The purpose of this study was to examine and compare how Israeli-Arab and Eastern-Jewish adolescents view the role of the citizen. Both groups share a minority status within Israeli society, but have different socializing environments and different political and cultural status. The study population consisted of 118 Israeli-Arab and 279 Eastern-Jewish adolescents ages 16-18. They were asked to rate 35 questionnaire items according to their importance for good citizenship. The data indicate that, overall, Arab respondents tended to assign less importance than their Jewish counterparts to all the items describing good citizenship. As expected, Arab youth assigned greater importance to the non-political than to the political dimension of good citizenship. Within the active and the passive categories the items which were considered important by them reflect a minimal commitment to the State and its institutions. Eastern-Jewish adolescents did not differ in their civic orientations from the general Israeli public. They assigned greater importance to the political, rather than to the non-political dimension of good citizenship, and stressed passive orientations more than active-participatory ones. No differences were found concerning the measured civic orientations between boys and girls in both groups. (Author/CR)
CITIZENSHIP ORIENTATIONS OF TWO ISRAELI MINORITY GROUPS: ISRAELI-ARAB AND EASTERN-JEWISH YOUTH

Orit Ichilov
School of Education
Tel-Aviv University

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the study was to examine and to compare how Israeli-Arab and Eastern-Jewish adolescents view the role of the citizen. Both groups share a minority status in the various social spheres within Israeli society.

The study population consisted of 118 Israeli-Arab, and 279 Eastern-Jewish adolescents ages 16-18. They were asked to rate 36 items according to their importance for good citizenship.

The data indicates that Arab youth assigned greater importance to the non-political than to the political dimension of good citizenship. Within the active and the passive categories the items which were considered important by them, reflect a minimal commitment to the State and its institutions.

Eastern-Jewish adolescents did not differ in their civic orientations from the general Israeli public. They assigned greater importance to the political, rather than to the non-political dimension of good citizenship, and stressed passive orientations more than active-participatory ones.

No differences were found concerning the measured civic orientations between boys and girls in both groups.
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Introduction

In western democracies participatory-related dispositions being to develop early in life, and during adolescence reach a level of maturity which is comparable in many ways to that of adults (Hess & Torney, 1967; Easton & Dennis, 1969; Langton, 1969; Jennings & Niemi, 1974). Variations, however, are great, and have been found to be associated with a variety of cultural and socio-economic factors operating in the adolescents' social milieu.

In contrast to the extensiveness of the literature on the socialization of majority group members into the dominant political culture (for example: Dawson & Prewitt, 1969; Dennis, 1973), only a few studies have examined the development of civic orientations among marginal and minority group members (for example: Greenberg, 1970, 1973; Hirsch, 1971, Jaros et. al., 1968). Little attention has been given to the development of citizenship orientations in conflict situations within pluralistic societies, where lack of consensus exists among groups over fundamental values and issues.

The purpose of this study is to compare citizenship orientations of Israeli-Arab and Eastern-Jewish youth, focusing upon socio-cultural rather than upon developmental aspects. In other words, we wish to test the hypothesis that the differential socializing environments in which Israeli-Arab and Eastern-Jews grow, and the differential location of Arabs and Jews within Israeli society, will give rise to different citizenship orientations.

The two groups share a marginal minority status within Israeli society, yet the problems concerning their integration into the political and cultural
spheres differ drastically.

In order to understand the similarities and differences in the socializing environments of Israeli-Arabs and Eastern-Jews, it is necessary to examine the status and particular relations with the Jewish majority of both groups within the Israeli context.

Israeli-Arabs and Eastern-Jews: A profile of two minority groups. Israel is the only country in the Middle East where Arabs constitute a minority. The Israeli-Arabs which now comprise about 15% of Israel's entire population, have remained within the State's borders following the establishment of the State in 1948. The Jewish majority was, thus, faced with the reality of a large enemy-affiliated Arab minority within the Jewish-Zionist state which is at war with their brothers across the borders. During the first years of its existence, Israel was also faced with influx of Jewish immigrants, the majority of which came as refugees from the traditional Moslem Arab countries in North Africa and the Middle East. The official ideological position concerning the Arab minority, as stated in the Declaration of Independence, was to grant them equal civic rights and to integrate them within the Jewish state. The desirable model for Arab integration was that of cultural pluralism which encourages the creation of ethnic enclaves, allowing minorities to preserve their native culture, and accepting their partial or full participation in the affairs of the larger community.

