The fundamental theme of these papers is what constitutes the common good and the issues and problems related to the understanding of that common good. Several anthropologists and a political scientist explore this theme in various geographic settings and from many theoretical and methodological perspectives. Among the countries and cultures represented in the compendium are Nigeria, Ghana, Japan, Singapore, Latin America, Chinatown USA, the Circumpolar North, and Canada. Papers include "Planning Nigeria's New Capital City: Implementation and the Public Good" (Ronald Cohen and John Paden); "Chieftaincy and Constitutionalism in Ghana: The Case of the Third Republic" (Maxwell Owusu); "The Reduction of Rates of Violent Crime: Japan since World War II" (Robert J. Smith); "Planners, Householders and Fertility Reduction" (Robert S. Merrill); "Conflict in Chinatown: Changing Images and Institutions" (Serena Nanda); "Research, Policy and Ideas in Good Currency: The Squatter Settlement Phenomenon" (Lisa R. Peattie); "Internal Colonialism or Self-Sufficiency? Problems and Prospects in the Circumpolar North" (John Dryzek and Oran R. Young); and "Formulating the Common Interest: The Role of Structures in Cree Development" (Richard F. Salisbury). (RM)
STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES

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Robert S. Merrill and Dorothy Willner, Guest Editors

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INTRODUCTION

This issue of Studies in Third World Societies deals with a fundamental theme in the social sciences: What constitutes the 'common good'? and what are the issues and problems related to the understanding of that 'common good'? Several anthropologists and a political scientist from the U.S.A. explore this theme in various geographic settings and from many theoretical and methodological perspectives. Among the cultures represented in this compendium are Nigeria, Ghana, Japan, Singapore, Latin America, Chinatown USA, the Circumpolar North, and Canada. The seemingly disparate yet related topics include such issues as planning and its implementation in Nigeria (by Cohen and Paden), the role and significance of chieftaincy in Ghana (by Owusu), crime reduction in Japan (by Smith), fertility control in Singapore (by Merrill), conflict in Chinatown (by Nanda), squatter settlements in Latin America (by Peattie), internal colonialism in the Circumpolar North (by Dryzek and Young), and Cree development in Canada (by Salisbury).

Ronald Cohen and John Paden in "Planning Nigeria's New Capital City: Implementation and the Public Good" state that "the public good involves utilitarian ends, means, and a continuing relation between them." The authors believe that "questions of ends are philosophical and ideological. . ." Implementation, however, involves "events and activity that can be predicted, observed, and interpreted." Related to implementation, according to them, is planning, the purpose of which is "to alleviate the problems of unforeseen and unwanted consequences." Based on their Nigerian research, Cohen and Paden make three important conclusions. First, planning and policy implementaiton entails errors because "actors are not just material objects," for they also "make decisions and behave in unpredictable ways in response to known and to unknown stimuli." Second, "planning always requires some missing data simulation or estimates." Third, "social science participation in policy research must be iterative and long term. One vital plan for social science in society is therefore its capacity to produce the monitoring needed to create planning and policy that has some relation to the real needs and interests of the people affected."

In his perceptive paper on "Chieftaincy and Constitutionalism in Ghana: the Case of the Third Republic," Maxwell Owusu underscores the significance of the institution of chieftaincy in the political life and soul
of Ghana, his native land. According to Owusu, "political representation involves active linkage between those who claim to speak on behalf of the moral community and those who comprise it.... Representation in this sense takes place through any linkage that involves leadership, accountability, and responsiveness to the wishes and preferences of the community. Such a linkage... need not necessarily proceed through political parties; equally important institutions such as chieftaincy may provide the channel through which political influence can be effectively and democratically exerted." Owusu states that at a gathering of the National House of Chiefs... on 6th August 1980, the President of the House emphasized that "chieftaincy was and should be above party politics." It should be, he said, "the unifying force in a multiparty state."

In his interesting and highly informative article on "The Reduction of Rates of Violent Crime: Japan Since World War II," an eminent specialist on Japan, Robert J. Smith raises the crucial question: "How... has it come about that in a context in which we would normally expect indexes of social pathology to rise they have fallen instead?" Smith attributes this to Japan's "application of intensive measures of social engineering, characterized both by adroit appeals to the public's desire for order and effective administrative action on many fronts." According to Smith, this successful social engineering was the result of the transformation of the "character of the police force." Smith says that "the image of the police has been changed from that of harsh, occasionally brutal figures of authority accorded respect largely based on fear to one of a very different kind." Smith contends that the vast majority of the Japanese assume that "police and public are on the same side in the unremitting effort to maintain order and minimize the dangers encountered by ordinary people in their daily lives." Over the past 35 years, police behavior has improved considerably, says Smith. One index is the decline in the number of complaints against them with the civilian review boards of the Ministry of Justice. Smith reports that in a population of 116 million, the number of complaints has declined annually since 1948 to its present number of about 100 per year. Further, he says, the police has not been tainted by scandal... "the rate of arrests per reported crimes---the so-called clearance rate--is the highest in the industrial world."

Robert S. Merrill, in his "Planners, Householders and Fertility Reduction," discusses innovation and response in fertility reduction in the Republic of Singapore between 1959 and 1975. According to Merrill, "population policies for fertility reduction encounter fundamental conflicts when there are discrepancies between the interests of families or households and the interests of governments." Merrill attempts to study World War II data on Singapore. He reviews carefully the Singapore government's methods of resolving the conflict and determines the place of government policies to bring about large declines in fertility. Finally, he considers "the implications of the differences found between governmental theories of how to change household conduct and the ways such changes apparently took place."
Serena Nanda in her "Conflict in Chinatown: Changing Images and Institutions," writes that social class, ethnicity, and lifestyle diversity in cities are important sources of vitality. At the same time, according to her, conflict results "as groups with divergent and often opposing interests come together in a variety of ways, struggling sometimes against each other, sometimes against urban bureaucracies and governments, for control over those institutions which immediately affect their lives." Nanda's paper centers on some of the past conflicts in an elementary school serving the Chinatown area in a large and heterogeneous northern city. According to Nanda, one way to solve the dilemma is to appeal to "the higher common interest." Such appeals, according to her, may be expressed as "abstract ideals of 'social justice' or 'equal opportunity' where the scope of the common good takes in not only the interests of one's own immediate group, but also the interests of groups to which one does not belong, and of less immediate groups, such as the good of the nation as a whole."

Lisa R. Peattie in "Research, Policy and Ideas in Good Currency: the Squatter Settlement Phenomenon," explains the role of social research in the marginal settlements of Latin America. Peattie writes that "in most rapidly growing cities of developing countries, a considerable part of the population is not living in either modern apartment buildings or modern houses but in a sharply contrasting environment: unplanned and often illegal settlements, lacking municipal services, and with houses which at the beginning at least are generally no more than shacks."

In "Internal Colonialism or Self-Sufficiency? Problems and Prospects in the Circumpolar North," John Dryzek and Oran R. Young describe the plight of the Circumpolar North villages as suffering from "an array of severe social problems...they appear to have completely lost control over their own destiny...many of them lack the will and capability to regain that control." The authors, in this paper, attempt "to develop in detail a diagnosis of this state of affairs; to explain how it came to pass; and to explore strategies for the future development of these communities which would enable them to overcome their current problems."

Finally, Richard Salisbury, in his article on "Formulating the Common Interest: the Role of Structures in Cree Development" writes that "perhaps the most frustrating situation for anyone concerned with social development occurs when all participants are quite clear what is needed to promote the common good, but for unclear reasons the clearly needed action is not taken. For many years this situation regularly occurred among the James Bay Cree of Northern Quebec."

Salisbury, in his analysis, tries "to isolate some of the critical changes in recent years that have changed the pattern so that now what is needed for the common good is often done." The author concludes that "...to formulate that common good into a programme for action required
the existence of a corporate body. Outside bodies require just such a corporate body, and its organized foundation, if they are to pay attention to the local views..."
Introduction

The public good involves utilitarian ends, means, and a continuing relation between them. Questions of ends are philosophical and ideological, and although important in their own right, they are for the most part beyond the scope of this paper, except as they relate to means. Questions of implementation involve events and activity that can be predicted, observed, and interpreted. In other words, within limits, implementation is an empirical phenomenon. The limits are those made clear in Pressman and Wildofsky's (1973) conception of implementation as the forging of future effects in a context of completely known cause-effect relations. Since this is patently impossible, implementation of policy is at best a probability—a good bet that always involves unforeseen consequences and short-falls from hoped-for outcomes. At worst, policy implementation may produce problems more serious than the one(s) it was intended to cure. And in turn, they may force goals and means to change accordingly so that implementation of one set of goals may lead to others in the future.

Planning is that part of the implementation process designed to alleviate the problems of unforeseen and unwanted consequences. By
asking how best policy goals can become realities, planning—at least successful planning—should foresee the difficulties, forecast the major costs and benefits, and thereby, chart a course towards the most promising implementation procedures among the set of all possible ones.

The planning group we were associated with used a logical and well-known approach to obtain their results. First, they clarified and made sure they understood the policy goals involved. Second, they collected data on the relevant factors affecting the plan. (This was based on a theory developed from experience with many similar plans elsewhere.) Third, using these data, they generated all feasible options for implementing policy. Fourth, each option was set into a model that attempted to foretell what would be the consequences should it be adopted. And finally, each option was ranked in term of its predicted outcomes; i.e., its likelihood of implementing policy with the most benefits for the largest number of peoples and regions in the country.

The entire process leads eventually to a set of secondary goals whose purpose is to accomplish the primary ones. It is in this sense that planners produce "policy" or guidelines for action. But the two overlap and interact. The government policy to have Dodoma, Tanzania’s new capital, divided up into a number of quasi-independent "village" units connected by public transport to one another and to the large central office buildings, presented planners with such enormous problems that the original policy had to be amended to fit with the feasible means available for the site and the resources of the country.

The two most telling limitations on this secondary set of goals are time and data. Unlike the usual scholarly research process, all work done on the job is a cost. Certainly, this is also true in research design and budgeting. However, as private contractors, our planning group was committed to a tight timetable. The hiring agency—in this case the Nigerian government—made it quite clear that this was a major consideration in the letting of the contract.

The second limitation, confounded and exaggerated by the first, was that of data. Planning requires good data and a capacity to make valid assessments and projections based on these materials. It has become clear to us after a hectic, but exciting two years on this project, that the data and our capacity to make valid projections not only vary, but vary systematically. It is this latter feature which is the focus of this paper. We believe our experience demonstrates this variability and leads to conclusions important for the development of applied social science.

In what is to follow, we shall describe the emergence of the primary policy and then summarize three major planning decisions and the process by which they have been determined. This leads to a final discussion concerning the place of social science in the implementation process. One caveat is important here. We have chosen these three issues to illustrate our point about the variability of planning projections. These issues and
the planning that went into them, in no way, exhaust the problems faced by the planning team. The entire region was examined and planned for as was food production, fuel, sewage, transportation, schools, and a host of other urban developments, all of which are discussed in the Master Plan.

The Major Policy Goal

Africa is simultaneously the most unurbanized part of the world and the most rapidly urbanizing, in terms of the proportion of its population now relocating into cities. Possibly 80 percent or more of the continent's population lives in rural surroundings. Most African cities are capitals: primate cities founded in the last 100 years (Abijan 1903, Brazzaville 1883, Djibouti 1892, Kampala 1890, Kinshasa 1881, Nairobi 1899). Except for Tananarive and Ouagadougou, all other indigenous capital cities are in North Africa. As colonial towns, they were extractive collection points, centers of interchange between the metropole and its colony. Even today, it is still easier to telephone from Nigeria to Chad (next door) via Europe than directly across the few hundred miles between Lagos and Njamena.

Although Nigeria has always had a number of urban centers, its capital follows the general African colonial pattern. It is at once the commercial, the administrative, and the main export/import center of the country. Situated on a few islands on the coast, its metropolitan area includes over two million people. In-migration may exceed five percent per year; housing shortages are staggering while problems of crime, poverty, sanitation, and transportation/traffic are almost insoluble. Land area to expand or rebuild is absent or exorbitantly expensive in both monetary and human terms. Ideologically, the old capital is a symbol of exploitation by foreign and local elites. And to make matters worse in this heterogeneous country, Lagos is located within the territory of one of Nigeria's largest single ethnic groups.

Millions of dollars worth of urban renewal planning and implementation have failed consistently to make even a small dent in the accelerating deterioration of Lagos. In early 1974, the government appointed a commission to report on the problem. This group examined all options open to the government for the improvement of Lagos. They sought other possible sites, and received reports and recommendations from groups throughout Nigeria. Finally, they visited a series of planned capital sites including Washington, Brasilia, Canberra, and Islamabad. After nearly two years' work, they concluded in December, 1975, that Lagos was not, and would never be, a suitable site for Nigeria's capital. Instead, they chose a 5000-square km area in the geographic center of the country. The Federal Capital Territory (FCT) (Fig. 1) is underpopulated by Nigerian standards and is almost equidistant from all major centers in the country as well as being one of the most beautiful from a topographic point-of-view. Socioculturally, the FCT lies in the boundary region between the Islamic emirates of the north and the more urbanized ethnic groups of the south among some of the most remote peoples of the country. The choice of the territory was thus a "natural" one from the
To implement their first goal FCDA decided to run a competition in 1976-1977 open to any group of urban planners anywhere in the world. In a period of intense nationalism at home, this took courage and independence. Nigerian planning groups were free to compete, but by and large they did not have comparable experience or the numbers of technically trained specialists commonly available among the wealthier, more industrialized and more urbanized nations. The fact that Nigeria was still under military rule meant as well that the predictable popular desire for a more nationalistic choice could be better withstood than under conditions of electoral democracy. The fact that FCDA was at first a parastatal public corporation also meant that it could be somewhat removed from ordinary ministerial politics and yet be directly connected to policy makers in the military government. Without these safeguards, the city as a project, and the international rather than a strictly national competition for its design could easily have become an instant and major issue in Nigerian public life. As it was, the project kept a low profile until it was well under-way, and even at this late date it still receives only sporadic and well-planned publicity.

The winner of the competition was a U.S. based three company consortium (International Planning Associates, IPA), created specifically to bid on this large project. The companies specialized in urban planning (WMRT, Philadelphia), urban transportation and development (Planning Research Corp., Washington, D.C.) and a firm of architect-planners (SOMA Archisystem International, Los Angeles). The FCDA also contracted with a Nigerian team of scientists to carry out a basic ecological study of the Federal Capital Territory. These materials would add enormously to the base-line data needed for the plan. This team was also asked to assess various parts of the FCT as possible sites for the new city.

It was at this point that we joined the U.S.-based team as social science consultants, whose research careers had been concerned largely with Nigeria. Both of us have worked in Nigerian Universities and are well-known to Nigerian social scientists who were to criticize the planning reports. This meant that the reports could utilize materials in our own files plus the extensive facilities of Northwestern's African collection.

Our task was to assemble research materials so that planning could be developed from the best possible information rather than guesses or estimates based on similar kinds of relocation problems in other countries. In the end, both kinds of materials were used because of gaps that had to be filled in. On the other hand, "unobtrusive" measures were often
invented from Nigerian sources themselves. For example, Federal Government publications do not break ministries up into capital city and non-capital city personnel. It is, therefore, impossible to obtain a direct count of the basic federal capital employees who will form the core group in the new capital city. By obtaining an average number of persons in the federal civil service per telephone and multiplying this figure by the Lagos federal directory of telephones, an estimate of the capital city federal service was constructed for Lagos (not the new city). From that point, planning experience, capital city moves elsewhere, and a number of other factors were added together to get the basic working population figures for the new capital of Abuja.

As academics concerned with Nigerian affairs and cultures, we also made a number of presentations to the planning team, especially at the beginning of the project, on Nigeria as a modern nation, its geography, and urbanization patterns that have evolved in the country over the past few centuries based on our own experience and a few major publications (e.g. Maboqunje 1968).

Incorporated into these discussions and many others was our role as advisers on diplomatic interaction between American style business contractors and the Nigerians who had hired them. Our general theme here was almost always one of cooling down potential conflicts through suggestions that American aggressive competitive modes of interaction might be mistaken and resented. The fear of foreign domination is real in the ex-colonial world, although this was counteracted in this case by a keen Nigerian desire to get the best job done for the lowest cash outlay. American expertise, we argued, would be more objectively evaluated if restraint and good manners were the fundamental principles governing interaction. We, therefore, advised that the very highest quality work be done and that it be done efficiently and on time, and that any aggressive or difficult-to-fathom Nigerian reactions never be responded to by "shooting from the hip." Efficiency is important. True or not, many Nigerians believe that local firms take longer to complete contract work than foreign ones. This still left unresolved problems of local development of skills—in effect, the technical transfer of such skills, as well as the foreign repatriation of profits, both of which had to be worked out as the project went forward. In general, our role as "cultural" advisers slowed down over time. The planning team developed their own experience, their own contacts with Nigerian counterparts, and their own expertise at inter-cultural co-operation and communication.

Finally, our major task was a comparative study, from library materials of twenty-seven Nigerian cities in terms of their lay-out and growth patterns and the factors that determine these outputs. This gave the planners a detailed picture of Nigerian urbanism that built on our earlier presentations and provided concrete data for gearing the new city into Nigerian, rather than American or European patterns of urbanization. Other consultants, both American and Nigerian, were used for health, food production, game park development, education, and the nature and structure of the Nigerian economy.
In order to demonstrate how specific planning decisions are made, we shall now summarize briefly three decisions made by the planners that vary in our view in the degree of confidence that should be placed in them. The decisions cover three basic issues: (1) the choice of the city site within the 5000 square km territory of the FCT; (2) the shape the site will take on the ground—the "footprint" of the city; and (3) the planning of residential areas.

The City Site

The first task was to choose the city site. The FCT is a large territory that varies within itself in terms of rainfall, altitude, road access, ground water and soils. Detailed knowledge of this variance was not available. Accordingly, as noted above, a team of Nigerian scientists under the direction of Dr. Akin Maboqunje, the leading urban studies specialist in West Africa, carried out an ecology-geography study of the FCT as a preliminary project to that of the Master Plan. The data led both teams to conclude that the Gwagwa Plains in the northeast of the territory was the most propitious area for the city site.

To the outside observer, inexperienced in the planning process, it soon became abundantly clear that deciding on the location was dependent upon a set of objective and measurable criteria that are surprisingly reliable. Although there were, indeed there are still, missing data, it is extremely doubtful that new information would lead to a conclusion different from the one made independently by both the Maboqunje team and the planners.

The planning team worked out its own procedures for selecting a site. First, the entire FCT territory was divided into sub-areas based on a set of environmental variables. Second, these sub-areas, treated as units, were ranked according to a set of urban-suitability scores using environmental factors. Third, the units were ranked on a set of scales that ordered them in terms of urban social life and amenities.

Figure 1 (page 7, Site Selection Report) shows the decision process used by the planning team to select the site. Each environmental-ecological variable used to divide the FCT into sub-regional units was deemed important. Adding or subtracting a criterion measure could, conceivably, have produced different sub-units but would not in all likelihood have altered the final choice. Each feature—climate, geology, physiography, hydrology, soils, vegetation, wildlife-disease, and existing land use patterns—was mapped. By using colour transparencies, natural sub-regions emerged in the form of nine sub-regions (figure 2).

Each sub-region was then tested for its urban suitability. First, a set of pre-emptive physiographic criteria was applied. If any of these were significantly present, they ruled out the choice. These included (1) a land slope area over 15 percent in a significant portion of the sub-region; (2) terraces indicating the site had experienced flooding; (3) very poor
DISTANCES FROM NEW CAPITOL OF ABUJA TO OTHER NIGERIAN CITIES

FIGURE 1: THE FEDERAL CAPITOL TERRITORY AND SUB-REGIONS
soils (the team was informed by us that Nigerian urban dwellers generally grow food on garden plots in or near their homes); (4) swamps and riverine forests indicating serious disease vectors; (5) geological faults that suggested the possibility of serious earth movements under tectonic pressures. On this basis, several areas were eliminated; e.g., flood plains in the southwestern portions, mountains in the far northeast.

The planners then added a series of cultural requirements that are associated with urban needs and ranked these as well. This entire set of judgments led finally to two sets of ordinal rankings which, when combined, clearly indicated a winning region--the Gwagwa Plains in the east and northern part of the FCT. These rankings are given below in Table 1.

### TABLE 1

**URBAN SUITABILITY OF SUB-REGIONS OF THE FCT**

#### A. Ecological Rankings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Natural Regions</th>
<th>Foundation Potential Interpreted</th>
<th>Building Material Availability</th>
<th>Potential Groundwater</th>
<th>Flood Hazard</th>
<th>Drainage Density</th>
<th>Soil Drainage</th>
<th>Ironpan</th>
<th>Vegetation</th>
<th>Wildlife</th>
<th>Disease Vectors</th>
<th>Topoclimatic</th>
<th>Committed Land Use</th>
<th>Agricultural Potential</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kau Plains</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Zuma-Bwari-Aso Hills</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Gwagwa Plains</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>4. Karu-Agwai Hills</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>5. Zango-Kuku Hills</td>
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<td>6. Robo-Afara-Bokwoi Plains</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>2</td>
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B. Land Use Suitability

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<th>Industrial/Manufacturing Construction</th>
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In the discussions of the site sub-units 3, 6, and 8 were considered "finalists" but number 3 (Gwagwa) had the most compatible climate, an aesthetically exciting situation, good soils, and good vegetation. It could also take the 1.6 to 3.0 million people being planned for as well as the larger-sized number 8 and it could do so better than number 6. As second in the competition, number 8 was considered a good candidate for future satellite towns.

Choice of a City Forms: The "Footprint"

Once the site had been selected and agreed to by FCDA and their own teams of consultants, the next major problem was the shape of the city on the ground—the footprint. How were the various elements to be placed in relation to one another? In effect, this meant looking at various determinants of urban development and asking which ones to facilitate, which ones to restrain. The planners used three sources of data to obtain a supportable set of variables to be considered. From these, they intended to differentiate urban forms into those that would enhance the goal of monumental, functional, and aesthetically superior design from those that would detract from this goal. The sources were (1) specially designed capital cities, (2) new towns in Europe and America, and (3) traditional patterns of urban design in Nigeria.
The new capitals chosen for comparative study were Washington, D.C., designed by Pierre L'Enfant in 1791, Canberra, planned by W. B. Griffen in 1915, Brasilia, created by Lucio Costa in 1956, and Chandigarh by Corbusier in 1962. New Delhi and Islamabad were considered, then dropped; New Delhi because it was built as a mid-nineteenth century colonial capital, a sensitive topic in any ex-colonial country, and Islamabad because the planning team judged it to be too plain, too uninteresting to achieve the monumentality and aesthetic success demanded of them by the Nigerians. The new town developments included several different time periods in England, satellite new towns outside Paris designed in the late 1960s, and two new towns (Reston, Virginia and Colomba, Maryland) in the U.S.A. Traditional Nigerian urban forms were first discussed with the planners, and we (Cohen and Paden) made a series of presentations and short reports during the first year of the project. In the second year, we carried out a systematic study of 27 Nigerian cities (Cohen and Paden, 1979) so that the planning team could have as comprehensive and comparative a set of Nigerian materials as possible to use in creating the Master Plan.

The first two studies produced the rationale for a series of "do's and don't's" that became a guiding set of criteria for ranking different options in the footprint design. The study results are too complex and too numerous to summarize. Unintended consequences, unplanned for and unforeseen problems, are clearly the most obvious problem. Brasilia's lack of worker housing is now well-known. The lack of planning for a central business district in both Washington, D.C. and Brasilia created many dispersed smaller ones, thereby creating congestion, traffic and transportation problems, as well as unbalanced and inefficient urban growth. Chandigarh had no regional plan so that adjoining provinces founded nearby urban marketing centers to compete with and benefit from the capital city development detracting from a planned for commercial growth in the new capital. The new town studies showed repeatedly that newly developed compact urban forms with one central area are best suited for populations under 100,000. Over that size, distances to and from shopping and other services are too great, necessitating sub-center development.

By raising the level of generalization to include larger sets of these study conclusions, the planning team developed criteria for judging all possible design options. It is important to note here that the process was more intuitive than it may appear. No clear-cut method for getting from the comparative studies to the urban form criteria was carefully designed or discussed. As far as we know the step from the massive amount of comparative data to urban form determinants was intuitive, experienced, and quite probably valid. But, unless another equally experienced group were to judge it, we have no objective means of assessing this synthesis. More on this point later.
The criteria that "emerged" from these studies were as follows:

1) **Imageability** - The city form must provide the observer with a clear understanding of its purpose, organization, and symbolic message.

2) **Efficiency** - The city form must create a physical environment in which government, business, and all ordinary daily tasks and pleasures can be carried out for the lowest costs. Each part of the city should have the highest accessibility to each other part consistent with a need for balanced growth; i.e. growth that allows for the full range of population needs to be met as numbers increase.

3) **Flexibility** - There must be as high a capacity as possible within the constraints of the other criteria for growth and change, and for unintended consequences to be accommodated within the overall plan.

4) **Cultural Continuity** - Nigerian cultural and political traditions and "realities" (i.e., differences) are to be applied to all decisions based on the first three criteria. This meant using the expertise of area specialists, checking with Nigerian colleagues before decisions were made, and most importantly, always providing options so that Nigerians themselves could argue the pros and cons of one decision alternative compared to another.

With these criteria in place the planning team then reduced the urban form to four interrelated decisions, each of which progressively reduced the number of options. The first one was in favor of one contiguous urban mass as opposed to a set of non-contiguous clusters based on utilization of available land surface, the desire to minimize infra-structure costs, aesthetic opportunities, and Nigerian traditions.

**THE FIRST STEP: CONTIGUOUS URBAN MASS**

![Diagram of the first step]
The second step was to favor a dominant center for the city compared with multiple centers. The dominant choice would create efficient connections between the commercial and government centers and provide the opportunity for a monumentality clearly desired by the Nigerians for their new capital. The planners chose a strong center to emphasize the government as well as commercial centrality.

The third step involved a local landmark, Aso Hill, which forms an enormous single granite dome flanked by an arc of smaller granite hills at the northeastern portion of the plain. The planners feel that the hill symbolizes the unity and solidity as well as the prominence of Nigeria as an emergent power in Africa and the world.

THE THIRD STEP: USING ASO HILL AS AN ORIENTATION POINT

The fourth and most crucial step was a more complex decision stemming out of the previous ones. This was choice to use a modified "fan" design rather than a linear, radial, or grid pattern. These four exhaust the possibilities for setting up new urban forms. This decision, made ultimately under some severe time constraints, was later altered by the shape of the terrain and the watershed areas into a double crescent or arc beneath the line of hills with its center oriented towards the larger 1,300 foot high dome of Aso Hill.
THE FOURTH STEP

THE FINAL FORM CHOICE RESULTING FROM THE FORM DECISIONS
Nigerian socio-cultural realities and traditions were considered continuously as decisions were made. But these were always set against other factors such as costs, efficiency, symbolic values, water drainage, mass transportation and physiographic features especially "inselbergs" (large granite outcroppings that dotted the site) as well as a small river or creek that cut through the central area making it less and less level as our knowledge of the site increased.

A good example of such competition among criteria occurred early in the work. The planning team went over all possible urban forms and examined how each might be developed into a viable city on the site. From a strict planning and urban design point-of-view, some compromise between linear and fan patterns was clearly in order. A radial city would stretch out over the plain using up too high a proportion of the land surface needed for other purposes, especially for an airport and a cheap efficient sewage system that the team was considering. On the basis of tradition, we (Cohen and Paden) noted that the radial pattern is the dominant one in the older indigenous Nigerian cities. In this instance, design criteria other than local tradition were considered more important. The planners were convinced that both a radial and a grid pattern would detract from the best possible use of the site. On the other hand, we also reported that 80 percent of the working adults in Nigerian cities go and return from the central city six or seven days a week. This datum was used to clinch the no vote on a linear pattern because parts of the city would be too far away from the center. It provided supporting material for the double linear or modified fan design using the space between the fan lines for a rapid transit system into the city center. This design also allowed for the projected population size within the curve of the hills, for a monumental center, and for the development of controlled and well-designed local sub-centers.

In more general terms, we noted that traditional Nigerian cities are broken down into well-defined administrative units, that approximately two-thirds have some form of orientation towards cardinal directions, and that well over half have some form of central place for governmental and commercial activities. The final northeastward orientation of the central government area towards the National Assembly and beyond that to Aso Hill is reminiscent of the centuries old eastward orientation of town centers in the Chad Basin area of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad.

None of these socio-cultural materials, with the possible exception of worker movement into the central city, was determinative of the final city design. The first three decisions (massed, dominant center, and orientation towards Aso Hill) were in effect fairly obvious. To have chosen otherwise would be to nullify practical and aesthetic advantages of the site for a capital city of 1.64 million by 2000 A.D. On the other hand, the choice of the double linear, or modified fan design was a difficult one that had to be argued out, clarified, and projected forward in time in terms of all the criteria discussed as well as any other factors that could be thought of during such discussions. Housing shortages and urban
sprawl, overcrowding, transportation, imageability, efficiency, and flexibility, traditional patterns, interaction with its regional surroundings, and the country at large, plus economic factors of cost materials, manpower, and the results of any and all data on these and a host of other matters all went into the hopper oft times in a helter-skelter fashion. Along with this went the accumulated experience of the members in their various disciplines. It was exciting, frustrating, educational, but not particularly systematic. Certainly not nearly as rational and "scientific" as the site choice had been or as the final report made it seem. Yet once done, once the "footprint" emerged, (modified here and there for physiographic reasons), the team was pleased and confident that the design was "right", that it would accomplish the policy goals of the Nigerian government. The Nigerians agreed.

Planning for Residential Areas

Once the urban form was developed and approved, detailed planning began on a large number of sub-projects ranging from transportation to the layout of the central city—a key issue—to water, health, and sewage, to regional planning (another key issue) and residential areas and housing developments to name only a few. The advantage of planning over architectural control of urban development is that a large team can be broken into sub-groups each of which deals with major issues broken down into progressively smaller problems. The approach is extremely complex, but not nearly so intricate and interrelated as the problems to be tackled.

The major criterion, really more of a guideline or implementation policy, developed for residential sector planning was to opt for more rather than less control over residential development. "At the same time it was hoped that there would always be as many degrees of freedom and options as possible so that at the neighborhood levels people could decide how and where and with whom they would most like to live—and be free to do so.

The reasoning here emerged from discussions and studies especially a major one (Cohen and Paden, 1978) on twenty-seven contemporary Nigerian cities. Overcrowding, and unplanned urban sprawl seem characteristic of newer urbanization in Nigeria, (indeed throughout the third world). To be at all viable the footprint envisaged as the urban form would have to include (1) controlled access to residential areas and (2) all levels of SES and types of ethnic groupings per residential area. Both of these goals were clearly desirable from Nigerian perspectives. Lagos is abhorrently overcrowded—one planner said it was the only place he'd ever seen that topped Calcutta—and this quality is a major reason for moving the capital. National unity needs require class and ethnicity mixture in the capital to the extent that this can be accomplished. One Nigerian scholar noted that the urban form practically invited squatting outside the perimeter of the planned areas, especially on the road to the airport. Without some controls, the double linear design will come apart and a radial will result with each new group of immigrants trying to get as close as possible to the central city.
Whether the plan works or not will depend on the Nigerian administration of the city. Northern Nigerian cities tend to be more controlled as to where people can and cannot live. Southerners are used to more degrees of freedom. Which style wins out will determine whether the plan is adhered to.

