Mary M. Kritz

This paper provides an overview of contemporary migration patterns from 1950 to the present. The first part reviews empirical data on global immigration trends and patterns. Permanent immigration receives emphasis, although temporary migration flows are also considered. The second part considers some of the factors underlying contemporary immigration patterns.

Immigration trends from 1950 to 1980 are compared in the four permanent receiving countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. These comparisons show that (1) only the United States increased its admissions, receiving two of every three migrants in 1980, (2) there is a steady increase in the proportion of immigrants originating in developing countries, and these trends are particularly pronounced in the United States, which now receives 80 percent of its immigrants from developing countries, and (3) Asia is the developing region that is the most important sender of migrants.

Data are also presented on the foreign-born composition of 31 countries in their two most recent censuses. A considerable range in foreign-born composition exists, with the largest proportions found in Middle Eastern countries and about 5 to 7 percent in most other immigration countries. Most countries experienced absolute increases in foreign-born population between their two most recent censuses. Countries experiencing decreases tend to be those with a foreign-born composition greater than 7 percent in their earlier census, suggesting that countries may restrict immigration as permanent settlement goes beyond a certain level.

Although trends and relative compositions among receiving countries are of interest, it is important to keep in mind that the United States is a special case. Though only 6.2 percent of the U.S. population was foreign born in 1980, a percentage exceeded by several countries, the United States has the largest immigrant population in the world more than three times greater than that of Saudi Arabia, the country with the highest relative foreign-born population. Several U.S. immigrant groups are larger in size than the total immigrant populations of most receiving countries. The Mexican foreign-born population in the United States in 1980 was larger than the total foreign-born popula-
tion of all but five countries (Australia, Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, and Canada).

The growing migration flows from South to North countries are associated with other North-South differentials, including levels of economic, development, technology, and population growth. As disparities continue and even widen between North-South countries, alarmists claim that the current flows represent only a trickle before the dam breaks. Their critics point to the relatively small percentage of emigrants and the continued efforts by receiving countries to control and, in most cases, reduce immigration. But considerable disagreement exists on the extent to which developing country emigration is demand-induced by labor needs of receiving countries or by push factors in the sending countries (e.g., lack of employment, population growth, and national regime consolidation). In addition, there is relatively little agreement whether such flows can be controlled through policies and programs that enhance development in the sending countries or through ones that restrict immigration in the receiving countries.

Asian Migrations and U.S.-Asia Relations
by Michael S. Teitelbaum

In recent years, Asian migrations have been transformed into important foreign policy issues, with special significance for U.S.-Asian relations. In only a decade and a half legal migration from Asia has increased from relatively low levels to become the largest stream from any world region. This rapid acceleration has occurred for a variety of reasons, including increased numbers of potential migrants due to population growth, improved transportation and communication, increased economic incentives favoring international movement, elimination of anti-Asian quotas in U.S. immigration law coupled with curtailment of entry to other countries, and political persecution in some countries of origin. In addition, Asia is the source of large numbers of "temporary" workers in West Asia and Europe, and of significant numbers of illegal immigrants to the United States, Canada, and elsewhere.

Foreign policies have affected the patterns of these recent migrations in significant ways. Political and military interventions in Indochina and Afghanistan have stimulated refugee outflows. Asian first-
asylum countries have pressured the United States to resettle Indochina refugees. Bilateral negotiations have facilitated temporary worker movements, and diplomatic initiatives have been undertaken to halt action against illegal migrations. Moreover, it has been argued in international fora that other foreign policy instruments, including foreign assistance, trade, and investment policy, can be directed so as to affect international migration trends.

In turn, international migrations have had significant impacts upon foreign policies. The presence of large numbers of nationals from another country tends to focus attention upon relations with the sending country. Sometimes the effect is improved relations and increased commerce, sometimes deteriorating ties and rising tensions. In the latter case, the migrant presence may represent a destabilizing factor. Moreover, migrations can be (and have been) employed as foreign policy tools to destabilize adversaries, to gain political influence in the receiving country, and even to establish sovereignty or de facto control over a disputed territory.

For Asian-U.S. relations, the following issues involving international migration can be considered of future significance: the continuing out-movement of Indochinese migrants, the civil war, foreign intervention, and massive refugee flow produced in Afghanistan, the future of Palestinian refugees in the swirling politics of the Middle East; the large-scale "temporary worker" migrations from South and East Asia to the Persian Gulf states, the political and economic future of Hong Kong, and the large migrations from Korea and the Philippines to the United States.

Contemporary Theories of International Migration: A Review and Critique
by Alejandro Portes

This paper reviews the state of theory in the field of international migration. There are no all-encompassing theories in this area, instead, there are hypotheses on several specific topics. Four such topics can be identified: origins of labor migration, their persistence and directionality in time, uses made of immigrant labor, and immigrant adaptation. Origins of immigrant flows have been explained by push-pull theories, the labor recruitment hypothesis, and more recent arguments derived from a world-system perspective. Similarly, these movements
have been portrayed as one-way escapes from misery and want, as target-earning ventures with a strong bent toward return migration, and as multiple, cyclical displacements in space.

Migrant labor, in turn, has been defined by neoclassical theory as a result of significant wage disparities between regions and as a way of restoring equilibrium. Neo-Marxist structuralist theories describe migrant labor, however, in a more pessimistic light. Three major variants of this general position can be identified corresponding to the concepts of internal colonialism, split labor markets, and the dual economy, respectively. On the issue of immigrant adaptation, classic assimilation theory is opposed by more recent perspectives, which emphasize the resilience of ethnic identities over time. This latter position includes the hypothesis of ethnicity as a useful tool for self-preservation and mobility among ethnic minorities and the “reactive formation” hypothesis that defines ethnicity as a logical consequence of rejection by the dominant group.

Despite their apparent diversity, a common thread runs among these various arguments. Underlying one set of them is the perception of immigration as a phenomenon that takes place within a basically consensual and equilibrium-restoring social order. Underlying another is the view of immigration as a process determined by and contributing to conflicts of interests between social classes and other economic actors backed by different forms of power. Both sets of hypotheses apply primarily to labor migrations, other flows, such as those of political refugees, have been much less theorized so far.

Comments on paper by Alejandro Portes
by Astri Suhrke

This paper is a comprehensive review of contemporary theories of international labor migrations. The theories are presented according to subject: the causes and direction of migration, the functions of the migrants in the receiving country, and their adaptation to the new society. The concluding section points out that this diverse body of theory really is bifurcated. On the one hand, we have a cluster of theories informed by an underlying perspective on society derived from a Parsonsian functionalist model. Society is viewed as a compact of mutually independent parts seeking equilibrium and expression of consensus. The contending perspective is informed by neo-Marxist thought. The causes of labor migration are found in an expanding
capitalist economy, the consequences are analyzed with respect to conflict among opposing classes or social forces in the host country.

The paper is an insightful assessment of the "state of the arts" in the field. It also conveys the sense of cumulative thrust that has been taking place in theorizing about labor migrations, some of it represented in other works by Portes. In particular, the early and somewhat mechanistic pull-push theories have been amplified, or replaced, by theories emphasizing factors that condition the pull-push dynamic such as the degree of integration in the international economy and social networking. Apparently there has been no similar synthesizing process with respect to the consequences of migration. We are here faced with conflicting orthodoxies. Do migrants function in basically the same way as indigenous workers on the domestic labor market, and is this process reinforced by a parallel, gradual integration in local society and culture? Or, are there sharply segmented labor markets, compelling migrants to enhance ethnic group identity for ideational and political defense?

These summary questions obviously simplify what is a rich and varied body of theory. It stands in striking contrast to a related field refugee studies which by comparison is theoretically very poor. One may ask if this is just a matter of underdevelopment, with more interest and research on refugee movements, is there any reason why theory should not develop pari passu? Or, are we dealing with a more serious case of underdevelopment, either because the subject matter is inherently more difficult to define, and/or because refugee studies will remain a poor cousin, overshadowed by labor migration studies for other reasons?

The latter objections are serious. With respect to definition, for instance, a labor migrant can readily be defined as someone whose labor is sold, or appropriated, on a particular labor market, and the physical movement is determined by that transaction. But what would be a corresponding sociological definition of "refugee"? To construct a definition around "push" versus "pull" and degrees of compulsion—has been tried, but with little success since compulsion obviously is a factor in labor migration as well ("the compulsion of poverty"). The economic versus political distinction also is tricky. When the government of Vietnam progressively restricted the private economic sector in the South, causing many ethnic Chinese to leave, were the latter transformed into labor migrants or "refugees"?
Unless we demand neat distinctions for a reality that probably is quite ambiguous, however, it seems that the field of refugee studies can be considerably developed. Two examples may be instructive. As for definition, the residual of the labor migrant as defined above would be a start. Thus, a refugee is someone who moves, not primarily to provide his labor, or (like the tourist) for pleasure, but for "something else" and that "something else" could be progressively narrowed. As for the "causes" of refugee movement, one can envisage a development from existing pull-push explanations, which emphasize "push" factors for refugees, to a broader perspective similar to the theoretical thrust in the study of labor migrations. To recall, the argument here is that "pull-push" factors conducive to labor migration only operate when a given region has achieved a certain integration in the world economy. The equivalent process for "refugees" might be a competitive internationalization of a local sociopolitical conflict. Competitive foreign intervention (direct or indirect) typically worsens a conflict, enhancing the pressures on people to leave. Insofar as there is foreign interest in the local conflict, there is also a potential foreign patron for the refugees. Concretely, and centrally, this would mean that they have a place to go without which, of course, there can be no international refugees.

The dynamic seems well illustrated in the contrasting cases of Kampuchea and East Timor. The 1977-79 conflict in Kampuchea was marked by competing foreign intervention and widespread international concern, including a media blitz in the West. The massive outflow of Khmer refugees peaked around 1 million. In East Timor, continuous vicious warfare since 1975 has caused enormous destruction and suffering. But there are no international refugees (excepting a few activists in exile). Perhaps the principal reason for this is that the conflict has not been competitively internationalized. Segments of the East Timor people are fighting one foreign power (Indonesia), but they themselves have no foreign patron and command very limited international attention.

This is not the place to develop this analysis further. The point is that a stronger theoretical base quite conceivably could be developed for refugee studies. In doing so, the field can draw on the comparatively richer theories of labor migration.
Asian Immigration to the United States: Flows and Processes
by James T. Fawcett, Fred Arnold, and Urmi Minocha

This paper reviews recent immigration trends from Asia and the processes involved in immigrating to the United States. In the first section of the paper, basic immigration flows and patterns are examined in a comparative framework that includes immigration from all regions of the world. The paper also compares the characteristics of immigrants from the major sending countries in Asia (the Philippines, Vietnam, Korea, China, and India). The historical trend in immigration from Asia is reviewed briefly, along with a discussion of immigration legislation that severely restricted Asian immigration prior to 1965 (the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the 1907 Gentleman's Agreement with Japan, the National Origins Act of 1924, and the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952).

The contours of recent immigration from Asia have been shaped primarily by the 1965 changes in U.S. immigration laws and the political changes that took place in Indochina in the 1970s. Asian immigration has grown dramatically from just over 17,000 in 1965 to more than a quarter of a million in 1983. During the same period, immigration from Europe declined by about 50 percent. In 1978, Asia overtook North America (including Central America and the Caribbean) as the largest source of U.S. immigrants, and it has maintained its predominance ever since. In 1960, none of the ten largest sending countries was in Asia, but by 1983 seven of the ten largest streams of immigrants to the United States had their origin in Asia. The most rapid gains have been registered by Indochina, from fewer than 1,000 immigrants in 1960 to more than 84,000 in 1981 alone. Most of these immigrants arrived from refugee camps in countries of first asylum, but increasing numbers are coming under the aegis of the Orderly Departure Program.

The majority of Asian immigrants admitted to the United States are not subject to the numerical limitation of 20,000 persons per year from any one country. These immigrants are primarily parents, spouses, and unmarried children of U.S. citizens and specially admitted refugees. Among those who have immigrated within the numerical limitation in recent years, more than four of five have come under the family preference categories and most of the rest have been admitted under the occupational preferences.
There is a tendency to think of immigrants as persons arriving at U.S. ports of entry loaded down with their possessions and ready to begin life in a new country. In the case of Asian immigrants, however, this characterization is inaccurate since only half of them can be counted as new arrivals. The other half were already physically present in the United States and were "adjusted" to permanent resident status without leaving the country. The bulk of these adjustments of status are related to the large influx of Indochinese refugees who were permitted to adjust their status after their arrival. However, even excluding refugees, more Asians were adjusted to permanent resident status in 1981 than were persons from any other region.

Although immigration statistics present a reasonably accurate picture of the flow of recent immigrants and changes in the characteristics of immigrants over time, they provide only limited insights into the causes and consequences of immigration flows. The actual admission of an immigrant is just one link in a chain that connects the premigration situation of the immigrant and the migration decision-making process with adjustment and settlement once the immigrant arrives in the United States. In the second half of the paper, we delineate various stages of immigration processes, to highlight the dynamics underlying immigration flows. This discussion takes its structure from a paradigm for microlevel research on migration systems, which is introduced to highlight the need for more comprehensive research on the causes and consequences of U.S. immigration patterns. Three stages in the immigration process—decision, transition, and adaptation—are discussed in relation to the structural factors at origin and destination that impinge on individual immigrants. The paper concludes with some examples of knowledge gained from an ongoing study of a Philippines-U.S. migration system.

Asian-Americans: Growth and Change in the 1970s

by Peter C. Smith, Robert W. Gardner, and Herbert R. Barringer

This paper focuses on some basic demographic attributes of the Asian-American population of the United States. The first part discusses population growth, size, and the age and sex composition of the most important Asian-American groups: Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, Asian Indians, Koreans, and Vietnamese (listed in order of size of group in 1980). The second part looks at 1970 and 1980 patterns of geographi-
The age and sex distributions of Asian-Americans are usefully decomposed into two parts: the native born and the foreign born. The former might be expected to be characterized by smoothly tapering pyramids reflecting relatively regular histories of reproduction and aging. In fact, several groups of native born differ from this pattern in
some important respect. Japanese and Chinese pyramids reflect their two waves of immigration, with substantial native-born populations at the older ages. The children of the earliest immigrants. The pyramids of native-born Filipinos, Koreans, Asian Indians, and Vietnamese, on the other hand, are much more regular.

The pyramids of the foreign-born populations are distorted much as one might expect, given the historical patterns of immigration. Foreign-born populations show the female bias of Korean and Filipino immigration and the male bias of Asian Indian and Vietnamese immigration.

Immigration and internal migration patterns are strongly affecting the geographical distribution of Asian-Americans. Asian-Americans in 1970 were heavily concentrated in the Western region of the country, where more than 70 percent of all Asian-Americans lived. Chinese, although following this pattern in general, were slightly more concentrated in the Northeast, while Filipinos and Japanese were disproportionately found in the West.

By 1980 some substantial changes had taken place. Asian-Americans, growing faster than the total U.S. population, showed at least a 30 percent increase in all four regions, with growth concentrated in the West but with the South gaining most proportionately, compared to the 1970 population. The percent of Asian-Americans living in the West fell during the decade, while all other regions gained the South being the biggest gainer. Asian-Americans in 1980 were slightly less unevenly distributed, compared to the total U.S. population, than in 1970.