The official ideological position concerning the integration of Eastern-Jews is stated in the Law of Return, which grants all the ingathering Jewish exiles
full citizenship and equal rights upon arrival in Israel. The desirable model for the integration of Eastern Jews was that of the melting pot, which aspires to the evolvement of a totally new national culture and character, out of the diverse cultural traditions of the various Jewish ethnic groups.

The major ethnic divisions in Israel are, thus, within the Jewish community, and between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority. Within the Jewish majority there are two ethnic blocks, which differ from each other in socio-economic status and cultural traditions: the Jews of western origin (i.e., Europe-America) who form the dominant group; and Jews of eastern origin (i.e., Middle Eastern, Asian and North African origin), who although now comprise over 50% of Israel's entire population, do not proportionally share in the national income, educational attainment, central political positions and prestigious occupations.

While the acceleration of integration, not merely desegregation, of the various Jewish ethnic groups into Israeli society has been declared a central national goal, it is fair to state that except for fringe elements on both sides, neither Jews nor Arabs has ever really aspired to integration. Institutional separateness and minimalistic demands upon the Arab citizen, have characterized the relations between the central government and the Israeli-Arab minority. For example, unlike all Israeli citizens, including minorities such as the Druze, for whom military service is obligatory, Arabs do not serve in the army. This is done both for security reasons, and in order to avoid a situation of having the Israeli-Arabs fight against their own kin. Their exemption from this central civic duty limits their civil rights, since army veterans enjoy special privileges in housing, loans, and work opportunities.
The major difference between the two minority groups is related to the realm of national values and symbols. Eastern Jews can readily form an Israeli identity, based on the Zionist ideology which considers the various Jewish subgroups as a single nation. However, the identification of Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state, and the definition of the Israeli Arab as an enemy-affiliated minority, makes the goal of democratic pluralism difficult to attain. The four conditions outlined by Smooha and Hoffman (1976/77) for cooperative coexistence, namely: Consensus over basic symbols and values, cultural autonomy, proportionate equality of resources and interpersonal accommodation, seem to be lacking in the case of the Israeli-Arab. The national flag, anthem and symbol; the official Jewish holidays, Hebrew as an official language, and the fundamental Law of Return are not an acceptable form of Israeli identity for the Arab minority. The lack of a general diffuse Israeli identity creates a situation where there can be no shared ideology, and the conflict between the Arab and the Jewish groups is over the very basic consensus.

Arab cultural autonomy, which could potentially foster an alien national identity, has been discouraged. Proportionate equality of resources and opportunities is not feasible when most of Israel's resources go to national security needs, immigrant absorption, and settlement. Interpersonal accommodation is also difficult to achieve in a situation where no common ideology exists, national identity is salient to both groups, and there is a general atmosphere of mutual alienation and distrust.

The difficulties of Israeli-Arabs to identify with the State have been documented in several studies. A survey conducted among Israeli-Arabs in 1974 revealed that only 40% of the respondents recognized without reservations Israel's right to exist, while 55% of them viewed the establishment of the State in 1948 as illegitimate. Similarly, only 25% of Arab respondents in 1974 felt more at home in Israel than
they would in an Arab country (Smooha and Hoffman, 1976/77), and only 22% thought that young Arabs have a future in Israel (Hoffman, 1976).

The Jewish side of Arab-Jewish relations show great ambivalence toward the Arab minority. In a study of the stereotyping patterns of Israeli Jewish youth Binjamini (1969) found that the Arab image was generally negative, even more so than the German image. Some studies report feelings of hatred and distrust among Israeli respondents toward Arabs (Levy & Guttman, 1976; Stock, 1968; Peres, 1971; 1976; Slann, 1973), and lack of differentiation between fellow Arab citizens and Arab citizens of enemy countries (Zohar, 1972). Other studies report of a general liberal attitude among Israeli youth toward the Arab minority. However, these studies also report that only 45% of the respondents would find it acceptable to have an Arab mayor in a mixed population city, and only 12% would allow Arabs to run for any political office on an equal footing with Jewish political leaders (Pukan & Moskovitz, 1976). Numerous studies show that eastern Jews display greater social distance and hostility towards the Arabs than Jews from western background. One common explanation for this phenomenon is that the Jews from Arab and Islamic countries suffered from inferior status and maltreatment in their countries of origin (Peres, 1971; Slann, 1973). Another explanation is that given the similarities between eastern Jews and Arabs in cultural traditions, darker skin complexion and stronger Middle Eastern accent, eastern Jews are eager to divest themselves of any association with Arab elements.