All Nigerian cities are divided traditionally into a hierarchy of units and sub-units ranging from 5,000 to 10,000 on the small side and up to 50,000 among the larger cities. The planners decided to maintain this custom but to introduce a larger, new, unit, the Sector. This was in line with criterion of more, rather than less control over residential growth. The final design of the urban form calls for two wing-like projections in parallel arcs making for four residential projections outward from the city center as shown in the diagram below.

RESIDENTIAL SECTORS FOR ABUJA

Each sector is planned for a population range of 120,000 to 230,000 depending on its size as determined by local physiographic features and transportation requirements. The four adjoining 'Sectors' to the city center are planned for development in this century, the rest to be built up after 2000 A.D. Each 'Sector' in turn will be divided into Districts approximately the size of those now used as wards in major Nigerian cities, four to a 'Sector'. There will, therefore, be sixteen Sectors developed by the year 2000. The planners have, by instituting this decision, created a new level of urban government and administration.

The next set of decisions are in effect determined to a large extent by those already made. How are major services to be planned for? The options are to place all important services in the center, disperse them, or hierarchize them, decreasing in scale as the population units decrease. Since the administrative units were in hierarchical form, and since
Nigerian services are generally nested into one another in decreasing scale and increasing numbers, the latter option was chosen. Thus, there would be one central hospital, post office, etc., and local sector and district branches, possibly even neighborhood ones as well. The same can be said for schools, courts, markets, parks, entertainment, and a host of other services. Planners were strongly persuaded that these were already used and accepted practices in the country. When not used, for example, where there was only one large hospital and no sub-centers, the system was inefficient and the service poor. Add to this the finding that European and American new towns over 100,000 require sub-centers, and the hierarchy of services decision becomes an easy one.

Somewhere about this level of planning, however, precision and confidence in our capacity to make good decisions began to slip. Attention now focused on housing and neighborhood development. Up to this point macro-level comparative data were generally good enough to help sort out trends and the projected results of one decision compared to another. Now more detailed macro-level data on households were required and these were not nearly so widespread or accurate. Accordingly, the reliability and validity of our decisions began to decrease, while experience, opinion, and discussion—much discussion—took over to fill the gaps.

Three issues, among many, will serve to illustrate the kinds of difficulties faced by the planners and the solutions or recommendations that resulted. These were (1) how to distribute income and ethnic differences within residential sectors (2) how to finance housing and (3) how to address problems of urban density and trends toward overcrowding.

In the study of twenty-seven Nigerian cities (Cohen and Paden, 1978), a number of urban areas had developed mixed ethnic and class neighborhoods. Published materials, and our own experience gave insights into Jos, Zaria (Tudun Wada and Samaru), Maiduguri (Gwange), Makurdi, Port Harcourt, and Ibadan. We looked at each of these to understand the most usual forms of urban adjustment among heterogeneous urbanites. Logically, we reasoned, they could (1) assimilate: i.e. newcomers adjust to the ways of the local people and local patterns albeit but slowly and minimally; (2) they could amalgamate: i.e. a new and original development occurs out of a mixture of old and new elements each of which retains some of their old ways, adjusting to strangers a great deal. The mutual adjustment produces the new form; (3) they can become pluralist: i.e. retain their old ways and interact mostly within their own group. Old ways continue in semi-segregated settings within the city.

The study reveals that in many Nigerian cities, for example, Jos, or Gwange ward of Maiduguri, amalgamation has been occurring successfully for the last several decades. Pluralist patterns also abound but the widespread presence of some amalgamation indicates that Nigerians can adjust and change to urban life by taking up new and innovative living patterns. In these instances a northern Islamic compound style has
changed into a compound with a group of households within the compound turning it more into a courtyard off the street that shares water and sometimes toilet facilities as well. The wealthier people have more rooms, and different ethnic groups do live in one courtyard, although the tendency is towards single ethnic group numerical dominance per courtyard or small neighborhood.

All Nigerian cities have had from colonial times onward, government housing areas where civil servants are housed at low rents. The system still operates to create core areas of low density, high income housing.

The study also showed that except for large commercial enterprises, most Nigerian rent housing from entrepreneurs who invest in property for profit. Housing supply and demand is a serious social problem in Nigerian cities. Demand exceeds supply by so much that prices are astronomical—$25,000 to $50,000 (U.S.) rental per year is common for a three to four bedroom European style house in a good suburb. A normal two bedroom house for lower level civil servants is 10-22 times the annual salary of such workers. Most people, therefore, rent a room or two in a courtyard constructed for that purpose. To finance housing in such a market so that all civil servants can own their own homes is beyond the financial capability of the government.

The problem of 'densification' took up much time and was never fully solved, agreed upon or completely understood. It can be divided into two parts, one widely reported on, the other less so. The first part of the problem of density stems out of high and continuing urbanization rates—in-migration to cities—and its associated socio-economic patterns. The study (Cohen and Paden, 1978) noted that over 50 percent of all urban Nigerian households report giving shelter, clothing, and food to in-migrant kin from rural areas. These and other data on the informal sector of urban economic life led us (Cohen and Paden) to advise the team against the use of nuclear family housing units which was first discussed, and even suggested to the Nigerians—who vetoed the idea.

The in-migration is made more complex in this case by the fact that the city will be a construction site for the next few decades. Construction crews and equipment will be a constant presence with workers numbering in the thousands. Where will they live and, where will equipment be housed and serviced? Many of the men who come for work will come at first without families. Where will they live and find leisure time activities consonant with the atmosphere of peace and tranquility desired by the government?

The more obscure but still important density issue emerges from cultural differences within the country itself. The study of twenty-seven cities revealed three basic patterns—Savannah, Forest, and New Town. Savannah city dwellers live in low elevation, high privacy dwellings with a premium of empty space separating public and private sectors of the compound. Forest city dwellers have evolved densification patterns in
cities like Lagos, Ibadan, and separate areas of northern cities where they congregate. In these areas, they fill up empty spaces over time then build up several stories. In cramped surroundings, they even expand walls out onto streets narrowing them eventually to impassable lanes and walkways. A compound that started two or three generations ago with a dozen people may contain several hundred people today. New Towns are made up of compounds but owners rent rooms, and possibly build a second story, but so far have not become so dense as Forest cities.

The problem that looms is how to mix class and ethnicity and not stimulate conflict when such different patterns of urban housing use are set cheek to jowl.

After many discussions and a full consideration of our report the plan incorporated a number of recommendations meant to be sensitive to these issues and to accomplish the overall policy of creating a city that could give positive evidence of national unity within a setting of cultural diversity. These were as follows:

1) Each Sector should be planned for varying density zones. As already noted, if the Sectors were to be developed one after the other, then this idea must be included. It means, in effect, that each Sector can contain all elements of the urban population so that eventually class and ethnicity will be distributed throughout all Sectors rather than concentrating one class or one ethnic group in any one place. By varying the densities within each Sector we planned to control, and represent all income levels, but only to some extent. People always try to live amongst their own kind and this can not be prevented unless excessive coercion is used.

2) Major transport stops should be in high density areas. Most higher income people in Nigeria go to work in their own vehicles. Therefore, public transport is for lower income and informal sector workers.

3) Neighborhood development can proceed on two fronts (a) high cost government housing in low density areas, added to commercial housing in the same areas, and (b) site and service areas for private housing in several zoning densities; zoning should be closely controlled.

4) The ethnic mix, and to a lesser extent, the class mix, should be left to peoples' needs, desires, and predictions. Some concentrations will occur and hopefully mixing will also develop with multi-ethnic local neighborhoods and ward organizations.

5) A basic requisite must be some form of monitored social assessment. We are not clear on what patterns will emerge, and therefore, only as things develop can the planning go forward to more detailed aspects for the residential areas. Later Sector development can then learn from earlier ones.
Analysis and Conclusions

The Master Plan for Abuja has been completed and accepted. A British firm has submitted an accelerated district and neighborhood plan, and 2000-4000 housing units were being built during 1981-1982. A large international style hotel is also going up to provide back-up for senior civil servants and foreign personnel if housing construction lags behind the time-table for a phased removal of Ministries from Lagos to Abuja over the next few years. The FCDA has also developed an urban master plan for Gwagwalada, one of the nearby satellite towns. This will house heavier industries--hopefully construction and construction workers keeping the city cleaner than would be expected during its first several decades. At the government level, FCDA has become a ministry, rather than a public corporation, making its claim on national resources more automatic and more assured. In other words, Nigeria is building its new capital; so far the original planning is being adhered to, although new plans have been added.

For us, as scholars concerned with Africa and the forefronts of our own disciplines, the experience has been a privilege and a profound lesson concerning the place of social science in human affairs. It is this lesson we have tried to impart in this paper. Social science has a role to play in contributing to the public good. But it is not, and cannot be, the same as that of natural science. Possibly, this is a matter of degree; possibly it is a different order of activity. We shall return to this question after considering what we have learned from this project that has more general application.

To begin, it is clear that our concern with the basic policy has been minimal. From the very start, we agreed with the decision to build a new capital. We have, as teachers and research scholars, come across writings for and against the policy, We have listened to discussions on the topic at scholarly gatherings, but our belief has not changed. Given the evidence available, we wholeheartedly support the idea that Nigeria needs a new capital and should, therefore, build one.

Arguments for and against the project revolve first around how 'best' to use national resources in the interests of the nation. Those against the policy argue ideologically that cities and consolidated national elites are part of an internal colonialist or class-based pattern of exploitation. They also argue that at this stage of the country's development these same resources should be used to raise the standard of living of the largely rural population. This latter point is in our view not easily assailable in the short term. But the question is raised in the wrong way. For in the long-term the country must do something drastic to improve or change its national capital. Is it better to wait or do it now? In this sense a new capital is not a yes/no question but a matter of when. Once put in these terms the question assumes a less conflict-laden set of policy issues.
Those for the project emphasize the now well-documented unsuitability of Lagos as a national capital. Either it must be completely rebuilt or expanded to nearby land. The city is, however, a set of islands requiring bridges. Expansion is difficult; rebuilding would cause displacement and severe hardships for large numbers of people. Those who argue for the city also emphasize national unity. Great sacrifices have been made for it and the memory of that struggle is still very fresh. The new city will provide a centrally located place for the heartbeat of the body politics dominated by no one group, and symbolize the unity they feel is so important. Finally, the city will not do a thing for or against the emerging position of a national elite. That group does (and will continue to) exist whether Nigeria builds its new capital or not, whether the country moves to the right or left, to more or less egalitarian principles and practices. Although we are not capable of making fully supported judgments on this point, in our view, the city is feasible financially. If we are in error the project will simply go forward more slowly. On the other hand, the benefits in terms of national self-confidence, unity, and pride are very clear, as are the long-term gains to be made from the experience of carrying through such an extensive and complex project.

What about implementation? Our participation in the planning stage allows us to evaluate the four-step approach used by the planning team. As noted, this has involved clarification of policy goals, data collection, and the creation of options and criteria for the ranking of options in terms of utilitarian standards. We have illustrated the process by choosing three major issue areas used to determine major portions of the Master Plan for the city. These were not the only issues—many other decisions in the Regional Plan and the city site had to be considered and planned for. However, those described represent a set of issues and associated data that run from more dominantly natural science materials to human or social science concerns.

Clarifying the goals was fairly simple. Once the planning team accepted the contract to develop the Master Plan for the city and its region, it had in effect accepted Nigeria's choice to create a new capital. Background materials explained why it was necessary and the only matters left were exchanges of information in which FCDA learned about several limits to the design, and the planners, in their turn, learned more about Nigerian current affairs and the history of the country.

Data collection for site selection was relatively easy. Many sources of material were available from government and scientific reports. The ecological-geographic report by Professor Mabogunje supplied much of the most essential data on geology, climate, and vegetation. A Nigerian scholar, Dr. Francis Idachaba, from the Food Policy Research Institute, Ibadan, and a native of the area where the city was to be built, developed exceptionally good data on crops, soils, agriculture, forestry, and indigenous statistics. Maps were not as detailed as necessary, but the situation improved with time and the experience of the team.
The result was a choice of city site that was clear and unequivocal, based on good data and an appropriate methodology. It is doubtful if any group of planners or scientists asked to carry out this task, or replicate it, would choose a different site. No matter what indicators are used, no matter what scales are developed to measure them, this particular site is clearly the 'best' place for a city within the federal capital region.

Data collection and the development of options and criteria for choosing among them was much less systematic for the city form—the 'footprint'. As already noted, there were time pressures involved. Although basic determinants and form features were completed, a number of details were still being worked on. Given the arc of hills to the northeast, the dominant quality of Aso Hill, and the need to control overcrowding and to move people in and out of the city center, a number of options were undesirable. These were accordingly ranked much lower. On the other hand, the lack of good contour maps early in the project meant that the first design of the city shape had to be changed later on to fit into drainage patterns. In effect, data collection and the final plan for the city shape went hand-in-hand. Transportation, housing, sewage disposal, population size—to name only a few—were discussed, argued about, researched, planned for, and thought through repeatedly by individuals, sub-teams, and the group as a whole at periodic meetings.

The result was clear to team members. The four-step deductive method for arriving at implementation policies had, in this case, become a guideline for writing up the material rather than a means for choosing the policy itself. By contrast, the actual process of creating the city form was much more inductive, much more trial and error, based more on experience rather than on objective methods, even though this is not clearly acknowledged in the final plan. The neat, natural science approach used in choosing the site could not carry us through the complexities of data, lack of data, arrival of new data at later stages of the project, arguments among leading proponents of differing policy options, and the reactions of the Nigerian government to drafts of the plan or parts of it. The process is so complex, the costs and benefits of each aspect in and of itself, and in terms of its effects on other aspects actually so indeterminate, that only prolonged discussions, simulation of various known outcomes of any one decision, along with constant and continuing efforts to obtain more detailed, precise data, allowed the team to resolve the issue before us.

Even then serious gaps occurred that required 'creative leaps'—as one planner called them. In planning the implementation of a large public project it is simply impossible to obtain all the data necessary for a totally informed judgment to be made. At this point, policy formation and implementation part company from research as that process of knowledge claiming is carried out by scholars. Whether data are available or not, accurate or not, the decisions must be made, the options thought through and evaluated. One brief example will illustrate the point. Some notion of the size of the informal labor sector had to be used as the basis for
innumerable planning options and decisions. Data indicated that it varies from one to two thirds of the total working population of a third world city. The entire planning team argued this point amongst themselves at several meetings. Housing, transportation, population growth, food and fuel needs, markets, schools and a number of other decisions depended very seriously on this one datum. Ultimately, the team reached some agreement on this topic—not because the requisite knowledge increased in reliability or validity—but because it was essential to do so if the task at hand was to be carried out.

During the process of district and neighborhood planning, the movement away from the natural science model increased even more. Policy goals were clarified. The team understood the high priority to be placed on control over urban sprawl and overcrowding. They also understood the sensitivity of the government to problems of ethnic and class differences. But data and implementation were not easy beyond a few initial steps. Controlled growth, ease of transport to the city center, and the innovation of a segment called a Sector were macro-level decisions that followed quite logically from policy. However, how to plan for different patterns of densification, for separate or mixed ethnic neighborhoods, or how to develop local neighborhood and ward organization and administration was not clear, nor is it yet so. What kinds of buildings and building materials should be allowed, disallowed, and encouraged, is still only vaguely known and planned for.

The basic problem here is not just the paucity of data. Our survey of twenty-seven Nigerian cities revealed many, if not most, of the problems now experienced in these urban centers. How will these problems manifest themselves in a totally new federal capital? At what rate will each sector of the city population expand? How will class differences emerge in housing and neighborhood development? Can people be forced not to build houses in parkland and building free zones reserved for other uses? All of these questions remain unanswered because they involve so many unknowns and so many outcomes that are at best only vaguely understood, so that claiming foreknowledge is impossible.

The only possible solution to this problem, therefore, is to plan for iterative research in which social data are collected as the first neighborhoods, wards, and sectors develop. Once patterns begin to emerge, more definitive plans can be made based on real rather than inadequately understood trends.

This conclusion is an important one in a number of ways. As Barnes (1979), points out, social science differs from natural science in a number of deeply significant ways. Social data and prediction emerge from objects that act on their own and do so teleologically and morally. This means that they cannot be treated or understood in the same way as inanimate objects. In our work, this contrast has led to a decrease in the applicability of a natural science method for creating planning options. If the method works well, alternative plans emerge and can be reliably
ranked in terms of their costs and benefits to the public interests they are designed to serve. But as the data moves from non-human to human objects, the method becomes progressively less reliable. Under such conditions which we believe are general, planning reports tend to be written as if the process were a more scientific one than it could ever be unless the data remains consistently at the natural science level.

Secondly, at some point in the process, policy research, if it takes place in the real world, must always abrogate the timeworn rules of behavior that govern academic research. This may or may not be admitted in planning reports. Nevertheless, the completion of policy implementation plans requires jumps, leaps, and projections based on missing data, as well as the best data available.

In summary, three conclusions emerge from our work: (1) Planning and policy implementation involves error based on the fact that actors are not just material objects, but actors that make decisions and behave in unpredictable ways in response to known and to unknown stimuli, and (2) planning always requires some missing data simulation or estimates. These two lead to a third that is important for both practical and academic purposes. Social science participation in policy research must be iterative and long-term. One vital plan for social science in society is fragment therefore, its capacity to produce the monitoring needed to create planning and policy that has some relation to the real needs and interests of the people affected.

NOTES

1. The Gorsuch Report 1964, summarizes the average Lagos civil servant as 30-35 years old, male, with secondary school education, and Yoruba! Conditions favoring such biased recruiting still exist and will continue as long as the capital city is where it is now located.

2. We assumed, for example, that public servants would not move in toto or all at once but would be phased in and that some (e.g. harbour officials) would keep a significant number of personnel in Lagos to provide local services.
3. It was our good fortune that the year after we joined the planning team, Professor Mabogunje came to Northwestern for six months as the Herskovits Professor of African Studies. Mabogunje, Cohen, and Paden jointly conducted a graduate seminar on urbanization in Africa.

4. Maps were in hundreds of feet elevation. Placing the fifty foot line halfway between was a good way to estimate—but less good when it created the impression of flat surfaces where there were hills.

5. Estimates on the size of the informal sector in Nigerian cities varies from one third to two thirds of the adult working population. This enormous variance bespeaks lack of adequate data rather than a valid observation. How people in this sector live and adjust and change is not well understood.

6. Redundancy is a useful and necessary feature of any complex implementation project requiring co-ordination in which there is a significant probability that the interdependent parts of the project may not be ready as planned. Redundancy at crucial points stops a chain reaction effect in which one delay doesn't hold up those features dependent upon its particular functions (Martin Landau: personal communication).

7. A good example here was the planners' desire to keep buildings low for aesthetic and practical reasons. The FCDA had originally thought of taller buildings for monumentality but compromised on this goal when the planners presented a strong case for lower buildings with fewer stories to decrease congestion and technological (e.g. elevators) problems and maintain the dominance of Aso Hill.

8. Sceptics will argue that academic researchers must also make assumptions in their work. True, but these are always open to challenge, to reversal, or to support by empirical research and new theorizing. By contrast, in planning, data generation and estimates are used to fill gaps generally seen as areas for empirical research among academic researchers.
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"I think the fear of many people is that chieftaincy is a strong institution which is the very foundation of our social existence and our social organization . . . that it will always be a sort of challenge or that it would be vying with the powers that be. . . . I think the proper way of dealing with it is to merge it with the temporal power, those ruling the land, and so give the temporal power the rights that our society has in the Constitution." (Nene Azzu Mate Kole, Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, Official Report, No. 89, Wednesday 16th July, 1969:3089.)

Constitutionalism in Ghana: The Continuing Debate

The 1979 Constitution of Ghana was the result of nearly two years of relentless popular and occasionally violent agitation and pressure for a return to constitutional, civilian rule. The demand for a quick return to civilian government was in great part a reflection of the very widespread dissatisfaction with the economic performance of the Supreme Military Council administration which had been in power since the coup of January 13, 1972, and of the fear, despite a deteriorating economy, that the military intended to stay in power for an indefinite period. In late 1976 the SMCI (the reconstituted National Redemption Council (NRC) called for a Union Government for Ghana based not on the Westminster style
party system which it had overthrown but on a no-party system in which the army and police would share power with civilians. The pressure for a return to constitutional rule included a general strike of university students, lawyers, doctors, engineers and other professions, a strike which nearly paralyzed the country in the summer of 1977 (see Chazan and Le Vine, 1979 for a good analysis).

The constituent Assembly Decree 1979 (SMCD 203) passed by the Supreme Military Council (SMC) headed by General I. K. Acheampong established the Constituent Assembly which was charged with the adoption and enactment of a constitution acceptable to the people of Ghana. The SMC Decree 203 was later amended when on July 4, 1978, General Acheampong was forced to resign as Head of State and Chairman of SMC(I) and Lieutenant-General F.W.K. Akuffo, Chief-of-Defence Staff replaced him as Head of State and Chairman of the reconstituted SMC(2).

Although members of the Constituent Assembly were not democratically elected, yet its membership represented on the whole a cross section of all "recognized identifiable bodies who command great influence in the community, and thus represented the ruling shades of opinion prevailing in the country at the time of their election, to serve in the Constituent Assembly by their respective Bodies and Associations" (see Report of the Meeting of the Ad-Hoc Committee of the Standing Committee of the National House of Chiefs on Proposed Review of the Provisons of the Constitution held in Accra on Tuesday 18th and Wednesday 19th March 1980, p. 2).

Before the Constituent Assembly could complete its work the SMC(2) was itself overthrown by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) headed by Flight-Lieutenant J. R. Rawlings. It was therefore the AFRC which promulgated the 1979 Constitution of Ghana. The AFRC made some fundamental changes in the Constitution, claiming they were in the public interest.

The most controversial of these changes, which generated intense public debate and agitation after the Constitution came into force, were the Transitional Provisions (first Schedule, Part IV, Miscellaneous) particularly articles 15 and 16 (see The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1979:168-77).

These articles (i) indemnify the Armed Forces in respect of all previous interventions in constitutional government by coups d'etat and (ii) make it illegal to prosecute or sue for damages any member of the AFRC for any action taken in the name of the AFRC especially measures related to the House-Cleaning Exercise. The House Cleaning Exercise consisted often of drastic extra-legal measures adopted against people alleged to have committed acts of corruption or had abused or misused the power entrusted to them.
What deeply troubled the Ghanaian public was whether (a) it was fair for any or all previous military governments of Ghana, namely, the National Liberation Council (NLC), the National Redemption Council (NRC), SMC I and SMC II to enjoy absolute immunity from civil and criminal action in the courts of law -- many Ghanaians felt that the indemnity provision amounted to the legalization of military coups and malversation; (b) it was just or legal that all actions taken by the AFRC during its administration should never be questioned in any court in Ghana; (c) whether it was right that confiscations and other penalties imposed by the AFRC could not be reversed by "any authority under the Constitution," and finally (d) whether section 19 of the Transitional Provisions, which made it illegal for Parliament to amend Sections 15-19 inclusive of the Transitional Provisions, be allowed to stand.

What complicated the issue was that after Ghana's return to civilian rule in October, 1979 a number of actions taken by the AFRC in the heat of the June 4 Revolution were reversed by the Special Tribunal under the chairmanship of Justice I. K. Abban, set up under Section 17 of the Transitional Provisions and by AFRC Decree No. 23 of 1979.

Again, there were allegations that of the huge amount (figures mentioned range from $4,500 to $4,900) ($1 US = £2.75) said to have been collected by the AFRC from tax defaulters and other government debtors and paid into the government chest only £23m was accounted for (see D. A. Darku, 1980:3). To clear its name, Captain Boakye Djan, spokesman of the erstwhile AFRC, called for a commission of inquiry into the conduct and actions of the AFRC and its civilian aides. For as one critical observer put it, the Transitional Provisions might "shelter criminals masquerading as patriots and philanthropists" (Darku, 1980:3) rather than ensure political stability as some would have it, by preventing possible victimization of members of the Armed Forces aimed at settling old political scores. It has been argued that one of the purposes of the Transitional Provisions was to help check the opening of old political wounds and to allow Ghana to make a clean political start.

It is not the intention here to go into the debate. Suffice it to point out that the volume of public outcry against these provisions was such that a prestigious review panel, drawn from the National House of Chiefs, was asked (i) to study the spirit and intent of the Transitional Provisions of the Constitution vis-a-vis the circumstances that motivated the AFRC to insert them into the Constitution; (ii) to ascertain what were fundamentally amiss about the insertion of the Transitional Provisions; and (iii) to ascertain the justifications for the debate and call for the review, amendment and an outright elimination or deletion of the Transitional Provisions either wholly or parts thereof from the Constitution and to make recommendations to the Standing Committee (see The Report of the Ad-Hoc Committee of the Standing Committee of the National House of Chiefs on the Proposed Review of the Transitional Provisions of the Constitution). It should be noted that the Transitional Provisions were entrenched and could be amended only by a national referendum.
The Ad-Hoc Committee was made up of Togbi Adeladza II, Awoamefia of Anlo (also the Vice President of the National House of Chiefs at the time) Chairman, Nana Kwantwi Barima II, Adansihene in the past a strong advocate of no-party politics, Nana Addo Dankwa III, Akwapimhene and S. K. Mireku, Registrar of the National House of Chiefs, its secretary. The Committee's report noted: (a) That the AFRC had no mandate from the people of Ghana to enact the fundamental law of the land. The AFRC was not competent to entrench the Transitional Provisions and to amend certain Articles and clauses of the Constitution drafted and prepared by the Constituent Assembly. (b) The Committee was of the opinion that the Transitional Provisions had taken away the fundamental rights of Ghanaians about the sort of law under which they should be governed. (c) The Committee also felt that Articles 15 to 19 of the Transitional Provisions had denied a section of Ghanaians their inalienable right of seeking redress in any law court in Ghana even if they felt aggrieved by certain decisions and actions of the AFRC. This was against natural justice, in the opinion of the Committee. The Committee feared that if the Transitional Provisions were allowed to remain in the Constitution they would generate a sense of insecurity for both the governed and the government to the detriment of the country. The Committee felt strongly that it was against natural justice to deny any citizen the right to appeal against the judgement or decision of the AFRC Special Courts which were courts of first instance. The trials of the Special Courts were not fair, according to the Committee. The Ad-Hoc Committee then recommended that the Transitional Provisions be reviewed and/or eliminated in its entirety, providing the review exercise be limited to only the Transitional Provisions of the Constitution and nothing else. This limitation was important, since it clearly indicated that the 1979 Constitution reflected general consensus in Ghana about its fundamental provisions.

It must be pointed out that the government never considered or acted upon the recommendations of the Standing Committee of the National House of Chiefs. All the same, according to a report in The Daily Graphic, the newly established Supreme Court of Ghana composed of Mr. Justice F. K. Apaloo, the Chief Justice (its President) and four other justices, was to hear after convening on the February 9, 1981, thirty cases including twelve for habeas corpus filed by "AFRC convicts" that is, people convicted and sentenced by the special court of the AFRC (see West Africa, No. 3315, 9 February 1981:292).

In this connection, it may be observed that the Committee appointed in 1980 by the Ghana government to inquire into the Ghana Prisons Service following a successful jailbreak by prisoners convicted by the AFRC recommended to the government that all "AFRC convicts" were to be allowed to appeal to the regular courts for redress. The Committee noted in words reminiscent of the Ad-Hoc Committee's recommendations (see above) that "stability will reign both in the nation and the prisons if both the public and the AFRC convicts themselves are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as regards guilt of all those involved" (West Africa, ibid,"
The Daily Graphic report also indicated that most of the so-called "AFRC convicts" had already filed petitions with the courts and were awaiting their determination by the Supreme Court. The ruling of the Supreme Court on these petitions could have directly affected or influenced the final decision on the constitutional issues involved in the debate over the Transitional Provisions.

It is conceivable that imaginative judicial interpretation of the relevant Transitional Provisions by the Supreme Court could have led to the provision of reasonable relief in those cases where it could be established that there had been a serious miscarriage of justice. The Constitution demonstrated the Ghanaian capacity for accommodation, and its major provisions indicated that it was a compromise constitution par excellence. The Constitution-makers made sure that the worst fears of the chiefs who had been strong advocates of a no-party government were allayed. The Constitution achieved this by guaranteeing the independence of chieftaincy for the first time since colonial overrule, that is, independence from executive or parliamentary control.

Under the terms of the 1979 Constitution, the President was to be directly elected by the people, running on a party ticket or as an independent. He had the power to appoint Ministers of State responsible to Parliament from outside Parliament, (that is, in accordance with the stipulation that Cabinet Ministers shall not be members of Parliament). Thus, the Constitutions ensured that the best qualified, eminent and experienced people would be Ministers irrespective of their party affiliations, and that electoral victory would be transformed into a real governing coalition of responsible and accountable leaders. According to the Westminster model, which Ghana inherited at independence, Cabinet Ministers were also members of Parliament.

The 1979 Constitution also provided for a non-party Council of State to aid and advise the President and Parliament in the performance of their respective functions. The Council of State was to comprise wise, honorable, eminent and responsible Ghanaians selected from each of the Regions of Ghana and from the recognized professional bodies and identifiable interests, Houses of Chiefs, past Presidents or Heads of State in good standing and willing to serve, from Parliament, the Judiciary, the army and police, the Universities, the Civil Service and the Bank of Ghana. Whether this body could have in fact carried more weight than did a similar (but toothless) Council in the Second Republic, is unanswerable now, but at least the new document preserved the possibility of fruitful collaboration between government and the country in functional interests.

In a word, then, the Constitution achieved what was consistent with a recommendation that asked for the structuring of power in such a way that "all or most elite groups, including professionals, chiefs, military leaders and leaders of trade unions, could have an impact on policy outcomes sufficient to deter them from translating their opposition into attempts to seize or arrogate power by force" (Owusu, 1979:105).
Aristotle in Africa: "Polity" and Interests

More general and contextual considerations apart, the specific purpose of this paper is to assess the place of traditionalism, especially the role of the chief, in national development and integration, under the 1979 Third Republican Constitution of Ghana.

Popular Ghanaian thinking about government and politics and the legal framework within which political activities take place (in so far as it is possible to identify an abiding or persistent set of characteristics), is surprisingly close to Aristotle's reflections in his Politics and Ethics. As long as one keeps the differing age, culture and place—that is, the differing contexts of Ghanaian and Greek (Athenian) efforts at constitutionalism—constantly in mind, the relevance of Aristotle's observations to a clarification of the underlying axion, the social and jural postulates that inform and organize Ghanaian perception of the political behaviour and the ends of political action, cannot be denied. This conclusion is based on a close analysis of the constitutional debates in Ghana between 1968 and 1979.

On political association, Aristotle notes that:

All associations aim at some good; and the particular association which is the most sovereign of all, and includes all the rest, will pursue this aim most, and will thus be directed to the most sovereign of all goods. This most sovereign and inclusive association is the polis, as it is called, or the political association ...(see Michael Curtis, ed., 1961:59).

Discussing the three major forms of constitutions and their perversions, Aristotle, points out that those

constitutions which consider the common interest are right constitutions, judged by the standard of absolute justice. Those constitutions which consider only the personal interest of the rulers (whether they are one, few or many) are all wrong constitutions or the perversions of the right forms. Such perverted forms are despotic ... whereas the polis is an association of freemen ... the term "constitution" signifies the same thing as the term "civic body" (Curtis, ed., 1971:74).