Five-year net internal migration figures for Asian-Americans reveal an outflow from the Northeast and the North Central regions toward the South and West, paralleling the movements of the U.S. population generally. Immigration, on the other hand, resulted in gains for all four regions.

This paper only sets the demographic foundation for the ongoing study of the most important questions of economic and social adjustment that are implicit in the rather tumultuous demographic patterns of recent years.
Pacific Islanders in the United States: A Demographic Profile Based on the 1980 Census
by Michael J. Levin

This paper briefly presents data from the 1980 census on Pacific Islanders in the United States and assesses how well Pacific Island immigrants are adapting to their new social and economic environment.

In 1980 there were 259,566 Pacific Islanders in the United States. Of the three large groups defined geographically and linguistically, about 85 percent of the population was Polynesian, 14 percent was Micronesian, and 1 percent was Melanesian. Of the 220,278 Polynesians, Hawaiians (172,346), Samoans (39,520), and Tongans (6,226) were the largest groups. Since Hawaiians are not immigrants, there were 87,220 Pacific Islanders in 1980 who would be considered immigrants. Among the 35,508 persons of Micronesian background, more than 8 of every 10 were Guamanian. The Fijian population was the largest Melanesian group with a total of 2,834.

The characteristics of Pacific Islander immigrants in the United States differ significantly from those of the U.S. population as a whole. Although the median age of the U.S. population was 30 in 1980, none of the large Pacific Islander groups had a median age greater than the 23 for Hawaiians. The 5.2 persons in Samoan families were almost 2 persons more than the 3.3 for the United States as a whole. Although Pacific Islanders tend to have more difficulty gaining participation in the labor force than some other groups, Tongans and Guamanians were in the labor force in 1980 in greater proportions than the U.S. average of 62 percent, while Samoans and Micronesians fell below the average. Many Pacific Islanders, however, were in entry-level positions, which is shown in the distribution of their occupations, industries, and income levels.

Pacific Islander immigration to the United States differs from most Asian immigration in several ways. For the most part, for example, the intent of Asian immigration is permanent relocation. Most Pacific Islander immigrants are from one of the U.S. Pacific territories, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Marianas, the Federated States of Micronesia, Belau, or the Marshall Islands. Since movement between these areas and the United States is fairly unrestricted, many Pacific Islanders come to the United States for schooling or for temporary jobs and fully intend to return to their islands permanently.
The education "industry" has been used as a safety valve for increased pressure on scarce resources. The extent of immigration for this reason was not foreseen. The safety valve works both ways. Pacific Islanders are able to emigrate and settle in the United States, and sending islands are not yet forced to face the potential problems of both returning migrants and large numbers of new participants joining the labor force (attributable partly to burgeoning fertility rates). The educational assistance given to Pacific Islanders is rarely sufficient to cover their expenses, so many must work part time or full time. Since most lack skills and English language ability, and because many Pacific Islanders settle in areas that lack adequate public transportation, most take jobs and remain in entry-level positions.

Even in entry-level positions, Pacific Islanders make more money and are exposed to more of the material aspects of the West than they would in the island setting. The seductiveness of cars and movies and tapes makes readaptation to the traditional society of their home islands increasingly difficult for the educated Pacific Islander. On the other hand, although they desire as many Western material goods as possible, many find it impossible to give up the communal life of the traditional societies. The conflict causes psychological and financial problems for many Pacific Islanders.

Many Pacific Islanders, then, eventually remain in the United States partly because return migration is increasingly problematic. The problems with potential return have as much to do with increasingly limited employment opportunities as difficulty in readaptation. There are few jobs available in most of the Pacific areas, and many of the jobs available in the recent past have been filled by persons with limited education. These people will not be retiring for many years, leaving increasing numbers of educated young people with few job prospects. The Pacific areas do not seem to be undergoing expansion of their economic bases.

**Southeast Asian Refugee Migration to the United States**

*by Linda W. Gordon*

This work traces the history of migration from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia to the United States. It includes an analysis of the composition of the migrant populations and their residence patterns in
the United States. A brief overview of research on their adjustment to American life is presented, and prospects for future migration are reviewed.

By comparison with other Asian nations, these three countries have a brief history of migration to the United States. Significant numbers did not arrive until the 1960s. Through 1974, fewer than 20 thousand immigrants had arrived in the United States from Indochina since record keeping began. From 1975 through 1984, 700 thousand more arrived as refugees. This movement took place in two major waves cresting in 1975 and 1980. Refugee arrivals continue at a yearly level of 50 thousand in the mid-1980s, while a small program for direct admission of immigrants from Vietnam is growing in size and political visibility.

As of 1984, the Vietnamese have become the fourth largest category of Asian-Americans, with more than 500 thousand refugee and immigrant arrivals. Refugees from Laos approach the 150 thousand mark, while more than 100 thousand have entered from Cambodia. Rapid growth of these populations through natural increase in the short term is assured by their very young age structure. In addition, available evidence points to high fertility among these refugees, at least during their first few years in the country.

The arrival of such large numbers in less than ten years, without established ethnic communities to ease their transition to American life, is unprecedented in the history of migration to the United States. Because of this and due to the federal policy of dispersing arriving refugees across the country, their initial pattern of settlement was much closer to that of the population at large than that of other Asians or other immigrant groups generally. A substantial redistribution through internal migration took place, especially among the earlier arrivals, resulting in residential concentrations in a number of cities. Currently 37 percent of the refugees are estimated to live in California. Refugees have gravitated especially toward urban places with warm climates and existing Asian populations. Sizable concentrations have developed in the South and West and in a number of urban centers in the East and Midwest.

Economic adjustment has proved difficult for refugees during their first year of residence in the United States, but over time, all economic indicators have moved toward the national rates. Recent research shows the most common successful strategy for economic
achievement to be multiple wage earners in a household. After initial issues of daily survival in the new setting are met, adjustment concerns focus on coming to terms with the loss of one’s former way of life, gaining permanent resident status and citizenship, and assisting relatives still in the home country to come to the United States. A substantial potential for more immigration from Indochina exists, but its level in the foreseeable future will be controlled primarily by relations between the governments involved.

The Future of U.S. Immigration Policy
by Lisa S. Roney

This presentation focuses on proposed changes in the Immigration and Nationality Act—the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill—which, after more than two years of debate and passage in both the House and Senate, was in Conference Committee at the time of this conference and appeared to be assured of passage, and the impact of these possible changes on the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, which administers the Act.

The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, which ultimately did not clear the Conference Committee, included provisions that would have legalized aliens illegally present in the United States since 1 January 1981. The Bill would also have made it unlawful for employers to hire illegal aliens and imposed a graduated scale of penalties. In addition to these best-known provisions, the proposed Bill would have tested a program waiving nonimmigrant visa requirements for natives of countries with low rates of fraud and included a bar on student adjustment of status with waivers available for certain students in high technology fields. The Simpson-Mazzoli Bill also mandated significant information-gathering requirements, including a longitudinal study of legalized aliens.

The impact of the proposed legislation on Asian immigration or Asians in the United States is not totally clear. Based on available research, it could be anticipated that well under one-quarter of the illegal alien population would be Asian. A far greater impact would be expected from a bar to adjustment of students to permanent resident status since a large portion of students are Asian, and since many of these students adjust status. The exemption for students in highly technical fields would be expected to mitigate that impact somewhat, however.
Changes in immigration policy, it was noted, are slow in coming. Extensive study and debate have preceded passage of major immigration legislation each time it has been proposed, whether in the 1920s, 1950s, 1960s, or now in the 1980s. Recommendations for change in the current law date back to the report of the Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Aliens in 1975 and have been continued in at least three other major study efforts, the most influential of which was the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. Change is clearly needed, the only question is how soon it will be achieved.

If the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill were to pass, it was noted, a huge administrative and operational workload would fall on the Immigration and Naturalization Service. If the bill did not pass, some changes in immigration law could be expected on a more limited basis through piecemeal legislation. Such changes might include administrative rather than judicial naturalization, creation of a provision for the immigration of investors, and a more recent or rolling qualification date for creation of a record of admission for certain long-term illegal aliens.

Other changes expected in the future could include limitations on groups qualifying for immigrant visas under the second and fifth preferences, both of which are heavily used by Asians. Although limits on those qualifying in these preferences have not been politically popular in the past, many believe that as the demand for immigrant visas continues to grow, a situation which would be exacerbated following a legalization program, further restrictions are inevitable.

The presentation also discusses how different provisions of immigration law work together to affect immigration patterns. Many patterns, especially those of Asian immigrants, result as much or more from the intricate workings of immigration laws than from the push-and-pull factors to which they are most often attributed. This is an area where more research and analysis are clearly needed.

The New Asian Immigrants in California
by Lucie Cheng

Based mainly on data from the 1980 census and reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, this paper examines the current status of Asian immigrants in California, focusing on their basic demographic attributes, their adjustment in terms of employment and major occupations, the services that are made available to them, and the problems they encounter in the receiving society.
Although immigrant groups in California are diverse in many ways, available data show that most of them have high proportions of the young and labor-potential population. In recent years, a striking demographic feature of Asian immigration is the preponderance of females over males, a pattern that stands in sharp contrast to recent Mexican immigration to California. Asian immigrant groups in California generally stand below the whites and their native counterparts in terms of income and occupational status.

Among the problems encountered by the Asian immigrants in the host society are unemployment and underemployment, lack of adequate housing, and, for some of the recent immigrants, poor health status. Although there are numerous government and private service agencies in California, their effectiveness in dealing with the problems of immigrants is hindered by lack of coordination and public support. The high concentration of Asians in California, rising unemployment, and the stagnation of the American economy have contributed to a climate that historically led to anti-Asian movements. Undoubtedly, however, Asians have played an important role in promoting closer ties between California and the immigrants' countries of origin, as can be seen in the increasing number of activities in trade and tourism and of educational and cultural exchange programs.

Community Impacts of Migration:
Recent Ilokano Migration to Honolulu
by Ainefil R. Aghayani

The first part of the paper gives a brief overview of migration to Hawaii, followed by a summary of Filipino migration. The final section utilizes a portion of a 1982 survey of Filipino Ilokano migrants to Honolulu conducted by the East-West Center Population Institute. A description of the sample of households and individual respondents is presented, along with an analysis of self-reported problems and patterns of utilizing agencies and services in Honolulu.

When viewed historically, the current 14.2 percent foreign born in Hawaii is relatively small. The data on foreign-born population show 60 percent in 1900, 21 percent in 1940, and 10 percent in 1970. During 1965-81 the largest number of legal immigrants reporting Hawaii as their intended residence were from the Philippines (54 percent), followed by Korea (13 percent), China, Taiwan (7 percent),
Japan (6 percent), and other countries (19 percent). Currently the Philippines is second only to Mexico in sending immigrants to the United States. Of the total Filipino migrants to the United States, 10 percent or 4 thousand Filipinos migrate to the State of Hawaii each year. Unlike the Filipinos who migrate to mainland United States, the Filipinos in Hawaii are predominantly from rural Ilocos and occupy a lower socioeconomic position.

The post-1965 immigrants from the Philippines are unlike the early immigrants who were predominantly uneducated; male, single, young plantation workers who intended to return to their homeland. The study sample shows 60 percent female; 82 percent married, an average age of 40, 22 percent had less than 6 years of schooling, 60 percent intend to remain in Hawaii, and 40 percent work in service occupations.

Housing problems were reported by 26 percent, job problems by 20 percent, and language problems by 19 percent. Twenty-eight percent of the respondents thought Filipinos were discriminated against. However, only 15 percent rated their current general satisfaction relatively low. Few persons reported ever using any service or agency (except Unemployment Compensation, which was used by 21 percent). A higher proportion of those reporting problems also reported agency use. Nearly a third of the sample reported at least one problem but no agency use.

Those who reported problems are characterized as having fewer family members in Hawaii and come from lower income households than those who reported no problem. Persons utilizing agencies are characterized as having more family in Hawaii and are more economically successful than persons who reported never using an agency.

Findings from this study may be of particular use to service agencies, policymakers, and the community in responding to new immigrants.

Comments on papers by Amefil R. Agbayani and Lucie Cheng by Sheila M. Forman

The following comments focus on those sections of the papers dealing with immigrant access to major health and human services.

Agbayani's paper cites low immigrant use of service agencies in general (in Hawaii), while Cheng's paper on California cites "recent studies [which] have shown that when linguistically competent and culturally sensitive services are available, Asian immigrants show high rates of service utilization."
Local efforts to use the legal system to develop such linguistically competent and culturally sensitive services have involved several members of the Interagency Council for Immigrant Services. As Agbayani's paper points out, the concepts of civil rights and affirmative action have been invoked in these reform efforts, and as a result major service agencies have been cited by the Office of Civil Rights for violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. These agencies have responded by submitting detailed plans to increase immigrant access to their services.

In general, real improvements have been few and far between. A chronology of events in a class action suit filed by a limited English speaker against the Department of Health (DOH) (Mangrobang versus Yuen) is illustrative of the problems:

1976  Suit filed by Mangrobang on behalf of himself and others in the class.
1977  State Judge ruled against plaintiff stating that his own immigrant parents had not had the benefit of specialized bilingual services. Plaintiff appealed to federal court.
1978  A compromise was arrived at between plaintiffs and DOH. Judge ordered the formation of a committee to make binding recommendations to improve access to DOH services. Committee formed, recommendations made.
1979  DOH refused to consider recommendations binding.
1980  Committee went back to federal court to ask Judge to order DOH to follow recommendations. Judge so ordered.
1984  Committee recommendations still not implemented.

The fact of the suit and the committee recommendations have had some effect. For example, a small bilingual aide program that originally was to have been deleted from the DOH budget has been maintained. However, improvements beyond the status quo will require more efforts. Legal remedies will still be important but other political and administrative strategies are needed along with them.

Comments presented at session on Community Impacts of Immigration: Pacific Islander Immigration and Adaptation by Robert W. Franco

These comments pertain to the major adjustments made by Samoans, and other Pacific Islander groups, as they enter the labor markets of Hawaii and the mainland United States. In the period 1951-75, the primary flow of Western Samoan emigrants was to New Zealand, and the main flow of American Samoans was to Hawaii and the mainland.
United States. After 1975, when stronger immigration restrictions were enforced in New Zealand, Western Samoans increasingly turned to American Samoa and the United States as destination areas, and since 1975, the pace of all Samoan immigration to the United States has accelerated.

Large Samoan communities can now be found in Honolulu, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Seattle, Auckland, and Wellington, and kinship networks link these communities in culturally specific ways. The Samoan family ('aiga) has always been both genealogically and geographically extensive, and traditional circular movement patterns (malaga) brought together different segments of the 'aiga for resource sharing and political maneuvering by family chiefs (matat). Malaga-like movements still occur but over much greater distances, and immigration regulations on the length of stay of Western Samoans, both in New Zealand and the United States, create a second type of Samoan circulation.