In the other social spheres, greater similarities exist between Arabs and eastern Jews. Geographic isolation is common to both groups. Israeli Arabs are geographically separated in 2 Arab cities, 103 villages, and 40 Beduin camps. The 10% who live in a few mixed cities, generally live in separate neighborhoods.
Similarly, the majority of eastern Jews is concentrated in development towns, and in separate neighborhoods within the cities.

On the municipal level, about two thirds of the Israeli Arabs are governed by locally elected Arab officials, and most of the development towns are governed by locally elected eastern Jewish officials. However, both groups are underrepresented in the central government and institutions. Nevertheless, the Arab and Jewish communities enjoy extensive governmental services in health, education, welfare, and economic development. Services in the Arab sector are implemented through separate departments in the various ministries. This does not, however, represent autonomy, since services in the Arab sector are ultimately controlled by Jewish officials in the central government. Given their low representation in the central political institutions, both groups have very limited impact in the national arena where important decisions are made.

The State has discouraged the formation of political parties on national and ethnic bases. The few Jewish ethnic parties which were established during the first years of statehood, have rapidly disappeared from the political scene, and the Arabs were discouraged from forming political parties and institutions of their own. Some Arabs are represented through minority parties which are affiliated with the Israeli Labor Party. Rakah, the Communist Party, which expresses Arab interests and represents a legitimate way of protesting the Zionist regime, has steadily gained from 20% of the Arab votes in 1965, 37% in 1973 to 49% in 1977 (Smooha, 1976) It is interesting to note that Rakah also includes the Black Panthers, a militant group of eastern Jews, which wish to protest their inferior status within Israeli society.

The number of years of schooling in the Arab sector is lower than in the Jewish population, and the rate of illiteracy is four times higher than among Jews. The Law of Compulsory Free Education for children ages 5-15, equally applies to Arabs
and Jews. However, while 59% of the relevant Jewish age group participates in high school education, only 19% of the equivalent group among Arabs attends high school. Eastern Jews are overrepresented in the lower status vocational high schools, and are underrepresented in the academically-oriented high schools which lead to the attainment of a matriculation certificate. Both Arabs and eastern Jews are underrepresented in the institutions of higher education. However, unlike the case of eastern Jews, there is little readiness to integrate Arab university graduates in occupations of higher status. They have fewer opportunities for employment outside of teaching or some other jobs in the Arab sector (Klinberger, 1969). This situation is frustrating. Arab intellectuals who have become most modernized and thus less tied to the family, religious and village traditions, many times express their frustrations and alienation from the rejecting Jewish society, by identifying themselves with various militant forms of Arab nationalism.

Even though Arabs have their own school system which is controlled by a separate department within the Ministry of Education and Culture, all state schools are officially open to them as well. In reality, however, there is only one mixed school in Haifa, in which Jews and Arabs study in separate classes tailored to the language and curriculum needs of each group. Several other high schools in the Jewish sector have admitted a small number of Arab students (Kramer, 1978). Integration of eastern Jews in the educational system, on the other hand, has become a major national goal. Integrated junior high schools which bring together a highly heterogeneous student population both ethnically and academically speaking, gradually became part of the Israeli educational scene since 1968. However, the cultural traditions and history of eastern Jews are hardly mentioned in text books which stress the western cultural traditions of the majority group. Similarly, little
attention is given in the Jewish schools to transmitting knowledge about Arab culture, religion and values, and sensitive issues such as Arab nationalism are avoided.

Even though both groups have been exposed to processes of modernization, traditional orientations predominate especially in the Arab sector, and the extended family and the immediate community play an important role.

The minority status of eastern Jews is clearly shown in studies of inter-ethnic relations in Israel. Eastern Jews often report feelings of frustration due to what they perceive as social injustice and discrimination (Peres, 1968; Wingrod, 1960; Bar-Yosef, 1969). They express greater readiness for social contacts with members of the western group than the other way around. This asymmetrical willingness to associate, is also a source of frustration among eastern group members. Studies indicate that both eastern and western Jews in Israel tend to express higher regard for the western group (Shuval, 1956, 1962; Peres, 1968, 1976; Rim, 1968; Biniamini, 1969; Hoffman, 1970). In Israel, ethnic identification is stronger among members of the eastern group than among westerners (Peres, 1968; Kfir et. al., 1975). Apparently, solidarity and identification with the group help marginal group members to withstand the rejection and hostility of outgroups (LeVine & Campbell, 1972).