Bernard Crick has argued rather persuasively that Aristotle more clearly defined the relationship between politics and democracy than "the usually over-complicated, or purely ideological writing of modern authors." Paraphrasing Aristotle, Crick points out that the

best form of government was ... political rule--"polity" or mixed-government. Such a government combined the aristocratic principle and democratic; good government is a matter of experience, skill, and knowledge. If there is no democratic element a state will be
oligarchic or despotic: if democracy alone prevails, the result is anarchy—the opportunity of demagogues to become despot (Crick 1965:71).

Given the focal importance of the institution of chieftaincy in Ghanaian society, the commitment to human rights and the popular will, Ghanaians clearly perceived the dangers to political stability and practicability that would arise if either the democratic or the aristocratic principle singly and exclusively dominated the constitution. Ghanaians also realized, as Aristotle did, that mixed government could survive in the long run only if backed by a stable society without extremes of wealth and poverty (see William Ebenstein, 1962:64-108). What this means is that the widening of the gap between the rich and the poor, which seems to be the current trend, cannot but have de-stabilizing political consequences. The problem in Ghana is how differing interests within the political system are to be conciliated by giving them a share in power in proportion to their importance to the welfare and survival of the national community.

One thread that runs throughout the chequered constitutional history of colonial and postcolonial Ghana is the conflict, sometimes violent, not so much over the idea of "mixed-government" which Ghanaians implicitly accept, as over the right balance that should be struck between the ancestral and inherited aristocratic principle (itself containing popular

In concrete terms the conflict is over the amount of public power that should be wielded by the different recognized and identifiable component associations, groupings, communities of the polity. In this contest, chieftaincy, which in precolonial times was the highest expression of the polity, becomes a central issue. Thus the systematic attempt between 1954 and 1979 to deny the chiefs meaningful amounts of public power through political party, executive or legislative control became a critical element in Ghana's constitutional crisis. It was the National House of Chiefs which in 1968 recommended a "no-party government" for the country and in effect initiated the debate on Union Government in 1976 (see Owusu, 1977). Traditional chiefs (more correctly; chiefs occupying traditional offices) as well as commoners—the people (farmers, workers, the professionals, the intelligentsia, etc.)—represent interests which are both general and specific. Since a government must govern to the common good or the general welfare, the constituent units of the polity, through proper representation, must freely decide what the common good is or ought to be, and devise the institutional means to bring it about. It is the purpose of government to harmonize or adjust the various interests as well as possible.

As Roscoe Pound notes:

When we think of law as existing to secure social interests, so far as they may be secured through an ordering of men and of human relations through the machinery of organized Political Society, it becomes apparent that we may reach a practicable system of
compromises of conflicting human desires here and now, by means of
a mental picture of giving effect to as much as we can without
believing that we have a perfect solution for all time and for every
place (Pound, 1972:44).

Pound consequently recommends a "...continually more efficacious
social engineering" (Pound, 1972:47), that is, governmental action designed
to secure, restore or maintain the good life whatever the current
preferred definition might be. In Ghana, a persistent element of the
definition of the good life is survival of ancestral cultural heritage
embodied in the institution of chieftaincy.

Chieftaincy: Bane or Blessing?

The focus on chiefs and chieftaincy—a popularly based aristocratic
institution—is particularly appropriate. Chieftaincy is a necessary
component of the Ghanaian ideal of mixed-government. It is now widely
accepted that a basic ingredient of any worthwhile notion of
"development," or "common good," is cultural identity. As the Brandt
report makes absolutely clear, a people

aware of their cultural identity can adopt and adapt elements true
to their value-system and can thus support an appropriate economic
development...; there are different and appropriate answers
depending on history and cultural heritage, religious traditions,
human and economic resources, climatic and geographic conditions,
and political patterns of nations. But there is a common notion that
cultural identity gives people dignity (Willy Brandt, 1980:20).

One of the twelve conflicting/contradictory legacies of British
colonial rule in West Africa identified by Gower is indirect rule which
everywhere helped to preserve rather than to destroy ethnic and
communal identities and to maintain divergent customary laws and the
traditional tribunals which enforced them. It may be pointed out that the
passage of the Native Jurisdiction Ordinance in 1927 in the Gold Coast
under indirect rule gave extensive judicial powers to chiefs, particularly
paramount and divisional chiefs. Much of these powers were grossly and
shamelessly abused leading especially in the 1930s to frequent
destoolment of corrupt and irresponsible chiefs. These customary laws (or
the common law of Ghana) of course co-existed with the dominant
received law of the English Common Law (the Anglo-American) tradition
(see Gower, 1967). The whole topic of legal pluralism and how it affects
the administration of justice in contemporary Ghana still awaits
systematic and comprehensive study. A preponderant amount of the
subject-matter of litigation in Ghana's district courts is customary law.
The old district courts are still a part of the judicial system of Ghana.
There is a real and persistent difficulty about how to ascertain what the
customary law is in each case. The magistrate has to decide on the
existence as well as the content of the relevant rule of customary law. So
heavy is the burden on the Western-trained district court magistrate who
is not well-versed in customary law, that many of them avoid the task. For this determination the magistrate may consult reported cases, textbooks, anthropological monographs and other sources. The district court may also request a House of Chiefs or a divisional or traditional council or other body possessing knowledge of the customary law in question to state its opinion which may be laid before the court in a written form (see J.H.K. Taylor, 1978, for insightful discussion of the District Courts Grade II). Indirect rule was to be a school for self-government, self-government achieved through the education of traditional chiefs, (through whom colonial power was exercised), and the gradual extension of their powers rather than "by the introduction of an alien system of rule by British educated and politically-minded progressives" (Gower, 1967:6).

Before the coming into force of the 1979 Constitution, the status and formal functions of the chief were defined and prescribed by previous constitutions, ordinances or Acts of parliament. As a member of the over 130 traditional councils in Ghana, the paramount chief (a "head" chief to whom various subchiefs owe customary allegiance) deals with all matters that concern the institution itself and with customary laws. Any chief is leader and "father" of this people. He initiates with his council or court of elders, organizes and leads the people in communal work; he arbitrates in cases affecting the well-being of the people; he is also involved and concerned with social and economic development in his area of jurisdiction. A partial listing of activities of a paramount chief during a typical day in Ghana was presented by Nene Azzu Mate Kole, one of the most prominent and patriotic chiefs in Ghana. It is worth recounting here for the light it throws on the role of the chief. These activities include:

(i) Early calls on him by the elders or sub-chiefs. These are informal meetings and they discuss matters of a general nature: farming problems, sanitation, conditions of paths, drains, etc. (ii) A call from the District Chief Executive (a civil servant) or an agent of the Central Government. It is the normal practice for such officials to consult with him on matters affecting the area. (iii) Visitors interested in some projects in the area call on him. This is usually in relation with the land or concessions for some natural resources. (We should include here visits by field anthropologists and other researchers.) (iv) Arbitration of some kind such as disputes about family property, etc. (Nene Azzu Mate Kole, 1977:27)

There are in fact virtually no limits to the type of matters that are brought before him for decision or advice.

Nevertheless, since independence from colonial rule, and despite constitutional guarantees, successive governments, whether civilian or military, took measures aimed at establishing the supremacy of the power of the Central Government, at reducing if not eliminating the residual power of chiefs in local, regional and national administration, and at neutralizing the sacred authority of the chiefs. It is not my intention to
go into the struggle for power between political parties in power and chiefs (for good accounts of this struggle see Maxwell Owusu, 1970; and Paul Andre Ladouceur, 1979). It is enough to point out that the Central government arrogated to itself the very colonial power to make and unmake chiefs depending on whether they supported or were against the policies of the government. The control of chiefs by the central government forced chiefs who depended on the government for their very survival to support government policies which were often against the interest of the people. Violent chieftaincy litigations, destoolments and political instability were the inevitable results (see Owusu, 1979; 1975).

It is against this background that in 1979 before the national elections for the Third Republic, the call by the Standing Committee of the National House of Chiefs on all traditional rulers--from paramount chiefs to the adikuro (village headmen)--to refrain from joining any political party in the interest of the institution and the nation should be understood. The Committee reminded the chiefs that they would be unable to effectively play their role as fathers of all their peoples if they took sides in the game of party politics. It is significant that the 1979 Constitution in addition to restoring substantial powers to chiefs liberated them from executive and legislative control.

Chiefs, the Constitution and Development

According to S. E. Finer, "Constitutions are codes or rules which aspire to regulate the allocation of functions, powers and duties among the various agencies and officers of government, and define the relationships between these and the public" (Finer, ed., 1979:15, italics mine). It is important to stress at the beginning that constitutions define the relationships that ideally exist between the various institutions of government on the one hand, and between those institutions and the general public on the other. As one should expect, the ideal relationships may be imperfectly realized in practice; that is, there is often a wide gap between what that constitution prescribes and what public officers and citizens do in fact. However, it is relevant to emphasize here that the size of the gap is to a large extent directly a function of the degree to which formal rules express the intuitive or living traditions of a people. In the Ghanaian case, there was a conscious attempt on the part of the 1979 Constitution-makers to have a document that was workable, imaginative, and that reflected the aspirations and the living heritage of the people.

In short, the 1979 document reflected the nation's quest for a constitutional government rooted in her historical experience and cultural traditions. It has been argued that the quest is not simply a search for appropriate forms adapted to the urgent need for national integration and development. What is needed, above all, are syncretic combinations that at once provide mechanisms that can operate in contemporary conditions and institutions, notably chieftaincy, that embody the living values of the community (see Owusu, 1979:96).
Article 181 of the 1979 Constitution defined the "chief" as "a person who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, elected, and enstooled, enskinned, or installed as a chief or queen-mother in accordance with the requisite applicable customary law and usage" (see also 1978 Constitutional Proposals - paragraph 257). The person thus enstooled or enskinned must also be registered in the National Registrar of Chiefs maintained by the National House of Chiefs.

National integration, for purposes of this discussion, refers to all those processes that help "foster a feeling of belonging and involvement" among the various people and "traditional communities and societies" of Ghana headed by chiefs, to the end that "loyalty to Ghana shall override sectional, ethnic or other loyalties" consistent with the public interest (see Article 7 a b c of the 1979 Constitution). National development includes the attainment of national integration as we have defined it, that is, the establishment and progressive growth of chieftaincy and other institutions that will bring about unity among all peoples of Ghana, and help raise the living standards and general welfare of her citizens.

Old Societies and the New State

In March 1959, two years after the independence of Ghana, an important conference was held at the University College, Ibadan, Nigeria on the subject "Representative Government and National Progress." Two crucial questions exercised the participants to the Ibadan seminar, the first of its kind in West Africa. These were (a) what kind of political structure and (b) what kind of political leadership were appropriate for the emergent countries in their struggle for rapid socio-economic development and political stability? A related question concerned the role of traditional institutions in progressive but orderly change. More specifically, how compatible were the institutions of the "old society"—traditional authority (of chiefs, queen-mothers, and other hereditary rulers), social structures (tribes, clans, extended families), religion, folklore, customs and practices—with the modern forms associated especially with Western capitalism, education, Christianity, imperialism and colonialism? (See Passin and Jones-Quartey, eds., 1963, for the relevant discussion.)

If in fact, the aim of the anti-colonial movement was and is the African attainment of independent nation-state on a Western European model, then economic, social and political modernization considered as the necessary part of the process would have to come to terms with the still vibrant traditional institutions and their demands. It hardly needs documentation to assert that the traditional systems and the values they embody still have powerful appeal to the ordinary people, including a substantial proportion of the educated members of the Ghanaian society. Yet the outlook of sections of the modern Ghanaian elite has often conflicted with that of the traditional (and more often illiterate) local rulers and their largely rural, illiterate subjects or followers. Thus, the fundamental problem faced by the new elite remains one of
communication. How can the new elite, in an idiom understandable to the masses at large, effectively and persuasively transmit a basically western-derived idea of "development"? What does it take to win them over, against their frequently subtle resistance and sometimes, open resentment? Chieftaincy may provide that link. The institution seems to have gained so much prestige in recent times that it is increasingly attracting the interest and support of the educated and professional people throughout the country. If that is the case, the old problem of elite-mass communication gaps is likely to be drastically altered or completely eliminated in due course.

The internal politics of the new nations, as Ghanaian examples show is pretty much taken up by attempts to arrive at acceptable, and viable compromises between the relative places that the "new" elite and the "old" should occupy and the functions they should each perform in the new nation-state. Given the basically capitalist and liberal democratic orientation of Ghana's post-independence constitutions, and given the Ghanaian ideal of mixed-government and the very great respect for traditions in Ghana, traditional institutions, particularly chieftaincy, will continue, as they did under colonialism, to be creative and adaptable to the requirements and conditions of modern socio-economic and political change. Anyone who has been privileged to listen to the debates of the National House of Chiefs at Kumasi cannot help coming to this conclusion.

As we have seen, though successive Ghanaian governments have sought to control, regulate or even reduce the power and influence of chiefs, none of them have recommended or taken steps for the abolition of the office of chief. It is worth recalling that in 1949 the Committee on Constitutional Reform chaired by Sir Henley Coussey, an African Judge (see Report to His Excellency the Governor by the Committee on Constitutional Reform, Colonial No. 248 [1949]), noted that "The whole institution of chieftaincy is so closely bound up with the life of our communities that its disappearance would spell disaster. Chiefs and what they symbolize in society are so vital that the subject of their future must be approached with the greatest care." The main proposals of the Coussey Committee were accepted by the British Government and incorporated in the 1950 pre-independence constitution (see Harvey, 1966, for a useful account of the pre-1969 constitutional development of Ghana). Indeed, Ghana's colonial and post-colonial constitution makers have all made provisions for the Constitutional Guarantee and preservation of chieftaincy. Nor have they dared to proclaim in Dennis Austin's apt phrase, the "republic of the common man at the village level" (Austin, 1978:157). The familiar clashes, sometimes violent and deadly, between factions in chieftaincy disputes across the country indicate the extent to which local people will go to defend their traditional rights. It is interesting to note that, after 1964 when the official ideology of the Nkrumah government was "Marxist-Leninist," an ideology that describes "tribalism" and "chieftaincy" as feudal and reactionary, the office of chief was allowed to remain a permanent feature of the emergent socialist society. Perhaps, this is just one example of the many unresolved
contradictions of the Nkrumah period discussed by Basil Davidson in his "Black Star," contradictions which eventually contributed to the overthrow of Nkrumah (see Owusu 1979a; Davidson, 1973). Nkrumah himself was very proud to be the Tufuhene of his native Nkroful.

However, it is worth pointing out to avoid misunderstanding that the famous Nkrumah threat that under his government chiefs opposed to him or his government would run away leaving their sandals behind was never meant to be an empty threat. Throughout the post-independence period Nkrumah did replace a number of recalcitrant chiefs with some of doubtful legitimacy but who were loyal to him and his party. Harvey comments on the weak and precarious position of the chief under Nkrumah's CPP government thus: "Today, his status in Ghana is reduced to that of a stipendiary of the central government, dependent in fact for office on official recognition, limited to meeting in bodies many of which have no traditional base, under procedures and to perform functions defined by statute. It is thus difficult to see how the chiefs can long remain a significant factor in the social, political or governmental life of the country" (1966:121-22; stress added).

It is important to emphasize that Harvey’s assessment could equally apply, during the period under consideration, to the position of many important voluntary organizations, bodies and national institutions, such as the Trades Union Congress (TUC) whose functional autonomy, power and influence in Ghanaian society were seriously compromised by the totalitarian measures of CPP rule. It is hardly surprising that when the CPP government fell in 1966 prominent paramount chiefs as well as leaders of professional bodies and other associations exploited skillfully and successfully the opportunity thus created to restore to the institutions they represent some of the power and influence in the society they had lost under the Nkrumah regime.

It is again remarkable that at the height of his power Nkrumah never seriously sought to abolish chieftaincy despite the irritating and even fatal challenge posed to his government by chiefly influence and opposition. Milton Obote did abolish the monarchies in Uganda in 1967. The leading role played by paramount chiefs, notably Nene Azzu Mate Kole of Manya Krabo, and representatives of recognized and identifiable organizations and professional bodies in the making of a post-Nkrumah constitution demonstrates clearly not only the continuing importance of these institutions but also their resilience in regaining their "proper place" in Ghanaian society and polity.

The Integrative Role of the Chief

It is now widely recognized throughout Ghana that since the Chief still has enormous influence and prestige and commands respect in the local areas, it is only through the close working association of the traditional authority and the central government, that makes the latter authority acceptable to the ordinary people and brings popular support to
the necessary measure of socio-economic development. This seems to be the main thrust of Professor K. A. Busia's *Africa in Search of Democracy* (London, 1967).

Busia argues in that book that it is foolish (as some African leaders have done) to seek to combat traditionalism, for a more realistic and sounder approach to the problem of "tribalism" in Africa is to accept the fact of pluralism. Ethnic associations and groupings are not necessarily incompatible with the building of a modern democratic society. In my own contribution to the recent debate on union or national government, I stressed that indigenous political traditions still had a good deal of strength and that unless some serious effort was made to incorporate adaptable elements from the tradition into the new Constitution Ghana might end up with a document "unreal to the general public" that is, it might have no "integrated reality" (Owusu, 1979:80).

The importance of this position was clearly not lost on either the ad hoc committee on union or national government or the makers of the 1979 Constitution of the Third Republic. The committee came to the conclusion that the "future political stability would, to a large extent, depend on the degree of integration between the political system and chieftaincy as an institution" (section 233, quoted in Le Vine 1979:86). It is again significant to note that, the Directive Principles of State Policy of the PNDC which overthrew the constitutionally elected government and suspended the 1979 Constitution on December 31, 1981, states (Section 53) that 'unless otherwise provided by Law the National House of Chiefs, the Regional House of Chiefs, the Traditional Councils and the chieftaincy tribunals established under the 1979 Constitution and in existence before 31st day of December 1981 shall continue in existence with the same functions, composition and powers not withstanding the abrogation of the said Constitution and for the purposes of these provisions, "Chief" shall have the meaning assigned to it in the said Constitution.'

**Chieftaincy and the 1979 Constitution**

Writing on traditionalism and the distribution of political power in Ghana, Dennis Austin raises some serious doubt about how long the intensity of local patriotism, and the grouping of power on a personal base—both characteristics of contemporary Ghanaian politics—will last. He argued, without much elaboration, that "while 'tradition as chieftaincy' is likely to diminish (and there is clear evidence for that), 'tradition as locality' will continue so long as Ghana remains a predominantly peasant and small town society. Communal and personal relationships are likely to persist, therefore, as the stuff of local (as well as national) politics for a long time to come" (Austin and Luckham eds., 1975:10).

The analytical distinction drawn above between "tradition as chieftaincy" and "tradition as locality," though interesting and perhaps useful, may be difficult to maintain and apply consistently. In practice,
since the chief remains an important leader, a link between the past and
the present, a symbol and fount of local patriotism, and a crucial power
broker in local and (sometimes) national politics, the evidence for the
decline of "tradition as chieftaincy" may not be all that conclusive. In
fact, the 1979 Constitution definitely gave a new life to the institution of
chieftaincy. Clearly, chieftaincy has shown great resilience and
adaptiveness over the years. And the fact that, as we have seen, the
institution is attracting really socially respectable and highly educated
people--the present Asantehene is a qualified lawyer, and a former
Commissioner for Economics is Gyasehene of Akwapim--is evidence of a
resurgence not decline.

Not only did the Constitution of the Third Republic, like the
constitutions before it, guarantee and seek to preserve the honor and
dignity of chieftaincy, together with its traditional councils as established
by customary law and usage, but above all, the Constitution went further
than previous ones to protect chieftaincy from arbitrary Executive or
parliamentary and party interference and encroachment.

Thus, so long as the institution of the family and lineage, the basis
of chieftaincy, survives, so will "tradition as chieftaincy." No doubt,
traditions will change as times change. In fact, the National House of
Chiefs is required by the 1979 Constitution (article 178 5a ) to
undertake the "progressive study, interpretation and codification of
customary law with a view to evolving in appropriate cases, a unified
system of rules of customary law" (italics mine).

At this point, it may be helpful to take a close look at some of the
relevant provisions pertaining to chieftaincy and traditionalism contained
in The Proposals of the Constitutional Commission for a Constitution for
the Establishment of a Transitional (Interim) National Government for
Ghana 1978 (hereafter, The Proposals . . . 1978) presented to the
Supreme Military Council (SMC) and The Constitution of the Republic of
Ghana 1979 promulgated by the Armed Force Revolutionary Council
(AFRC). The two documents should be read together, since the latter is
the logical outcome of and is based substantially on the former. The
Proposals . . . 1978 provides useful background materials for a deeper
appreciation of the provisions and articles of the 1979 Constitution. (See
also the 1969 Constitution, particularly the Constitutional Commission
report.)

Chapter 19, paragraph 253 of The Proposals . . . 1978 states
thoughtfully:

In spite of certain features which have often given cause for serious
concern and the not altogether satisfactory record of some chiefs in
national life, we remain convinced that the institution of chieftaincy
has an important and indispensable role in the life and government
of Ghana, both for the present and for the foreseeable future. We,
therefore, consider it right and necessary that the institution should
be protected and preserved by appropriate constitutional guarantees" (italics mine).

The next paragraph (254) observes that for the guarantee to be effective there should be a clear and easily understood definition of who is a chief. We are all painfully aware of the many attempts, some successful, of various governments to manipulate chieftaincy and the chiefs by playing about with the concept of chief in such a way as to enable them, literally, to make and unmake chiefs at will. To prevent such manipulation we believe it is essential that there should be a constitutionally enshrined definition which either parliament nor the Executive can change.

Paragraph 261 also states that "National and Regional Houses of Chiefs perform useful and necessary functions and should therefore be maintained in much the same way as they are provided for in the 1969 Constitution and the Chieftaincy Act of 1971." It goes on to deplore the past practice whereby some illiterate paramount chiefs otherwise qualified for membership of National House of Chiefs were passed over for junior chiefs because of illiteracy. Paragraph 263 recommends the establishment of Chieftaincy Tribunal by the National and Regional Houses of Chiefs.

The relevant point here is that despite the tendency for some chiefs to abuse their power, and despite the fact that the institution of chieftaincy has often been corrupted by material values, and that party politicians frequently "played politics" with chieftaincy, chiefs still have crucial roles to play in local and national life. As I have pointed out (see Owusu, 1979) the values which chieftaincy embody are still alive in the hearts, minds, and daily practices of millions of people living in Ghana's hamlets, villages and small towns.

Apart from the judicial functions of chiefs in chieftaincy and customary matters, the chiefs are assigned important functions in local government and administration by the 1979 Constitution. They appear as indispensable agents of development and progressive change as they did in the colonial period. As members of district, municipal or city councils and of village, town and area Development Committees established for the primary purpose of encouraging increased participation by all citizens in the process of government and of organizing the local people for local developmental and social projects, the chiefs and their traditional bodies were seen as playing a central role (see The Proposals . . . 1978, especially pages 101-02; and The 1979 Constitution, particularly chapters 19 and 20).

The chiefs and traditional bodies are well-adapted to mobilizing integrative and representative functions particularly in a society where primary allegiance in many areas is still to local chiefs and where over 75 percent of the adult population are functionally illiterate in English, the official language of national government. Significantly, it is taboo for
chiefs (whatever their formal education and their subjects' level of literacy in English) to address their subjects in a foreign language. Thus as chiefs become increasingly literate in English the sanction that requires chiefs to speak to their people in the indigenous languages could ensure that the role of chiefs as culture brokers would be performed more responsibly and in the interest of the people. This is a vitally important consideration, the full political and economic implications of which cannot be gone into here. Suffice it to point out that it is conceivable that educated chiefs who have more in common with the educated men and women of power at the center than with their illiterate subjects, could manipulate their crucial brokerage role in the interest of the unity, hegemony and economic dominance of the ruling class. (I take up the complex issue of the economic interpretation of the 1979 Constitution in a study under preparation.)

Article 183 of the 1979 Constitution provided for the establishment of a local government council two-thirds of whose membership must be elected and one-third of whom shall be chosen by the traditional authorities in the district "in accordance with the traditional and customary usage." The Constitution also provided for the establishment of a regional council in each Region which shall include in its membership no more than two chiefs from the Regional House of Chiefs. The regional council is to have as much administrative autonomy in the performance of its functions as it is consistent with the attainment of overall national goals (see Article 185 (1) (b)). A representative of the National House of Chiefs is also a member of all important Lands Commissions whose functions have been enlarged and decentralized as provided for by article 189 of the 1979 Constitution. The Lands Commission holds and manages exclusively all public lands and minerals vested in the President, on behalf of, and in trust for, the people of Ghana.

The Chief and Control of Lands

Fundamentally, under Ghanaian customary law, the crucial role of the chief in local and national life derives from the chief's traditional responsibilities and rights in relation to land. By customary law, all rights in land, that is allodial (freehold) titles to lands are vested in traditional communities, notably stools, skins and families. In fact, "public lands" consist largely of "unoccupied," "unowned" lands or lands which previously belonged to traditional communities and were acquired from them by the central government.

The control over stool and skin lands by chiefs is an important source of the chiefs' power, influence and prestige. "Stool land" is defined as including "any land or interest in, or right over, any land controlled by a Stool or Skin, the head of a particular community or the captain of a Company (Asafo), for the benefit of the subjects of that Stool or the members of that community or company" (1969 Constitution, Article 172). (In any case, a chief may not "own" land in
any proprietary sense; he is the custodian of land, the trustee directed to allocate its uses. Stool and skin lands rest in the office of the chief—the chieftaincy—and an incumbent chief can only use them insofar as those uses relate directly to his office. He may not, of course, sell or otherwise alienate such land.

The chief's control of the use and possession of land—for farming and building—puts the chief in a position where the exercise of these responsibilities directly affect, under capitalist, free-market conditions, not only the rate and direction of national economic growth and development, but the distribution of wealth and power in society, and the changing contours of social stratification or class formation and class action (see especially Woodman, 1976:158-76 for a useful discussion).

The Proposals . . . 1978 adopt most of the provisions on lands in the 1969 Constitution. However, the former document recommends changes in two important areas that have the effect of enhancing the authority of some chiefs in relation to lands. Under the existing system certain skin lands in the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana are considered "public lands" and as such vested in the Government of Ghana, whereas stool lands in other regions of Ghana are considered as vested in the stools concerned. This obvious anomaly or lack of uniformity in the provisions is a carry over from the colonial period and from the previous constitutions and laws. The Proposals . . . 1978 therefore recommends that a new provision should declare that the skin lands in the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana which were vested in the government of Ghana immediately before the coming into force of the Constitution shall not continue to be public lands, but that such lands shall henceforth vest in the appropriate skins (The Proposals . . . 1978, paragraph 280; see also 1979 Constitution, Article 188 (3)).

It should be pointed out that there are still some overlooked anomalies in the provision revesting land in stools and skins. No provision was made, for instance, for lands in southern Ghana—the Ahafo lands, and the Kumasi lands in Brong-Ahafo Region, the New Juaben stool lands, Nkawkaw lands—all vested in the State by Executive Instruments 46 and 95 of 1961.

Again, whereas the 1969 Constitution provides that any freehold interest in or right over any land held by a non-Ghanaian in Ghana should be considered a leasehold interest for a period of 50 years and the reversionary interest in that land shall vest in the President in trust for, and on behalf of, the people of Ghana, The Proposals . . . 1978 recommends that where the land was originally vested in a stool or skin or other person, the reversionary interest, after the expiry of the 50 years' leasehold, should revert to that stool, skin or person (paragraph 283; see also Article 189 3, 9, 10, 11, 12 of the 1979 Constitution). The object is to prevent non-Ghanaian citizens from acquiring and maintaining a stranglehold on one of Ghana's important resources. Withal, the provision cannot but strengthen the authority of the chiefs.
Indeed, in chapter 4 (page 9) of the 1979 Constitution the decentralization of the administrative machinery to the Regions and Districts is explained in terms of the need to foster a feeling of belonging and involvement among the various peoples of Ghana through their active participation in government as a basis of national loyalty and national unity. In this process, the representative role of the chief cannot be underrated.

As I have argued elsewhere (see Owusu, 1979) political representation involves active linkage between those who claim to speak on behalf of the moral community and those who comprise it in fact. Representation in this sense takes place through any linkage that involves leadership accountability and responsiveness to the wishes and preferences of the community. Such a linkage, it must be stressed, need not necessarily proceed through political parties; equally important institutions such as chieftaincy may provide the channel through which political influence can be effectively and democratically exerted. It is significant to note that at a meeting of the National House of Chiefs in Kumasi on 6th August 1980, the President of the House, commenting on the role of the chief in the Third Republic, stressed that chieftaincy was and should be above party politics. It should be, he said, the unifying force in a multiparty state, and for that matter in a 'no-party' state as well.

Conclusions

It is clear from the discussion above that the 1979 Constitution not only guaranteed and preserved the institution of chieftaincy in all its traditional honor and dignity. What is more, the Constitution protected the institution from partisan politics and from Executive and parliamentary interference. Traditional rulers were given a new lease on life under the 1979 Constitution. The chiefs were given vital roles in national, regional and local government administration. The National and Regional Houses of Chiefs were maintained as were Regional and National Chieftaincy Tribunals (or Judicial Committees) with responsibilities for disputes over chieftaincy and customary matters. Chiefs were allocated important functions on local and regional councils as well as on development committees. The membership of the Lands Commission included a chief, and the president of the National House of Chiefs was a member of the Council of State.

In the Northern and Upper Regions, lands which were formerly "public lands" and controlled by the central government reverted to the appropriate skins by a constitutional provision. The chiefs' power over the control and regulation of the use of stool or skin lands—important national resources—was virtually complete. The fact that millions of Ghanaians still owe allegiance to stools and skins across the country and also depend on the co-operation and goodwill of the chiefs for allocation of agricultural and building lands make the chiefs indispensable links between the central government and local communities.
In fact, the chiefs' control of stool lands means that the decisions of local chiefs are extremely vital if not decisive for the success or failure of national economic development policies and their implementation. It is interesting in this regard, to note that in Ghana's recent Constitutional debates, no one seriously called for the abolition of chieftaincy and what it represents. In contrast, in Nigeria, Professor Awojobi of the University of Lagos has demanded a definite programme of abolishing all traditional institutions throughout Nigeria "beginning with the setting up of a tribunal on assets and liabilities of every traditional ruler who should become a plain citizen as from Monday October 1, 1979" (see Sunday Times 17th October 1976, p. 17 for details). It hardly need be pointed out that chieftaincies continue to thrive in Nigeria, all suggestions for their abolition notwithstanding.

Speaking at the 12th annual general meeting of the Ghana Institute of Engineers in Accra, on "Political Organization of Rural Communities for Development," Nana Kwakye Akuoko Sarpong, Agogohene, pointed out that attempts by agents of past governments to organize the ordinary people for development yielded no positive results. This, according to the Chief of Agogo, was because the agents could not organize or enter into fruitful communication with local people at the grassroots level. He emphasized with some exaggeration that the institution of chieftaincy was the only political organization capable of mobilizing the majority of the people, particularly those in the rural sector for development (see Free Press, Thursday, February 28, 1980, p. 7).

Consistent with the revived or revitalized powers of chiefs under customary law and usage enshrined in the 1979 Constitution, Nana Dansa Appiah II, Akwamuhene of Oda in the Akyem Kotoku Traditional Area recently appealed, as successive national Governments continue to do with little success, to his fellow chiefs to give out lands for commercial farming and industrial development to help improve the living standards of their subjects so as to check the migration of rural youth to the urban areas in search of non-existent jobs (see The Mirror, February 15, 1980, p. 1). There is no doubt that the question of land tenure and land allocation needs to be carefully evaluated by the chiefs with a view to making lands easily available to those who really need them for development in the national interest without sacrificing the interest of posterity.