Samoans usually state two related reasons for their immigration to the United States. Samoans want to visit, join, or help their relatives, and they want to find improved employment opportunities and a better life-style. The extensive Samoan network facilitates employment search activity, and income from employment is often used to pay the travel costs of family members. Compared to Asian origin areas, Samoa is relatively close to Hawaii, and circular, short-term and life-course migration appears to be a developing pattern.

According to the 1980 U.S. Census, the Samoan community in Hawaii is experiencing the highest unemployment rate of any selected Asia-Pacific Islander group. Samoan labor force participation rates for both men and women were the lowest, and the percentage of Samoans living below the poverty level was the highest of any selected ethnic group. Hawaii State data suggest a growing frustration in job search activities for Samoan males 15–24 years of age. The Samoan employment picture is much better in California where the relatively small Samoan community is essentially "invisible" and not experiencing the discrimination that Hawaii's Samoans report.

Increasing numbers of Tongans began coming to the United States in the early 1970s, and this flow has also accelerated since the tightening of New Zealand immigration restrictions in 1975. Tongans and Samoans seem to be contributing to a growing secondary economy in Hawaii. The Tongans are more committed to this adaptation because
they do not have access to the wide range of social welfare programs available to American Samoans.

Micronesian movements into the United States also have increased since 1970. These immigration flows will likely increase with the termination of U.S. Trusteeship as the current Compact allows for essentially free access to the United States. Greater travel distances and costs will make circular mobility more difficult for Micronesians than for Samoans.

The Asian-Pacific Islander Population of the United States

by Leon F. Bouvier and Anthony J. Agresta

This paper analyzes the composition and distribution of the Asian-Pacific Islander population living in the United States as it changed from a homogeneous population of predominantly Chinese and Japanese in the early 1970s to an increasingly heterogeneous population today. Population projections of both the resident Asian-Pacific Islander population enumerated in the 1980 census and the post-1980 immigrants born in Asian-Pacific Islander countries serve as the basis for a discussion of this group's changing composition as we approach the twenty-first century and beyond.

The first section of the discussion centers on the differing definitions of Asian-Pacific Islanders held by the Census Bureau and Immigration and Naturalization Service. Current data tell us that the number of Asian-Pacific Islanders residing in the United States more than doubled during the 1970s, rising from 1,538,721 in 1970 to 3,727,940 in 1980. Most recent data reveal that in 1981 the four leading origins of Asian immigrants admitted to the United States were Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, and China.

The paper includes discussion of the nature of population projections as well as the underlying fertility, mortality, and migration assumptions used for the projections made in this study.

The Asian-Pacific Islander population will increase from 3.7 million in 1980 to more than 8 million by 2000, 14.5 million by 2025, and reach the 18 million mark by 2050 if the assumptions presented hold true. Filipinos are expected to be the largest Asian-Pacific Islander ethnic group by the year 2000. The Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese will follow respectively. Increases in the flow of post-1980 immigrants to the United States will lead to changes in the
ethnic composition of the group. In 1980 the Japanese represented 18.8 percent of the total Asian-Pacific Islander population in the United States, while 21.8 percent were Chinese. These figures will drop to 6.2 and 15.0 percent, respectively, by 2050. The percentage of Vietnamese and Koreans is expected to rise during this 70-year period.

Detailed regional projections reveal that California, New York, Hawaii, Illinois, and Washington are home to about 75 percent of all Asian-Pacific Islanders living in the United States. A similar concentration of the population in future decades is expected unless patterns of internal migration change dramatically.

The proportional distribution of Asian-Pacific Islanders is expected to increase from 1.6 percent of the total population in 1980 to 5 percent by 2030. Thus, in the future we will see increasing ethnic diversity among Asian-Pacific Islanders and growing numbers of Asian-Pacific Islanders living in the United States.

This analysis leads us to another important point. If these changes continue, how will they affect future patterns of assimilation? With fertility of the resident population below replacement levels and immigration reaching the high levels experienced at the beginning of this century, we notice an important difference in the transformation process. Whereas immigrants at the turn of the century were predominantly Europeans, today a large majority are Asians or Hispanics. The question remains whether these newcomers to American life-styles will be able to assimilate without problems. Most importantly, what type of nation will we see emerge from these future patterns of immigration, and how will this changing panorama affect the institutions of our society?

Korean Emigration: Connections to Urban America: A Structural Analysis of Premigration Factors in South Korea by Ilsoo Kim

Since 1966, eight developing nations—Mexico, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, the two Chinas (including Hong Kong), the Philippines, India, and South Korea—have sent the largest numbers of immigrants to the United States. This pattern of immigration is due to the selective interplay of their premigration factors with United States immigration policy as stated in the Immigration Act of 1965 and its 1976 Amendment.
This paper is a case study of how premigration factors in South Korea, such as its degree of urbanization and industrialization, its "population explosion," and its political and economic dependence on the United States, are conducive to the emigration of its people to the United States.

It is my central thesis that the premigration factors have interacted with specific aspects of United States immigration policy and thereby have directly and indirectly contributed to the formation of Korean "emigration connections," which fosters the establishment of a set of entry mechanisms, legal or illegal, of Koreans into the United States.

The premigration factor of the political and economic dependence of South Korea on the United States since the end of World War II has generated specific "emigration connections" of South Koreans with the United States in "international marriage connection," "occupational connection," and "cultural connection." These "emigration connections" are serendipitous for Korean emigrants. Other general premigration factors "population explosion," "overurbanization," the development of an export economy, and the emergence of new urban middle classes have also been explored and discussed to the extent to which they have contributed to Korean emigration to the United States.

The effects of United States foreign policy on the creation of premigration factors in South Korea are emphasized. The historical involvements of the United States with the two Koreas have fostered Korean emigration to the United States by creating specific "emigration connections" within the framework of the United States immigration laws.

The formation of Korean "emigration connections" to the United States is the unintended consequence of United States immigration policy; it is an unexpected result because American policymakers did not anticipate the effects of the premigration factors on immigration. That is to say, United States immigration laws are aimed at all nationalities, but the number of beneficiaries differs from country to country depending on the degree of its urbanization, economic development, and the intensity of its economic, political, and military dependence on the United States.
The Trends and Policies of Korean Emigration
by Jung Keun Kim

This paper describes the major trends of Korean emigration history and reviews the policies adopted by the Korean government during the past 30 years.

The history of the Korean people's emigration in a modern sense begins with Korean agricultural workers' emigration to Hawaiian sugar plantations and Mexican cotton plantations early in this century. But their number was less than thousands in total before imperialist Japan annexed Korea in 1910.

The thrust of Korean emigration started again with her independence in 1945. The U.S. involvement in the Korean War provided a new opportunity for the Koreans' emigration to the United States as spouses of American soldiers or students or adopted children of Americans. The amendment of the American immigration regulations in 1965 gave a further impetus to the Korean emigration flow to the United States. Of the total emigration of about 400 thousand between 1962 and 1983, family reunification, international marriage, and child adoption accounted for 95 percent, the remaining 5 percent comprised medical doctors, nurses, pharmacists, and other workers in the employment class. The Korean government's direct contribution to this growth of emigration is minimal, if any. The main contribution comes from the traditional strong kinship of the Korean people. However, it is noted in recent years that the total number of emigration applicants is decreasing. This new phenomenon can be attributed to the recent economic growth of Korea.

Turning to the emigration policies of Korea, the Korean government did not take any particular policy toward its nationals' emigration until the Emigration Act was promulgated in 1962. The purpose of the Act was to ensure the optimum population level and to stimulate the national economy. Yet the achievement of its purpose is doubted. Admittedly, the gradual shift of the Korean emigration policy from the restrictive to the liberal during the past 20 years made possible a large outflow of family class emigrants in the 1960s and 1970s, most of whom were from the highly educated middle and upper classes. Since the transfer of emigration affairs from the Ministry of Health Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1984, the Korean government has been actively engaged in negotiating
with the main receiving countries regarding the migration exchange on the basis of reciprocity, while adjusting part of its emigration policy to meet changes in the receiving countries' demand for types of immigrants. For business emigrants to Canada, for instance, the Korean government has lifted the relevant provisions of the foreign exchange regulations limiting the maximum amount of foreign currency to $100 thousand that an emigrating family can take out overseas. At the same time, measures have been taken to facilitate the issuance of passports for those traveling to Canada to explore business prospects there.

The Policy Meaning of Nonreturning U.S.-educated Chinese Students and Scholars

by Ching-shyang Hwang

This paper discusses the policy meaning of nonreturning U.S.-educated Chinese students from the Republic of China. The main topics of discussion are (1) the profile of Chinese emigration from the Republic of China to the United States, (2) the role of nonreturning U.S.-educated Chinese students in emigration, (3) the Republic of China's studying abroad policy and emigration policy, and (4) policy implications and directions for future research.

There are two main groups of emigrants from the Republic of China to the United States: students and nonstudents. During the period 1950–83, nearly 63 thousand Chinese students stayed in the United States, and most of them became or would become U.S. citizens sooner or later. “Study and stay” thus has become a way of emigration to the United States. In the same period, about 134 thousand Chinese nonstudents were expected to remain and become U.S. citizens. The total number of Chinese emigrants to the United States, both student and nonstudent groups, was about 197 thousand between 1950 and 1983. The composition of this figure is noteworthy because nonreturning Chinese students are not only themselves a main and significant source of emigrants from the Republic of China to the United States, but also an example that Chinese nonstudents follow.

Historically, the number of Chinese students who went abroad is closely related to the Republic of China's studying abroad policy. This policy has been a vital mechanism in controlling the number of
U.S.-bound students since it went through five stages of revision from 1950 to 1983. To some extent, the studying abroad policy may be considered as the emigration policy. Further, the main reasons for not having a clear emigration policy in the Republic of China are (1) the concern over the Communist threat to Taiwan, and (2) the existence of many ways other than official emigration for emigrants to go to the United States. Finally, the policy implications and directions for future research are provided at the conclusion of this paper.

The 1997 Question and Emigration Problems in Hong Kong

by Paul Chun-Kuen Kwong

This paper examines the issues and problems related to the 1997 question—the year in which Britain will formally turn over to China the sovereignty and administrative rights over Hong Kong, Kowloon, and the New Territories. Specifically examined are the past and current emigration trends in Hong Kong and the factors that are likely to affect the future level and mode of emigration from the country.

In recent years, the emigration of Hong Kong residents has increased sharply in the face of the intensified 1997 negotiations. The most common destinations of Hong Kong emigrants are the United States and Canada, and return migration is negligible. Results of opinion polls also show that although only a small proportion of Hong Kong residents have actually taken steps to emigrate, many had expressed a desire to do so should China exercise sovereignty rights over Hong Kong in 1997. Among the factors that would affect the future levels of emigration from Hong Kong are (1) the nationality status of Hong Kong born residents after 1997, (2) the citizenship and residency requirements of major receiving countries for Hong Kong immigrants, and (3) the extent to which China's open-door policy vis-à-vis Hong Kong will continue.

Reproducing Development Inequalities:
Some Effects of Philippine Emigration to the United States

by Ricardo G. Abad and Elizabeth U. Eviota

This paper points out how Philippine emigration to the United States is part of a reinforcing cycle by which historical relations of inequality between the two countries are reproduced. In the 1920s and 1930s
this movement took the form of out-migration of Filipino farmers to
Hawaiian sugar plantations, but since the 1960s, emigration has con-
sisted largely of professional and technical workers and their house-
holds. These movements of labor are generated by economic and
political conditions deriving from the country's subordinate position
within the global economy in general and to the United States in
particular. This position is a legacy of colonialism that in recent years
has deepened with the accelerated expansion of the market economy
and the pursuit of specific economic and political projects that did
little to absorb a rapidly growing work force. This paper takes selected
aspects of the migration process—the transfer of labor, remittances,
return migration, and the economic and political effects of Filipino
presence in the United States—to indicate the manner in which rela-
tions of dominance and dependence between the two countries are
reproduced.

The emigration of highly trained professionals and technical work-
ers is a drain to the Philippines because these skills are required to
meet development goals. Skilled emigration also means that the coun-
try allocates resources to an educational system to train a particular
work force but that labor is later appropriated by an external
economy, such as the United States. Remittances benefit individual
households but have largely an inflationary effect in the increase of
national income because they are unrelated to an increase in real pro-
ductive capacity and, given the kind of consumption they create,
do not have an economic growth function. In the countryside, remit-
tances tend to sharpen economic differentiation among households
and have the contrary effect of stimulating a socioeconomic decline
because the local economy is externally dependent on income from
remittances rather than on the productive capacity of workers. Export
demands of Philippine products generated by Filipinos abroad have
increased export earnings, but these demands have been met at the
expense of the earning capacity of the local population. Return mi-
grants bring back not only material cultural values, which increase
demands for imports, but also intellectual perspectives reflecting in
the main, specific approaches toward development geared to U.S.
interests, thus detracting attention from underlying structural inequal-
ities. In the past few years, however, Filipino presence in the United
States has led to the formation of a few lobby and information groups
that have pointed out precisely these development inequalities.
The state continues to encourage the export of labor as a way to ease unemployment and to augment foreign exchange reserves. It puts a premium on capturing foreign earnings by requiring remittance of a certain portion of emigrant wages, streamlining banking services and foreign exchange networks, and promoting “return” programs. But for the most part, foreign exchange reserves have been deflected from development programs that would benefit the majority of the population.

Emigration Policies and Domestic Development Goals of the Government of the Philippines Affecting Emigration to the United States
by Teofilo I. Marcelo

This paper demonstrates the adventurous nature of Filipinos in search of better opportunities in foreign shores. The Philippine exposure to American ways, as well as tastes, and, more importantly, the thought of the United States as a provider, a friend, and an ally after World War II, are fundamentally the reasons for the concentration of Filipino emigrants in the United States. The first part of the paper reviews the migration trend in the Philippines from its early stages to the present and the Philippine Government Policy on Emigration. The second part discusses the Philippine government’s recognition to uphold the welfare and rights of Filipinos abroad through the creation of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), a special government agency under the supervision and control of the Office of the Philippine President.

Emigration in any country is a constitutional right bestowed to every Filipino citizen provided he or she has been legally accepted by the host country and that he or she does not have any pending civil or criminal case before any Philippine Court of Law.

Migration to the “Americas” can be traced during the American occupation of the Philippines for more than four decades. Records show that for the past 37½ years (1946–84), a total of 588,420 Filipinos have migrated to the United States.

A breakdown on the quantitative outflow of the emigrants to the United States is as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Filipinos Migrating to the United States</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946–75</td>
<td>276,731</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration &amp; Naturalization Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976–80</td>
<td>157,469</td>
<td>Office of Emigrant Affairs, Ministry of Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981–84</td>
<td>154,220</td>
<td>Commission on Filipinos, Overseas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>588,420</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the states, territories, and possessions of the United States (including Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands), California absorbs the largest number of Filipino migrants, followed by Hawaii, Illinois, Guam, and New York, respectively.

When President Ferdinand E. Marcos visited Hawaii in April 1980, the leaders of Filipino communities sought presidential intercession regarding their predicament in living away from their loved ones and their problems in the host country. In response to their request, the Philippine Parliament created the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) on June 16, 1980; by virtue of Batas Pambansa (Republic Act) No. 79 specifically to protect the welfare of Filipinos overseas and provide assistance to Filipinos desiring to migrate to other countries, as well as establish a data bank in aid of national manpower policy formulation.