In an attempt to theoretically conceptualize the major ethnic divisions in Israel, it is helpful to use Coser's distinction between realistic and non-realistic conflicts (Coser, 1956). Non-realistic conflict functions primarily as means of displacement or projection of frustrations that may be intragroup or individual in origin. Realistic conflict, on the other hand, assumes that groups do have incompatible goals and conflicting interests. An additional distinction within the category of realistic conflict is that of communal versus non-communal conflict.
Communal conflict takes place within the context of shared values and ends, while non-communal conflict exists when there is no community of ends between the parties, and the conflict is over the very basic consensus of the relationship.

Concerning both minority groups, some components of a realistic conflict with the majority are visible. The Israeli-Arabs are defined as an enemy-affiliated minority. They present a threat in a situation of Israel's struggle for existence in the midst of a hostile Arab world. As for eastern Jews, competition over national resources and a struggle between two different cultural traditions, are representative of a realistic conflict. The fact that easterners now form over 50% of Israel's entire population, might foster the sense of threat among western group members. However, while the conflict between eastern and western Jews take place within a framework of shared values and ends, the conflict between Arabs and Jews clearly is non-communal in nature.

In spite of the great similarities between Israeli-Arabs and eastern Jews in cultural traditions, and their marginal status in the various social spheres within Israeli society, the prospects for future integration seem brighter for eastern Jews. Being part of the Jewish people, all avenues for integration are in principle open to them, and their marginal status might be a temporary one. It is more difficult to conceive of a solution to the problems of the Arab minority, and for their chances of being an autonomous minority within a democratic-pluralistic context. Peace between Israel and its neighboring Arab states might transform their status from that of an enemy-affiliated minority to that of a group which can be trusted, granted greater autonomy, and afforded with greater opportunities for participation on the national level. However, it will not alleviate their difficulties to fully identify themselves as Israelis, given the Jewish nature of the state.
The majority of both groups have reacted to their marginal status by instrumental adaptation, and militant responses were relatively scarce. Separateness together with minimalistic demands upon the Arab citizen by the Israeli government, have enabled many Arabs to compartmentalize their Arab and Israeli identities, being pro-Arab without necessarily being anti-Israel. Among eastern Jews, instrumental adaptation is reflected in their passive acceptance of their status, and in their desire to be integrated into the dominant western culture.

Dimensions of citizenship orientations. Almond and Verba (1963) maintain that the specific contents of the citizen's role are closely related to the structure of local and national political institutions and to the prevalent political culture. They define political culture as "The political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings and evaluations of its population... The political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientations toward political objects among the members of the nation" (IBID, p. 13). Following this approach the citizen role can be seen on the one hand as determined by the political culture, and on the other hand as one of its manifestations.

Almond and Verba see the political process in a democratic society as following two directions: "input" processes, which refer to the demands put upon the system by the people; and "output" processes which refer to acts of legislation, policy making, and the like, which flow from the system. Distinguishing also between attention to purely political objects and attention to general and non-political objects, Almond and Verba classify three types of political cultures and three corresponding citizenship orientations. A participant political culture, which stresses "input" processes; a subject political culture, which stresses obedience to the "output" processes; and a parochial political culture which, unlike the former two, emphasizes attachment to
nonpolitical objects and bodies. These three types of political cultures and their corresponding citizenship orientations usually exist side by side but receive different emphases in different societies, and among the various sub-groups within a particular society.

Based on the analysis of Almond and Verba, the dimensions of citizenship that were examined in the present study include first, the extent to which the citizen's role is viewed as specific and restricted to the political sphere, or as broader and diffuse, consisting of the whole of an individual's obligations to his fellow men and to the society and the community in which one lives. Secondly, the extent to which adolescents regard the citizen role as entailing primarily active participation and involvement in the political process, or as consisting chiefly upon passive affiliation, stressing obedience and loyalty.

Studies of citizenship orientations among Israeli Jewish youth revealed that urban youth tended to describe the citizen's role as limited and specific, rather than as diffuse and inclusive, and as defined essentially in terms of the individual's attachment to political frameworks, officials and processes. Also, obedience and loyalty were stressed much more as compared with active participatory orientations (Ichilov & Nave, 1981). In the kibbutz, on the other hand, the citizen's role was equally balanced between political and non-political characteristics, and between active participation and loyalty and compliance (Ichilov, 1981). It seems that in the kibbutz, being a small and a cohesive community, social life is not as fragmented as in the city, and the private and public spheres are interrelated, thus fostering more balanced civic orientations than in the city.