The Akwamuhene of Oda, along with others, however, urged the National House of Chiefs to impress upon the Government the need for a review (with a view to increasing them), of salaries and allowances of traditional rulers to meet their financial and traditional obligation. The whole subject of the economic status of chiefs should be examined carefully and critically. Until the establishment of PNDC rule on December 31, 1981, chiefs from the wealthier traditional areas who had access to proceeds from concessions of natural resources and to the farms of the stools or skins, as well as chiefs who had large private farms or lucrative businesses, were doing fairly well, while the majority who were not so fortunate had to struggle to make ends meet.
Ghana's supreme law has given full recognition to traditional rulers at both national and regional levels. The chiefs, as Nana Dansa Appiah II's statement shows, need the central government as the central government needs the chiefs. National unity and development in Ghana's cultural and socio-political setting is impossible without this form of mutual support.

But whatever their calibre, chiefs could not successfully perform their new constitutional functions in the public interest unless they set their own houses in order and remain above board. This would involve taking among other measures the following:

(a) Improvement of the chief's economic status which must be linked with the improvement of the economic conditions of the people. In his contribution to the constitutional debate on chieftaincy in 1969 Dr. K. A. Busia observed that "the chief is carrying out certain functions and certain rites and customs which no longer accord with contemporary knowledge, science and technology. Also the chiefs are continuing to bear obligations for which the customary provisions have ceased. For example, few people, if any, carry to the chief pots of palm-wine they have tapped; few carry to the chief meat they have killed from their farms" (Proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, Official Report No. 12, Wednesday, 5th February 1969:522, stress added).

(b) The Reform of the procedures for the allocation or distribution to potential users--especially farmers--of "stool" and "skin" lands to check corruption and possible abuse of chiefly power. Admittedly, this is a complex and sensitive problem (see Sarpong, 1980:104-16, on abuse of chiefly power). Nana Antwi Baadu II, chief of Bukuruwa is reported "to have fraudulently collected £32,680.00 as compensation for land acquired for the Kwahu Dairy Farm Project" (Ghanaian Times, Thursday, September 27th, 1979:8).

(c) Checks against the all too familiar wanton dissipation or misappropriation of "stool" and "skin" land revenue by some chiefs.

(d) The establishment of effective procedures and sanctions against the endless, rampant, disruptive and wasteful chieftaincy disputes and litigations.

As the recent violent and bloody Yendi chieftaincy dispute demonstrates, the role of chiefs as agents for stimulating economic and social development at the grassroots and for maintaining law and order cannot be performed if chieftaincy disputes and litigations could not be expeditiously and satisfactorily resolved.
NOTES

1. This paper is based on an earlier and shorter essay entitled "Chieftaincy, Traditionalism and National Integration in Ghana" prepared for presentation at the Workshop on "The Third Republic: Constitutionalism and Development" organized by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon, and sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation of West Germany. The Workshop was held at the Mensah Sarbah Hall, University of Ghana, Legon from the 19th-21st August 1980.

The paper is part of a larger study on Constitutionalism and Indigenous Political Institutions in Ghana being carried out by me. I am deeply grateful to the Social Science Research Council and the Wenner-Gren Foundation for their generous support making the research possible. I thank also Professor Victor LeVine, Department of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, U.S.A., and Professor Don Rothchild, Department of Political Science, University of California at Davis for useful suggestions that greatly improved my analysis and the readability. I have decided to make only minor and mostly grammatical revisions in the paper despite the abrogation of the 1979 Constitution following the overthrow of constitutional rule on 31st December 1981 by the armed forces headed by Flight Lieutenant Jerry J. Rawlings. I am currently preparing a manuscript on the impact of Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) rule, especially of the establishment of Peoples Defence Committees (PDCs) on the institution of chieftaincy. See for instance Maxwell Owusu, "The Anthropologist, Informal Policy Studies, and Revolutionary Change: The Struggle for Chieftaincy in Ghana" Paper presented at the Xth International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, at Laval University, Quebec City, Canada on 15th August, 1983.

2. Article 15 (indemnity) provides (1) that it shall not be lawful for any court to entertain any action or take any decision or order or grant any remedy or relief in any proceedings instituted against the Government of Ghana or any person acting under the authority of the Government of Ghana whether before or after the coming into force of this Constitution or against any person or persons acting in concert or individually to assist or bring about the change in government which took place on the twenty-fourth day of February, 1966, on the thirteenth day of January, 1972, and on the fourth day of June, 1979 . . ." (pp. 173-74).

Article 16 (Preservation of Confiscations and Penalties Imposed by A.F.R.C. in Relation to Purging Exercise) provides that:

Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, any confiscation of any property and any other penalties imposed by or under the authority of the Armed Force Revolutionary Council under
any Decree made by that council in pursuance of the exercise undertaken by the Council to purge the Armed Forces of corruption and graft and to restore the image of the Military and to deal with accomplices of the guilty members of the Armed Forces and other persons guilty of malpractices to the detriment of the Economy of Ghana or the public interest or both shall not be reversed by any authority under this Constitution.

3. The paper does not go into the bitter and protracted constitutional struggle which began in Ghana with the Supreme Military Council's proposals for a Union or National Government which culminated in the violent and bloody overthrow on June 4, 1979 of the Supreme Military Council (SMC 2) by Flight-Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings and his Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. The democratic elections arranged by the displaced SMC regime for 18 June 1979 were allowed to go ahead as planned by the AFRC. It is interesting to point out that the 1979 Constitution of Ghana is closer to the American model than to the Westminster model which Ghana inherited from Britain in 1957 at the time of Independence. Under the present constitution the Head of State is also the Head of Government; the Chief executive is directly elected by and is responsible to the electorate; ministers of State are not members of the one-house parliament and so hold their jobs at the pleasure of the President. For analysis of aspects of Ghana's constitutional struggle and the 1979 elections, see Victor T. LeVine, 1979; Maxwell Owusu, 1979; Diddy R. M. Hitchens 1979; and Naomi Chazan and Victor T. LeVine, 1979; Richard Jeffries, 1980.

4. It is worth noting that the recommendations contained in the Final Report (pp. 1-42) of the Inter-governmental Conference on Cultural Policies in Africa organized by UNESCO with the co-operation of the OAU (the Organization of African Unity) held in Accra, Ghana from 27th October to 6th November 1975 included the safeguarding of cultural authenticity of countries and the assertion of cultural identity and national unity. It is significant that the Directive Principles of State Policy which provide the basic framework for the exercise of all powers of government state among other things that "traditional cultural values are to be adapted and developed as an integral part of the growth and development of the society".

5. There is a hierarchy of courts known/classified as superior, inferior and traditional. At the apex is the Court of Appeals with two divisions—an ordinary bench and a full bench; that is followed by the High Court, which is both an appeal court and a court of original jurisdiction. Together with the Court of Appeal they form the superior Court of Judicature and the superior courts of record of the Republic of Ghana. Below the superior courts are inferior courts, namely the circuit courts, the district courts grades I and II, the juvenile courts, and lastly a hierarchy of traditional courts, the judicial committees or tribunals in descending order of the National
House and Regional House of Chiefs and traditional councils. The traditional courts deal exclusively with chieftaincy matters. In addition, there exist provisions for the establishment of public tribunals in pursuance of the PNDC (Establishment) proclamation, 1981.

6. "Stools" are the symbols of chieftaincy, in much the same way as the "crown" symbolizes the British monarchy. "Skins"—which traditionally are in fact animal skins—are also such symbols but tend to refer to chieftaincy in northern Ghana.

7. According to Alhaji Shani Mahama (former MP for the Yendi area) at a press conference in Tamale, farming, the main occupation of the people in the Dagomba traditional area had come to a halt and schools temporarily closed down following the clash of the two warring factions in the dispute (see Daily Graphic, Saturday, May 31, 1980:1).

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Everyone knows intuitively that the rapid influx of very large numbers of rural migrants into cities leads to deplorable social and physical conditions of life. Pollution, crowding, the breakdown of services, monumental traffic congestion, and above all high rates of violent crime are seen as inevitable consequences of the twin processes of urbanization and industrialization in the modern world. Americans in particular, perhaps, are persuaded that the two sets of phenomena are so closely linked as to represent a necessary condition of modern life, the unhappy price that must be paid for the measurable benefits of postwar industrial society.

In many respects the early postwar history of Japan reveals in fullest flower the processes and their consequences described above. Since 1945 it has become one of the most highly urbanized countries in the world, the proportions of urban and rural populations reversing in the past 35 years. The scale of its industrial development is widely known as the Japanese 'economic miracle.' In 1945 the cities of Japan lay in ruins and its industrial plant had simply ceased to function. It was not until 1952 that the measures of the standard of living once again reached the level of the mid-1930's, and as the pace of growth picked up the seemingly inevitable consequences followed. From the late 1950s and into the 1970s there occurred an explosive influx of people into the cities, already plagued by a severe shortage of housing and hopelessly overloaded public transit systems. Their streets, most of which had been designed in an earlier period for foot-traffic, were choked with automobiles and their...
skies were darkened by the smoke of the factories that were simultaneously polluting the streams and rivers and ultimately the sea itself. It was in the 1960s that a colleague remarked to me that localized pollution was so serious a problem that there were human populations in Japan suffering from forms of chemical poisoning known elsewhere only in laboratory animals.

It was also in the late 1960s and early 1970s that the quality of life in Japan's cities began to improve, at first with agonizing slowness but with gathering speed. Mass transit facilities expanded immensely, along with the spread of private automobile ownership throughout the society. Progress of a more limited sort was made in the area of housing. Pollution control laws were strengthened and enforced with increasing stringency. For the mass of the citizenry, consumerism emerged as a dominant social value for the first time in the country's history.

Much of the foregoing is general knowledge, perhaps, but what is less commonly appreciated is that at the end of the Pacific War it was not only Japan's cities and economy that lay in ruins. The moral and ethical foundations of the society had been swept away. The gods had not protected the divine land; the national religion of emperor-worship had been irrevocably discredited; the physical and spiritual supports of the civil order had collapsed in the catastrophic end of the conflict. It is a period which most Japanese do not like to recall, for not only was the country occupied by foreign troops, it was a bitter time of hunger and deprivation when normally law-abiding people violated the law and their own sense of morality in order to feed their families and keep going. To those who lived through it, the early post-surrender years were the nadir of Japan's proud history. As Reischauer (1977:104) has put it, "Not just the cities but the hearts of the people had been burned out."

In these years there also occurred an unprecedented rise in the rates of violent crime. Crimes against the person and property alike soared, and drug abuse emerged as a major problem with the diversion into the black-market of Japanese military stores of barbiturates. Amphetamines followed in due course. To most observers it appeared that Japan was entering into a period of full-fledged replication of the worst features of the Western urban experience. And so it seemed to the Japanese authorities who viewed the prospect with understandable alarm.

The drive to restore and expand the economy is well documented, and whether or not it can be said that the 'economic miracle' was an unmixed blessing for its people, it cannot be denied that in the past 35 years there has been in Japan a spectacular improvement in almost every indicator of performance commonly employed in such analyses. What is far less well documented is the success of the drive to reestablish both public order and personal integrity through appeals to self-interest, national pride, and the common good.
Nowhere is its success more apparent than in Japan's remarkable achievement with respect to the reduction in the rates of major and violent crime. Now, it would be remarkable in another sense if Japanese had always exhibited low rates of violent crime, and of considerable anthropological interest. It is not difficult to catalogue the variety of social and psychological explanations that might have been adduced to explain such a case, and indeed, such explanations abound. The Japanese character is said by some to incline in the direction of obedience and conformity; others would have it that the structure of the society is such that there is little latitude for anti-social behavior.

But surely it is the fact of declining rates of crime that offers a greater challenge to the analyst. Drug offenses peaked in 1963; juvenile delinquency peaked in 1964. Traffic accidents and the number of casualties resulting from them began to fall after 1970. Over all, in the decade between 1960 and 1970, taking 1960 as the index of 100, the rate of major crime in Japan fell to 84, while in the United States it rose to 264, in France to 210, and in the German Federal Republic to 107. Several explanations come readily to hand. Perhaps, it is said, that compared to the American police, for example, the Japanese police are blatantly under-reporting the number of crimes known to them. There is simply no evidence to support the charge and in fact the opposite seems to be the case (Bayley 1976:7-8). Alternatively, it is argued, the ethnic homogeneity of Japanese society accounts for the low rates. It cannot be denied that ethnic homogeneity might well serve to explain low rates of crime, although there surely are homogeneous societies in which rates of crime are quite high, but it is difficult to see that it can serve as a powerful predictor of declining rates. In point of fact, Japan's history has been a violent one, and this has been so at earlier periods when it was an even more homogeneous society than it is today, with its substantial Korean minority and other less numerous ethnic groups that are almost exclusively urban dwellers.

How, then, has it come about that in a context in which we would normally expect indexes of social pathology to rise they have fallen instead? It is my contention that the unanticipated reversal has been achieved through the application of intensive measures of social engineering, characterized both by adroit appeals to the public's desire for order and effective administrative action on many fronts. In offering this analysis, I am, of course, suggesting that the public does in fact prefer order to disorder, and that the citizenry is persuaded that certain courses of action will in fact produce the desired outcome.

A major component of the program of social engineering that has borne fruit so swiftly is the successful effort to transform the character of the police force, particularly with respect to its relationship to the public at large (Ames 1979, Bayley 1976). The image of the police has been changed from that of harsh, occasionally brutal figures of authority accorded respect largely based on fear to one of a very different kind. It is today the assumption of the vast majority of Japanese that police and
public are on the same side in the unremitting effort to maintain order and minimize the dangers encountered by ordinary people in their daily lives. Police behavior has improved immeasurably over the past 35 years, as is suggested by the astonishing fact that the number of complaints lodged against them with the civilian review boards of the Ministry of Justice has declined annually since 1948 to its present number of about 100 per year — this is a population of 116 million. Police scandal is virtually unknown, and the rate of arrests per reported crimes — the so-called clearance rate — is the highest in the industrial world. This achievement results only in part from good police work, as they are themselves the first to admit. Far more directly it stems from the many ways in which the police maintain close contact with the public and carefully scrutinize it.

Japanese cities are dotted with police boxes (koban) which are possibly unique to the Japanese law enforcement system. They range in size from the smallest, with two or three officers on duty at all times, to those with 20 or 30 officers regularly assigned. The pattern of police-box dispersal virtually guarantees that no resident of a neighborhood is ever very far away from help when it is needed. Ames (1979:46) has pointed out another very important aspect of their jurisdictions, which, in the small city in which he worked, frequently matched old village boundaries. Thus, "...the police rely on the long established cooperative relations between households in the villages and neighborhoods in crime prevention and investigations." He describes a typical koban in the city of Kurashiki as follows, "Koban usually have an office area in front with desks and cabinets, and large glass windows in the front wall for easy view outside by the police officers. A sign board is located in front, pinned full of posters of wanted or missing persons or displaying slogans for crime prevention and other police interests. There is usually a small cooking and storage area in the back, a tatami room for sleeping and relaxing, a safe in the closet of the tatami room for locking up pistols when sleeping, and a covered area in the rear for parking bicycles or motorbikes (belonging to the officers on duty) (Ames 1979:47)."

"To the casual observer, Japanese policemen on the beat seem to take a low profile; they are not as visible as American police, for example, who cruise around the city in their patrol cars. They seem to spend a lot of time just sitting in their police boxes talking or waiting for something to happen... Yet their very presence, distributed over the area in police boxes, acts as a deterrent to crime... and is reassuring to the citizens (Ames 1979:61)." Indeed, the police today present themselves as basically service-oriented, and provide counseling and guidance on a very wide range of problems in person or by telephone. People from the neighborhood often drop by for a chat, and the police are every ready to assist a tipsy resident to his home if he seems unlikely to be able to make it on his own.

There are more formal duties of which surely the most important touching on community relations and the control of crime is the
requirement that twice a year an officer from the local police-box visit every residence and place of business in its jurisdiction. He takes with him a record-book in which there is an entry for each firm or household. "The following information is elicited for families: place of origin, names and birthdays of all members of the family, whether or not they are living in the household, their occupation and employers, and whom to contact in emergencies. Another purpose of this periodic visit is to gather information and gossip about occurrences in the neighborhood. The police cannot force people to provide the information, yet almost all people do so voluntarily (the police say that only communists refuse to answer)" (Ames 1979:51). Legally, anyone may refuse to answer the questions without penalty, which was not the case before World War II.

In addition to this remarkably detailed material on the residents of their jurisdictions, the koban files contain a perfectly astonishing array of other kinds of information: "...Lists of people working late at night who might be of help as witnesses to crimes; lists of people who are normally cooperative with the police; lists of people who own (long) guns or swords; lists of all rented homes and apartments that might serve as hideouts for fugitives; lists of people with criminal records; lists of people with mental illness; organizational charts of gangs in the police station jurisdiction and in the prefecture...; lists of old people in the area living alone who should be visited periodically; lists of all neighborhood organizations...and their leaders; lists of all bars, restaurants and amusement facilities...; and a compilation of the total population, area and number of households... In addition, records of all recent crimes in the area, wanted posters and bulletins on criminals, and information on left- and right-wing political groups in the area are kept in the police box. All police officers in the police box familiarize themselves with this information and it provides them with an immense knowledge of their jurisdiction (Ames 1979:51-52)."

Yet all of this information would be of limited value and utility were it not, as I have remarked above, that by and large the public has come to believe that it shares with the police a common concern for the maintenance of order. This assumption leads people to report their suspicions of persons and activities to the police, and to cooperate in investigations when called on to do so. They may well prefer to avoid contact with the police, but I believe it to be widely assumed that only the wrong-doer has anything to fear from them.

The public also backs the authorities in the stringent control of hand-guns, a policy that is so effective that for any year's reported 80,000 odd crimes in Tokyo, hand-guns figure in no more than 15 to 20. The only legal hand-guns aside from those issued to police are in the possession of members of the Olympic shooting team. The police, who still prefer not to carry their side-arms even when on riot duty, unsuccessfully resisted the American decision to arm them, arguing that such a step would serve them ill. The correctness of their assumption is demonstrated by the contrast between our two countries with respect to police fatalities. In 1973, of the 127 police officers killed in the line of duty in the United States, 125 died from gunshot wounds. During the four-year period 1969-1973, 16 Japanese policemen were killed, 3 the victims of firearms.
There is one aspect of the use of guns in the commission of crimes that further persuades the public that they and the police are on the same side. In 1971, of all the crimes committed in Japan that involved the use of rifles, shotguns, and air-guns, 94% were perpetrated by members of known criminal groups. The authorities are naturally much concerned, and their enforcement of the hand-gun control law is stringent. In 1971 again, the police investigated 3,107 cases of illegal possession of firearms and seized 2,116 firearms of all types. It is worth noting that they view these numbers—surely calculated to excite the disbelief of American law-enforcement authorities—as alarming evidence of the partial failure of their efforts to render the society completely gun-free.

Equally astonishing to their American counterparts is the record of Japanese law-enforcement agencies with respect to the abuse of stimulant drugs. As we have seen, it was a severe problem in the immediate postwar period, peaking in 1954. Armed with new laws, the authorities launched a campaign to educate the public to the danger and against criminal groups which had become involved in the production and sale of stimulant drugs. By 1958, the number of cases known to the police had dropped to an incredible 265.

With the appearance of heroin and other so-called hard drugs, the authorities moved once more. Known offenses were at their peak of 3,689 in 1963. By 1973, following a sharp decline, they rose again to 1,525 (about 60 per cent of the 1963 figure) despite a vigorous campaign against dealers and users alike. This strikingly modest figure is not the result of the turning of a blind eye to drug abuse, for the authorities find it unacceptably high. The breakdown of the 1,526 cases (remember that this is a national statistic in a population of just over 110,000,000) is instructive: 504 involved heroin, 240 opium, and 782 marijuana. Yet here the picture is not entirely encouraging, for the abuse of stimulant drugs has once again sharply increased, rising from the low of 265 in 1958 to more than 12,000 in 1973. Law enforcement circles freely admit that the use of marijuana, still strongly disapproved by most of the public, is bound to spread, especially among the young.

Why do most private citizens support the efforts of the authorities to suppress the traffic in guns and narcotics? They do so on what I believe to be the entirely reasonable grounds that no one's interests are well served by condoning or encouraging the spread of either. What is clearly implied here is one aspect of the definition of the common good. There is no tradition—and no mythic reading of their past—that persuades the Japanese that one's personal security is enhanced by the possession of a lethal weapon with which to ward off external threats to life and property. Rather, they take the view that it is to the advantage of all that no one possess this means of assault or protection. Thus, by acquiescing in the proposition that both the authority and power to maintain order should be lodged exclusively in the hands of those assigned that specific responsibility, the public at large at once asserts its confidence in those agencies and renounces what many Americans (mistakenly?) perceive to be a right to defend their individual interests.
The attitude toward narcotics has a less complex rationale. By and large, the Japanese appear to view the producers and purveyors of illegal drugs as evil people whose activities doubly undermine the system designed to promote the common good. These activities are almost exclusively associated with recognized and organized criminal elements in the society, whose gain is thought to represent a loss to every other element. Not only is the income derived from the narcotics traffic used to finance a variety of other unacceptable and anti-social activities, but the users of drugs are clearly perceived to be victims and nothing more. Thus, society is deprived of the full participation of some of its members who are regarded as irresponsible at best and dangerous at worst. It is little wonder that the Japanese public takes alarm at any indication of slippage of control in this area of law enforcement, for the more informed among them see the current situation in the United States as the most plausible outcome of any relaxation of vigilance. They see no grounds for a counter-argument that turns essentially on the assertion of the right of individual to indulge in whatever degree or kind of narcotics use that suits his or her fancy.

For all the successes discussed above, it is nevertheless the case that many criminal acts are committed in Japan each year, for it is not, of course, a crime-free society. That being the case, it is necessary to look further into the nature of the criminal justice system as it relates to the control of crime. In the debate that has recently developed in the United States over the putative failures of our own system, it is often argued that the swiftness with which justice is meted out will itself serve to deter criminal acts. Perhaps it is so, but court dockets are as crowded in Japan as in our own country, and cases move through them at an agonizingly slow pace. The two features of the Japanese criminal justice system that do seem likely to have a deterrent effect are the very high probability that commission of a criminal act will result in one's arrest for it, and the virtual assurance of conviction if one is brought to trial by the prosecutors.

The first has to do with the clearance rate, which is the ratio of arrests to the number of known offenses. The clearance rates in Tokyo in 1973 were, for murder 97.4 per cent, for rape 94 per cent, and for robbery 84 per cent. Comparable rates for six American cities with populations of one million or more were 79, 55, and 26 per cent respectively (Citizens Crime Commission of Philadelphia 1975:9). The second consideration is a rather more complicated issue. Few of those arrested for the commission of criminal acts -- rarely more than 5 to 6 per cent -- actually go on trial, the rest of the cases being disposed of in summary proceedings or other ways. But of that group of offenders against whom the prosecutors do press charges and bring to trial, nearly all are convicted. In 1972 the figure was 99.9 per cent (Citizens Crime Commission of Philadelphia 1975:10). However, lest it be assumed that harshness of punishment is a factor in discouraging criminal activity, let me report that in Japan in 1973, only 5 per cent of those convicted of a crime were imprisoned, compared to 45 per cent in the United States. The result in Japan is a
small prison population and a large number of persons returned to society under police surveillance reinforced by local sanctions. Clearly there are other factors at work.

I cannot but believe that a factor of critical importance in the decline in crime rates in the postwar period is the intense identification of the individual with his small groups of affiliation. Most Japanese believe that one's actions will reflect directly on one's group, although its members no longer pay any legal penalty for the transgressions of the offender among them, as they did in the period prior to the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The intensity of identification is manifested in many ways. When the television cameras attempted to film ordinary office workers arriving at their company on the morning following the suicide of a vice-president who had assumed the blame for company involvement in a major bribery scandal, all shielded their faces or turned and bolted out of camera range. Not one could be persuaded to offer a statement of any description on or off camera. The taint of scandal, I would submit, was felt to affect them all; moreover, it would be disloyal to comment to any outsider on the disaster that had cast discredit on the whole enterprise.

There are in daily life, many less dramatic occasions on which the power of the small affiliative group is demonstrated, but suffice it to say that if I am correct in thinking that it plays a central role in producing the orderly society that contemporary Japan has become, it follows, as I have already suggested, that these groups have strengthened their hold over the individual in the postwar period, as traditional hierarchies have weakened or collapsed completely. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that so far, to a quite remarkable degree, the values of the total system remain embedded in each relatively self-contained group, and that the smooth functioning of each of them is seen as playing an indispensable part in the preservation of the total structure. In some senses, this attitude represents a postwar reading of the prevailing prewar ideology. As Sakuta (1978:226-227) has argued, that ideology merged individual, family, group and state into an undifferentiated whole which admitted of no internal conflict of interest. "The logic supporting that contention may be schematized in the following propositions. First, in order for the individual's desires to be satisfied, the group or nation to which he belongs must be securely established. Secondly, the individual must be willing to give up his personal satisfaction in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the group or nation."

In such a formulation there can exist no alternative affiliation for the component parts, or an alternative program for the whole to pursue. Sakuta maintains that the defeat in the Greater East Asia War deprived the state of its claim to legitimacy, leading to the emergence of just such alternatives at both levels. As a consequence, he believes, there has been a sharp break between the interests of the individual and his or her family on the one hand and the state on the other. In my view, he overstates the degree of that separation. For while Japan is, of course, no longer a Confucian state in any formal sense, the sentiment of the Analects is not alien to the contemporary orientation of its people: "Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed."
A further point must be made. The values embedded in each group include the stringent requirement that its individual members conduct themselves with propriety both within its confines and in the world outside it. All external acts performed by members of a group redound to its credit if they are positive and socially approved, while inappropriate and unacceptable behavior on the part of one discredits all equally.

This perception of the nature of the social order produces at least two possible outcomes, however. The first is that it may well result in an almost total lack of civic consciousness. That is, individuals and groups consider it their chief duty to manage their own affairs without exposing themselves to unwanted intervention by outsiders. It is also notoriously difficult to forge links that unite disparate groups in pursuit of a common cause. In the absence of a capacity to institutionalize action aimed at the achievement of shared goals, therefore, the whole system rests precariously on the principle that so long as every member of society does what is required of him or her, the whole system will function to serve the common good. It is an assumption that requires a degree of faith in human nature and the inherent stability of the social order that few Americans today appear to entertain. They may well envy the Japanese, while at the same time wondering what negative effects might flow from the discovery or realization that such trust is after all unjustified. The second is that the members of a society may fail to claim or may surrender some degrees of individual freedom in the interest of maintaining domestic order. The Japanese have gone further in the latter than Americans are likely to consider acceptable, but it is clear that they have done so in full recognition of the nature of the trade-off they have made. Japan's domestic tranquility is far more obviously the result of consent than the product of coercion. What the postwar history of Japan shows most clearly, perhaps, is that it is possible for a people to act effectively on the assumption that crime, far from being an inevitable consequence of urbanization and industrialization, is susceptible to control through social engineering.
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Population policies for fertility reduction encounter fundamental conflicts when there are discrepancies between the interests of families or households and the interests of governments. In this paper I examine information on a society—post World War II Singapore—where such a conflict existed. I summarize how the Singapore government sought to handle this conflict. Then I examine the role of government policies as compared to other factors in bringing about large declines in fertility. Finally, I discuss implications of the differences found between governmental theories of how to change household conduct and the ways such changes apparently took place.

In the period considered, 1959 to about 1975, Singapore's new parliamentary government was in the hands of the Socialist People's Action Party (PAP) under the continuing leadership of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Despite some serious internal and external problems, PAP stayed in power, forming a successful, quite authoritarian, essentially one-party government. The Government stressed planned economic growth via industrialization and the provision of extensive housing, education, and health-care facilities and services.

My chief source is the 1979 Population Council volume edited by Chen and Fawcett, supplemented by the 1976 volume edited by Hassan, and an essay on the history of family planning in Singapore by Thomson and Smith (1973).
At the time PAP came into power, Singapore's government was already involved in a family planning program focused on providing contraceptive information and supplies to better enable families to pursue their private interests by reducing numbers of unwanted children and being able to space births in a more desirable fashion. In such a classical family planning program there was little or no conflict between family interests and the public interest as defined by the government.

However, in 1959 the PAP party manifesto, issued at the time of its election to power, stressed the social necessity of birth rate reduction as a means of preventing short-run population increases from eating up resources essential for needed capital formation and improved public welfare services. The birth rate needed to meet this governmental interest was probably lower than the birth rate generated by families pursuing their own interests even with the aid of birth control. Therefore, an implicit conflict developed between the government's interest and the interests of families. This conflict did not appear to affect Singapore population policy significantly until 1965 when the forced severance of Singapore from Malaya followed by the sudden withdrawal of England's troops in 1968 put the newly independent city-state into a desperate fight for survival. At this time the governmentally aided (but private) Family Planning Association ceased to dominate fertility reduction efforts. It was largely replaced by a governmental statutory body: the Singapore Family Planning and Population Board established in 1966.

The 5 year government plan for fertility reduction activities of the FPPB, spelled out in a 1965 white paper, included an explicit birth rate reduction goal and policies with new aims. These policies sought to modify family reproduction and related goals rather than just to enable existing goals to be better achieved. In the next ten years, the PAP dominated government enacted and carried out a cumulative series of increasingly intrusive population measures. The government, in trying to modify family goals as well as the ways families implemented them, clearly manifested an increasing willingness to intrude more and more into hitherto private realms of domestic reproduction-related decision-making and action. The conflict between family interests and governmentally defined public interests was to be resolved by the government changing basic aspects of family life until family behavior corresponded to public needs. However, the intrusion did not go so far as to include the use of direct coercion such as compulsory sterilization.

Given the kinds of data available to me, something of the government's idea of how to bring about such more extensive family changes can be inferred from the measures adopted and from the doctrines promulgated in mass education efforts.

Some of the population measures were expansions of traditional family-planning activities. Facilities and activities for disseminating birth control information and supplies were increased. Efforts were made to provide more comprehensive coverage of all segments of the society.
In addition, a wider repertoire of fertility reducing methods was made legal and accessible. Both a Voluntary Sterilization Bill and an Abortion Bill were enacted in 1969. Voluntary sterilization was further liberalized in 1972 and abortion in 1974.

Overlapping these measures in time and extending to 1976 were measures which sought to modify domestic conduct by altering the costs and benefits of having larger as compared to smaller families. Most prominent were disincentive measures which penalized having more than two or three children, or which removed existing pro-natalist incentives. Policies included altering priorities for access to new public housing and to the right to sublet; limiting rights to maternity leave to low parity births; making maternity fees vary with birth parity; limiting income tax deductions to only the first three, or, later, two children; and giving priority to choice of elementary school to smaller families with the highest priority being given to families with two or fewer children and at least one sterilized parent.

The action seeking to bring about the most comprehensive changes in family life was the effort to establish the two-child family as the valued family norm. This was attempted by means of a wide variety of extensive educational and information activities. Basically, the effort was nothing less than trying to persuade families to adopt a new lifestyle. This lifestyle is permeated with traditional middle class emphases on hard work, living better, advancing one's children through education and one's self through job advancement. It encompassed much of what Prime Minister Lee meant in proclaiming that Singapore must become a "rugged society."