Moreover, the following are vital enactments adopted by the Philippine government on emigration:

1. The declaration of the State policy of maintaining close ties with Filipinos overseas as well as in promoting their welfare;
2. The amendment of Article XIV of the Philippine Constitution as approved and adopted by the people in the plebiscite of 1981 granting natural-born Filipinos who are citizens of foreign countries the right to purchase or be a transferee of real estate for residential or agricultural purposes;
3. The provision of a transportation discount package to returning immigrants who shall use the national flag carrier the Philippine Air Lines;
4. The extension of the validity of passports to a period of four years;
5. The creation of overseas offices of the CFO to provide the service
and welfare-oriented agency the visibility and direct contact to its (CFO) clientele; and

6. The institutionalization of programs such as the Balikbayan, returning imigrants), the Balik-Scientist (returning scientists), and the Balikbaha (repatriation of old, indigent Filipino workers in Hawaii and California).

Filipino migration to foreign shores will increase in the years ahead depending to a large extent on the migration policies of host countries, coupled with the Filipinos’ desire, among others, to improve their social and economic situations. As such, the Philippine government through its various agencies will continuously extend its assistance to every Filipino emigrant in a foreign land.

Review of Data Sources Concerning Emigration from India to the United States

by Ajit Kumar Dasgupta

This paper reviews studies on the distribution of Indians living abroad and recent steps taken to improve our understanding of the nature of Indian emigration. Data relevant to the emigration of Indians are collected by the Office of the Protector of Emigrants, the Reserve Bank of India, the Ministry of Education, the Department of Tourism, and other agencies. These data are rather fragmented and are usually simply a by-product of data collected for other purposes.

The Office of the Protector of Emigrants keeps track of skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers going abroad for employment purposes but does not deal with professional and technical workers. The Reserve Bank of India has some records on the international movement of students, since the bank controls foreign exchange required for study abroad. The Ministry of Education has records on students going abroad for higher education with the assistance of the government of India. The Department of Tourism publishes in its annual reports information on Indians leaving the country from the four major ports of Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research regularly releases information on placement applications from Indian scientists and technicians returning from abroad. Finally, the National Register of Scientific and Technical Persons has an Indian Abroad Section, but registration is voluntary and the list is incomplete.
These sources are far from comprehensive, so it is not possible to measure accurately the size of the Indian population living abroad or the annual flow of Indians moving abroad. Data for the receiving countries are also inadequate to this task. New data are becoming available, but again they cover only certain segments of the population. The future need is for all countries to gather detailed information about international migration in a coordinated manner. As a first step in this direction, it is recommended that the United Nations Statistical Agencies canvass national statistical agencies on the need for programs for the collection, tabulation, and presentation of data on aliens.

Indian Immigrants in the United States: Demographic Trends, Economic-Assimilation in the Host Society, and Impact on the Sending Society
by Urmil Minocha

This paper presents the historical pattern of Indian immigration to the United States and examines the demographic and economic profile of Indian immigrants. From the sending-country perspective, the impact of large-scale exodus of highly skilled Indians on the economic structure of India is also assessed.

Although Indians are among the earliest Asian immigrants to the United States, the majority of them have come after 1965, largely as a result of the liberalization of U.S. immigration laws toward Asians. The number of Indian immigrants increased from 582 in 1965 to 21,522 in 1981, an increase of about 3,600 percent. However, the annual number of Indians entering the United States has leveled off at about 20 thousand. An overwhelmingly high proportion of these immigrants are admitted within the numerical limitation of 20-thousand persons a year and under the family (or relative) preferences.

Recent immigrants from India are predominantly young, highly educated, and well-trained professionals or skilled male workers from urban areas. However, certain shifts in the age-sex structure and occupational profile of Indian immigrants are of particular significance in terms of their potential impact on both the sending and the receiving countries. More specifically, there is a gradual but definite trend toward older Indians immigrating to the United States, and the proportion of professional, technical, and kindred workers among all
Indian immigrants is on the decline. With regard to the settlement patterns of Indian immigrants, most of them tend to reside in urban areas of a few selected states. New York and California are among the most frequently selected states of destination for most Indians.

The high educational and occupational qualifications of Indian immigrants greatly facilitate their rapid entry into the American economic system. A vast majority of them are gainfully employed and earn relatively high incomes. Despite this, they frequently encounter racial prejudice and job discrimination, especially in the initial process of their transition from India to the United States. At present, underemployment, largely due to discrimination, appears to be pervasive among Indian immigrants.

The heavy exodus, especially in the early 1970s, of highly qualified professionals from India was feared to hamper India’s economic growth. However, much of this early concern over the issue of the so-called “brain drain” seems to have abated considerably. The dismal employment situation in India has led some researchers to view the emigration of professionals as functional, as it benefits both the sending and the receiving countries and the individuals involved as well. Though the net impact of emigration from India cannot be determined at this point due to lack of adequate knowledge about the cost and benefit of this process, it appears that the positive effects of emigration somewhat outweigh the negative effects.

Although still a very small fraction (0.2 percent in 1980) of the total U.S. population, Indians are among the most rapidly growing Asian immigrant groups in the United States and have great potential to eventually exert a profound influence on the economic, social, and political spheres of the United States. Therefore, large-scale empirical and comparative studies are urgently needed to fully understand this potentially important community.
and 1965, only 16,000 Indian immigrants entered the United States. In the following decade, nearly 100,000 Indians immigrated to the United States and the numbers have continued to increase since that time. Indian immigrants in the United States fall into four broad categories:

1. Farm laborers (and their descendants) who left the Indian States of Punjab between 1904 and 1914. This group of about 50,000 Indians is of peasant stock and is engaged primarily in agriculture.

2. Those who immigrated just before or soon after World War II. This group (currently numbering fewer than 30,000) is better educated than the group that preceded them and is relatively well-off economically.

3. Those who came in the 1960s and early 1970s (mostly students, visitors, and dependents) and stayed on. This group, numbering about 90,000, is doing well both financially and professionally.

4. Those who came in the 1970s, mostly students, who wanted to stay on for practical training or otherwise, but who had not acquired permanent resident status. Most of the 50,000 persons in this group are quite young (between 21 and 30 years of age).

There have been no comprehensive studies of the socio-economic consequences for India of emigration to any country, including the United States, but there has been considerable concern expressed about the brain drain, since such a large number of Indians leaving for the United States are professional and technical workers. Some efforts have been made to attract Indian professionals in the United States back to India, for example, by giving them assistance in finding suitable employment. Discussions about the brain drain in India, however, should take into account the large pool of professionals who have remained in India. Currently, the stock of scientific and technically qualified manpower in India is estimated to be more than 2.5 million, constituting the third largest reservoir of qualified manpower in the world. In this light, the brain-drain problem is less serious than would be expected from examining the number of highly qualified emigrants in isolation.
Indochinese Refugee Outflows and Migration Patterns
by Richard A. Engelhardt, Jr.

This study reviews the scale of Indochinese refugee flows and argues that the patterns of refugee population movement are largely prescribed by culturally predetermined networks. Data from a recent survey of refugees are also discussed.

Since 1975, an estimated 2 million persons have fled Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. Of these, some have chosen to return home (about 20,000), others have died (perhaps 100,000), and some have been integrated into the country of first asylum (about 30,000). As of 1984, about 350,000 remained in camps or in areas along the Thai border.

Of the roughly 1.5 million who have moved onward from countries of first asylum, about half have gone to the United States, more than 700,000 of whom were resettled through the refugee program, while others were admitted under the Orderly Departure Program. Another quarter million have gone to China, perhaps 350,000 have gone to non-Asian countries other than the United States, and about 5,000 have gone to Third World countries within Asia.

The potential shock of these refugee movements has been lessened by the history in both sending and first-asylum receiving countries of four related traditional patterns of movement. (1) rural relocation, (2) urban probe, (3) client-patron migration, and (4) forced removal. These patterns were discussed in the light of data from the refugee survey and other sources of information. An analysis of the occupational patterns of departing refugees suggested that the majority would be considered of peripheral value to the new regime, so losses to the refugee sending countries were deemed slight.

Refugee Movements as a Product of Social Conflict
by Astri Suhrke

Refugee population flows can be seen to result from the historical development and extension of state power, particularly the conflict associated with "late state formation." Analysis of the situation in Afghanistan and Ethiopia illustrates this process. Different types of population outflow should be recognized because movements of whole communities, for example, have different implications than individual refugee movements.
An important question is how certain population outflows come to be recognized as political refugees by the international community. Political conflict associated with "late dependent capitalism" is characteristic of a number of countries in Asia, yet they have no large outflow of people identified as "refugees." A sociological definition of refugee is needed and perhaps deserves legal recognition.

Paradise Left? Polynesian Voyagers in the Modern World by John Connell

Migration has characterized population change in the South Pacific in the past two decades, nowhere more so than in the predominantly small Polynesian states, such as American Samoa, Western Samoa, and Tonga, where there has been extensive emigration, primarily to New Zealand and the United States, to the extent that, in some cases, the actual populations are declining. The populations of Pacific Island states are becoming increasingly concentrated in national capitals or in cities in the metropolitan countries fringing the region.

Migration rates are influenced by economic changes in the international economy and by the increasing incorporation of the South Pacific into that world system. The states of the South Pacific are small (in population and land area) and with limited potential for economic development. Development potential is broadly correlated with size, and the extent of emigration is even more broadly inversely correlated with size. Population growth rates are invariably high but much population increase has been diverted into emigration, which is therefore often regarded as a "safety valve."

Migration is primarily a response to real and perceived inequalities in socioeconomic opportunities and is associated with value changes associated with the effective penetration of capitalism to this remote periphery of the world economy. Emigration has transferred much fertility overseas and contributed both to a brain-and-skill drain and a decline in agricultural production. A massive inflow of remittances has increased domestic welfare but, in the absence of productive investment opportunities, has rarely contributed to economic growth. Return migration has been limited in extent, often being primarily of "failures" or retirees, and few acquired skills have been effectively transferred into local economies. In some contexts, there has been opposition to return migration.
Few countries have attempted to slow emigration rates or to promote development strategies that would reduce dependence on emigration and from the poorest countries, especially Kiribati and Tuvalu, there have been new pressures on metropolitan countries to accept more migrants. Future migration opportunities are likely to result from economic changes and political responses in metropolitan countries. There is greater opposition to increased migration in Australia and New Zealand than in the United States, although historic colonial ties have provided continued avenues for migration. Currently the overseas Pacific Islander population is larger and growing faster in the United States than anywhere else, and this trend appears likely to continue.

Comments on paper by John Connell
by Te'o I.J. Fairbairn

In dealing with this subject, Dr. Connell succeeds in bringing together a large body of evidence, based doubtless on a reading of practically all that has been published in the English language on the subject. Major economic factors are highlighted, which reveal much about the motives to migrate from Pacific island countries. He concludes that such motives are likely to remain powerful influences, paving the way for a “new diaspora.”

I will confine my comments to pointing out a few apparent ambiguities in the paper as well as areas that merit further clarification. On the substance and major conclusions, I find little in the paper with which to disagree.

Collating and interpreting material for so many island countries, each exhibiting important differences from the others, is no easy task. Connell succeeds but not without an occasional lapse. Perhaps most notable is the failure in places to specify clearly whether a particular point is meant to apply to Pacific islands in general or to individual countries or groups of them in particular. To illustrate, much is made of the arguments against emigration contained in Western Samoa’s plan documents, but no indication is given of whether these have general application or significance. Clearly, such arguments would have little significance for the small resource-poor countries, which tend to view emigration as a vital option offering the possibility of escape from an otherwise unavoidable drift toward poverty.

The paper correctly emphasizes the importance of agriculture in the
economic life of the region, but it points out that in many instances agriculture has failed to "provide for the food requirements of a growing population" (p. 7), and this has created problems for the balance of payments. It goes on to say that "the value of food imports has generally been greater than revenue from food crop exports" (p. 6). (The first of these points is repeated on pages 17 and 38.)

The claim that agriculture has failed is generally true in the case of export production but is open to dispute in relation to food production for local consumption. The evidence suggests that in many cases agriculture has performed well in providing for subsistence needs and in meeting local market demand. This has been the case in Western Samoa (see latest Development Plan) but is probably true of other Pacific island countries as well. A further ambiguity lies in equating food imports with food exports, a relationship that is not critical for balance-of-payments equilibrium.

A key component of the paper is that of dealing with the rationale for migration. The paper clearly points to economic factors as principal motives for emigration. One cannot quarrel with this, but what needs to be done is to strive for more precision in identifying the kind of economic forces at work and how they affect migration. "Wider economic opportunities" are cited as a primary factor, but this rationale needs to be disaggregated into more specific elements. These possibilities include wage and/or income differentials, securing of regular employment, access to "fast money," achievement of economic independence, escape from limited job opportunities, greater savings potential, and fulfillment of material aspirations. Dealing in such specific terms would be a step forward in itself and would also provide a more satisfactory basis for analyzing differences between island countries.

The role of remittances in small Pacific island economies is as yet poorly understood. Connell's paper reflects this, for example, in the statement that the planning goals of "self-sufficiency implies reduction of migration and remittances" (p. 30) and that "continued dependence on remittances is symptomatic of continuing underdevelopment and dependency" (p. 31). I doubt that island countries view things this way. Remittances are now such a key factor that many islanders accept them as a perfectly normal way of obtaining money and as a means of satisfying material aspirations. They are viewed as essentially money transfers from family members working abroad and
not as a form of charity or handout. Nationally, remittances bring in large amounts of scarce foreign exchange vital for the balance of payments and for development in general. It can be argued, therefore, that this form of transfer is not incompatible with efforts to promote greater self-reliance.

Emigration acts as a "safety valve" that relieves pressure on national governments of these countries to provide employment opportunities and welfare services. As such, it gives them breathing space and an opportunity to get their act together in tackling vital development and related problems. A danger, as the paper points out, is when emigration is viewed as a "substitution for development" rather than a short-term support for increasing the effectiveness of national development efforts. But again the latter caveat has limited validity for the very small island countries.

There are limits to what can be covered in a paper, but one regrets the absence of more detailed evidence relating to the microlevel or family, household level of emigration. More needs to be known about family, and individual attitudes toward emigration, its role as a family option, impact of emigration on family labor and work organization, effects of remittances, and nature of the household relations with overseas members. Further research in these areas would help to give us an even clearer picture of international migration from the region.

A Regional Perspective on Sending Country Issues
by Jerrold W. Huguet

The presentation argues that a true regional perspective on the issues of emigration to the United States does not exist in Asia and discusses some reasons why. It cites the importance of student migration and discusses the possibility of Asian countries attempting to influence United States immigration policy in the future.

One reason for claiming that a regional perspective on emigration does not exist in Asia is that the experience of countries in the region varies greatly. The five countries of China, India, Republic of Korea, Philippines, and Vietnam provided more than 20,000 migrants to the United States in 1980. Aside from the somewhat special cases of Iran (10,400 migrants) and Laos (14,000 migrants), no other country provided as many as 5,000 migrants. Several countries with sizable
populations provided fewer than 1,000 migrants (e.g., Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka).