Girls in the city and the kibbutz tended to attach greater importance than boys to the political aspect in the citizen's role, and to emphasize the active-participatory dimension.
The alienation of Israeli Arabs from the major ideology and symbols of the Jewish-Zionist state, their limited autonomy, the differential opportunity structure for Arabs and Jews, and the traditional structure of Arab society, leads us to expect that parochial orientations would be more prevalent among them than political ones. In other words, attachment to the family and community would be emphasized more than attachment to political officials, institutions and processes. The minimal demands upon the Arab citizen by the Israeli government leads us to expect that passive obedience would be more pronounced among them than active participation in the Israeli political sphere.

Coming from a traditional background, and sharing a stronger ethnic identity than westerners, eastern adolescents might assign greater importance to the non-political dimension in the citizen's role than adolescents of western origin, but less so than their Arab counterparts. They would also attach greater importance to passive obedience than to active participation, but less so than their Arab counterparts.

We might also expect that girls in both groups would reflect stronger parochial and passive political orientations than boys, given the traditional role of women, and their minimal participation in the public and political spheres.

Hypotheses

Based upon the aforementioned similarities and differences between Israeli-Arabs and eastern Jews in Israel, the following hypotheses were formulated concerning citizenship orientations in both groups:

1. Eastern adolescents will characterize the good citizen primarily by political traits, whereas Arab youth will attach greater importance to the non-political dimension of good citizenship.

2. In both groups, the passive political dimension will be attributed with greater importance than the active participatory dimension. However, this tendency will be stronger among Arab than among eastern Jewish respondents.
3. Girls in both groups will project stronger passive and non-political orientations than boys. This tendency, however, will be stronger among Arab than among eastern Jewish girls.

The Study

Research population. The study population consisted of 118 Arab and 276 eastern Jewish high school students ages 16-18. The Arab respondents live in an Arab village located in the center of the country, and attend an all-Arab high school. The Jewish respondents included students in both academic and vocational high schools in the greater Tel-Aviv area.

The percentage of boys in the Arab group was 52.5% and the percentage of girls was 47.5%. In the Jewish group the percentages of boys and girls were 49.6% and 50.5% respectively. All the Arab respondents were Moslems, and 94.3% of them defined their nationality as Arab, while 3.3% as Palestinian.

In the Arab sub-sample most parents are employed in agriculture, or in blue-collar, un-skilled jobs in the city. 71.7% of the fathers of the eastern respondents were employed in low-status occupations, and 43% of the fathers have completed only partial of full elementary education.

The research questionnaire and data collection. The research instrument consisted of 36 items describing "the good citizen." The items included equally political and non-political characteristics. The political items reflected the citizen's passive as well as active relationships to political officials, institutions and processes. For example, loyalty to the state reflects a passive political orientation, and regular participation in the elections and party membership, reflecting active participation. The non-political items included personal traits such as honesty and truthfulness, and characteristics reflecting the relationships of the citizen to particularistic frameworks, such as the family and place of work.
This list of items which has been used by Ichilov & Nave (1981), and Ichilov (1981), was drawn based upon instruments used by Jennings & Niemi (1974), and Oppenheim & Torney (1974). In addition, items were constructed based upon content analysis of 60 compositions by 11th and 12th graders on the subject "the citizen and democracy in Israel."

Subjects were asked to classify these items into five categories such that the first category included the four characteristics valued as most important for good citizenship, the second category included eight characteristics considered important, the third category twelve somewhat important characteristics, the forth eight characteristics regarded as unimportant, and the fifth category, the four least important characteristics. This rating procedure was selected because it forces the respondents to weigh the importance attached to each item in relation to all other items. This is especially important when studying a concept like citizenship which is often enveloped in cliches and slogans (Jennings & Niemi, 1974: 123). Had subjects been asked to rate each item separately, it is likely that most of them, especially in the Jewish sector, would have assigned high ratings to all.

In order to minimize the effects of possible threat and social desireability, questionnaires in the Arab sector were administered by Arab personnel.

Findings

We first examined how each of the 36 items characterizing good citizenship was rated by Arab and eastern respondents. In Table 1, item means, standard deviations, ratings, and the percentage of respondents who considered the item as important and unimportant are presented.