I have sketched the Singapore government's measures for modifying family life. They were aimed at promoting the public interest as that was interpreted by the government. But at the same time these measures conflicted with strong norms limiting intrusion of the state into spheres of domestic life reserved to family and household members. Moreover, to be effective (in its own eyes as well as objectively), the government's efforts to promote a 'middle class' style of family life had to actually transform precisely those families whose conduct was viewed as being 'irrationally' focused on 'backward,' 'unmodern,' as well as 'irresponsible' notions about domestic life. That audience could not miss the fact that the government, including the very outspoken Prime Minister, held them in considerable contempt. In addition, the Prime Minister and the government were predominately Chinese while their characterizations of non-middle class lifestyles clearly fit many stereotypes applied to members of the Indian and Malayan minority ethnic groups. Hence, ethnic/racial conflict was also involved.

Nonetheless, on the surface, the government population policies were highly successful. As the policies became stronger and stronger the fertility rate declined drastically. The crude birth rate was reduced from some 30 per thousand population in 1965 to 18 per thousand in 1975. The
population growth rate declined from 4.4% in 1957 to 1.6% in 1975. And, in 1975, the net reproduction rate had declined to 1.0, the zero equilibrium population growth fertility level.

However, there is a major complication. During this same period Singapore was undergoing amazingly rapid changes. Industrialization on a large scale was brought into being. Per capita income rose markedly. Greatly improved housing, health and education facilities were governmentally provided. These are all changes often associated, by themselves, with fertility reduction. Therefore it is difficult to sort out the role of policy, as compared to the roles of other factors, in bringing about the fertility decline. It is so difficult that recent scholars generally only conclude that both policy and other factors were influential, but the proportions are not clear.

There is one study, however, which provides an especially revealing picture of what apparently was happening. This is the study of Wong and Salaff (1979) based on intensive interviews with a sample of Chinese working-class families. Note that the Chinese are the ethnic group for whom it would be most plausible to expect the government propaganda to be effective. Nonetheless, the study points to the possibility that the government propaganda and incentive policies played a relatively small role.

Wong and Salaff focus their study on assessing the effects of the population disincentives, but their findings also bear on the influence of efforts to spread the two-child family ideal. The sample of working-class families was analyzed using four variables: socioeconomic status; intended family size; the degree to which the families believed they had been affected by population disincentives; and, finally, a variable called "planning orientation." By planning orientation the authors mean the extent to which families were making efforts to improve their social status and that of their children by such means as saving for education, purchasing housing, and/or attempting or achieving job mobility. On these bases, families were classified as higher planners, medium planners, and non-planners.

Analysis in these terms brought out the following patterns: There was a close relationship between greater planning orientation and higher socioeconomic status. In addition, intended family size varied inversely with planning orientation. No nonplanners wanted as few as two children and most wanted four or more. This suggests that the two-child propaganda had limited effects at most. Even more startlingly, 62 out of the total of 85 couples studied said that they had been totally unaffected by the population disincentives, another indication that population programs of these sorts were not as influential as one might suppose.

Putting these findings together with their rich interview data, Wong and Salaff develop a significant hypothesis about how fertility reduction was being brought about. And they also draw some important policy
implications from their findings. I repeat their conclusions in their own words (Wong and Salaff 1979:126):

Since the nonplanners were found to have the largest family size intentions, their interpretation of the disincentives have policy implications. They suggest that, to reduce population growth, governments cannot simply impose economic penalties on large families. Such measures will not prompt nonplanners to reorganize their lifestyle and reduce their intended family size. Rather these couples will try to avoid the full impact of the measures. Until these families receive the motivation to plan ahead, based on realistic perceptions of the possibility of advances within the social-class structure, few will have any desire to reduce their family size.

An alternative to present circumstances is for the state, by direct intervention or other means, to improve the socioeconomic position of the lower income groups so that they find planning for the future a meaningful activity. If high planners most frequently want small families in order to improve their social-class position, they are also the ones with the means to improve their present position. This is not the case with many medium planners, and certainly not for the nonplanners.

It thus appears that in Singapore non-coercive population policies aimed at altering family reproductive lifestyles had relatively little to do with fertility reduction. In the conflict between government aims and the family goals of crucial segments of the society, the families have been able to effectively resist both economic and propaganda efforts to change their ways.

This does not mean that all population policies are irrelevant. Certainly the availability and knowledge of birth control methods spread widely through the society by government efforts were crucial in helping couples who, on their own, wanted to change their reproductive situation. Furthermore, the absence of change among lower socioeconomic segments does not mean that their commitment to their lifestyles is necessarily deep or absolute. The very fact that families who found themselves in improved economic circumstances very frequently drastically changed their lifestyles points to the conclusion that lifestyle commitment can be largely adaptive.

On the other hand, the nature of the socioeconomic policies needed to change family economic status and opportunities requires special investigation. But there is likely to be considerably less (though different) conflict over such policies than over governmental efforts which intrude into the autonomy of domestic groups. A reduction in the amount of government intrusion, by diminishing conflicts between government policy
and attitudes and the conceptions of families about their own interests, might then make possible a more truly common good recognized as higher by almost all segments of the society.

Finally, this case raises the interesting question of what factors affect the perceptions by a segment of society of the conduct of other segments. Singapore government policies did not stem solely from the fact that officials were dominated by Chinese middle class ideals to which they were personally committed. Rather, policies were related to the influence those ideals had on their perceptions of other socioeconomic and/or ethnic/racial groups. The pattern exemplified in Singapore is apparently widespread. Middle class Chinese assess the conduct of other segments as exhibiting a failure to live up to various of their own standards. Thus, they view such discrepancies in the same fashion as they view individual 'deviants' of their own group. They are seen as people for whom the training and sanctions of the group have failed to elicit conformity. If this is so, then our question becomes that of asking how such particular ethnocentric conceptions can be modified at least to the extent of making possible more realistic evaluations of the probable effects of alternative policies. More particularly, what influence can social science findings, such as those discussed in this paper, have on policy formulation and execution? Probably the most fruitful way of pursuing these issues would be to find cases where the perceptual framework of policy makers has changed or been changed in an effort to identify the processes involved.
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The heterogeneity of cities with respect to social class, ethnicity, and lifestyle is an important source of their vitality. This same heterogeneity also leads to conflict, however, as groups with divergent and often opposing interests come together in a variety of ways, struggling sometimes against each other, sometimes against urban bureaucracies and governments, for control over those institutions which immediately affect their lives.

Many contemporary urban conflicts center on the public elementary schools. Historically, the American urban public school has been an important institution in the socialization of immigrants; the current attempts to utilize the public schools to further racial integration through bussing is one extension of the idea that the public schools can, and must, provide opportunities for furthering the traditional American ideals of both social justice and social mobility (Berrol 1980).

This paper focuses on some of the conflicts that have emerged in the past several years in an elementary school serving the Chinatown area in a large, heterogeneous, Northern city. In this city an important turning point in increasing the role of the public schools in local community struggles occurred about 12 years ago, when, after a long and bitter strike, the city's public education system was decentralized.
At the present time there is a Central Board of Education whose members are appointed by the mayor, and 31 separate community school boards whose members are elected by the registered voters in the school district every three years. Community district superintendents are employed by contract by community school boards for a term not to exceed one year beyond the term of the board. The community superintendents can be removed by the district boards only on charges after a hearing (Doyle 1980:63).

The community school boards are responsible for many aspects of school policy and budget priorities. In addition to the money the city expends on its schools, which is distributed through the boards, the schools as well as the boards can also apply for federal grants for such programs as mainstreaming the handicapped, providing compensatory skills instruction for underachievers, providing special enriched gifted children's classes, supporting programs contributing to ethnic pride and heritage for minorities, experimenting with innovative and alternative school curricula in districts with high dropout rates, offering bilingual education, etc.

Ideally, community control, as decentralization came to be called, would involve a high degree of parent participation in implementing educational policy and in hiring school personnel, particularly principals. This was hailed as an important step in improving the quality of education in minority communities. It quickly became obvious, however, that there was not just one community, but many, within the districts served by the community school boards. Community school board elections and district superintendent appointments were hotly contested and issues of ethnicity and political control surfaced with great intensity in many districts with the first election.

Also underlying the issues to be discussed below is the changing nature of urban public elementary school populations. The most recent U.S. Census indicates that there is a continuing movement of white, middle class families out of inner cities (Molotsky 1981); the racial/ethnic composition of this city's public elementary schools is now over 80% non-white. For many parents, this change in urban demographics is linked to the frightening increase of violent crime, particularly as this occurs in the streets and schools of their city. However, racist these fears may seem to some, they must be taken into account as an ethnographic fact, as they influence the behavior of many parents with school age children. Recent research (Boyte 1980) suggests that it is when institutions closest to people--family, church, school--are perceived to be threatened, that political mobilization and local group conflicts arise.

One way of resolving these conflicts is by appealing to the higher common interests which are involved. Such appeals may be couched as commitments to abstract ideals of "social justice" or "equal opportunity" where the scope of the common good takes in not only the interests of one's own immediate group, but also the interests of groups to which one does not belong, and of less immediate groups, such as the good of the
nation as a whole. Another way of appealing to parties with conflicting interests is to pursue a compromise in which each group is persuaded to give up a little in order to get a little. In the school discussed here, until recently, the most effective appeals were in terms of the harmonious functioning of the school's academic programs. This appeal is very compelling in the United States where formal education is essential to upward mobility; it is even more compelling to a Chinese community where upward mobility through education, combined with a culturally based respect for formal education and authority are central both in the traditional cultural setting and in the immigrant situation as well.

This school is a well run school. Appeal to its continued effectiveness carries a lot of weight in resolving conflicts because of the school's easily measurable success in the most manifest aspects of its function--providing its children with the skills necessary for successful high school and college performance. These same conditions do not hold in many other minority communities where schools are so ineffective that parents do not respond very actively to appeals "in the interest of the school" (Rosenfeld 1971).

In the last several years, however, although the academic aspects of the children's education are still frequently articulated as the highest common good, more and more conflicts have emerged which are less easily resolved than they used to be. This suggests that there are significant divisions emerging within this community and its schools, each group defining what is best for the children somewhat differently. Underlying every conflict, however seemingly trivial, and accounting for the heat which such conflicts have generated, are significant differences of political ideology, ethnicity, cultural values and the divergent goals of different socioeconomic groups.

Most often, in this school, the underlying issues of ethnicity, power and social class have not been brought out into the open. Sometimes this is because references to the realities of racial/ethnic/class power are considered impolite. Recently, however, the emergence of a heightened Asian-American consciousness has led to more open acknowledgment of some of the underlying issues of ethnic/class power, and recognition of divergent community interests and goals. These divergent interests do not merely exist among the different ethnic/class groups represented in this Chinatown school. The Chinese community itself is split along several ideological lines. Melford Weiss, in his study of social process among Chinese-Americans (1973), points out that one of their sources of strength is the ability of different and even opposing segments of the community to join forces when necessary to present a united front to the non-Chinese world. This tactic, which had been much used in the past in the school discussed here, no longer works as well as it did. The appeal to the higher common good of Chinese unity and restraint has not worked sufficiently well and some parents in this Chinatown school now feel that new directions must be taken in shaping the Chinese-American future even if this means that the traditional stereotyped images of the Chinese are shattered.
The Setting

The Chinatown discussed here is part of an inner city neighborhood that has historically accommodated minority groups; a classic ghetto area where immigrants, first Europeans, and then others, lived when they first entered the United States. Today most of the Europeans have moved out of the area to the suburbs, except for the poor, the old, some professionals, and a few Europeans who still have businesses there. The area is now mainly inhabited by Hispanics, blacks, Chinese, Italians, Jews, artists, and "homeless men." Although several new middle income housing projects have been built on the borders of the Chinese area, most of Chinatown's population is lower class or poor; persons working as waiters, garment factory workers, and so forth, living in old, inadequate and overcrowded housing. Many of the upper and middle class Chinese in the city do not live in Chinatown, and therefore the population of the Chinatown schools is weighted in the direction of the lower class, and often newly immigrant, families.

The school itself goes from grades Kindergarten through 6th. It has about 1000 students, and a teacher/student ratio of 1 to 32. The traditional Chinese values of respect for the aged, familialism, esteem for education and educated persons, and respect, or at least courtesy for those in authority, are dominant here, just as they are in other Chinatowns in the United States (Sue and Sue 1973). Parents report being able to walk through the Chinatown schools and "not hear a sound from the children in the classrooms." Because discipline is not a problem in the Chinatown schools as it is in the rest of the city, these schools easily attract good teachers, whereas schools in other minority locations have difficulties in this regard.

In 1976, this school was not utilizing space in the building to its fullest capacity. At that time, the city, in an attempt to more efficiently use educational funds, was closing some schools and shifting many programs around. The principal of this Chinatown school, in an attempt to ward off the imposition on his school of an "undesirable" program such as one for the mentally retarded or emotionally disturbed, invited, and had accepted, one of the city's programs for Intellectually Gifted Children (IGC), which was at that time housed in a school scheduled for closing in an upper class neighborhood. Because of the reputation of the Chinatown schools for safety, discipline and skills teaching effectiveness, the parents of the IGC children were happy to have the program moved there. Some of the parents were only interested in finding a safe, trouble free atmosphere; others had a real interest in traditional Chinese culture and looked forward to their children having the opportunity to participate in an ethnically mixed school environment.

The introduction of the IGC caused problems and divided the school community from the beginning. Initially, when it moved, the program had almost 100% white children from professional families living in middle class sections of the city. A few Chinatown parents complained and
eventually Chinese children were admitted into the program. The IGC classes are now about 50% Chinese. However, it has not been forgotten that this was achieved by district parents, rather than initiated by the principal or any of the original group of IGC parents. A residue of feeling was left that the principal had excluded the Chinese from the IGC program in order to build a support base with "outsiders," i.e., the white middle class parents, who both shared his view on homogeneous intellectual classes, and with whom he, as a white middle class professional himself, clearly felt more comfortable.

This alliance was challenged; the principal was accused, for example, of giving the IGC classes the best teachers, of rearranging the school schedule to meet their needs, and so on. Thus, although the issue appeared to be conflict between the IGC parents vs. non-IGC parents, it also became a racial/ethnic conflict. Conflict arose over the criteria for IGC admission. The demeanor of the Chinese children is clearly different than that of the white, middle class; these latter children are generally articulate, precocious, even aggressive; certainly individualistic and competitive. The importance of these qualities in American culture and their fostering by the American elementary school has been vividly described by Jules Henry (1963). The Chinese children, on the other hand, are taught to be respectful to the teacher, not to speak out, not to challenge authority, not to ask questions, not to physically strike each other, and in other ways to mute, rather than to call attention to themselves. In the minds of some Chinese parents whose children were not accepted for the IGC, there was the feeling that they were being discriminated against by the selection criteria, which featured prominently a personality assessment session with a white, middle class female psychologist.

Another issue which immediately arose was the role of the Parent's Association in the school. Up until this time, the Parent's Association (PA) had been a very passive group; the principal spoke in their name and any parents who disagreed with his policies got sufficiently discouraged from lack of response and community support so that they lost interest. Hardly any conflicts arose. With the addition of the IGC classes things began to change. The IGC parents, consistent with their views on the importance of parent participation in the school, wanted an active PA. Some of the Chinese parents were ambivalent. On the one hand, in principle, a strong PA could be used to balance the power of the principal; on the other hand, it was quickly apparent that the articulateness and activism of the IGC parents would not necessarily work to the advantage of the majority of (Chinese) children in the school. In defense, some of the Chinese parents tried to mobilize themselves. One of the strategies they tried was to draft a constitution that would prevent "parents who reside outside the school district from becoming officers in the Parent's Association." The IGC parents, most of whom lived outside the district, sent a letter to the central Board of Education denouncing such an amendment as "racist." Without any other comment, the central Board of Education upheld the view that such an amendment was illegal. As a compromise, after much informal and formal discussion, the PA board was
established with dual positions - co-officers for every executive position, with the unwritten understanding that one of the pair was to be Chinese, the other non-Chinese. Furthermore, one of the few white parents who resided in Chinatown was cajoled into becoming the candidate for co-president. Since she also had her child in the IGC, she was the perfect compromise candidate, and both sides felt they had achieved their goals. IGC parents felt their victory consisted of keeping the door open to their continued active participation in the Parent's Association, and the Chinese parents felt reassured that they would not be excluded from the power positions in the Parent's Association. This compromise was achieved mainly because both parties had a strong interest in a workable Parent's Association and because the non-Chinese nominee for President was strongly allied with the Chinese parents.

Under the strong leadership provided by this person, a real attempt was made to involve the Chinese parents in the school. Invitations to the PA meetings were translated into Chinese and distributed personally by neighbors to each other. A Chinese translator was provided for the meetings; everything that was discussed was immediately translated into Chinese. Mothers with small children were accommodated at the PA meetings and meetings with the principal. Many of the Chinese mothers had not previously attended meetings because they had no one with whom to leave their small children, and they felt unwelcome with their children along. Chinese language classes were instituted one afternoon a week at the school as a part of the regular school program, rather than after school as the IGC parents had wanted. In the interest of the continued harmonious functioning of the school, this first year of the IGC saw the peaceable resolution of several issues over which serious conflicts threatened to erupt.

This harmony became increasingly fragile, however, as it became clear that there were some underlying divisions between sections of the school community which represented important ideological oppositions. Four significantly different groups emerged, each with a somewhat different interest regarding school priorities. For convenience, I have labelled them: 1) the traditionalists, 2) the liberals, 3) the Asian-Americans and 4) the career administrators.

The Traditionalists

The traditionalists form the most numerous group, and it is the longest established viewpoint in the school. This view is presented by the principal on behalf of the school, and is publicly supported by several important voluntary associations in Chinatown. These groups are politically conservative with a business philosophy and melting pot assimilationist goal. They include the Lions Club of Chinatown, the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association, and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. The role of such groups in New York City's Chinatown has been discussed by Kuo (1977). The principal works closely with these groups; they in turn support his efforts for the school, sometimes
contributing financially, for example, to school projects. The ability of
the principal to run a "model" school is no small accomplishment in this
city. Because of the discipline and the high academic achievement of its
students, the principal has, until recently, been an unchallenged
spokesman for the "interests of the children." When decentralization
occurred he was unanimously supported by the community board to remain
as principal.

In claiming to represent his school, which he calls "the Chinatown
school," the principal presents an image of the Chinese as a group that is
law abiding, politically passive, upwardly mobile, very interested in
education, with children who are bright, but not insubordinate or
physically aggressive. His public and private pronouncements indicate
that he views the Chinese contribution to cultural diversity mainly in
terms of the Chinese New Year celebration, their food, and their
behavioral restraint. He sees them, and in his view, rightly so, as
basically assimilationist, looking to the school to perform its traditional
functions of skill learning and Americanization. From this perspective,
the most important goal of the school is to have children learning
traditional academic skills in a safe and secure environment; the goal of
cultural pluralism, insofar as it might involve self determination and the
real sharing of political power, is for him, clearly secondary. Where
cultural pride is consistent with traditional goals it is fostered - Chinese
teach language taught after school.

Where cultural pride is interpreted as threatening the current
political status quo, or the power of the principal, or the discipline of the
school, it must be repressed, according to the traditionalists. This
traditionalist view holds that children are best served by giving them the
academic tools that will allow them to compete successfully in the
economic mainstream of corporate, commercial, bureaucratic institutions,
with all that this implies about political and social conformity. In this
view, the principal always claims to "represent the majority of the
parents." In fact, it is difficult to say what the majority of parents want,
as they have never been active politically, or in the school. This
traditionalist view, in addition to being held by the principal and the
"silent majority" of Chinese parents he claims to represent, is also held by
many of the IGC parents, both Chinese and non-Chinese.

The Liberals

The liberal view is held by the most articulate and educated, though
by no means the largest, group. For the liberals, the overriding goal of
contemporary urban institutions must be the creation and maintenance of
the United States as a socially just and culturally pluralistic society. To
this group, city living presents the chance to put into practice the
ideologies to which they are dedicated.
To understand this group, Richard Sennett's analysis of city families is instructive (1970). According to Sennett, middle class families who flee the cities for suburbia are seeking a "simplification of the social environment." The price paid is a limitation on the confrontations between diverse groups that create social complexity and ultimately, individual growth. Suburban living, primarily because of its social homogeneity, cuts off the vision of human variety that is only sustainable when challenged by new situations. Sennett sees the preference for suburbia as a tacit admission that parents do not feel confident of their own human strengths to guide their children in the midst of an urban environment richer and more difficult than that of the "neat lawns and tidy supermarkets of the suburb." He sees the move to suburbia as the flight of people afraid to live in a world they cannot control. This "society of fear, this society willing to be dull and sterile in order that it not be confused or overwhelmed," has, Sennett says, unfortunately become the model for rebuilding inner city space as well - rigidly planned space usage, an emphasis on security and warding off of intrusions from the outside - in short, a simplification of the contacts and social environment in which the family lives.

Sennett argues that this makes "men passive in the larger society of the city." He explains the hostility of middle class mothers faced with bussing, for example, by their being asked to be "more than passive onlookers in the social process; they are being asked to interact with people who are different, and that they find too painful." I have quoted Sennett at length here because I believe his to be a very insightful comment on much of what underlies the conflicts in this Chinatown school, and the reactions of the traditionalists as they are confronted with change.

The liberals in this school community are the people Sennett characterizes as willing to experience the "pain of difference" for their commitment to their ideals. Through great expenditures of time, money and emotional energy, the liberals help in active ways to strengthen urban institutions such as public schools, libraries, community boards, tenants committees, block associations and responsive neighborhood police and security forces. This commitment does indeed, as Sennett suggests, bring groups and individuals into conflict with each other. And these encounters do bring pain, both for adults and children. But the liberals hold that the creation of a school environment where children learn to interact and appreciate authentic cultural pluralism, linked in their minds to meaningful political power and control over local institutions, is as important as learning traditional academic skills. The liberals also respect these skills, however; mainly professional themselves, they are committed to high academic achievement in a safe, orderly, but also creative, learning environment.

The liberals in this school community are all in some way "outsiders" although they reside mainly within the district. One of them, for example, is a Chinese woman married to a black man, another an Hispanic woman married to a Chinese man. The liberal parents tend to be the
mediators between the traditionalists and the Asian-Americans, those Chinese residents of the district who are pursuing a Chinese image that is new, and sometimes threatening, to the traditionalists. The effectiveness of the liberals as mediators is based on the trust they have with the Chinese, because they live in the district; yet they are articulate enough to be persuasive in encounters with the traditionalists. They are also more used to, and more willing to stand up and call attention to themselves and their interests than the Chinese parents, even those who are highly educated.

The Asian-Americans

At present the Asian-American viewpoint is actively expressed by only a small, although vociferous, group of Chinese parents. Those who hold this view want to see the school actively contribute toward forging a new Chinese-American identity, different from the one that has dominated both the images and realities of American cultural and political life. The need for changing these images and realities has been forcibly expressed by a number of contemporary Asian-American writers. Frank Chin (1974), for example, calls for a new Asian-American identity which is neither assimilationist, nor dual, that is, the idea that the Chinese-American contains within him/herself, two distinct personalities, one Chinese and one American.

What is rejected is somewhat easier to define than what is sought: the Asian-American identity is in the process of emergence. This new identity attempts to integrate some traditional Chinese values, while at the same time being sensitive to, and taking action on, a number of contemporary issues such as poverty and racism, which affect the Chinese as well as other minorities (Sue and Sue 1973:117). Asian-Americans view society as to blame for the present conditions of the Chinese in the United States. They emphasize raising Chinese self esteem and pride, for they believe that only through collective action, and not simply individual and family social mobility, can the present situation change. The Asian-Americans hold that the consciousness of both the Chinese and the Americans must be raised; only after the images of the Chinese in America are changed, will their socioeconomic and political position be changed. The emerging Asian-American identity involves some intense inner conflicts; on the one hand the identity includes pride in one's heritage, knowledge of one's culture and unity of the group. At the same time, however, it encourages, perhaps even requires, assertiveness, questioning of authorities and action against established institutions, which may be in conflict with traditional Chinese culture and with the individual's own upbringing.

Asian-Americans are adamant in demanding control over local institutions so that these institutions can be changed in ways that are fundamental for making social, economic and political gains. This movement is clearly influenced by the civil rights movement of the 1960s and the resurrected ethnic identities of oppressed peoples such as blacks,
Hispanics, and native Americans. The stance taken by the Asian-Americans may appear "militant" or "radical" to those not so committed, both Chinese, and non-Chinese. Sue (1973) points out that this militancy may translate into open contempt and anger at those within the minority group, as well as the larger society of white, middle class America.

In the school discussed here, the Asian-Americans have sometimes alienated the Chinese parents, and the liberals, by their tactics, rather than their ideology. Furthermore, where the liberals tend to agree with the traditionalists that the school is basically a good one, requiring some changes perhaps, the Asian-Americans appear to be working toward a more complete changeover in school administration and programs, however much this may temporarily dislocate and even disrupt the formal educational functions of the school and the positive image of the Chinese community in the city at large.

As might be predicted, the Asian-Americans have their greatest distance from the traditionalists; it is, in fact, the unwillingness of the Asian-Americans to bury and minimize the disagreements with the school's administration that constitutes the biggest change and challenge in the school's functioning. The Asian-American-traditionalist conflicts are aptly symbolized by the name of the school. When it moved to a new location three years ago, it was named after the first Chinese-American to attend an American university. The principal's opening day speech lauded this man as "the first Chinese-American to seek higher education," and therefore an appropriate role model for the children and parents of the Chinese community. In a recent introduction to a collection of Asian-American literature Frank Chin, the Chinese-American playwright says of this same man that..."he is the outstanding example of early yellow-white supremacy... (in which)... The subservient character of the Chinese and the inferiority of China were major themes in works by Chinese converts to white supremacy (1974)."

The articulation of an Asian-American viewpoint in this school community has been strengthened by the presence of the IGC classes. The alliance of the principal with the IGC parents awakened some of the Chinese parents to more fully assert the Asian-American presence. Furthermore, a few of the white IGC parents are aligned ideologically with the Asian-Americans and this adds both a psychological and pragmatic boost to their position.

The Career Administrators

The career administrators are the school district personnel, such as the district superintendent and his staff. A primary interest of these administrators is the furtherance of their own professional careers; this requires manipulating the different factions on the Board so that these community boards will renew their contracts. These career administrators are in a difficult position in the heterogeneous district in which this school is located. The district board is a generally liberal one,
although there are several very conservative members, one of whom is Chinese. The district board meetings are well attended by articulate, energetic parents who take an active part in the Parent's Associations of their respective schools and who are knowledgeable about educational philosophies and local politics.

The current district superintendent and his high level staff have thrown in their lot with the more liberal faction of the community board, trusting that their past dominance of district educational affairs will continue. This was justified in the most recent school board election, where the liberals maintained their majority position on the board. In the conflicts which have arisen in the elementary school discussed here, the district superintendent and other board representatives have taken an active role in opposing the traditionalists. The district superintendent, who is black, has sided with the Asian-Americans in trying to redefine the Chinese community as an oppressed minority which shares common interests with other such minorities in the city.

In addition to ideological differences between the district superintendent and the school principal, the expansion of power on the part of the one is an obvious threat to the power of the other. The district superintendent has taken an active role in meeting with parents and establishing a personal presence in the school. While any principal will naturally have a narrower view of the common good than a district representative who is more in touch with political and funding realities at local, state and federal levels, the conflict in this school is exacerbated by the strong ideological differences between the two men. It can be fairly said that district representatives are exploiting school conflicts to further their own careers.

The Conflicts

In this section two conflicts will be analyzed in some detail in order to illustrate the complexity of the resolution of conflict by appeals to the common good in contemporary, urban America.

The Lunchroom

A lunch period in the elementary school appears to the outsider as part of Dante's inferno. Yelling, physical movement, crowding - seeming chaos reigns. In this school four lunchroom aides supervise 250 children during two periods. These aides are older women from the nearby Italian community and are hired by the principal; they are paid about $4.00 an hour.

At a recent Parent Association meeting a Chinese mother complained that her child and herself were rudely treated by a lunchroom aide. The principal responded, "If you were only one of four aides supervising 250 screaming children, you'd yell too." Some of the PA board, both Chinese and non-Chinese, felt that the principal was
unnecessarily rude and unresponsive to the complaint, and that had it been a white parent, or an IGC parent, he would have responded differently. They felt he should have investigated the matter further.

The parents taking this view discussed the matter among themselves after the meeting and decided to write a letter to the principal protesting both the aide's behavior and his own (lack of) response. The protest letter was signed on behalf of the parents by the Chinese co-president of the PA very reluctantly. This family lives outside the school district and strictly speaking her child is in the school illegally. She claims the child lives with the grandmother (within the district) and this claim has never been challenged. In fact, quite a number of students in the school are in a similar position. Parents living in nearby, less safe neighborhoods, or even some Chinese parents who live in the suburbs but who work in Chinatown send their children to this school. The principal has not objected in the past as it fills his school with highly motivated, well behaved youngsters and gains him some parental support. These parents are vulnerable, however, as subsequent events showed.

The parents stated in their letter to the principal that they realized the difficulty of understaffing in the lunchroom, but that "screaming at children, especially those who do not understand English, can cause emotional damage." This reference to the fact that it was Chinese children, and their parents, was not lost on the principal. His response, in the form of a letter to the PA Board President indicates clearly the direction and intensity of the conflicts emerging between groups and within institutions in Chinatown. He began on a sad, rather than angry note, saying, "I feel, suddenly, quite old, as I realize that I have miscalculated the support that I had from the Parents Association..." He then went on to refer to his past performance in which he had acted in the special interests of the Chinese community by allowing elderly grandmothers to come into the school at lunchtime to be with their grandchildren. He noted this as part of his recognition of the cultural specialness of the Chinese, for whom families are so important and in which many of the mothers as well as fathers, must work. He referred in his letter to these grandmothers: "The result of my allowing adults in the lunchroom, which no other school allows, is that adults steal large amounts of food that should go to the children. You can see many of them eating the children's food. While I have some sympathy, it is clear that the school has no responsibility to feed adults or to encourage thievery." He further made explicit reference to "parents whose children were admitted to this school although they do not live within the zoned area, and who have the right to withdraw their children from the school and return to the proper zoned school, and...to a probably much better administered, more efficiently run school."

These two references, to "adults stealing food," and "parents from other zoned areas" were a clear warning of the vulnerability of many parents in regard to the power of the principal. This kind of explicit use of the principal's power had never happened before. Most parents agreed
that although the principal's letter was an angry overreaction, the conflict ought to be resolved within the school community so that neither the children nor the vulnerable parents would suffer. An informal network of reasonable parents was brought into play. The liberals were used as mediators - on the one hand it was felt that they could "calm down" the Asian-Americans who were threatening to take the letter to the district superintendent's office, and even the press. The liberals appealed to the Asian-Americans by referring to the vulnerable parents who lived outside the district whose children would be most hurt through no fault of their own if they were forced to withdraw from the school. They also persuaded the Asian-Americans that the good of the school would suffer if it was served by a principal who felt angry, betrayed and defensive. The liberals were also able to speak to the principal in his own language and on his own level, amply demonstrating that they did indeed understand his past efforts to be sensitive to the special needs of the Chinese community. After many informal meetings, the conflict was resolved.