At the regional level the issue of emigration to the United States is dwarfed by other concerns, such as political and security questions, international trade issues, and even the importance of international labor migration.

If by “regional perspective” we mean a viewpoint that is held strongly enough to affect government policies, then no regional view exists, because essentially no national views have developed. Most of the Asian countries represented at the conference indicated that they have taken no measures to restrict emigration to the United States.

Although recent economic theories of international migration emphasize that it widens the development gap, the presentation suggests that governments have not sought to restrict emigration because (1) it simply has not become a policy issue, (2) governments hold the values of human rights to be more important than economic gain, (3) governments are not convinced that emigration represents a net loss, or (4) the policy is in error. The presentation speculates that Asian governments would be more likely to protest if the United States stopped all immigration from their countries than if it permitted unlimited migration.

Migration for the purpose of study is often overlooked in migration research because it is conceived of as a temporary move, but the thousands of Asian students who study in the United States establish academic, professional, business, social, and cultural links that are extremely important for both the United States and the Asian countries.

To date, Asian countries have not, singly or collectively, attempted to exert much influence on the formulation of United States migration policy, but in the future, they may wish to lobby for certain numerical quotas, for a policy that would achieve a better balance among sending countries or for policies emphasizing either family reunification or occupational preferences. Such lobbying is not anticipated, however, for the same reasons that Asian governments have not generally formed their own policies regarding emigration.
Accounting for Immigration: The State of the Art
by Daniel B. Levine

Although almost always a topic of concern, immigration to the United States has drawn steadily increasing interest over this past decade. As birthrates have declined, recognition has grown of the role immigration will play in future population growth. Debate is heard on the impacts of immigration on national economic conditions and social structures. Questions abound over the volume of illegal alien immigration and the numbers now residing in the country, as well as over our policies toward refugee resettlement. As government attempts to formulate and develop policy approaches to deal with the issues, the ability of the federal statistical system to provide a factual basis for planning, implementation, or evaluation is called into question.

In response to these and other long-standing expressions of concern, the Committee on National Statistics of the National Research Council was asked by the Immigration and Naturalization Service to convene a conference to assess the feasibility of and need for a review of federal immigration statistics. The Conference, held in late 1980, strongly supported the need for a comprehensive review and, accordingly, in late 1982, the Panel on Immigration Statistics was established within the Committee on National Statistics of the National Research Council, with the support of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice. A panel of 14 members was selected, reflecting the diversity of interest in the topic, they represented expertise in economics, sociology, demography, law, statistics, management, and journalism.

The study had three major aspects:
1. to determine data needs for immigration policy, for administration of immigration law, and for other purposes related to immigration;
2. to review existing data sources related to immigration, emigration, and foreign stock and to assess their statistical adequacy, and
3. to identify major shortcomings and recommend appropriate remedies and actions.

The paper presents an overview of the activities, findings, conclusions, and general recommendations of the Panel on Immigration Statistics. Following some introductory discussion on the background of the issues and a description of the Panel, it describes and discusses the
Data-gathering activities, limitations, and problems of several of the major data sources that provide information on different aspects of immigration, including flows, stocks, and the dynamics of the process. Highlighted are the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Census Bureau, the State Department, the National Center for Health Statistics, and the Social Security Administration. Because the Panel’s report had not yet been published, specific recommendations were not available; however, the paper concludes by noting a number of broad, major actions required if the availability of reliable and timely data relevant to the policy concerns of the day is to become a reality.

Key among the suggestions are:
- The Statistical Policy Office of the Office of Management and Budget must take a lead role in fostering and maintaining coordination among producers and users within the government. Of particular importance is establishing common definitions, ensuring their use; ending duplication of effort, defining essential items, and extending the exchange of information.
- Advisory committees and other mechanisms must be established to obtain outside experience and expertise.
- Quality, timeliness, and consistency must become integral elements in the production of statistics.
- The Immigration and Naturalization Service must recognize that quality statistics will become the norm only when top management becomes committed to and fully supports the idea that data are important and necessary. Until that point, any other action is simply a finger in the dike.
- A major new study, consisting of a longitudinal panel survey, should be initiated under the support of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to provide continuing information on the dynamics of the process of settlement and adjustment in the United States by immigrants and refugees. The study should cover new immigrants and those changing status, temporary admissions for educational, training, and short-term work, and aliens given legal status under amnesty provisions.

Comments on paper by Daniel B. Levine
by Samuel Baum

Mr. Levine presented a comprehensive assessment of the adequacy of U.S. immigration statistics, therefore, I have only a few minor com-
ments to offer in the nature of some complementary thoughts on the topic under discussion.

First, the limited quantity of immigration statistics and their limited accessibility are not confined to the United States. Immigration statistics are probably the least adequate of the three major variables of national population growth for almost all countries of the world, both developing and developed.

Levine points out the low priority given to immigration statistics by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). I have the impression that this reflects the low priority given to such statistics by all federal agencies, including the Census Bureau. For example, my impression is that the major impetus for the Census Bureau’s interest in how many Americans and others emigrate was not because of an interest in immigration itself but because lack of emigration data was an obstacle in the Census Bureau’s attempts to measure the undercount in the population census. Low priority for immigration statistics might also be inferred from the failure to obtain the relatively small amount of money required to carry questions on emigration in the Current Population Survey.

My impression, and here all of you experts on U.S. immigration may object, is that academics have not in recent decades fully exploited what data on immigration are available in population censuses, public use samples, and the Current Population Survey. Immigration has not been as popular a topic as fertility, for example, consequently, less attention has been paid to the subject except for some newsworthy aspects, such as illegal immigration. This has been changing in recent years, however, and this conference is a reflection of the renewed interest in immigration.

I am somewhat puzzled by Levine’s statement that “I would hope the Bureau would finally explore the feasibility of using the CPS to test the collection of information on emigration through a multiplicity approach.” My understanding is that the Census Bureau had fully explored this but could not obtain the funds, which was a paltry sum by federal spending standards.

One of the major contributions of Levine’s paper is to bring to our attention the important role that non-INS data sources can play in studying immigration. For example, if we go back to the framework developed in the paper presented by Fawcett, Arnold, and Minocha at this conference, it becomes obvious that many important data are
potentially available from State Department and Social Security Administration sources and nowhere else. It is hoped that relevant federal agencies, Congress, and the Office of Management and Budget will recognize their value as a source of data and will implement recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel to translate their potential into actual data.

Finally, I believe we owe a debt of gratitude to the NAS panel, and the INS who sponsored the study, for developing a wide range of recommendations that could dramatically change the data situation. Whether they will be adopted we shall have to wait and see.

In the meantime government and non-government users of data can strengthen their case for more and better immigration statistics by better exploitation of what is available, for example, the special tabulation on the foreign born from the U.S. 1980 Census. If this rich body of data does not get exploited, it is less likely that similar data will be produced from the 1990 U.S. Population Census and that other countries will follow our lead in preparing similar data from their forthcoming population censuses.

Special Studies of Immigrants. A Comparison of Work on Asian and Hispanic Immigrants to the United States
by Teresa A. Sullivan

Despite large, recent increases in the proportion of Asians among legal U.S. immigrants, research on this population has been relatively scarce. One reason for this scarcity is common to all studies of immigrants: the structural separation of immigration data production from data analysis. Data production can be carried on under official and unofficial auspices and analyzed by official agencies or by unofficial researchers and agencies. In the United States, immigration data have been produced by official agencies but analyzed by unofficial researchers. As a result, many needed data are never collected or the time series are interrupted. Some researchers produce their own (unofficial) data, but this is costly and may produce only small or local samples.

In addition, the particular study of Asian-American immigrants is complicated by four factors. First, data bases collected under official auspices are often inadequate. A national sample survey will yield too few cases for analysis, and the race/ethnic codes in many official data bases may combine all Asian nationalities as "other."
Census is an exception, but its questionnaire permits analysis of only a few issues at 10-year intervals.

Second, a perception prevails among analysts that Asian-American immigration issues are different from those facing other groups. For example, Asian-Americans are perceived as a heterogeneous group of permanent immigrants who assimilate quickly and become “model minorities.” By contrast, Latin-American immigrants are often characterized as a homogeneous, temporary migration stream that refuses to assimilate and is fast becoming a social problem. Both stereotypes are badly distorted.

The third factor derives from the second. The issues facing Hispanic immigrants are seen as more important, perhaps because they are often compared to blacks as a “problematic” minority. Many studies of black disadvantage have been replicated for Hispanics, but there are relatively few studies that include even one Asian immigrant group as a comparison.

The fourth factor is the development in studying Asian-Americans of emphasizing issues and concepts that cannot be studied with official data sources. These issues are often studied with small, local, unofficial samples. Examples include generational change in values, use of mental health facilities, and networks among Asian immigrants. A literature review of recent articles is used to illustrate some of the important themes in this body of literature.

Canada and Immigration of Asian Nationals: Development of an Immigration Policy
by Daniel Kubat

The early formulations of Canada’s immigration policy began before the turn of this century primarily as a response to immigration of Asians. The Asian immigrants, arriving and settling for the most part in British Columbia, were seen as a threat numerically, culturally, and economically to a relatively sparse, mostly British population in the Province. Provincial powers kept trying to thwart additional immigration of Asians who were sought as cheap labor for major construction projects. The ultimate responsibility for immigration rested, however, in Ottawa. The federal government had to take into account the needs of the radicalized provincial constituency, as well as the obligations it had toward the British Crown and toward large-scale
employers of Asian labor. Understandably, the federal government was reluctant to show a bias directed at a specific nationality while the administration of immigration proved to be restrictive to Asians. This was accomplished through a sophistry in formulating rules of admission predicated on the principle of assimilability.

From 1967 on, Canada's immigration policies became tied explicitly to the dual concerns of demographic and labor force balance. The intake of immigrants, however, responds now mainly to humanitarian concerns, both by allowing liberally into the country relatives of Canadian residents and by accepting for settlement a fair number of refugees from around the world. A bona fide economic immigration to Canada of all races and nationalities has become quite small ever since the immigration regulations have become bona fide universalistic. One exception to this trend is an active recruitment of entrepreneurs importing financial capital into Canada.

Asian-Pacific Immigrants in Australia
by Charles A. Price

Up to about the early part of the twentieth century, Australia's immigration policy has been characterized by severe restrictions. Popularly known as the White-Australian Policy, these restrictions drastically reduced the number of Asian-Pacific peoples in Australia, except for those engaged in exempt occupations. Though small in number, the early immigrants to Australia had much to do with the revival of Asian-Pacific immigration once the restrictions were eased, culminating in the introduction of completely nondiscriminatory policies in 1973.

Along with the current emphasis on family reunification and acceptance of responsibility for refugees, the easing of restrictions produced a substantial increase in Asian-Pacific immigration to Australia in recent years causing renewed concern in some sectors of Australian society.

Asian-Pacific immigrants in recent years are in general highly qualified with substantial proportions of South and East Asians in the professional and technical occupational categories. Although Asian-Pacific groups tend to concentrate in certain areas of Australia, they are at present experiencing outmarriages very much more than Mediterranean immigrants, and most of these outmarriages are with
native Australians. They are contributing, therefore, less to the perpetuation of a pluralist multicultural society than to the emergence of a new ethnically mixed society, reminiscent more of the American melting pot than Swiss Cantonal pluralism.

New Zealand: An Alternative Destination for Asian and Pacific Immigrants
by Andrew D. Trillin

This paper examines New Zealand's immigration policies with specific reference to the entry of Pacific and Asian migrants. The first part of the paper reviews the nature and provisions of current policies, including the underlying considerations and responsibilities. The second part of the paper, using 1981 census results, focuses upon the size and selected characteristics of Pacific and Asian populations in New Zealand to provide some indication of policy outcomes. Finally, because of their bearing upon either domestic or external responsibilities and their influence upon aspects of current policies, the nature and resolution of three recent immigration issues (i.e., Pacific Island overstayers, the Samoan citizenship crisis, and the delayed entry of Indochinese refugees) are briefly discussed.

Underlying current immigration policies are a number of domestic and external responsibilities or considerations. These include the management of a vulnerable domestic economy, a humanitarian responsibility to assist in refugee resettlement, a special commitment toward the development of South Pacific territories formerly administered by New Zealand, and the provision of assistance to other developing neighbors in the Pacific and Asia. Considerations pertaining to the ethnic and racial composition of the New Zealand population, immigrant assimilation, and harmonious intergroup relations are also important. The latter considerations, emphasized in the early 1970s, have not been explicitly stated in recent years, but their continued influence can be deduced from current immigration provisions. With these responsibilities or considerations in mind, the various provisions and criteria specified for either permanent or temporary entry to New Zealand may be more easily understood and appreciated.

Three main categories for applicants seeking permanent entry to New Zealand are:

1. Entry on occupational grounds. Selection is based on the Occu-
pational Priority List (OPL), which varies according to employment levels and vacancies for particular skills. Preference is given to persons from "traditional source countries" (i.e., United Kingdom and other Western European countries). Skilled persons from developing countries are specifically excluded unless their skills are needed in New Zealand, are not in demand in their country of origin, and are not obtainable from a developed country.

2. Entry on family reunification grounds. Notably spouses and dependent children, and (subject to certain conditions) parents, siblings, and independent children of New Zealand citizens or permanent residents.

3. Entry on humanitarian grounds applies primarily to refugees (e.g., the Indochinese) with schemes considered in response to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees requests. The numbers accepted are dependent on the availability of long-term resettlement resources (e.g., accommodation, employment) and suitable voluntary sponsors.

Others who may qualify for permanent entry include entrepreneurs of proven ability, and Western Samoan citizens under a quota system (currently set at 1,100 per year) that has existed since the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and the declaration of Samoa independence in 1962.

Aside from nonworking visitors and tourists, temporary immigration of Pacific Islanders and Asians is governed by three sets of policies. These concern:

- **Entry of managerial and other skilled overseas staff**, plus their dependents, brought in by an employing company in New Zealand where the applicant possesses a specialist skill required for the job (e.g., this provision accounts for a high proportion of Japanese migrant residents in New Zealand).

- **Entry of South Pacific workers**, with a 6-month rural employment scheme for Fijians and an 11-month urban work scheme for Fijians, Tongans, and Western Samoans (in each case the respective island government is responsible for selection of workers).

- **Entry of overseas students**, perceived as a contribution to the development of their homelands with preference given first to South Pacific students, followed by those from Southeast Asia (notably Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand).

In terms of the policies specified above, Pacific Islanders have clear
advantages over Asians with regard to immigration to New Zealand. These advantages include the Western Samoan quota (exempted from OPL skill-requirements), the temporary work permit schemes, the first preference given to South Pacific students, and, of course, the New Zealand citizenship and hence unrestricted entry of Cook Islanders, Niueans, and Tokelauans. The embargo on recruitment of skilled personnel from developing countries precludes, with few exceptions, the permanent entry of Asian migrants on occupational grounds. Thus the vast majority of prospective Asian migrants are restricted to qualification for permanent entry on family reunification, marriage, or humanitarian grounds and to temporary entry as company employees or students.