Insert Table 1 about here
Each item was graded on a scale ranging from 1 (most important) to 5 (least important). Among Arab respondents the items' mean scores ranged from 1.850-4.198, and among eastern respondents from 1.317-3.914. Overall then, Arab respondents considered the various items as less important for characterizing the good citizen as compared with eastern respondents. The item "reads newspapers regularly," was rated as the least important by both groups. However, concerning most of the items' scores, significant differences were found between the two groups. Overall 13 items were found to be significantly more important among Arab respondents, 14 items were rated more important by Eastern respondents, and for 9 items no significant differences were found between the mean scores of the two groups.

Examination of the contents of the items which were rated as more important by Arab respondents, clearly reflect their minimal commitment to the State and its political institutions and processes.

Obedience of laws, loyalty to the State and to the government, and respect and honor for the State have been rated by Arabs as significantly less important than by eastern respondents. Regular participation in the elections which was rated 13th by eastern respondents, was rated 30th by their Arab counterparts. The item "an active political party member," on the other hand, was rated 2nd in importance by Arab respondents, and only 30th by eastern Jews. Discussing politics with others, was also attributed with greater importance by Arab than by eastern respondents.

Items representing parochial orientations such as "devoted to his family," and "a good neighbor," and items representing general characteristics which are not necessarily political such as "truthful," "tolerant of others' views," and "a person of principle," were attributed with greater importance by Arab than by eastern respondents.
In order to have a clearer overall view of the items' ratings by Arab and eastern respondents, the items were classified into two major categories: political and non-political. The political category was further subdivided into active versus passive civic orientations. The data processing refers sometimes to the political dimension, and sometimes to its sub-categories. In Table 2, the distribution of mean scores concerning these four dimensions is shown.

Insert Table 2 about here

It was expected that Arab respondents will assign higher rating to non-political items than to political ones, and that they would attribute greater importance to items reflecting passive civic orientations than to those projecting active participation. As can be seen in Table 2, the majority of Arab respondents have rated the four categories of items within the range of 2.5-3.5, while the ratings of the easterners tended to be more differentiated. Also, while 33% of the eastern respondents have rated the political dimension within the range of 1.00-2.49, only 0.8% of the Arab respondents did so, and while 68.5% of the eastern respondents have rated passive civic orientations within that range, only 6.8% of the Arabs have rated them similarly. Contrary to our expectations, then, the majority of Arab respondents have rated political and non-political items similarly. However, as expected larger percentage of the Arab respondents have rated the passive dimension higher than the active one. Passive political orientations were also considered more important than active ones by members of the eastern group.
Differences in civic orientations between boys and girls in both groups were then examined. In Table 3, mean scores and standard deviations of the various dimensions among boys and girls in both groups are presented. In Table 4, F values based on analyses of variance are shown. Analyses were carried out separately, once for all political items, once for the active and for the passive dimensions, and once for all non-political items.

As can be seen in Tables 3 & 4 contrary to expectations, no significance differences by sex concerning the various dimensions were found. In other words, boys and girls have rated the four categories of items similarly. As expected, the political dimension was significantly more important for eastern respondents, and the non-political dimension was more important for Arab respondents. However, contrary to expectations, the passive political dimension was significantly more important for eastern than for Arab respondents. Also, no significance differences between the two groups were found in the active-participatory dimension, which was assigned with medium importance by both groups.

Discussion and Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to examine and compare the perception of the citizen's role among Israeli-Arab and Eastern-Jewish youth in Israel. As we have seen, great similarities exist between these two minority groups in cultural traditions and in their marginal status in the various social spheres within Israeli society. The major difference between the groups lies in their ability to identify themselves as Israelis, given the Jewish-Zionist nature of the State and the definition of Arabs as an enemy-affiliated
minority; also in their prospects for future integration.

The research findings revealed that over all, Arab respondents tended to assign less importance than their Jewish counterparts to all the items describing good citizenship. The major difference in civic orientations among Arab and eastern youth was found to be in the perceived importance of the political and non-political dimensions. As expected, Arab youth attributed the non-political dimension with greater importance than the political one. In other words, they viewed personal characteristics and commitment to the family and community as more important for good citizenship than both passive and active attachment to the political sphere. This predominance of the non-political dimension might reflect the more traditional orientations of Arabs, which stress the centrality of the extended family and the community. It could also be related to their minority status within Israeli society. Studies have shown that group affiliation among minority group members is important primarily in situations of hostility between groups, and when the channels for social mobility and integration seem to be blocked (Glazer & Moynihan, 1963; Kramer & Leventman, 1961).