The principal publicly announced that he would not press the issue of stealing food or illegal status of the children from outside the district; he also agreed to hire an Asian-American lunchroom aide. He did, however, send a memo to the parents which stated that "due to overcrowding, no more parents or other adults would be permitted in the lunchroom and that school food was not allowed to leave the premises." The wording of this latter phrase in the passive voice was an attempt by the principal to mollify the Chinese parents who had been offended by the accusations of stealing food.

The parents had been even more upset by the principal's public threat to exploit the vulnerability of the parents who lived outside the school district. This situation had gone on for years with the complete knowledge and acquiescence of the principal. For him to use it as a weapon was seen as violating the normative but unstated working arrangement which had been mutually beneficial to the school and the parents. It was considered by many as "hitting below the belt," and undermined the trust many Chinese parents had in the principal. Furthermore, such shaming remarks made publicly are in total opposition to the Chinese idea of how people treat each other. By destroying the convention of politeness which had been so important in relationships within the school, the principal's action irreversibly turned some parents against him. Though this particular conflict was resolved by everyone giving in a little, a residue of discontent remained on both sides. One of the Asian-American parents acting on her own, did in fact, show the principal's angry letter to the district superintendent. He correctly interpreted this as an indication of a more militant viewpoint forming in Chinatown which could possibly become a base for the further extension of his power in the district.

Further, although the liberals finally managed to help resolve this particular conflict, it became clear to them that there was an important difference between themselves and the Asian-Americans, who viewed this
incident as part and parcel of a long history of prejudice and discrimination against the Chinese by the non-Chinese, rather than an isolated incident overheated by emotion, but basically resolvable. The liberals realized that future conflicts would be more difficult to resolve, and began to think that perhaps the Asian-Americans were, as the principal claimed, out to get rid of him and replace him with a Chinese, or at least a minority person more overtly and actively sympathetic to an authentic Asian-American consciousness.

**Bilingualism**

Conflicts over bilingual education are so frequently clouded by political and economic considerations that rational discussion on what is really in the best interests of the bilingual child - educationally, psychologically, and socially, have gotten somewhat lost. In the recent conflict over bilingual education in this Chinatown school, the emerging Asian-American viewpoint, and its alliance with the self interest of the career administrators has become clear. Because of the funding involved, which partly comes from the federal government, bilingualism as an issue makes particularly clear the necessity for understanding the ways in which local communities articulate with higher level institutions and groups.

This school has always had two bilingual classes for Chinese children who do not speak English at the kindergarten and first grade level. The classes are taught by Chinese teachers who are fluently bilingual, and who are, in addition, trained professionals in teaching English as a second language (ESL). In these classes the subjects are all taught in Chinese, and the children are given an ESL component as part of their curriculum. The aim of these classes is to make the children fluent in English as rapidly as possible so that they may enter the regular English medium classes by the second grade. This is consistent with the traditionalist view that the school has an important Americanization function. This view of bilingualism prevailed until last year. In 1979, a Chinese-American bilingual coordinator was hired by the district board to supervise the district's bilingual programs. He viewed his mandate as one of expanding bilingual education in the district. He wants the Chinatown school to more adequately meet the needs of rising Chinese identity, as well as serve the increasing number of non-English speaking Chinese immigrants coming into the community.

The bilingual coordinator envisions a full fledged "model" bilingual program being housed in this school, rather than the modest one room Asian-American center they now have. He believes that this school could become the model for Chinese bilingual/bicultural programs all across the country, i.e., in development of materials, presentation of cultural performances, training of personnel, etc. Additionally, he will also stand to gain in his career if this idea goes through - he will be the man in charge, and large sums of money will be under his control. In this role he would also be in a position to set up an alternative power structure to aid the Asian-American parents in their conflicts with the principal. It is
obvious to the principal that to the extent that the bilingual coordinator enlarges his empire, the principal's power diminishes.

This conflict has reached to the district level. The district superintendent, who from both a personal and ideological standpoint is sensitive to all minority group concerns, is behind the bilingual coordinator. The superintendent has come into previous conflict with the school principal as well. Like many other educators in this socially diverse district, the superintendent considers classes for the intellectually gifted as elitist, if not racist. He believes that the educational advantages to the gifted children of such special classes are outweighed by the social and political implications of such groups to those who are not chosen for them. Further, the presence of the IGC in his district increases the number of white, middle class, articulate and involved parents who do not agree with him on all issues, tending to be less liberal. Finally, the superintendent was not unaware of the racial implications in the IGC parents' preference for locating the program in the Chinatown school, rather than in one of the equally available schools in any one of a number of predominantly black neighborhoods in the central city.

In the school itself, the bilingual issues appear to have widened the separation between the liberals and the Asian-Americans. The liberals basically agree with the principal that overcrowding would occur if the bilingual program attracted students from other zones within the school district. They also agree with him that bilingual education should ideally be transitional until the children master both languages. They also tend to see the district coordinator's plans to make bilingualism a permanent feature of this school as primarily based on his own self interest rather than on a sincere educational philosophy. It is difficult to tell what the parents of the non-English speaking children want, as they are largely absent from public meetings and overwhelmingly work long hours which inhibits their participation in school affairs. Since they are not a strong visible presence, the principal claims to speak for them, assuming they want assimilation as much as he does, while the bilingual coordinator presents these parents as desiring bilingualism as much as he does.

The conflict over the future of bilingualism in this school has now gone beyond the school community. One of the Asian-American parents took this issue, seemingly after getting informal approval from the district bilingual coordinator, to an underground, militantly Asian-American newspaper published in Chinese. An article appeared on the front page which called attention to the conflict over bilingualism, using this to illustrate the confrontation between parents in Chinatown and non-Chinese school principals. The article said that "where unlike the power of parents which has increased in other school districts (since decentralization), in Chinatown the power of the parents has not increased." It continued in this vein, noting that the principal and most of the PA board in this school were white. The article questioned the "sincerity" of the principal in objections to bilingualism, claiming that all the teachers cared about was losing their jobs to bilingual teachers. It
noted that "white parents of the IGC children, who have much free time which permits them to take part in the PA," have too much of a voice in Chinatown school policymaking." The article also mentioned the setting up of a district wide Chinese Parents Association, saying "only those that hold education to be holy should serve the Chinese community schools." Attempts to resolve this conflict in private discussion did not therefore succeed in spite of the principal's appeal to the higher common interest of a school that was not overcrowded and distracted from its primary function of educating its children in basic skills, in English. Now that the issue has been carried outside the school community, its resolution will be more difficult.

Realizing the problems that lie ahead should he confront head on the district coordinator, the principal has taken another tack. He is trying to get the school approved as a "magnet school" for folklore and the arts. Under federal guidelines this approval, and money to maintain the program, will be forthcoming if the school, which is defined as a minority school, can attract 15% or more white children. Because of the school's record for safety, order, and education, as well as the lack of political volatility which characterizes other minority schools, and taking into account the current resurgence of interest in Chinese culture, along with our new cordial relations with the People's Republic of China, it is highly possible that this strategy to avoid commitment to bilingualism will succeed.

Discussion

This paper has so far focused on some recent conflicts and their resolutions in a particular school in an urban Chinese community. The nature of the conflicts and their resolutions must be seen against the background of the last twenty years of ethnic resurgence, the civil rights movement, and confrontation politics in the United States. In a recent presentation, Edward Bruner (1980) referred to descriptions of ethnic group relations with the larger society in the United States as "narratives," or "stories," in which the present is given meaning by the interpretation of the past and the goals for the future. According to Bruner, there are two main "stories" which have had currency at different times in United States history. In the "story" which held sway until about WW II, the minority group past was held to be a golden age, the present was interpreted as a period of acculturation, and the future was defined in terms of eventual assimilation. Since WW II, but particularly in the last twenty years, a new "story" has emerged. Here the past is seen as exploitation, the present as an age of protest, and the goal of the future as ethnic resurgence.

Although Bruner discussed the opposition of these two stories with respect to native Americans, his paradigm has direct relevance to the situation described in this paper. Clearly, the traditionalists, reflecting the view of the public at large, hold to the first narrative: present acculturation should lead to future assimilation, and the school is viewed
as having an important role in this process. The liberals, the Asian Americans, and the district representatives are writing scripts and acting roles according to a different story. For them, the American past has consisted of an altogether oppressive racism; the present must be a time of assertiveness, redress, even militancy, and the future goal that of a genuinely autonomous, economically viable, Chinese community with control of its own image and the important institutions which serve its population.

In attempting to reshape their image and place in American society, Asians have not only been influenced by the rhetoric and style of the 1960s civil rights movement, but have also allied with it in associational terms, as the alliance between the Asian-Americans and the district bilingual coordinator and district superintendent in this Chinatown indicates. As Chia Ling Kuo points out for New York, "...voluntary associations in Chinatown are powerless to effect social change...by themselves. Social changes in Chinatown have resulted from the civil rights, student, and antiwar movements in the encapsulating society...all of which have contributed to the development of the nationwide Asian-American movement." Even minor changes, such as in health services, education and employment, have been achieved in (NYC) Chinatown only with the association of other, non-Chinese, political pressure groups on the lower East Side (Kuo 1977).

Kuo's comments on change in New York City's Chinatown greatly facilitate understanding of the conflicts in the Chinatown discussed here. The Asian-American viewpoint is developing slowly, and even today is held by only a few parents and no school personnel. Whether these parents will be able to mobilize other segments of the school community in ways that further the Asian-American identity would appear to depend on how far this viewpoint carries them from the view that the school's primary obligation is to provide a good education in a safe, calm environment with as little conflict as possible. Their willingness to compromise with the other segments of the school community are in proportion to the strength they feel they have. If they gain support from powerful elements outside the school itself, this will undoubtedly intensify their determination to impose their view of the rest of the school community.

The various segments of the school community are not only in disagreement on school goals and policy, but also on the strategies they consider legitimate to achieve these goals. The Asian-Americans, liberals, and career administrators hold to the view that furthering the American ideals of social justice is a high priority educational goal. This idealized concept of the common good requires that everyone in the school community become subject to whatever is necessary to achieve this goal, even if this may interfere with narrower worthwhile goals such as academic achievement or school stability. The liberals attempt strategies of persuasion, the career administrators use their power as district representatives over policy and budget, the Asian-Americans use tactics of confrontation and threats of disruption; the motivation of each of
these groups is somewhat different depending on their different positions in the community and resources at their command, but they are similar in understanding the common good as applicable equally to all segments of the school.

The traditionalists, on the other hand, have a notion of the common good that visualizes different, competing interest groups who will be willing to compromise in order to maintain useful working arrangements and continued functioning of institutions. It is becoming clear, however, that compromise does not work in all situations. Where there appears to be an even balance of power, and when goals are sufficiently close, compromise can be a way to resolve conflicts, as in the case of the complaints and principal's response to the lunchroom situation. In this case both sides gained by compromise; the principal was allowed a graceful withdrawal to an insulting overreaction in writing, and in return, the vulnerable status of parents who had their children in school illegally was overlooked.

In situations where the opposing sides are too far apart ideologically, as on the bilingual issue, or where there is a major imbalance of power, compromise may not be suitable to resolve conflicts. In the bilingual issue, for example, the principal, seeing no compromise as possible, has preferred to seek another alternative altogether, that of turning his school into a magnet school which depends on funds which will be forthcoming from outside the control of the district superintendent, thereby evading having to deal with him, and his bilingual coordinator at all. The Asian-Americans also are seeking alternative sources of power with the district representatives, rather than working out a compromise with the principal. They are seeking this approach because they believe that the power of the district bilingual coordinator, along with help perhaps from other minority groups, will force the principal to give in on the issue.

The conflicts in this school precisely involve those "painful encounters" described by Sennett, in which diverse groups of people meet head on in conflicts which involve both different goals and different means. So far this school community has held together; whether the changes now taking place will lead to a more vital and constructive school community, or whether the present conflicts will lead to retreat from social goals remains to be seen. The future, in this district, which reflects some of the problems, as well as the opportunities, of a creative urban environment in the contemporary United States, is uncertain.
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Let me start by laying to one side the idea of the "common good." I am sure that there are shared goods, or as I would put it, common interests, but I am not so sure that there is a single common good which anthropologists or anyone else can help to produce or to identify. I will, however, talk about the role which social research—much of it anthropological—has played in one arena which has generated both theoretical argument and struggles over material resources: the arena of controversy surrounding the marginal settlements of Latin America.

In describing the role which research has played in these practical and intellectual controversies I want to take exception to the view, a common one I believe, in which research appears as intervening into controversy from some realm outside it. I see research more as part of controversy. We often think of research as a clarifying influence, mediating dispute by producing facts, acting on the social world by being used, influencing policy, having consequences. Research does that, I believe, but the causality also runs the other way. Interests shape research; controversy on policy focuses research topics for investigation; lines of action have ideas embedded in them, and bring consequences which demand an explanatory framework. Thus with respect to Latin American "squatter settlements" there has been a kind of noisy conversation involving at the same time the world of programs and policies and the successive ideas in good currency which have organized that world intellectually, and the world of social research. The positions taken do not divide the world of research from the world of policy, making a conversation between these two, but rather cross-cut. In this noisy
conversation, the political left and the political right sometimes find themselves appealing to the same interpretation of reality. Within the academic community, it appears oddly that field studies of the phenomenon are done largely by outsiders to the area, while local scholars appeal more to analysis at a general societal level. Meanwhile, the evolution of programs encounters new issues on which neither pattern of investigation has so far much data to offer.

The setting of this discussion is the following: In most rapidly-growing cities of developing countries, a considerable part of the population is not living in either modern apartment buildings or modern houses but in a sharply contrasting environment: unplanned and often illegal settlements, lacking municipal services, and with houses which at the beginning at least are generally no more than shacks.

In some places, Lima being a notable example, such settlements have been formed through large, organized invasions of land, usually land in public ownership. Elsewhere land has been invaded inconspicuously by single families and small groups over a period of time. Other settlements, probably the greater part of the whole, are the result of land subdivision and lot sales which are carried out outside of the legal structure of subdivision regulation, and usually in violation of the standards required in legal subdivision. There are different local names for such settlements: the barriadas of Lima, favelas of Rio, callampas of Chile, ranchos of Venezuela, villas miseras of Buenos Aires, colonias populares of Mexico.

Government policy towards such settlements has varied, both in time and place, from attempts at eradication--given the economic and demographic factors of necessarily spotty success--to attempts at upgrading and administrative incorporation--also, necessarily, fraught with difficulty, and troubled by the ambiguities of developing official policy towards a kind of settlement conspicuously violating official norms.

The ideas in good currency as to how to deal with the problem of housing the poor in developing countries seem to have evolved away from a focus on building of completed houses (with a search for technical means to lower costs), to a set of programs aimed at supporting and adding to the efforts of poor families themselves. In the 1960s when the planner Charles Abrams took this approach in an influential book and policy monograph (Abrams 1964, 1966), the position was somewhat novel, but it now appears to be that of enlightened practice (Dwyer 1975, World Bank 1975, Payne 1977; Munson and Lea 1979). There is an interest in developing programs which cut costs by providing only a rudimentary "core", to be added to by the occupants or only a serviced lot ("sites and services") or which install services in existing marginal settlements ("upgrading"). The World Bank, in particular, whose influence on policy is both financial and intellectual, draws from programmatic experience the lesson that "master planning" and new construction have failed to reach the poor, and that "squatter upgrading and sites and services projects would continue to be the prime instruments for improving the housing conditions of the urban poor" (World Bank 1975). The United Nations not
only takes the same programmatic position, but generalizes it as representing a "change in attitude to the urban poor and the spontaneous settlements they construct."

Instead of perceiving the poor and their settlements as "marginal" and counter-developmental, governments, through the efforts of the United Nations, individual researchers and their own experience, are seeing positive aspects to the "housing solutions" developed spontaneously by the urban poor.

(United Nations 1977)

There has been, then, something of a dramatic change in the "ideas in good currency" among policy-makers. At the same time, there appears to be a growing sense that the programs organized around supporting the efforts of the urban poor themselves do not constitute a wholly satisfactory solution of the low income housing problem. In Bogota, I was told that it was recently calculated that nearly a quarter of the city's families cannot afford even a serviced lot at present prices and income levels. So there is definitely room for continuing discussion.

The "problem of spontaneous settlements" is thus one at once conspicuous, intractable and controversial. Because the settlements raise practical problems, represent an arena of political struggle, and are symbolically important, over the last fifteen years they have generated a substantial literature.

Some of this lies within the academic traditions of sociology, anthropology and political science, attempting to conceptualize and understand the phenomenon in the context of the characterization of societies in the process of rapid change. Another form taken by the literature on marginal settlements is a literature of social problems, having as its referent the identification of issues which urban policy should address and the implicit or explicit advocacy of various programmatic approaches. These kinds of literatures interact; in addition, these two broad categories of studies are related to the evolving body of practice constituted by the housing and urban settlements programs of the various developing countries and the guidelines and ideas in good currency of the international agencies which fund such programs.

The story is complicated further by the fact that each of these strands is a realm of political controversy. Research perspectives, problem description, and policy recommendation are shaped by contrasting political positions.

Even to refer to the settlements is to enter into the realm of disputatious conceptualization.

Taken as a category, they have been given various names: uncontrolled or spontaneous settlements, in reference to their lack of
regulation and sponsorship by government; squatter settlements, in reference to the portion—relatively large in some places, relatively minor in others—formed by land invasion; shantytowns, in reference to the poor quality of building; marginal settlements, in reference to a conception of the role which their inhabitants are deemed to play in urban society, as well as to their usual location on the cheaper and less closely-policed lands of the urban periphery; transitional settlements to represent a more positive view of their social role. (For a typology of illegal settlements see Stokes 1962, Turner 1965, Portes 1971, and Ward 1976, among others.)

At the outset, one might distinguish family of studies, analyses, and policy directions which treat the settlements as "rings of misery" or unsightly slums inhabited by people at the margins of urban life, both physically and socially. Studies in this framework focus on poverty and poor housing; analyses at a societal level focus on unequal distribution in the development process; and policy focuses on slum clearance and re-housing.

For a classic view of the settlements and their inhabitants as essentially problem-creating, see the comments of a professional town-planner named Morris Juppenlatz (1970):

As the political control of cities with an urban squatter problem passes from the presently established urban society... into the hands of the emergent urban squatter society, who have little or no heritage of city-dwelling, and who at present have no training in or administrative knowledge of city maintenance, it can be expected that essential services will diminish until they finally break down and collapse. (p. 171)

Richard Morse (1965), identifying the position earlier among Latin Americanists, described it as the view that the city is properly the "citadel of high culture" currently being invaded, both literally and figuratively, by a mass of untutored people from the countryside.

This view of the settlements has clear roots both in ignorance and in self-interest: the ignorance stemming from the class barriers which preclude direct contact between social elites—including planners—and settlers, and the self-interest stemming from a professional commitment to the development of modern standard housing projects. In this form, it may be seen as a conservative political position, the ideological basis for the slum clearance policy which displaced the favelados from commercially valuable land at the center of Rio to cheap land on the periphery.

A contrasting perspective sees the settlements as representing creative energy, "a process of social reconstruction through popular initiative" (Mangin, 1967b). The marginal settlements are seen as creative coping, city-building, and the construction of new institutions. Those who

This perspective on the settlements seems to have received its major impetus not so much in research findings, as in advocacy with reference to the slum clearance policies legitimized by the social disorganization-rings of misery view.

The idea that housing should be appraised as a vehicle for social change, rather than in terms of its physical standard, had been set forward in a 1962 paper by an economist contrasting "slums of hope" with "slums of despair" (Stokes 1962), and the perspective has been developed by a number of others (Hutchinson 1963, Peattie 1969, Dietz 1969, Casasco 1969, Portes 1971 and 1972), but the figure who was clearly most important in generalizing and establishing this view was not a social researcher but an architect, John Turner. Turner, a Britisher with anarchist ideas, in the course of a number of years working in Lima, Peru (Turner and Fichter, 1972), became convinced that official attempts to build were bound to be both more expensive and less appropriate than the "self-help" efforts of the settlers themselves. Turner's paper on "uncontrolled settlements" at a United Nation conference in 1966 was a pioneering and important effort to set out the view of such settlements as "vehicles for social change" and to propose a re-alignment of governmental actions with regard to them. A subsequent series of articles and books (1963, 1965, 1967a, 1967b, 1968a, 1968b, 1970a, 1970b, 1976; and Turner and Goetze 1967, Turner and Mangin 1968, and Turner and Fichter 1972) on the same theme made him much the most quoted authority in the field.

Substantively, Turner's writings were important in establishing the view that marginal settlements could be "more appropriately described as self-improving suburbs than as slums" and that "the imposition of modern minimum standards on popular urban housing in a transitional economy is an assault on the traditional functions of housing as a source of economic security and mobility." Turner's view of marginal settlements as the work of "consolidators", most of whom had moved to them from "bridgehead" slums in the central city (1965), not only redefined the settlements as an evidence of social advance, rather than deterioration, but also placed them in the context of a complex urban housing system. Ideologically, Turner's very strong sense of housing as the arena for struggling out issues of individual autonomy in a world of powerful governmental institutions gave the shift in policy ideas very much the flavor of a movement. Finally, it would appear that Turner played a role in linking the world of policy debate to that of social research, particularly in his working association with the anthropologist William Mangin in the early '60s (Mangin and Turner 1968, 1969, Mangin 1967a, 1967b, 1970a, 1970b, 1973).
Social science groups followed by organizing policy-focused seminars and symposia on spontaneous settlements, of which probably the most important was the week-long anthropological meeting (Burg Wartenstein Symposium No. 73) financed by the Wenner Gren Foundation in 1977. In addition, specialized magazines among which Ekistics has been perhaps the most influential, have contributed to diffuse research findings and policy experiences around illegal settlements. There is now a substantial literature on the positive value of squatter "self-help" housing.

The view of the shantytowns as positive coping has drawn significantly on anthropological field research, much of it by North Americans, not Latins. For this, rather odd circumstance there seem to be two reasons. One is the relatively greater development of the fieldwork tradition in the North American universities. The other, which we will come to later, is the disengagement of North Americans politically, and therefore conceptually, from the marginality theory which has been central to Latin American thinking about their situation, and therefore, to their placement of the squatter phenomenon.


A major theme coming out of this stream of research was the positive valuation of the marginal settlements. Squatter settlements were seen as "not the problem but the solution." The residents were seen to be bravely defending the land they had settled against the clearance efforts of the authorities. The shanties they built were to be understood not in terms of their low standard at the moment as slums, but as better houses in process. The incremental building process was the most adaptive possible for people whose incomes were low and irregular. Finally, the settlement process itself, with its housing consolidation and the community organization developed to press for services, was seen not as marginalization but as social consolidation and progress.

The researchers responsible for developing this perspective tend to present their analysis as a discovery of the "real situation," a rebuttal of the "myths" of "marginality" and of squatter settlement disorganization. Yet there may be more to it than that. The discovery of orderly striving
among squatters follows a theme already laid down by anthropologists discovering culture where others saw savagery, street corner society where others saw social pathology, community where others saw slums. The finding is inherent in the research orientation.

Moreover, the literature is part of anthropological advocacy. Taking sides with the settlers defending the land they had occupied and pressing for services, this group of studies had an immediate connection with policy debate and with the shift in ideas in good currency towards sites and services, upgrading, and "self help" programs.

This "positive view" of squatter settlements and the processes within them confronts a set of very different ideas which come not only for Latin American scholars, especially, the "marginality" of shantytown residents to urban life has been a central theme, not so much as the basis for criticizing the settlement as it has been the basis for criticizing society. For Latin scholars it has become the central imagery of their critical analysis of their development (e.g. Murmis 1969; Nun 1969, 1972; Quijano 1969, 1972a, 1972b, 1974). For these scholars, the supposed chaos and physical discomfort of the settlements (Rosenbluth 1963), the alleged economic parasitism of the inhabitants (Vekemans 1969) and their alleged lack of political participation (see Giusti 1972) meant not that the squatters should be kept out of the city, but that the city should receive them, or be transformed by them. The concept of "marginality" was largely established by the DESAL group in Chile (DESAL 1966, 1967, 1969, Vekemans 1969, Vekemans et al. 1969, Vekemans and Giusti 1970) who used it as the charter of the social democrats' attempt to organize and incorporate the "marginals," politically via settlement upgrading, sites and services, and community organizing. Again, given the prior claim of the Marxist left parties to the established working class, a clear interest in the perspective on the part of its proponents is visible.

On the other hand, those of a more radical perspective, the best known being Fanon (1968), have been able to develop an account of the marginals in which exclusion from the goods of urban life leads to increasing radicalization and political extremism, with potential for the re-ordering of society from the bottom up (Davis and Golden 1954, Soares 1964, Soares and Hamblin 1967, Schmitt and Burks 1963, Koth et al. 1965, Fanon 1968, Lenkersdorf 1971). (There is, it must be noted also a substantial body of research arguing that the projected radicalism is not forthcoming.) (Nelson 1969, 1970).

As has been noted, the "positive view" of squatter settlements and the processes within them has been tied to the evolution of policy ideas in good currency towards sites and services, upgrading, and "self help" programs. Here, also, the defenders of squatter settlements find themselves under vigorous attack from the Left as well as the Right. There is a lively and polemical literature from the Left criticizing the idea of "self help" housing policies.
This literature, coming out of the Marxist tradition, is increasingly not simply Latin American, but also North American. These writers, taking off from Engels' analysis of "the housing question," see the shantytown dwellers "self-help" activities in quite another light. For these analysts, the coping activities of the squatters merely lower wages; and make it harder for the shantytowners to develop a sensible grasp of their class position. By achieving a cheap housing solution, the self-help builders contribute to super-exploitation by the capitalist enterprises, which need not accommodate a higher housing cost in wages, and by making poor families into small property holders the shantytown "solution" builds false consciousness (Burgess 1978; see also Pradilla 1976, Lea 1979, Peattie 1979).

One might think that research would easily contribute to resolving the Great Debate between the followers of John Turner and the Marxists. It does not, for the two groups are arguing directly past each other. Turner argues about the role of housing at the household and local community level, and uses as his evidence observation of households, local community organizations, and particular government housing projects. The Marxists argue about processes at the level of the whole society, and base their argument largely on reasoned analysis--and let us not put this down, for most of the prestigious field of economics is based on this kind of evidence.

The political issues behind such a debate will no doubt continue to inspire research. It is already clear from the work of such researchers as Eckstein (1975a) and Lomnitz (1978) that the political economy issues will be carried into a body of research which is more institutionally-specific; which traces the specific linkages between the marginal settlement economy and the rest of the city and national economy; which relates varying characteristics of individual settlements to varying positions in the urban structure (Leeds 1969, Brett 1974, Doebele 1977); and very likely, in the process of developing such an empirically-grounded picture, comes to criticize the broad generalizations of Neo-Marxist "marginality" and "dependency theory".

Empirical research of this character shows a potential for intersecting in an interesting way with programmatic concerns and the development of policy orientations. As the development of the idea of marginal settlements as "a solution not a problem" took root in the agencies responsible for housing programs, a set of programmatic recommendations came into style which either made minimal inputs and left residents to do the rest (sites and services) or took existing settlements as given, and added to them roads, sewers, water lines and perhaps some services (upgrading). Both of these approaches, and especially the second, imply a different approach to research. The characteristics of the program inputs in themselves are less critical than are the characteristics of the housing markets into which they enter. Issues which arise are those of the market effects of changes in land tenure; the institutional factors governing the price of construction
materials; and the way in which the structure of housing markets affects people's inclination to invest in housing in various kinds of locations.

Thinking on such programmatic issues draws from the studies which are now appearing treating peripheral marginal settlements as one type in a variety of low-income housing systems (Harris 1971, Eyre 1972, Vaughn and Feindt 1973, Brett 1974, Sudra 1976, Angel et al. 1977, Brown 1977, Conway and Brown 1980).

These studies suggest investigations of the structure of the urban economy from top to bottom. Policy concerns and political economy debate may then intersect in a concern for a kind of comparative "institutional economics".

There already exist studies of the legal and quasi-legal institutions in relation to marginal settlements (Conn 1969). There are beginning to be studies of the relationships between economic institutions in the marginal settlements and the larger economy (Frankenhoff 1967, Lomnitz 1978, Eckstein 1975a, 1975b, 1977, Peattie 1968, 1979, Roberts 1973, 1978). It seems possible that work may evolve in the direction of a kind of sociology of urban land markets and neighborhood formation. The focus would no longer be on marginal settlements per se, but on the structuring of the urban environment. At this level, empirical research would meet the work being done, largely in a Marxist framework, to develop a theory of the city as it functions in relation to the class structure (Harvey 1973, Pickvance 1976, Castells 1977, among others).

NOTE

1. The research for this paper was carried out in collaboration with Jose Aldrete-Haas, with whom the present author has published a general review of the literature on squatter settlements world-wide while this paper is selectively focused on research-policy interaction. See Lisa Peattie and Jose A. Aldrete-Haas, "Marginal Settlements in Developing Countries: Research, Advocacy of Policy, and Evolution of Programs," American Review of Sociology (1981) 7:157-75.
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World Bank
The villages of the Circumpolar North currently suffer from an array of severe social problems. Not only are these communities typefied by a range of social pathologies, they appear to have completely lost control over their own destiny. Moreover, many of them lack the will and capability to regain that control. It is our intention here to develop in detail a diagnosis of this state of affairs; to explain how it came to pass; and to explore strategies for the future development of these communities which would enable them to overcome their current problems.

Within the Circumpolar North one finds a variety of indigenous cultures: Inuit, Dene, Sami, Chukchi, Komi, Yakuty, and others. Given this variety, we might be accused of intemperance in claiming that a cross-culturally valid common set of pathologies can be identified. Nonetheless, it would be hard to deny that something is extremely wrong with many of these communities; indicators of their unfortunate condition abound. The rate of emigration from Northern communities is high, and
the flow of emigrants is weighted heavily toward the more able and ambitious rather than the more marginal members of these communities. There is a pronounced trend toward the abandonment of smaller villages (that is, those with populations under 400-600), despite a growth in overall population among Native peoples and other groups. Levels of unemployment and underemployment are high, in some cases affecting the majority of the population during certain seasons of the year. The dramatic rise in felt needs experienced in recent years—a development fueled by increased contact with affluent Southern societies and exacerbated by the introduction of television—has done much to bring about a decline in traditional authority structures, with an inevitable concurrent rise in intergenerational conflict.

To make matters worse, these communities are increasingly faced with financial pressures, and even the threat of outright insolvency. Rising demands for services (for example, health and education) coupled with a wholly inadequate tax base have gone far toward making their residents wards of the state. The results of this combination of difficulties are manifested in high rates of individual pathologies such as alcoholism, suicide, homicide, and various forms of mental illness. Additionally, there is considerable resentment and hostility directed toward outsiders, especially those identified with dominant Southern societies. This resentment and hostility is especially pervasive among Natives who have suffered from attitudes of racial superiority and discrimination.

Despite the weight of this empirical evidence, however, one might still argue that any talk of "pathologies" can only be value-laden and culture-bound. Behavior that we in Western society might recognize as symptomatic of alcoholism may be perfectly acceptable in an Inuit community. Whites may prefer to lie drunk in their homes, whereas an Inuk will lie drunk in the street. Introducing the idea of pathologies implies some notion as to what constitutes health; but, in the same way that physicians can identify physiological pathologies without being able to define health, there comes a point at which the overwhelming weight of the evidence suggests that there is something seriously amiss in these communities. More: some of the more eloquent testimony as to the extent of their social pathologies comes from members of the affected communities (see, for example, BigJim and Ito-Adler 1974). One could hardly claim that this represents the misguided perceptions of outsiders. It would require an extraordinary display of sangfroid to deny that the conditions we have described have reached crisis proportions in many parts of the Circumpolar North.