The effects of these policies are to some extent reflected in census results. In 1981 the foreign born accounted for 14.8 percent of New Zealand's usually resident population with immigrants from Australia, the United Kingdom, continental Europe, and North America accounting for about 76 percent of the foreign born. The bulk-of-the remainder were from 30 Pacific and Asian birthplaces, of which only 13 (including the Cook, Niue, and Tokelau islands) had in excess of 1 thousand members. Even on the basis of ethnic origin (which includes New Zealand-born generations), only Samoans accounted for more than 1 percent of New Zealand's usually resident population. Other policy effects include the relatively short duration of residence of Pacific and Asian populations (there were only three major birthplaces wherein the percentage resident for 20 years or more exceeded 50 percent), their youthfulness, and low dependency ratios, except for groups where the percentage of full-time students was high (e.g., Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand). The inescapable conclusion is that New Zealand's immigration policies, governed by domestic economic considerations and the factors of assimilation and harmonious intergroup relations, have successfully restricted Pacific and especially Asian immigration in favor of migrants from traditional European sources.

What are the future prospects for Pacific and Asian immigration? The newly elected labor government will no doubt embark upon a period of renewed commitment to the social and economic development of South Pacific neighbors. If the serious economic difficulties, which have handicapped New Zealand during the past ten years, are successfully resolved it may be possible to raise the Samoan quota, to
expand the temporary work-permit schemes, and to liberalize family reunification policies in the case of Fijians, Tongans, and Samoans. For Asians it is difficult to envisage the government being able to offer, or New Zealanders tolerating, much more than minor modifications to current immigration policies. Experience since the late 1970s with the Indochinese refugees (of whom 5,400 have been resettled), however, has demonstrated the existence of previously underestimated levels of community goodwill and tolerance. Thus resettlement of Indochinese refugees could be expected to continue and to be extended to other Asian refugees as and when the need arises.
Conference participants formed three working groups to discuss research and policy issues. The first group assessed the gains and losses to the sending country. The second group considered the gains and losses to immigrants and the receiving country. The third group looked into the implementation and effectiveness of U.S. immigration policy. The outcome of the discussions in these groups was reported to the entire conference. A summary of the reports is presented here.

Gains and Losses to the Sending Country

This working group arrived at two general conclusions. First, migration has significant consequences for the sending country regardless of the magnitude of the flow, that is, emigration is generally not neutral to economic and political processes within sending countries. Migration is a generator of (and generated by) social and economic change within a society. Second, even when the initial magnitude is small, emigration streams almost inevitably grow and, as emigration streams mature, return migration is likely to become a significant phenomenon. Research therefore must address the future consequences of present emigration patterns.

In this light five substantive areas of research were identified. (1) transfer of human resources, (2) transfer of other economic resources, (3) patterns of migration, (4) demographic factors, and (5) political implications. The units of analysis for each topic can range from the individual to the family and household, community, nation, and the international system. The group listed specific topics for each general substantive area.

The transfer of human resources involves largely the problem of the brain-skill drain, the effects of the loss of professional and technical skills on the provision of basic needs and welfare, and on the supply of needed skills in the sending country. In relation to this problem the policy research should look into, first, the appropriateness of educational curricula as these may be directed more to social and political needs of receiving societies rather than sending societies, and second,
the effectiveness of such compensation measures as bonding schemes and taxation policies in preventing the loss of these skills.

The transfer of economic resources is primarily the issue of remittances. Remittances need to be viewed from both ends of the process—their effects on the economy, their use by households occupying different positions in the social economy, and the extent to which these are affected by government control.

Under patterns of migration the main consideration was with return migration and its effects, the reasons for returning, and the reintegration of returnees. The effects of other types of migration, such as labor migration, circular migration, and temporary or permanent migration, also should be explored.

The demographic factors that need investigation are life-cycle changes related to remittance flows, the restructuring of the family and household, and changes in social networks and support systems.

The political consequences of emigration include the impact of the emigration of strategically placed individuals or groups, the effect of remittances on the political system, the influence of lobbying in host countries and its effect on the sending country.

The group also discussed research designs appropriate for the study of these issues. Emphasis was given to comparative research, longitudinal studies (particularly on the community level), qualitative and structural or institutional research, interviews at points of entry and departure, and opinion polls. These studies should also focus on the relevance of policy to economic and developmental goals.

Gains and Losses to Immigrants and the Receiving Country
This working group focused its discussion on two general issues, the impact of immigrants on the receiving country or local community, and the most appropriate research strategies to collect data on this impact. On the issue of immigrant impact, the group took into account topics that provide information for both policymakers and researchers. Of interest to policymakers, for example, is the extent to which immigrants affect local resources and institutions, including the labor market, schools, housing, and health services. Researchers are also interested in these issues and are likely to use them as indicators by which to measure or understand immigrant adaptation, particularly the degree to which immigrants exhibit ethnic resilience on the one hand and assimilation on the other. Researchers will then need
additional information on such topics as ethnic enclaves, social networks, intergroup relationships, expectations before and after migration, indices of assimilation (and distinctions between short-term and long-term adaptation), immigrants' familiarity with host community structures and norms, and linkages with the sending country via remittances and return migration.

On the issue of research strategies, the group brought up questions of research design, the agency most appropriate to undertake the research, and the sampling frame. The need for a framework for the research agenda was also discussed. A longitudinal study of various immigrant groups was thought most useful in the light of current emphasis on single group studies. However, this type of approach needs to be supplemented by cross-sectional studies and case studies. The U.S. Bureau of the Census was deemed one of the logical agencies to undertake such studies, partly because Census Bureau data are made accessible to researchers. The sample could be derived from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) files or from the census. If derived from the census, migrant groups could be oversampled to increase data reliability.

Implementation and Effectiveness of U.S. Immigration Policy

This working group approached immigration policy from three different but mutually interdependent points: its determinants, its implementation, and its effectiveness. For each of these, the group identified factors relating to the origin and destination of migrants as these bear on policy. Some factors, which figure in the determination of policy, are the political situation, economic development, culture (e.g., kinship structures), population growth, humanitarian issues, migration experiences of migrants, pressures and expectations of citizens, and alternative "futures" of origin and destination.

The implementation of policy is affected by, among other things, the operation of bureaucracies (i.e., the mission of agencies and organization for policy formulation and implementation), the response of potential migrants to policy (whether complied with or ignored, as with undocumented immigrants), and the effect of citizen response upon the behavior of decision makers and the enforcement of policy.

The indicators of policy effectiveness have to do with the relation of observed outcomes to policy objectives. These indicators include the expectation of policy operations in terms of domestic politics,
economic issues, intergroup relations, return migration, social cohesion, discrimination, and the alternative futures of origin and destination.

The group also listed six broad areas! of priority research directed toward evaluating the effectiveness of immigration policy. These areas of research need to take into consideration data availability and current procedures in immigration policy analysis. On the one hand, researchers ought to realize the contributions they make to policy analysis, formulation, and implementation, and to the evaluation of its effectiveness, and on the other, Congress and various agencies concerned with immigration policy must develop an appreciation of the critical role of scientific research in policy implementation and evaluation.

The first area of research recommended is a comparative analysis of immigration policies to better understand the process of policy formulation and implementation in the United States. A second area is the consistency of policy goals with community or institutional values regarding immigration and ethnic relations. Third, research should look into demographic and other aspects of the migration process, including data on different categories of migrants, their length of stay, and social and economic characteristics. As a fourth area, the group recommended studies to determine the potential supply of immigrants to the United States. On the macro or institutional level, such studies would deal with the supply and demand of labor in sending countries, patterns of income distribution in these countries, and political and economic linkages between the United States and sending countries. On the micro or household level, these studies would focus on decisions to migrate, knowledge of U.S. policies, and norms on mobility (the "culture" of migration). Fifth, policy needs to be examined in the light of its achievement of specified goals (e.g., family reunification, labor market needs and labor market protection, and resettlement of refugees). Sixth, research might look into migrant strategies concerning expected and intended length of stay, expectations about naturalization, and maintenance of the household.
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POLICIES ON POPULATION MOVEMENT IN SELECTED ASIAN COUNTRIES

The materials in this section have been excerpted from *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983.* Prepared by the U.S. Department of State, this volume is submitted annually to the U.S. Congress as part of the presentation materials for the U.S. security assistance programs. The report summarizes human rights conditions in many countries around the world, drawing on information furnished by United States missions abroad, congressional studies, non-governmental organizations, and human rights bodies of international organizations.

Each country report contains a section on freedom of movement. These have been excerpted for the countries of Asia to provide insights about policies in four areas of concern: (1) internal travel, (2) foreign travel and emigration, (3) readmission of exiles and expatriates, and (4) refugee and asylum matters.

Because many persons were involved in the drafting of the volume, country conditions and policies are described in varying levels of detail and comprehensiveness. Inevitably, differences in perspective, judgment, and emphasis also appear in the various country reports. The reports do provide, however, information about emigration policies—formal and informal—that is otherwise difficult to obtain.

AFGHANISTAN

Domestic travel has been severely curtailed by the war. Overland movement has become more difficult and dangerous because of physical damage to roadbeds and destruction of bridges. Surface travelers also run the risk of being caught in fights between mujahidin and Soviet and regime convoys. The civilian traveler is also faced with frequent checkpoints or roadblocks by Soviets, regime forces, mujahidin and, in some cases, bandits. Tolls are often extracted at these stops. Regime officials in Western dress ordinarily travel by air, since they run the risk of being identified and killed by the mujahidin. However,
domestic air travel has also become more dangerous because of occasional resistance attacks on aircraft and airports.

The regime severely curtails foreign travel by Afghans under its control. Permission for professionals such as doctors, engineers, and academics is routinely denied out of fear they will not return. Substantial businessmen can still obtain passports, but many Afghans are forced to pay bribes of $1,000 or more to have a passport issued. Bank accounts and real estate are often asked as surety for return, and the regime seizes the property of persons absent from Afghanistan for more than a year. Passports are often limited to one trip only and seized at the airport upon return. Afghan pilgrims to Mecca are issued documents valid only for Saudi Arabia in an effort to assure return to Afghanistan.

While legal emigration is virtually impossible, large numbers of Afghans continue to leave the country clandestinely to seek refuge abroad. The regime has seized entire families who presented insufficient justification for traveling on routes commonly used to leave the country surreptitiously. Most estimates place the number of Afghans who have fled the country at over three million. Though the regime has often asserted that such exiles are welcome to return to Afghanistan without penalty, most expatriate Afghans have decided not to return as long as practices such as the indiscriminate bombing of villages continue.

BANGLADESH

Bangladesh citizens are free to move within the country, but there are designated "protected areas" near the borders and certain other locations from which all nonresidents may be banned. Bangladeshis regarded as "loyal" citizens, such as those against whom no criminal charges are pending, are generally free to visit or emigrate abroad, subject to foreign exchange controls. In some instances, persons deemed by the government to be security risks have not been allowed to travel abroad at will. Ultimately, the martial law authorities determine who is a loyal citizen. Civil servants must obtain "no-objection certificates" from the ministry in which they are employed before traveling abroad, and citizens going overseas to work in the Middle East and elsewhere must register with the ministry responsible for manpower exports. The right of repatriation is observed in Bangladesh.
Although the government has no stated policy on refugee and asylum matters, it has in the past provided temporary asylum to sizable groups of Arakanese Muslim refugees from Burma.

Approximately 250,000 non-Bengal Muslim Biharis remain in camps in Bangladesh, in principle pending resettlement in India or Pakistan. After independence in 1971, these Biharis opted for Pakistani citizenship. As neither Pakistan nor Bangladesh recognizes them as citizens, the issue remains unresolved, and the people are effectively stateless. Camp dwellers may seek employment and conduct other activities but face disadvantages as non-citizens. Some Biharis have lost property as a result of laws confiscating Pakistani holdings. On the other hand, those Biharis who chose to become Bangladeshi citizens in 1971 are entitled to full rights as such.

**BHUTAN**

There is freedom of movement within Bhutan for Bhutanese citizens and no bar on emigration or foreign travel. Permanent residence for Nepalis and Indians in Bhutan (except those in government service) is restricted to the southern hill region. Bhutan traditionally has welcomed refugees and exiles from other countries in the region. Some 4,000 Tibetan refugees sought refuge in Bhutan after 1959, joining approximately 2,000 Tibetans already in the country. Because it perceived threats to national security resulting from the Tibetan refugees' lack of allegiance to Bhutan, the Bhutanese government required in 1979-80 that the Tibetans either accept Bhutanese citizenship or face expulsion. When India and other countries initially refused to accept the Tibetans, Bhutan's policy raised the possibility of forcible repatriation. However, the government decided not to carry out its threat. Of the approximately 4,500 Tibetans in Bhutan in 1979, 1,000 accepted Bhutanese citizenship, 1,500 were settled in northern India, and the remainder stayed in Bhutan without obtaining citizenship. The government of Bhutan has assured the Tibetans who accepted citizenship that they will always be free to return to their homeland.

**BURMA**

The Constitution guarantees Burmese citizens the right to live anywhere in the country, although exceptions apply to areas of insurgent
activity. Except for these limitations, internal travel by Burmese citizens is unrestricted, but they must inform local authorities of their temporary place of residence.

Citizens wishing to travel abroad, except for official purposes, must obtain approval from the Passport Board. There are long delays in the processing of applications, and less than half of them are believed to receive approval. Although the Passport Board does not need to justify its decisions, it is apparent that political considerations are a major factor in some cases. The Burmese government has been responsive to humanitarian appeals in a few cases.

Private citizens normally must reimburse the government for their university and professional education and pay income tax in advance before traveling abroad. Noncitizens are generally unable to travel abroad legally, as Burma does not recognize stateless documentation for exit purposes.

While no such policy has been formally enunciated, emigration is restricted because of the government's concerns about security and loss of trained personnel. Legal requirements and bureaucratic procedures cause long delays, and the right to emigrate often is denied. Emigres are severely limited in terms of what they are allowed to take out of the country with them. Citizens who adopt another nationality lose their Burmese citizenship.

Burmese government policies severely restrict the return of emigres, although the 1980 amnesty permitted exiles living abroad to return to Burma. A number of prominent former politicians and some former insurgents took advantage of the offer. Emigres who left the country legally are generally allowed to return to visit relatives, although there are often delays in obtaining entry visas. Emigres wishing to return permanently are required to reapply for Burmese citizenship. In general, emigres who leave the country illegally cannot legally return under any circumstances.

Burma does not permit foreign refugees or displaced persons to resettle or seek safehaven within Burma. The government treats persons claiming to be refugees as illegal immigrants subject to arrest or deportation. In the late 1970s, the Burmese government forcibly expelled over 150,000 alleged "illegal immigrants" from Bangladesh. Most were subsequently repatriated to Burma and resettled under UNHCR auspices.

An unknown number, probably several hundred, of displaced
persons or "illegal immigrants" has been under detention for years. These stateless persons entered Burma, often without papers, in hope of transit or resettlement. Among the detainees of Chinese origin, who constitute the largest group, some fled from China during the Cultural Revolution and have been under detention for fifteen years or more. Others are ethnic Chinese who fled Vietnam during the period of persecution of Chinese in the late 1970s.