Within the political dimension, contrary to expectations, Arab youth has similarly rated the active and the passive dimensions, assigning to both a fairly low importance. However, examination of the contents of each dimension clearly reveals a pattern of instrumental adaptation. The items which were considered important represent possible channels of influence, and minimal commitment to the State and its institutions. Party membership, for example, was considered much more important than regular participation in the elections. Given the massive support of Rakah in the Arab sector, it seems that Arabs have greater faith in their ability to promote their interests via party membership, than through the elections. Their minimal commitment is clearly shown in the low importance which they have attached to the respect for the State and its institutions.
The civic orientations of eastern youth resemble those of urban Jewish adolescents, who tended to assign greater importance to the political rather than to the non-political dimension of good citizenship, and stressed passive orientations more than active-participatory ones (Ichilov & Nave, 1981). Similar patterns of citizenship orientations have been found among Israeli adults as well. Etzioni-Halevy and Shapira (1977) characterized Israeli citizens as being engaged in "spectator" rather than in "gladiatorial" political activities. These characteristics of the political culture, seem to be transmitted to the younger generation through the various agents of political socialization. Eastern adolescents, thus, do not differ in their civic orientations from the general Israeli public. This might reflect their acceptance of the political culture, and their desire to become integrated into it.

Contrary to expectations, no differences were found between boys and girls in both groups. A possible explanation might be that girls who participate in secondary education in these traditional groups which do not encourage women to study, must be ambitious and talented, and project the same civic orientations as boys.
Notes

1. The Arab sample consisted of Arabs holding Israeli citizenship, who have remained within the borders of Israel following the establishment of the State. It does not include residents of the West Bank and of the Gaza Strip who are not Israeli citizens.

2. During the first years of statehood this ideology was not put into effect. The Israeli-Arabs were under martial law, and their civil rights were very limited.

3. In reality Jews of eastern origin were required to integrate into the dominant western culture. Their cultural traditions were considered incompatible with the ideal of developing a modern western state.

4. The national symbols represent Jewish themes. The national flag shows the Star of David, and the national emblem shows the Menorah of the temple. The national anthem describes the yearning of the Jews during two thousand years of exile, to return to their homeland. Its last verse is "to be a free nation in our country, the land of Zion and Jerusalem."

5. The official name of the party is: Equality (Rakah), Black Panthers and Jewish-Arab Circles.

6. Which in Israel is tuition-free but not compulsory.
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Table 1: Item Ratings, Mean Scores, and Percentage of Arab and Eastern Respondents

Who Rated Item as Very Important and As Unimportant

| Items which were rated as significantly more important by Arab Respondents* | Mean Score | Standard Deviation | % Rating as very important | % Rating as unimportant | Mean Score | Standard Deviation | % Rating as very important | % Rating as unimportant |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tolerant of Others' Views | 2.161 | 0.982 | 31.3 | 0.9 | 4 | 3.124 | 0.958 | 5.7 | 6.2 | 20 |
| Devoted to His Family | 2.345 | 0.904 | 22.1 | - | 6 | 3.477 | 1.280 | 9.1 | 27.9 | 29 |
| Discusses Politics with others | 2.726 | 0.879 | 7.1 | 2.7 | 13 | 3.829 | 1.049 | 13.9 | 33.7 | 34 |
| Sticks to his Opinions | 3.046 | 0.980 | 5.6 | 7.4 | 20 | 3.792 | 0.948 | 1.6 | 24.0 | 33 |
| A Good Neighbor | 3.066 | 1.054 | 8.5 | 6.6 | 22 | 3.877 | 0.977 | 1.5 | 31.3 | 35 |
| Is Not Afraid to Speak his mind | 2.164 | 0.913 | 24.1 | 1.7 | 5 | 3.186 | 1.026 | 4.6 | 8.8 | 24 |
| An Active Political Party Member | 2.000 | 1.000 | 39.1 | 0.9 | 2 | 3.487 | 1.056 | 2.1 | 20.9 | 30 |
| A Good and Faithful Friend | 2.586 | 0.939 | 11.7 | 3.6 | 10 | 3.356 | 0.993 | 2.6 | 13.9 | 27 |
| Truthful | 2.391 | 0.949 | 18.2 | 2.7 | 7 | 2.878 | 0.917 | 6.9 | 3.7 | 14 |
| Does not Take Advantage of People weaker than himself | 2.073 | 0.868 | 26.6 | 0.9 | 3 | 3.175 | 0.965 | 2.1 | 10.1 | 22 |
| Ready to Compromise on occasion | 3.065 | 0.993 | 6.5 | 7.5 | 21 | 3.670 | 0.918 | 1.1 | 19.7 | 32 |
| A Person of Principle | 2.676 | 1.028 | 14.4 | 6.3 | 12 | 3.300 | 1.093 | 7.4 | 12.6 | 26 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items which were rated as significantly more important by Eastern-Jewish Respondents*</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>% Rating as very important</th>
<th>% Rating as unimportant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obey the Laws of the State</td>
<td>3.430</td>
<td>1.241</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participates Regularly in Elections</td>
<td>3.473</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyal to the State</td>
<td>2.500</td>
<td>0.912</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always Ready to Volunteer in Public Affairs</td>
<td>3.046</td>
<td>1.265</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest</td>
<td>2.866</td>
<td>1.127</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cares About What Happens in the Country</td>
<td>3.245</td>
<td>1.076</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items which were rated as significantly more important by Eastern-Jewish Respondents*</th>
<th>Mean Score</th>
<th>Israeli-Arabs (N=118)</th>
<th>Eastern-Jews (N=276)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>% Rating as very important</td>
<td>% Rating as unimportant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active in Municipal Affairs</td>
<td>3.785</td>
<td>1.055</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.772</td>
<td>0.883</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Always ready to Help Others</td>
<td>3.991</td>
<td>1.098</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical</td>
<td>3.439</td>
<td>1.074</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reads Newspapers Regularly</td>
<td>4.198</td>
<td>0.899</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.752</td>
<td>0.954</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considerate of Others</td>
<td>3.131</td>
<td>1.074</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.721</td>
<td>1.047</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Items which were rated as equally important by both groups*:

| Behaves According to Social Norms | 2.983 | 1.121 | 8.8 | 11.4 | 18 | 2.969 | 1.127 | 9.2 | 11.7 | 16 |
| Reliable | 2.982 | 1.022 | 8.0 | 7.1 | 17 | 3.035 | 0.831 | 2.0 | 4.0 | 19 |
| Does not "Pull Strings" | 3.105 | 1.229 | 11.4 | 14.9 | 24 | 2.839 | 1.113 | 11.9 | 9.8 | 12 |
| Performs His Duties to the State | 1.850 | 0.815 | 38.9 | - | 1 | 1.779 | 0.854 | 44.2 | 1.0 | 3 |
| Self-Disciplined | 3.148 | 0.861 | 3.5 | 5.2 | 26 | 3.168 | 1.011 | 5.6 | 8.2 | 23 |
| Takes an Interest in what's Happening in the State | 2.655 | 1.171 | 15.0 | 9.7 | 11 | 2.500 | 0.826 | 10.2 | 0.5 | 8 |
| Gets Along with People | 3.518 | 0.984 | 0.9 | 17.3 | 31 | 3.430 | 0.933 | 1.0 | 15.5 | 28 |
| Dedicated to his Job | 3.081 | 0.841 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 23 | 3.228 | 0.903 | 1.6 | 9.0 | 25 |
| | 2.758 | 0.846 | 8.1 | - | 15 | 2.942 | 1.099 | 5.8 | 11.6 | 15 |

* According to t-tests measuring differences between items' mean scores.

** Rating was done by mean-scores-ordering of the various items. Items are rated 1-36 in both groups with 1=Most Important and 36=Least Important.
Table 2: Distribution of Mean Scores Assigned by Arab and Eastern Respondents to Political and Non-Political Items (Percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean Scores</th>
<th>Israeli-Arabs (N=118)</th>
<th>Eastern Jews (N=276)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00-1.49</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.50-2.49</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.50-3.49</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least Important</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.50-5.00</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table details the distribution of mean scores assigned by Arab and Eastern respondents to political and non-political items, with scores ranging from 1.00-1.49, 1.50-2.49, 2.50-3.49, and 3.50-5.00.
Table 3: Mean Scores and Standard Deviations For Political and Non-Political Items Among Arab and Eastern Boys and Girls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Political Dimension</th>
<th>Active Dimension</th>
<th>Passive Dimension</th>
<th>Non-Political Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arab Boys</td>
<td>Mean Score</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Girls</td>
<td>Mean Score</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Boys</td>
<td>Mean Score</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>3.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Girls</td>
<td>Mean Score</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>3.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Summary of Analyses of Variable (F Values)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variables</th>
<th>Political Dimension</th>
<th>Active Dimension</th>
<th>Passive Dimension</th>
<th>Non-Political Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>1.838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>56.024*</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>125.689*</td>
<td>69.969*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex x Group</td>
<td>0.916</td>
<td>1.482</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.914</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p ≤ 0.05