The picture we paint, then, is not a pretty one. Moreover, there are few signs of progress toward solutions in most of the communities of the region. How can we explain the emergence of these conditions, and what can be done to alleviate them? We believe that the conditions outlined above and their causes are best understood in the context of the concept of internal colonialism. How, then, does internal colonialism operate in the Circumpolar North?
Internal Colonialism and Economic Dependence

Perhaps the most obvious element in the pattern of internal colonialism is the extraordinary degree of economic dependence which characterises many of the communities of the Circumpolar North. Of course, few communities in the modern world are completely independent of outside forces. But interdependence is not the same as dependence. Dependence implies an asymmetrical relationship - as, for example, when a Northern community comes to rely on the fur trade for its survival. The fur trade could exist without Northern communities; indeed, the world would be affected but little by the disappearance of the fur trade. Yet the community in question will survive or perish according to what happens to the market for furs. In this vein, dependence may be thought of as a situation in which the key decisions affecting the welfare of a community (or other entity) are under the control of forces outside to the community and outside the scope of its influence, by virtue of external control of economic resources. In other words, we are referring to a structural relationship, as opposed to psychological dependence. As we shall see, though, a widespread mentality of dependence is one outgrowth of this structural relationship.

In some cases, the configuration of dependence can be traced back over several hundred years to early contacts with groups of Europeans. The Aleut villages of the Pribilos, for example, were originally established and operated by Russian fur traders for their own benefit (see Torrey 1978). More often, however, extreme focus of economic dependence are an outgrowth of social transformations taking place during the twentieth century.

The onset of economic dependence is traceable to sharp declines in the traditional subsistence lifestyle of Northern Native peoples. This lifestyle, though primitive in Western economic terms, provided for the basic needs of life without any reliance at all on outside contacts. The declines in the subsistence lifestyle resulted from two striking developments. In the first instance, it is important to recognize the role of European (and, subsequently, Canadian and American) entrepreneurs in stimulating the emergence of an export trade in furs. While the fur trade arose at different times in various parts of the Circumpolar North, its effects have been remarkably similar throughout the region. This trade diverts attention from subsistence activities per se and inevitably promotes the rise of a cash economy. It leads to the establishment of trading posts which typically become focal points of permanent settlements and gradually undermine the semi-nomadic pattern of life common among Native groups in the pre-contact era. Efforts to maximise the harvest of a cash crop (that is, furs) not only lead to radical changes in orientations toward nature, they also stimulate felt needs for goods available only from outsiders (for example, guns and western clothing). Above all, the fur trade has generally been both highly volatile and subject to the control of a few large trading companies (for example, the Hudson's Bay Company). Under the circumstances, once the residents of villages in
the Circumpolar North get caught up in the fur trade, they quickly become dependent on outside actors who often have the power to determine whether they survive or perish.

Equally important is the capital intensification of subsistence activities. The last several decades have witnessed a marked trend toward reliance on guns, outboard motors, snow machines, and so forth in connection with subsistence hunting and gathering (see Usher 1970, Vol. 2). Of course, this enhances the growth of the cash economy. Further, it sets in motion additional sources of economic dependence. Capital intensification permits increased harvests. This, in turn, encourages the depletion of local stocks of animals, making it necessary to go further afield in order to maintain an adequate harvest. This leads to a demand for even more advanced technologies, hence tighter links with outside suppliers and the cash economy more generally.

Additionally, the growth of the cash economy gives rise to an increasing emphasis on town life, as opposed to bush or country life, and, over time, a gradual attrition of subsistence attitudes and skills. This sequence of events rapidly becomes irreversible once it gets under way (see also Asch, 1977). Despite some of the nostalgic arguments heard today, it is simply impossible to turn the clock back once social change has produced growing towns, a cash economy, and vocal demands for the services associated with town life (for example, health services, wage employment, and Western education). The capital intensification of subsistence activities is, then, part of a chain of events undermining the traditional autonomous subsistence lifestyle but failing to yield any new basis for achieving economic self-sufficiency. Certainly, subsistence as an economic activity remains important in many parts of the Circumpolar North; the point is that the way of life associated with subsistence is no longer viable.

Given these declines in the traditional subsistence lifestyle, what are the economic alternatives for Northern communities? Neither agriculture nor most forms of manufacturing offer much potential. With few exceptions, agriculture is ruled out by the climate of the Circumpolar North. Boreal forest and tundra ecosystems are simply not hospitable to agricultural activities of the sort with which we are familiar in the temperate zones. The restrictions on manufacturing are somewhat more complex, but hardly less severe (see Alonso and Rust, 1976). Local materials are not, in general, plentiful. Large markets are remote, and local markets for most manufactured goods are tiny. Transportation costs are unusually high. Northern communities are ordinarily lacking in many forms of social infrastructure (for example, harbors, road networks, reliable telephone systems) required for manufacturing activities. And the cost of labor is typically high, despite the presence of numerous unemployed workers. All in all, therefore, it would be unrealistic to expect agriculture or manufacturing to provide a sound economic base for most of the small communities of the Circumpolar North.
What this leaves for the majority of these communities is an emphasis on the exploitation of natural resources. The Circumpolar North is unusually rich in both renewable and non-renewable natural resources. These include, most notably, hydrocarbons, hard minerals, timber, fish, and marine mammals. Moreover, the demand for natural resources in advanced industrial societies is great. Added to this are rising fears concerning resource scarcity which serve to make the natural resources of the far North even more attractive to industrialized Southern societies. Moreover, industrialised countries such as the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union find these resources attractive in geopolitical terms, due to the relative ease of securing control over their Northern regions. Under the circumstances, it is a safe bet that demands for the natural resources of the Circumpolar North will grow rapidly during the foreseeable future. But this holds little promise of an escape from economic dependence. On the contrary, there are good reasons to expect the exploitation of natural resources in the region to perpetuate and exacerbate extreme forms of dependence.

To begin with, management authority with regard to these resources typically rests with outsiders - be they governments or private interests - who exhibit no special sensitivity to local concerns in their decision making. The American case is instructive, though hardly unique, in this respect. The federal government controls all the offshore hydrocarbons and marine mammals adjacent to Alaska, most of the major fisheries of the region, the bulk of the area’s hard minerals, and the lion's share of Alaska’s timber resources. The remaining natural resources are more often than not subject to management by the government of the State of Alaska. Even where title to natural resources has been transferred to Native peoples under the terms of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the major decisions are apt to be made by officials of regional corporations who have little contact with the residents of the communities in the areas where the resources themselves lie. What emerges, then, is a pattern in which the small communities of the region are thoroughly dependent on the decisions of outsiders with respect to major decisions affecting their economic welfare.

To make matters worse, the exploitation of natural resources in these areas ordinarily requires the development of forms of infrastructure which can only be planned and supplied by outsiders. To illustrate, the village of St. Paul cannot establish a serious bottom fishery in the absence of a boat harbor; plans for such a facility are under the control of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Similarly, the coal located in Northwestern Alaska will never become commercially valuable unless a transportation network is developed; this can only be done under the aegis of the federal government or the State of Alaska. This is not to suggest that any project along these lines is desirable, but simply to illustrate that this is another major source of economic dependence, for small Northern communities are typically unable to initiate projects of this magnitude.
Adding to these difficulties is the size of capital requirements for natural resource development in the far North, which is generally far beyond the capabilities of local enterprises. This is obvious in the case of oil and gas development. But it is worth emphasizing that the capital requirements of a modern fishery or timber industry are also large, and well in excess of available capital in the communities of the Circumpolar North. Various responses to this difficulty are conceivable. The prospects for joint ventures with outside groups having access to capital may be explored. However, such ventures are apt to produce severe problems. Outside investors are more likely to be driven by the search for tax advantages rather than any concern for community well-being. These investors are skilled in financial planning and management; hence they typically seek to dominate decision making in these joint ventures. The Native regional corporations in Alaska are large enough to take an interest in natural resource development, though their capital is by no means unlimited, and their managers are relatively uninterested in the problems of small communities. Additionally, we should not rule out a careful consideration of projects emphasizing appropriate technology and small scale operations. Nevertheless, the size of the capital requirements for natural resource exploitation in the far North is a contributing factor to economic dependence. Those in possession of the capital will ordinarily call the shots, and there is little reason to suppose that these people will exhibit any special concern for local autonomy or socio-cultural integrity.

A further contributing factor to dependence comes from an unexpected quarter: environmental groups. Some of these groups have regularly pushed policies that have heightened the problems of Northern communities. A dramatic case in point involves the management of marine mammals. In many areas, a small, well-managed commercial harvest of marine mammals could sustain a local industry without leading to any significant depletion of animal stocks (see Young 1981, ch. 3). Yet environmentalists have often opposed such practices as a matter of general policy. Similar comments are in order with respect to mining of the public domain which could be restricted to small operations under the control of local enterprises. From the vantage point of many communities in the Circumpolar North, then, government, big business, and the environmental movement constitute a de facto alliance to perpetuate dependence. All of these groups are made up of distant and alien outsiders with their own interests to pursue and little regard for the needs of local communities. All are resolutely opposed to transferring management authority over these resources to those residing in these communities.

All these sources of economic dependence are exacerbated by the pronounced fluctuations in level of activity that natural resource exploitation is subject to. These fluctuations take the form of boom/bust cycles. In the case of renewable resources, they can result either from the volatility of natural systems or from fluctuations in demand for various products. In earlier times this was a striking feature of the export
trade in furs, as many Northern communities discovered to their sorrow (see, for example, Usher 1970, Vol. 2). Such fluctuation is common today in the timber industry and fisheries. The demand for wood products is closely tied to fluctuations in national economies. Bad years follow good years in the salmon fisheries. Boom/bust cycles in non-renewable resource exploitation are both more predictable and more severe (see Albrecht, 1978). Typically, development commences with a large influx of labor and cash coupled with extensive capital construction. The level of activity falls off as the construction phase is completed, and eventually winds down as the resource is exhausted. Jobs simply disappear as specific pipelines, tank farms, and other projects are completed. This is hardly a recipe for the development of stable and self-sufficient communities; industries based on the exploitation of natural resources are unlikely to offer steady employment or a secure financial base. A more likely result is to add to welfare problems which small communities are ill-equipped to handle (see Jones, 1976).

Some of the problems we have outlined have been offset by the rise of the welfare state during the postwar period. National governments have assumed increasing responsibilities for health, education, and welfare in the communities of the Circumpolar North, just as they have in dependent communities located in metropolitan regions (see Armstrong, 1966; Lantis 1966). This development has ameliorated some of the most severe immediate problems afflicting these communities. To illustrate, the incidence of tuberculosis has declined markedly in rural Alaska, and food stamps have found their way even to the most remote settlements. However, welfare and public assistance now accentuate the dependence of Northern communities by making them still more subject to the favor and whims of outsiders. Indeed, decision makers in national agencies can exercise extraordinary control over specific communities by either threatening to cut off or promising to extend various forms of assistance.

In addition, the extension of public assistance serves to divert attention away from the pursuit of local self-sufficiency. More able individuals may become expert in obtaining grants from government agencies, but they do not acquire any great skill in the development and management of economic activities that would offer hope for the achievement of self-sufficiency. Overall, then, public assistance generates attitudes of dependence, stimulates individual pathologies, and breeds resentments directed with particular force toward outsiders. The result in many settlements is a demoralized and alienated population, thoroughly dependent on the national government but increasingly resentful of its plight. Ironically, this situation is traceable in large measure to the efforts of people genuinely concerned about the problems of disadvantaged peoples.

Local Institutions

As a consequence of the economic order we have described it is exceedingly difficult to foster the development of local institutions
capable of articulating clear conceptions of the community interest and cultivating a strong sense of community. Consequently, there is a deficiency in political institutions able to promote the ability of local residents to control their own destiny and the pursuit of socio-political autonomy. In this section, we should like to comment on some specific problems along these lines.

The decentralized subsistence lifestyle of earlier times minimized the need for institutions designed to handle collective or group needs. Subsistence activities focused on one or a few families, so that "... few issues of consequence had to be faced or decided upon by the group as a whole" (Helm, 1980:235). Life was semi-nomadic, there was no reason for an elaborate division of labor, and self-sufficiency was taken for granted. Traditionally, settlements in the Circumpolar North were small and seldom permanent. The emergence of permanent settlements is traceable largely to the establishment of trading posts and to various concerns projected by dominant Southern societies (for example, the need for fixed sites for administrative and educational purposes). In short, most of the communities of the Circumpolar North lack extensive experience with the creation and operation of local institutions of the sort that would be required to promote socio-political autonomy under contemporary conditions (see also Hoebel, 1954).

Equally important, however, is the fact that dominant Southern societies have done little to encourage the development of effective local institutions. On the contrary, they have frequently contributed to cynicism by paying lip service to the promotion of local autonomy or home rule while systematically withholding the authority or resources that real progress toward this goal would require. To illustrate, consider the case of St. Paul, a village which is better off than others in the Circumpolar North in many ways (see also Foote, Fisher, and Rogers, 1968). The U.S. Fur Seal Act of 1966 lays down the pursuit of local autonomy as an explicit goal of public policy, and some steps have been taken under the terms of this mandate to turn over responsibility for municipal services to the municipality of St. Paul. But what are the real prospects for St. Paul? The community's principal industry, the commercial harvest of fur seals, is fully controlled by the U.S. Federal Government, which may at any moment decide to terminate the harvest irrespective of local concerns. The leading public issue in St. Paul today involves the idea of installing a boat harbor, but there is no organized local debate concerning the issue since any decision on the matter will be made externally by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Oil and gas development in the St. George Basin or Navarin Basin may have far-reaching impacts on St. Paul in the 1980s, but the basic policy choices in this realm will be made by officials in Washington, D.C.; officials who are poorly informed about St. Paul and have little interest in the fate of the community. While St. Paul is incorporated as a second class city under the laws of the State of Alaska, it has no significant tax base and is subject to severe restrictions on its taxing powers in any case. True, the federal government has turned over functions like the maintenance of roads and the airport to local officials,
but these are carried out under contracts with the federal government, which provides the necessary funds and could of course cut off funding as a result of dissatisfaction with the performance of local officials. The federal government retains direct control over the most critical community services such as the generation and distribution of electrical power. This is hardly the record of an outside agency anxious to promote the development of effective local institutions or a sound base for economic self-sufficiency. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the most able members of the community typically do not focus their attention on the municipal council and that some of them have chosen to pursue careers requiring that they leave St. Paul altogether.

Another problem characteristic of the communities of the Circumpolar North is the fragmentation of authority among several groups. For the most part, this problem has arisen through the overlay of new authority patterns on the preexisting authority structures of traditional society. Under the decentralized arrangements characteristic of the subsistence lifestyle, certain elders (or religious leaders) and leading hunters shared authority in a relatively unambiguous fashion (see Freuchen, 1961; Graburn, 1969). With the rise of permanent settlements, village councils or governments have come into existence all over the region. But this has not led to the elimination of traditional authority structures, a fact that has produced both confusion and a good deal of conflict. More recently, additional sources of fragmentation have arisen; the Alaskan case is illustrative. Village corporations have been established throughout Alaska under the terms of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Though these corporations are private, for-profit enterprises in legal terms, they have taken on the role of competing repositories of authority in many villages. There are several reasons for this development. All the members of the individual villages (at least those born prior to 18 December 1971) are shareholders in these corporations. For the moment, the corporations have access to greater resources than village councils or governments. The more energetic members of many villages have chosen to devote their time to running the village corporation rather than the village council. The upshot is another layer of authority operating concurrently with existing layers.

This fragmentation has promoted rising levels of confusion. There are cases in which a particularly powerful individual has attempted to solidify control over his constituency by dominating the village council and the village corporation simultaneously. More often, however, competing leaders (including members of the same family in certain notable cases) use these several institutions as power bases in a fashion that precludes the emergence of consensus concerning formulations of the public interest or common good. And there are communities where traditional leaders (for example, whaling captains) are still capable of exerting effective authority. Under the circumstances, there is little significant movement toward the articulation of new ideas on which to base a drive to community integration. Conditions of this sort hardly constitute a sound basis for overcoming the extreme forms of economic dependence discussed in the preceding section.
Equally disturbing is the fact that this lack of effective local institutions contributes to a psychological pattern that might best be described as a mentality of dependence, especially among Native peoples (see Watkins, 1977; Svensson, 1976). Many individuals, faced with the erosion of traditional authority structures together with a lack of control over their own destiny, make psychological adjustments to what they perceive as an unalterable environment. In fact, such adjustments are regularly encouraged by members of dominant groups, for whom this process is an efficient method of maintaining control over subordinate peoples. Extreme examples of this phenomenon are well-known in connection with slavery. But somewhat milder versions are common when specific groups of people remain highly dependent on superordinate groups over long periods of time. This mentality of dependence does not disappear overnight in the wake of any formal changes in relationships between these groups. Vestiges of the mentality often linger for a long time, especially in a social environment characterized by substantial elements of de facto control on the part of outsiders and by the fragmentation of local authority structures (see Brody, 1975). This serves as an impediment to the acquisition of the self-esteem and new skills needed to develop local institutions and a sound basis for economic self-sufficiency.

To close the circle, the conditions we have described are frequently exacerbated by problems of alienation and emigration. In many communities there are deep splits between (usually younger) individuals who have been educated outside, have urban tastes, aspire to assimilation, and are willing to sacrifice traditional ways of life to achieve this goal and (usually older) individuals who would like to reestablish local autonomy and cultural integrity on the basis of traditional ways. This is often a recipe for confrontation (see Bigjim and Ito-Adler, 1974). The younger modernizers are seldom accepted without reservation by members of the dominant Southern societies, but they often succeed in alienating many members of their original communities as they attempt to instigate major changes upon their return from several years of education outside. Ultimately, they are apt to fall between two stools with the result that they either emigrate permanently, taking their talents with them, or remain in the community only to become increasingly bitter and resentful with the passage of time. For their part, the older traditionalists are engaged in a battle that cannot be won. Social transformation has gone too far in most villages of the Circumpolar North to permit any return to older ways and the traditional subsistence lifestyle. Further, the traditionalists are not skilled in dealing with governmental agencies and corporate structures, a problem which cannot be avoided today. The results of these confrontations are not only destructive to individuals, they also serve to produce a severe loss of energy and direction. It is as though many communities have reached an internal stalemate that makes it impossible for them to move forwards or backwards in the development of coherent local initiatives, even though they are often severely buffeted by forces of change generated outside. Understandably, this combination of circumstances exacerbates the social and individual pathologies
outlined at the beginning of this essay. What it has not done so far is to engender any movement of a sort that would permit these communities to break the grip of internal colonialism.

Crisis and Response

The conditions we have described are severe and debilitating. While the total population of the region is relatively small (less than 1% of the earth's population is located in the Circumpolar North), the human tragedy embedded in these conditions is profound. Perhaps the most troublesome feature of this situation is the extent to which it exhibits the characteristics of a vicious circle. Extreme forms of economic dependence clearly constitute a major source of the inability to develop autonomous and effective local institutions. Yet the underdeveloped and fragmented state of these institutions serves to perpetuate economic dependence. The result is a self-reinforcing cycle of problems which often seems virtually impossible to break. In fact, many efforts of those who are strongly motivated to break this cycle serve only to make matters worse. It is this vicious circle, rather than its component elements, which is the real core of internal colonialism.

Many individuals in the dominant Southern societies exhibit well-meaning (though often ill-informed) attitudes toward the communities of the far North and would happily go along with efforts to alleviate the problems of these communities. Despite this, internal colonialism remains a predictable consequence of the contact between affluent industrialized societies with a largely uncontrollable need for natural resources and small communities in a region that is sparsely populated but unusually rich in natural resources. The dominant Southern societies (be they capitalist or socialist) cannot control their requirements for natural resources, and the Northern communities cannot acquire an effective voice in policymaking processes. If we add to this an element of racialism arising from the fact that a large proportion of the population of the far North consists of indigenous peoples, it is hardly surprising that internal colonialism flourishes.

In our judgment, the social and individual pathologies we have described have reached crisis proportions in many of the settlements of the Circumpolar North. What steps might be taken, then, to alleviate the vicious circle of internal colonialism? If we accept the argument of the preceding paragraph, the resultant problem is a peculiarly puzzling one, even for those with a genuine desire to help. As a way of exploring the dimensions of this problem it may help to comment briefly on the reasons why the typical responses of Southern societies to the difficulties of Northern communities have failed.

These responses can be divided into four categories. There is, to begin with, the policy of encouraging assimilation on the part of Northern peoples. In the case of indigenous peoples, this means making individual Natives into good whites through education or exposure to white attitudes
and values. For others, it means inducing individuals to adopt the approved lifestyle of affluent Southern societies. Policies of this type have generally yielded unfortunate results (see Puxley, 1977). Above all, they have produced individuals who are neither fish nor fowl in the sense that they never really achieve a Southern lifestyle, even though they are no longer capable of living comfortably in the small communities of the far North. Additionally, assimilationist policies are based on radical misconceptions of both the natural environment and the socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the region. These circumstances are simply not compatible with efforts to reproduce the affluent urban lifestyle of Southern societies on a small scale. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that policies of this sort have exacerbated rather than ameliorated the problems of small communities in the far North.

Equally unfortunate results have attended policies characterized by the provision of welfare coupled with a broader posture of benign neglect. This approach has enjoyed considerable currency in the United States; the results have been no better in the small communities of Alaska than they have been in the urban ghettos of the lower forty-eight. Such policies do nothing to overcome extreme forms of economic dependence, and they often have dramatic effects in terms of the loss of individual self-esteem, the disruption of family units, and the growth of hostility directed toward outsiders (see Brody, 1975). These reactions are accentuated due to the fact that dominant Southern societies are not content to isolate these communities and to ignore them. Rather, there are powerful pressures to exploit the natural resources of the region, even while maintaining a posture of benign neglect toward the indigenous peoples. It is too much to expect local residents to refrain from drawing unflattering inferences about the intentions of dominant Southern societies from this combination of circumstances.

Somewhat more enlightened policies toward the far North feature efforts to promote home rule or political autonomy. But such policies become shams when they are not accompanied by serious efforts to provide a reasonable basis for economic self-sufficiency, and when home rule is coupled with arrangements that ensure a continuation of de facto economic dependence. The results are even worse when the idea of promoting political autonomy is combined with continuing outside control over the principal resources of communities. Under these conditions, the more energetic members of these communities cannot fail to experience rising levels of frustration, and many of them will be afflicted by a growing sense of failure as they witness the continuing deterioration of their communities despite the appearance of local autonomy. Developments along these lines make it hard for local leaders to explain their failures by pointing to political as well as economic dependence on outsiders. The Danish policy of promoting home rule in Greenland should certainly be carefully assessed from the point of view of the concerns articulated in this paragraph. For example, while the Danish government has agreed to turn over a number of functions to the government of Greenland, it remains to be seen who will exercise effective control over
natural resources. The current dispute over the proposal to open a uranium mine in Southern Greenland constitutes a crucial test case.

A particularly complex set of difficulties can be traced to policies of lands claims settlement, as exemplified by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act and the James Bay agreement in Northern Quebec. On the surface, at least, the Alaska act appears to constitute a reasonable response to the claims of Native peoples, and to go some way toward providing them with the resources necessary to achieve economic self-sufficiency. Yet it is increasingly apparent that this response, too, has contributed to the problems of village Alaska (see Young, 1981:ch. 2). The bulk of the resources flowing from the settlement ends up in the hands of the regional corporations, large for-profit ventures which have failed to exhibit much sensitivity to the problems of small communities. There are restrictions on the funds going to both regional and village corporations which make it hard to use them in dealing with problems of health, welfare, and social infrastructure. The creation of the regional corporations initiated a brain drain from small communities, further impoverishing them of human talents and skills. As we have already indicated, the establishment of the village corporations has contributed to the fragmentation of authority structures in many communities. Far from ensuring the financial solvency of their communities, many of the village corporations failed to obtain funding sufficient to capitalize their own continued operation, with the result that a number of them have had to file for bankruptcy during the years since their creation in 1972 (see Anonymous, 1977). But above all, the Alaska settlement contains provisions that compel indigenous peoples to embrace the capitalist system of contemporary America. Though some individual Natives have adjusted to this mold with considerable success, it has proven a source of new problems in many communities (see Bigjim and Ito-Adler, 1974). There is a sense, therefore, in which this settlement has promoted assimilationism with a vengeance. Predictably, the consequences in many communities are beginning to look like exaggerated forms of the results of more traditional assimilationist policies.

Given the failure of these four categories of policies, is it possible to come up with a better response to the crisis conditions facing many Northern communities? Though in possession of no magic formula, we should like to outline what strikes us as a realistic approach. Any successful response must rest on the following postulates. There is no going back to the traditional subsistence lifestyle of earlier times. The Circumpolar North as an anthropological museum is both infeasible and unattractive. Any real progress must involve a large element of self-help. Even with the best will in the world, outsiders cannot substitute for the emergence of local political and entrepreneurial skills. Outside intervention will be predisposed to failure precisely because it is from the outside, hence insensitive to local circumstances. By the same token, however, the pathologies of these communities can never be overcome so long as outsiders continue to control most of the important decisions affecting these communities and refuse to turn effective control over to them.
The results of sharing or even derogating authority in this realm might prove painful to the dominant Southern societies. The people of Kaktovik might reject offshore oil and gas development in their immediate vicinity regardless of its commercial potential in the Beaufort Sea. The residents of Gambell or Wainwright might develop ideas about the management of marine mammals that conflict with those of biologists as well as of environmentalists. And the affected communities in Southern Greenland might exhibit little interest in developing a uranium mine, even if this development seems critical to Danes and others worried about fossil fuel shortages.

Nevertheless, the only alternative to local control is to maintain Northern peoples as wards of the state, with all the moral as well as economic burdens associated with such a policy. While not especially sanguine about the willingness of Southern societies to provide Northern communities with a fair opportunity to escape from the bonds of internal colonialism, we are convinced that their prospects will continue to be bleak in the absence of some such opportunity.

Assuming such an opportunity does arrive, however, the key to solving the problems of these communities lies in the pursuit of economic self-sufficiency. By self-sufficiency, we do not mean the capacity of a community to survive in isolation from the rest of the world. Certainly, the subsistence economy, in which there was practically no trade with outsiders, was self-sufficient. And there are advocates of autarky for Northern peoples: some of the proponents of an autonomous "Dene Nation" in Canada's Northwest Territories in the 1970s implied just this (see Watkins 1977:182-187). But, as we have indicated, there is simply no return to the traditional subsistence lifestyle that autarky would necessitate. Economic self-sufficiency should therefore be conceived of as a situation in which a community is capable of satisfying the basic needs of its members through a combination of local production for local use and imports financed by exports. Self-sufficiency in this sense eliminates the need to depend on handouts (such as welfare) from outsiders, and reduces the control of remote actors over key decisions affecting the community and its members.

More specifically, self-sufficiency would require the development of small scale industries, relying on appropriate technologies and using local materials wherever possible (see Schumacher, 1973). Renewable resource development - as advocated by Canada's Berger Commission and others (see Berger, 1977) - could contribute to a strategy for the attainment of self-sufficiency, though it is not obvious that embracing this as a central postulate makes sense. It is remarkably easy to deplete renewable resources, especially given the slow rate of recovery of many natural systems in the far North and the widespread availability of efficient harvesting technologies.

The critical tests to apply to any economic activity contemplated should be first, that it is capable of being carried out under local control,
and second, that it can be viable at a small scale of operations. Given these constraints, cottage industries, renewable resources, subsistence hunting and fishing, agriculture, and even non-renewable resource development could contribute to the strategy. Diversification of economic activities would cushion communities against the effects of boom/bust cycles in any one activity. The preferred mix of activities would be expected to vary according to local conditions and potential. Beyond this, investments in social infrastructure geared to smallscale industries and the creation of local markets would be desirable. The guiding principle should be to import only that which cannot be produced locally; this would reduce dependence on outside decision makers.

Along with the production of economic self-sufficiency, the reconstruction of local cultures possessing genuine integrity is critical. Policies of assimilation do not constitute a viable option. At the same time, however, cultural disintegration combined with the rise of individual pathologies could well undermine efforts to achieve self-sufficiency, even if an opportunity to escape the bonds of internal colonialism should arise. What is needed, then, is a cultural renaissance which stresses traditional values but which is forward looking rather than a form of nostalgia for a past that cannot be recaptured. As the authors of Letters to Howard put it: "We don't want to become better white men or beat them at their own game. We just want a chance to develop our traditional values into a satisfying way of life that we can understand" (Bigim and Ito-Adler 1974:82). To the extent that some such cultural renaissance can be coupled with a drive toward economic self-sufficiency, the vicious circle of internal colonialism can be reversed. As is the case with individual development, community development commonly exhibits the form of a self-reinforcing spiral: economic self-sufficiency and cultural reconstruction progress together and reinforce one another. Additionally, each of these would contribute substantially to the emergence of local institutions capable of articulating clear conceptions of the public interest and successfully promoting socio-political autonomy.
NOTES

1. By which we mean the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Scandinavia, and the Soviet Union. Our field experience with the Circumpolar North derives primarily from work in Alaska. Accordingly, we have relied heavily on the works of others for information about the remaining sections of the region. Most of these are cited at various points in the text below. Additionally, we have benefitted from discussions with a number of people familiar with the circumstances of communities in various parts of the far North.


4. The phrase "traditional subsistence lifestyle" is intended to refer to a way of life, and not just to certain methods of hunting and gathering. Many of the social and cultural characteristics of the indigenous communities of the Circumpolar North during pre-contact times were linked directly to the requirements of subsistence hunting and gathering. For further details consult Nelson (1973).

5. For an extended account of a specific instance see Graburn (1969).

6. For a well-known and particularly poignant account of a specific case, see Mowat (1952).

7. There are indications that the Soviets have pushed certain types of manufacturing in the larger communities of Siberia. While it is hard to get accurate information on such developments, see the informal account in Mowat (1970).

8. For an excellent survey of current estimates, see U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1978:6-33).

9. For a case study dealing with Northern fur seals, see Young (1981, Ch. 3).

10. It remains to be seen whether the move toward home rule will alter this situation in Greenland. For the text of the Greenland Home Rule Act of 1979 see Arctic Coastal Zone Management Newsletter, 20 (May 1979), 5-7. For an English language summary of the report of the Commission on Home Rule see Arctic Coastal Zone Management Newsletter, 18 (February 1979), 15-17.
11. For a more detailed account of the St. Paul case see Young (1981, Ch. 3).

12. For the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of this option, see Schumacher (1973).

13. For a discussion of the interests of environmentalists and others in the context of the Circumpolar North, see Dryzek (1980).

14. For a well-known account of similar problems in metropolitan areas, see Piven and Cloward (1971).

15. For an intriguing discussion of the consequences for children, see Coles (1977:3-228).

16. The argument here is that such control is necessary to secure the operations of the Coast Guard's Loran C station and the weather station on St. Paul Island.

17. For a more extended discussion of the effects of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement, see Young (1981, Chapter 2).

18. See also Coles (1977) for a discussion of the effects of this situation on the children of several Eskimo villages in Alaska.

19. For a particularly clear account of the role of racialism in the Circumpolar North, see Brody (1975).

20. It would be a mistake to infer from this that any of these settlements is on the verge of collapse as an organized social entity. Human communities have a remarkable capacity to persist in the face of assaults on the quality of life of their members.