CHINA

Travel within China is subject to numerous restrictions. Chinese citizens must have a written letter of introduction from their work unit to buy airline tickets, secure hotel accommodations, or acquire ration coupons that allow them to purchase basic food items in areas outside their place of residence. Those traveling by rail who plan to stay with relatives need not obtain letters of introduction but still are required to register with local police during their visits. In practice, many Chinese citizens travel frequently within the country, and some ignore the bureaucratic requirements without any difficulty.

Controls over travel abroad and emigration have relaxed significantly in the past few years. Tens of thousands of Chinese citizens go abroad each year to study, conduct business, or visit relatives. The U.S. Embassy and Consulates in China issued over 16,000 nonimmigrant visas in Fiscal Year 1983 and refused many thousands of other Chinese applicants who secured travel documents but failed to meet U.S. visa standards. During the same period, over 6,000 immigrant visas were issued in China, with 80,000 applicants on the waiting list. Since normalization of U.S.-China relations in 1979, several hundred Chinese residents regarded as local citizens by the Chinese authorities have presented claims of American citizenship. In nearly all cases where their documentation is valid, they have been allowed to leave under Chinese documentation. The situation with regard to visits and emigration to other countries is similar, with variations related to the size of the country, the size of its Chinese community, and other factors. Despite the trend toward loosening controls on foreign travel, Chinese citizens cannot go abroad as a matter of right. Many who apply for passports are refused, although no statistics are available. Chinese permitted to leave the country, however, are allowed to return.
There is no practice in China of revoking the citizenship of political dissidents. In fact, the Chinese authorities have welcomed the return for permanent residence of Chinese who had fled their homeland earlier in fear of Communist rule. Defectors are also welcomed back for either brief visits or residence. An estimated seven million overseas Chinese, including political opponents of the regime, visit the China mainland annually for business or tourism.

China has provided resettlement to large numbers of refugees, most of them ethnic Chinese from Southeast Asian countries. There have been two large waves: in the early 1960s, when 60,000 people fled Indonesia in the wake of anti-Chinese riots, and since 1977 with the resettlement of around 250,000 refugees from Vietnam and 3,000 from Laos. This latest flow has slowed considerably with only 2,200 new refugees reported in the first half of 1983. There were no known cases of repatriation of refugees, either forced or voluntary.

**CHINA (TAIWAN)**

The Constitution provides for the freedom to change residence. Except for military and other restricted areas, there is general freedom of internal travel in Taiwan. Emigration and private travel abroad have become freer since 1979. In 1982 640,669 Taiwanese went abroad for tourism an 11 percent increase above 1981. After the last calendar day of the year in which they turn 15, males may not leave Taiwan until completion of compulsory military service. Beginning in 1980, businessmen have been permitted to travel to, and do business directly with, certain eastern European countries. Although travel to the PRC is officially prohibited, the authorities overlook some personal and commercial travel to the mainland by people with clear anti-Communist credentials who do not publicize their travels.

Permission to leave Taiwan may be delayed or withheld for security reasons, because of pending legal proceedings, or because the individuals involved have criticized the political establishment. However, a number of persons critical of the KMT have in recent years been permitted to leave Taiwan.

In general, the authorities recognize the right of repatriation of those Chinese holding Taiwan passports who normally reside in Taiwan. Those issued “overseas Chinese” passports do not automatically
have the right to travel to Taiwan for permanent residence. In principle, Taiwan will not authorize the entry of Chinese between the ages of 16 and 75, even those who have long held Taiwan passports, if they have lived in Communist-controlled areas within the preceding five years.

Since 1976 an estimated 5,183 ethnic Chinese from Vietnam have been resettled in Taiwan, and 1,912 small boat refugees have been granted temporary refuge. Refugees are not forced to return to their countries of origin.

INDIA

Millions of refugees have been admitted into India from neighboring countries since Indian independence in 1947. The vast majority of those who wanted to remain have been granted Indian citizenship and integrated into the society and economy. Figures on their numbers are not available.

In Assam, migration of Hindus and Muslims from what is now Bangladesh led to the violence of early 1983. As a result of the disturbances in Assam, a large number of Bengali-speaking people from Assam moved into West Bengal. West Bengal authorities report that over 23,000 are still in relief camps. Following ethnic disturbances in Sri Lanka in July, several thousand Tamils came from Sri Lanka to India, particularly to the state of Tamil Nadu. Several thousand Afghans have entered India since the Soviet invasion in 1979. Many have departed to other countries. Although India does not as a rule formally recognize Afghans as refugees, there is no evidence of forcible repatriation of those who are in India. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees operates an office in India.

Except for requirements for permits to enter sensitive border areas, there is full freedom of movement within India for all citizens. Foreign travel and emigration are without political restrictions, and in the last six years the rules for obtaining a passport and necessary foreign exchange have been liberalized and simplified. More than three million Indian citizens now live abroad. There are no special restrictions of movement of any sort applied to women or to other groups.
INDONESIA

Movement within Indonesia is unrestricted, although there are exceptions. The government requires permits to change residence in certain areas, primarily to control the further shift of population from rural to urban locations. Since 1958–59, ethnic Chinese have been denied the right to live in rural areas of Java (although the practical impact of the regulation is mitigated by the fact that no such rural area is more than 15 miles from a major town). Travel to certain areas, including most of eastern Indonesia, requires a special permit. There are also restrictions on movement to and within East Timor. Former political detainees associated with the abortive 1965 coup attempt are required to notify authorities of travel away from their homes.

Citizens who leave the country are guaranteed the right to return. The only exception is ethnic Chinese without citizenship documents who departed Indonesia before 1965.

Emigration is unrestricted except that, since the 1976 integration of East Timor into Indonesia, authorities have closely controlled emigration and repatriation of former Portuguese subjects. Despite agreements with the Australian government and the ICRC, up to the end of 1982 only limited numbers of East Timorese left Indonesia legally. Many who did so had to pay substantial bribes. In 1983, however, officially sanctioned emigration from East Timor increased markedly. Through September, 109 persons were repatriated to Portugal under ICRC auspices, while an additional 79 persons left for Australia under a government-to-government family reunification program. These departures substantially reduced the number of persons who had previously indicated a desire to leave Indonesia permanently.

A few Indonesians remain in Communist countries where they chose to stay after the 1965 upheaval. The government must give permission for them to return, such permission is determined on a case-by-case basis.

Under its humane refugee policy, Indonesia has given first asylum to over 80,000 Indochinese refugees since 1975. In cooperation with the UNHCR, the Indonesian government has also provided one of the region’s two refugee processing centers, where Indochinese refugees from camps in Indonesia or other first asylum countries are given training to prepare them for permanent resettlement in other coun-
tries. Indonesia has not accepted any Indochinese refugees for permanent resettlement.

**JAPAN**

Nationals have the right to travel freely, both within Japan and abroad, to change their place of residence, to emigrate, and to repatriate voluntarily. Nationality is never revoked.

**KAMPUCHEA**

The Heng Samrin regime tries to control tightly all travel within the region under its control. Passes are required for internal movement between villages. Checkpoints are ubiquitous, and bribes as well as passes are required to pass them, although checkpoints can often be dodged. A system of neighborhood surveillance, modeled after the Vietnamese system, was introduced in 1981. Nevertheless, thousands of Khmer continue to move around inside the country and to the Thai border to trade, look for family members, or join the resistance. Only the very top Heng Samrin officials travel abroad. Other Khmer seeking to emigrate must flee to the border. The Heng Samrin regime has agreed in principle to accept refugees back from camps in Thailand but has not taken any so far because it has put off reaching an agreement with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees on the mechanics of repatriation. Thousands of Khmer have returned informally to Kampuchea from the Thai border. Sixty-two thousand Khmer are still in holding centers in Thailand.

The Khmer Rouge also tightly control movement within their zones and attempt to prevent the non-Communists from operating in or crossing what they consider their "liberated areas." The Khmer Rouge and the non-Communist groups have accepted people back from refugee camps in Thailand.

**KOREA (DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF)**

Internal travel in North Korea is strictly controlled. A travel pass is required for any movement outside one's home village and is granted only for required, official or personal travel. This requirement is strictly enforced. Foreign travel is limited to delegations of officials or
trusted artists and performers. Emigration is not allowed, and few
refugees or defectors succeed in fleeing the country. Retaliation
reportedly is taken against the relatives of those few persons who
manage to escape. According to Freedom House, "rights to travel
internally and externally are perhaps the most restricted in the world.
tourism is unknown—even to Communist countries."

North Korea encourages Korean residents overseas to repatriate to
"the Fatherland." Some observers estimate that, since 1959, over
100,000 Korean residents of Japan have voluntarily repatriated to
North Korea. Because of their "corruption" by exposure to foreign
influences, repatriates are isolated from North Korean society after
their arrival until they can be indoctrinated and their ideological
reliability gauged.

North Korea has permitted some overseas Korean residents to
return to visit their relatives, and several have made repeat visits.

KOREA (REPUBLIC OF)

There is essentially complete freedom of movement and freedom to
change employment in Korea. The government encourages a modest
level of emigration and does not discriminate against prospective
emigrants. Most people can obtain passports, except for criminals or,
in some cases, persons considered politically suspect. However, a num-
ber of dissidents, former political prisoners, and persons banned from
political activity have been allowed to travel abroad.

A small continuing influx of Vietnamese boat refugees is admitted
to first asylum in Korea. They are cared for at a camp in Pusan by
the Korean Red Cross until they can be resettled abroad. Over 600
such refugees have passed through Korea in the last several years.

LAOS

Lao citizens must obtain permission from the authorities for all in-
ternal travel of any distance and in all cases when crossing provincial
boundaries. A curfew exists in the capital and other major cities. Its
rules change from time to time, as does its enforcement. Government
officials have cited threats of "disorders" created by "reactionary"
elements as the reason for the restrictions.

Foreign travel is permitted for officials, students in government-
approved programs, and some others who have access to foreign exchange. In 1983 there was a noticeable increase in the number of Lao permitted to travel abroad. Border crossing permits are available for those with business in Thailand. Although the Lao government has said that those wishing to emigrate will be allowed to do so, as a practical matter legal emigration is rarely authorized for ethnic Lao and, when it is, reportedly requires substantial bribes. Since 1975, about 281,500 of the Lao have fled Laos and registered as refugees in Thailand.

Some of those fleeing are fired upon and some killed by Lao, Vietnamese, or Thai border patrols as they attempt to cross the Mekong River. Many Lao caught seeking to leave illegally have been imprisoned, although in some cases they have only been sent to short indoctrination seminars and then released.

The Lao and Thai governments have agreed to take back, on a case-by-case basis, those of their respective citizens who have illegally crossed into the other country and wish to return home. From May 1980, when agreement was reached with Thailand and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on a voluntary repatriation program, to May 1983, 2,263 Lao refugees voluntarily returned to Laos under the auspices of the UNHCR. The Lao government suspended the program after May 1983, citing logistical problems, but repatriation resumed in November 1983. Those accepted for return receive several days of political indoctrination and are then released to return to their homes, where they are placed under the control of village authorities. The UNHCR provides basic necessities and monitors treatment and living conditions thereafter. Perhaps 4,000 to 5,000 refugees have repatriated themselves without official involvement. There appears to be no pattern of official harassment or maltreatment of these voluntary returnees.

MALAYSIA

Persons wishing to travel abroad must obtain passports, which have been denied in a few cases on what the government terms security grounds. The government also restricts travel to China by ethnic Chinese citizens below the age of 65.

Malaysia has played a key role in providing first asylum to almost 190,000 Vietnamese refugees since 1975 and has cooperated fully
with international organizations and resettlement countries in facilitating the eventual movement of the refugees to those countries. Malaysia itself has resettled over 5,000 Khmer Muslim refugees.

MONGOLIA

Until recent years, few Mongolians traveled abroad, even to the Soviet Union. Foreign travel usually has been permitted only for official purposes, but government-sponsored education abroad has become increasingly common. With the notable exception of a small graduate student exchange with Great Britain, the limited foreign travel allowed is almost exclusively to Soviet Bloc countries. No Mongolians are known to have requested repatriation to Mongolia, and there is no known emigration from Mongolia except that of recent forced emigration of ethnic Chinese.

All Mongolians over 16 years of age must have internal passports and must obtain permission from the Security Bureau to travel within the country. Attempts to change jobs or residences must be approved by both the Security Bureau and the People's Control Organization.

The 1978 Constitution guarantees the right "to reside in the territory" of the Mongolian People's Republic to foreign citizens, provided they have "striven for the defense of the interests of the working people, for national liberation, and for strengthening peace..." Ethnic Chinese have resided in Mongolia since the Yuan Dynasty (thirteenth century AD). As they did in the 1930s, Mongolian authorities again in May 1983 began the systematic expulsion of Chinese nationals residing in the Mongolian People's Republic. Many of the approximately 7,000 Chinese nationals in Mongolia were reportedly offered a choice between resettlement in the barren northern part of the country or expulsion to China. The Mongolian authorities claimed the expellees had no formal occupation and/or did not abide by Mongolian law, despite the fact many of them had been living and working in Mongolia since the 1950s. By late September 1983, over 2,000 Chinese had returned to the People's Republic of China. Through most of the summer, the expellees were reported to have been stripped of their individual property by the Mongolian customs authorities before being allowed to cross over into China. Although Ulaanbaatar rejected China's diplomatic protests on the expulsions, the Mongolian People's Republic is reportedly now per-
mitting Chinese to leave on a less onerous basis, without confiscation of their possessions. The expulsions are nonetheless continuing, and the Mongolian authorities appear determined to expel or widely disperse the entire Chinese community, mainly concentrated in Ulaanbaatar and its suburbs.

NEPAL

There are no restrictions on travel within the country for Nepalese citizens, although several border areas have been restricted for travel by foreigners. Voluntary repatriation of Nepalese citizens is not hampered by government interference. Passports are normally available to virtually all applicants. Issuance, however, is hindered by slow processing, short validity, and country limitations. Allegations were made in past years by opposition members that the government limited their travel outside Nepal. During the past year an outspoken opposition member was given a passport for travel to the United States, despite having been previously refused, and a leader of the Congress Party traveled to Europe and the United States, despite his declared intention to seek foreign support for his banned party. There are no known cases of revocation of citizenship for political reasons.

Nepal has no stated refugee policy. In the past it has accepted and assimilated approximately 12,000 Tibetan refugees and, according to immigration officials, no refugee has ever been forced to return to Tibet. Today, travelers from Tibet travel freely in both directions across the border.

PAKISTAN

In general, Pakistani citizens have freedom of movement, though some prominent opposition leaders were barred from entering certain provinces. The government has denied passports to some politicians, and in other cases has refused them the foreign exchange needed to finance their children's study abroad. Pakistanis emigrate freely for work abroad. The government encourages and facilitates this economically advantageous practice and assists emigrants upon their return to Pakistan.

According to official registration figures, between two and three million Afghan refugees have fled the Soviet invasion of their country.
to Pakistan, constituting the world's largest refugee population. The government administers over 300 refugee camps and bears much of the cost of inland transportation of relief goods provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, bilateral donors, and several voluntary agencies. The government tries to make regular payments to the refugees to supplement international donations of food, clothing, and shelter. Pakistan has placed few restrictions on travel or employment by refugees, although only residents of official refugee villages may draw relief articles. Given the number of refugees and the strains placed on resources, violence between refugees and local residents has remained remarkably rare.