21. For a detailed account of the events leading up to this settlement and the terms of the settlement itself consult Arnold (1978).

22. For eloquent testimony concerning this danger see the account of Eskimo children in Coles (1977).
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Perhaps the most frustrating situation for anyone concerned with social development occurs when all participants are quite clear what is needed to promote the common good, but for unclear reasons the clearly needed action is not taken. For many years this situation regularly occurred among the James Bay Cree of northern Quebec. This paper tries to isolate some of the critical changes in recent years that have changed the pattern, so that now what is needed for the common good is often done. While at one level it is clear that most of these actions involve the new Cree Regional Authority (CRA), a body created by law, following the settlement of Cree land claims by the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) of 1975, it is equally clear that it is not the statutory nature of the CRA that is critical. We shall explore other explanations.

Banfield, in 1956, noted the same lack of action where community action was needed in southern Italy in a town he called Montegrano. He placed the blame for this on what he called on the "moral" level, arguing that the Montegranesi's fierce individualism, loyalty to their own family, and suspicion of other families produced so much suspicion of any initiative taken by members of other families (even if it was thought desirable for the community) that no one would collaborate in it. Instead there was rivalry, boycott or sabotage. Ventures like a town cinema were short lived. This underlying moral ethic he dubbed "amoral familism."

Many other writers subsequently described a pattern in peasant society of endemic suspicion, factionalism, uncooperativeness, rivalry, but
also of fear of stepping ahead of one's fellows, as this would make the target for vindictive action by others. Foster (1957) explained the pattern cognitively, rather than in terms of moral values, as a situation where because the world is seen as providing only a limited amount of good, everyone is afraid that if any other person takes more of the good, there will necessarily be less for oneself. In a more modern idiom, "Life is seen as a zero-sum game." Materialists tried to go further, arguing that there is indeed only a limited "good" in peasant society, and that what is perceived is a reflection of reality (ignoring the potential for greater common good that Banfield observed). The various "levelling mechanisms" in such societies - usually distributions of wealth in organizing community ceremonies, as a moral obligation on the successful which yields prestige, but prevents investment to produce lasting benefits -- were seen by many materialists as the mechanisms that ensured that the "good" remained limited.

These explanations have met many opposing arguments. We shall examine only Silverman's (1965), based on a village in central Italy which she calls Colleverde. She found that in the village there was indeed collaboration for joint action, (thus the rule was not applicable to all peasant societies). She looked at contrasts between Colleverde and Montegrano that might explain the differences. One was in the nature of the terrain, for whereas Montegrano farms were relatively flat, and divided from one another only by arbitrary fences or ditches, in Colleverde each farm was on hilly land, and owned a variety of land types -- hill land, trees, sloping land, or valley bottom. In terms of cropping the predominant monocrop (for cash sale) of Montegrano contrasted with the diversified agriculture (including animals, and subsistence crops) in Central Italy. Silverman argued that in the monocrop area it made sense to think of one's farm as under constant threat of limited encroachment by a neighbour, who could hypothetically buy sections of a field; in the more mountainous region each farm had to be treated as an independently viable unit, that could not be subdivided, or expanded by small increments. It was in everyone's interest not to let any whole farm go to rack and ruin, for that would affect the viability of the community.

She also commented that there had been a long tradition of the region being administered as a single whole by an aristocratic family, which still lived in the region, and exerted social leadership, even if the formal status of nobility no longer implied position in the state hierarchy, nor the wealth to dominate the region.

Materialist explanations at various levels can clearly be inferred for the difference analyzed by Silverman. The monocrop agriculture of Montegrano implies an involvement in capitalist cash-cropping, and an alienation of the farmer from a subsistence commitment to farming, as commercial farming implies an orientation to money and land being purchased to expand farms; the commitment of Silverman's farmers is to their own farm, that has been in the same family for generations, and is more reminiscent of a pre-capitalist agriculture.
More generally the individual small farmers of Montegrano live alongside larger properties, and are small units in a national system (both economic, political, and religious) that is dominated from the capital in Rome. The State (and its police), the Church (through its priests) and the merchants who buy crops can act in Montegrano on a larger scale than any farmer; their action (and the benefits the larger structures obtain) is possible because of the fragmentation of the small farmers, and they are advantaged by that fragmentation. Local small farmers cannot enter the large structures which require education, wealth, and contacts in the centres like Rome. By contrast in Colleverde the region is composed of many like-sized farms; it is a region with a tradition of effective local administration, where local people have ties to the local representatives of the State, Church or Economy (many of whom are of local origin); higher level contacts with the centres are provided through aristocratic linkages.

In summary the explanations for Banfield's observed lack of combined action for the common good in Montegrano (with the refinements provided by Silverman) suggest a hierarchy of "causes." Effectively it is the cognitive orientation of intense individualism and suspicion of others that keeps people from combined action. The material conditions of a poor society may contribute to the cognitive orientation, but the evidence of Silverman suggests that the relationship is not a necessary one but that it is specific elements of the competitive nature of farming in the specific area that produce such a suspicious orientation. At a deeper level all the elements of poverty, competitiveness and alienation of individuals may be related to a distance from the centres of political and economic power, particularly where this is not mediated by intervening structures that are locally controlled.

We shall examine the Cree data for evidence for each of these elements -- the cognitive orientation, the internal relations of the local economy, the relationship of the local system to the state. We shall also examine a factor indicated by Silverman, but given less stress in her argument, that of the presence of a structure to articulate what is the common interest; to anticipate our conclusion, it is this factor which has been critical in explaining the change within Cree society.

The James Bay Cree Before 1975

Before 1980 the 5000 Cree of Quebec (a number which has since grown to about 7000) were divided into eight administrative bands. For most of the year these groups were split into micro-bands of 20-30 individuals, occupying a "family hunting territory" of between 300 and 1000 square miles. For some months each year the micro-bands joined together at the eight Posts, for which the administrative Bands were named -- Rupert's House, Eastmain, Old Factory, Fort George, Great Whale River, Nemiscau, Waswanipi, and Mistassini. Progressively since 1947 more families had built permanent houses near the Hudson Bay
Company (HBC) post, and the mission churches (Anglican and Oblate), schools, and government buildings that had begun to appear in the region. The year-round residents looked after school-age children of parents who wintered "in the bush," and gradually the proportion of year-round residents was increasing, as against those who lived in a tent or teepee when at the Post. Even so the annual round of each band was similar; summers at the post, departure for the bush before Fall freeze-up by the majority, a long winter perhaps broken by a visit to the post over Christmas, a return to the post either before Spring breakup (in order to hunt goose on the coast), or after the break-up (elsewhere), with a summer at the post selling the winter's furs, catching fish, earning money with casual labour, and preparing for the following winter in the bush.

Material possessions were few in number, and cash incomes were small. Even in 1970, when the proportion of year round hunters had declined somewhat, over 60% of all food was provided by hunting. A figure of 75% for 1960 is a likely estimate. Cash was used principally to buy hunting equipment and food staples like flour, lard, tea and sugar to supplement the meat diet, and to provide for emergencies. In principle people acted (and observers stated that it was the case) on the basis of each hunting group paying for its cash expenses from the income obtained by the sale of the furs, either from the previous spring, or from credit from the HBC at outfitting time, to be repaid in the spring, following. In practice the cash incomes earned in the summer (e.g. in transporting or unloading goods for the HBC) had long provided a proportion of the cash needed. This had been supplemented by welfare payments (originally paid by the Government in the form of rations obtainable at the HBC) for many years also. The payment of statutory allowances for children and for pensioners starting in 1947 had provided an increasing proportion of cash incomes, especially as fur prices declined markedly between 1947 and 1960. By 1970 transfer payments, casual unskilled wage labour, and fur sales provided respectively 35%, 50%, and 15% of the cash incomes of the area, (Salisbury et al, 1972:58), for a per capital income of $340. In cash terms, there was extreme poverty, and even if income is estimated including a replacement value for meat, namely $1000 per capital, there was still considerable hardship.

But if one looks at the moral ethic of the Cree, it is very different from that of the Montegraneese. The independence of the individual, the value placed on providing responsibly for oneself and one's dependents, and the sensitivity with which people avoid infringing on other people's independence by giving orders or making demands, does present some similarities with the family atomism of Montegrano. But the ethic underlying the independence of each family is not based on suspicion of others, but is radically different. It is based on two suppositions - if you can understand and work in harmony with the surrounding world, the weather, the forest and its animals, it will provide for you, and secondly that one should share with one's neighbours and kin, as they will do with you. The good hunter, who is respected, is not the one who kills the most animals, but the one who can manage his hunting territory so that it yields
a stable number of animals, who consistently has meat available, and
distributes it generously to everyone in the village, or to visitors to his
camp (Feit 1973). It is an ethic that is still observed in an era when more
people live in the villages around the Posts, as hunters share meat with
non-hunting families who cannot reciprocate in kind. The latter loan
equipment (like trucks) that they have bought from their salary earnings,
and care for the children of hunting families while they are at school.
Family groupings usually contain some families living in the village, and
some that hunt intensively, and there is little sign of any division into
discrete groupings of village dwellers and hunters (Scott n.d.).

Yet one could cite evidence for lack of combined action for the
common good, despite the collaborative ethic. The HBC in the nineteenth
century organized what are known as "canoe brigades" to transport the
furs from inland posts to the coast, and to haul the year's supplies of
imported goods up from the coast to the inland locations. They paid men
of the band to do the work, but all the organizing was done by the HBC,
who appointed local men (respected hunters) as "canoe bosses" for the
actual paddling and portaging. The canoemen must have seen the
differences in prices between inland and coastal posts; they had all the
skills needed for transporting by canoe; they could in theory have cut out
the high cost of maintaining the traders at inland posts, (which they paid
for in their labour and in low prices for furs) if they had organized the
transport themselves. But they did not -- even in the period after 1915,
when railroads reached close enough to the area to orient canoe traffic
towards the south.

One can see reasons for not organizing their own canoe brigades,
either as individual travel to coastal posts, or on a cooperative basis. In
economic terms, the presence of the manager in an inland post provided
services, as an accountant, and as providing the insurance of a stock of
goods carried on from year to year; he acted as a political middleman, and
as a source of information about the outside world. Making the inland
posts "unprofitable" would have eliminated these services. In terms of the
local ethic of independence, and of not giving orders to fellow Crees,
since that would offend their independence, ordering and planning large
canoe voyages of groups of Cree appeared distasteful. The HBC manager
might order people about; he was a white-man, and that was the way of
white-men, and one tried to live in harmony with the white-man by doing
what he wanted. The canoe-bass was clearly acting to try and please the
HBC manager, and once the canoes had left the post he could do that best;
not by giving orders, but by working with a team of canoemen, and by
making the decisions that all the crew knew needed to be made --splitting
up of loads at portages, when and where to camp, etc. -- and for which he
could use the combined knowledge of the whole crew (including his own
pre-eminently). The presence of the outsider, as HBC manager,
conveniently provided the catalyst for combined action. But when the
HBC closed posts (as they did at Nemiscau and Waswanipi) after 1960, and
withdrew their managers, the Cree living around the posts did not set up
their own transport system even when none of the reasons existed; they
dispersed and traded at the remaining post nearest their hunting
territories.
Another graphic occasion of lack of common action for the common good was the near extinction of beaver in the area, during the 1920s. Recent work, particularly by Feit (1978), explains this seeming catastrophic failure to live up to the basic Cree values of conservation and harmony with the environment, using a concept of "pre-emptive trapping out." Within each family hunting territory a senior man, or "tallyman" had the responsibility of preserving that harmony, inviting hunters on to the land in numbers that would not deplete game, particularly beaver, and if necessary "resting" areas if the yields started to decrease. Ritualistically, the tallyman conducted ceremonies of contact with the Masters of the Animals of that territory. Knowledge of yields, and control of access was vital to conservation, though it relied entirely on the voluntary acceptance by others of tallyman control for its efficacy.

The 1920s brought whites to the area. The railroad to the south made access easier for white trappers; mining exploration and sport hunting by plane brought other groups in. Though these visitors were not so numerous that they personally over-hunted the region, their local depredations resulted in calamitous winters for particular micro-bands, whose long-term conservationist planning over a five or ten year cycle was upset. Why save a territory's beaver for three years in the expectation of built-up population that is easily harvestable over the succeeding five years, if an outsider can fly in and destroy the whole population by breaking down dams in one short period? Rather than leaving enough beaver to reproduce at the end of each year, a hunter fearing white incursions would kill all available beaver, and thus make the area inhospitable to outsiders. As individual territories emptied of beaver, extinction throughout the region threatened.

Whites in the area did try to control the incursions. Missionaries like Harry Cartlidge of Waswanipi tried to lobby for political support of native protests. Police (RCMP) efforts did limit unlicensed flights into the region, but did not stop the problem, which became compounded as illegal trading in furs endangered the stability of trading posts and the credit system of financing this year's hunting. The solution was largely the result of the suggestions of James Watt, the HBC agent at Rupert's House (cf. Knight 1968:27-30). He persuaded the Quebec Government to declare areas, roughly corresponding to the hinterland surrounding each HBC post, as "Beaver Preserves." Hunting within each preserve was permitted only by license, valid for a particular "territory," and for a number of animals appropriate to the beaver population of the territory. In practice each "territory" roughly coincided with an existing family hunting territory; the tallyman of the territory reported each year on the number of beaver lodges present, and so fixed the quota for next year's hunt; the people receiving licenses were the individuals he invited to hunt with him. In short, James Watt solved the problem by using the Cree methods of controlling the hunt that had long been effective at the level of the family hunting territory, by getting an external agency (the Quebec Government) to sanction and enforce a licensing system at the level of each Beaver Preserve.
In the present context what is striking is that "Preserves" corresponded roughly with particular Cree bands. Combined action by members of a band could, through enforcing the tallymen's control under a wider umbrella, have produced the same results. But bands did not act. A third example of lack of local action for the common good is one that is common in many areas administered centrally by a distant government, as the Cree area was before 1975: an apparent local disinterest in planning or policy. Though band councils were supposed to "control" most programmes for the provision of services to the band -- house building, schools, water and electricity supply, garbage disposal etc. by passing resolutions at Council meetings relating to these matters, in reality plans for these programmes were prepared by Department of Indian Affairs (DINA) officials in Ottawa, Quebec City, or the regional centre of Val d'Or. A DINA official would fly in to the village of the band for the meeting, and present the plan; though a chief, as President of the Band Council, if he was experienced, would then ask for a motion to approve the plan and might ask for questions about it, there was usually little local input to the plan; critical comments were usually countered by the answer that DINA policy did not allow the suggested alternative, or that funds were available only for the plan presented. In practice, resolutions were often not made; councillors often did not attend meetings; meetings would be late, or put off to another day; no alternative plans were thought out ahead of time; discussion was not focused on issues; the membership of band councils changed from year to year; few people saw meetings as achieving anything, and few gained the knowledge of procedures necessary to get action through a Band Council.

Specific issues were of vital local interest, particularly that of house-construction. DINA had built some modern-style houses in each village, according to designs prepared in Ottawa, and each band complained that not enough were being built. The limit was the DINA budget. Standard designs supposed to cost less than $10,000, while providing space for a family, cost $20,000 or more when transported to the north and built by skilled southern workers paid at overtime rates, and northern "hardship allowances." Yet the building of these houses created the feeling that DINA was obligated to provide housing. Theoretically it gave the houses to the bands in response to band requests and band plans. In fact bands took whatever DINA provided, with some complaints that it was not enough, and then used the housing primarily for those who otherwise would have nowhere to live -- welfare cases such as single mothers with numbers of children -- and for those, like band officials, who had to live close to the band office.

In 1970 DINA recognized that re-housing was proceeding too slowly, and tried to involve bands in the programme. It was suggested each band should produce a plan for rehousing the community. Then the DINA could loan (or provide security for a loan) the money needed. The band would own houses, rent them out (or permit individuals to buy them over time) and use the rental fees obtained to speed up the rate of building. In so
doing, DINA hoped, there would begin an on-the-job training programme for construction workers in the communities, that would gradually reduce, and eventually eliminate the need for flying in southern workers.

The additional funds did speed up house construction, but did not have the desired effects of band involvement. The collection of rent by the bands was not systematic; in fact very little money was collected. Band members saw the housing as something DINA was obligated to supply to the needy; now the needy were being forced to pay DINA, using the band officials as rent collectors for the DINA demands. Band officials could not turn out needy individuals occupying houses, if it was only to install a wealthier tenant who could and would pay rent.

Now that there was the promise of better housing for everyone, the task of allocation became more difficult. Those who could afford houses were prepared to pay rent, yet if they were allocated houses, the slightly less well-off felt that they were being discriminated against (often claiming personal links of the successful to the council members). Bands did not receive as much in rents as hoped, and so house building went more slowly than expected, and there were always fewer houses available than were applied for. The work was badly organized. In Fort George the water-table under many houses turned out to be higher than anticipated, and costly drainage trenches were needed. There were inordinate delays in shipping up materials from the south, and skilled workers were few in number. The band councils, being involved, became the butt of criticism for programmes that they had little influence upon. Instead of housing being the point of community integration and pride, with the Councils taking the lead, the housing programme became the target for recriminations within the communities. For officials outside the communities the housing programme was the stereotype of incompetence, corruption, and lack of combined action on the part of local bands. From outside it appeared a familiar story of inaction in the face of community need.

Changes after 1975

November 1975 marked the signing of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement. In it, in return for relinquishing claims to the land based on aboriginal right, the James Bay Cree obtained recognized legal rights (of various kinds) to all their territory. They permitted the hydro-electric project to go ahead, received a financial compensation of $150 million, and recognition by the Governments of Quebec and Canada of Cree administrative bodies that would act in appropriate capacities within the Quebec provincial structure. The Cree Regional Authority would administer the territory surrounding villages; the Cree School Board would administer local schools; for the hunting economy there would be an Income Security Programme for Hunters and Trappers (run by a joint Board of Quebec and Cree), Cree participation in the Advisory Committee to the Ministry of Fish, Game and Leisure that regulates conservation and
hunting province-wide, and on the SOTRAC Board monitoring adverse effects of the hydro-project, together with a Cree Trappers Association and other bodies to aid in financing and marketing the furs -- and so on in most fields of health, justice, economic development, etc.

Perhaps the most important programme that the JBNQA approved is the Income Security Programme for Cree Hunters and Trappers (ISP). It guarantees a basic cash income to all people (male and female) who qualify as "intensive hunters" by spending more than 90 days outside the settlement each year in hunting, plus a cash allowance for every day spent in hunting. For a husband and wife in 1980, who spent 185 days hunting and had no other income, the amount received would be approximately $10,000 -- more than sufficient to cover basic outfitting and transport costs to a hunting territory, but not sufficient to diminish the incentive to take wage employment during the summer months. ISP has resulted in a 50% increase in the numbers of people living on the land, a slightly lower increase in the volume of meat provided by the subsistence economy, an increase in wives accompanying their husbands to the bush, and a significant increase in the number of young adults entering the hunting economy. The overall annual payment involved for the whole of the Cree population approximates $5,000,000, but the programme has almost eliminated government welfare and unemployment payments that previously cost about half that sum. Cree see it as the major support for a continuation of the Cree way of life, and of Cree society.

It is a programme that is almost entirely administered locally, although it is supervised by a joint Quebec-Cree Board, that monitors the programme and negotiates changes, for it is seen by the Government as a significant social experiment. The local administration is basically a matter of each eligible beneficiary keeping a diary of the days spent in hunting, and a record of his/her catch. These are collected and vouched for by the "tallyman" on whose hunting territory they have spent the winter, and submitted to the local representative of the ISP Board in each village -- usually a senior hunter. That representative hands out to each beneficiary the cheques which are received from the Board every three months. For September, December and February the cheques cover the anticipated period of hunting (and other revenue) during the ensuing quarter, and in June an end-of-the-year reckoning is made, based on actual entitlement.

The only detailed control that the Board exercises, and that is stated in the JBNQA, is a limit on the total number of man-days of hunting for which a per diem allowance can be paid to all Cree. This is potentially negotiable each year, but has stabilized after the first year's experience of dramatically expanded hunting. Thus in effect the tallymen and village representatives do check on who is "really hunting," as spurious claims would limit the ability of the programme to support real hunters, and to be flexible enough so that dependents who would otherwise have no means of support can indeed be members of hunting groups (e.g. unmarried young women with babies who accompany their fathers to hunting camps).
performing hunting-related tasks. The tallymen see their role as defending the viability of Cree hunting, not as administering a subsidy programme of Government. ISP is a Cree programme, and there is community support for it not being evaded, or treated as a "milch cow" to be "ripped off" for spurious claims.

Other activities in support of the hunting economy that the Cree have organized at the local level include a joint purchasing agency for supplies for hunting, a Cree Trappers Association, a programme of emergency radios in every hunting camp that can call for assistance via the village receivers, but which also permits communication between most hunting camps, and five years of intensive monitoring of all hunting catches. The latter was designed to measure the volume of Cree animal harvests before the hydro-electric dams inundated the land, to provide a baseline for damages should the volume decline subsequently. It involved literate local interviewers questioning every hunter on return in the spring, and the compilation of the data to give the most thorough statistics on hunting and gathering economies ever produced. (Native Harvesting Committee, 1976-9). These data now form the basis for local pressure, through a Joint (Cree-Quebec) Advisory Committee to the Minister of Fish, Game and Leisure, to fix limits of allowable catch, and of numbers of hunters in those sections of the Cree land where non-cree are allowed to hunt. The collection of the data has resulted in a body of young Cree wildlife biologists, to administer conservation programmes, even if they do not have university degrees. Again we have a situation where local people have taken up an opportunity to influence action by the Provincial government, and have organized and trained local people (with some technical assistance from outside consultants, it is true, (LaRusic et al. 1979) to act autonomously to ensure the local common good.

The situation as regards housing also shows a dramatic contrast from 1970. Three Cree communities have been completely rebuilt. Waswanipi and Nemiscau bands, which had dispersed when their HBC trading posts had closed around 1960, conducted long consultations and selected sites for building entire villages to house the bands. Fort George, which had obtained in the JBNQA extensive protection from the potential consequences of water salination and of erosion when stream flow was increased, was offered a new village, that the Hydro Company found could be built at only a slightly higher cost than the protective works. A new town, Chesaribi, was built on a more stable site, retaining trees and community isolation from main roads, after intensive community consultations and retaining of town-planners by the band.

All bands now are actively involved in planning their housing programmes. The bands make use of mortgage loan programmes available to all Canadians from the (federal) Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, in which the bands guarantee the loans to individuals from their revenues. The work of construction itself is progressively being undertaken more exclusively by a company, Cree Construction, set up by the Cree themselves. It employs outside specialists as well as training
local Cree people. At first the carrying out of projects at widely dispersed locations involved the company in administrative problems, and in problems of continuity of employment for people from different bands. These problems are being squarely faced. Though there is still criticism over inadequate funding, both federal and provincial, for public works projects (like drainage or health facilities) the housing situation is seen as something that local people can indeed organize themselves to solve. The allocation of housing and the collection of mortgage payments and rents proceed smoothly at the band level.

Analysis

The examples we have given of successful joint action by Cree groups to realize programmes for the common good are not the only such actions, though they are among the most dramatic, in that they contrast with previous inaction. It must also be added that there still remain many areas where there is agreement on what is needed for the common good — for example inadequacies in health and preventive medicine, and in the provision of activities and employment for teenagers in villages — but still the actions taken are ineffectual. Comparing these negative cases with the ones cited will clarify the reasons for success.

It would be easy to say that over the ten year period the Cree attitude to Government has changed; that ten years ago there was indeed alienation from participation in programmes that "they" (the distant officials) planned, and that now programmes are felt to be "ours" (belonging to the Cree). Yet this is clearly an over-simplification. In many fields -- health and schooling being two -- there is still widespread feeling that the problems are ones which "they" -- a Distant Government -- should solve, for example by constructing drainage systems and so checking infant gastroenteritis, and local initiative is not stressed. Alienation is present in many fields, and we must look for the distinctive features of housing and hunting that make them not subject to alienation. What has made them into "our" programmes rather than "their" programmes? And what has also made them into "programmes", viewed as potential collective action with a wider view of the beneficiaries from the action, rather than as the means for individuals to satisfy their needs?

Again let us answer these questions in simplistic terms, and then complexify the answers. Simply one could use a political concept and say that the Board of the Income Security Programme, the Cree Housing Authority, and the individual Bands Councils have achieved political "legitimacy," and have proved effective. "Legitimacy" means that they are seen as Cree "bodies," and "effectiveness" means that its programmes have formulated the common interest of diverse individuals in ways that can be implemented. This rephasing then poses the further questions of how the bodies emerged, of how they acquired grass-roots acceptance (we have already indicated that the legislative establishment of the JBNQA did not ensure grass-roots legitimacy for all its offshoot organizations), and of how they became effective.
To answer these questions we must go back to 1971 when the eight administrative Bands had little sense of common unity, only partial legitimacy, and very little effectiveness. This was when the forthcoming James Bay hydroelectric project was announced. Local reaction to the threatened flooding of one third of their hunting territories was traumatic -- but unorganized. Organization was provided in 1972 by the Association of the Indians of Quebec (IQA), to which the chiefs of the eight bands belonged. This body acted, through its lawyers and through experts that it hired, to challenge the project in the courts and to collect information in the villages regarding the social and ecological effects of the project. The IQA did not have grass-roots legitimacy, as its non-Cree leaders were seen by Cree as negotiating with their own interests in mind, rather than the specific interests of the Cree. In 1974 the Cree chiefs who had worked together within the IQA broke away to form their own organization, the Grant Council of the Crees of Quebec (GCCQ). By November 1974 they had signed an agreement in principle with the Quebec Government, and in November 1975 they signed the IBNQA. But they did so only after a process of consultation and intensive discussion of each element that they negotiated, that involved meetings in every village over many months.

Let us treat the element of effectiveness first, for it is the simplest. Between 1972 and 1975 individual Cree, mostly those with a high-school education, worked within the IQA (and later the GCCQ), collecting information on individual hunters, on the numbers of hunting territories, on catches and economic production; they negotiated with officials about plans, maps, programmes, social impacts; they had to think in global terms; they were forced by the village consultative process to relate these global concepts to the reality of villager's wishes and views; they had to evaluate their own activity and the overall agreement in terms of its monetary cost and its social gains. In short, they received a crash course in executive programme management in the hard school of "learning by doing." The basic skills needed to run effective programmes were thus produced -- though not in all areas or in sufficient numbers -- at the time when programmes requiring combined action became feasible. Many of the skills needed for the ISP programme and for the housing programme were already present before 1972, in the traditional house building and family hunting territory management of the Cree, and in the conservation and hunting group recruitment activities of "tallymen." We would suggest that it is where the technical skills needed for effective common action -- including managerial skills -- are present, that "programmes" -- or organized formulations of how one could act to produce a common good -- are in fact put into effect. Where experience proves that "programmes" produce results, people more readily accord legitimacy to a body that produces programmes. There is thus a natural positive feedback between "legitimacy," "programmes" and effectiveness that is only possible when the technical conditions for effectiveness -- in this case trained manpower -- are present. Part of the effectiveness is also the ability of individuals to conceptualize "programmes."
But the feedback process requires that legitimacy be there first. Many of the pre-1972 programmes of the Hudsons Bay Company or the DINA were effective in material terms. They organized the hunting economy, and provided some housing and cash income. But as these bodies were not "legitimate" in local eyes, there was no local input into the preparation of new programmes, no increment to effectiveness, and no greater support for the bodies concerned. The IQA organized the fight against the James Bay project, formulated many "programmes" (or possible ways of negotiating with the Quebec Government), and for two years involved the Cree leaders of the future GCCQ in meaningful cooperative activity. But it too did not achieve legitimacy, as it appeared not to respond to what villagers expressed in Band meetings, but rather to the problems of Indian people elsewhere in Quebec. When the GCCQ took over the activities of the IQA, it was able to appear "effective;" it achieved "legitimacy" as a Cree body and could sign the 1974 "agreement in-principle," because it did consult every band, it involved the chiefs of every band, and other individuals from every Cree village.

But by 1974 we must insist that the pre-requisites for joint action for the common good were already present — the skills needed for the joint action, the ability to visualize the common good in terms of a practical programme, and a corporate body that could have, at least potentially, carried out the programme. If adding "legitimacy" to that corporate body turned the potential into reality after 1974, the major change for Cree society giving it the potential for combined action had already occurred before 1964: the presence of a corporate body, the IQA.

Briefly we would argue that the unorganized thinking of individuals about the common good that occurred in the crisis of 1971-72, and that had also occurred before the near-extinction of the beavers in the 1920s, provided a situation in which the essential individualism of the Cree yielded a near consensus on at least one issue — a need to save "our" way of life. The referent to which the loyalty of "our" was directed was not clear in 1971, but already there was agreement that that body should act. If no referent had been available there might well have been no action, and either a depression of failure, making combined action less likely in future, or a religious cult movement (cf. Worsley 1958). But there was an organization present — that of the IQA. The consensus could be expressed to outsiders — particularly to the Quebec Government, to the courts, and to the media — as the unified voice of the people affected. The existence of a structure permitted action to be taken — the court case, the data collection, and the consultation of communities. Taking action involved at least the leaders among the Cree in conceptualizing programmes of action for the common good in addition to actions for private well-being. It did not matter to the outside world that the IQA did not constitute the right legitimate body for Crees, it was accepted as though it was the voice of the Crees.

In short, crisis produced a consensus about at least one common good. But to formulate that common good into a programme for action
required the existence of a corporate body. Outside bodies require just such a corporate body, and its organized formulation, if they are to pay attention to the local views. Internally in a situation of crisis and consensus, the programme of action of the corporate body is not questioned. Where previously collective programmes were not formulated, people now find it practical to conceptualize group action. The legitimacy, representativeness, or structure of the original corporate body may later be questioned; but once the pattern of an effective corporate body to formulate the common interest has been set, a niche has been created into which a legitimate body can step. The pattern of disorganized atomism that characterized the Cree and the Montegranese can be changed. It was no accident that the Bands readily took over their own housing programmes in 1975, when they had not done so in 1970; Cree had accepted the concept of "programmes," and had breathed life into a band structure that had previously not worked.

We would argue that the Cree case takes further the arguments of Silverman. It was not necessarily the specific structures of the feudal aristocracy that organized common action in Colleverde, but rather that there had long existed structures to formulate thoughts about the common interest; if old structures proved unable to be effective, or did not gain legitimacy, other structures could be created to organize action about what had been formulated. The contrast with Montegrano is that there only the church and the state formulate the common interest; the structures that they provided did not, in Banfield's time, provide a model for locally legitimate new organizations; the only consensus in Montegrano was of opposition to the outside, and the structures present could not articulate this opposition. The presence of a corporate body as a model for combined action is a necessary condition for formulating the common interest and taking action. Sufficient conditions demand the means for action, and a legitimacy for the structures as well.

NOTES

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2. I am clearly over-simplifying here. Provincial jurisdiction over
game laws implies that to get respect by whites, and band-level
control of trapping licenses, would require authorization under
Provincial statutes. But elsewhere Game clubs, municipalities,
conservation groups, and private clubs have combined to lobby for
Provincial legal hacking for what they want. We return to the
modern situation in relation to conservation later.

3. For an extended treatment of the negotiating process, which is here
grossly over-simplified, see LaRusic et al. 1979.

4. This is not entirely true. Lawyers seeking an injunction against the
hydro-electric development filed the suit only in the names of
individuals who would be harmed by the project -- chiefs of the Cree
bands -- and not on behalf of the IOA.

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