PHILIPPINES

There is freedom to change one's place of residence and employment. Emigration is generally permitted, but former detainees in "temporary release" status need government permission to leave the country. It is generally granted but was denied in two instances in 1983 to members of the opposition.

A 1980 Presidential Decree provides that persons convicted of subversion, rebellion, or sedition shall forfeit their rights as citizens, whether such acts are committed inside or outside the country, and that judgments may be promulgated in absentia. No instance of enforcement of this decree is known.

As of October 1983, there were about 2,700 Indochinese refugees in first asylum camps in the Philippines. The Philippines continues to offer asylum and to cooperate with international organizations and with the foreign governments that offer permanent resettlement to refugees. In addition to providing first asylum to boat people, the Philippine government, in conjunction with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, operates a major refugee processing center where refugees from camps in both the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries are given English language training and cultural orientation before being resettled elsewhere.
SINGAPORE

There are no limitations on the freedom of movement within the country other than those under the Internal Security Act. This permits the Minister for Home Affairs to restrict a person's activities, place of residence, and travel outside of Singapore. All Singapore residents over the age of 13 are required to register with the government, receive and carry an identity card, and report changes of address within 14 days. Recipients of government-financed educational benefits, who are required to sign a bond obligation to serve the government for a fixed period, cannot emigrate without paying the balance of their bond.

The right of voluntary repatriation is extended to holders of Singaporean passports. However, several hundred ethnic Chinese who left Singapore for China during the politically difficult 1950s and 1960s have encountered obstacles to their return.

Refugees are granted first asylum for 90 days in Singapore only if they have a third-country guarantee of resettlement. Between 1975 and September 1983 a total of approximately 28,200 Indochinese refugees were brought into Singapore in temporary asylum status.

SRI LANKA

The Constitution guarantees every citizen “freedom of movement and of choosing his residence within Sri Lanka” and “freedom to return to Sri Lanka.” These guarantees are honored in practice.

The present government removed exit visa requirements imposed by its predecessor and now permits virtually unimpeded emigration and travel. Sri Lankans of every ethnic group, both male and female, have taken advantage of this policy to seek better-paying jobs abroad. It is believed that there are over 100,000 Sri Lankans working in the Middle East alone.

Some Tamils, predominantly young men, have traveled abroad and sought refugee status or political asylum in the United States and other countries, on the grounds that they are members of a persecuted minority. The number of such applications increased after the July communal violence. Under the Constitution, they are free to return to Sri Lanka at any time.

The government is very reluctant to permit refugees or displaced
persons from other countries to stay in Sri Lanka while seeking permanent residence elsewhere and generally denies such persons entry.

THAILAND

Apart from long-standing restrictions on the travel of Vietnamese aliens living in Thailand, including those who have lived in Thailand for a generation, the only limitations on travel are restrictions on entry into certain rural areas where insurgents are active. There are no government restrictions on foreign travel or emigration, but Thai women and also children under 14 must have their passport applications approved by the Department of Public Welfare to prevent the export of children for sale and women for prostitution.

The government has revoked citizenship only in a handful of cases in recent years.

Since 1975, almost 600,000 persons from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea have fled to Thailand for refuge. Thai policy has been to provide assistance to them until they can be repatriated or resettled in third countries. The current refugee population on Thai territory is about 40,000. In addition, about 50,000 Vietnamese who arrived in Thailand before 1954 remain there. The Thai government has not given asylum to new arrivals from Kampuchea since early 1980, but it permits about 230,000 Kampuchean to live in camps along the border, an increase of almost 20,000 since early 1983. Most of this increase appears to be a result of Khmer fleeing more repressive Vietnamese security measures imposed in the spring of 1983. Thailand has assisted international voluntary agencies to provide food and medical care to Khmer in the border camps. The Thai government permitted more than 65,000 of these people to move temporarily into Thailand in the wake of attacks by Vietnamese and People's Republic of Kampuchea forces in 1983 but they were required to return to the border after the danger had passed. Similarly, Vietnamese coming overland after April 1981 have to remain on the border until they are accepted for resettlement abroad, when they are allowed to transit Thailand to their new homes.

Since early 1980, small groups of Khmer caught trying to move illegally from border camps into refugee camps inside Thailand have been returned by Thai authorities to the border region. Some Khmer have volunteered to leave the refugee camps for the border, but such
movements ended in 1983 following Vietnamese destruction of six border encampments. Thai policy on refugees has been to promote voluntary repatriation, particularly for the Khmer and Lao, who comprise 93 percent of Thailand's refugee population. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the major resettlement countries have supported this Thai policy. About 2,260 Lao have returned to their homeland under UNHCR supervision following bilateral Thai-Lao repatriation negotiations in September 1980. However, the Lao authorities suspended this repatriation program in May 1983 without providing a reason or an expected date of resumption. UNHCR negotiations with the Heng Samrin regime in Phnom Penh concerning the repatriation of Khmer refugees remain stalled. The government of Vietnam has been unwilling to discuss repatriation of Vietnamese refugees in Thailand. Few of the Indochinese refugees are presently willing to return home because of fear of persecution.

To reduce the flow of refugees into Thailand, the Thai government instituted a policy in 1981 under which new arrivals are indefinitely detained in austere camps where they are provided only essential services and not immediately allowed to apply for resettlement abroad. As of September 30, about 28,000 refugees were living in such austere camps. The government decided to permit limited resettlement from these camps in 1983.

VIETNAM

Government approval is required for all external travel, and one must have an identity card to travel internally. No one is allowed to change his residence or work location without permission from the authorities. Since public security cadre periodically check household occupants against the official family register, unauthorized absences also subject families to surveillance and harassment. With few exceptions, only government officials or approved spokesmen for quasi-governmental organizations receive permission to travel abroad. A number of factors, in addition to the generally repressive political situation, have caused a mass exodus from Vietnam since 1975. Among them are ethnic and religious persecution, discrimination with regard to economic and educational opportunities, fear of incarceration or forced resettlement in remote areas, and fear of conscription to fight in Kampuchea.
In early 1978, the Vietnamese adopted a program to "facilitate" the departure of ethnic Chinese and others as refugees. The program was administered through special offices at the provincial level, which charged large fees for exit permits and passage. At its height in the spring of 1979, the exodus, mostly of ethnic Chinese, reached over 40,000 a month by boat, with the "boat people" exposed to extreme hardships at sea, in many cases resulting in deaths.

At the international conference on Vietnamese refugees held in Geneva in July 1979, the government announced a moratorium on these refugee departures, and information from refugees who have left Vietnam since then indicates that the authorities are no longer officially assisting such departures (many do if sufficiently bribed) and are punishing people caught trying to depart clandestinely.

In May 1979, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reached agreement with the government on the legal departure of persons from Vietnam under the Orderly Departure Program. The program started slowly with only slightly more than 13,000 departing Vietnam in the 27 months between July 1979 and October 1981. The Vietnamese then expanded the program, and over 12,000 left in the next year. During fiscal year 1983 the number of persons departing Vietnam under the program increased to 15,631.

A significant number of persons departing in the Orderly Departure Program are ethnic Chinese who consistently find it easier than ethnic Vietnamese to be approved officially for departure. Another significant portion is composed of persons fathered by Americans in Vietnam, known as "Amerasians," who have suffered racial discrimination.

During 1983, refugees continued to leave Vietnam clandestinely. However, Hanoi and provincial radio stations have broadcast reports of executions or of lengthy jail sentences for organizers of failed escape attempts, as well as punishments dealt to others implicated. Currently, male offenders can expect sentences ranging from three to fifteen years at hard labor depending on their role in the departure attempt while female offenders receive one to three months, with childless women often receiving longer sentences. "Reeducation camp" releases who attempt flight can expect to be returned to the camps for an indefinite term. Property, often including the means of livelihood, is confiscated from those caught trying to escape, as is the property left behind by those who succeed.

Individuals reportedly must often bribe officials to be placed on
Orderly Departure Program lists. Refugees from the Mekong Delta have reported that some persons have paid officials from $4,800 to $6,000 in gold per person to be placed on tentative lists with no guarantee as to when or if they would be permitted to leave. Persons who have applied for exit permits reportedly are subject to recurring security checks and harassment.

Few have returned to Vietnam after having fled the country. Those who fled in the immediate aftermath of the fall of South Vietnam in 1975 and later returned were incarcerated in “reeducation camps.” In only a few isolated cases has Hanoi allowed anyone to repatriate in recent years, in effect, those who emigrate lose their citizenship. Some who left Vietnam prior to 1975 and have acquired nationalities and travel documents of other countries have been permitted to return to Vietnam as visitors.

Since the occupation of Kampuchea by Vietnam, large numbers of Vietnamese, possibly as many as several hundred thousand, have been encouraged or assisted by the Vietnamese authorities to settle in Kampuchea. Although many of these persons are former residents expelled by Kampuchea’s former rulers, a significant number are reportedly first-time settlers.
CONFECE ON ASIA-PACIFIC IMMIGRATION
TO THE UNITED STATES
September 20-25, 1984
Jefferson Hall, Asia Room
East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii

AGENDA

Thursday; September 20
9:00 a.m. Opening Session
  Welcoming Remarks
    Lee-Jay Cho, Chairman of Directors and Director,
    East-West Population Institute
    Conference Goals and Organization—James T. Fawcett,
    Benjamin V. Cariño, and Fred Arnold
    Conference Arrangements—Leland Chang

9:45 a.m. Welcoming Coffee
10:30 a.m. Chair: Fred Arnold
  Paper: Mary M. Kritz “The Global Picture of Contemporary
  Immigration Patterns”

11:15 a.m. Discussion
12:00 noon Lunch
1:30 p.m. Chair: Benjamin V. Cariño
  Relations”
2:15 p.m. Discussion
2:30 p.m. Paper: Alejandro Portes “Contemporary Theories of Interna-
  tional Migration: A Review and Critique”
3:15 p.m. Coffee
3:30 p.m. Panel Discussion, Geoffrey R. Hayes, Hagen Koo, and Astri
  Suhrie
4:00 p.m. Discussion
4:45 p.m. Group picture taking

Friday, September 21—Pumehana Room (basement, Jefferson Hall)
9:00 a.m. Chair: Charles A. Price
  Papers: James T. Fawcett, Fred Arnold, and Urmil Minocha
  “Asian Immigration to the United States: Flows and
  Processes”
Peter C. Smith, Robert W. Gardner, and Herbert R. Barringer - "Asian Americans: Growth and Change in the 1970s"

Michael J. Levin - "Pacific Islanders in the United States: A Demographic Profile Based on the 1980 Census"

10:30 a.m. Discussion
10:45 a.m. Coffee
11:00 a.m. Chair: Ching-shyang Hwang
Paper: Linda W. Gordon - "Southeast Asian Refugee Migration to the United States"

11:30 a.m. Discussion
12:00 noon Lunch
1:15 p.m. Depart for Susannah Wesley Community Center
2:00 p.m. Chair: Mary M. Kritz

3:00 p.m. Chair: Lee Tamorra
Papers: Lucie Cheng - "The New Asian Immigrants in California"
Amefil Agbayani - "Community Impacts of Migration: Recent Ilokano Migration to Honolulu"

4:00 p.m. Panel Discussion: Sheila M. Furman, William Hoshijo, and Robert W. Franco
4:30 p.m. Discussion
5:30 p.m. Depart for no-host dinner

Saturday, September 22
9:00 a.m. Chair: Lucie Cheng

9:30 a.m. Discussion
10:00 a.m. Coffee
10:15 a.m. Chair: Teresa A. Sullivan
Sending Country Perspectives: East Asia
Papers: Ilsoo Kim - "Korean Emigration Connections to Urban America: A Structural Analysis of Premigration Factors in South Korea"
Jung Keun Kim—“The Trends and Policies of Korean Emigration”

Ching-shyang Hwang—“Taiwan: The Policy Meaning of Nonreturning U.S.-educated Students and Scholars”

Paul C.K. Kwong—“The 1997 Question and Emigration Problems in Hong Kong”

11:30 a.m. Discussion

12:00 noon Lunch

1:30 p.m. Chair: Gordon F. De Jong

Sending Country Perspectives: Southeast and South Asia

Papers: Ricardo G. Abad and Elizabeth U. Eviota—“Reproducing Development Inequalities: Some Effects of Philippine Emigration to the United States”

Teofilo I. Marcelo—“Emigration Policies and Domestic Development Goals of the Government of the Philippines Affecting Emigration to the United States”

Ajit Kumar Dasgupta—“Review of Data Sources Concerning Emigration from India to the United States”

Urnil Minocha—“Indian Immigrants in the United States: Demographic Trends, Economic Assimilation in the Host Society, and Impact on the Sending Society”

Ramesh Narayanaswami—“Indian Immigration to the United States: Socioeconomic Consequences and Imp on India’s Economic Development”

Refugee Sending Countries and First Asylum Receiving Countries: Richard A. Engelhardt, Jr., and Astri Suhrke

3:15 p.m. Discussion

3:30 p.m. Coffee

3:45 p.m. Chair: Peter N.D. Pirie

Sending Country Perspectives: The Pacific


4:15 p.m. Discussants: L. Te'o Fairbairn and Geoffrey R. Hayes

4:45 p.m. A Regional Perspective on Sending Country Issues—Jerrold W. Huguet

Sunday, September 23

Free Day
Monday, September 24

9:00 a.m.  
Chair: Jung Keun Kim  
*Paper:* Daniel B. Levine - "Accounting for Immigration: The State of the Art"

9:30 a.m.  
*Discussant:* Samuel Baum

9:45 a.m.  
Discussion

10:15 a.m.  
Coffee

10:30 a.m.  
Chair: Ricardo G. Abad  
*Paper:* Teresa A. Sullivan - "Special Studies of Immigrants: A Comparison of Work on Asian and Hispanic Immigrants to the United States"

11:00 a.m.  
*Discussant:* Gordon F. De Jong

11:15 a.m.  
Discussion

11:45 a.m.  
Lunch

1:15 p.m.  
Chair: Ramesh Narayanawami  
*Alternative Destinations for Asia-Pacific Emigrants*  

2:45 p.m.  
Discussion

3:15 p.m.  
Coffee

3:30 p.m.  
Chair: James T. Fawcett  
*Working Groups on Research and Policy Issues*  
*Group A: Assessment of Gains and Losses to the Sending Country*  
*Discussion Leaders:* Benjamin V. Carilho and James T. Fawcett

*Group B: Assessment of Gains and Losses to Immigrants and the Receiving Country*  
*Discussion Leaders:* Ricardo G. Abad and Victor G. Nee

*Group C: Implementation and Effectiveness of U.S. Immigration Policy*  
*Discussion Leaders:* Fred Arnold, Ellen P. Kraly, and Lisa S. Roney

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Tuesday, September 25

9:00 a.m.  
Continuation of working group discussions and preparation of group reports
12:00 noon  Lunch
1:30 p.m.  Chair: Samuel Baum  
Group A: Report and Discussion  
Group B: Report and Discussion  
Group C: Report and Discussion
3:00 p.m.  Concluding Remarks

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